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Democratic Legitimacy under Conditions of Regulatory Competition: Why Europe Differs from the United States

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Scharpf,  Fritz W.
Problemlösungsfähigkeit der Mehrebenenpolitik in Europa, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society;

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2000_145.pdf
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引用

Scharpf, F. W. (2000). Democratic Legitimacy under Conditions of Regulatory Competition: Why Europe Differs from the United States. Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales <Madrid>: Estudios, 145.


引用: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0012-54FD-7
要旨
The paper examines the implications of European economic integration for the effectiveness and the democratic legitimacy of government at European and national levels. In contrast to the situation in the United States, welfare-state functions were fully developed at the national (state) level before economic integration was completed, and these functions have come to define a basic social contract between citizens and their state that has a high
normative salience. European economic integration creates conditions of regulatory and tax competition among member states which reduces the capacity of national governments to respond effectively to the demands and expectations of their citizen. However, and again in contrast to the United States, there is no prospect that welfare-state functions could be effectively Europeanized (federalized).The paper explores ways in which European policy could nevertheless help to facilitate national responses by reducing the pressures, and regulating the
practices, of regulatory competition among EU member states.