No Exit from the Joint Decision Trap? Can German Federalism Reform Itself?

Scharpf, Fritz W.

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No Exit from the Joint Decision Trap? Can German Federalism Reform Itself?

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Scharpf, Fritz W.
Politik und politische Ökonomie, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society;

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mpifg_eui05_24.pdf
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引用

Scharpf, F. W. (2005). No Exit from the Joint Decision Trap? Can German Federalism Reform Itself? EUI working paper / RSCAS.

引用: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0012-4F47-6

要旨

Germany's unique institutions of a 'unitary federal state', long considered part of the country's postwar success story, are now generally perceived as a 'joint decision trap' impeding effective policy responses to new economic and demographic challenges at both levels of government. Nevertheless, a high powered bi-cameral Commission set up in Autumn 2003 failed to reach agreement on constitutional reforms. The paper analyses the misguided procedural and substantive choices that explain the failure of reform, and it discusses the possibility of asymmetric constitutional solutions that might enhance the capacity for autonomous action at both levels.