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**Emotional Man:  
A Third Perspective on  
Collective and Corporate Action**

**Helena Flam**

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A Third Perspective on  
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89/7

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## Abstract

The rational and normative man models have predominated in the social sciences. This paper proposes an emotional man model as an alternative point of departure for analyses of individual, but also of collective and corporate action. The overall argument is developed in two steps. First, the concepts of "pure" and "constrained" emotional man are introduced and developed. Then an emotional interaction model addressing the theme of cooperation is presented. After engaging the cooperative interaction model to highlight certain aspects of collective action, the author engages the concepts of "pure" and "constrained" emotional man to provide a new perspective on corporate actors.

\* \* \* \* \*

Bisher herrschen in den Sozialwissenschaften die Modelle rationalen und normativen Handelns vor. Diese Arbeit stellt ein Modell emotionalen Handelns vor, das als alternative Ausgangsbasis für Analysen individuellen, aber auch kollektiven und korporativen Handelns dienen soll. Das zweistufige Argument beginnt mit der Darstellung der Modelle "reinen" sowie "eingeschränkten" emotionalen Handelns. Darauf folgt die Darstellung eines Modells emotionaler Interaktion in Situationen sozialer Kooperation. Verschiedene Aspekte kollektiven Handelns werden anhand dieses Modells betrachtet. Die Konzepte des "reinen" sowie des "eingeschränkten" emotionalen Handelns eröffnen schließlich auch einen neuen Blickwinkel auf korporative Akteure.

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The major purpose of this paper<sup>1</sup> is to propose a model of emotional man as a complement to the models of rational and normative man. It is not its intention to argue that the model of emotional man should replace either of the other two. Rather it is to advocate model pluralism in lieu of the present model duopoly. The model of emotional man is useful because it helps to explain some aspects of collective action which the rational and normative man models cannot handle. It also offers a new perspective on corporate actors and suggests the many different ways in which corporate actors, usually considered from a rationalistic or a normative perspective, are in fact emotion-motivated emotion managers.

#### 1. Rational Man Model and its Limits

In classical and neo-classical economics, rational man is posited as a free man and a free decision-maker. He is free in the sense that he can undisturbedly set up his preference order. While the generation of preferences is taken for granted in the classical model, the problem posed is that of a choice among means.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> I would like to thank Jens Alber, Jürgen Feick, Atle Midttun, Andreas Ryll, Brigitte Schenkluhn and Volker Schneider for valuable bibliographical suggestions and comments on the ideas for this paper. Constructive criticism of the first drafts of this paper came from Renate Mayntz, Fritz Scharpf, Uwe Schimank and Helmut Wiesenthal, whose contribution I gratefully acknowledge.

<sup>2</sup> Rational man has definite preferences about what he wants to achieve, but his problem is his lim-

Yet, the freedom of rational man is constrained in this model of rational decision-making because he is obliged or compelled to follow certain rules in making his choices.<sup>3</sup> First, he is constrained by his own cost-conscious, calculating rationality - the fact that he holds the criteria of relative cost and benefit (and has to compare marginal utilities attached to each good in order to maximize his overall utility) as sovereign guidelines for choosing among different options and in rank-ordering his preferences. The freedom of rational man is also constrained by the pursuit of internal consistency of choice. He is not to have contradictory desires or beliefs. He is to be exacting and careful in his comparisons, exercising the utmost effort to comply with the rule of consistency (Sen 1985: 109). Finally, rational man of classical economics is selfish. The final constraint on his action is exercised by his unrelenting pursuit of self-interest which informs all his choices (Sen 1985: 109-111).<sup>4</sup> In sum, rational man of the classical economics is desirous, calculating, consistent and selfish. And, the three criteria of rationality - calculus, consistency, selfishness - organize his desires.

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ited resources which constrain his choices. His decision-making problem, then, consists, first of all, in the disposition or allocation problem - how to distribute scarce resources among the multiple, desirable goals (Hogarth and Reder 1987: 1-3).

<sup>3</sup> Not in the terms of the classical model, which sees only the actual resources as a constraint, but rather from a point of view of the model-generated "logic of action".

<sup>4</sup> Sen himself argues against conflating consistency with self-interest (Sen, 1985:109).

Now, this model of action has managed to usurp a monopolistic, exclusive position not only in economics and decision theory, but also in much of organizational sociology. The model has captured the scientific imagination to such an extent that even its critics often have defined their views in terms of deviations from this model but not in their own terms.<sup>5</sup> Let me briefly illustrate this point.

Simon's model of bounded rationality rejects the assumption of complete information, certainty and perfect calculability<sup>6</sup>. Simon's man is defined as limited in his capacity to handle either complexity or uncertainty. Yet he remains rational even in this model - (sub)goal-oriented, cost-conscious, calculating, and (under)informed - although his capacities have been considerably reduced.

If Simon removes the assumptions of complete information, certainty and calculability, Schelling and Elster considerably weaken that of consistency (Elster 1986, 1987, 1988; Schelling 1984). They take up themes, among others, such as contradictory desires, momentary impulses and failures of integration. They argue that

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<sup>5</sup> See also Etzioni for this point in Etzioni 1988: 93.

<sup>6</sup> "The classical model calls for knowledge of all the alternatives that are open to choice. It calls for complete knowledge of, or ability to compute, the consequences that will follow on each of the alternatives. It calls for certainty in the decision-maker's present and future evaluation of these consequences. It calls for the ability to compare consequences, not matter how diverse and heterogeneous, in terms of some consistent measure of utility" (Simon 1978: 285).

an individual has cognitive coordination problems and experiences some motivational conflicts, and that he is engaged in a constant battle to remain rational and to maintain self-control: human reason and/or will often cave in under the weight of contradictory desires, momentary impulses or norms.<sup>7</sup> Schelling even speaks of a passionate self as one possible type of self which is sometimes alone in charge and alternates with rational self.<sup>8</sup> Both Elster and Schelling try to improve the concept of rationality by evoking the image of multiple selves - individual and organizational - but stay with the model.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> History, even intellectual history, repeats itself. Once before the concept of interest denoted an element of prudent reflection and efficient calculation with respect to the manner in which human aspirations were pursued. It also implied peace from contradictory passions and momentary impulses. But, and this is a crucial point, the concept of interest understood in this manner failed miserably. Those who promoted this concept simply did not manage the task of demonstrating that it actually constrained aspirations and passions or generated a normative-framework. In this sense, interest joined both morality and reason as yet another aspiring but ineffectual tamer of desires (Hirschman 1977: 32-35, 40-45).

<sup>8</sup> Passionate self acts upon "... passion, or infatuation ... all of those transient overwhelming moods that elevate certain values to absolute domination ..." (Schelling 1984: 89).

<sup>9</sup> In fact, Elster's own position is inconsistent - he argues as if he were improving the concept, but also as if he were rejecting it. He sees his own criticisms as introducing "[t]he slack in the concept of rationality" but also concludes in the same article that "... rational-choice explanation may fail ... simply because people act irrationally" (Elster 1988: 64). In my view, his criticisms could be read also as a radical condemnation of the use of the concept of rationality - understood as control and organization

Finally, Elster and Sen, for example, reject the monopolistic assumption of selfishness and replace it with a duopolistic assumption of motives. The argument is that the classical economic model is too restrictive in proposing that only self-interestedness can affect the choices of rational man. In fact, normative, other-oriented logic constitutes an alternative to that of selfishness, and helps to understand certain types of preference-ordering (Elster 1987; Sen 1982: 84-106).<sup>10</sup> Again, as was the case in previous arguments, they seek not to reject but to refine and improve the model of rational man.

In effect, all these criticisms taken together justify why one should not just explore the soft edges of rationality or its boundaries, but actually ask what other models of man should be constructed, or used if already available. Yet, as I have emphasized several

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of desires by calculus and consistency - under such conditions in which calculus and consistency fail to control and organize desires, and desires may be said to have come to determine the decision-maker in this very sense.

<sup>10</sup> Sociologists and political scientists have stressed what the rational man model omits - the normative shaping of individual preferences. A sociological argument is that norms are constitutive of the rational man's means-and-ends schema (Durkheim 1951; Douglas 1986; Etzioni 1988: 67-113). A parallel political science argument is that institutions select, rank-order, and vest "interests" with normative power, and, that, therefore, these interests (revealed preferences) neither can be seen as the actual individual needs and desires nor have any primary explanatory power (Schmitter 1981; Connolly 1972; Ball 1979; Willms 1973; Balbus 1971).

times, most critics<sup>11</sup> do not dare beyond the exploration of the limits of rationality.<sup>12</sup>

The argument that we should entertain alternative models of action rather than look for facilitators or disturbers of rationality is also supported by another type of criticism directed at the rational man model - one that points to a very important area of reality which the model cannot adequately address. Namely, it cannot explain either voluntary collective behavior or the voluntary creation of public goods. Mancur Olson's theory, which relies on the rational man model, makes a strong argument for why neither cooperation nor public goods should exist. Yet, cooperation and public goods do exist, and their presence needs to be explained.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> See Elster (1987) where he deals with the logic of normative action, for an exception to this rule.

<sup>12</sup> See Etzioni (1988) for an extended discussion of how normative-emotional action logic functions and how it influences rational decision-making and the processes of a) information selection, processing and inference-making and b) the selection of means in structured ways through exclusion, infusion and indifference (Etzioni 1988: 93-193). This approach shows how this "mixed" logic structures action, economic regimes and economic and corporate decisions in particular, but also how it facilitates or disturbs rational decision-making. However, it does not treat emotional "logic" in its own right.

<sup>13</sup> Axelrod (1984) provides a game-theoretic solution to the problems of voluntary cooperation and provision of public goods: repeated interactions and the use of a tit-for-tat strategy.

Mancur Olson's specification of exceptions to his own theory points to both norms and emotions as alternatives to interest. In his view, the problem of free-riding does not apply to 1) sincere, self-sacrificing, disciplined and committed initiators of collective action, who are "altruistic" and "irrational" within this framework, 2) ideologically or leader-inspired groups, associated with revolutions and social upheavals, 3) non-economic lobbies which are altruistic and, 4) by inversion of Olson's argument, groups with sufficient emotional resources which can do without selective incentives and coercion (Olson 1965: 1, 61, 64/65, 87, 106-108, 160-162).

To elaborate, Olson's major argument is that the rational man model implies "rational" free-riding when it is applied to collective action. Each rational actor is a potential free-rider who is concerned about not wasting his contribution, so that he always calculates if his individual contribution would be futile. Since for many types of collective action, this indeed would be the case, it either does not come about at all or, when it does, all potential free-riders turn into actual free-riders. The reason why collective action does sometimes come about is that the association between calculus, sense of futility and free-riding can and is at times broken. For example, either the presence of selective incentives or a measure of coercion can persuade the individual on rational grounds that his cooperative effort would not be futile and, thus, motivate him to contribute to collective action.

In Olson's own view, however, when this sort of "rational" calculation is not made at all, that is, when individuals are "irrational" or, in my terms, when a sense of futility<sup>14</sup> is absent altogether, there is no defensible reason to apply the rational man model. The rational man model is not useful when ideological inspiration and altruism countervail the sense of futility or when self-disciplined commitment and heightened emotional resources accomplish the same task. In other words, not only coercion and selective incentives can solve the free-rider problem and motivate participation on "rational" grounds. Ideological inspiration, altruism, commitment or high emotional resources also solve the free-rider problem and motivate participation, albeit on "irrational" grounds.

Although Olson's own remarks suggest that both normative and emotional resources firmly belong to the residual category of "irrational", prototypical explanations of cooperation focus exclusively on the normative reasons for contributing to collective action. It is argued that in the realm of public and joint goods a rational individual may switch to another logic of

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<sup>14</sup> A sense of futility is "effective" when the free-rider effectively benefits from the collective action undertaken by others who are more interested in the provision of a given public good, although he himself does not contribute. This situation only strengthens the free-rider's feeling that his own individual contribution does not matter. If all individuals were "rational" in this way and considered their potential contributions futile, public goods would be produced only by those "more interested".

action out of a sense of interdependence and duty.<sup>15</sup> The shift in the action logic occurs when incentive-based, calculating rationality does not suffice to guarantee production of or access to desired non-divisible goods and when individuals realize that they are dependent on others for their own welfare. Under these circumstances, a rational individual will operate under a different logic, that of norms or commitment to the welfare of others, even if it may mean a reduced expected welfare for his own self.

As this prototypical explanation shows, but also as the current state of the art indicates, sociologists, political scientists, but even some economists, have already devoted so much attention to the normative action logics and dynamics, that, I would argue, there is no need to focus on them here.<sup>16</sup> Instead, in what follows, the focus will be on the emotional man model, proposed as a complement to those of rational and normative man. This model is constructed based mostly on the available sociological literature.

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<sup>15</sup> The differing arguments in support of this view are: 1) normativist: norms are already in place, but become activated only when imperative, for example, in situations where individuals know their welfare is interdependent - Prisoner's Dilemma; 2) functionalist: norms emerge when self-interest alone is not enough to safeguard or guarantee social order (which is often itself necessary to promote self-interested rationality); 3) rationalist: individuals create norms in self-interest, to protect themselves from free-riding (Elster 1987; Sen 1982; Johansen cited in Sen 1982: 96; Etzioni 1985; Hechter 1987).

<sup>16</sup> See, for example, Parsons (1951); Luhmann (1985); Burns and Flam (1987); Etzioni (1988), but also Sen (1982) and Elster (1987).

## 2. "Pure" and "Constrained" Emotional Man

It has to be noted that the model-construction undertaken here is made more difficult by the fact that contemporary sociologists of emotion have developed their theories in considerable disciplinary isolation<sup>17</sup> and that only one classical sociologist explicitly dealt with emotions.<sup>18</sup>

It also should be emphasized at the outset that after presenting a "pure" emotional man, I will consider the constraints under which he operates. The distinction between a "pure" and a "constrained" emotional man is necessary to reflect the fact that feelings are rarely expressed in a direct and spontaneous fashion. On the contrary, normative, social, and strategic expectations combine to compel "pure" emotional man to manage his feelings.

In fact, it could be argued that if for the rational man the ultimate selector and reducer of the broad array of his preferences are the limited economic means at his disposal, for the "constrained," but not for the "pure," emotional man the ultimate selector

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<sup>17</sup> The war that they wage is against the over-emphasis on a cognitive-normative man model which still dominates sociology and anthropology.

<sup>18</sup> Among classical sociologists, Max Weber conceived of affective-expressive action as devoid of rules or logical constraints, Durkheim pointed out normative emotions, but it was only Simmel who dealt with emotions in their own right.

and reducer of the broad array of feelings<sup>19</sup> are the limited cultural and social means at his disposal which prescribe, proscribe and permit the expression of certain emotions<sup>20</sup>. In both cases, there is a built-in tension between the goals and the means. There is a certain cost attached to achieving a goal - whether it is to produce/consume or express something in so-

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<sup>19</sup> The traditional philosophical view is that feelings are subjective inner experiences of and about various emotions and that emotions cannot be known because they are individual, unique, private and not accessible to others (Farrell 1988: 73; Rorty 1982: 159). Drawing on this view I reserve the term feeling for a "subjective" experience of an affective-cognitive state, and contrast it with the term emotion which draws attention to "intersubjective," behavioral and circumstantial attributes of the affective state (cf. Bedford and Armon-Jones in Harré 1986). Some sociologists treat the terms feelings and emotions as interchangeable, but focus on their management and construction, thus, in effect, recognizing the distinction between private and socialized aspects of affect (Hochschild 1979; Shott 1979). Kemper sometimes distinguishes between real and displayed emotions and treats the latter as epiphenomenal (Kemper 1981; Kemper 1978: 41).

<sup>20</sup> Among modern philosophers, an emotion stands for an affect - a state of bodily agitation accompanied by or interwoven with a contemporaneous cognition or belief and/or caused by an evaluative judgement or by a belief or a desire or their combination. In contrast to feelings, which are inner, incomparable, fleeting subjective states, emotions are socially accessible (Farrell 1988: 73, 79, 81-85). Sociologists debate whether norms or status-power cause and shape emotions, but agree that emotions are evoked by "real, anticipated, imagined, or recollected outcomes of social relationships" (Kemper, cited in Shott 1979: 1318). Like some philosophers, sociologists fuse the physiological, cognitive and normative elements to constitute the concept of emotion, rejecting or drawing on the work of psychologists in various ways (Harré 1986).

cially, culturally, and strategically legitimate terms, and, *homo sentiens* just like *homo economicus* cannot ignore this cost. One is compelled to sort out his preferences and manage his resources, the other sorts out and manages his feelings. Both are much more rule-bound than is "pure" emotional man.

#### A. "Pure" Emotional Man

If rational man is defined as free, consistent, cost-conscious, calculating, and selfish, "pure" emotional man, in contrast, is unfree, inconsistent, cost-indifferent, and other-oriented.

As noted earlier, rational man is self-interested and self-referential. In contrast, a "pure" emotional man may be self-interested, but his feelings orient him to others.<sup>21</sup> Such feelings as love, loyalty, or respect bind individuals together, whereas such feelings as anger, fear or envy separate individuals from each other (Kemper, in Scherer/ Ekman 1984: 374). Feelings relate individuals to others and make these individu-

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<sup>21</sup> Aesthetic feelings and emotions are of no concern here, although it could be argued that they entail an other-oriented component, since taste is in part an intersubjective phenomenon.

als develop concern for the negative or positive welfare of others.<sup>22</sup>

In contrast to rational man, who is free and whose choices are voluntary, "pure" emotional man is unfree. Feelings have an involuntary character. They cannot be produced at will. Feelings invade or overwhelm. They connect or separate individuals against their will. In this sense feelings are spontaneous and generative - they generate a sympathetic or antipathetic charge which informs the substance of a relationship. Thus, one falls in or out of love, or, feels sympathy or antipathy towards somebody for reasons that often defy rational analysis or one's own will (Kemper 1978, 1981, 1984: 374; Simmel 1955; Rorty 1982).

A "pure" emotional man is cost-indifferent - what matters is that he can express his feelings. And, these feelings themselves are non-quantifiable and non-calculative as a matter of principle. Positive feelings, such as romantic or fraternal love (solidarity), generate a willingness to share. One gives without an expectation of compensation.<sup>23</sup> Similarly,

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<sup>22</sup> Emotions have an intricate relationship to empathy, but I omit this topic to simplify the exposition. Post World War II social scientists have mostly stressed the cognitive nature of empathy, but see Shott (1979: 1328) for an analytical distinction between cognitive and affective empathy.

<sup>23</sup> Disappointed or unrequited positive feelings may issue in attempts to convert the relationship in a calculable exchange relationship, but these attempts fail because it is very difficult to measure respective, from the outset incommensurate, contributions to an emotional relationship (Deutsch 1985; Davis 1973).

pure negative feelings, such as hostility, whose object are the characteristics of the other(s), defy calculability - the purpose is to destroy at any cost (Kemper 1978, 1981; Simmel 1955; Davis 1973).

Feelings have a logic of their own. First, they are multiple or multi-layered. Secondly, they can be, roughly speaking, compatible or incompatible. Thirdly, they resist attempts at ordering or hierarchization (Nedelmann 1988: 28; Simmel 1955: 22-28, 35-55).<sup>24</sup> This means that "pure" emotional man can be either consistent or inconsistent in his mind and his actions. Consistency refers to the fact that some feelings are complementary, such as, for example, insecurity and shame. Others are mutually reinforcing, for example, love and admiration. Inconsistency<sup>25</sup> refers to the fact that incompatible, antagonistic or contradictory feelings, such as, for example, love and hate often co-exist in one and the same person.<sup>26</sup> Even the most ex-

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<sup>24</sup> In relationship to each other, feelings can be compatible, complementary or mutually reinforcing on the one hand, or antagonistic, incompatible, or mutually destructive on the other.

<sup>25</sup> Compare to Schelling's and Elster's arguments that an individual's desires may be contradictory, and to Hirschman's account of the history of the idea of contradictory desires. See also Etzioni (1988: 70), where he points out that psychologists, but not economists, assume a mix of motives and emotions that are at least in part incompatible.

<sup>26</sup> Simmel identified many, what I would like to call, "emotional constellations" of this type such as sympathy-antipathy, love-fear, loyalty-opposition-competition, hate-guilt, accord-discord, dominance-submission-defiance, etc.

treme and contrary feelings can co-exist within a single individual and be felt simultaneously in relationship to a single person or an object. And the most contrary emotions can issue from each other, such as, for example, friendship from animosity.<sup>27</sup>

So far, the attributes of "pure" emotional man paralleled and contrasted with those of rational man. The following two - inconstancy and indeterminacy - underscore even more the crux of the matter with "pure" emotional man: The fact that he is often unpredictable. The point with a rational man, after all, is that he exercises self-control and follows "rational" rules of decision-making. These characteristics make him predictable and, one could say, socially accountable. In contrast, the predictability of a "pure" emotional man is considerably more problematic. "Pure" emotional man follows only his own feelings in choosing a course of action, which, since these feelings may be inconstant, if not inconsistent and indeterminate, makes the course of his action unpredictable.

Inconstancy refers to the fact that even the most passionate or the most routinized feelings may come to an end. "Pure" emotional man's feelings are beyond his control and, therefore, may be in a constant flux. Love turns into hate, hate into love, friendship into hostility, etc. etc. This follows from what was said

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<sup>27</sup> Simmel also identified many typical "emotional strings," such as love-indifference, love-hate, respect-contempt, loyalty-opposition-competition, etc., which differ from emotional constellations in that the emotions are not felt simultaneously but one precedes the other. The term "emotional strings" is mine.

above about the nature of emotions - they overwhelm and invade, they are involuntary. Neither can feelings be stopped or extended at will nor, once there, can they be changed without a long-term effort of the will.

Indeterminacy is at its peak when "pure" emotional man is ridden by strong, contrary and inconsistent emotions, and when his actions are purely expressive in Weber's sense. In such a case, neither he himself nor others can determine how he will act.<sup>28</sup> It is uncertain on which of his contrary feelings "pure" emotional man will in fact act, since neither norms nor calculus nor status-power relations weigh in favor of any particular feeling. He may act on one "stronger" feeling or, consecutively, on two or more contrary feelings.<sup>29</sup>

To summarize, "pure" emotional man is unfree, other-oriented, non-calculative, and inconstant. He is either consistent, or inconsistent and indeterminate -

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<sup>28</sup> The theme of unpredictability has its own intellectual history. Hirschman reminds us that past attempts to make passions a predictor of action turned around the attempts to decide which passions are stronger than others and, therefore, which can be said to countervail and dominate the others. However, this method failed. Instead, interest, first as a countervailing and second as a mild passion, emerged as a concept as a result of these attempts. But, very quickly, the concept left the emotional realm as it came to include reason and even moral precepts (Hirschman 1977).

<sup>29</sup> There is, of course, the possibility that the contradictory emotions will block each other and paralyze the individual. This is even more likely when one of the emotions is backed by norms, but not the other.

in the latter case, he is also unpredictable. When he is unpredictable, but also when his (intense and other-oriented) feelings escape his own and outside control, he may disregard and upset the elements of the social order. And, he lurks even behind the socialized and constrained emotional man - "feelings, while quite plastic, can be culturally manipulated only within a certain range..." (Shott 1979: 1320, fn 4).

This lack of predictability and of social accountability gains even more importance from the fact that feelings are very powerful motives of individual action which defy standardization - they vary in range and intensity from individual to individual and, thus, cannot constitute a basis of social order (see Footnotes 19 and 20). On the contrary, it is both the subjectivity and the unpredictability of the "pure" emotional man that make him a foe of the social order and, consequently, turn his feelings into an object of attempts at regulation, neutralization, and suppression.

#### B. "Constrained" Emotional Man

In general, it can be said that specific cultural sensitivities, status and power relations, as well as strategic considerations constrain the feelings of "pure" emotional man. "Constrained" emotional man is not free to either feel or emote. He is expected to manage both his actual feelings and his emotional expression. He is to suppress the expression of and neutralize proscribed feelings, but to evoke and dis-

play prescribed emotions. He is to follow social guidelines, so-called "feeling rules" and "expression rules," which entail a set of cognitive-normative expectations specifying not only the context-bound expected, idealized or obligatory feelings but also the appropriate quality and quantity of emotional display (Hochschild 1975: 302; Hochschild 1979: 563-566; Harré 1986).

Individuals who realize or are made to realize that they are defying any of the feeling or expression rules can resort to "emotion work" or "emotion management" (Hochschild 1979). They can sort out and manage their feelings in order to reduce the discrepancy between what and how they actually feel and what and how they should feel. Apart from suppressing, re-working, and neutralizing the undesired feelings, they should also engage in manufacturing and manifesting the desired emotions. The individual ability and willingness to do so is a measure of moral, social, and strategic competence, and, often involves cooperation: "emotion work can be done by the self upon the self, by the self upon others, and by others upon oneself" (Hochschild 1979: 562; Armon-Jones in Harré 1986: 33-34).<sup>30</sup>

Put succinctly, the control of feelings and the construction of emotions presupposes three distinct types of control mechanisms: individual, group, and institu-

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<sup>30</sup> Compare to Schelling (1984) and Elster (1986).

tional-organizational.<sup>31</sup> But, as the present-day theories state, neither institutional-organizational nor group control are possible without self-control. This internalized, willed, intentional mechanism of control, which entails cognitive processes, such as self-reflection, self-criticism and self-correction, but also feelings of trust, respect, shame, embarrassment and guilt, is at the basis of any social order.<sup>32</sup>

The construction of social order entails in part the manufacturing of expectational structures which decrease complexity, contingency, and uncertainty and which, when fulfilled, although not specifically meant to prevent the expression of proscribed emotions, nevertheless minimize the likelihood of undesired emotional agitation and of resulting unpredictability. However, when unmet, the very same normative-cognitive expectational structures define the realm of the unexpected, surprising, or disappointing which causes a display of proscribed, strong, positive or negative, feelings, such as fear, embarrassment, anger or joy. The shock caused by disappointed expectations may lead the individual to lose his self-control and to act

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<sup>31</sup> The institutional-organizational presupposes the presence of rules, staff, selective incentives and coercion. The group presupposes opinion-forming and expression as well as the availability of sanctions. The individual presupposes a sense of expressive-normative integrity, a will, and a measure of self-esteem.

<sup>32</sup> Among historical predecessors of these alleged individual self-control mechanisms, we find virtues, mild (or benevolent) passions, interest as a mild passion, other-oriented, sympathetic sentiments, reason. See Hirschman (1977) and Rorty (1982).

"unpredictably in a state of agitation ... [H]e may lose his temper in his agitation and forget himself, thus disrupting the continuity and reliability of his presentation of self and risking the loss of the social identity of his personality ..." (Luhmann 1985: 41).<sup>33</sup> Feeling and expression rules, shaping both emotional behavior and expectational structures concerned with this behavior, play an important contributory role in the construction of a predictable social reality not the least because they also provide blueprints for handling the unexpected. They provide behavioral guidance even when normative cognitive-expectations are violated (see below).

In general, individuals manufacture prescribed emotions to meet expectations formed on the basis of the prevalent rules. Already Durkheim's classical contribution stressed this obligatory-coercive, routine aspect of emotional self-control associated with the presence of cultural norms. Cultures<sup>34</sup> have their specific emotional profiles and sensibilities - they encourage some and discourage other emotions, grant similar emotions inverse or simply different moral status, or call for a similar emotion but require that it be more or less intensely felt. Norms concerning emotions - what Goffman calls expression rules - re-

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<sup>33</sup> In his theory of law, Luhmann assigns a central role both to expectational structures which selectively decrease complexity, contingency and uncertainty, and to the social mechanisms for handling, channelling and cooling off disappointments.

<sup>34</sup> See Harré (1986: 10/11) for an interesting 5-point argument for the cultural relativity of emotions.

flect these cultural sensibilities which are obligatory, and are experienced and expected as a system of rights, duties, and sanctions. These rules specify the time and place at which the encouraged emotions should be displayed as well as their intensity, direction, and duration (Hochschild 1975; Hochschild 1979; Shott, 1979).

Not only normative, but also hierarchical orders and strategic considerations issue in rules which make for emotional self-control. Status and power structures are embodied in a system of feeling and expression rules. Positive emotions are supposed to flow up and negative emotions are supposed to flow down in the affirmation of the social hierarchy. The exercise of self-control is a necessary pre-requisite of these flows, in particular when these flows ignore and defy individual status and power aspirations (Kemper 1981; Hochschild 1975).<sup>35</sup> Similarly, an appropriate control of emotional expressions and of displayed sensitivities (rules of etiquette) confirms one's own social and cultural competence but also affirms the social order. Finally, strategic considerations, formed on the basis of normative or instrumental goals, motivate the specifics of individual self-control - the display of unfelt emotions and the suppression of felt feelings - desired for the sake of impression management. Strategic considerations also inform individual calculations concerning the choice of techniques (discre-

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<sup>35</sup> Kemper argues that "feeling rules," which Shott and Hochschild describe, are a function of and should be reduced to rules attached to status-power structures. He does not grant any autonomy to culture.

tion, concealment, feigned indifference, emotional blackmail, etc.) by which desired emotions as expected outcomes can be produced or neutralized in oneself or others (Hochschild 1979; Nedelmann 1988: 30; Goffman 1969).

Durkheim also stressed another important social cause of intended emotional construction: norm violations. When normative expectations are not met, and deeply felt values are violated, a collectivity is supposed to react by directing strong, negative emotions against the deviating individual(s).<sup>36</sup> Violations of norms should cause a prescribed production of emotional outbursts. The same applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to the emotional reactions against the violations of feelings rules attached to a hierarchical order. These emotional reactions are prescribed and contrast with the emotions involved in the violations themselves which entail (not necessarily intentional) acts of defiant, proscribed emotional display (Kemper 1978; Hochschild 1979: 567).<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> See Nedelmann (1986: 407) on "Dieser Durkheim-sche zirkulare Prozess zwischen Wertverletzung - öffentliche Empörung - Sanktionierung - Wertstabilisierung ...".

<sup>37</sup> Proscribed emotions are seen as being caused by two simultaneous processes: a) negative deployment of power and/or insufficient deference on the part of the power/status holders and b) unmet expectations concerning social acceptance and rejection on the part of the power/status-less. Proscribed emotions presuppose positive self-esteem on the part of the powerless (Kemper 1979). See also Morton Deutsch for an extended argument that it takes positive self-esteem, supportive environment, and a sense that redress is probable, for individuals and groups to begin to feel that they are treated unjustly and to turn self-assertive

In contrast to a socialized man and a rebel who, respectively, follow or defy the established rules for emotional construction, a strategist is a professional manipulator of these rules. A strategist not only distantiates himself from but also thrives on and exploits these feeling rules as techniques which will help him to achieve his goals. By the same token, a strategist's greatest foe is his own normative socialization which may jeopardize his "professional" efforts and cause him to reveal his "socialized" but at the moment unwelcome feelings, and, thus, his strategic goals.<sup>38</sup>

When considering "pure" emotional man, I emphasized that he is unfree, cost-indifferent and non-calculative, other-oriented, uncontrolled as well as inconstant and unpredictable when ridden by inconsistent feelings. "Constrained" emotional man is still other-oriented, but differs in his other attributes from "pure" emotional man. Through emotion-work and emotion-management, he achieves a considerable degree of

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(Deutsch 1985). This is a fairly standard argument. See, for example, Barrington Moore, Jr. (1978) or Alexandra Ålund (1988).

<sup>38</sup> "... [o]nce norms are incorporated, their infraction is likely to lead the actor to display uncontrollable minor signs of guilt, shame, and embarrassment ... these giveaway signs ..." (Goffman 1968: 57). Similarly, the "professional" strategist can experience a disappointment caused by his unmet cognitive expectations, which prompts undesired, yet bursting feelings which, if displayed, could uncover his true reactions and intentions. Whether this disappointment will in fact cause any emotional display on his part depends ultimately on his skills in self-presentation and emotion management.

control over and freedom from (some of) his feelings. He does not allow the feelings to overwhelm him. If they are contradictory or incompatible, he works to achieve consistency by suppressing or neutralizing some, while cultivating others. He is not necessarily completely free or in control, but neither is he an emotional slave. Instead, and this is an important point, he very well may be a slave of socio-cultural norms entailed in the feeling and expression rules, unless he is either a strategist who exploits them or a rebel who adopts a critical stand towards them and engages in their conscious re-definition.<sup>39</sup>

Moreover, "constrained" emotional man is also much more cost-conscious and calculative than "pure" emotional man either because feeling rules have taught him so (for example, by defining a time limit for non-reciprocal feelings or a social-status limit for reciprocal feelings) or because he is aware of the costs of socio-cultural deviance. In extreme cases, it is precisely the awareness of the costs of deviance - the expected negative sanctions - that is the sole ground for emotion-management and emotion-work in which he

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<sup>39</sup> A social actor merely follows socio-cultural rules according to a functional-structural perspective emphasizing socialization and internalization processes. A social actor interprets, reflects upon, communicates about and modifies socio-cultural rules according to a constructivist perspective. The "constrained" emotional man model presented here fits more the first perspective not because it is preferable, but because the students of emotion, even though some draw on the constructivist perspective, in fact have very little to say about why and how social actors work to modify feeling and expression rules (see Hochschild 1975; Scheff 1988; Shott 1979; Harré 1986).

engages to manufacture prescribed emotions and to neutralize and suppress the proscribed feelings.

In sum, "constrained" emotional man approximates either a rational or a normative man. He is much more consistent, constant, and predictable than "pure" emotional man to the extent to which he allows these alternative logics of action influence his actual behavior. He mixes the normative and rational action logics when he exercises self-control, becomes cost-conscious, pursues consistency and engages in emotion-work and emotion-management in order to comply with norms. The success of his efforts is predicated upon the presence of a stable system which not only produces internally consistent and predictable expectational structures, but also provides the means for their realization.

### 3. Collective Action Reconsidered in the Light of an Emotional Interaction Model

So far I have briefly referred to prescribed and proscribed emotional expression, and contrasted the logic of "pure" with that of "constrained" emotional action. In the following, I return to an objection raised earlier against the rational man model - that it cannot explain adequately voluntary cooperation and public goods - in order to argue that the emotional man model can explain them, at least partially.

Of all emotional interindividual interaction models developed by sociologists, I select a model of "love" because it addresses the theme of cooperation and therefore is the most relevant to my overall polemical argument. But, it must be noted that the presentation of this model is also meant to convince the reader that emotional interaction models can and have been constructed,<sup>40</sup> and that they can handle both self-reinforcing and contradictory emotions or a mixture of both.<sup>41</sup>

The model of an "emotional unity-discord" presented below, pertains not only to dyadic intimate relationships, but also to individuals who voluntarily join a collectivity. The model pinpoints contradictory emotions at work and periodizes a typical emotional sequence in which interacting individuals move between emotional indifference and emotional engagement. Over time, but also structurally speaking, there are two distinct developmental trajectories possible in a dyad or a collectivity: isolation-unity-isolation or isolation-unity-consolidation. Taking the first trajectory into account, the model pinpoints the phase-contingent

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<sup>40</sup> See Conclusion, but also, for example, the article on the escalation of anger in a two-actor interaction in Harré 1986. See also Sarbin's article in the same volume which suggests that a cultural repertoire contains stereotypic emotional roles, role-interactions, and plots on which actors can draw in staging their "emotional-dramaturgical", identity-asserting performances.

<sup>41</sup> For a model of self-perpetuating negative emotional contagion, involving shame and anger, see Scheff (1988: 396-397).

emergence of emotion-stabilizers, whose application issues in the second trajectory.

Individuals, whether forming dyads or collectivities, experience contradictory emotions, which in the long run may undermine the very intention they have of merging with the other(s).<sup>42</sup> There is an inherent ambivalence built into this type of a relationship due to the contradictory emotional needs which the individuals bring into the relationship. On the one hand, they want to love, to experience communion - the merger of the souls and minds. On the other hand, they fear that love and the communion may deprive them of their autonomy.

Individuals want to merge - lose their selves in the others' - in part because of the transformative nature of communion: in the "nascent" stage, the past retreats, the present is an expanding universe, the future is open and unconstrained. An individual self loses its contours and becomes united and enlarged by others. Joy and pleasure stem from giving for its own sake and from sharing the joys and the sorrows of the other(s). Love and/or solidarity are at this point still near-nonvolitional and noninstrumental - neither meant to stimulate reciprocity nor cognizant of the costs attached (Davis 1973; Alberoni 1984; Kemper

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<sup>42</sup> Deutsch, Kemper, and Scheff argue that a cognitive-emotional merger will occur and perpetuate itself without any obstacles if certain preconditions for it are met, such as: a) rough equality of power and status b) a perceived similarity in beliefs and goals c) open communication d) trust, friendliness, helpfulness. For an example, see Deutsch (1985: 69-70).

1978). The members of a collectivity experience the intensified emotional state and emotional group-contagion<sup>43</sup> wherein the entire group shares the same emotions, whether gaiety, joyful agitation, sadness mixed with anger, or sorrow: "... human sentiments are intensified when affirmed collectively. Sorrow, like joy, becomes exalted and amplified when leaping from mind to mind ..." (Durkheim 1915: 446). In the nascent state, solidarity and a sense of powerful potentiality reinforce each other: "Together, we can change the world."

The very same individuals, however, may come to fear that they will suffer a loss of their own emotional make-up, distinctive individuality, sense of judgement - in short, autonomy. They may come to fear that their vital interests or status and power may have to be sacrificed too much. These fears may mitigate their willingness to merge with the other(s). Here we deal with an "emotional constellation," containing emotions which are contradictory and, therefore, account for inconstancy. While at first, individuals may act upon their willingness to merge, subsequently they may act upon their fear of a merger.

For this kind of a relationship, typical relation- and phase-contingent institutional developments have been identified. Individuals engaged in a unifying relationship often recognize its fragility and seek to

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<sup>43</sup> Note that in contrast to a two-person "emotional contagion" with several different emotions, which Scheff proposes, this classical Durkheimian model posits an emotional group-contagion with shared emotion(s).

solidify it. Those more interested in the stability of the relationship compromise their interests and identities more, but, eventually, press for commitment and for establishing compliance-insuring mechanisms. In response to this pressure, the other(s) may terminate the relationship. However, if commitment is made and compliance-insuring mechanisms are accepted, avoidance strategies contrary to the spirit of the commitment can be punished. But, if these mechanisms fail, first persuasion attempts and then conflict escalation can be expected. If conflict does not settle the issues, separation (ostracism in groups) ensues.

The periodization of this unity-discord relationship includes the first positive encounter(s), the emergence and the cognitive-emotional experience of communion, a development of a sense of common identity which sets apart from the others, commitment, routinization of the relationship, definition, detection and destruction of the sources of discord, confession-forgiveness mechanisms, unity-reviving ceremonies, threat-persuasion re-negotiations, and, if these mechanisms, ceremonies and strategies do not work, conflict and separation (Davis 1973; Alberoni 1984; Zablocki 1980).

Let me now propose that the model presented above directly answers the concern of the critical economists that rational man model cannot account for the emergence of voluntary collective action or that of joint or public goods. Note that this model emphasizes the attractiveness of an interindividual merger to isolated individuals. A rationalist could argue that

this merger could be seen as a selective incentive to participation in the Olsonian sense, comparable to socializing, for example. The merger, however, cannot be unequally distributed and, therefore, is not at all selective. Moreover, merging with a collectivity is not a means to some (rational) end. It is an end of action all in its own right. And, it implies a near-complete dissolution of the rationalistic self and its conversion into a purely emotional self - indifferent to both cost and consequences.<sup>44</sup>

Nor can the feelings of love or compassionate solidarity, which motivate "participation," be seen as outcomes of a premeditated decision and explained in terms of the rational man model. After all, the point with both love and compassionate solidarity is that they are nonvolitional and spontaneous. They overwhelm, and, thus, leave no time for information collection, comparisons, deliberated choice, or bargaining. Here we deal with Schelling's "passionate self", which sometimes is alone in charge and alternates with the rational self. And, it is of great significance that this passionate self can remain in charge for months, even for years. Many movements, intentional communities, and forms of collective action last at

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<sup>44</sup> My argument draws on Pizzorno's, except that I emphasize the near-absorption of the individual self in the collective self, while he emphasizes the integration and the reinforcement of the individual self resulting from the individual participation in a collective action. His is a life-long, dynamic perspective on an individual self, mine is a duration-limited, structural perspective focused on what happens to the self in a particular collective action, social movement or collectivity (Pizzorno 1986).

least a year before the absence of normative-instrumental stabilizers finally makes for their demise (Kanter 1972; Alberoni 1984). This is so because interacting positive feelings can reinforce each other's self-perpetuation.<sup>45</sup>

Those who see this "passionate" account of the reasons for joining collective action as too romantic should consider a more rational yet related argument, which the model also suggests. Aside from emotions, the model stresses the importance of intentions, commitment, norms, compromises and persuasion for the initiation and stabilization of collective action. These elements complement Olson's dyad of selective incentives and coercion. They point to the importance of not only the intentions behind joining, which may very well involve a rational and pre-meditated decision to switch from a "rationalist" to an "emotional" action context offered by a collectivity, but also of negotiated-consensual, processual-interactional stabilizers of collective action, which Olson ignores and which emerge as a matter of contingency, i.e. only when the participants in a collective undertaking intentionally seek to stabilize it.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> "Mutual conformity and respect lead to pride and fellow feeling, which lead to further positive feeling, in a system that seems virtually automatic" (Scheff 1988: 397). See also "Deutsch's crude law of social relations", which states that "...the characteristic processes and effects elicited by a given type of social relationship also tend to elicit that type of social relationship" (Deutsch 1985: 69).

<sup>46</sup> On this very point see Kanter (1972: 133, 189).

As important as the intentions and the processual-  
interactional stabilizers of collective action are,  
they should not be allowed to overshadow the impor-  
tance of the initial emotional charge generated by a  
sense of unity among individuals engaged in a merger.  
This emotional charge is prior to the emergence of  
norms meant to stabilize the collectivity as well as  
to the formation of interests in or against this sta-  
bilization. And, most importantly, it is this initial  
emotional charge which suggests why a "threshold to  
collective action" may be easier to overcome than the  
rational man model suggests (Granovetter 1978; Oliver/  
Marwell/ Teixeira 1985).<sup>47</sup> "Emotional," non-calculative  
individuals or charismatic leaders, whose importance  
Mancur Olson recognizes, often initiate collective ac-  
tion, since, for them, participation is costless.  
Their participation, in turn, lowers the costs of  
joining for the rational, calculative individuals.  
Along with those who join compelled by their sense of  
duty, these two types of individuals combine in col-  
lective action. In this sense, the emotional charge,  
capable of overcoming the sense of futility, provides  
a straightforward complement/alternative to self-in-  
terest or a sense of duty, which are evoked by econo-  
mists as the reasons behind collective action aimed at

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<sup>47</sup> Says Jean Cohen, drawing on Pizzorno: "...only if one sees solidarity and identity as goals of group formation ... can one see that, with respect to these goals, collective action is costless" (Cohen 1985: 687). Say Oliver, Marwell and Teixeira: "... an 'irrational' contributor may well find that, instead of being a 'patsy,' he or she is a role model or organizer whose action sets off others' actions and, in the end, vindicates the original contribution" (Oliver/ Marwell/ Teixeira 1985: 547).

the provision of public or joint goods.<sup>48</sup> It is important to note that, in contrast to both normative and rational collective action models, the emotional model implies that the production of public or joint goods is an unintended consequence of an intended successful merger on the part of "emotional," non-calculative individuals.

Let me now switch the perspective on collective action for a moment to round off the stabilization argument. So far I have mostly focused on "positive" emotional elements inherent in collective action. But collective action, as a purely emotional phenomenon, is also associated with "negative" emotions. Fear, anxiety, and anger precede, while hate and hostility often accompany collective action.<sup>49</sup> In fact, until recently, most sociological studies of collective behavior and social movements have focused on these emotions (Smelser 1962; Gurr 1970; Cohen 1985). While positive emotions are directed inwards and reserved for the members of the collectivity, these negative emotions are directed outwards, towards the group(s) defined as the foe. What is of the utmost significance for the argument developed here is that these negative feelings help to consolidate and stabilize many different types

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<sup>48</sup> It seems like a minor point of contention, so I leave it out of the text, but individuals engaged in a collectivity may shirk from their duties not because of a sense of effective futility, but because of: emotional-cognitive discord; routinized emotional indifference or defiance; intention to leave, kept in check by commitment, etc.

<sup>49</sup> See Cohen (1985: 672) for a brief recent account of this perspective on collective behavior.

of collectivities and collective actions (Douglas/Wildavsky 1983; Douglas 1986). Thus, not only can collective action be stabilized by the self-reinforcing character of mutual positive feelings within a solidaristic group, but also by the negative feelings directed outwards.

As I stated in the introduction, I see the emotional man model not as a substitute, but as a complement to both rational and normative models. This is because the other two models are needed to explain what the emotional man model cannot explain in its own terms, such phenomena as, for example, non-emotional factors involved in the formation of a collectivity, in the emergence of discord, or in the stabilization and consolidation of a collectivity. In short, I advocate model pluralism instead of the present normative-rationalistic model duopoly.

#### 4. Emotional Corporate Actors?

So far I have focused on the individual and inter-individual micro-level emotionality as well as described some emotions pertinent to the macro-level of collective action. Here I would like to consider emotions in corporate actors.

The usual perspective on corporate actors is either rationalistic or normative. They are treated as cognitive, goal-oriented, problem-solving, decision-making and intervening actors with their own interests and

strategies or with their own value-systems and norms. Yet, corporate actors are composed of individuals, and some - family-owned business firms, for example - are designed and owned by single individuals. Moreover, many corporate actors, such as political parties, trade unions, professional associations, or lobbies, have evolved from collective action. For both these reasons it should be legitimate to ask if corporate actors are in fact as immune to emotions as the rationalistic or strict normative perspective would imply. If, as I have argued so far, emotions play a significant role both in individual and collective life, then it follows that they should also play some role in corporate life as well.<sup>50</sup> The purpose of this section is to consider this possibility.

Thesis 1: Corporate Actors are Emotion Motivated Emotion Managers who Construct Emotions.

The term "corporate actor" refers to a wide variety of formal-legal organizations, ranging from business firms to charitable foundations. Upon a closer inspection, not all, but sufficiently many of these formal organizations can be analyzed as a set of legal-rational rules for emotion management and a substitute for authentic feelings. I would like to suggest that what

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<sup>50</sup> Yet another reason for considering the relationship between emotions and corporate actors is that cultural and emotional sensibilities have been attributed to and studied in social and occupational groups, classes, and elites, and, there is no reason why organizations or corporate actors should be set apart in this respect.

these organizations produce, apart from everything else, are tempered (restrained, disciplined) but solidified and permanent emotions in place of unpredictable and wavering, often boundless feelings. For example, a business firm - one of the supposedly most rationalistic corporate actors - can be seen as a complex system of legal-rational checks, restraints and balancing procedures imposed on the otherwise boundless and irrational impulse of acquisitiveness, on the one hand, and on the equally boundless and self-indulgent impulse to consume, on the other (Weber 1978: 9). Many trusts, philanthropic foundations, welfare organizations and state departments are systems created, among other reasons, in order to solidify and regulate otherwise intermittent, arbitrary and unplanned feelings of compassion for the needy (Barber 1983; McGill 1941/2: 280). Professional and trade organizations, finally, are corporate actors whose one important purpose is to stabilize and regulate intra-group solidarity, but also to inspire and stabilize public trust (Barber 1983).

From this perspective, such corporate goals as "profit-realization" or "help to the needy" or "solidarity" can be seen as intentions to construct and sustain specific emotions, while corporate rules can be seen as emotion-managing rules which prescribe in what ways these emotions should be constructed and displayed. For example, the corporate (expression) rules of a business firm specify the desired intensity, direction and duration of acquisitiveness and consumption when they specify the levels at which profits and investments are to be made, require that profits be made in

a peaceful manner, and set up the time frames within which the profits are to be achieved.

Earlier, I suggested a distinction between subjective feelings and constructed emotions, reflected in a distinction between a "pure" and a "constrained" emotional man. Here, I suggest a similar differentiation of concepts, to reflect a historical-cultural but also structural perspective on corporate actors. Following Weber's cultural-historical analysis, I propose that certain passions, feelings and sensibilities have existed in a "pure," unorganized, cultural-historical form in the West and that some of them have motivated the establishment of a rational organization - a corporate actor - which would stabilize and rationalize their pursuit. But, and here is the structural part of the argument, once these corporate actors are established, they may be said to construct emotions, using the available formal rules and procedures, which differ in form but remain related to the original feelings which initiated the entire process. Moreover, corporate actors also generate emotions in another sense. They impose the constructed emotions on the individuals working for or living off them and, sometimes, they modify their own rules and procedures and, thus, can construct emotions only weakly related to the feelings which originally initiated the entire process.

If this reasoning is accepted, then it follows that many corporate actors as actors are non-feeling, but emotional. Corporate emotions should be understood in the very sense in which I spoke of emotions in the

preceding sections of this paper - as intended constructions, formed according to obligatory-coercive rules, in this case, according to the organizational rules. Let me elaborate this general idea.

Corporate actors require emotional display and deep acting from their members to sustain their self-definitions which are related to their goals. Corporate charters and mandates often translate into formal and informal norms requiring the individuals working for an organization to manage their emotions in specified ways - to display particular emotions and to suppress particular feelings. Just like many jobs so many corporate actors "call for an appreciation of display rules, feeling rules, and a capacity for deep acting" on the part of their members (Hochschild 1979: 570).

Of importance in this context also is that individuals acting on behalf of corporate actors are supposed to construct "representative" emotions to help sustain the self-image of a corporate actor. It is true that as a rule, for example, bankers are to display reserve, discretion, delicacy, sensitivity as well as inspire trust and confidence, "ideal" state bureaucrats and scientists are to display "affective neutrality," while business executives "may be required ... to sustain a definition of self, office, and organizations as 'up and coming,' or 'on the go,' 'caring,' or 'reliable ...'" (Hochschild 1979: 570). But, it is also the case that there is as much variability among the same type of corporate actors as among individuals in their emotional make-up. For example, a Communist Party may explicitly ban all interpersonal

emotional ties from its organization, and also require emotion-management for the sake of party goals<sup>51</sup> (Coser 1974: 128, 131-135). In contrast, a Green Party may equally strongly encourage both affective-expressive "authenticity" and interpersonal emotional ties among its members. A welfare department in one country may display inquisitive compassion for the clients, while another hostility and indifference. Each of these corporate actors, then, can be said to foster and promote very specific emotional habits, "representative" emotions, in the individuals it brings together.

This is also to say that there is enough variability among and between corporate actors to warrant research into corporate cultures, the preconditions for their emergence and maintenance, as well as their influence on the achievement of various corporate goals.

A pertinent question in this context is the extent to which the obligatory expression and feeling rules and compliance degrees are the same for the principals and agents, oriented supposedly to the same goals.<sup>52</sup> Draw-

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<sup>51</sup> "With this requirement, that all behavior be controlled and directed toward Party goals, goes the requirement that the Party member treat himself as a tool to carry out the wishes of the Party, but that he be at all times a conscious tool, voluntarily submitting himself to the discipline of the Party. And the discipline must be minute and detailed, over himself and over his every movement ... The eyes can lie - and how. You can express with your eyes a devoted attention which, in reality, you are not feeling. You can express serenity or surprise ..." (Mead, cited in Goffman 1969: 26-27).

<sup>52</sup> See for these terms Flam/ Ryll (1988) and Pratt/ Zeckhauser (1985).

ing on a related theory<sup>53</sup>, one can set up at least two hypotheses. First, that those at the top of organizational hierarchy (the agents, to whom the principals delegate decision-making rights) identify more with the corporate goals, and feeling and expression rules and, therefore, comply with them more than the non-decision-makers. Secondly, that the more hierarchical a corporate actor and the more power its agents have usurped from the authorizing principals, the easier it would be for these agents to develop not only autonomous goals, but also feelings, and expression and feeling rules, and/or ignore the rules considered legitimate by the principals. In either case, it would be more difficult for the principals to identify with the agent-promoted rules if they have not participated in their creation. The following example, taken from Sweden, illustrates a disparity between the programmatic agent-promoted "feeling rule" and the actual conduct of the principals. The leadership of the Swedish central employee federation, LO, is very concerned with promoting solidarity between white-collar and blue-collar workers and between public- and private-sector employees. However, the wide-spread presence of wage-drift and of insistence on performance-related wage relativities indicates that many LO members do not share the enthusiasm their leaders feel for solidarity as a feeling rule with redistributive consequences (Olsson/ Burns, in Burns/ Flam 1987). Despite the long-term attempts to impose this feeling

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<sup>53</sup> See Mayntz (1970: 374-375), where the focus is on the relationship between morality, organizational division of labor, role-identification, and compliance with organizational goals.

rule on the LO-membership "from above," compliance has not been secured because the associated costs seem too high.

Another interesting research question is if and how the organizational rules developed within a corporate actor or the external constraints under which it operates affect either the actual feelings or the constructed emotions of its members. Here we are in the realm of both intended and unintended consequences. For example, German trade unions are supposed to promote internal solidarity, but the recently implemented organizational rules seem to weaken its bases (Streeck, in Lehmbruch/ Schmitter 1981: 249-284). German parliamentary party groups are at least to display, if not feel, internal solidarity in parliament. However, the competitive rules of political career-making make compliance with this feeling rule extremely costly for individual MPs who, when they follow it, lose valuable career-making opportunities. At the same time, the interparty opposition and displays of animosity in parliament actually help to reinforce the solidarity rule (Mayntz 1989: 9).

As just pointed out, organizational rules or constraints may strengthen or weaken the corporate capacity to observe feeling rules. But, the opposite may also be the case. A feeling rule may structure the division of labor, patterns of conflict and cooperation, and the information flows within a corporate actor. It may function as an exquisite means of securing internal cohesion or compliance with the corporate goals, but also motivate undesired shifts in these

goals. The case in point is the feeling rule which operates in the British government. This rule states that the ridicule which "the parliamentary Opposition tries to heap upon the government at every opportunity" is to be incessantly avoided (Heclo/ Wildavsky 1974: 10-11). And, indeed, the constant fear of embarrassment accounts for most of the work load of the British ministers, their staff and the Treasury staff, cooperation between ministers and their staff, conflict among the cabinet ministers, and, finally, the type of information released up or across the government hierarchy and to the media. Moreover, it also accounts for the shifts in the ministerial goals (Heclo/ Wildavsky 1974: 15-21, 55/56). This suggests that corporate actors, just like social and occupational groups or elites, may rely on "controlling" emotions, such as the fear of embarrassment, or shame, or guilt to buttress whatever other (normative or instrumental) means of control they have at their disposal in the organization of their work.

Another aspect of corporate emotional life that can be easily studied is the variations in the triggers, frequency and intensity of emotional mobilization. As far as most Western political parties are concerned, it is the legal framework of each state which determines the election-timed frequency of their "routinized," relatively non-intense, and regular cycles of mobilization (Nedelmann 1987; Flam 1988). In contrast, the Communist and Fascist parties, when in power, organize constant, high-pitch, minutely orchestrated mobilization "from above." It is the leadership and

the staff of these parties themselves which typically trigger a mobilization.

In bureaucratized and centralized trade unions, where normative-instrumental controls are imposed on the membership to prevent it from "spontaneous" mobilization, a mobilization "from below" occurs relatively infrequently and rarely encompasses the entire membership. In contrast, in decentralized and weakly bureaucratized trade unions, mobilization from below is more frequent and contagious. However, "top-down", leader-initiated mobilization in both kinds of unions is difficult to achieve, albeit for very different reasons (Schain, in Cerny/ Schain 1980: 208; Hinrichs/ Wiesenthal 1986: 285, 292-293).

While mass political parties and trade unions differ from other corporate actors to the extent that they have a considerable "collective movement" component to which "bottom-up" emotional mobilization can be attributed, it is nevertheless clear that even business firms go through "top-down" cycles of emotional mobilization, wherein the purpose is to heighten employee loyalty towards the firm, strengthen their commitment to its goals, and, thereby, to increase productivity. Employee loyalty is considered a functional prerequisite in the life of every business firm, but, the point is that top-down drives to secure it go through recognizable cycles. In the West, such mobilization cycles seem to accompany economic stagnation cycles, but also periods of war mobilization. It is also common knowledge that Japanese firms rely more routinely on this kind of mobilization than European firms have,

at least in the past. These facts justify past and current research on organizational cultures as well as on national and international variations in business-firm cultures.

**Thesis 2: Feeling Rules Regulate and Emotions Accompany Corporate Interactions.**

So far I have focused on internal corporate feeling rules. But, it can be also argued that even intercorporate feeling rules exist, rules that could be studied just like the internal ones.

For example, based on the available research devoted to national variations in collective bargaining, it can be pointed out that each nation has its own collective bargaining emotional culture. National collective bargaining systems can be placed along a continuum wherein the polar interclass feeling rules prescribe either hostility or, for lack of a better term, the spirit of reconciliability, if not amicability.<sup>54</sup> These emotions are "representative," and negotiators on each side should display them in dealing with each other. If the leadership of either employer or employee association violates the rule, the members of the respective associations may be expected to signal dissatisfaction or even withdraw a mandate to common negotiations.

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<sup>54</sup> Affective neutrality, associated with "scientific expertise," would constitute a mid-point of this continuum.

The example above dealt with an intercorporate, voluntary, negotiation setting within which corporate actors interacted. The next example, concerned with national parliaments, deals also with an intercorporate setting, but one that is not only obligatory and permanent, but also imposes rather strict procedural rules about decision-making on the corporate actors operating in it. Like collective bargaining, national parliaments exhibit remarkable variations in their emotional cultures which cannot be understood by a reference to particular MPs (the turnover is too high for that). Rather we seem to be dealing here with an interactive, but self-perpetuating, obligatory-coercive phenomenon which exacts its emotional dues from the MPs despite their internal resistance and annoyance. One is struck that hostility, offensive insults, and aggression accompany the polemics between the oppositional parties in the German Bundestag, ridicule and embarrassment accompany them in the British parliament, and, finally, affective-neutrality and the spirit of compromise accompany the polemics in the Swedish parliament (Mayntz 1989: 17; Heclo/ Wildavsky, 1974: 10-11; Nils Stjernquist, in Dahl 1969: 137/138). An obvious question that comes to mind is what accounts for these differences in parliamentary emotional cultures: political parties and the interparty feeling and expression rules they create, or, perhaps, the opposition-cooperation rules between the govern-

ment and the opposition?<sup>55</sup> The answer is to be found in empirical research.

### Thesis 3: Prescribed and Proscribed Emotional Outbursts in Corporate Actors

As the last theme, I would like to treat emotional outbursts which can occur within and between corporate actors. The model of "constrained" emotional man dealt with proscribed and prescribed emotional outbursts (see section 2.B), attributing them either to feeling and expression rules or to their breach. I would like to suggest that individuals working for or living off corporate actors can be expected to exhibit emotional outbursts for the very same reasons.

Prescribed emotional outbursts within or between corporate actors can be expected when the feeling and expression rules are violated, that is, when: a) "representative" emotions are not displayed and/or the displayed emotions are interpreted as acts of defiance, or b) behavioral norms, rules of etiquette or expression and feeling rules attached to hierarchical positions (within or between corporate actors) are not observed.

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<sup>55</sup> Note that in both Germany and Great Britain there is no cooperation between the government and the opposition in parliament - the opposition is not given much influence, and is reduced to a role of a critic. This factor, then, is shared by both parliaments, yet their similarly "negative" emotional cultures are different, underscoring the need to recognize the importance of cultural autonomy in this type of research.

On the other hand, proscribed emotional outbursts within or between corporate actors can be expected either when strategic expectations are disappointed and the strategist fails in the task of impression management, or when the feeling and expression rules, embodying the normative or hierachical orders, themselves become a target of discontent.

Only the last case, I believe, needs some additional reflection. The feeling and expression rules produced by normative and hierarchical orders can become a target of discontent for "legitimate" reasons, for example, on the grounds that they make corporate or intercorporate goal-achievement ineffective. In rare cases, such "defiant emotional outbursts" may actually be charismatic, win principal or agent acclaim, and lead to the restructuring of the feeling and expression rules - and the means-and-ends schemas and organizational hierarchies associated with them.<sup>56</sup> Most often, however, these outbursts will be perceived as acts of defiance and receive a prescribed (negative) emotional response.

Of course, "defiant emotional outbursts" may also reflect personal or group discontents, which may ultimately reflect blocked career opportunities, inequities, denials of deference or power, organizational

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<sup>56</sup> Recently many multinationals, threatened with a profitability crisis, replaced their managers en masse on the assumption that the new ones, brought from the outside and uninfected by internal corporate rules and cultures, would in fact behave as the kinds of charismatic leaders I describe here, and spearhead the process of innovation and rejuvenation.

strains and stresses, etc. etc.<sup>57</sup> Much of contemporary "corporate consulting" deals with, if not actually heals, this type of corporate stress.

Ultimately, most corporate emotions can be classified into two groups:

- a) prescribed emotions include "representative" emotions, tied up with organizational goals and the corporate self-image, and "controlling" emotions, such as fear, embarrassment, shame or guilt as well as anger with defiance. The "controlling" emotions back corporate goals as well as expression and feeling rules and constitute paramount control mechanisms;
- b) proscribed emotions include "non-representative" emotions, seen as obstacles to the realization of the corporate goals and to the appropriate presentation of the corporate self-image, as well as "stressful" and "charismatic" emotions, both expressing, each in its own way, corporate discontents.

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<sup>57</sup> Defiant emotional outbursts may be preceded by self-blame, shame, guilt, sense of frustration and deprivation, but lead to anger and hostility - just like collective behavior theory tells us. Defiant emotions, in contrast to defiant emotional outbursts, may consist in self-blame and a sense of depressed frustration, go no further, and still lead to corporate distress to the extent to which they prevent the construction of the representative emotions. In this sense, lax or absent emotion management is in itself an act of defiance.

Conclusion<sup>58</sup>

In this article I presented a "pure" and a "constrained" emotional man model against the background of a classical and neo-classical model of rational man. Moreover, I re-stated the well-known fact that the rational man model cannot explain the presence of either voluntary collective action or public goods in the absence of selective incentives or coercive measures, and suggested considering not a normative but an emotional man as a potential, complementary point of departure for a solution of this problem. I argued that the emotions involved in collective action, both positive and negative, not only lower the threshold to collective action but even make for its consolidation. In particular, I stressed the role of a "pure," non-normative and non-calculating, emotional charge in initiating collective action. Finally, with respect to corporate actors, I pointed out that even they can be seen as "emotional" and studied from a new perspective which presupposes that they are important constructors, shapers and carriers of emotions and emotional cultures.

Needless to say, the particular weaknesses of the emotional man model that I have proposed and of the arguments I have put forward should not be held against the "emotional" perspective as such. This

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<sup>58</sup> I would like to thank the participants in the MPI Theory Circle for providing me with ideas for this concluding section.

article is meant as an invitation to others to open up and improve conceptually this perspective.

At least one path for future pluralistic model-construction can be proposed. The first step could involve improving and contrasting normative, rational, and emotional action models. In this article I only have touched upon the characteristics of "pure" emotional man and outlined the contours of an emotional interaction model pertaining to love to show that, in fact, sociologists already have done a bit to detect some typical interaction models based on contradictory emotions. But, it is worth noting that sociologists have also identified self-reinforcing emotions and the stable interaction patterns to which they give rise (for example, internal shame in each actor combined with anger between these two actors). Since these emotions are self-reinforcing and self-perpetuating, they can issue in typical, long-term emotional interactional patterns. This focus is akin to Simmel's classical contribution which posited emotions as generative of stable interactional structures. This amounts to saying that sociologists have developed models of "pure" emotional interaction and shown that emotions do in fact have an independent logic and a capacity to structure reality. What is needed is an effort to systematize this work.

The second step would entail specifying typical action-logic mixes both synthetic and temporal. A "constrained" emotional man model exemplifies a synthetic mix wherein rational and/or normative action rules

interact with "pure" feelings and shape emotional expression. Even here improvements and further specification are called for. Of interest in this context is the question which types of feelings are compatible with a parallel rational or normative action-logics and which can only be acted out spontaneously and in defiance of these other action-logics. For example, fury seems only compatible with a spontaneous, cost-indifferent but either norm-oblivious or norm-guided act of aggression, while hate or "cool rage" seems quite compatible with a premeditated, cost-conscious and systematically carried out identical act of aggression. Another unexplored area is the specification of the conditions under which an actor will switch from one type of action logic to another, that is, go through a temporal sequence such as, for example, love, calculus, perceived negative distributional consequences, anger, norm against anger expression, suppressed anger.<sup>59</sup>

Finally, unexplored in this paper and elsewhere is the question of the conditions under which "pure" emotional man restructures norms, determines the choice between the use of selfish or other-oriented type of calculus, or hinders reliance on either norms or calculus. This is yet another exciting task awaiting those interested in pursuing the emotional perspective on social action.

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<sup>59</sup> Both steps could be executed not on a grand scale but in connection with a concrete research project at hand where the research object itself would inform the selection of relevant emotions, emotional interaction models, logic-switches and -mixes, etc.

In conclusion I would like to emphasize again my belief that social research would benefit from model pluralism not the least because social phenomena are multi-dimensional: markets are embedded in norms, corporate actors are emotional, and the sphere of intimate relations does not escape rational calculus. It is an error to assume that each life or action sphere has its distinct and separate logic and should be studied with a model reflecting this logic. Instead, our efforts should be directed at detecting mixes of action logics and the conditions under which switches in action logic take place within one and the same life or action sphere.

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