Optimal Pricing and Quality of Academic Journals and the Ambiguous Welfare 
Effects of Forced Open Access: A Two-Sided Model

Mueller-Langer, Frank; Watt, Richard

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Optimal Pricing and Quality of Academic Journals and the Ambiguous Welfare Effects of Forced Open Access: A Two-Sided Model

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Mueller-Langer, Frank
MPI for Intellectual Property and Competition Law, Max Planck Society;

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http://ssrn.com/abstract=2045956
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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3375
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Citation

Mueller-Langer, F., & Watt, R. (2012). Optimal Pricing and Quality of Academic Journals and the Ambiguous Welfare Effects of Forced Open Access: A Two-Sided Model. TILEC Discussion Paper, DP 2012-019.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0010-0E04-9

Abstract

We analyze optimal pricing and quality of a monopolistic journal and the optimality of open access in a two-sided model. The predominant aspect of the model that determines the quality levels at which open access is optimal is the nature of the relationship between readers and authors in a journal. In contrast to previous literature, we firstly show that there exist scenarios in which open access is a feature of high-quality journals. Second, we find that removal of copyright (and thus forced open access) decreases journal profits but has ambiguous social welfare effects.