Territories of Knowledge in Japanese Conversation

Coverphotograph by Kaoru Hayano
Printed and bound by Ipskamp Drukkers b.v., Nijmegen
ISBN: 978-90-76203-47-8

Territories of knowledge in Japanese conversation

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor
aan de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen
op gezag van de rector magnificus prof. mr. S.C.J.J. Kortmann,
volgens besluit van het college van decanen
in het openbaar te verdedigen op maandag 6 mei 2013
om 13.30 uur precies

door

Kaoru Hayano
geboren op 30 mei 1977
te Tokyo (Japan)

Promotoren
Prof. Dr. Stephen C. Levinson
Prof. Dr. John Heritage (UCLA)

Copromotor
Prof. Dr. Tanya Stivers (UCLA)

Manuscriptcommissie
Prof. Dr. Nick Enfield
Prof. Dr. Elizabeth Couper-Kuhlen (University of Helsinki)
Prof. Dr. Makoto Hayashi (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)

The research reported in this thesis was supported by a grant from the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften, München, Germany.

Acknowledgements

Of course, writing a PhD thesis is a difficult process, involving alternations between self-doubt and regret. Mine was no exception. It was not easy to keep telling myself it was worth everything I was devoting and sacrificing, or even that it would be completed one day. But, looking back at the years I spent at Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, I can now see that the entire process was, and is going to be, the most cherished time of my life. Every single day at MPI challenged me in the most exciting way imaginable. Now, as I came to the end of this process, I feel a strong attachment to this thesis precisely because it is the culmination of all I was given by the people I have had an honor to meet.

First and foremost, I want to thank Steve Levinson, my promotor and the author of the book that first drew me into the venture of pragmatics many years ago. I could feel my brain vibrate and absorb as much as it could handle every time I discussed data with him. I sincerely enjoyed his insightful input and criticism, which improved the quality of the thesis to a great extent. I thank him for his intellectual stimulation, generosity and encouragement.

I was extremely lucky to have worked in the office just across the hall from my supervisor Tanya Stivers, whom I could always count on. Whenever I got stuck or needed inspiration, she was just a few steps away to give me patient and encouraging guidance. I benefitted tremendously from her constant passion and devotion, which I could feel flowing from of her office. Her positive energy helped me enjoy the difficult steps.

I cannot put into words how thankful I am to my mentor John Heritage. It was John's papers that got me seriously committed to conversation analysis in the first place, seriously enough to leave Tokyo. I started CA because I wanted to learn to analyze human conduct as critically and warmly as he does, and write it out as beautifully as he does. That will always be my goal, and I thank him for giving me such an exciting aim.

I would also like to thank four other teachers I have had: Manny Schegloff, Chuck Goodwin, Sachiko Ide and Makoto Hayashi. Working with them built my backbone as a researcher which then supported me throughout the dissertation writing process. Knowing how devoted and uncompromising Manny is makes me feel obliged to do my very best and dig deep into every piece of data. I learned

from Chuck how to transcribe, how to analyze, and more fundamentally, the joy of doing CA. Professor Ide taught me what it meant to read, what it meant to think and what it meant to write when I had no clue. Makoto has never been officially appointed my supervisor, but what he has done for me definitely makes him the most generous teacher I could wish for. He kept faith in my work and opened doors for me at every critical step.

I owe much to my friends Jeremy, Lila, Rebecca and Netta, who generously edited my final draft. I felt honored and rewarded to share my work with my friends. Their thorough reading and thoughtful comments improved the thesis tremendously. I am lucky to have such friends.

The members of the L&C group are the ones who made my days tolerable, colorful, exciting or happy, depending on what we were facing each day. I thank Penny, Jan-Peter, Asifa, Gunter, Michael, Edith, Gertie, Sonja, Mark Dingemanse, Connie, Hilário, Tyko, Olivier, Mark Sicoli, Elizabeth, Joe, Simeon, Giovanni, Kobin, Saskia, Vishnu. I learned tremendously from all the conversations I've had with them at meetings, lunch tables, parties and hallways. Nick Enfield deserves a special thanks − he was always patient with me and discussions with him were a source of inspiration. I wish I could thank Melissa in person. She was my role model − as a researcher, teacher and friend. I was inspired and encouraged day-to-day by her abiding curiosity, devotion to the work and her colleagues and her warmth. I hope I will be able to give half of what she has given me to people I work with.

I also thank members of TG, especially Paul and Nick Wood for all the technical support they patiently provided. Some more friends from other groups also deserve mentioning: I thank Sarah, Francisco, Giusy, Makiko and Helen for all those coffee breaks, beer breaks and climbing breaks, which were indispensable part of my PhD life.

I would like to express special thanks to Lilla, Federico, Clair and Sylvia, who supported me in every way imaginable. I loved and benefited a lot from all the discussions, chats and conspiracies we had. I thank Lilla for helping me stay strong and find fun in life. I thank Federico for all the laughs, inspiration and support he would provide in the perfect form. No word captures how much I owe to my office mates and paranymphs Clair and Sylvia. I thank Clair for being incredibly kind and warm and always standing by me. I thank Sylvia for being such a faithful, inspirational and supportive friend. They are my family without whom I would never have been able to make it.

Finally, I would like to thank my family, who understood and supported my decision to be away for years without questioning even once. My parents nurtured my conviction that I should seek after what I want, and I never stopped feeling supported. I can never thank my husband, Yuki, enough. It has been a tough process for him as it has been for me, but he survived it with me. Although it does not show in the text, it's his support that made every page in this thesis possible.

Contents

Transcript Symbols

1 Data are represented in three-line transcripts. The first line represents the original utterance transcribed as it sounded in Japanese. The second line provides word-by-word glosses of the utterance (see the list of abbreviations, pp. vii). The third line provides an English translation.

2 Temporal aspects

[Left brackets indicate a starting point of overlapping talk.

] Right brackets indicate an ending point of overlapping talk.

[[Double left brackets indicate a starting point of nonverbal behavior.

]] Double right brackets indicate an ending point of nonverbal behavior.

= Equal signs ordinarily come in pairs – one at the end of a line and another at the start of the next line or one shortly thereafter. They are used to indicate three things:
1) If the lines connected by two equal signs are by the same speaker, then there was a single, continuous utterance with no break or pause, which was broken up in order to accommodate overlapping talk.
2) If the lines connected by two equal signs are by different speakers, then the second was “latched” to the first.
3) If two words within a single turn are connected by equal signs, then the two words sound “latched or run together.

(0.0) Numbers in parentheses indicate silence represented in seconds.

(.) A dot in parentheses indicates a micropause.

3 Aspects of speech delivery

:: Colons indicate the prolongation or stretching of the sound just preceding them.

- A hyphen indicates a glottal stop.

hh The letter "h" or a series of "h"s indicates audible outbreath. The number of "h" corresponds to the length of outbreath.

.hh The letter "h" preceded by a period indicates audible inbreath. The number of "h" corresponds to the length of inbreath.

$ The U.S. dollar sign indicates "smile voice."

> < The combination of “more than” and “less than” symbols indicates that the talk between them is compressed or rushed.

<> Used in the reverse order, they indicate that a stretch of talk is markedly slowed or drawn out.

< The "less than" symbol by itself indicates that the immediately following talk sounds like it starts with a rush.

words Underlining is used to indicate stress or emphasis.

° The degree sign indicates that the talk following it was markedly quiet or soft.

°° When there are two degree signs, the talk between them is markedly softer than the talk around it.

A harsh sign indicates creaky or gravelly voice quality.

4 Aspects of intonation and prosody: The punctuation marks are not used grammatically, but to indicate intonation.

. The period indicates a falling, or final, intonation contour, not necessarily the end of a sentence.

? A question mark indicates rising intonation, not, necessarily a question

, A comma indicates slightly rising intonation, not necessarily a clause boundary.

?, A combined question mark and comma indicates a rise stronger than a comma but weaker than a question mark.

_ An underscore following a unit of talk indicates level intonation.

^ The circumflex symbol indicates a rise in pitch.

| The pipe symbol indicates a fall in pitch.

5 Others

( ) Empty parentheses indicate inaudible word(s).

(words) Words in parentheses in the first line of transcripts suggest that they are likely possibilities of what was said. Words in parenthesis in the third line of transcripts indicate words that were not uttered in Japanese but supplied to make English translations grammatical and/or intelligible.

((words)) Double parentheses are used to supply contextually relevant information.

List of abbreviations used in the inter-linear gloss

AUX	auxiliary verb
CNJ	conjunctive particle
CP	various forms of copula *be*
CS	causative
EMP	emphasis marker
END	endearment title
FP	final particle
HNR	honorific marker
HS	hearsay
HT	honorific title
IP	interjection particle
ITJ	interjection
L	nominal linking particle
MIM	mimetics
N	nominalizer particle
NC	numeral classifier
NM	newsmark interjection
O	object particle
P	partile
PL	plural marker
PST	past tense
Q	question particle
QT	quotative particle
SP	subject particle
TAG	tag question marker
TP	topic particle
VOL	volitional

Chapter 1

Introduction:
Territories of Knowledge, Grammar and Interaction

1.1 Point of departure: social distribution of knowledge

Participants in everyday interaction assiduously attend to distributions of knowledge and information among one another in designing utterances. While for the most part their orientations to knowledge distribution covertly underlie the actions and activities in which they are engaged, distribution of knowledge can, at times, come to the foreground of social interaction. The most explicit illustration of such cases is when dissonance emerges in conversationalists' views of knowledge distribution. For instance, in Extract 1-1, Emi assumes her interlocutors Yui and Aki share the information that she has: that the restaurant whose food they are eating is relatively new. This assumption, however, is rejected by Yui and Aki.

Extract 1-1 [TD: NewVille]

```
1      Yui:    mhhm. ((speaking with mouth full))
               good
               (It's) good.

2              (1.2)

3      Yui:    niku.
               meat
               Meat is (good).

4               (1.6)

5      Emi:    umai.
               good
               (It's) good.

6              (3.1)
```

```
7 ->   Emi:    koko dekite yokatta  yone,
               here built  good.PST FP
               It was nice that this (restaurant) opened, yone,
8             (1.0)

9      Aki:    [nn?
                Mm?

10 =>  Yui:    [atarashii no?,
                new       P
               (Is it) new?,

11     Emi:    nyuu ville?
               ((Name))
               New Ville?

12     Yui:    ((nods))

13 ->  Emi:    atarashii yone:,
               new       FP
               (It's) new yone:,

14             (0.2)

15 =>  Aki:    shira na:i,=
               know  not
               (I) don't know,=

16     Emi:    =nakatta    mon.
                be.not.PST FP
               =(It) wasn't there.

17     Aki:    a   soo  na no:,=
               ITJ that CP P
               Oh is that so,=

18     Emi:    =hn,
                ITJ
               =Yeah,
```

After appreciating the food (lines 1-5), Emi asserts that it was nice that the restaurant opened (line 7). With the particle *yone* attached to this utterance, Emi conveys that she assumes her interlocutors share the knowledge about the restaurant's opening and invites them to agree or disagree with her assessment that it is "nice" (Hasunuma 1995; Chapter 2, this thesis). Instead of agreeing or disagreeing with Emi, however, both Yui and Aki display lack of knowledge regarding how old (or new) the restaurant is: Yui does so by asking for confirmation of the information that was implied in Emi's previous utterance (i.e.,

whether the restaurant is new [line 10]); and Aki explicitly states that she does not know (line 15). Emi then asserts that the restaurant was not there (line 16), this time presenting this as information that is not shared by her interlocutors. Thus, what was launched as, and could have been, a simple assessment-agreement sequence turns into an extended exchange in which they readjust their views on who knows and does not know what, using various linguistic resources.

Whether it becomes an explicit issue in interaction or not, interactants must assess, index and reassess who knows what and to what extent. It is not surprising, for knowledge and information is considered a "good" (Garfinkel 2008) with economical and social value (Levinson 2012a) that belongs to its possessor's "territory of information" (Kamio 1990, 1994, 1995, 1997, 2002) or "preserve", whose boundaries are "patrolled and defended by the claimant" (Goffman 1971: 52). It is in everyday interaction that we claim, patrol and defend our territories, as well as respect or violate others' territories, and our interactional conduct is consequential to the territories. In what follows, I will label this concern with knowledge 'epistemicity'.

Moreover, knowledge distribution is not a matter that simply operates at the level of individuals. Instead, as sociologists suggest, it is *socially* distributed: a body of knowledge is often considered to be possessed by a social group (Schutz 1964; Holzner 1968; Sharrock 1974). For instance, medical knowledge belongs to "physicians" as a social group, and this conceptualization is not generally put into question by lay individuals who possess as much knowledge (Drew 1991).

It follows that information territories are bound to social identities and social relations. In an institutional setting such as medical interaction between a physician and a patient, interactants exhibit their orientations to relevant social roles by displaying professional knowledge on the side of doctors, and amateur knowledge, on the side of patients (Drew 1991). In non-institutional casual settings, too, participants are oriented to who is entitled to what experience (Sacks 1984), or has rights to which bodies of knowledge, and accordingly, who they are to each other (Heritage and Raymond 2005; Stivers 2005; Raymond and Heritage 2006). This is not to say that social identities determine the type and amount of knowledge that people actually have. Rather, participants work together to make a specific aspect of their identity relevant at a moment in interaction (e.g., as 'doctor', instead of 'a man', 'an adult', 'an Asian' and so on, see Sacks [1972]; Schegloff [1991]), and displaying their knowledge states to each other is one way of doing so (Raymond and Heritage 2006). When the topic is about a medical condition, participants'

identities and relationships are set by reference to the activity (i.e., medical treatment). When the topic is about when a local restaurant opened, it may reflexively index who is an old-timer local and who is new (cf. Extract 1).

In order to be considered competent, interactants have to be able to display their orientation to social aspects of epistemicity via linguistic resources. It is this aspect of language use that this thesis investigates: interactants' competences to claim, index, and negotiate territories of information and their social identities in everyday interaction. Adopting the methodology of conversation analysis (CA), this thesis explores how participants' orientations to epistemicity are manifested in their language use and in the sequence organization in Japanese everyday conversations.

The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. First, I review research on epistemicity in psychology and linguistics and then discuss conversation analytic studies that examine the relevance of knowledge distribution in interaction (Section 1.2). I then discuss academic contributions I attempt to make by examining Japanese data (Section 1.3). Next, I specify the scope and goals of this thesis (Section 1.4). Section 1.5 describes CA methodology, illustrating some key analytic apparatuses. Section 1.6 provides a description of the database used for the study. Finally in Section 1.7, I preview the organization of this thesis.

1.2 Approaches to epistemicity

The history of our interest in epistemicity goes back as far as Aristotle and Plato (see Givón [2001]). Since then, it has been a research subject in such wide-ranging fields as philosophy, sociology, anthropology, cognitive sciences and linguistics. In this section, I review three major lines of research that address the significance of epistemicity in human language and communication: psychology, linguistics and then conversation analysis.

1.2.1 Psychological approaches

Many psychologists and cognitive scientists study knowledge distribution. A central theory on the topic is "Theory of Mind", i.e., the ability to attribute mental states (knowledge, beliefs, intentions etc.) to oneself and others (Premack

and Woodruff 1978). For instance, in their false-belief task, Wimmer and Perner (1983) ask subjects to observe a scene in which an object is moved from one place to another while the protagonist character is absent. Subjects are then asked to predict where the protagonist will look for the object. In order to successfully perform this task, subjects must be able to recognize that what they know to be the case does not necessarily represent what others believe to be the case. Normally developing subjects older than 3 or 4 years of age are able to predict that the protagonist will look where the object used to be (but is not any longer) while younger children and people with autism are unable to correctly predict it (Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith 1985). Studies that observe babies' pointing show that they are aware of what caretakers are informed of and not informed of even at the age of 12 months (Liszkowsky 2006).

The ability to understand others' mental states is a basic cognitive faculty that is a prerequisite to human communication. If we were not able to assess others' mental states, we could not decide, for instance, whether or not a piece of information counts as news to a particular recipient. In actual interaction, however, participants not only take into account knowledge distribution but also constantly update it monitoring each other's contributions. Those who discuss "common ground" − the mutually recognized shared information (Stalnaker 2002:704) − focus more on such processes in communication (Clark and Brennan 1991; Clark 1996). They see communication as a joint process of upgrading and building up common ground. By conceptualizing communication this way, Clark (1996) proposes a logical and economical model of communication.

These psychological studies reveal features of the cognitive faculty and processes involved in attending to what others know. What they deal with is the management of knowledge in controlled and/or imagined situations. In spontaneous interaction, the domain of knowledge states are inseparable from such other interactional concerns as the management of affiliation and disaffiliation, the management of social identities and relations, and the management of participation frameworks. The current study approaches epistemicity not as an independent cognitive process but as a social phenomenon embedded in such a multi-layered, complex structure of interaction.

1.2.2 Linguistic approaches

Linguists document various aspects of human orientation to knowledge and information that are indexed by and presupposed in language and language use. In this section, I discuss three lines of linguistic work on epistemicity: linguistic marking of epistemicity in grammar; psycholinguistic work on information structure and common ground; sociolinguistic and pragmatic discussions on epistemicity in action.

1.2.2.1 Linguistic encoding of epistemicity

Linguists investigate grammatical encoding of speakers' orientation to knowledge and information. They discuss the issue under the rublic of two major topics: epistemic modality and evidentiality. Palmer (1986:51) defines epistemic modality as "the degree of commitment by the speaker to what he says" (see also Lyons 1977; Givón 1982; Chafe 1986; Palmer 1986; Traugott 1989; Nuyts 2001, among many others). Thus, unlike the philosophical work in epistemology, which sees epistemicity to be a purely logical and objective matter (see Lyons [1977] and Givón [1982] for a review of epistemological work) linguists see it as a speaker's subjective attitude and have been interested in the topic as a site to observe human subjectivity in grammar (e.g., Traugott 1989). Topics of their work include structural and semantic descriptions of epistemic modality markers, typology of how epistemicity is encoded across languages (e.g., Givón 1982, 2001), logical structures that the epistemic modal system brings about (Lyons 1977; Givón 1982, 2001), or how a lexical item comes to be an epistemic stance marker through grammaticization processes (Traugott 1989).

While epistemic modality primarily concerns the likelihood of the correctness of information, evidentiality concerns the source of information (e.g., Boas 1911; Chafe ane Nichols 1986; Willet 1988; Kamio 1990, 2002; Fox 2001; Gipper 2011). For instance, Yurakaré has clitics that indicate whether a piece of information is hearsay, an inference, a subjective interpretation or an assumption (Gipper 2011). Early work on evidentiality focuses on languages that have grammaticized evidential markers, but more recent work adopts a typological perspective and examines non-grammaticized resources to mark the source of information as well (see, for instance, Fox [2001] on English perception verbs and Clift [2006] on English reported speech constructions).

The majority of linguistic studies on epistemicity and evidentiality focus on the description of formal and semantic features of the linguistic markers, leaving social or contextual factors outside their scope. However, when examined from an interactional viewpoint, epistemicity and evidentiality is often, if not always, a social phenomenon − it concerns the relationship between participants and a referent, social responsibilities or entitlement (Du Bois 1986; Fox 2001; Gipper 2011).

Among efforts to incorporate social factors into the discussions on epistemicity is Kamio's theory of "territory of information" (Kamio 1990, 1994, 1995, 2002). His contribution is unique and important in two major respects. First, his theory systematically incorporates addressees into the framework. Kamio argues that a piece of information belongs to 1) the speaker's territory of information, 2) the hearer's territory of information or 3) both speaker's and hearer's territories of information, and the form of an utterance is controlled by which type of information it delivers. Second, his theory not only provides a framework to investigate semantics and the use of epistemic markers but also allows us to acknowledge the pragmatic and social upshots of deferring or failing to defer to interlocutors' territories of information. He suggests that failure to respect others' territories does not result in an ungrammatical utterance but in a socially inapt, impolite utterance (Kamio 1990:231-238). This suggests that the territory of information is not a static semantic category but is a social entity that is respected or violated via language use. In this respect, Kamio's theory informs and resonates with work done by sociologists and conversation analysts. In fact, although his work is based on made-up sentences, Kamio insightfully predicted that the notion of territories of information would account for the distribution of evidential markings in conversation (Kamio 1990, 2002). His theory influences recent conversation analytic work on epistemicity to a great extent (Heritage 2012a, 2012b; Heritage and Raymond 2005), and this thesis is no exception.

In this subsection, I have reviewed linguistic work on epistemic modality and evidentiality. Before we move on, it should be noted that the distinction between epistemic modality and evidentiality is not always relevant for studies that adopt a social perspective; the source of knowledge (i.e., evidentiality) is often indexed in order to defer to an interlocutor's authority or validity of the speaker's position (i.e., epistemic stance) (Fox 2001; Gipper 2011). In this thesis, I do not treat epistemicity and evidentiality as distinct or separable from each other. The term epistemicity is used broadly to refer to human orientation to knowledge and

information, including the degree of commitment to knowledge (epistemic modality) and kinds of access to knowledge (evidentiality), among other aspects (see Section 1.2.3.4 below).

1.2.2.2 The state of information and discourse

While the linguistic studies discussed above focus on specific grammatical elements within a sentence as the object of analysis, others approach epistemicity by examining the structure of a sentence referring to the discursive context within which it is produced.

Lambrecht (1994) suggests that a sentence has the "information structure", which accommodates and is adapted to a speaker's assumptions about the hearer's state of mind (see also Halliday [1967]). For instance, whether a speaker assumes that a piece of information is already known to a hearer or not is formally expressed in a sentence through grammatical markers or prosody (Lambrecht 1994:6). The choice of a reference form also manifests a speaker's assumptions about the hearer's state of mind (Chafe 1976, 1998; Lambrecht 1994). Chafe (1976), for instance, explains that a full noun is used for a new or inactivated referent whereas a pronoun suffices for a referent that has already been given or activated in the preceding discursive context (see also Fox 1987; Enfield 2006).

These studies therefore see epistemicity as the issue that pervades in language and language use. As Chafe (1998:107) says, language serves its function in communication because speakers are able to and do take the listener's mind into account. Here, we see the convergence of psychological and linguistic views on knowledge: both acknowledge that we are equipped with the cognitive ability to consider and assess others' knowledge states and with linguistic competence to index them with grammatical resources. The ability to take others' knowledge states into account is also presupposed in speech act theory, on which the next section focuses.

1.2.2.3 Epistemicity and speech act theory

Another line of work that should be mentioned here comes from language philosophy and sociolinguistics: those studies that view epistemic states as a component that determines the action that an utterance performs. Speech act theory refers to speakers' and addressees' knowledge states as a preparatory condition for some speech acts. For instance, in performing an act of questioning, a condition that must be met is that the speaker does not know the answer and the addressee

putatively does know the answer (Searle 1969:66). When it is clear from the situation that the speaker knows the answer, the utterance, even if it is in the interrogative form, will not be treated as a request for information but as an 'exam question' (Searle ibid.). Sociolinguists Labov and Fanshel (1977) also discuss the relevance of information distribution to the action an utterance implements. They distinguish between two types of information: 'A-events' and 'B-events'. A-events are known to the speaker (A) but not to the addressee (B), and B events are known to the addressee (B) but not to the speaker (A). They point out that a declarative statement that addresses a B-event (e.g., "You booked your flight already.") functions as a question or a confirmation request even though it lacks any lexical or syntactic element that marks the utterance as such. Thus, distribution of information can contribute to determining the action that an utterance performs despite its dissonance with the syntactic form (Heritage 2012a). The assumption underlying both speech act theory and Labov and Fanshel (1977) is that interactants generally have an understanding about who knows what and what information belongs to whom, and that understanding is a prerequisite for producing and understanding utterances. As we will see in Section 1.2.3.2, this perspective is taken up and developed by conversation analysts.

The linguistic studies I have reviewed in this section contribute to our understanding of how epistemicity is encoded in language, how its perception is fundamental in language use, and how knowledge distribution is presupposed in language use. What remains to be done is empirically work out ways in which interlocutors attend to territories of information in interaction using linguistic (and non-linguistic) resources. By systematically examining sequences of turns in spontaneous interaction, instead of individual sentences, CA describes dynamic processes of deferring, defending, invading and negotiating information territories, which reflexively informs us of functions of linguistic resources used in the processes and the nature of information territories.

1.2.3 Conversation analytic approaches

In the preceding two subsections, I reviewed previous studies in psychology and linguistics that address epistemicity. Psychologists investigate our cognitive ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others, while linguists

contribute to our understanding of linguistic encoding of mental states and pragmatic competence in indexing and recognizing knowledge distribution. Conversation analysts, in contrast, focus on social processes through which participants deal with relative knowledge states. It is considered that attribution of information (e.g., who owns it, whether it is news or not) is not simply determined prior to and independently of interaction. Rather, participants constantly and reflexively (re)establish intersubjectivity regarding information attribution through their moment-by-moment conduct in interaction. From such a viewpoint, CA has developed a unique analytic framework which reveals procedures through which participants index and negotiate relative epistemic states not in a single occasion or sentence, but over the course of interaction.

While epistemicity has been a rapidly growing area of research in CA over the last several years, some foundational work was done in early 70s and 80s. Participants' highly sensitive orientations to interlocutors' knowledge states and their interactional manifestations were described by Goodwin (1979, 1981, 1984) as well as Sacks (1974) and Terasaki (2004[1976]). Pomerantz (1980) dealt with the issue that Searle (1969) raised - the relation of utterance form, knowledge distribution and the action that the utterance implements - from the interactional viewpoint. Heritage (1984a), through the analysis of a change-of-state token "oh", demonstrated that interactants negotiate and co-establish epistemic relations through turn-by-turn talk in interaction. Sacks (1984, 1992) discusses the notion of "entitlement" - that interactants have senses about who are entitled to experience or information, and how that entitlement can be or cannot be passed on through interaction. The idea that parties have different degrees of entitlement to information or experience and that it is through interaction that the entitlement is claimed, respected and/or transferred is recast and elaborated in recent studies (see Section 1.2.3.4).

These early studies built the foundation of the area of investigation, providing for later work. They established that epistemicity is a social interactional problem to parties in everyday conversation, and participant orientation to it can be found in various aspects of interactional conduct. In what follows, I discuss conversation analytic studies that address epistemicity, grouping them into four clusters depending on their focus: those that discuss epistemicity as a dimension of "recipient design"; those that discuss epistemicity with regard to the action that an utterance implements; those that discuss it as a device to mobilize response; and

those that discuss different dimensions of epistemic stances that are adopted alongside the action.

1.2.3.1 Epistemicity as a dimension of recipient design

The earliest CA studies that refer to knowledge distribution discuss the issue as an aspect of "recipient design" (Schegloff 1972; Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974; Sacks and Schegloff 1979). Recipient design is “a multitude of respects in which the talk by a party in a conversation is constructed or designed in ways which display an orientation and sensitivity to the particular other(s) who are the coparticipants” (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974:727) and this principle operates pervasively in interaction. For instance, speakers try to pick a form to refer to a person in the way that is adequate and appropriate to a particular recipient (Sacks and Schegloff 1979).

Another way in which this principle takes effect obliges participants to be attentive to interlocutors' knowledge states: they are oriented to not presenting as news, something that an interlocutor already knows (Sacks 1974; Terasaki 2004[1976]; Schegloff 2007). Thus, participants who have possible news to deliver ensure that a recipient is not informed of the news before delivering it (see Chapter 3 for an example) (Terasaki ibid.).

Goodwin (1979, 1981, 1984, 1986) reports how a unit of talk, a story or even a single sentential TCU, is constructed such that it is appropriately designed for a targeted recipient at the moment. In particular, he examines cases in which a speaker has both "knowing" recipients (i.e., recipients who have prior knowledge about the event that is being told) and "unknowing" recipients (i.e., recipients who do not have prior knowledge) and shows that details of sentence construction reflect its speakers' sensitivity to the knowledge state of the recipient to whom they are addressing at the moment.

In short, attendance to interlocutors' epistemic states, and adjustments to one's conduct accordingly, are pervasively observed in interaction. Participants work to avoid violating the principle of not telling known news as news using various interactional means. This is one way to attend to their interlocutors and show respect to their "territories" of information (Kamio 1990). Another reason participants must attend to each other's epistemic states is to understand the action that an utterance is used to perform. The next section turns to studies that address this aspect of participants' orientations to epistemicity.

1.2.3.2 Epistemicity and action

In Section 1.2.1, I discussed the ways Labov and Fanshel (1977) and speech act theory refer to knowledge distribution as a factor that conditions the action that an utterance implements. Conversation analysts also discuss this aspect of action formation and recognition (Pomerantz 1980; Heritage 2002, 2012a; Koshik 2002; Levinson 2012a, 2012b). Pomerantz (1980) argues that participants in interaction distinguish between two types of knowledge, which are similar to those that Labov and Fanshel (1977) propose: Type 1 knowables and Type 2 knowables. A type 1 knowable is information that an individual has rights and obligations to know. A type 2 knowable is information that an individual happens to know. Pomerantz demonstrates that when a speaker does "telling my side", or, refers to Type 2 knowables that are Type 1 knowables to recipients, they function as "fishing devices" to solicit first-hand information from the recipient. Below is an example.

Extract 1-2 [Pomerantz 1980:189]

```
A:      Yer line's been busy.
B:      Yeuh my fu(hh)! .hh my father's wife called me...
```

A refers to information that she happens to have but that B should definitely know about. Although this utterance is not marked as a question with any grammatical or prosodic cues, it functions as a request for information (cf. a 'B-event statement', according to Labov and Fanshel 1977); B responds to this with an account for why it is that her line has been busy. Pomerantz suggests that by soliciting information in this way, as opposed to with more directly questioning (e.g., 'Why has your line been busy?'), speakers display their orientation to the possibly delicate nature of the issue − e.g., interlocutor's privacy or possibly complainable issues. Mentioning Type-2 knowables, therefore, is a practice for performing an action of its own interactional import, and participants' shared orientations towards to whom a piece of information belongs play a central role in producing and understanding this action.

This phenomenon underlines that declarative syntax is not necessarily used to make a declarative statement, nor is interrogative necessarily used to do questioning (see Bolinger 1957; Quirk et al. 1985; Heritage 2002b; Koshik 2002; Heinemann 2008). In order to understand whether an utterance in the declarative form is a statement or a question, one has to discern who knows what better than

whom to what extent. This leads Heritage (2012a) to propose that participants distinguish "epistemic status" from "epistemic stance". "Epistemic status" is a relatively enduring social relationship vis-à-vis knowledgeability that is presumably shared by participants: physicians putatively know medicine better than lay people do; parents putatively know their children better than others do; close friends putatively know about each other than mere acquaintances do. On the other hand, "epistemic stance" is a moment-by-moment, actual expression of knowledge distribution in utterances, encoded through grammatical resources or intonation. While epistemic stance usually converges with epistemic status, B-event statements (Labov and Fanshel 1977) or 'telling my side' (Pomerantz 1980) are cases where they diverge: the grammatical construction (i.e., declarative) indicates that the speakers have access to the information, but they actually do not. When such a divergence appears, it is epistemic status that takes precedence in shaping the action that an utterance is understood to implement. Participants, therefore, attend both to linguistically or prosodically encoded epistemic stances and to putatively shared epistemic relations in order to produce and understand utterances in interaction.

1.2.3.3 Epistemicity as a mobilizing response device

Another way in which knowledge distribution is attended to and utilized in interaction is for inviting an interlocutor's participation (Goodwin 1987) or for mobilizing responses (Stivers and Rossano 2010). Goodwin (1987) demonstrates that displaying "forgetfulness" or uncertainty in the course of storytelling can be an interactional resource to recruit a knowing party's aid in the telling. Below is an example.

Extract 1-3 [Goodwin 1987:117]

```
Mike:   I was watching Johnny Carson one night
        en there was a guy by the na- What was
        that guy's name. =Blake?
```

In this conversation, there are three couples: Mike and his wife Phyllis, and two other couples. Mike starts off his story addressing it to and gazing at unknowing recipients, the two other couples. However, in the midst of his telling, he displays uncertainty about the name of the guest ('What was that guy's name.=Blake?'), while looking at Phyllis, whom he treats as a knowing participant. Goodwin

convincingly shows that such a display of uncertainty does not always index a purely psychological state of mind, for it can be an interactional strategy to recruit a knowing participant's, in this case Phyllis', participation.

Relatedly, Stivers and Rossano (2010) demonstrate that addressing recipient-tilted epistemic asymmetry is one of the resources to mobilize recipient response. They argue that utterances do not equally solicit responses, but the degree to which an utterance mobilizes a response varies depending on 1) morphosyntactic features, 2) prosody, 3) knowledge distribution and 4) presence or absence of gaze at the recipient. They show that when an utterance addresses an issue that belongs to the recipient's territory of information, that utterance is more likely to solicit a response than one that addresses information that is already shared or information that belongs to the speaker's information territory. In the same line of thinking, Heritage (2012b) maintains that epistemic asymmetry, whether it is tilted toward the recipient or the speaker, serves as a driving force to advance sequences of talk. He says that when epistemic asymmetry is evened, topics tend to come to closure.

These studies present cases in which speakers downgrade their epistemic stances, the primary objective of which is not to reveal their uncertainty but to promote interaction. They show that epistemic stance can serve as a vehicle to achieve another interactional goal, i.e., ensuring others' participation or response. However, there are cases in which epistemicity is the issue that participants orient to as relevant. The next section introduces studies that approach epistemicity in such a context.

1.2.3.4 Dimensions of epistemic stances

Section 1.2.3.2 discussed conversation analytic studies that show that epistemicity can be a crucial factor in formulating and understanding an action. In these studies, participants can be identified as either "knowing" or "unknowing". However, epistemicity is not a dichotomous polar notion but consists of multiple dimensions. As Sacks (1974) suggests with his concept of "entitlement", knowledge often involves such social and moral orders as rights, responsibility, and authority. This section reviews studies that discuss such dimensions of knowing or not knowing relevant in interaction: different types of *epistemic access* (Pomerantz 1975, 1984a; Goodwin and Goodwin 1987; Heritage 2002a); *epistemic authority* (Heritage 2002a), *epistemic primacy* (Raymond and Heritage 2006), *primary rights* (Heritage and Raymond 2005; Stivers 2005) and *epistemic*

responsibility (Keevallik 2011; Stivers 2011; Stivers, Mondada and Steensig 2011).[1]

Epistemic access

As discussed in Section 1.2.3.1, participants assiduously attend to whether their interlocutors have epistemic access to a referent or not in order to design their turns appropriately for them. In addition to this dichotomous, have-or-not-have distinction, what kind of access one has can also be a relevant issue.

For instance, one can have either *independent access* or *dependent access.* In her work on agreement and disagreement, Pomerantz (1984a) argues that proffering a second assessment is a way to claim independent access to the referent, while one can also respond to a first assessment without claiming independent access. For instance, in the example below, G agrees with C's first assessment by stating her own, second assessment.

Extract 1-4 [Pomerantz 1984a: 60]

```
C:      ... She was a nice lady--I liked her.
G:      I liked her too
```

By responding to C in this particular way, G is not only agreeing with C but is also asserting that she knows the referent ('she') independently of C.

On the other hand, in Extract 1-5 below, A responds to B without claiming independent epistemic access while affiliating with her. Here, B tells A about a car wreck that she witnessed. She concludes her report with an assessment "Boy, it was a bad one, though." (line 3). At line 4, A responds to it expressing affiliation but not claiming independent access to the wreck.

Extract 1-5 [Pomerantz 1984a: 97]

```
1       B:      And on the way home we saw the: (0.5) most gosh awful
2               wreck.
        ----- (lines omitted)-----
3       B:      Boy, it was a bad one, though.
4 ->    A:      Well that's too ba:d.
```

[1] Stivers, Mondada and Steensig (2011) provide an extensive review of previous interactional studies on epistemicity. The classification that I make here is informed by their classification, though I adapted it to the purpose of the current chapter.

A affiliates with B insofar as she shows sympathy for the terrible event. However, the referent of her assessment is not the wreck itself but the information that B has just provided. Thus, A's response is based on epistemic access that is indirect and dependent on B.

Heritage (2002a) develops and systematizes this line of inquiry. He argues that when parties in interaction assess an object, that necessarily involves the issue of epistemic stances. The production of first assessments implicitly asserts primary rights to assess a referent (unless the right is neutralized somehow). Given a first assessment, then, recipients are in the position where they are "vulnerable to the inference that their response is fabricated on the instant to achieve agreement or disagreement, and is thus a dependent or even a coerced action within a field of constraint that is established by the first" (Heritage 2002a:198). Thus, in order to be heard as epistemically independent and voluntarily and fully agreeing, second assessment speakers have to do more than saying, for example, 'yeah'.

One way to show full agreement, according to Pomerantz (1984a), is upgrading. Extract 1-6 is an example.

Extract 1-6 [Pomerantz 1984a:66]

```
B:      She seems like a nice little [lady
A:                                   [Awfully nice
        little person.
```

In response to B's first assessment 'She seems like a nice little lady,' A agrees with an upgraded second evaluation adding an intensifier 'awfully'. Pomerantz says that upgrading is commonly found in second assessments, and that this is the ideal way to agree. In contrast, second assessments that proffer same-intensity evaluations are often used as a preface to disagreements. In Heritage's words, therefore, proffers of upgraded evaluations are a means to resist the 'secondness' that is tied to the second position in assessment sequences. (Japanese practice differs in this regard, as will be shown in Chapter 2.)

Heritage (2002a) discusses another resource that is used to deal with this secondness in English interaction. He says that *oh*-prefacing is a means to index independent access to referents. See Extract 1-7 for an example. Jon and Lyn are talking to Lyn's mother Eve. Jon reports to Eve that Jon and Lyn saw a movie "Midnight Cowboy," (line 1), and Lyn asks her if she saw the movie as well. Eve answers that she has not (line 4), and explains why by reporting her friend's assessment of the movie: "Rae sed it 'n she said she f- depressed her terribly" (lines

5/7). In response, Jon and Lyn each produce *oh*-prefaced second assessments (lines 8 and 9).

Extract 1-7 [Heritage 2002a:210]

```
1      Jon:    We saw Midnight Cowboy yesterday -or [suh- Friday.
2      Eve:                                        [Oh?
3      Lyn:    Didju s- you saw that, [it's really good.
4      Eve:                           [No I haven't seen it
5 ->           Rae [sed it 'n she said she f- depressed her
6      ():         [( )
7      Eve:    ter[ribly
8 ->   Jon:       [Oh it's [terribly depressing.
9 ->   Lyn:                [Oh it's depressing.
```

Heritage argues that, by prefacing their agreements with *oh*, Jon and Lyn suggest that they are not forming their views dependently on Rae's reported first assessment here and now, but that they had independently formed their views prior to this exchange.

Epistemic access can be of various kinds. It can be independent or dependent (Pomerantz 1984a; Heritage 2002a), direct or indirect (Goodwin and Goodwin 1987; Heritage 2002a), specific or generalized (Goodwin and Goodwin 1987; Heritage 2002a); real or imaginative (Heritage 2011). It follows that different kinds of epistemic access can be ranked. In Extract 1-7, for instance, the epistemic access that Jon and Lyn have regarding the movie is direct and thus primary relative to Eve's indirect, hearsay access. In effect, they assert better knowledge − or epistemic authority − with regard to the movie. Thus, the kinds of epistemic access that participants claim to have are often inseparable from the issue of who has better knowledge. The next section discusses this aspect of epistemic stance.

Epistemic authority / Epistemic primacy / Primary right

While epistemic access is mainly concerned with the kind of access that individual participants have with regard to the referent in question, when it is indexed in interaction, the issue comes to be about knowledgeability relative to the other. As was the case in Extract 1-7, a claim to have independent access often collides with a claim to know better. Heritage (2002a) uses the terms *epistemic authority* and *epistemic primacy* to refer to primacy in knowledge. It is often neither easy nor relevant to distinguish these two notions. Heritage and Raymond (2005) and

Raymond and Heritage (2006) seem to use the two terms interchangeably, while Stivers, Mondada and Steensig (2011) consider *epistemic authority* to be one of the factors that determines *epistemic primacy*. In this thesis, I follow Stivers, Mondada and Steensig in considering *epistemic primacy* to be a broader notion than *epistemic authority*. *Epistemic authority* is "a qualitative difference in the depth of (...) knowledge" (Stivers, Mondada and Steensig ibid: 14), which is grounded in such factors as one's profession, expertise or experience (Raymond and Heritage 2006:702). On the other hand, *epistemic primacy* does not have to be based on such extra-interactional factors. For instance, stating an opinion before other participants, can give the speaker *epistemic primacy* (Heritage and Raymond 2005). Studies also discuss *epistemic rights* and *primary rights* to assess a referent (Stivers 2005; Raymond and Heritage 2006; Stivers, Mondada and Steensig 2011). *Epistemic rights* and *primary rights* collide with *epistemic primacy*, but the former set of terms tends to be used when the focus of the discussion is on normative regulations regarding who is to be respected for their social/interactional identity. For instance, local residents of a country can claim primary right to assess the country over a foreigner, even if their actual knowledge is no greater than the foreigner's (Stivers 2005).

There have been many studies that report various linguistic resources that are used to assert and index *epistemic authority*, *epistemic primacy* or *epistemic rights/primary rights*. For example, Schegloff (1996a) shows that when a confirmation is done through a lexical repeat, instead of an interjection ('yeah') or a pro-term repeat (e.g., 'I did'), its speakers claim that they are not merely confirming what the prior speaker but had already *alluded to* the view in the preceding turn and thus is the original author of the view. Extract 1-8 is an example offered by Schegloff from a telephone conversation.

Extract 1-8 [Schegloff 1996a:174-175]

```
1       Eve:    =Hi: Rita
2       Rita:   Hi: Evelyn:. How [are y'
3       Eve:                     [I hadda come in another room.
4       Rita:   Oh:. Uh huh.=
5       Eve:    =I fee:l a bi:ssel verschickert.
6                    (0.2)
7       Rita:   W-why's'a:t,
8                    (0.4)
9   ->  Rita:   uh you've had sump'n t' dr^ink. =
10  =>  Eve:    =I had sump'n t' dri:nk.
11      Rita:   Uh huh.
```

In response to Rita's confirmation request "uh you've had sump'n t' dr^ink." (line 9), Eve confirms this by repeating it ("I had sump'n t' dr̲i:nk.") (line 10). Schegloff says that by confirming in this format, conveys that this is what she had alluded to earlier at line 5 ("*verschickert*" is a Yiddish word that means "tipsy"). We can see that the practice serves to assert epistemic primacy over the issue in a second position.

As was mentioned earlier, Heritage (2002a) shows that *oh*-prefaced second assessments, which as their basic function index epistemic independence, are often used to assert epistemic authority or epistemic primacy. We saw earlier in Extract 1-7 that Jon and Lyn assert epistemic authority based on their direct epistemic access to the referent relative to Eve's indirect access. Heritage and Raymond (2005) illustrate further linguistic resources that are used in first and second assessments to upgrade or downgrade their epistemic stances in English: evidential markers, negative interrogatives, tag questions, and the use of confirmations in place of agreements. Stivers (2005) discusses "modified repeats" (e.g., 'It do^es.' as a response to a preceding comment 'It take talent and hard work to be successful.' [Stivers 2005: 142]) as a means to assert primary rights from a subsequent position. Clift (2006) shows that reported speech can also be used as a resource to claim epistemic primacy in English conversation.

Agreement sequences are not the only site in which epistemicity matters. Heritage (2008) suggests that by affirming a polar question with a repeat as opposed to an interjection 'yes/yeah/mm-hm', the speaker asserts epistemic rights over the issue more than was conceded by the question speaker (see also Sorjonen [2001a], [2001b]; Heritage [2010]; Heritage and Raymond [2012]).

These studies all show that participants routinely orient to the "ranking" of the knowledge and build asymmetrical relations. As we will discuss later in Section 4, this orientation to differentiating between depths of knowledge sits in an interesting relation to the orientation to achieve affiliation or same-mindedness.

Epistemic responsibility

We have already discussed the idea that interactants are expected to, or even obliged to, know some kinds of information interactants are expected to. Labov and Fanshel (1977) call such domains of knowledge "A-event" information, and Pomerantz (1980) calls it Type 1 knowables. As Stivers, Mondada and Steensig (2011) suggest, the domain of knowledge that one is responsible for knowing is not limited to personal information. Participants have means of treating a piece of

information as something that they or their interlocutors are responsible for knowing. For instance, Heritage (1998) shows that answers that are marked with *oh* convey that the lack of knowledge that the question speaker has displayed is inapposite (for similar practices, see also Wu [2004] for Mandarin Chinese, Keevalik [2011] for Estonian, Heinemann, Lindström and Steensig [2011] for Danish and Swedish, and Mondada [2011] for French). Relatedly, Stivers (2011) analyzes 'of course' as an answer to polar questions. She shows that 'of course' is used to suggest that the addressee is responsible for knowing the answer without having to question it. These reports suggest that territories of information involve not only rights, but also responsibilities.

The conversation analytic studies discussed in this section show that participants in interaction are concerned about such issues as who knows what, who knows what in what ways, who knows what better than whom, and who ought to know what. Participants are accountable for orienting to these issues in order to produce and understand utterances, mobilize response, design utterances appropriately for particular recipients, and to defend, respect and claim each other's territories of information. They do so using a wide variety of grammatical resources − some of them have long been considered as epistemic stance markers (e.g., evidential markers), some of them we did not know to serve such functions (e.g., interjection *oh*). These studies, therefore, not only advance our understanding of how participants conceptualize and attend to knowledge and information in spontaneous interaction but also enrich descriptions of functions of linguistic resources that are employed for these interactional objectives. Table 1-1 summarizes the dimensions of epistemicity discussed above.

Table 1-1: Dimensions of epistemicity used in this thesis

Dimension	Description
epistemic access (binary distinction)	whether one has access to a referent or not
(in)dependence of epistemic access	whether one has independent access to a referent or only dependent access via information that has just been made available by an interlocutor or hearsay
epistemic primacy	qualitative superiority or priority in knowledge based on one's expertise (epistemic authority), experiencing the referent before others or stating the position before others, etc.
epistemic authority	a qualitative difference in the depth of knowledge grounded in such factors as one's profession, expertise or experience
epistemic right	right to a body of knowledge based on a speaker's social identity
epistemic responsibility	responsibility for a body of knowledge based on a speaker's social identity or a relationship with an interlocutor

Although there have been studies of epistemicity based on data in languages other than English in recent years (see Stivers, Mondada and Steensig 2011), our knowledge about the topic to date heavily relies on studies based on English data. It has yet to be found out to what extent these findings apply to interaction in other languages. This thesis attempts to contribute to this developing body of literature. Moreover, while previous studies have revealed much about how participants' orientation to knowledge distribution are manifested in forms of individual utterances, they have not made a systematic attempt in documenting their consequences to the sequences of interaction: how they motivate development of courses of talk. We know from the literature that there are interactional concerns that warrant particular sequence organizations. For instance, announcements are often preceded by pre-announcement sequences (Terasaki 2004[1976], see Chapter 3) so to-be announcement speakers can make sure that to-be recipients are not informed of the news yet. By examining how territories of knowledge are handled not in individual turns of talk but over sequences of turns jointly by interlocutors, this thesis shows that epistemicity is a social phenomenon that is subject to interactive negotiation.

1.3 Japanese grammar and interaction

This thesis studies participants' orientation to knowledge distribution in Japanese interaction. Although a large part of CA findings come from work based on English interaction, there has been a substantial body of work on Japanese interaction (e.g., Mori 1999; Tanaka 1999; Hayashi 2003, 2010; Iwasaki 2008, among many others). What is found in these studies is cross-linguistic variations in how the organization is adjusted to and realized by the grammar of Japanese. For instance, Tanaka (1999) reports that while the basic turn-taking system operates in the same way in Japanese and English (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974), the word order of Japanese (i.e., SOV) provides distinct contingencies for Japanese interactants (for a larger cross-linguistic study on the question-response system, see Stivers et al. 2009). Studying data in diverse languages thus allows us to discover universal and relative properties of interaction and how the universal interactional principles and organizations are "woven together to make a coherent local practice" (Levinson 2006:61). At the same time, studies of interactions in languages other than English gives us a fuller view of what constitutes universal properties of interaction. Previous studies reveal much about how English speakers handle territories of knowledge in interaction, but how speakers of other languages deal with the issue is under-investigated (however, see contributions in Stivers, Mondada and Steensig [2011]). By examining Japanese interactional data, this study attempts to enrich our understanding of what the 'epistemic landscape' (Heritage 2008) looks like in Japanese and how that is different from or the same as that of English.

In fact, Japanese is a particularly interesting language to look at to study this topic, for Japanese grammar has a series of particles that form a paradigmatic system of marking epistemic stances at the end of a sentential TCU. While English has various linguistic resources to adopt an epistemic stance − tense markings (Goodwin and Goodwin 1987), interjection *oh* (Heritage 2002a), tag questions or negative interrogatives (Heritage and Raymond 2005; Raymond and Heritage 2006) − Japanese has a set of final particles with contrasting functions. Especially interesting are final particles *ne, yone* and *yo*. Many researchers agree that these particles are used to mark epistemic stances: *ne* and *yone* are used to refer to shared information and *yo* is used to refer to information that is not shared by addressees (Cheng 1987; Kamio 1990, 1994; Koyama 1997; Katoh 2001; Lee 2007) (see Chapter 2). Although there is a substantial body of literature on these particles, a

large part of it is based on made-up sentences and authors' intuitive judgments of their functions. There are studies that use recorded interaction (e.g., Cook 1992; Lee 2007), but their analyses still rely on intuitive interpretations of the examples. They do not show with empirical evidence how participants in interaction themselves use and understand the particles. In spontaneous interaction, the use of the particles looks random and arbitrary − a single speaker uses different particles in referring to the same object in a short span of discourse, switching from one particle to another. There are a few recent studies that approach the particles taking the interactional contingencies into account (Morita 2002, 2005), but there has not been a systematic study that demonstrates how the particles are employed to manage territories of knowledge in spontaneous interaction.

This thesis attempts to add new insight to the literature on the particles. In each of the ensuing chapters, I pay close attention to the distribution of Japanese particles that are indices of epistemic stances: sentence final particles *ne*, *yone*, *yo*. Also, in Chapters 3 and 4, the use of a particle *no* is extensively discussed. It is shown that this particle is used to suggest that the information is remarkable or counter to one's expectation, whether it is something that the speaker presents as news or questioning about. These particles are grammatical resources that are employed to manage epistemicity and their presence informs our analyses significantly. By seeing them as interactional resource for interactants to negotiate and achieve a congruent view on knowledge distribution, it investigates the particles' functions and interactional motivations that underlie their usage.

1.4 Goals and the scope of the Study

Motivated by previous studies reviewed above, this thesis aims at achieving the following goals:

1) Adding new insights into our understanding of human orientation to knowledge − what aspects of knowledge are treated as relevant and important by interactants and how they are handled.
2) Documenting interactional processes through which interactants negotiate and achieve congruent views on how knowledge is distributed among them.

3) Describing interactional principles and motivations that underlie the use of Japanese final particles.

As suggested by studies reviewed in the previous section, interactants vigilantly attend to epistemicity for various interactional objectives. The primary focus of this thesis, however, is on cases when epistemicity serves not as a vehicle or resource for understanding utterances or to solicit responses, but on cases when epistemicity itself is attended to as a relevant issue at a moment of interaction. I selected three sequential environments on which to focus: assessment sequences (Chapter 2), informing sequences (Chapter 3) and polar question-answer sequences ("polar question sequences" henceforth) (Chapter 4).

An assessment sequence consists of a first assessment (e.g., "It's cold today.") followed by a second assessment (e.g., "It is"). Both first assessment speakers and second assessment speakers must have access to the object in question (Pomerantz 1984a). Probably due to this, there is a strong possibility of symmetrical epistemic access, but this is also an environment in which there may be conflicts over epistemic rights, primacy etc. Informing sequences are initiated by an utterance that provides a piece of information as news (e.g., "It's not that sweet"), making relevant a response that receipts the "first pair part" (FPP) of an adjacency pair as such (e.g., "Oh really?"). In informing sequences, FPP speakers have access to the information while it is presumably unknown to "second pair part" (SPP) speakers. Polar question sequences can be conceived as the inverse of informing sequences in that it is FPP speakers who lack access to information and SPP speakers supply it.[2]

These sequences are contrastive with one another in terms of putative knowledge distribution: in assessment sequences, speakers *share* information/ knowledge regarding the referent and orient to achieving shared evaluations of it; in informing sequences, FPP speakers *provide* information; in polar question sequences, FPP speakers *request* information. Tomasello (2008:87) considers these three activities, namely, sharing, providing and requesting, to be the fundamental communicative motives. By examining these three contexts in Japanese interaction, this study attempts to provide a holistic picture of how participants' orientations to epistemicity are manifested. It should be noted that boundaries between these categories of action sequences are not always clear. As Extract 1 exemplifies, a

[2] See Section 1.5 below for a description of adjacency pairs and their components.

sequence that was initiated as an assessment sequence may transform into an informing sequence, if it turns out that the recipient of the initial assessment, unexpectedly, lacks access to the information. Thus, the type of resulting sequence should be seen as an interactional achievement, which itself is the subject of discussion in the following three chapters.

1.5 Methodology

The methodology that this study adopts is conversation analysis (CA). CA is a field of sociology that emerged in the 1960s as an attempt to describe "interactional competence" − procedures through which participants in spontaneous everyday interaction produce and recognize each other's conduct and maintain and reproduce social order (Heritage and Atkinson 1984). In traditional linguistics, spontaneous interaction was considered to be too random and arbitrary to be a subject of investigation (Saussure 1959; Chomsky 1965). Even those who attempted to study language use relied on, and still tend to rely on, invented, made-up examples (Grice 1975[1967]; Searle 1969). When such fields as sociolinguistics, discourse analysis and functional linguistics emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, researchers started to analyze recorded discourse (e.g., Labov and Fanshel 1977; Van Dijk 1971; Tannen 1989). However, they were often criticized for dismissing details of conduct and relying on the researchers' intuition in their analyses (Levinson 1983). In contrast, conversation analysts examine spontaneous interaction rigorously and systematically "to find rules, techniques, procedures, methods, maxims (...) that can be used to generate the orderly features we find in the conversations we examine" (Sacks 1984: 413). This approach proved to be powerful in revealing how grammar is used not by idealized speakers and hearers (Chomsky 1965) but by actual participants of interaction. Indeed, as was discussed above, the methodology of CA has been adopted to document participants' orientation to territories of knowledge in spontaneous interaction and has contributed significantly to the body of literature.

To be more specific, the methods used are: 1) audio/video record naturally occurring interaction; 2) transcribe the recorded interaction in great detail; 3) make a collection of target candidate phenomena and analyze them; 4) identify interactional regularities involving the phenomenon in the collection using as an analytic tool the understanding that participants display about the phenomenon and

the phenomenon's distribution in the sequential context and 5) see if deviant cases are oriented to as deviant by participants so that their occurrences reinforce the regularity (Schegloff 1968).

By examining naturally occurring interaction in this way, conversation analysts have identified some fundamental structures of interaction. These structures are now referred to by analysts in understanding the interactional import of utterances (see Levinson 1983; Schegloff 2007; Sidnell 2010). Although it is not possible to provide adequate descriptions of all key organizations of interaction in what follows, I briefly discuss those that are particularly crucial to the current study.

Actions

One of the most fundamental premises of CA is that utterances in interaction are best described as performing 'actions', instead of conveying meanings (Schegloff and Sacks 1973; see also Levinson 2012a). Utterances are produced to implement recognizable social actions. They may have labels in our vernacular language (e.g., 'requesting', 'offering', 'inviting'), but not necessarily. A number of CA studies have identified action types that do not have such vernacular labels and which are beyond speakers' metapragmatic awareness. For instance, studies have identified actions such as 'pre-closings' (Schegloff and Sacks 1973), 'pre-announcements' (Terasaki 2004 [1976], and 'preliminaries to preliminaries' (Schegloff 1980). As will be mentioned in the following subsections, other organizations of interaction can be discerned only if we look at utterances for the actions that they implement.

Turns

In social interaction, participants take turns with an amazing degree of precision such that one speaker talks at a time without much overlap or gap between turns (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974; De Ruiter, Mitterer and Enfield 2006; Stivers et al. 2009). Turns consist of 'turn constructional units' (TCUs) (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson ibid.). Current speakers have rights and responsibilities to bring at least a single TCU to completion, and current recipients listen to an ongoing utterance for its projectable possible completion so that they can take a turn when it is complete with minimal silence.[3] Three resources contribute to

[3] The length of overlaps and gaps that are tolerated and treated as interactionally insignificant varies across languages. For example, the timing of turn-taking in Japanese interaction is reported to be faster than 9 other languages studied in Stivers et al. (2009).

making a spate of talk recognizable as a TCU: grammar, intonation and action (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974; Ford and Thompson 1996; Schegloff 1996b). A grammatical unit, be it a sentence, clause, phrase or lexical item, constitutes a TCU and contributes to making speaker change relevant. Though De Ruiter, Mitterer and Enfield (2006) show that subjects are able to project when a turn reaches possible completion without prosodic cues, intonation can be employed as a resource to organize turns and turn-taking as well (Ford and Thompson 1996; Schegloff 1996b). The third facet of TCUs is social action (or pragmatics). When a bit of talk has recognizably implemented an action, then the turn is hearable as possibly complete. These three components of TCUs often co-occur: when a grammatical unit comes to possible completion, we find intonation indexing the end of a TCU either with a final falling pitch or rising pitch, and a social action reaches possible completion as well. At this point, speaker transition becomes relevant. However, there are other factors as well (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson ibid.; Ford and Thompson 1996). For instance, intonation can "cancel" the relevance of speaker transition that the completion of a grammatical unit brings about. Extract 1-9is an example that Schegloff (2007) offers. Vivian and Shane are hosting Nancy and Michael for a chicken dinner. Vivian prepared the meal and Shane, Vivian's partner, has been teasingly complaining that potatoes are hard. Related to this, Vivian asks if the potatoes are not done (line 7). Shane answers the question ('Ah don't think so,) (line 8), and then Nancy provides a second answer disaffiliating with Shane and affiliating with Vivian (line 10).

Extract 1-9 [Schegloff 2007: 5]

```
1      NAN:    You[do that too:? tih yer pota]toes,
2      SHA:       [This one's hard ezza rock.]
3      SHA:    ↑Ye[ah.
4      VIV:       [It i:[s?
5      SHA:           [B't this thing- is ↑ha:rd.
6              (0.3)
7      VIV:    It's not do:ne? th'potato?
8      SHA:    Ah don't think so,
9              (2.2)
10 ->  NAN:    Seems done t'me how 'bout you Mi[chael,]
11     SHA:                                    [Alri' ]who cooked
12                 this mea:l.
13     MIC:    ˙hh Little ↓bit'v e-it e-ih-ih of it isn'done.
14     SHA:    Th'ts ri:ght.
```

In her turn at line 10, Nancy produces two sentential TCUs ("Seems done t'me how 'bout you Michael,"). Each sentence implements an action: the first answers Nancy's question, the second asks Michael a question. As far as syntax is concerned, the completion point of the first sentential TCU could be recognized as a point where speaker transition is relevant. However, this possible relevance of speaker transition is 'cancelled' via prosody. At the end of the first TCU there is no final intonation (t'me), and the second TCU follows without a gap. As is exemplified here, syntax, intonation and social actions are three resources that may or may not concur with each other to construct TCUs and mark a point where speaker transition is relevant.

Adjacency Pairs

The turn taking system that Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974) uncovered explains how participants know now to take turns without causing long gaps or overlaps. Another fundamental organization of interaction has to do with how participants produce coherent sequences of turns (Goffman 1971; Schegloff 1968; Schegloff and Sacks 1983). Schegloff and Sacks (1973) maintain that what they call an 'adjacency pair' is the most basic and pervasive organization that ensures that participants produce coherent sequences of utterances and that they understand each other. Briefly put, features of adjacency pairs are 1) two utterances in length, 2) adjacently positioned, 3) produced by different speakers (Schegloff and Sacks ibid). The first of the two utterances, 'a first pair part (FPP)', initiates a sequence (e.g., a request, greeting, question), and the second of them, 'a second pair part (SPP)', responds to the FPP (e.g., a compliance/rejection, greeting, answer). A FPP, like any other turn in interaction does, implements a social action (e.g., a request). The production of a FPP makes it 'conditionally relevant' for its recipient to produce a responsive action of the same action type as the FPP (e.g., compliance or rejection of the request) (Schegloff 1968; Schegloff and Sacks 1973).

This simple and minimal organization that ties two utterances is robust. Upon the production of a FPP, the recipient is normatively obliged to produce a SPP, and its absence is treated as official, accountable or even sanctionable (Schegloff 1968; Schegloff and Sacks 1973; Heritage 1984b; Stivers and Robinson 2006; Schegloff 2007; Stivers and Rossano 2010). Moreover, the production of SPPs that were made relevant by FPPs provides insight into their speakers' understanding of the FPPs. Thus, the system of adjacency pairs makes available the mutual establishment of intersubjectivity. As we will see in ensuing chapters, by

analyzing epistemic stance markings over sequences of turns in interaction by reference to the organization of adjacency pairs, our analysis benefits tremendously in describing participants' orientation to epistemicity and its consequences to the structure of interaction.

Repair

Another mechanism that provides for establishing intersubjectivity in everyday conversation is an organization for managing troubles in speaking, hearing and understanding: repair organization. Though this study does not deal with the organization of repair per se, its relevance will necessarily be addressed in examples offered in this thesis. Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks (1977) show that repair is organized by reference to three features: the party who initiates a repair (whether it is initiated by the speaker of the source of a trouble or by another speaker); the timing of the repair initiation; and the party who fixes the source of the trouble. The organization provides that the speakers of trouble-source have a priority in seizing an opportunity to initiate a repair and correct themselves, instead of having others initiate repair and correct them.

Other initiation of repair is a central resource to delay a response that is due at the moment and adumbrate incipient disaffiliation (Pomerantz 1984a), and we will repeatedly observe this in examples presented throughout this thesis. The next section describes the organization which governs sequences of all types, including repair.

Preference Organization

Most types of FPPs make two alternative responses relevant: a request makes a compliance or rejection relevant; an invitation makes an acceptance or rejection relevant; a request for confirmation makes a confirmation or disconfirmation relevant. Between the two alternative SPP actions, one that promotes solidarity (Heritage 1984b) and facilitates the project that the FPP launched (Schegloff 2007) is preferred to the one that hinders solidarity or the initiated project (Pomerantz 1975, 1984a; Heritage 1984b; Sacks 1987; Schegloff 2007; Pomerantz and Heritage 2012).

By 'preference', conversation analysts do not mean to refer to individual speakers' psychological predispositions. Instead, preference is a structural organization that allows interactants to manage social solidarity in interaction. Their orientation to preference organization is manifested in various structural

features of turn design and production. As Levinson (1983:333) points out, the structural contrast between preferred and dispreferred responses are parallel to the contrast between morphologically 'unmarked' and 'marked' categories: 'marked' categories tend to be morphologically irregular and contain more material whereas 'unmarked' categories do not (Comrie 1976). Similarly, preferred SPPs tend to be direct, to the point, and produced without delay. Moreover, they tend to lead to sequence closure without elaborate expansion, while dispreferred SPPs tend to be mitigated, hedged, and delayed via means such as inter-turn silences, *uh*s and *uhm*s, repair initiations (e.g., "Hm?" "What?") (Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks 1977; Drew 1997) or 'weak', pro-forma agreements. Subsequently, dispreferred responses tend to lead to sequence expansion (Pomerantz 1984a; Schegloff 2007).

These features of preferred and dispreferred SPPs allow interactants to avoid dispreferred SPPs from fully emerging. See Extract 1-10 for instance.

Extract 1-10 [Pomerantz 1984:77; Sacks 1987[1973]:64]

```
1      L:      Good cook there
2              (0.?)
3 ->   L:      Nothing special
4      J:      No, everybody takes their turns.
```

L's question at line 1 is formulated to convey L's anticipation of a positive answer, or preference for, a positive answer. Thus, what is expected is that a positive, "yes" answer would be produced without mitigation or delay while a negative, dispreferred "no" answer would be expected to be delayed and mitigated. The inter-turn silence at line 2 is indeed recognized to adumbrate a "no" answer. What L does then is to reverse the valence of the question which then invites a negative answer. J then produces an answer to this second question as a preferred response: the answer is not delayed or mitigated. Thus, preference organization provides participants with a system by reference to which they can avoid and minimize disaligning and disaffiliative moves.

It is recognized that multiple dimensions of preference can collide in a single turn. For instance, while agreement with a first assessment is a preferred action, agreement with a self-deprecating assessment is dispreferred (Pomerantz 1984a). In such an environment, the latter aspect of preference is generally prioritized. Turns other than SPPs can also have preference. For instance, offers are preferred over requests as a means to accomplish transfers (Schegloff 1979:49, 2007:81-96; Levinson 1983:343; Sacks 1992).

Some extend the notion of preference in illustrating principles concerning alternative ways of interactional conduct other than preference between alternative actions. Stivers (2008) discusses two possibly conflicting preferences in story telling: a preference to yield the floor to the storytellers until they are finished, on the one hand, and a preference to show support for the storyteller's stance throughout the telling, on the other. Stivers calls the former, structural aspect of preference a 'preference for alignment' and the latter, evaluative aspect a 'preference for affiliation'. As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4, Raymond (2003) observes a preference regarding the form of answers to polar questions. Stivers and Robinson (2006) report that there is a preference for a selected next speaker to respond over a non-selected next speaker to respond (see Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974]). Heritage (2002c) discusses preferences that are found specifically in an institutional context, interactions between heath visitors and newly delivered mothers. When going through the survey, health care visitors design their questions in such a way that exhibits preference for "optimized states of affairs" − they would ask "Is your father alive?" rather than "Is your father dead?" unless they have reasons to think the latter is the case.

Throughout this thesis, I address another aspect of preference that is concerned with epistemicity: the preference for achieving congruent views as to how information is distributed among participants, or, the preference for epistemic congruence. While the preference for affiliation can be glossed as an orientation to maintaining or promoting social solidarity (Heritage 1984b), the preference for epistemic congruence may lead to a state where participants' different epistemic positions are featured. It is argued that the preference for epistemic congruence is critical in describing the procedures through which participants establish or reach consensus as to how information is distributed.

It is by reference to these interactional organizations − social actions, turns at talk, adjacency pairs, repair organization and preference organizations − that participants understand each other's utterances and jointly construct coherent sequences of talk. When we look at spontaneous interaction referring to these organizations of interaction as an analytic apparatus, the systematicity of participants' contributions reveals itself. Drawing on these organizations which we already know about from the literature, this study sheds light on phenomena in Japanese interaction that have not been fully investigated, namely, phenomena that are organized by reference to participants' orientations to epistemicity.

1.6 Data

The database used for this study consists of roughly 22 hours of video-recorded face-to-face conversations and 7 hours of audio-recorded telephone conversations. Face-to-face conversations were recorded and transcribed by the author. Telephone conversations are drawn from Call Friend corpus distributed by the TalkBank organization (http://talkbank.org/) (see MacWhinney 2007).

In the face-to-face conversations, all participants are native speakers of Japanese, and except for those specified in the table below, they speak the Tokyo dialect. The recorded conversations were transcribed following the conventions originally developed by Gail Jefferson (see Atkinson and Heritage 1984 ix-xvi; see also pp. iv-vi, this thesis). The annotation software ELAN was used for transcription (Wittenberg et al. 2006). Table 1-2 provides brief descriptions of the face-to-face conversations.

Table 1-2: Data sets of face-to-face conversations

Code	Description	Dura-tion
BB	A male barber and a male customer conversing during a service. The barber has the Tohoku accent. The customer speaks the Tokyo dialect.	60m
BSA	A male beautician and a female customer conversing.	35m
BSB	A male beautician and a female customer conversing.	41m
IL	Middle-aged sisters-in-law conversing while having an afternoon tea at one of the sisters' house.	180m
DWT	A dinner conversation in which a middle-aged couple is hosting a close friend. The guest speaks the Osaka dialect.	60m
TMD	A dinner conversation in which a middle-aged couple is hosting another couple and a female friend. One of the guests speaks the Osaka dialect.	120m
TT	A tutor, tutee and the tutor's husband conversing over lunch, followed by the tutoring session.	90m
TD	A dinner conversation among three female friends followed by a conversation in which two of them plan an upcoming trip.	180m
PTR	A private pottery lesson held at the instructor's home. Includes a lunch break with the instructor's daughter joining.	180m
TC	A tea ceremony lesson held at the instructor's home. Three friends take the lesson together. One of the students speaks the Osaka dialect.	60m
SP	A sushi lunch party among 4 university students at a TA office.	15m
MR	A business meeting between two marketing researchers.	60m
MR2	An informal meeting in which a senior marketing researcher introduces a young marketing researcher to his former colleague.	60m
MM	A conversation between two close female friends at a cafe.	150m
MD	A conversation between Mother and Daughter at Daughter's home.	20m

The Call Friend corpus consists of sets of telephone conversations between friends. Participants were allowed to make a free 30-minute telephone call to friends in return for offering the telephone conversation for recording and researching. Participants are native speakers of Japanese but residents of the United States. Though TalkBank provides transcripts along with audio recordings, excerpts from Call Friend were re-transcribed by the author for the precision required for the analyses.

Of course, face-to-face conversations and telephone conversations are not equivalent: participants have visual access to each other's here-and-now experience in face-to-face conversations whereas they do not in telephone conversations. The availability or lack of availability of visual access provides different contingencies in face-to-face and telephone conversations, which indeed comes up in some cases we will examine in ensuing chapters. However, this does not mean that linguistic resources serve different functions in different settings. What is argued about Japanese particles have general relevancy across settings.

1.7 Organization of this Thesis

As was mentioned earlier, this study examines how participants' orientations to epistemicity are manifested in three environments: assessment sequences in which participants have shared access to a referent, informing sequences in which FPP speakers provide information that is not shared by SPP speakers, and polar question sequences in which FPP speakers lack information and SPP speakers provide it. Although the production of these actions *per se* presupposes a certain type of knowledge distribution, how they are formulated in particular interactional contexts reveals finer distinctions that participants attend to regarding their relative epistemic statuses. It is hoped that examinations of the three sequential environments will lead us to see a holistic system of how Japanese interactants manage territories of information in everyday interaction.

Chapter 2 investigates participants' orientations to epistemicity in assessment sequences. In particular, I examine procedures of claiming and establishing epistemic primacy. The focus of analysis is on the use of final particles *ne*, *yone* and *yo* and its correlation with the intensity of evaluation, i.e., whether an object is okay, nice, or very nice. It will be demonstrated that *claiming* to know better is not always accepted by an interlocutor as reasonable, in which case

participants *demonstrate* that they know better or *provide support* for the claim to know better by manipulating the intensity of the evaluation. Findings suggest that participants are oriented to achieving congruent views regarding how knowledge is distributed between them, whether it is symmetrically distributed or asymmetrically distributed.

Chapter 3 is on informing sequences. While the standard form of adjacency pairs generally takes two turns, the majority of informing sequences take more than two turns (cf. Sacks 1974; Terasaki 2004 [1976]). Recipients of an informings usually provide a series of responses. I examine the extended structure of informing sequences and show that it allows interactants to negotiate and achieve a balance between territories of experience, affiliation and empathy. I also demonstrate the scope of experience (e.g., whether the experience is about "bleeding" in general or "internal eye bleeding" in particular) is an interactional resource that can be manipulated to claim uniqueness of one's experience or achieving affiliation between interlocutors.

Chapter 4 investigates a fine level of coordination of epistemic stances in polar question-answer sequences. The chapter starts with an analysis of interjection answers, which include a "yes" token *hai/nn/ee* as opposed to repetitional answers, which convey confirmation via repetition of the question (e.g., *mita yo?,* "I saw it," as an affirmative response to a question *mita no?,* "Did you see it?"). It is demonstrated that while interjection answers offer acquiescent, minimal confirmation, repetitional answers convey more assertive, committed answers. It will further be demonstrated that the use of these alternative answers is associated with the level of (un)certainty that questioners have conveyed through the question design. When they have conveyed a predisposition toward an affirmative answer, a minimal confirmation (*hai/ee/nn*) is sufficient. When they have conveyed some doubt or predisposition toward disaffirmative answer, an assertive, committed answer (a repetitional answer) becomes more relevant than an interjection. The findings are discussed in light of the notion of 'type conformity' (Raymond 2003); it is argued that what form of response is 'type-conforming' and preferred cannot be specified just by reference to the action alone and that finer level of epistemic states is consequential to the relevant form of answers.

Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of the thesis and discusses their implications in terms of our understandings of functions of Japanese final particles and the notion of epistemic stance in contrast with that of action. The chapter then revisits the proposition that knowledge is socially distributed and interactionally

managed. The thesis concludes by discussing implications of this research for future work.

Chapter 2

Epistemic Congruence in Assessment Sequences: Final Particles, Evaluation Intensity and Epistemic Primacy[4]

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I investigate how interactants' orientations to epistemicity are manifested in assessment sequences in Japanese conversation. When a speaker takes an **evaluative stance** towards a referent that is accessible to a recipient, thereby making a first assessment in conversation, this invites recipients to convey their evaluative stance about the same referent in the next turn, a second assessment (Pomerantz 1984a). Second assessments can be formulated as agreements or disagreements in multiple ways, and their production and design manifest a systematic preference for agreements over disagreements in interaction (Pomerantz 1984a).[5] For instance, Pomerantz (1984a) observes, in English conversation, that a second assessment which is understood as agreeing is commonly produced without delay and produced with upgraded evaluation (e.g., "It's just gorgeous," in agreeing with "It's a beautiful day,"), while a disagreement tends to be delayed and involves a same-degree or downgraded evaluation. This bias toward agreement can be seen as a way in which speakers orient to the maintenance and maximization of social solidarity in interaction (Heritage 1984a: 265).

However, social solidarity is not solely about agreement on evaluative stance alone. Interlocutors are also concerned with multiple aspects of their knowledge states relative to each other's (Goodwin and Goodwin 1987; Schegloff 1996a; Sorjonen 2001a; Heritage 2002a; Kanai 2004; Morita 2005; Heritage and

[4] Part of discussions in this chapter was first published in Hayano (2011).

[5] There are exceptions to this principle. For instance, when a first assessment is self-deprecating, disagreement is preferred to agreement, but in this case too, the preferred action (here disagreement) is the more pro-social action (Pomerantz 1984a).

Raymond 2005; Stivers 2005; Raymond and Heritage 2006; Hayano 2007a; Hayano 2007b; Stivers, Mondada and Steensig 2011). When speakers produce a first assessment, they not only take an evaluative stance but also an **epistemic stance**.[6] Employing linguistic resources, the speakers embody how they see the relevant information or knowledge to be distributed between them and the recipients. In the following turn, the recipient of the first assessment, in addition to taking an evaluative stance that agrees or disagrees with the first speaker's evaluative stance, adopts an epistemic stance, which can be compatible or incompatible with the first speaker's. In order to keep the distinction between these two dimensions clear, I refer to the (in)compatibility of interactants' epistemic stances as "**(in)congruence**" and that of their evaluative stances as **(dis)agreement**. Extract 2-1 is an example in which agreement is established while epistemic incongruence emerges. Megu and Fumi are talking about what American girls are like in general. Megu has been in the U.S. for years while Fumi recently moved to the U.S. from Canada. Prior to the excerpt, Fumi reports that she was warned by a friend that American girls can be quite 'bossy'. Megu confirms that, saying that they can be very bossy. However, Fumi contradicts that stating what she has been observing herself: there are so many humble people (lines 1/3-4).

Extract 2-1 [CallFriend 1756: humble]

```
1 ->   Fumi:  .hh atashi nante::, mitete::, a:-
                  I      TP       seeing
              .hh A::s for me, seeing (how American girls are), a:-

2      Megu:  [hn:

3 ->   Fumi:  [(tk) .hh atashi nohoo 'a  zenzen- dakara- (0.2)
                        I      than   SP EMP     so
               (tk).hh I am more really- so- (0.2)
```

[6] In Chapter 1, I introduced Heritage's (2012a) distinction between epistemic stance and epistemic status: an epistmic stance is a moment-by-moment, actual expression of knowledge distribution in utterances, encoded through grammatical resources or intonation, while an epistemic status is a relatively enduring social relationship vis a vis knowledgeability that is presumably shared by participants. In this chapter, we focus on exchanges in which various linguistic resources are used to adopt certain epistemic stances. Interactants negotiate their relative epistemic statuses through such exchanges.

```
4 ->   Fumi:  minna    kenkyona hito   toka sugoi ooi  kara[:,
       everyone humble   person etc. very  many so
              Everyone, there are so many humble people (American
              girls), so:,
5 =>   Megu:                                                 [n::n,
                                                             ITJ
                                                             Yea::h,

6 =>   Megu:   soo [soo  soo  yo:?,
               that that that FP
               Right right right yo:?,
```

Fumi's assessment is designed as an evaluation that is not shared by Megu: she starts the turn with *atashi nante::,* 'A::s for me,' explicitly presenting the view as her own and not shared by Megu. At lines 5-6, Megu **agrees** with Fumi that there are many humble girls in America. At the same time, by using a final particle *yo*, whose function and usage we explore in detail in this chapter, she claims to know the issue better than Fumi does. Thus, Fumi's and Megu's epistemic stances are **incongruent** with each other's: Fumi presents the assessment as a view that she originally arrived at and is not shared by Megu, Megu claims **epistemic primacy** over the issue.

As this example shows, in assessment sequences, interactants may agree or disagree on the evaluation of a referent, and at the same time, they may hold congruent or incongruent views as to how knowledge is distributed between them vis-à-vis the referent. In this chapter, I examine how assessment turns and sequences exhibit interactants' orientation to **epistemic congruence** − whether their epistemic stances are compatible with each other's. In particular, I demonstrate that the intensity of evaluation is not only indicative of its status as agreement or disagreement, but is strongly contingent on the epistemic stance that the speaker is adopting through the use of final particles. Based on the findings, I argue that interactants are oriented to achieving epistemic congruence.

For this chapter, 97 cases of assessment sequences are extracted from the database: 75 assessment-agreement sequences and 22 assessment-disagreement sequences. Out of the 75 assessment-agreement sequences, the chapter primarily focused on 46 sequences in which agreements involved partial or full repeats of preceding initial assessments (see Section 2.3).

The organization of the chapter is as follows. First, I discuss existing literature that addresses two crucial issues to which interactants attend in assessment sequences: relative epistemic stances (Section 2.1) and the intensity of evaluation (Section 2.2). Section 3 is devoted to illustrating the basic distributions

and functions of linguistic resources recurrently used to formulate assessments in Japanese. Section 3.1 looks at three Japanese final particles, *yo*, *ne* and *yone*, drawing on previous studies as well as referring to its usage in the present corpus. Section 3.2 illustrates the intensity of second assessments relative to that of first assessments in Japanese and how it is different from what Pomerantz (1984a) argues about English. Sections 4 and 5 present the analysis of how these linguistic resources are used to claim epistemic primacy and achieve epistemic congruence between interactants. Section 4 focuses on agreements, and Section 5 focuses on disagreements. Then in Section 6, I discuss the findings in the light of their implications for social orientations which are manifested in everyday interaction.

2.2 Background

2.2.1 Epistemic Stance in Assessment Sequences

When interactants state their assessments about objects in conversation, they are not only concerned with the evaluations but also orient to various aspects of stance regarding their knowledge about the referent (Goodwin and Goodwin 1987; Heritage and Raymond 2005; Raymond and Heritage 2006; Sorjonen 2001a; Stivers 2005; Stivers, Mondada and Steensig 2011). The very production of an assessment claims that the speaker has epistemic access to and experience of the object in question (Pomerantz 1984a). Moreover, speakers show their orientations to *kinds of* access and relative epistemic stances, which are marked with and negotiated through various linguistic resources. For instance, Goodwin and Goodwin (1987) point out that the present tense (e.g., "It's good,") indexes general access or knowledge while the past tense (e.g., "It was good,") indexes access to a specific event or object (Goodwin and Goodwin ibid.:27).

In recent years, more systematic attention has been paid to how interactants deal with relative epistemic stances in assessment sequences. Heritage (2002a) discusses the asymmetry of first and second assessments regarding the epistemic stances they inherently convey due to their sequential positions: by producing a first assessment, speakers claim epistemic authority regarding the referent whereas speakers of a second assessment are vulnerable to being heard as epistemically dependent or coerced to agree unless they claim otherwise. Heritage shows that a change-of-state token (Heritage 1984a) *oh* is a resource with which a second

assessment speaker claims epistemic independence in the second position. Heritage and Raymond (Heritage & Raymond 2005; Raymond & Heritage 2006) observe that first assessments tend to be epistemically downgraded (e.g., evidentials and tag questions) while second assessments tend to be marked with linguistic resources to claim epistemic independence or even epistemic authority (e.g., confirmations, Oh prefacing, tag questions, negative interrogatives). This asymmetrical distribution of "epistemic downgrades" and "epistemic upgrades" in first and second assessments supports Heritage's earlier claim about the epistemic claims deriving from sequential position (Heritage 2002a); epistemic downgrades tend to be found in first assessments to offset the claim of epistemic authority inherent in the position, whereas epistemic upgrades are found in second assessments to offset the epistemic dependence.

Because the epistemic stances tied to first and second positions derive from the basic sequential order of the turns, they should be found in any language. However, as we will see later (Section 3.2), the pervasive reciprocal use of Japanese particles that mark equivalent knowledge neutralizes the positional effects to a great extent in Japanese interaction.

Another way in which the relevance of epistemic stances is manifested in assessment sequences is in modifying an epistemic stance as a means to mitigate disagreement. See Extract 2-2 for instance. This is an exchange between a pottery instructor (Kayo) and a student (Eiko). Kayo is examining a teapot that Eiko made at home after the last lesson and has been giving critical comments. She then starts to give positive feedback, saying that this is the best pot among those Eiko has made so far. She further comments that the ones that Eiko made in the past were too big, that this pot is about the right size, using the final particle *ne* to invite an agreement (line 1).

Extract 2-2 [PTR: too big]

```
1       Kayo:   de .hh ima made no ga ^ooki sugita kara ne:,
                and    now by   N  SP  big  too    so   FP
                And .hh  because the ones (you've made) were too big
                ne:,

2 ->    Eiko:   a  ^soo  desu ka.
                ITJ that CP   Q
                Oh ^is it.

3               (0.2)
```

```
                [[Kayo points at the pot
4               [[(0.2)

                [[Kayo holding the pointing finger
5       Kayo:   [[chi^gau?
                  different
                  ^No?

6       Eiko:   .ffff wakan [nai.
                      know   not
                .ffff (I) don't know.

7 ->    Kayo:               [tabun    motto motto okkika tta=
                             probably more  more  big    PST
                            (I) think (they were)

8 ->            =[to omou  yo?,
                  QT think FP
                =probably much bigger yo?,

9       Eiko:   =[ah  honto  desu [ka,
                  ITJ really CP    Q
                =Oh really,

10      Kayo:                     [nn:,
                                  ITJ
                                   Yeah:,
```

In response to Kayo, instead of an agreement, Eiko produces a '*soo* newsmark' (see Chapter 4). A *soo* newsmark is often used as a ritualized newsmark response that treats the preceding information as newsworthy. This particular token of a *soo* newsmark, with the heightened pitch, seems to convey that Eiko finds Kayo's assessment particularly unexpected or counter to what she had thought. Kayo hears this as a harbinger of an incipient disagreement; she asks Eiko if she thinks otherwise (line 5). In response, Eiko claims a lack of knowledge to answer the question (line 6). Given these two turns in which Eiko claims lack of knowledge to base her judgment on, which can be again heard as a hint of disagreement, Kayo downgrades her epistemic stance with an adverb *tabun* 'probably' and a cognitive verb *omou* '(I) think' when she restates her position (lines 7-8).

While it is not clear if Eiko really lacked epistemic bases to agree or disagree with Kayo or claimed lack of epistemic bases as a means to adumbrate disagreement, we can see that lack of knowledge is hearable as a harbinger of incipient disagreement. Faced with incipient disagreement, a participant often downgrades an epistemic stance to mitigate it or back down (Schegloff 2007:103), as Kayo does here. In this regard, an epistemic stance may be manipulated for the

sake of managing affiliation and disaffiliation. However, as is described in this chapter, there are cases in which interactants' orientations to relative knowledgeability come to be the issue in their own right and consequential to turn formulations as well as to sequence organization.

2.2.2 Intensity of Evaluation and Preference Organization

Given the production of a first assessment, a second assessment is heard as either agreeing or disagreeing. Whether a second assessment is heard as an agreement or disagreement most fundamentally depends on the valence of the evaluation and its compatibility with the first assessment (Schegloff 1996a). For example, a second assessment that uses a descriptor 'not good' or 'bad' is understood as a disagreement with a first assessment using a descriptor 'good'. However, the intensity of the evaluation of a second assessment also plays a crucial role in whether it is heard as an agreement or disagreement. In English conversation, a fully affiliating agreement is typically upgraded as in the following example:

Extract 2-3 [Pomerantz 1984a:65]

```
J:      t's- tsuh beautiful day out isn't it?
L: ->   Yeh it's just gorgeous
```

In agreeing with J's assessment that it is a 'beautiful' day, L uses a stronger descriptor 'gorgeous'. An upgraded second assessment like this is heard as an unproblematic wholehearted agreement.

On the other hand, downgraded second assessments tend to be heard as disagreements as in Extract 2-4:

Extract 2-4 [Pomerantz 1984a:68]

```
A:      She's a fox.
L: ->   Yeh, she's a pretty girl.
A:      Oh, she's gorgeous!
```

Here, though L uses an agreement token 'yeh' and is taking a positively valenced evaluative stance his second assessment is treated as a disagreement since 'pretty

girl' is weaker than 'a fox'. That A hears this as a disagreement is manifested in A's third turn, in which A restates his position. Pomerantz (1984a) calls this kind of sequence a 'disagreement sequence'.

A same-degree evaluation is often found to preface overt disagreement as in Extract 2-5:

Extract 2-5 [Pomerantz 1984a:67]

```
A:      Yeah I like it [(     )
B: ->                  [I like it too but uhh
        hahheh it blows my mind.
```

Here, B repeats the same evaluative term used by A ("I like it too"). Pomerantz considers a same evaluation like this to be a "weak" agreement, which can be followed by a disagreement, as is the case in this example, in which the “but” contrasts the initial agreement with the negative evaluation that “it blows my mind.”.

However, while saying that a same level evaluation can be a simple agreement that does not precede a disagreement, Pomerantz does not specify when speakers do and do not upgrade their evaluation. Moreover, the interactional significance of evaluation intensity observed in English does not entirely hold in Japanese. As will be illustrated in Section 3.2, in Japanese assessment sequences, same-evaluations are the default way to fully agree and they are not used as prefaces to disagreements. On the other hand, upgraded second assessments are proffered to do more than simply agreeing. It is this chapter's objective to explore when and for what interactional effects agreements are upgraded in Japanese interaction.

In this section, I have illustrated two aspects of the formulation of assessments: epistemic stance and the intensity of evaluation. It was suggested that epistemic stance may be contingent on and consequential to the second assessment's status as an agreement or disagreement. However, as we will see in Section 4, there are cases when speakers' orientations to epistemic stance come to be an issue in their own right, and consequential to turn formulation as well as sequential organization. Before starting the analysis of such cases, however, let us see what these two aspects of the formulation of assessments look like in Japanese.

2.3 Assessment sequences in Japanese

Assessments can be formulated in various ways in Japanese. They can be formulated in bare declaratives or can be marked with various utterance-final particles and tag-like expressions.[7] The grammatical repertoire for formulating agreements is also rich in Japanese as well as in other languages (Heritage & Raymond 2005; Raymond & Heritage 2006; Schegloff 1996; Sorjonen 2001a; Sorjonen & Hakulinen 2009; Stivers 2005). Each of the different forms of assessments and agreements conveys a different epistemic stance.

There are three basic ways to formulate an agreement in Japanese: interjections, repetitional agreements and anaphoric agreements. Interjection agreements are done through *hai /ee* 'yes' or *nn* 'yeah/uh huh'. Aoki reports, however, that interjections convey only "weak" agreements (Pomerantz 1984) that are not heard as sufficient affiliation to constitute full agreement (Aoki 2008). Repetitional agreements are agreements that repeat the descriptive word used in the first assessments, while anaphoric agreements replace the descriptive word with an anaphor *soo* ('that', roughly speaking). Hayano (2007b) shows that repetitional agreements convey that the speakers have had the view independently from and prior to the production of the first assessment, while anaphorical agreements indicate that the assessment provided by the preceding speaker is something that they have not had in mind. Accordingly, they are often used to insinuate upcoming disagreement. This chapter focuses on varieties of formulation within the category of repetitional agreements.

In addition to these variations in formulations of the 'stem' of agreements, there are other sets of linguistic resources that are used in repetitional agreements, resources that are consequential to the epistemic stance that the turn as a whole puts forward: final particles *yo, ne* and *yone*, and the intensity of second assessments relative to that of first assessments. In this section, I first provide illustrations of the basic functions of the final particles and then discuss how the intensity of second assessments is manifested in Japanese talk-in-interaction.

[7] I regard a sequence as an assessment sequence when interactants assess a single referent, agreeing or disagreeing with each other, regardless of the form used.

2.3.1 Marking epistemic stance in Japanese: *yo, ne* and *yone*[8]

Final particles *yo, ne,* and *yone* are frequently used in informal conversations. While *yo* and *yone* generally occur at the end of a sentential turn constructional unit (TCU) (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974), after the predicate of the sentence,[9] *ne* occurs in various syntactic positions and even as an independent stand-alone response token. As for their functions, many researchers consider them to mark epistemic stances (Kamio 1990; Katagiri 2007; Katoh 2001; Koyama 1997; Takubo and Kinsui 1997). However, it is difficult to provide a characterization of the particles that covers their functions across contexts. These particles are used in utterances that implement a variety of actions (e.g., informings, questions, requests, offers). Also, the intonation makes a difference in the particles' workings (Koyama 1997). Based on the particles' distributions described in the following sections, and along the line of previous studies (Kamio 1990, Katoh 2001 in particular), I argue that *ne* and *yone* are used to claim shared knowledge of, or access to, the referent or the view while *yo* is used to claim epistemic primacy.

The account for the particles based on the distribution of knowledge is sometimes criticized with counter examples. For instance, Kinsui (1993) shows that speakers can use *ne* in answering a question even though it is clear from the fact that the interlocutor has asked the question that they do not share the information. However, such a criticism is valid only under the assumption that the use of particles is rule-governed. Instead, I suggest that interactants use these particles *reflexively* not just to "correctly index" relative epistemic states but also to claim, negotiate and renegotiate them (see also Katoh [2001:43]; Morita [2002], [2005:121]; Kanai [2004]; Heritage [2012a]). Moreover, participants' orientation to achieving affiliation can interfere with the epistemic stance they adopt. Thus, participants adopt epistemic stances to deal with knowledge distribution as well as other interactional concerns, not to follow definite prescribed rules.

---

[8] These particles are used in such actions as requests and offers as well as in assessments. In requests and offers, the issue of epistemic stance plays little role, and the characterizations of the particles this chapter offers may not be applicable to their uses in such environments.

[9] *Yo* can occur at the end of a phrasal TCU within a sentential TCU (see Lee [2007] for an example). However, the use of *yo* in this environment sounds coarse and has sociolinguistic constraints. In fact, my data do not have any example of *yo* in the intra-sentential TCU position.

2.3.1.1 *Yo*

Yo is often described as a marker of information that is not shared by a recipient (Cheng 1987; Katoh 2001; Koyama 1997), or as an epistemic marker of "authority (...) that is not open to negotiation" (Morita 2002:227). For instance, when first speakers ask a question, through which they display a lack of (sufficient) knowledge about the issue as well as a presupposition that the addressee has it, an answer is often marked with *yo* (see Chapter 4 for a full illustration and analysis).

In assessment sequences, *yo* is used when the speaker knows or claims to know the referent of the assessment better or has first hand experience with it, while the addressee lacks first-hand knowledge or has only knowledge that is based on the ongoing here-and-now experience. This suggests that *yo* is used to claim "epistemic primacy" (Raymond and Heritage 2006); a speaker claims to be in a "one-up" position on the addressee in terms of knowledge about or epistemic access to the referent. It should be emphasized that it is the *relative* epistemic stance between interactants that is at issue here; a *yo*-marked utterance may be hedged or epistemically downgraded, as long as the speaker is ready to claim to know better than an interlocutor.

For instance, see Extract 2-6. Here, Eiko, Nami and Kayo are having a lunch break from a pottery lesson at Kayo's home. Each of them brought food for herself. Nami has told the others that she has just started to prepare lunch for her husband to take to work every day and is studying what food would be good to put in the lunch box. Eiko has pieces of salmon in her lunch box, and at lines 1-2, Eiko offers them to Nami to try as a suggestion of them as good food for a lunch box. As a part of the offer she makes an assessment of the salmon marking it with *yo*.

Extract 2-6 [PTR: salmon]

```
                [[((Eiko puts her lunch box in front of Nami))
1 ->   Eiko:    [[kono shake  oishii yo. chotto   tabete goran.
                  this salmon good   FP  a_little eat    try
                  This salmon is good yo. Try (it).

2 ->            kosuko no shake.
                Costco L  salmon
                (It's) salmon from Costco.

                [[((Nami reaches toward the lunch box))
3               [[(0.2)
```

```
4       Nami:   hmm:::.
                ITJ
                I see.

                [((Nami eats the salmon))
5               [(3.3)

6       Eiko:   nanka shio:mi   mo   choodoii  tte iu  ka,
                like  saltiness also temperate QT  say or
                (It's) like, the salti:ness is right (or something),

7 =>    Nami:   aa:: honto da,
                ITJ  true  CP
                Oh::: (you are) right,

8               (0.2)

9 =>    Nami:   oihii     oihii.
                delicious delicious
                (It's) good (it's) good.
```

At lines 1-2, Eiko produces three TCUs, all of which contribute to offer the salmon as something to which Nami does not have access, and thereby encourage Nami to accept the offer: in the first TCU, she informs Nami with a positive assessment marked with *yo* (*kono shake oishii yo* 'This salmon is delicious-*yo*'); in the second, she explicitly offers it (*tabete goran* 'Try (it)'); in the third, she specifies that the salmon comes not from an ordinary supermarket but specially from Costco. Since Costco is relatively new in Japan and is not a store that many people would go to for everyday grocery shopping, to remark that the salmon is from Costco is a way to emphasize its novelty. The particle *yo* is used in the assessment whose objective is to present the referent as something that the speaker has experienced but the recipient has not, which supports the characterization of the particle *yo* as a marker of epistemic primacy.

In response to this, Nami accepts the offer by eating it (line 5), through which she gains epistemic access to the salmon. She also acknowledges Eiko's turn as informative by providing an agreement prefaced with *aa* (line 7), the equivalent of the English "change-of-state" token *oh* (Heritage 1984a). With this turn, Nami acknowledges Eiko's epistemic primacy. She further agrees with Eiko by proffering a second assessment (line 9). Thus, epistemic congruence is achieved here; Eiko claims epistemic primacy, and Nami aligns with this stance by displaying her epistemic subordination.

While Eiko has exclusive access to the referent in Extract 2-6, *yo* can also be used by a speaker who does not have exclusive access but nonetheless has epistemic primacy. In Extract 2-7, B and G are talking about a gathering both of them had been to the previous day. G has been criticizing B for monopolizing the conversation and told him that she gave up even trying to talk. At line 1, B asks G if that was the reason why she fell asleep while B was still talking. After G provides an answer that obliquely denies this, B brings up another girl who was at the gathering, Ayumi, and says that she talks a lot counter to expectation (line 5), inviting G's agreement through the particle *ne* (Tanaka 2000; Morita 2005). To this, G responds with a *yo*-marked second assessment.

Extract 2-7 [CallFriend 1841: Ayumi]

1	B:	sorede n-nechatta no ka yo.[10]
		then fell.asleep P Q FP
		Is that why you f-fell asleep?
2	G:	<iya are wa moo:- sono tokini moo nemuku natteta
		no that TP EMP that when already sleepy became
		<No, that was that (I) was already sleepy and
3		kara moo n: dame da: moo ne yoo to
		so EMP uhm impossible CP already go.to.bed VOL QT
		so (I) thought "no, I will go to
4		omotta kedo:,
		thought but
		bed now," but,
5 ->	B:	demo a^yumi chan yoku shaberu **ne:**, igaini **ne:**,
		but ayumi END much talk FP unexpectedly P
		But A^yumi talks a lot **ne**, *unexpectedly* **ne**,
6 =>	G:	ayumi chan wa yoku shaberu **yo** an[o ko wa.
		ayumi END TP often talk FP that girl TP
		Ayumi talks a lot ***yo***, *that girl (does).*
7	B:	[nn.
		ITJ
		Yeah.

[10] The particle *yo* used in an interrogative as in line 1 here is different from the final particle this study focuses on because such use of *yo* is socio-linguistically more limited than the use of *yo* in the contexts I examine.

8 G: nn-
ITJ
Yeah-

Note that though B's initial assessment is followed by an 'increment', i.e., an element that is added after the possible completion of the host TCU (Ford, Fox and Thompson 2002; Couper-Kuhlen and Ono 2007), *igaini ne:,* 'unexpectedly *ne:,*'.[11] This adverb itself conveys B's epistemic stance, that his knowledge about Ayumi's talkativeness is new. Notably, he attaches the particle *ne* to this phrase. As we will see in the next section, *ne* attached to a non-sentential TCU should be distinguished from that at the end of a sentential TCU, which serves as an epistemic stance marker. In this case, *ne* after *igaini* seems to function to invite agreement also with his epistemic stance conveyed with *igaini*.

While G agrees with B, at the same time she claims epistemic primacy − that she knows better than B that Ayumi talks a lot. She does so with the particle *yo*. Also, by replacing the adverb *igaini* 'unexpectedly' in B's turn with another element (*ano ko wa* 'that girl (does)'), G specifically declines to agree that Ayumi talks a lot *unexpectedly*. The addition of the subject after the possible completion (*ano ko wa* 'that girl (does)') may serve to suggest that Ayumi was not being talkative only that particular night but she is generally talkative. By formulating her turn this way, G claims that she had known that Ayumi talks a lot for longer than B does. Thus, in this case, G's claim of epistemic primacy is incongruent with B's, who has used *ne* and invited G to adopt the same epistemic stance.

As these cases exemplify, *yo* is typically used when the speaker has exclusive or primary knowledge of the issue in assessments. What follows is that *yo* suggests epistemic asymmetry between the speaker and the addressee: a speaker of a *yo*-marked utterance has primary, superior knowledge to the recipient. This suggestion may be accepted by recipients (Extract 2-6), or may be made in incongruence with the other's epistemic stance (Extract 2-7). In contrast, *ne* and *yone* are used to suggest epistemic symmetry between interactants. In the next section, I review previous studies on *ne* and then show how it is used and distributed in the sequence organization of talk.

---

[11] The canonical position in which an adverbial phrase like *igaini* 'unexpectedly' occurs in Japanese is *before* a main predicate, as in *Ayumi chan igaini yoku shaberu ne* 'Ayumi talks a lot unexpectedly'. Couper-Kuhlen and Ono (2007) call this type of increment an "insertable", in contrast with a "glue-on", which are fitted to the end of the main TCU (e.g., "Have ^you go(.)t uh: ^Seacliff's phone number?h (1.1) *by any chance*?") (Couper-Kuhlen and Ono ibid.: 522, see also Ford, Fox and Thompson 2002).

2.3.1.2 *Ne*

The particle *ne* is sometimes considered as an interpersonal or affective marker. For instance, *ne* is described as a marker of "rapport" (Uyeno 1971:132), a marker of "affective common ground" (Cook 1992), or a marker to invite an addressee's involvement in an incorporative manner (Lee 2007). Though these descriptions may be appealing to the native speakers' intuitions, their shortcoming is that they do not account for cases when the use of *ne* is obligatory (Oso 1986; Kamio 1990; Morita 2002). For instance, when interactants are assessing an object that they are experiencing together, the use of *ne* (or *yone*) is very common and almost obligatory unless the turn is designed as self-talk (Morita 2005) or as a "response cry" (Goffman 1981) (this will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.1.2). Moreover, as will be shown in this chapter, *ne* does not necessarily index or invoke positive interpersonal/ affective effect across contexts; in fact, there are sequential contexts where it can be challenging to the interlocutor's stance.

Other researchers treat *ne* as an epistemic stance marker. Kamio (1990) says that *ne* marks a piece of information as shared by the addressee (Kamio 1990; see also Masuoka 1991), and Katagiri (2007) argues that it is used when the speaker has not yet wholeheartedly accepted the information. I too argue that this particle is a marker of shared information, or more specifically, a marker to claim shared access to, or knowledge about, a referent in question. When a first assessment is marked with *ne,* its speaker presents the referent or the view as shared by the recipient, thus making it relevant for him/her to produce a second assessment in the next turn (Pomerantz 1984a; Tanaka 2000; Morita 2005).

See Extract 2-8. This is an exchange between the pottery instructor Kayo and her student Eiko. They are examining a teapot that the student made at home and brought to get the instructor's comments. At line 1, the instructor produces a first assessment, a critical comment about the pot. The particle *ne* marks the object as something to which both the instructor and the student share access. By portraying the referent as something accessible to Eiko, Kayo invites Eiko to produce a second assessment (Pomerantz 1984a). Eiko agrees with Kayo reciprocally using *ne.*

Extract 2-8 [PTR: thick]

```
1 ->   Kayo:   de- (0.2) a^tsui ne.
               and       thick  FP
               And- (0.2)(it's) ^thick ne.

2 =>   Eiko:   atsui desu [ne:.
               thick CP    FP
               (It's) thick ne:.

3      Kayo:              [un:.
                           ITJ
                           Yeah:.
```

Here, both first and second assessments are marked with *ne,* through which Kayo and Eiko establish between them that they have equivalent, shared access to the pot. In other words, they achieve epistemic congruence as well as agreement regarding their evaluation through this adjacency pair. It should be noted here that, given that Kayo is the instructor, she could have reasonably used *yo* and claimed epistemic primacy. By using *ne* instead, she declines to index her status as the instructor and speaks rather as the one who holds symmetric epistemic status with Eiko. This may be a means for the instructor to mitigate her critical comment; by presenting the evaluation as something that is presumably shared by the student, Kayo may imply that she assumes Eiko to be good and experienced enough to be aware of this problem.

As was mentioned earlier, while *yo* and *yone* nearly always occur at the end of a sentential TCU, *ne* can occupy a whole turn as an affiliative response token as well. Tanaka (2000:1141) describes *ne* in this position as "reconfirming an agreed point". However, stand-alone *ne* can be used to respond to an initial assessment that has not yet been conveyed or agreed with. In fact, a stand-alone *ne* as a response to a first assessment seems to convey a fully affiliative agreement just as a repetitional agreement does (in contrast to anaphorical agreements, as will be briefly reviewed in the Section 2.3.2), claiming that its speaker held the view prior to the articulation of the preceding first assessment. Thus, we can analyze a stand-alone *ne* response as a highly truncated version of a *ne*-marked repetitional agreement.[12] Let us look at Extract 2-9, in which a beautician (Beau) and a customer (Cust) are talking about the weather of the day.

[12] One of the factors that influences the use of lone-standing *ne* in contrast with *ne*-marked repetitional agreements may be "repeatability". That is, some first assessments involve immediately repeatable descriptors while others use descriptions that are too lengthy to repeat. It takes another

Extract 2-9 [BSA: rain]

```
1 ->   Beau:   sugoi ame  desu ne:_
               heavy rain CP   FP
               It's heavy rain ne:_

2 =>   Cust:   ne:_ kyoo  wa ki^noo    yori-
               FP   today TP yesterday than
               (It is) ne:_ Today is more (heavily rainy) than
               yesterday-

3      Beau:   hai.
               ITJ
               Yeah.
```

Beautician makes a first assessment marking it with *ne* (*sugoi ame desu ne:* 'It's heavy rain *ne:'*) (line 1). Through *ne,* he conveys his presupposition that the view is shared by Customer, and by responding with *ne,* Customer not only agrees with Beautician regarding the evaluation but also adopts a stance that she indeed has equivalent access to the issue.

Similarly, in Extract 2-10, both first and second assessments are marked with *ne.* This is an extract from a tea ceremony lesson. The instructor (but not the students) is wearing a kimono, and Masa has earlier made an admiring remark about the pattern of it. Following this, the instructor says that most of the kimono pieces she has are hand-me-downs (lines 1/5).

Extract 2-10 [TC: Kimono]

```
1      Inst:   m[inna] konna ano:]
               all     this  well
               Everything is uh:m

2      Masa:    [h n ] :  :  :  ] :  :
                 ITJ
                Mm:::::

3      Kazu:    [h n ] :  :  :  ] ^: : n

4      (Yuki): [(hn)]
```

---

research project to investigate precisely in what interactional environment *ne*-marked repetitional agreements and lone-standing *ne* agreements are provided respectively.

```
5      Inst:   i-wate-moraimono [°bakkari (de)]
                       present    only     CP
               °all hand-me-down.

6      Kazu:                    [a  a  :  :   [: :]
                                 ITJ
                                 Oh:::::

7      Masa:                                  [nn,]
                                               ITJ
                                               Yeah,

8              (0.5)

9      Kazu:   [iya:::]
                ITJ
               We:::ll

               [[gazing at Kazu
10 ->  Yuki:   [[[ne. den]too  [(wa) ase  nai] ne,
                  FP  tradition  TP  fade not  FP
                (It is) ne. Tradition doesn't fade ne,

11     Masa:                   [i y a : : , ]
                                ITJ
                                We::ll,

12 =>  Kazu:   ne,
               FP
               (It is) ne,

13             (0.8)

14     Yuki:   nn
               ITJ
               Yeah
```

The instructor's comment that her kimonos are hand-me-downs is hearable as a self-deprecation since it suggests that she is not wealthy enough to buy new pieces and/or her kimono pieces are old. Yuki makes a subsequent assessment which turns this into something to appreciate: *ne, dentoo wa ase nai ne,* 'tradition doesn't fade *ne*.' The implication is that kimonos are not like other kinds of hand-me-downs and stay beautiful and valuable over generations. This turn consists of two TCUs: *ne* as a stand-alone affiliative response token and a sentential TCU. The initial, stand-alone *ne* is not preceded by an assessment to agree (or disagree) with. However, through the prolonged production of the change-of-state token *aa* (line 6), Kazu has displayed appreciation. This may give Yuki grounds to assume that the view is

already shared by Kazu and therefore the use of *ne* is appropriate. Thus, Yuki's "first" assessment that the tradition does not fade can be heard as the lexical articulation of what has already been agreed on between them. By marking it with *ne* while gazing at Kazu, Yuki invites further agreement from Kazu. In response, Kazu agrees through the reciprocal use of *ne* (line 12). In this example, Yuki and Kazu achieve congruent epistemic stances through the reciprocal use of *ne*.

It should be noted, however, that *ne* does not mark equivalent access/ knowledge in *all* syntactic positions. Unlike *yo* and *yone,* which occur only at the end of a sentential TCU, *ne* occurs at various syntactic positions within a sentential TCU, but its function as an epistemic maker emerges only in the sentence-final or stand-alone position. Tanaka (2000) argues that *ne* in turn-internal position serves a different interactional function than *ne* in a turn-final position does: the former shows that the speaker has not finished the current turn and demands recipiency from an interlocutor while the latter invites agreement from the recipient in the next turn. Indeed, *ne* at the end of phrasal or clausal TCUs within a turn marks ongoing speakership and does not mark equivalent knowledge. Thus, within a single sentential TCU, *ne* and *yo* can co-occur as in Extract 2-11. Sisters-in-law are talking about a resident in a nursing home where their mother lives.

Extract 2-11 [IL: chamber pot]

```
1 ->   Kazu:   dakara ne, are  o tsukatteru yo, ano:: omaru      o.[13]
               so     FP  that O using      FP  uhm   chamber.pot O
               So ne, (she) uses that yo, uh::m a chamber pot.

2              (0.3)

3      Kazu:   okkii no o_
               big   N  O
               A big one_

4      Yoko:   hn::::,
               ITJ
               I see:::,
```

At line 1, Kazu provides information that is supposedly not shared by Yoko, marking it with *yo*. However, within this turn, a conjunction *dakara* 'so' is marked

[13] This turn involves right-dislocation, with the use of a nominal demonstrative *are* 'that' as a 'place holder' (Hayashi and Yoon 2006). The particle is placed at the 'sentence-final' position, namely, after the predicate verb *tsukatteru* 'uses', though before the right-dislocated object *omaru* 'a chamber pot'.

with *ne*. Nonetheless, this turn as a whole is heard and received as new information by Yoko (line 4). Thus, *ne* in the turn-internal position here does not contribute to the epistemic stance of the turn.

Also, within multi-unit turns such as a story, a sentential TCU that is hearably not the end of the turn may be marked with *ne* without having any import as an epistemic stance marker. In the following extract, Ami is telling a story about a muddy road that she had to take to access the place where she was to take an entrance exam for a university.

Extract 2-12 [MM: muddy road]

```
1       Ami:    dorodoro no mi[chi na(h) no(h):(h)]=
                muddy    L  road   CP    FP
                (It's) a muddy road (h) (h) (h),=

2       Mari:                  [ U   h   h   h   h ]

3       Ami:    =tsuchi no michi d[e, .hh]
                 soil   L  road  CP
                =(it was) a road of soil, .hh

4       Mari:                     [h h h]

5       Ami:    dat- maa  so mukashi       da kara moo
                so-  well th long.time.ago CP so   EMP
                So- (it's) a long time ago, so

6               [kawa]tta ka]mo shire nai kedo:,=atshi ga gen'eki=
                 changed   maybe know  not but    I     SP senior
                (it) might have changed but,=when I was a senior in
                high school,

7       Mari:   [nn,]
                 ITJ
                Mm hm,

8 ->    Ami:    =no::- toki ni [juke]n  shita [no ne?,]
                 L     time at  taking  did    P  FP
                (I) took an entrance exam ((of that school)) ne?,

9       Mari:                  [nn,]          [nn,]
                                ITJ            ITJ
                               Mm hm,         Mm hm,

10              (.)
```

```
11 -> Ami:    soo  su to   sa:, .hh ^sugoi   yuki datta  no yo.=
              that do then IP       amazing snow CP_PST P  FP
              Then, .hh (it) was ^heavy snow yo.=

12            =ano  toshi [no fuyu   tte]::.
               that year   L  winter QT
              the winter of that year.

13    Mari:              [u:(h)n]
                          ITJ
                          Yea(h)h,
```

Ami introduces the fact that the way to the university is an unpaved dirt road (lines 1/3), and then says that she took the school's entrance exam when she was a senior in high school (lines 6/8). So, there is a gap between these two bits of information that, a recipient would expect, should be filled as the story unfolds. Thus, the sentential TCU at lines 6/8 is hearable as a part of a story that is yet to be finished, and in such a context, *ne* does not mark the preceding information as shared. In fact, Ami's turn at lines 1/3-5/8 provides new, unshared information. Thus, even when it occurs at the end of a sentential TCU that is marked with *ne,* unless it is hearable as a TRP, *ne* is used to claim ongoing speakership (Tanaka 2000) and does not function as an epistemic stance marker. It can even be attached to a piece of information that is clearly inaccessible to a recipient.

2.3.1.3 *Yone*

Let us now turn to the last of the three final particles of our focus, *yone*. Some researchers treat *yone* as a compound of *yo* and *ne,* in which each of the two particles retains its respective semantics (e.g., Kinsui 1993; Takubo and Kinsui 1997; Katoh 2001; Morita 2002, 2005). For instance, Takubo and Kinsui (1997) argue that *ne* marks information that the speaker is in the process of incorporating from 'I-domain' (indirect experience domain) to 'D-domain' (direct experience domain), and *yo* is used to set up a proposition in the I-domain for further inference. *Yone* is the combination of these two cognitive processes, namely, setting up a proposition to be verified and then to be incorporated in the D-domain. However, their description of *yone* is not supported by empirical evidence and it does not tell us what differences there are between the different interactional functions and consequences of *ne* and *yone*. In contrast, Hasunuma (1995) argues that the function of *yone* cannot be reduced to *yo* and *ne*, and I support this position. As I discuss below, the function of *yone* can be better captured if we see it as a single particle that is different from both *ne* or *yo*.

Like *ne, yone* is often used reciprocally in first and second assessments when the referent is accessible to both first and second speakers, through which they establish that they have equivalent, symmetrical epistemic stances. Extract 2-13 is an example. When a beautician is cutting a customer's hair, the beautician's wife (and an assistant of the salon, AST) sneezes loudly at the back of the salon. The beautician remarks on it laughing in a teasing way.

Extract 2-13 [BSA: cold]

```
1      AST:    HHEgh! (0.5) Egh!   ((a loud sneeze from the back of
                                     the salon))

2      Beau:   hh

3      Beau:   $kushami shiteru$
                 sneeze  doing
               $(She's) sneezing$

4              (3.3)


5 ->   Cust:   kyoo  datte   sa^mui desu mon.
               today because cold   CP   FP
               (Well) (it's) ^cold today.

6              (.)

7      Cust:   [( )

8 =>   Beau:   [samui desu yone:,=kyoo  wa ne[:,]
                 cold  CP   FP     today TP IP
               (It's) cold yone,=today (it) is ne:,

9      Cust:                                    [(so]:-)=
                                                 (tha:-)
10     Cust:   =[nn:,]
                  ITJ
               =Yeah:,

11 ->  Beau:   =[kion]:      hai,
                 temperature ITJ
               =The temperature: yes,
```

```
12 ->          [hikui  desu  yone:,       ]
                low    CP    FP
               (it's) low yone:,

13 =>  Cust:   [kion        wa- hikui desu] yo[ne:,]
                temperature TP  low   CP    FP
               The temperature is- low yone:,

14     Beau:                                    [ha:i,
                                                 ITJ
                                                 Yeah:,
```

The customer makes a first assessment about the coldness of the day as a defense of the assistant. Thus, that it is cold is "pointed out" but not presented as an assessment inviting agreement. However, the beautician agrees with this, leading to an exchange on the weather of the day. The beautician's agreement (line 4), as well as subsequent utterances regarding the temperature (lines 6-8), is marked with *yone.* The weather and temperature of the day are equally accessible to the participants, and assessments on such a matter are often marked with *yone.*

Thus, as far as their distributions in assessment sequences are concerned, *ne* and *yone* are used quite similarly: they are used when participants share epistemic access to an object and their epistemic stances are symmetrical. However, this does not mean that they are equivalent, interchangeable particles. In Chapter 3, it will be demonstrated that *ne* is used in informing responses when its speakers comment on the informing based on what they have just heard, whereas *yone* is used when the speakers' comments are based on their own, equivalent experience. Thus, we can expect that *yone* marks a stronger, more independent epistemic stance than *ne* does in general. I cannot develop a full analysis of the difference in their functions in assessment sequences in this chapter. However, there are pieces of preliminary evidence that support this hypothesis.

Let us first register that *ne*-marked first assessments are more likely to be followed by *ne*-marked second assessments than by *yone*-marked second assessments, and *yone*-marked first assessments are more likely to be followed by *yone*-marked second assessments than *ne*-marked second assessments. Out of 14 assessment sequences in which repetitional agreements are given and both first and second assessments are marked with either *ne* or *yone,* 9 cases (64.3%) have the reciprocal use of either particle and 5 (35.7%) have the mixed use. This distribution suggests that they are not really used as interchangeable, equivalent particles.

Now, the cases of the mixed use of *yone* and *ne* support our hypothesis that *yone* marks a stronger, more independent epistemic stance than *ne*. In these cases,

the speaker using *yone* is in the position to claim better knowledge or rights than the *ne*-marked assessment speaker. For instance, see Extract 2-14, which transpires before the exchange in Extract 2-10. The tea ceremony instructor is wearing a kimono while the students are in ordinary clothes. While watching the instructor making tea as a model performance, Masa says to Kazu that the kimono makes a difference in how it feels marking it with *ne* (lines 1-2). Kazu only minimally agrees with an interjection (line 3), but then the instructor produces a second agreement (lines 5, 7).

Extract 2-14 [TC: sleeves]

```
1 ->   Masa:   yappari   yoofuku to   wa: nanka tamoto ga aru to
               after.all clothes with TP  like  sleeve SP be  then
               Compared to (non-kimono) clothes, with (its) sleeves,

2 ->           kanji ga   chigau [ne,
               feeling SP differ  FP
               (it) makes a difference ne,

3      Kaz:                      [nn:,
                                  ITJ
                                  Yeah:,

4              (1.3)

5 =>   IST:    soo  yone[: yatteru- ya-[(.)tte[te mo=
               that FP     doing    do     ing    also
               (It) does yone: doing- as (the one who is) do-ing
               (it) as well,=

6      Masa:            [ne::,          [ya-   [nn:.
                         FP               do     ITJ
                         It is ne::,     do-    Yeah:.

7 =>   IST:    =chigai masu [yo[ne:,]
                differ HNR   FP
               =(it) is different yone:.

8      Kaz:                [a [a:.]
                            ITJ
                            Oh::.

10     Mas:                  [nn:]:.
                              ITJ
                              Yeah::.
```

```
11    IST:    yappari   ocha wa kimono ka[na:.
              after.all tea  TP kimono Q
              After all, for a tea (ceremony), (it has to be / I'd
              want to wear) kimono, I guess.

12    Mas:                                [nn:.
                                           ITJ
                                           Yeah:.

13    Kaz:    nn:.
              ITJ
              Yeah:.
```

After Kazu's weak agreement (line 3) and 1.3 seconds of gap, the instructor produces an anaphorical agreement and then a repetitional agreement, both of which are marked with *yone* (lines 5, 7). As she does this, she takes a different perspective than Masa did; she responds explicitly as the one who practices tea ceremony in a kimono and has done it both in a kimono and in ordinary clothes, while Masa is merely watching it and making the assessment based on the occasion that is happening here-and-now. The instructor's elaboration at line 11 (*yappari ocha wa kimono kana:* After all, for a tea ceremony, it has to be/ I'd want to wear a kimono, I guess) also indexes the different statuses of her and the students. That is, as an expert, it matters to the instructor what she is wearing, but as novices, the students are still at the stage where it does not matter. The asymmetrical use of *yone* in response to a *ne*-marked assessment is fitted to the asymmetry in their social statuses, which is evoked throughout the turn.

In Extract 2-15, too, the use of *yone*, in contrast with a recipient's use of *ne*, seems to index a slight asymmetry in the interlocutors' epistemic stances. But in this case, the asymmetry is not based on their social statuses but is derived from an interactional contingency (cf. Stivers 2005). While Mari and Ami are chatting in a café, Mari notices a poster for a music CD on the wall just by their table, and she makes an assessment that it is too *ayashii* 'fishy' (line 1).[14] This turn is formulated as a statement to be agreed or disagreed with through a negative interrogative (Heritage 2002). Instead of agreeing or disagreeing, however, Ami reads aloud from the poster and they discuss it to see which singer is singing which song (line 3). After 33 lines of exchange on what the poster says, Mari gives a basis for why it is fishy by pointing out that the song is sponsored or produced by a university with

[14] Mari gets distracted by the poster and started the exchange about it interrupting Ami's ongoing turn and story telling. This may account for Ami's reluctance in producing a full agreement to Mari's assessment about the poster.

a strange name that they have never heard about (line 36) and then restates her assessment with the negative interrogative (line 37). However, instead of agreeing, Ami again reads another phrase from the poster (*naikakufu ninsho- ^naikakufu- .ss °ninsho-°* 'government's certification- ^government's .ss °certification-°) (line 39). This can be heard as responsive to Mari's assessment, for it is odd for a poster of a music CD to say that the government certifies it and thus she can be heard as identifying yet another fishy feature of the poster. However, this is not treated as a sufficient response by Mari. Mari at line 44 restates the assessment yet again, this time with *yone.* It is then that Ami produces a repetitional agreement marked with *ne.*

Extract 2-15 [MM: fishy]

```
1      Mari:   na(h)nka(h)- (.) ayashi sugi nai?,
               like             fishy  too  not
               Li(h)ke(h)- (.) isn't (this) too fishy?,

2              (1.3)

3      Ami:    uta- (0.2) o-
               song
               Song- ((reading from the poster)


------- 33 lines omitted -------


36     Mari:   hora koofuku   daigaku    toka itte nanka
                    see  happiness university etc. say  like
               See, (it) says (it's coming out from) Happiness
               University, like

37             sugoi ayashiku nai?,
               very  fishy    not
               isn't (it) very fishy?,

38             (0.8)

39     Ami:    naika[kufu  nin]sho-   ^naikakufu- .ss °ninsho-°
               government  certificate governmention   certification
               "Government's certification- ^government's .ss
               °certification-°

40     Mari:        [anata mo-]
                     you   also
                    "((why don't)) you too-"
```

```
41              (0.8)

42      Ami:    H h

43              (0.5)

44 ->   Mari:   ayashii yone,
                fishy   FP
                (It's) fishy yone,

45 =>   Ami:    ayashii ne,
                Fishy   FP
                (It's) fishy ne,

46              (2.6)

47      Mari:   a(h)ya(h)shi sugi nai?,kore. .h
                fishy        too  not  this
                (Isn't it) too fi(h)shy(h)?,This (is) .h

48              (.)

49      Ami:    ko(h)no hito- (       ) no kana:,
                this    person          P  Q
                This person (     ), I wonder,
```

Ami's full agreement at line 45 is given only after Mari's multiple attempts to elicit it and convince Ami of its fishiness. Thus, Ami's second assessment here is discernibly dependent on Mari's first assessment(s). Thus, though the referent itself is equally accessible to Mari and Ami, there is an asymmetry regarding the authority over the view.[15] The asymmetrical use of *yone* and *ne* here is fitted to the epistemic asymmetry in terms of the independence in arriving at the assessment.

In sum, notwithstanding the fact that both *ne* and *yone* can be used reciprocally to established symmetrical epistemic relations, the two particles index different epistemic stances when they are used in a single assessment sequence: *yone* indexes a stronger, more independent epistemic stance than *ne* does. Unlike *yo*, however, the asymmetry *yone* poses in contrast with *ne* is subtle and my corpus

[15] Mari produces yet another first assessment after Ami's *ne*-marked agreement (line 47) which is upgraded compared to the preceding first and second assessments (lines 44-45) with the intensifier *sugi* 'too (excessively)'. This looks like a sequence expansion recurrently found after a disagreement (Pomerantz 1984), suggesting the possibility that Mari hears Ami's second assessment at line 45 as a weak, insufficient agreement. However, the long gap between at line 46 makes Mari's turn at line 47 sound like a first pair part of another, independent assessment sequence. Also, its formulation with the negative interrogative (*nai* 'isn't it?') inviting agreement contributes to the hearing of the turn as a new sequence.

does not have a case in which the asymmetry leads into observable interactional consequences in the way the asymmetry posed by *yo* often does, as will be demonstrated later in this chapter.

This section has provided illustrations of Japanese final particles that are frequently used in assessment sequences to mark epistemic stance. *Yo* is used to claim epistemic primacy, *ne* and *yone* to claim shared epistemic access or knowledge, *yone* being stronger than *ne.* While *yo* suggests epistemic asymmetry between interlocutors, *ne* and *yone* are often used reciprocally to establish epistemic symmetry. That is, these particles do not index the speakers' knowledge state, but they are used to make claims about how knowledge is *relatively* distributed between interactants. Therefore, as we will further examine throughout this chapter, it matters whether their epistemic claims are compatible with, or congruent with, each other's. Consequently, interactional upshots of the particles cannot be determined independent of the sequential context of their use. For instance, the use of *ne* can be affiliative and congruent in one context but it can be challenging and incongruent in another. Table 2-1 summarizes the discussions so far.

Table 2-1: Functions of *yo, ne* and *yone* in first and second assessments

1st assessment	2nd assesment
yo: claims epistemic primacy	○ **acknowledgement** of the 1st speakers' epistemic primacy (e.g., "oh you're right," "that's true") × **ne**: claims shared knowledge × **yone**: claims shared knowledge
ne: claims shared knowledge	○ **ne**: claims shared knowledge ○ **yone**: claims subtle primacy × **yo**: claims epistemic primacy
yone: claims shared knowledge	○ **yone**: claims shared knowledge ○ **ne**: claims subtle secondariness of knowledge × **yo**: claims epistemic primacy

○ ... epistemic stances that are congruent with the epistemic stance adopted in first assessments

× ... epistemic stances that are incongruent with the epistemic stance adopted in first assessments

In the next section, we examine another aspect of the formulation of second assessments that I argue has to do with the turn's epistemic stance, namely, the intensity of the evaluation.

2.3.2 Intensity of Evaluation in Japanese

As was reviewed earlier (Section 2.2), the intensity of second assessments relative to that of first assessments has been shown to index the degree of agreement in English conversation (Pomerantz 1984a): an upgraded second assessment is heard as a full agreement; a downgraded second assessment is heard as a disagreement; a same-degree second assessment is often followed by a disagreement by the same speaker and thus is heard as less than full agreement. The intensity of evaluation in Japanese interaction, however, exhibits different features. While downgraded second assessments are heard as disagreements in Japanese as well, the default way to show full affiliation in Japanese interaction is

not upgraded evaluations but same-evaluations.[16] For instance, in Extracts 2-7, 2-8, 2-9, 2-12 and 2-14 we saw earlier, second assessments proffer same evaluations which are not followed by disagreements or treated as disagreement implicative by the first assessment speakers. Extracts 2-9 and 2-10 were cases in which agreements were done through stand-alone *ne*. I argued that this use of *ne* is equivalent to a *ne*-marked repetitional agreement. Thus, I take it that stand-alone *ne* as an agreement token can be seen as a form of agreement that does not modify the intensity of evaluation proffered in the first assessment.

In Table 2-2, we see evidence for this distributionally: 64% of second assessments that are treated as unproblematically affiliating are done with same evaluations while only 36% of them are upgraded. Interestingly, however, the tendency reverses if we look only at *yo*-marked agreements: 71% of *yo*-marked agreements involve upgraded evaluations. Thus, *ne* and *yone* are consistently used with same-evaluation while *yo* is consistently used with upgraded agreements.

Table 2-2: Distributions of same-evaluation and upgraded agreements[17]

	Same-evaluation agreements	Upgraded agreements	Total
Marked with *ne / yone*	20 (83.3%)	4 (16.7%)	24 (100%)
Marked with *yo*	5 (33.3%)	10 (66.6%)	15 (100%)
Total	25 (64.1%)	14 (35.9%)	39 (100%)

Thus, the distribution of same-evaluation agreements and upgraded agreements are quite different in English and Japanese. This may be due to the availability of final particles *ne* and *yone*. We saw earlier that these particles are pervasively used in first assessments as well as in second assessments. This provides a context that is different than what Heritage (2002a) describes. Heritage suggests that second

[16] Mondada (2011) also reports that second assessments that proffer same evaluation occur commonly in French interaction between car dealers and customers and that they are not treated as a pre-disagreement implicative.

[17] Only those agreements that are done through repetitional agreements are included in the table.

assessment speakers are vulnerable to be seen as epistemically dependent and thus "merely" agreeing with the preceding speaker. The intensification in second assessments in English interaction can be seen as a means to counterbalance this epistemic presumption that is attached to the second position and to be heard as sincerely agreeing. However, in Japanese interaction, since first assessment speakers can acknowledge second assessment speakers' shared access through *ne* or *yone*, second speakers are *not* vulnerable to be regarded as epistemically dependent on the basis of the design of their assessment proper. In this environment, intensification may therefore be reserved for another interactional goal.

In the remainder of the chapter, I demonstrate that an upgraded second assessment is provided as a means to give support to the claim of epistemic primacy embodied with *yo*. Section 2.4 focuses on *yo*-marked agreements proffering upgraded evaluations, and then examines the minority of cases when *ne*- or *yone*-marked second agreements are upgraded to show that upgraded evaluations function to provide support to an epistemic claim throughout the context though with varied contingencies. Section 2.5 presents an analysis of the use of *yo* in disagreements.

2.4. Agreements

2.4.1 Second assessments marked with *yo*

In the last section, we saw that upgraded second assessments are rather rare in Japanese interaction and the majority of them are marked with the particle *yo*. It was also pointed out that same-degree agreements do not endanger sequence expansion through which to pursue fuller agreements. This suggests that upgraded second assessments serve another interactional function than fully agreeing with initial assessments. In this section, I analyze *yo*-marked agreements and demonstrate that intensification of assessments is employed as a means to provide support to the claim of epistemic primacy.

As Table 2-2 shows, *ne* and *yone* are more commonly used to mark agreements than *yo* is. Participants mark their agreements with *yo* to claim epistemic primacy. As Heritage and Raymond (Heritage 2002a; Heritage and Raymond 2005; Raymond and Heritage 2006) discuss, claiming epistemic primacy

in the second position often takes extra interactional work while it is simpler in the first position. When participants produce a first assessment, they claim as well as exhibit their epistemic access, and moreover, claim epistemic authority, unless they use epistemic downgraders to offset this implication associated with the position (Heritage and Raymond 2005; Raymond and Heritage 2006). It is in this sequential environment that a second speaker produces a second assessment. Second assessment speakers need to push back this epistemic implication associated with the second position to claim epistemic primacy. In order to establish epistemic primacy in second position, speakers often give some support to the claim of epistemic primacy that they are putting forward. For instance, recall Extract 2-7, partially reproduced below as Extract 2-16.

Extract 2-16 [CallFriend1841: Ayumi]

```
5 ->   B:      demo a^yumi chan yoku shaberu ne:, igaini       ne:,
               but  Ayumi  END  much talk    FP   unexpectedly P
               But ^Ayumi talks a lot ne:, unexpectedly ne:,

6 =>   G:      ayumi chan wa yoku shaberu yo an[o ko wa.
               Ayumi END  TP much talk    FP that kid TP
               Ayumi talks a lot yo, that girl (does).

7      B:                                       [nn.
                                                 ITJ
                                                Yeah.
```

It was pointed out that G is claiming epistemic primacy over B through *yo*, and that she indexes her prior knowledge by not repeating the adverb *igaini* 'unexpectedly' in B's turn. In other words, G formulates line 6 so that it gives support to her claim of epistemic primacy.

In this section, I illustrate another linguistic resource that is recurrently used to give support to the claim of epistemic primacy, namely, the intensity of evaluation. To begin with, see Extract 2-17, an extract drawn from a conversation among four university students. They are having a plate of sushi they took out from a sushi restaurant. Yumi has had sushi from this restaurant before and she is the one who suggested they have a sushi plate from the restaurant. After they unwrap the sushi plate and are getting ready to eat it, Kumi, looking at the plate, remarks that there is no piece to discard such as *kappa* (cucumber rolls), meaning that the plate is filled with good pieces. In response to this, Yumi makes a *yo*-marked second assessment (line 4).

Extract 2-17 [SP: discard]

```
1 ->   Kumi:   nanka kappa          toka sute    ga nai jan.=
               like  cucumber_rolls etc. discard SP not TAG
               (It's) like there is no discard like cucumber rolls.=

2 ->   Kumi:   =sute[goma    [ga.
                discard_piece SP
               =No piece to discard.

3      Maki:        [n n     [:. honto.
                     ITJ         right
                     Yeah:. (You're) right.

4 =>   Yumi:                 [zenzen nai yo.
                              at_all not FP
                              There aren't at all yo.

5              (1.0)

6      Yumi:   (sooyuu no de-) (.) a   demo sooyuu menyuu m[o  aru.
                such   N  with     ITJ but  such   menu   also be
               (With such pieces-) (.) Oh but there are also such
                 menus (in the restaurant).

7      Hiro:                                                  [he: a-=
                                                               ITJ ITJ
                                                              Hmm, oh-

8              =^soo  na n da:,
                that CP N CP
               =there ^are:,
```

Kumi's initial assessment at line 1 is marked with a tag question marker *jan*. According to McGloin (2002), this marker does not presuppose the recipient's agreement and is often used to persuade the recipient or justify the speaker's position when a disagreement is emerging (McGloin ibid.). This utterance final form, therefore, does not acknowledge the recipient as the one who arrived at the assessment before the speaker.

While Maki agrees with Kumi acknowledging it as a view that she has not had (*nn honto* 'yeah (you're) right') (line 3), Yumi's second assessment at line 4 involves more than agreeing; she claims epistemic primacy through the particle *yo*. Also, she upgrades the evaluation by adding the intensifier *zenzen* '(not) at all'. This can be seen as a way to demonstrate that she, without having to look at every piece in the place, already knows the plate thoroughly, which is distinct from the epistemic access that Kumi and the others are gaining by looking at it here and now.

Thus, Yumi is *claiming* epistemic primacy through the particle *yo,* on the one hand, and *demonstrating* epistemic primacy through the upgraded evaluation on the other (Sacks 1992). In addition, Yumi's reference to another menu that does have "pieces to discard" (line 6) after a second of pause (line 5) supports this analysis; by so doing, Yumi exhibits her knowledge about other menus of the restaurant which is not shared by others. Thus, this can be seen as her attempt to pursue a response that acknowledges her epistemic primacy and takes credit for having recommended the restaurant and the plate. Though Kumi does not give either of these possibly relevant responses, Hiro acknowledges the newsworthiness of Yumi's turn, thereby at least accepting her claim of epistemic primacy (lines 7-8).

In contrast, in the exchange that shortly follows, Maki acknowledges that Yumi has a level of access that she does not have when she makes an assessment of the taste of sushi (line 14).

Extract 2-18 [SP: discard_continued]

```
14 -> Maki:   honto da:, oi^shii ne.
              true  CP   good    FP
              True, (it's) ^good ne.

15 => Yumi:   nn::.
              ITJ
              Yeah::.

16            (1.0)

17    Yumi:   shinsen.=koko.
              fresh    here
              (Sushi is) fresh.=In this (restaurant).
```

Though Maki is the first to eat the sushi on this occasion and others have not had their first pieces, she prefaces her assessment (*oishii ne* '(it's) good *ne*) with an acknowledgement (*hontoda:* '(That is) true'). Through this, she refers to Yumi's assessment that might have been produced previously or her earlier utterance at line 4 in the preceding extract (*zenzen nai yo* 'There aren't (discards in this sushi plate) at all *yo*'), acknowledging that Yumi is the one who knew the sushi and recommended it. Yumi responds with an interjection *nn::* 'yeah::', through which she simply accepts Maki's assessment without taking issue with it. That is to say, she does not object to the epistemic stance that Maki has taken, and epistemic congruence is achieved such that Yumi is in a one up position. Compared with this

exchange, we can see that Yumi's *yo*-marked second assessment in Extract 2-17 is concerned with claiming and establishing her epistemic primacy, which has not been acknowledged.

Extract 2-19 is another example in which a second assessment speaker uses *yo* to claim epistemic primacy and gives support to the claim by upgrading the evaluation. This is a telephone conversation between Hiro and Taro. Hiro recently moved to Boston, and Taro lives in San Diego and has never been to Boston. Prior to the extract, Hiro has told Taro that he and his wife decided to move to Boston not only because it suited to his business but also because it is a fun place to live. Following this, Taro brings up his friend who recently visited Boston (lines 4-5) and quotes his/her positive assessment of it (line 7). Hiro responds to this with a *yo*-marked second assessment at line 8.

Extract 2-19 [CallFriend 4573]

```
1      Hiro:   ma   jaa, (0.4) koko ni shi yoo ka tsutte.
               well then       here to do  VOL Q  say
               (We were like) "well, then, (0.4) shall (we decide
                 on) this (town).

2      Taro:   aa  soo.
               ITJ that
               Oh I see.

3      Hiro:   hai.
               ITJ
               Yes.

4      Taro:   n::?, .hh nanka ore no tomodachi de ne:, yappa ano::
               ITJ       like  I   L  friend    as P    also  uhm
               Mm:. .hh Well, my friend, uh:m

5              saikin   bosuton ni (itteta) hito   ga ita n da kedo:,
               recently Boston  to  webt    person SP was N CP but
               (s/he) recently went to Boston as well, bu:t,

6      Hiro:   hai,=
               ITJ
               Mm-hm,=

7 ->   Taro:  =.hh yappa     sugo:- ii   machi da tte itte   ta  ne,
                    expectedly ver- good town  CP QT  saying PST FP
               =.hh (as one would expect,)  (s/he) was saying that
                 (it) was a ver- good town-ne.
```

```
8 =>  Hiro:   su[ngoi] ii   desu yo.=
              very     good CP   FP
              (It's) very good yo.=

9     Taro:     [egh]

10    Taro:   =machi ga koo- chotto- (0.2) >nante no<
               town  SP this a.little       what  P
              =The town is like- a little- (0.2) >how do (I) say<

11            renga zukuri no ie    ga ookute:?,
              block made   L  house SP many
              there are many houses of brick?,

12            (.)

13    Hiro:   nn,
              ITJ
              Mm-hm,

14    Taro:   nde:: maa-  rekishi mo   kanjirushi sa:,
              and   well  history also feel       P
              A::nd well- (one) can feel the history as well,
15            (0.4)

16    Taro:   .hh

17    Hiro:   Amerika de ichiban furui machi janai desu ka koko,
              America in most    old   town  TAG   CP   Q  here
              (It) is the oldest town in America, right, here?

18    Taro:   aa  soo,
              ITJ that
              Oh is it,

19    Hiro:   nn
              ITJ
              Yeah

20    Taro:   hnn:
              ITJ
              Mm::
```

By providing a quoted assessment, Taro is referring to a source of information about Boston that he has besides Hiro. When Hiro agrees with this at line 8, he marks his second assessment with *yo* and claims epistemic primacy. Here again, the intensity of evaluation is modified as a resource to provide support to his claim.

In Taro's quoted assessment, he cuts-off his talk right before the last vowel of the intensifier *sugoi* 'very' is articulated (*sugo:-* 'ver-') and puts the stress on the

adjective *ii* (good). The natural stress for the phrase *sugoi ii* 'very good' would be on *sugoi* 'very'. However, the stress is put on *ii* here, because of which the intensifier is heard to be abandoned. Hiro, in contrast, puts emphasis on the intensifier (*sungoi*) in his second assessment. By differentiating his evaluation from the quoted evaluation in terms of the intensity in this way, Hiro invokes a basis for claiming that he knows Boston better than Taro, and better than Taro's friend whom Taro has quoted, who merely visited Boston, while Hiro lives there.

Taro does not overtly attend to nor even acknowledge Hiro's epistemic claim but continues to report what he heard about Boston from the friend (lines 10-11 and 14), which can be seen as resistance to Hiro's claim of epistemic primacy. Probably in response to this, Hiro does not insist on epistemic primacy: as he says that Boston is the oldest town in the United States (line 17), he "inappropriately" suggests Taro shared this knowledge, conveying that he assumes Taro knows this as well through the sentence final form *janai desu ka* 'right?'[18]. However, Taro did not know this and responds with a news receipt (line 18) and then with an interjection *hnn:*, with which he registers the preceding turn as informative (line 20). With these responses that display lack of knowledge, Taro is taking an epistemic stance that is congruent with Hiro's claim of epistemic primacy. Consequently, Hiro reestablishes his epistemic primacy and starts to describe Boston from this position in the subsequent exchange (data not shown).

In the last extract, we observed a case in which a speaker claims epistemic primacy about an object of which he has first-hand knowledge. In Extract 2-20, the basis for claiming epistemic primacy seems to come from an ongoing interactional contingency. Here, male friends Shin and Toshi are talking on the phone. Shin, who could graduate from college soon but was planning to transfer to another school, told Toshi that he is thinking of taking some time off school and spend it to build up his body before he transfers. Toshi first laughed at this idea and then said that Shin should transfer now if he wants to do so at all. The extract starts when Shin is defending his idea, arguing that it would be too late if he does not work on his physical strength now, implying that this has to be done before transferring to and starting with another school.

[18] The locative demonstrative *koko* 'here' at the end of Hiro's turn at line 17 is a right-dislocated addition following the possible completion of the utterance.

Extract 2-20 [CallFriend 6166: downhill]

```
1       Shin:   o- osoku natte  kara  hitoride ganba roo toka
                l- late  become after alone    try   AUX etc.
                If (I/we) l-later think like

2               omotte mo     ganbare nai yo.
                think  though try.can not FP
                "I'll work (to get physical strength) on my own,"
                 (I/we) won't be able to work hard yo.

3               (1.0)

4 ->    Toshi:  -maa   na,=moo     [sorosoro kudarizaka da=
                 maybe FP  already  almost   downhill   CP
                -Maybe (you're right),=cuz (it's) almost=

5       Shin:                      [nn,
                                    ITJ
                                    Yeah,

6 ->    Toshi:  =kara [(na),
                 so     FP
                =downhill.

7 =>    Shin:         [kudarizaka mo ii   toko  da yo.=moo.
                       downhill   TP good place CP FP  EMP
                      (It's) far into downhill yo.=Really.

8               (0.3)

9       Shin:   onaka   hekomashito kanaito moo natsu  madeni.
                stomach flatten     must    EMP summer till
                (I) have to flatten (my) stomach before summer.

10              (0.5)

11      Toshi:  .hhh ho- majide:   honto:
                     rea seriously really
                .hhh Rea-  seriously really

12      Shin:   n::n,
                ITJ
                Yeah,

12              (0.2)

13      Toshi:  hajimari soo  da mon.
                start    seem CP FP
                (It) looks like (it's) starting ((in my body)).
```

After Shin's claim, Toshi concedes, hesitantly agreeing with Shin (*maa na* '(you) may be right') (line 4). He then makes an assessment *moo sorosoro kudarizaka da kara (na)* 'cuz (it's) almost downhill', seemingly referring to physical conditions of people their age (lines 4-5).

Shin responds to this assessment produced as part of a concession with a *yo*-marked agreement. Shin, being the one who has been arguing that he should work on his physical strength now, not later, has a reasonable basis for the claim that he does not need Toshi to tell him that it is downhill and that he knows this better than Toshi. In addition, in this context, it is in his interest to establish this view as a basis for justifying his plan to invest time to build up physical strength before starting with a new school. To that end, Toshi's formulation that is downgraded with *sorosoro* 'almost' is not sufficient. Thereby, while agreeing with Toshi on the basic valence of the evaluative stance, Shin claims epistemic primacy over the view and upgrades the intensity of the evaluation by saying *kudarizaka mo ii toko* 'far into downhill' and adding an emphasis marker *moo* 'really'.

After a short delay of Toshi's response (line 8), Shin adds that he has to flatten his stomach before summer (line 9), referring to a manifestation of his body already going 'downhill'. Toshi, on the other hand, says that it is almost starting, indicating that downhill has not yet started for him (lines 10 and 13). By focusing on his own body instead of Shin's, Toshi avoids positioning himself with respect to Shin's self-deprecating comment (Pomerantz 1984a).

In this section, we have seen that *yo*-marked agreements commonly co-occur with upgraded evaluation. With this combination, speakers of *yo*-marked second assessments seem to be claiming that they have a "stronger" or "more accurate" evaluation than first assessment speakers', which gives a basis for their claims of epistemic primacy. Thus, this is a way to take and legitimize the epistemic primacy that they are claiming.

2.4.2 Second assessments marked with *ne* or *yone*

I have argued that *yo* marked second assessments tend to be upgraded. I have argued that this upgrading is primarily concerned with providing a basis for the claim of epistemic primacy that *yo* marking conveys. Conversely *ne*- or *yone*-marked second assessments, in which the speakers are claiming to know just as much as the preceding speaker, generally involve same evaluations and,

correspondingly, tend not to be upgraded (recall 2-7, 2-8, 2-9, 2-12 and 2-14). However, in the corpus used for this thesis, there are two cases of second assessments that are marked with *ne* or *yone,* which are also upgraded. Though they look to be counter examples to my argument, a close look at their interactional contingencies reveals that in these cases too, an upgraded evaluation is proffered to provide a basis for the speaker's epistemic claim.

First, let us consider Extract 2-21, an exchange from a telephone conversation between G and B. What transpires in Extract 2-21(1) seems to prepare a context that accounts for the use of an upgraded evaluation in the following exchange in Extract 2-21(2). G earlier described a novel by a Japanese classic mystery author. B has not read that novel but has read other novels by the same author and described them as "obscene", with which G disagreed. As a concession, they later agreed that they are "creepy", but G adds that his work is not as creepy as that of another mystery author. Then at lines 1-6, B says that he has not read such mystery novels much because they are *kowai* 'scary', with which G again disagrees (line 8).

Extract 2-21(1) [CallFriend 1841: scary]

```
1     B:    -maa- boku a:nmari ano  hen  no mono  yonda koto
            well  I   much    that area L  thing read  N
            -Well- I haven't read that kind of

2           nai kara sa:,
            not so   IP
            genre much,

3           (.)

4     G:    a   honto:, [hnn:]
            ITJ really   ITJ
            Oh really:, I see:

5     B:                [nn,]
                         ITJ
                        Yeah,

6     B:    .hhh (0.2) cho-tto  ne, aaiu      no anmari sukija
                       a_little IP  that.kind N  much   like
            .hhh (0.2) We-ll, (I) don't like that kind (of
            novels)
```

7 B: na(h)i n da **yone**[(h), .hh hh .hh ko]wai jan datte::
not N CP FP scary TAG because
very much **yone***(h), .hh hh .hh (They) are scary,*
aren't (they) (that's why).

8 G: [hhhahhahhahhahhahh]

9 G: da- ko^waku wa naka tta **yo**,
scary TP not CMP FP
(They) weren't ^scary **yo**,

10 B: kowai tte iu ka kimochiwarui tte iu ka [sa:,
scary QT say or eerie QT say or P
(They) are scary or (should I rather say) eerie,
11 G: [a::=
ITJ
Oh::

12 =chicchai toki atashi yonda no yo:, nanka:,
little time I read P FP like
in (my) childhood (I) read them yo:, *like*

13 B: nn,=
ITJ
Yeah,

14 G: =sono toki wa su:goi kowaka tta kedo ne, [nanka: mo:
that time TP very scary PST but FP like EMP
=at that time, (they) were very scary, (I) was like
really:,

15 B: [°↓nn.
ITJ
°↓Yeah.

16 G: nanka: .hh kowa::i toka omotte,
like scary etc. think
li:ke, .hh "scary::," (I) thought,
17 B: na:ru[hodo ne,
ITJ P
I see,

18 G: [°ya:me chatta kedo.
stop AUG.PST but
((and)) (I) stopped (reading them).

19 B: °n[n:]
ITJ
Yeah

In response to G's disagreement, B modifies his earlier assessment and says they are *kimochiwarui* 'eerie' (line 10) as an attempt to achieve an agreement. However, instead of accepting or rejecting this descriptor, G goes back to the original evaluation, saying that they *were* 'scary' *when she was little* (lines 11-12/14/16). This delayed, conditional "concession", therefore, maintains the difference between their stances: G does not find them scary any longer while B does.

The assessment sequence of our interest transpires after this, at lines 20-22. G brings up and makes an assessment about yet another mystery author, Agatha Christie, following which B produces a second assessment that is upgraded as well as marked with *yone*.

Extract 2-21(2) [CallFriend 1841: scary_continued]

```
20 -> G:    [.hh] ^sono ten     agasa  kurisutii toka yonde mo
                  that respect Agatha Christie  etc. read  if
            .hh In that sense, reading Agatha Christie

21 ->       anma(h)ri ko(h)waku nai n [da yone,
            very      scary     not P  CP FP
            is not so scary yone,

22 => B:                                [^zenzen kowaku nai yo^ne,
                                          at.all scary not  FP
                                          (It's) not scary at ^all
                                          yo^ne,

23    G:    ne,=
            FP
            (It's not) ne,

24    B:    =nn,
             ITJ
             Yeah,
```

Here, B upgrades the intensity of evaluation by adding an intensifier *zenzen* 'at all' as well as deleting a qualifier *anmari* 'very', which G used in her first assessment (line 20). Unlike other upgraded second assessments we have seen, however, this is not marked with *yo* but with *yone.* What accounts for this atypical formulation, I argue, is the preceding exchange in which B admitted not to have read the mystery novels by the Japanese authors much because he finds them scary. Under these circumstances, it is reasonable for G to suspect B might not have read Agatha Christie for the same reason that he does not read the Japanese authors, namely,

because they are scary. Thus, B may feel that he may have to do extra work to claim appropriate level of epistemic access in order to be heard as fully agreeing that they are not scary. This is what the upgraded evaluation is proffered for. Note that B starts to produce his second assessment before he hears the particle *yone* in G's first assessment. G uses the particle *yone* and conveys that she sees the information to be shared between them, but B does not wait to hear the particle before he produces an intensifier *zenzen* 'at all'. Thus, B's possible suspicion that G suspects B does not have epistemic access or share the evaluative stance is still valid at that point. Hence, B's upgraded evaluation is proffered in the context where it is relevant for B to provide a basis for his claim of epistemic access, based on which he is agreeing.

With this analysis in hand, we can characterize an upgraded evaluation in a second assessment more generally as a means for its speakers to provide a basis for the epistemic claim they are putting forward, whether it is a claim for epistemic primacy or equivalent knowledge, when the interlocutor does not (or is likely not to) acknowledge it.

The other case of an upgraded second assessment that is marked with *ne* further supports this analysis. Extract 2-22 is a telephone conversation between Ken and Jun, both of whom live in the United States. They have been talking about the rates of international phone calls and about how expensive their families in Japan think them to be, although in reality, they do not cost much. Jun said it could be as cheap as 60 yen per minute and Ken said it is even less than that. At lines 1-3, Jun is telling about a one-hour phone conversation that he had, through which he found that an international call is not so expensive and it can be cheaper than making calls for telephone dating (*bakkayaroo* '(you) idiot' in Jun's turn at line 4 is a reproach of Ken for mentioning such a service while being recorded). Then Jun proposes an alternative way to see this: it is not that international calls are cheap, but it is Japanese domestic long-distance phone calls that are expensive (lines 6, after multiple attempts to start earlier at lines 2 and 4) and thus making international calls feel cheap. This turn is marked with *yo*.

Extract 2-22 [CallFriend 6228: calls]

```
1     Ken:    ^sonna takaku    nai na:,=toka n:, [((NAME  ] )) yori
               so    expensive not FP   etc. uhm  ((NAME))     than
              “(International calls) are not so expensive”, ((I/we
              thought)),
```

2 Jun: [maa nihon-]
well Japan
Well, Japan-

3 Ken: yasui [jan to(h)ka(h) itte(h) h e h h e h h e h h e
cheap TAG etc. say
(I was like) "(They are) cheaper than ((the name of the telephone service))"

4 Jun: [ya da: nihon no ro- ghh ba(h)kkayaro(h) hhh
no so Japan L lo- idiot
No, so Japanese lo- ghh (you) i(h)dio(h)t, hhh

5 Ken: [hehhe hh

6 -> Jun: [.hh nihon no rongu disutansu ga takai n da **yo:.**
Japan L long distance SP expensive N CP FP
.hh (It's) Japanese long-distance phone calls that are expensive **yo:.**

7 (.)

8 => Ken: Aa [soo soo ni]hon wa:, nm kyokutanni=
ITJ right right Japan TP extremely
Oh right right , (in) Japan, (long-distance calls) are=

9 Jun: [yappari.]
after.all
after all.

10 Ken: =takai **ne**[:,
expensive FP
=extremely expensive **ne:,**

11 Jun: [**ne**:,
P
Right?

12 (.)

13 Jun: [da kocchi kitara nandemo: yasui janai.
so here come.then anything cheap TAG
So once (you/we) come here (=States), everything is cheap, right?

14 Ken: [nn ^ko-
ITJ hea-
Yeah ^hea-

15 Ken: .hh >kocchi kitara ano< tookyoo: oosaka kan: o
here come.then well Tokyo Osaka between O
.hh >once (you/we) come here, well<

16 Ken: hiruma kaketeru no to onnaji-
day calling N with same
that (international calls) are the same as daytime calls between Tokyo and Osaka

17 Jun: ne:,=
FP
Right,

18 Ken: =kankaku da **yo.**
feeling CP FP
=is how (it) feels **yo.**

Since Ken has been emphasizing how cheap calling from the United States to Japan is, Jun has good grounds to claim that his view that it is Japanese domestic long-distance calls that make international calls comparatively cheap is different from Ken's and that he is more knowledgeable (or insightful in this case) about this matter than Jun, and this is conveyed with the particle *yo*. In fact, though interrupted midway, Jun's second attempt to start this utterance (line 4) is prefaced with *ya* 'no', a negative interjection that is often followed by a contradicting or disagreeing comment (Saft 1998).[19]

Under this circumstance, Ken is in a position to have to do extra work in order to claim that Jun's assessment is not news and he shares the view. He initially responds to Jun's assessment with an interjection *soo* 'right'. Kushida (2002) analyzes the use of *soo* after a proffer of collaborative completion and shows that it is used to approve the interlocutor's contribution (the TCU that collaboratively completed the speaker's ongoing turn) as something that goes along with the speaker's project but something that the speaker him/herself could not sufficiently articulate. This analysis appears to account for the use of this interjection in the current context as well: *soo* seems to suggest that the preceding turn has stated what has already been in the speaker's mind. In other words, *soo* is used to claim previous, independent access to the view that Jun has stated, which Ken has not had a chance to state.

Ken's *ne*-marked second assessment is produced in this context, where he seems to be striving to claim independent access to the view. And this assessment is upgraded with an intensifier *kyokutanni* 'extremely'. As in the previous example, therefore, an upgraded evaluation occurs in environments where giving some

[19] On the other hand, *iya* can also preface confirming answers to questions. Kushida (2005) argues that *iya* is used to block possible trajectories projected by the prior question.

support to a claim of epistemic stance (previous access in this case) is due. Here emerges incongruence between Jun's and Ken's epistemic stances: while Jun is claiming to have epistemic primacy, Ken is claiming to know as much as Jun does. This incongruence is immediately resolved at line 11, where Jun backs down and acknowledges Ken's epistemic claim by using *ne* to reconfirm the agreement.

Extracts 2-21 and 2-22 examined in this section exhibit cases in which upgraded second assessments are marked with *ne* or *yone*. It was shown that in these cases too an upgraded evaluation was exploited to give a basis for the epistemic stance the speakers are claiming, i.e., equivalent access or knowledge. It is plausible that an upgraded evaluation is used as a means to give support to an epistemic stance, for proffering an evaluation that is different from and more specific than the first speaker's can be an indication of its speaker's epistemic independence (Pomerantz 1984). It is not relevant for a second assessment speaker to appeal to this method when a first assessment speaker, by marking the first assessment with *ne* or *yone,* is already granting equivalent access to the second speaker.

So far, I have shown how second assessments are designed to claim and establish epistemic primacy. However, turn design is not the only aspect of talk that exhibits interactants' orientation to this issue. How the sequence of talk unfolds also shows that to be a significant issue to be dealt with. In the following section, I illustrate how interactants' orientation to who holds epistemic primacy is manifested in the development of sequence organization.

2.4.3 Expanded Assessment Sequences

For many action types, when a first pair part (FPP, Schegloff and Sacks 1973) receives a preferred response, whether it is a compliance of a request or agreement with a first assessment, the general tendency is that the sequence closes without elaborate expansion (Schegloff 2007). On the other hand, a sequence with a dispreferred response is extensively expanded, during which interactants minimize or resolve the disalignment and/or disaffiliation that has emerged. For instance, in Extract 2-21 we saw earlier, reproduced below as Extract 2-23, B's assessment about mystery novels by a Japanese author (line 6-7) is disagreed with by G (line 9), which is followed by a post-expansion in which they work to resolve the disagreement.

Extract 2-23 [CallFriend1841: scary]

6 B: .hhh (0.2) cho-tto ne, aaiu no anmari sukija
a_little IP that.kind N much like
.hhh (0.2) We-ll, (I) don't like that kind (of novels)

7 B: na(h)i n da **yone**[(h), .hh hh .hh ko]wai jan datte::
not N CP FP scary TAG because
very much **yone***(h), .hh hh .hh (They) are scary, aren't (they) (that's why).*

8 G: [hhhahhahhahhahhahh]

9 G: da- ko^waku wa naka tta **yo**,
scary TP not CMP FP
(They) weren't ^scary **yo**,

10 B: kowai tte iu ka kimochiwarui tte iu ka [sa:,
scary QT say or eerie QT say or IP
(They) are scary or (should I rather say) eerie,

11 G: [a::=
ITJ
Oh::

12 =chicchai toki atashi yonda no yo:, nanka:,
when I little read P FP like
in (my) childhood (I) read them yo:, *like*

13 B: nn,=
ITJ
Yeah,

14 G: =sono toki wa su:goi kowaka tta kedo ne, [nanka: mo:
that time TP very scary PST but FP like EMP
=at that time, (they) were very scary, (I) was like really:,

15 B: [°↓nn.
ITJ
°↓Yeah.

16 G: nanka: .hh kowa::i toka omotte,
like scary etc. think
li:ke, .hh "scary::," (I) thought,

```
17    B:    na:ru[hodo ne,
            ITJ       P
            I see,

18    G:          [°ya:me chatta  kedo.
                    stop  AUG.PST but
                  ((and)) (I) stopped (reading them).

19    B:    °n[n:]
             ITJ
            Yeah
```

At line 10, B modifies his evaluation, proposing an alternative evaluative term *kimochiwarui* 'eerie' to substitute *kowai* 'scary'. This gets G to tell a telling about her experience of having found the novels scary in her childhood (lines 11-12/14/16), which works to show some degree of agreement with, or at least understanding of, B's evaluation, albeit in a qualified way. Thus, the development of the post-expansion in this example is the product of B's and G's orientation to remedying the dispreferred response at line 8.

In other words, post expansion can be seen as an indicator that there is something disaffiliative or disaligning about the sequence. In this section, I provide case analyses of two assessment sequences in which incongruence emerges between participants' epistemic stances, which leads the sequences into elaborate expansion. My argument that there is a systematic preference for a response that takes an epistemic stance that is congruent with the epistemic stance taken by the first assessment speaker, in addition to a preference for agreement to disagreement, is based on these cases.

In Extract 2-24, *yo* is used in the turn that is observably devoted to claiming that the speaker knows the referent better than the recipient. Two sisters-in-law, Kazu and Yoko, are having tea in the late afternoon in a room at Kazu's home, which looks down to her balcony. They are appreciating the flowers there. Prior to the extract, Yoko asked a question about a particular kind of flower on the balcony. Kazu's response concludes with the assessment in line 4.

Extract 2-24 [IL2: morning flower]

```
1    Kazu:  donokurai:: chanto:: ne, rainen    deru     ka
            what.extent well     IP  next.year come.out or
            how well (they) will grow next year,
```

2 Kazu: wakan nai kedo.
know not but
(I) don't know (it).

3 (0.8)

4 Kazu: °kore ga mata kawai[i:_
this SP also pretty
°*These are also* pretty*:*_

5 Yoko: [kawaii **yone.**[au mon.=
pretty FP suit FP
(They are) pretty **yone**, *(They)*
suit (other flowers).=

6 Kazu: [un,
Yeah,

7 Yoko =choodo [ne:.
perfectly P
=*perfectly* ne:.

8 -> Kazu: [asa ga ka[waii no **yo,**
morning SP pretty P FP
Morning is (the time when they are) pretty
yo.

9 Yoko: [nn:
Yeah:

10 (0.5)

11 -> Kazu: hontoni moo,
really EMP
Really,
12 (0.7)

13 -> Kazu: >ano< (.) <asa wa> moo me ga sameru hodo kawaii.
well morning TP EMP eye SP wake degree pretty
>Like< (.) <in the morning,> (they are) so pretty
(they) wake (me) up.

14 => Yoko: aa soo,=
ITJ that
Oh are they,=

15 Kazu: =nn!
ITJ
=*Yeah!*

16 Yoko: asa [sa-ku wake,
morning bloom N
(They) bloom in the morning?

```
17     Kazu:          [i-

18     Kazu:   hn  hn  hn
               ITJ ITJ ITJ
               Yeah yeah yeah.

19             (0.3)

20     Yoko:   hn::::
               ITJ
               (I) see.

21             (1.0)
22     Kazu:   nde  mo  kaaten akeruto ne, pa::: tto-
               then EMP curtain open   FP  MIM   QT
               When (I) open the curtains, (they look) brightly-
```

It is not easy to characterize Kazu's first assessment (line 4) in terms of epistemic stance; since Yoko starts her turn before the last syllable of the adjective *kawaii* pretty is produced, we cannot determine if Kazu was going to produce any final particle. In any case, however, Yoko's subsequent turn design treats it as "agreeable" (line 5), and she displays her understanding that she shares epistemic access to the flowers (Pomerantz 1984a). Moreover, through the particle *yone*, she claims equivalent knowledge of it, which is plausible given that they are talking about the flower that they are looking at right in front of them.

However, at line 8, Kazu reformulates her assessment, this time claiming epistemic primacy with *yo*. Here, she narrows the referent of the assessment from the flowers to how they look in the morning (*asa ga kawaii no yo* '(they are) pretty in the morning-*yo*'). In redefining the referent, Kazu makes it exclusively accessible to herself: the one who lives and spends mornings in the house, not to Yoko (see Chapter 4 for more discussion on the scope of referents). The use of *yo* in this turn, in contrast with the use of *yone* and *ne* in Yoko's turn, indicates that it claims epistemic primacy, which is distinct from the kind of epistemic stance that Yoko has.

This reformulation may have been motivated by Yoko's second assessment (lines 5, 7), which could be heard as qualifying the 'prettiness' of the flower: by saying that it suits other flowers perfectly, she might be undermining the beauty of the flower in its own right, and Kazu might have felt that she needed to defend it. Alternatively, Kazu may have been going to claim epistemic primacy in the first instance. In fact, her "savoring voice quality" (Goodwin and Goodwin 1987:39), lack of gaze at Yoko (Stivers and Rossano 2010) and the choice of the intensifier

mata (originally means 'again', but is often used as an intensifier) give one an impression that she is not talking about an object that is accessible to Yoko to invite a second assessment, but instead is talking about an object that she is recollecting on in her mind. In either case, this reformulation endangers congruence between Yoko's and Kazu's epistemic stances: Yoko claims equivalent access and Kazu claims epistemic primacy. This kind of situation routinely leads to sequence post-expansion.

Yoko does not immediately respond to Kazu's reformulated assessment (line 10), which can be seen as resistant to Kazu's claim of epistemic primacy. Kazu then pursues response at line 11 and again at line 13 by upgrading the intensity of her evaluation (*hontoni moo* 'Really' (line 11); *me ga sameru hodo kawaii* '(they are) so pretty (they) wake (me) up' (line 13)). By so doing, she seems to be implying that the flowers that she is talking about look different from those that Yoko is now looking at and thus provide a basis for her claim of epistemic primacy. Yoko finally produces a news receipt response (*aa soo* 'Oh are they') at line 14, acknowledging Kazu's epistemic primacy and thus taking a stance that is congruent with Kazu's. What is achieved in the post-expansion in this example is not restored agreement on the interlocutors' evaluation of the referent. Instead, they establish epistemic congruence, that Kazu has primary access to the flower and that the access Yoko has is partial and inferior.

In the previous example, it was not transparent whether the post expansion was triggered by already-emerging epistemic incongruence or by the formulation of the second assessment that was hearable as undermining the beauty of the flower. In the next example, it is clearly observable that the post-expansion is the embodiment of the interlocutors' orientation to epistemic incongruence as a dispreferred state. Here, Mari and Ami are chatting at a cafe a week after Michael Jackson's death. Mari says she has glanced at the news, while Ami seems to have been following the news rather closely. Prior to the extract, Ami asked Mari if she liked Michael Jackson, and Mari responded that she liked him when he was younger, and brought up a song that he sung with Paul McCartney as an example of her favorite song of his. However, it turned out that she was thinking of the song *Ebony and Ivory*, a song that addressed racial issues, which in fact was not sung by Paul McCartney and Michael Jackson but by Paul McCartney and Stevie Wonder. The song Michael Jackson and Paul McCartney sang is *Say Say Say*. The fact that Michael Jackson sang a song that also addressed racial issues probably contributed

to Mari's confusion.[20] Ami explained all of this to Mari, saying that she too had been confusing these songs and had looked them up on the Internet. After this confusion was clarified, Mari makes an assessment about the song *Ebony and Ivory* at line 10: *ebonii and o(r)aiborii ii yo are* '*Ebony and Ivory* is good, that (is)'.

Extract 2-25 [MM: Ebony and Ivory]

```
1       Ami:    ya:ppari  s(g)a:, are  machigae yasui  yone::_
                after_all IP       that mistake  easily FP
                That's easy to mistake yone::_ (I thought so)

2               ebonii ando aiborii ne:,=
                ebony  and  ivory   FP
                'Ebony and Ivory' ne,=

3       Mari:   =sono atashi sono s-ebonii ando aiborii ^to
                 well I      well   ebony  and  ivory    and
                =Well, I, well, 'S-Ebony and Ivory' ^and
4               [say] say say ga go(h)ccha[ni(h)>nante] yu  no<=
                 say  say say SP mixed.up        how    say P
                'Say Say Say' were mixed up(h) .hh how do (I) say,=

5       Ami:    [un]                       [hh   soo,  ]
                 ITJ                             right
                Yeah                       hh  Right,

6       Mari:   =[hito]tsuno- [(.hh) nanka kategori(h)i] ni haitteta=
                  one               like  category      to enter
                =(They were) in like a single- .hh category(h)=

7       Ami:     [(  )]        [bhe hhe hhe he h hhe ]

8       Mari:   =kedo[:,]
                 but
                =but,

9       Ami:          [poo]ru ga dete   kuru ka(h)ra(h) ne,=
                       Paul   SP appear come so         FP
                      (That's) be(h)cau(h)se Paul appears (in those
                        songs) ne,=

10 ->   Mari:   =u:n. [>are demo<] ebonii ando (r)aiborii ii  yo, are
                 ITJ    that but   ebony  and     ivory  good FP that
                =Yeah:. >But that< 'Ebony and (r)Ivory' is good yo,
                that (is).
```

[20] The song is *Black or White,* but Ami called it *Black and White* and Mari did not notice the mistake and calls it *Black and White* as well at line 17.

```
11      Ami:          [u : n ,    ]
                       ITJ
                       Yeah,

12 =>   Ami:    ^are  wa ^ii    yo[ne : ,]  [ a : : : :  are   ] wa=
                 that TP  good  FP                      that    TP
                ^That is ^good yone:, tha::::that is=

13 ->   Mari:                     [are  ii]  [yo, sugoi ii   yo,]
                                   that good  FP  very  good FP
                                   That's good yo, very good yo,

14 =>   Ami:    =i[i  n da kedo maikeru] kanke(h)e na(h)i n da(h) yo=
                 good N CP but  Michael  concern   not    N CP    FP
                =good but Michael is no(h)t i(h)nvo(h)lved yo=

15      Mari:     [u : : n ,          ]
                   ITJ
                   Yeah::,

16 =>   Ami:    =[a(h)re(h) H] H H [ hh   h   h   h   ]
                   that
                =(not) in tha(h)t (song).H H H hh h h h

17      Mari:     [  h  h  h  ]     [.h u:n, burakku an]do wh-whito=
                                        ITJ  black   and   white
                    h h h             .h Yea:h, 'Black and wh-White'=

18              =wa ne,
                 TP FP
                =is ne,

19      Ami:    u:[n,]
                ITJ
                Yeah,

20      Mari:     [u]:n
                   ITJ
                   Yeah:,
```

As Mari produces an assessment about *Ebony and Ivory* (line 10), she claims epistemic primacy with *yo*. However, she is not in an advantageous position to do so given that she thought it to be a song by Michael Jackson by mistake. Not surprisingly, Ami does not accept this claim. She proffers a second assessment, marking it *yone*, which is recurrently used when interactants have equivalent access to the issue (line 12). Here incongruence emerges between their epistemic stances: Mari claims to know better while Ami claims to know as much.

In the next turn, Mari reasserts her initial assessment again marking it with *yo* and produces yet another *yo*-marked assertion, this time upgrading the assessment from *ii* 'good' to *sugoi ii* 'very good' (line 13). Pomerantz (1984a) calls a sequence with such a reassertion in the third position a "disagreement sequence"; when speakers of a first assessment are disagreed with by its recipient, they often reassert the position they have taken in the third position, often upgrading the intensity of the evaluation (Pomerantz 1984a: 68). That is precisely what Mari is doing here, even though Ami has clearly agreed with Mari as far as the evaluation of the song is concerned. What is motivating Mari's reassertion in third position seems to be the incongruence of their epistemic stances. Just as disagreement regarding evaluative stances often engenders the first speaker's reassertion of the same evaluative stance, incongruence regarding epistemic stances also leads to sequence expansion in the same way. The implication is that epistemic incongruence is dispreferred and bears consequences for the development of the course of interaction.

This sequence does not end here; overlapping with Mari's *yo*-marked reassertion (line 13), Ami reasserts her position yet again (*are wa ii n da kedo* 'that is good but') (lines 12, 14). However, this is not simply another reassertion of the evaluative stance. This prefaces the second half of her turn (*...maikeru kanke(h)e na(h)i n da(h) yo a(h)re(h)* 'Michael is not involved-*yo,* (not) in that (song)'), in which she reminds Mari of the information that Mari should have known if she is to claim epistemic primacy over the song but did not (lines 14, 16). Ami's use of *yo* here and the claim of epistemic primacy embodied through it contests Mari's claim of epistemic primacy, though it is mitigated by Ami's laughter which is produced with and after the turn (Haakana 2001). Mari does not further insist; she laughs along with Ami, and shifts the focus of the topic to the other song that was sung by Michael Jackson (line 17).

I have demonstrated that an upgraded evaluation is systematically provided to give support to the epistemic claim that the turn is putting forward. The majority of the cases in the corpus are *yo*-marked agreements, in which a speaker is claiming epistemic primacy, *ne-* or *yone*-marked agreements are typically accompanied by same evaluations, though there are minority of cases (n=2) in which a speaker is in need of giving support even to their claim of equivalent knowledge. Based on the features of sequence expansion that are found when epistemic incongruence emerges, it was suggested that there is preference for epistemic congruence over epistemic incongruence.

However, a second assessment that takes an epistemic stance that is incongruent with that of first does not exhibit *all* the features of a response that is dispreferred regarding the *action* that the turn is performing, the way that a disagreement, for instance, does. In particular, these turns are not usually delayed or mitigated in the same way a disagreement is. In the next section, we examine *yo*-marked disagreements and explore the intersection between (dis)affiliation regarding the evaluative stance and (in)congruence regarding epistemic stance.

2.5 Disagreements

We have seen that the majority of agreements in the corpus are marked with *ne* and *yone* and *yo*-marked agreements are rather uncommon. In contrast, disagreements are frequently marked with *yo*. In fact, Masuoka (1991) proposes that *yo* indexes disagreement in interlocutors' views. Koyama (1997) argues that *yo* gains different functions depending on the prosody in which it is produced: *yo* in the rising intonation is used to provide unshared information while *yo* in the falling intonation is found to produce correction or disagreement with an addressee. My position is that it is not essential or plausible to consider these two functions to be distinct from each other. Proffering a forthright disagreement often insinuates that the second speakers have the 'better' or 'more legitimate' view because they know the issue better. Thus, I suggest that disagreement is one interactional environment in which the use of *yo* and a claim of epistemic primacy become relevant. Indeed, in many *yo*-marked disagreements, we can observe a basis for the speaker to be claiming epistemic primacy.[21]

See Extract 2-26. Rika and her aunt Kayo are talking about cats. Kayo owns a cat but Rika has never owned one. At line 1, Rika makes an assessment about how often they meow. By marking the assessment with *yone*, Rika indicates that she expects Kayo to share the knowledge and invites agreement. However, Kayo disagrees, marking her assessment with *yo* (line 3).

[21] The frequent deployment of *yo* in second assessments that straightforwardly disagree with first assessments is contrastive with the use of *Oh* in the context of disagreement in English interaction reported by Heritage (2002a). Heritage shows that *Oh* is hardly found in a disagreeing second assessment but is reserved for the third position, where the first assessment speakers hold their position following the interlocutor's disagreement, and that *Oh* escalates the ongoing disagreement. In Japanese, even mitigated disagreements (see Extract 2-26 for example) can be marked with *yo* and the sense of escalated disagreement is not indexed by *yo*.

Extract 2-26 [WF: meowing][22]

```
1->    Rika:   neko tte- kekkoo- yoo  nakutemo- naku yone:,
               cat  TP   fairly  need without   meow FP
               Cats- meow fairly- often- without reasons- yone:,
2      Rika:   inu  tte saa,
               dogs TP  IP
               (Whereas) dogs,

3 =>   Kayo:   naka nai yo:,=sonnani.
               meow not FP   that.much
               (They) don't meow yo:,=(not)that often.

4      Rika:   a  ^soo  na no?
               ITJ that CP P
               Oh (they) ^don't?

5      Kayo:   nn.
               ITJ
               No.

6              (0.8)

7 =>   Kayo:   hon:tto:ni shizuka  yo.
               really     quiet    FP
               (A cat/My cat) is rea:lly: quiet yo.

8      Rika:   hee.
               ITJ
               I see.
```

Kayo's second assessment (line 3) straightforwardly disagrees with Rika's first assessment through the negation particle *nai* 'not' and is marked with *yo.* In this case, because of the asymmetry in their experience with cats, which surfaced in the prior conversation, Kayo can reasonably claim to know them better than Rika does. Thus, this second assessment is a disagreement as well as the expert's view.

Notice that this *yo*-marked disagreement is mitigated with the post-positioned qualifier, *sonnani* '(not) that much'. This qualifier minimizes the difference between, and thus the disagreement between, the two views (Heritage 1984b; Pomerantz 1984a). It is after Rika backs down by treating Kayo's view as new information (line 4) that Kayo upgrades the evaluation (line 7), marking it again with *yo*. Forthright disagreements take the opposite valence from first assessments, and thus, incompatibility of the two evaluative stances is transparent.

[22] This excerpt is taken from an audio-recorded face-to-face conversation that is not used elsewhere in this thesis.

In such cases, speaker orientation to minimizing disagreement may manifest itself in the form of qualifying the intensity as in this case. This is an interesting contrast with *yo*-marked agreements, where a second assessment takes the same valence with the first but is differentiated from it by adjusting the intensity for the sake of an epistemic claim.

As was the case in the previous example, the claim of epistemic primacy through the use of *yo* and forthright disagreement commonly occur hand in hand. Extract 2-27 is another such example, but this case, the disagreement is not mitigated through the manipulation of the intensity of evaluation because of the "crosscutting" preference for disagreeing with a self-deprecating comment (Pomerantz 1984a; Schegloff 2007). Kazu and her husband Ken are hosting Kazu's friends Masa and Yuki for dinner. Masa brought a bottle of wine, and when she gave the bottle to the hosts, she specifically said it was Japanese wine. The following exchange transpires after they have tasted the wine. At line 1, Masa says to Ken that it does taste like Japanese wine, inviting an agreement with *ne*. Ken explicitly disagrees with Masa marking it with *yo* (lines 2-3).

Extract 2-27 [TMD: Japanese wine]

```
1 ->   Masa:   nanka nihon no aj[i  ga suru n[e?,
               like  Japan L  taste SP do   FP
               (It's) like, (it) has a Japanese taste ne?,

2 =>   Ken:                     [.shh        [iya nihon no aji=
                                              ITJ japan  L taste
                                 .shh         No (it) doesn't=

3 =>           =shi nai yo, f-nanka d- [do- (   )
                do  not FP    like
               =have a Japanese taste yo, (it's) like

4      Masa:                           [nanka sa,
                                        like  IP
                                        Like,

5      Yuki:   n[n
               ITJ
               Mm hm,

6      Masa:    [yappari   ho- gaikoku no to   chigau_
                 after_all     foreign N  with different
                 (It's) different from foreign (wine)_
```

```
7      Yuki:   °hn[::,
                 ITJ
               °I see,

8      Masa:      [nanka [kuu-
                   like   ai-
                   (It's) like, the ai-

9      Ken:              [maa  furansu [no wain-
                          well France   L  wine
                          Well, French wine-

10     Masa:                           [kuuki ga shittori shiteru.
                                        air   SP wet      being
                                        The air is moisturized.
```

Here again, claimed epistemic primacy seems to underlie Ken's disagreement. By assessing the wine in categorical terms − "Japanese" or "not Japanese", rather than evaluative or descriptive terms (e.g., "good" or "sweet"), Masa and Ken are displaying their knowledge of wine in general, for they need to be experienced with wine in order to be able to tell what other wine this particular wine is similar or dissimilar to. When Ken disagrees with Masa, he claims to know wine better than she does, and the subsequent exchange shows their orientations to such an epistemic issue. Following Ken's disagreement, Masa refers to "foreign wine" from which, according to her, this particular wine is different (line 6). At line 9, Ken mentions French wine to contrast it with, though this gets interrupted by Masa's second description of the wine that sounds as if she is mocking a sommelier (line 10). The use of *yo* in Ken's disagreement contributes to making the epistemic issue explicit between the interactants.

It should be remarked that Ken's disagreement does not have features of a dispreferred response: it is not delayed or mitigated in any way. It may be due to a possible implication of Masa's assessment as a self-deprecation. Given that the wine was Masa's gift, the description that it has a Japanese taste can be heard as unauthentic or negative and thus self-deprecating, after which a disagreement is a preferred response (Pomerantz 1975, 1984a). In fact, later in this occasion, it turns out that Ken believes Japanese wine is generally too sweet, while this particular wine is dry, which he appreciates. Therefore, in this particular case, disagreement is done as an affiliative move, which is likely to be providing him with extra motivation for claiming epistemic primacy and strongly insisting on his position.

In our final example, a second assessment is produced showing features as a dispreferred, disagreeing response though it takes the same valence with the first

assessment. In Extract 2-28, female friends Miki and Rumi are talking on the phone. Miki told Rumi that she had *okonimiyaki* (savory pancake) for lunch on the day and said that it was not as good as it could have been because she was missing one ingredient. Rumi then said she did not eat it often as a child and she was not even interested in it until recently. She then produces a first assessment at line 1, stating her evaluation that she got from the recent occasion when she had it. Miki is from Osaka, where *okonomiyaki* is a local specialty while Rumi is from somewhere else.

Extract 2-28 [CallFriend 6666: okonomiyaki]

```
1 ->   Rumi:   nn:, ^kekkoo oishii    yone, okonomiyaki.
               ITJ   quite  delicious FP    okonomiyaki
               Yeah:, (it's) quite good yone, okonomiyaki.

2              (0.2)

3 =>   Miki:   nn:. [watashi wa suki da yo,
               ITJ   I       TP like CP FP
               Yeah:. I like (it) yo,
4      Rumi:        [nn,
                     ITJ
                     Yeah,

5              (0.2)

6      Rumi:   atashi mo   suki.
               I      also like
               I like (it), too.

7              (1.0)

8      Rumi:   da tsukurikata wakan nakutte sa:,
               so how.to.cook know  not     IP
               (I) just don't know how to cook (it) so
```

At line 1, Rumi makes a positive assessment about *okonomiyaki* (*kekkoo oishii yone okonomiyaki* '(it's) quite good-*yone*, *okonomiyaki*'). After a short delay (line 2), Miki minimally agrees with an interjection *nn:* 'yeah:', and then adds *watashi wa suki da yo* 'I like (it)-*yo*.'

On the one hand, we can see that *yo* in line 3 is used to claim epistemic primacy. That is, while Rumi has only recently discovered, counter to her expectation, that *okonomiyaki* is good, Miki has always known that it is good and thus holds epistemic primacy; Miki is from the region where *okonomiyaki* is the

local specialty, and both the fact that she cooked and ate it that day, and that she can talk about it in comparison to the pancakes that she had made on other occasions indicate that she has it regularly. Thus, as is embodied through the use of *yo,* Miki is differentiating her position from Rumi regarding the epistemic stance.

If this is the only aspect in which Miki is disaligning from Rumi, then Miki's second assessment should be regarded as an agreement involving the claim of epistemic primacy, just like the cases we earlier examined in Section 2.4.1. However, unlike the cases of *yo*-marked agreements, Miki's second assessment here does not simply upgrade the first assessment with an intensifier but formulates the assessment in completely different terms. In addition, the turn involves multiple features of a dispreferred response with which this turn is produced. First, Miki's second assessment is delayed for 0.2 seconds (line 2) and then further delayed through the minimal agreement interjection *nn*, a 'weak' agreement that is often followed by a disagreement (Aoki 2008; Pomerantz 1984a). Also, the articulation of the first person pronoun *watashi* 'I', which is not grammatically obligatory in Japanese, and the contrastive topic particle *wa* attached to it present the view to be contrastive from Rumi's. Thus, although this second assessment takes the same, positively valenced evaluation as Rumi's first assessment, it is more hearable as a disagreement than as an agreement. The fact that Rumi 'agrees' with Miki at line 6 (*atashi mo suki* 'I like (it), too') suggests that Rumi does not consider Miki to be assuming that her position (that she likes *okonomiyaki*) is shared by Rumi. It may be that it is the intensity of Rumi's first assessment that Miki is taking issue with; Rumi's first assessment is modified with an adverb *kekkoo,* which roughly means 'fairly' or 'quite'. On the other hand, Miki states an unmodified subjective assessment (Wiggins and Potter 2003). As a person from the region who cooks and eats *okonomiyaki* regularly, it is understandable that she does not go along with the modified assessment about it. Although upgrading is a method recurrently employed to show full affiliation in English interaction (Pomerantz 1984a), this example shows that that is not the case across contexts.

This section has illustrated the use of *yo* in disagreements. It was argued that claiming epistemic primacy is relevant when one is straightforwardly disagreeing with the first assessment speaker. From a psychologists' point of view, it may not be surprising that a single linguistic resource is found in two environments. As Matsui et al. (Matsui et al. 2009) show, distinguishing the notions of "a person lacking the relevant knowledge" from "a person with a false belief" is a complicated competence that is acquired relatively late. It may be that

the stances to take toward a person who knows less and toward a person who has a "false belief" are similar or even equivalent conceptions that may collide.

2.6 Conclusion

Recent conversation analytic literature has reported how different linguistic resources are employed to mark epistemic stances of various sorts: *oh*-prefacing is used to claim epistemic independence (Heritage 2002a); modified repeats claim primary rights (Stivers 2005); reported speech can be a means to claim epistemic primacy (Clift 2006). I demonstrated elsewhere (Hayano 2007b) that whether to repeat a descriptor or refer to it with an anaphoric agreement is a way to claim or not to claim, respectively, that a speaker has independently formed the view in Japanese interaction. This chapter contributes to this developing body of literature by examining another grammatical resource to deal with epistemic stances. In this chapter, I have examined assessment sequences in Japanese conversation, paying particular attention to the use of final particles *ne, yone* and *yo* and the intensity of the evaluation. It was demonstrated that the intensity of evaluation in second assessments is an interactional resource that is used contingently on the epistemic stance that the speakers are putting forward through the use of particles *ne, yone* and *yo*. When they are claiming epistemic primacy or equivalent knowledge that was not acknowledged or yielded by the first speaker, the intensity of evaluation is recurrently upgraded in order to give support to the epistemic claim. An implication is that, while linguists presume epistemic stance to be encoded in devoted grammatical elements that are attached to the 'propositional content', there is an interesting interference between them. Whether people evaluate an object to be "good" or "very good" is not solely determined by their individual perception and judgment but is highly contingent on interactional contingencies--- whether or not to acquiesce to the knowledge distribution suggested by an interlocutor. In the case of English, where second assessment speakers are by default in the position to have to claim epistemic independence (Heritage 2002a), this interactional resource is implemented quite commonly, and its use is regarded as a default way to fully agree. On the other hand, in Japanese, where final particles *ne* and *yone* provide a context in which second assessment speakers do not have to strive to claim epistemic independence, intensification is

reserved for cases in which provisions of support to their epistemic claims are relevant.

It was also shown that there are cases in which a claim of epistemic primacy is made for pro-social interactional goals such as promoting an offer (Extract 2-6) or rejecting a self-deprecation (Extract 2-27). Thus, while claiming epistemic primacy in general may be an act to claim to be unique and different from an interlocutor and thus undermines an otherwise affiliative course of action for establishing solidarity and "same-mindedness", this is not always the case.

Based on the analysis, I proposed that interactants' epistemic stances can be congruent or incongruent: epistemic congruence is a state in which interactants agree on how knowledge is distributed between them, whether it is symmetric or asymmetric. Epistemic incongruence is a state in which they do not agree on this issue. It was shown that when interactants' epistemic stances are incongruent with each other's, the sequence exhibits a feature that is associated with a disagreement sequence: expansion of the sequence in which speakers reassert his/her original stance. Thus, this chapter contributes to our understanding of preferred and dispreferred responses. While at the level of action, agreements constitute preferred responses and disagreements dispreferred responses, interactants are simultaneously attentive to congruence and incongruence at the level of epistemic stances, and are oriented to resolve incongruence when it emerges in interaction.

Chapter 3

Epistemic Congruence, Affiliation and Alignment: Structure of Informing Sequences

3.1 Introduction

In the last chapter, I examined how interactants' orientations to knowledge distribution manifest themselves in assessment sequences in Japanese interaction where both participants have, or claim to have, epistemic access to the object. It was demonstrated that such linguistic resources as final particles and intensifiers are employed not simply to index speakers' epistemic states but to negotiate, construct and re-construct relative epistemic statuses they hold toward the object in question. We examined cases in which participants adopt epistemic stances that are compatible with each other's, in contrast with those in which they take epistemic stances incompatible with each other's. Observations we had about these contrastive cases suggested that participants are oriented to achieving congruent epistemic stances in addition to achieving agreement on their evaluations of objects that they are assessing.

In this chapter, I explore participants' orientations to epistemic stances in another environment: informing sequences. By *informings*, I mean a class of actions that involve the provision of information or a view as newsworthy or informative to a recipient. They include news deliveries, announcements, story tellings, as well as informings that implement other actions such as suggestions and recommendations. Though these different types of informings involve different interactional contingencies and sequence organizations, they can be considered as a single category of action for a basic feature that they have in common: they provide new information and make relevant a response that receipts it as such.

Another feature that researchers have observed is a structural one. While the basic organization of adjacency pairs consists of two turns - first pair part (FPP) and second pair part (SPP) (Schegloff and Sacks 1973), most informing sequences

take more than two turns (Jefferson 1981; Heritage 1984a; Sacks 1992; Maynard 1997, 2003). Extract 3-1 is an example, in which A informs B that he got an athletic award.

Extract 3-1 [Maynard 1997:108, see also Terasaki 2004[1976]]

```
1 a->   A:     °hh And I got athletic award.
2 b->   B:     REALLY?!?
3 c->   A:     Uh huh. From Sports Club.
4 d->   B:     Oh that's terrific Ronald.
```

When the informing comes to possible completion, B produces a first response "REALLY?!?", receipting the informing as newsworthy by displaying surprise, thus adopting a congruent epistemic stance (arrow b). At the same time, this response is aligning in that it provides A with an opportunity to elaborate on the informing. That is to say, *really?*, by virtue of being a token to request reconfirmation, gives A another turn slot before B makes a more substantial response that would bring the sequence to closure. A can use this slot either to provide a minimal reconfirmation and give the turn back to B, or to elaborate the informing (arrow c). In this case, A first reconfirms and then elaborates. B then produces a second response, an affiliative assessment, acknowledging the information's positive significance to A.

Many informing sequences develop into this four-turn, if not more extended, structure in Japanese as well as English interaction. In this chapter, relying on 108 cases of informing sequences drawn from our Japanese corpus, I examine forms of utterances that are produced in each slot of this four-turn structure and their interactional consequences. In doing so, I argue that this four-turn sequence structure is an optimal and methodical solution that allows participants to negotiate and achieve epistemic congruence, affiliation and alignment all at once. Alternative forms of utterances in each slot of informing sequences, which may appear to be functionally synonymous to each other, are shown to serve distinct functions that display a stance with regard to these three interactional orientations.

The organization of the chapter is as follows. In Section 3.2, I discuss previous studies that address the three interactional orientations to which participants are oriented in informing sequences and discuss how the four-part structure serves as a solution to them. Section 3 illustrates four common forms of

informing turns in Japanese and shows what interactional differences they make. Section 4 turns to informing responses - their forms, distributions in informing sequences and functions they serve with regard to epistemic congruence, affiliation and alignment. It becomes clear in this chapter that epistemic congruence, on the one hand, and alignment and affiliation, on the other, are not completely independent issues but are intertwined, and are often in conflict with each other. Finally in Section 5, with the findings of analyses in hand, I reconsider epistemic congruence, affiliation and alignment, and shed new light on what underlies the four-part structure of informing sequences.

3.2 Three orientations in informing sequences

Informings convey two stances: an epistemic stance, that the information they are delivering is not shared by the recipient, and an evaluative stance toward the object or event in question, whether it is positive or negative (Terasaki 2004[1976]; Sacks 1974; Pomerantz 1984a; Maynard 1997, 2003; Schegloff 2007; Stivers 2008). In order to respond to an informing congruently and affiliatively, recipients have to attend to both of these stances. In addition, interactants have to negotiate and achieve consensus as to whether, and to what extent, to elaborate on the topic in order to collaboratively develop and close a sequence (Jefferson 1981; Heritage 1984a; Stivers 2008). Participants are oriented to these three issues, employing various linguistic resources and interactional practices. In this section, I discuss these three orientations and illustrate how they are manifested in interaction.

3.2.1 Preference for epistemic congruence

Whether a piece of information is news to a particular recipient is not determinable prior to or independently from interaction. Instead, it is negotiated and established as interaction unfolds (Terasaki (2004 [1976]); Maynard 1997, 2003). In many cases, information that is presented as news is receipted as news, but there are other cases in which its claimed newsworthiness is challenged or even denied.

The literature has focused on the informing speaker's point of view in discussing this issue, treating it as an aspect of 'recipient design'. Recipient design

is “a multitude of respects in which the talk by a party in a conversation is constructed or designed in ways which display an orientation and sensitivity to the particular other(s) who are the coparticipants” (Sacks et al. 1974: 727). In the case of informings, the principle of recipient design encourages participants to be attentive to what their interlocutors already know or do not know and thus discourages them from telling something that they already know as news (Sacks 1974; Terasaki 2004 [1976]). This accounts for occurrences of story prefaces in which possible storytellers check a possible recipient's knowledge state instead of launching a story with an unconfirmed presumption that the recipient has not heard the story (Sacks 1974; Terasaki 2004 [1976]; Goodwin 1979). Below is an example of a story preface in which a possible storyteller establishes the recipient's uninformed knowledge state before launching a story.

Extract 3-2 [Terasaki 2004: 195]

```
1 ->   Jim:    Y’wanna know who I got stoned with a few(hh) weeks
2              ago? hh!
3 =>   Gin:    who.
4      Jim:    Mary Carter ‘n her boy(hh)frie(hh)nd. hh.
```

Jim, before producing the actual telling, initiates a pre-sequence (lines 1-2). By asking Gin a question while previewing the upcoming telling (that he got stoned with someone a few weeks ago), he sees whether Gin is uninformed of the event. Gin assures Jim that he is uninformed at line 3 by providing a “go-ahead” response. This is one method with which prospective informing speakers ensures that the recipients are uninformed and that they would not violate the principle of recipient design.

However, this issue is oriented to by not only informing speakers but also by recipients of informings. Terasaki (2004[1976]:181) states that following news announcements, responses that take them as news are much more common than those that take them as "not news", and argues that the former is preferred to the latter. Moreover, when an informing recipient disconfirms that the information was news/ informative, that disconfirmation tends to be withheld. For instance, in Extract 3-3, Barber and Customer are talking about their common acquaintances whom they see at bars in their neighborhood. Barber tells Customer that they go to a bar called Hinoki. When that exchange is closed, Barber says that he himself does not go to Hinoki. By formulating this turn in the form of bare declarative (line

12), he presents this information as unshared by Customer, making a news receipt relevant.

Extract 3-3 [BB: Hinoki]

```
1      Barb:   ts: kono:- tonari no:- sunakku no nikai     ni
                   this   next   L    bar     to 2nd.floor to
               Ts: (They) go to (a bar) upstairs to this- bar

2              iku no.=ano  hito   tachi.
               go  P   that person PL
               next door.=Those people.

3      Cust:   e::: (.) nante iu  mise?
               ITJ      what  say place
               Hmm:::. (.) What is the place called?

4      Barb:   hinoki.
               ((P.N.))
               Hinoki.

5              (0.2)

6      Cust:   a   hinoki   ne [so   so   so   so s .ss asokode=
               ITJ ((P.N.)) FP  that that that that     there
               Oh Hinoki, right right right right s .ss=

7      Barb:                   [nn

8      Cust:   =nankai     ka atta:
               some.times or saw
               =(I) saw (them) there a couple of times.

9              (0.2)

10     Barb:   nn,
               ITJ
               Yeah,

11             (0.8)

12     Barb:   asoko senmon.
               there specialize
               (They) only go there ((and no other place)).

13             (1.2)

14 ->  Barb:   ^orya: asoko ika nai.
                I.TP  there go  not
               ^I don't go there.
```

```
15 =>          (1.0)

16 ->  Barb:   [orea sono shita na  n desu (yo).=
                I.TP its   below CP N CP    FP
               I (go to a place) below that (bar) yo.

17     Cust:   [(  )

18 =>  Cust:   =mae    kara soo  itteru ne asoko wa [ika nai tte.
                before from that saying FP there TP  go  not QT
               =(You) have been saying that ne, that (you) don't go
               there.

19     Barb:                                        [nn
                                                     ITJ
                                                     Yeah

20             (0.2)

21     Barb:   ika nai wake ja nai n da kedo mae    wa
               go  not N    TP not N CP but  before TP
               (It's) not that (I) don't go (there), in the past,

22             itteta n da kedo:,=
               go.PST N CP but
               (I) went (there), but

23     Cust:   =nn
                ITJ
               =Yeah
```

As it transpires, Barber had told Customer in the past that he does not go to Hinoki. Thus, what Barber presented as new information is not news to Customer. Instead of saying so immediately, however, Customer withholds a response for a full second (line 15). He then starts to utter something inaudible in overlap with Barber (lines 16 and 17), who elaborates on where he does and does not go for drink. When Barber's turn comes to completion, Customer finally states that Barber has been saying that before (line 18). What this response does is adopts an epistemic stance that is not congruent with the stance that Barber adopted at line 14 (as well as at line 16) and rectifies the epistemic assumption that Barber conveyed.

As is exemplified here, responses that do not treat informings as news are often delayed, and they are rarely found in the corpus. This preference for responses that take informings as newsworthy over those that do not can be seen as one manifestation of a preference for epistemic congruence. Chapter 2 examined epistemic congruence in participants' views about how knowledge is distributed among them − whether they have equally shared knowledge or one has epistemic

primacy over the other. In informing sequences, the issue concerns the informed vs. uninformed statuses of participants: initiating speakers present information as news to recipients, something they do not have epistemic access to, thus suggesting that they are informed and their interlocutors are uninformed. A preferred, epistemically congruent response accepts this epistemic suggestion and acknowledges the information as newsworthy or informative.

Adopting a congruent or incongruent epistemic stance is not the only interactional function that an initial informing response serves. It also adopts a stance with regard to what extent an elaboration of the informing is encouraged. The next section discusses this aspect of participants' orientations: orientations to alignment.

3.2.2 Orientation to Alignment

When recipients of informings receipt the preceding informing as newsworthy or informative, that response adopts an epistemic stance that is congruent with the informing speaker's, who presented the information as newsworthy or informative. Another stance that initial informing responses adopt is about whether, and to what extent, recipients of informings are encouraging of some elaboration of the informing.

Stivers, Mondada and Steensig (2011:20) broadly define 'alignment' as "the structural level of cooperation", whereby recipients facilitate an action or activity their interlocutors have launched.[23] An instance of alignment is a display of recipiency during story telling. Stivers (2008) suggests that story recipients align with storytellers by withholding from taking a full turn until the story is complete while displaying continuing recipiency through continuers, i.e., such response tokens as *uh huh*, *mm hm* (Schegloff 1982).

While storytellers may project an extended telling in story prefaces (Sacks 1974), that is not necessarily the case with informings: many informings are possibly complete after a first turn constructional unit (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974, henceforth abbreviated as TCU) (see Extract 3-1, for instance).

[23] Stivers, Mondada and Steensig (2011) consider epistemic congruence as a layer of alignment. However, for the purpose of the discussion of this chapter, I use the term 'alignment' to specifically refer to participants' orientation to letting each other elaborate and complete their informings and treat epistemic congruence separately from alignment.

However, recipients of informings often encourage their interlocutors to elaborate the informings by producing 'newsmarks' (Jefferson 1981; Heritage 1984a; Maynard 1997, 2003). For instance, see Extract 3-4. When N's informing comes to possible completion (line 2), E produces a newsmark at line 3, following which N elaborates on the informing.

Extract 3-4 [Heritage 1984a:340]

```
1      N:      An' Warden, had to physically remove 'im from'iz
2                   office, .hhhh
3 ->   E:      Really?
4      N:      Yeh they'd had quite a scuffle, a:nd.....
```

According to Jefferson (1981) and Heritage (1984a), the form of an initial informing response projects different trajectories of the sequence: some encourage elaboration more than others. For instance, partial repeats prefaced with *oh* (e.g., 'Oh did he?') encourage elaboration more strongly than free-standing *oh* or free-standing partial repeats. Heritage (1984a) also observes that a response in the form of an interrogative (e.g., *Oh did he?*) is more encouraging of elaboration than one in the form of a declarative (e.g., *Oh he did?*). With these response forms, recipients provide informing speakers with an opportunity to elaborate and complete the informings at varying degrees of encouragement.

The orientation to encouraging informing speakers to elaborate and complete the informings can be seen as one manifestation of participants' orientation to alignment; recipients cooperate with informing speakers by providing an opportunity to elaborate by showing continuing recipiency. When an individual presents a new piece of information, a pro-social way of responding is to show interest in it. Producing a newsmark and soliciting further talk on the issue is a way to do so. As we will see in Section 3.4, orderly distributions of different response forms in Japanese can be well understood by reference to the degree of elaboration encouragement.

3.2.3 Preference for Affiliation

As was discussed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, features of the formulation and delivery of alternative second pair parts ('SPPs', Schegloff and Sacks 1973) suggest that one is preferred to the other (Pomerantz 1984a; Heritage 1984b; Sacks

1987; Schegloff 2007); in Heritage's (1984b:265) words, responses that contribute to "the maintenance of the social solidarity" are preferred to those that hinder it. Thus, agreement is preferred to disagreement, an acceptance of an invitation or offer is preferred to a rejection, compliance with a request is preferred to denial, and so on. Both first pair part (FPP, Schegloff and Sacks 1973) speakers and SPP speakers show their orientations to achieving a sequence with a preferred response: SPP speakers characteristically produce a preferred response without delay in a straightforward formulation, whereas they produce dispreferred responses with a delay and mitigate or circumvent them. FPP speakers, when faced with precursors of a dispreferred response, often reverse or backdown from their initial positions to avoid the incipient dispreferred response from emerging (Pomerantz 1984a:76-77). In addition, sequences with a preferred response tend to close without elaborate expansion, while those with a dispreferred response tend to expand during which participants rework on the sequence (Schegloff 2007:162-168). In this chapter, following Stivers (2008), this aspect of preference that has to do with affective or evaluative stances is referred to as 'preference for affiliation'.

Though some informings are primarily concerned with information transfer with little relevance of the speaker's evaluative stance, most informings are delivered to convey the speaker's evaluative stance toward the object or event in question as well (Sacks 1974; Pomerantz 1975; Maynard 1997, 2003; Stivers 2008). When the informing is over, recipients often produce evaluative comments, displaying their understanding of the gist of the preceding informings (Pomerantz 1975). An evaluative response that affiliates with it exhibits features of a preferred response, while a response that disaffiliates with it exhibits features of a dispreferred response (Pomerantz 1975; Stivers 2008). Let us look at Extract 3-5. Kazu and her husband are hosting Yuki and Masa for dinner. Masa brought a pot of mint with leaves and blossoms as a gift for Kazu. Prior to the following excerpt, they have appreciated the smell of the pot as a whole. Kazu then left Yuki and Masa to prepare dinner, during which Yuki and Masa noticed from a blossom that fell from the pot that it is not just the mint leaves but also the blossoms that smell good. Yuki puts the blossom in front of Kazu's seat on the dining table. When Kazu returns, Yuki informs Kazu that the blossom "smells a lot", meaning that it is very fragrant (line 1).

Extract 3-5 [TD: herb]

```
1       Yuki    so-  hana   sugoi niou  no yo?,
                tha  flower very  smell P  FP
                Tha- flower smells a lot yo?,

2               (0.3)

                [((reaches to the flower))
3 ->    Kazu:   [hn, [tu-
                ITJ
                Yeah, tu-

4       Yuki:        [niotte [goran,
                      smell    try
                      Smell (it),

5       Kazu:                   [((picks the flower))


6       Kazu:   ((smells the flowers))

7 ->    Kazu:   aa  honto da.=ii   nio[i da] ne:,
                ITJ true  CP  good smell CP  FP
                Oh (you're) right.=(It's) a good smell ne:,

8       Yuki:                          [°nn ]
                                        ITJ
                                       °Mm hm
```

Yuki's utterance at line 1 implements multiple actions, adopting multiple stances. First, the turn is an informing, presenting information that is not known to Kazu. Second, Yuki states her evaluation of the blossom that it "really smells". Although she does not explicitly use a positive or negative evaluative term of the smell and the verb *niou* 'smell' can have a negative connotation when contrasted with its positive synonym *kaoru* 'be fragrant', given that it is a blossom of the mint that they have appreciated together and that she had kept the blossom for Kazu, this assessment of the intensity of the smell is likely to be heard as a positive evaluation. Third, the turn serves as a suggestion or recommendation:[24] expressing an assessment about an object to which the recipient (Kazu) lacks epistemic access

[24] Positive assessments about a referent that a recipient has not experienced but can experience in the future are often produced and understood as recommendations or suggestions making it relevant for recipients to experience it on the spot or display intention of experiencing it in the future.

but is available to be experienced, the turn is hearable as encouraging Kazu to try the smell.

In her response, Kazu accepts the suggestion/recommendation and then affiliates with Yuki's evaluative stance while at the same time treating it as informative. First, she responds to the suggestion/recommendation implemented by Yuki's turn by smelling it (lines 5-6). It should be noted that, though Yuki's next turn at line 4 explicitly tells Kazu to try the smell, Kazu has already started reaching for the flower after line 1. This suggests that Kazu hears line 1 as a suggestion. Second, Kazu orients to line 1 as an informing by crediting Yuki's first assessment to have been informative as well as valid: by saying *aa honto da* 'Oh (you're) right', she suggests that the information that Yuki presented as news (i.e., that the flower smells a lot) was indeed news and that it was valid. She then affiliates with it by adding her own assessment that it is a good smell (line 7). This series of responses is designed and delivered as preferred; they are not delayed or mitigated.

Similarly in Extract 3-6, an informing recipient affiliates with an evaluative stance of an informing speaker as well as acknowledging its informativeness. Here, Hiro is telling Tomo about his recent trip to Germany and describing how German girls working at a bar were so amused when he said to them "*Ich liebe dich"* that they poured extra wine for him. Although Hiro does not explicitly articulate his evaluative stance toward the event he is reporting, given that Tomo knows (and Hiro knows that Tomo knows) that Hiro loves wine, it is clear that Hiro is portraying the event as a favorable one.

Extract 3-6 [DWT: GERMANY]

```
1      Hiro:   hnde:[: biiru tsu-ano:=
               and     beer  pour uhm
               and they pour beer-

2      Tomo:         [nn,
                      ITJ
                      Mm hm,
```

```
3       Hiro:   =wain no tsu-ano: [gurasu wain no tsugi ga=
                 wine L  pour well glass  wine L  pour  SP
                =(They) pour wine- uh:m, as for a glass of
                wine,=

4       Tomo:                      [nn,
                                    ITJ
                                   Mm hm,

5       Hiro:   =ooku naru   n [(da  )
                 much become N   CP
                =(they) pour more.

6       Tomo:                  [aa  soo,
                                ITJ that
                                Oh do they,

7       Hiro:   n[n,]
                ITJ
                Yeah,

8       Tomo:    [so]re wa ii   ne:,
                  that  TP nice FP
                  That's nice ne:,

9       Hiro:   ((nods))

10              (1.2)
```

When Hiro's telling comes to possible completion at line 5, Tomo first provides a newsmark response at line 6 (*aa soo,* 'Oh do they,'), which acknowledges the preceding telling to have provided her with something that she did not know, and then affiliates with Hiro by providing a positive evaluative comment at line 8. Again, Tomo's response exhibits features of a preferred response – it is delivered straightforwardly without delay or mitigation.

In Extracts 3-5 and 3-6, recipients of informings affiliatively respond to the evaluative stances of informing speakers. In contrast, in Extract 3-7 a response to an informing is not affiliative, and this response is produced in ways characteristic of dispreferred responses. Sumi is telling Yuta a story about their mutual friend Ken. Sumi and Yuta used to live in the same city as Ken, but they recently moved to different towns. Sumi asked Ken to give her new address to their mutual friends, but it later turned out that Ken failed to do so. The story starts with a preface (Sacks 1974) at line 0, in which Sumi says *nanka ken nanka iikagennishiro tte kanji* 'Like as for Ken, (it's) like "give me a break"'. With this, Sumi makes it explicit that she is complaining about Ken and that affiliation with that stance is

relevant upon the completion of the story. The first possible end of this story comes at the end of line 1, when Sumi says that she learned that Ken had not given her new address to others because her friend's letter was addressed to the old address. However, Yuta does not provide an affiliative response.

Extract 3-7 [CallFriend 6149]

```
0      Sumi:   nanka ken nanka iikagennishiro tte kanji atashi ne,
               like  ken like  give.a.break   QT  like  I      FP
               Like as for Ken, (it's) like give me a break, I, ...


------- 50 seconds of the story omitted -------


1      Sumi:   migotoni  mukashi no juusho. .hhh
               of.course old     L  address
               Of  course  (her  letter  was  addressed  to  my)  old
                  address. .hhh

2 ->   Yuta:   eh[hehhehhe

3      Sumi:     [HEHHEHHEHHEHHE .hhh Ka(h)ite- .hhh da(h)ka(h)ra
                                      write          so
                  HEHHEHHEHHEHHE .hhh (She) wrote- .hhh so

4              ken ga zenzen itte ^nai no yo.
               Ken SP at.all say   not P  FP
               Ken has not told (them) at all.

5 ->   Sumi:   a:[::,
               ITJ
               I see::,

6      Sumi:     [.hh moo[: <^zenz::en> tsukaenai n da[kara-
                      EMP     at.all    useless   N CP so
                   .hh (He) is <^to::tally> useless-

7 ->   Yuta:             [n::                          [uh huh?,
                         ITJ                           ITJ
                         Yeah::                         Uh-huh?,

8      Sumi:   .h moo nanka ne:::, (0.4) dandan    haragatattekita
                  EMP like  FP           gradually became.mad
               .h like ne:::, (0.4) (I) gradually started to be mad
```

```
9       Sumi    watashi wa. h [hehhehhehhe] .hh >de  mo<=
                I       TP                       and EMP
                I (did). hhehhehhe .hh >and<=

10      Yuta:                 [hehhehhehhe]

11      Sumi:   =[iikagennishiro tte ka(h)nji da kedo.
                 give.a.break    QP  like     CP but
                = "give me a break,"(it's) li(h)ke.
12      Yuta:   =[hhe]

13              (.)

14 ->   Yuta:   u[:::

15      Sumi:    [n::n,
                  ITJ
                  Yea::h,

16              (.)

17 ->   Yuta:   .H .H .H [ a : : :  m a a :    ] moo: (.)=
                           ITJ      EMP          EMP
                .h .h .h  I see::: we:ll (.)=

18      Sumi:            [dakara- chie chan ni-]
                          so      PN   END  to
                               So- to Chie-

19 ->   Yuta:   =shooganai      deshoo.
                 out.of.control TAG
                =what can you do?

20      Sumi:   ma:ta kake nakyaikenai shi .h[hh i- ikkai ^denwa=
                again make need.to     also         once   phone
                (I) have to call (Chie) aga:in. .hh (we) should
                ^call=

21      Yuta:                                  [u:so,
                                                lie
                                                No kidding,

22      Sumi:   =shi yoo yo. dareka  ni.
                 do  VOL FP  someone to
                =someone (one of their friends from
                where they used to live).
```

In pursuit of an affiliative comment, Sumi re-completes the story multiple times with additional TCUs (Pomerantz 1984c): at lines 3-4, she clarifies the situation; at line 6 she restates her negative evaluation of Ken (*moo: <^zenz::en> tsukaenai n da kara-* '(he) is <^to::tally useless'); at lines 8-9, she expresses her stance yet

again, coming back to the evaluation she stated in the story preface (*iikagennishiro tte kanji* '(It's) like "give me a break,"') (lines 9/11). During all these elaborations, Yuta is laughing along (lines 2/10) and minimally acknowledging (lines 5/7), but does not state his evaluative stance. When he finally does so at lines 17/19, he declines to blame Ken and instead produces a rather disaffiliative response, saying "*shooganai deshoo* (what can you do)". This response exhibits two characteristic features of a dispreferred response: it has been delayed, and it is mitigated (Yuta could have defended Ken more explicitly or confrontationally). Sumi stops pursuing an affiliative response here and shifts the topic, from retroactive complaint about Ken to a prospective plan to call one of their friends. This case is an example where a disaffiliative response following an informing is dispreferred, similar to the way that a disagreement following a first assessment is dispreferred.

As was exemplified in the three cases examined in this section, informings usually convey their speakers' evaluative stances toward the object or event in question, and responses that affiliate with them are preferred to those that do not. In Section 3.4.4, it will be demonstrated that different forms of informing responses convey different degrees of affiliation, some of which are treated as inadequate by informing speakers.

3.2.4 Summary

This section has discussed three issues to which interactants are oriented in informing sequences: epistemic congruence, alignment and affiliation. Now, the four-part structure of informing sequences discussed earlier (Jefferson 1981; Heritage 1984a; Sacks 1992; Maynard 1997, 2003) can be seen as a solution to these issues. Let us revisit Excerpt 1, shown as Extract 3-8 below.

Extract 3-8 [Maynard 1997:108, see also Terasaki 2004[1976]]

```
1 a->       A:    °hh And I got athletic award.
2 b->       B:    REALLY?!?
3 c->       A:    Uh huh. From Sports Club.
4 d->       B:    Oh that's terrific Ronald.
```

A's announcement presents a piece of information as news (arrow a). In her initial response to this, B adopts an epistemic stance that is congruent with A's: B receipts it as news by displaying surprise (arrow b). At the same time, this newsmark is

aligning, for it gives A an opportunity to elaborate on the issue (arrow c). This opportunity is taken up in this case but could be passed with a minimal confirmation. It is then that B produces an affiliative comment that attends to the evaluative stance of A's (arrow d). Of course, it is not to say that an informing always develops into this four-part structure. A sequence like Extract 3-8 is interactionally achieved as a result of moves that each party makes in each turn. A close examination of utterance forms in each slot of this four-part structure reveals a highly systematic deployment of grammatical resources and their consequences to the development of a sequence. The following sections will examine Japanese grammatical resources used to form informings and informing responses and demonstrate that they all adopt different stances.

3.3 Design of informings

This section illustrates how informings are formulated in Japanese. As discussed previously, by definition, informings are those utterances that deliver a piece of information as newsworthy, informative, or not yet shared by a recipient. Accordingly, informings are often formulated with grammatical resources that embody such an epistemic stance. In Japanese, the particle *yo* is the final particle that indexes such an epistemic stance. Also, utterances whose final forms are *no(da)* and bare declaratives convey that the information is not shared by recipients. In addition, there are cases in which informings are marked with particles that suggest shared epistemic access, *ne* and *yone*. The distribution of these forms is summarized in Table 3-1 below.

Table 3-1: Turn-final forms of informings

Yo-marked	*No(da)*-marked	Bare declaratives	*Ne/yone*-marked	*Tte*-marked	Others	Total
39 (36%)	17 (16%)	17 (16%)	16 (15%)	5 (5%)	14 (13%)	108 (100%)

The quotative particle *tte* is also found in informing turns (see Hayashi [1997] for an analysis of the use of *tte* in the turn-final position). The category 'others' include informings that are not grammatically completed before a response is produced, those that finish with a connective *kara* ('so'), and those that finish with final particles such as *wa*, *zo* and *mon*. This section focuses on the four most recurrent turn-final forms of informings: *yo*, *no(da)*, bare declaratives and *ne/yone*. It explores what stances each of these forms conveys in contrast with the others.

3.3.1 Final particle *yo*

The most common turn-final form of informings in the corpus is the final particle *yo* (36%). The use of *yo* in assessment sequences was discussed in Chapter 2, where it was suggested that it is used to claim epistemic primacy (see also Kamio 1990; Kinsui 1993; Koyama 1997; Katoh 2001; Morita 2002; Kanai 2004; Katagiri 2007). It was noted then that this characterization is not to exclude cases where a speaker of a *yo*-marked utterance has *exclusive* access to the information (Section 2.3.1.1). Indeed, there are cases where *yo* is used to mark an utterance whose referent is exclusively accessible to the speaker but not to the addressee, and some researchers propose that to be the basic function of the particle (Cheng 1987; Katoh 2001; Koyama 1997). Such a generalization would fail to capture the use of *yo* in other cases, where both participants have access to the referent but one of them has better, more authoritative knowledge about it. However, it is true that *yo* is used when the referent is exclusively accessible to the speaker as well. It seems that *yo* by itself does not specify whether it is epistemic primacy or exclusive access that a particular token of *yo* is used to claim, independently of such factors as the prosody and the situational and sequential context.

In contrast to *no*-marked informings and informings in bare declaratives, *yo*-marked informings appear to explicitly treat recipients as uninformed (Heritage 2008), and by doing so, they seem to highlight the relevance of the information to recipients. Extract 3-9 is a case in which *yo* is clearly used for and heard as a claim of exclusive epistemic access. Sumi starts to inform Yuta of updates about their common friend/acquaintance Mark. As she mentions that Mark studies Japanese, she first uses a tag-question marker *janai* ‘right?’ (line 6), conveying that she expects Yuta to share this information. However, as soon as she has a reason to suspect that Yuta may not actually know this, she switches to *yo* (line 10).

Extract 3-9 [CallFriend 6149:Mark]

```
1       Sumi:   ... de  maaku ga ne,
                    and Mark  SP IP
                    and Mark,

2       Yuta:   nn,
                ITJ
                uh-huh,
3               (0.3)

4 ->    Sumi:   nihongo  naratteru janai kare.
                Japanese studying  TAG   he
                (He) studies Japanese, right?

5               (0.4)

6 =>    Yuta:   nn,
                ITJ
                mm-hm, / yeah,

7               (0.3)

8 ->    Sumi:   naratteru no yo.[25]
                study     P  FP
                (He) studies (Japanese) yo.

9       Yuta:   u:n,=
                ITJ
                uh-huh/ yeah,=


10      Sumi:   =de [nanka- .hh
                 and like
                =and like-

11 =>   Yuta:       [shitteru shi°tteru.
                     know     know
                    (I) know (I) °know.

12              (1.2)

13      Sumi:   ^Meriirando ni kaette kiteru n da tte,
                 Maryland   to return come   N CP QT
                (He) is back in Maryland (I heard),
```

[25] In Sumi's utterance at line 8, *yo* is preceded by another particle *no,* which marks the reported information as particularly unexpected or surprising (see Section 3.3) whether or not that information is shared by a recipient. What *no*(*da*) indexes in combination with other particles is an important and interesting topic for a future study.

Sumi's initial mention of Mark's learning Japanese marked with the tag question marker (line 4) invites Yuta to indicate whether he indeed knows that Mark studies Japanese. However, there is a delay in response (line 5) and then Yuta produces a minimal acknowledgement, *nn* (line 6). Although this interjection can function as a confirmation (see Chapter 4), which would suggest that Yuta knew that Mark studies Japanese, in this context, it is also hearable as a mere continuer, which would leave it ambiguous if he knew it previously or not. Presumably because of the delay and the quite monotonous prosody, Sumi understands this token not as a confirmation but as a continuer, that Yuta did not know that Mark studies Japanese.[26] Thus, Sumi takes it that she failed to tailor her turn to this particular recipient. She dedicates the next turn at line 8 to repair on recipient design: she restates the same information this time with the particle *yo,* conveying that she is now aware that Yuta is an uninformed addressee. This is heard by Yuta as such: at line 11, he says *shitteru shitteru* '(I) know (I) know'. With this turn, Yuta explicitly claims that Sumi's re-presentation of the information as unshared was unnecessary. Thus, in this case, *yo* is used to demonstrate an explicit epistemic stance that the information is news to a recipient, and is observably oriented to as such.

Lee (2007: 381) observes that *yo* is used to denote an 'implied message'. For instance, an utterance *soto samui yo* 'It is cold outside *yo'* has an implication that the recipient should put on a coat, for instance, while there would not be such an implication without *yo*. The *yo*-marked informing turn in Extract 3-5 examined earlier (*so- hana sugoi niou no yo?,* 'That- flower smells a lot *yo*?,') also had an 'implied message', or, in interactional terms, implemented an extra action, i.e., suggestion that the recipient should smell the flower. Implementation of an extra action upon which a recipient is invited to act may be a unique feature of *yo*-marked informings that distinguishes them from other informing designs.

Extract 3-10 is a similar example. A couple, Ken and Kazu, are hosting Masa and Yuki for dinner. Kazu has told Masa and Yuki an episode from a recent trip she and Ken made. Ken's utterance at lines 1-2 is a teasing comment about Kazu's behavior during trips, followed by Kazu's rebuff. At line 5, Ken starts a new sequence, shifting the topic from the episode to the airline that they used for the

[26] Sumi's turn at line 4 is hearable as a piece of background information preliminary to an upcoming main part of her informing because of the un-completed, "floating" noun phrase at line 1 (*Maaku* 'Mark', followed by the subject marking particle *ga* and interjection particle *ne*) that projects a predicate to follow. A storyteller may start a new syntactic unit without providing the projected predicate and tells a story, and provides the predicate to mark the completion of the story. This is reported to be a recurrent device to start a story in Japanese conversation (Kanai 2003).

trip, Korean Air. He addresses this utterance to *minasan* 'everyone', meaning the unknowing participants, Yuki and Masa, who Ken assumes have not traveled with this airline. This turn, which Ken explicitly frames as a recommendation, includes a *yo*-marked informing - *yo*-marked assessment about a referent that is inaccessible to recipients.

Extract 3-10 [TD: Korean Air]

```
1      Ken:    obasan    no zuuzuushisa   de   oshiwatacchau
               old.women L  imprudentness with survive
               With the old women's imprudentness, (you) survive.

2              n da yo. moo hon[::ttoni
               P CP FP  EMP really
               rea::lly

3      Kazu:                  [honna koto  nai [yone:,
                               such  thing not  FP
                               That's not true yone:,

4      Yuki:                                   [h h h

5 ->   Ken:    tada    minasan  ne,=osusume        wa daikan kookuu.
               anyways everyone P   recommendation TP Korean Air
               Anyways, everyone, (my) recommendation is Korean Air.

6 ->   Ken:    ko'  ii   yo:: [saabisu wa iishi [moo- ]
               this good FP    service TP good.and EMP
               This (airline) is good yo::, the service is good, and
               really-

7      Masa:                 [h m m : : : : :  [: : :] : : : ?,]

8      Yuki:                                    [a!.h a]no:s-kon]do=
                                                ITJ  uhm    soon
                                                Oh! .h uh::m s-

9      Yuki:   =kara  mo[tto yoku naru   desu yone,
                as since more   good become CP   FP
               =(it) will be even better soon yone,

10     Kazu:           [hn

11             (0.2)
```

```
12    Yuki:   n[ihon takusan hairu n desho?
              Japan  many    enter N TAG
              There will be many flights departing from Japan,
              right?

13    Kazu:    [aa  so-
                ITJ so
               Oh will th-

14    Kazu:   aa: ^s[oo  [na n     [da,
              ITJ that    CP N      CP
              Oh: ^will they,

15    Ken:          [sore [wa shira [nakatta.hmm::n
                     that  TP know   not.PSt
                     (I) didn't know that.

16    Masa:               [aa       [soo : : : .
                           ITJ       that
                           Oh will the::y.

17    Yuki:                         [nn,
                                    Yeah,
```

Ken's positive assessment of Korean Air is given as a part of a recommendation. This assessment is marked with the particle *yo*. Though it is possible to perform the same action − an informing embedded within a recommendation − without the particle, its presence explicitly conveys that Ken presents the information as news to recipients and that recipients should know this. This turn does not develop into a typical informing or recommendation sequence because Yuki volunteers information about the airline (lines 9/12), which turns out to be news to Ken as well as to others and takes over the focus of the interaction. Nonetheless, Ken's *yo*-marked informing is framed as a part of a recommendation, presenting the information as something that recipients should know for their sakes and inviting them to try the referent in future.

In Extract 3-5 and Extract 3-10, *yo*-marked informings implement, or are part of, a recommendation, highlighting the significance of the information to recipients. In other cases, however, *yo*-marked informings do not clearly implement other actions. For instance, in Extract 3-9 shown earlier, Sumi's *yo*-marked informing did not implement any action other than informing. Whether *yo*-marked informings implement another action or not seems to depend on various factors. What may be generally said about the use of *yo* in informings is that it explicitly marks the asymmetry in the speaker's and the recipient's epistemic states. The use of *yo* inevitably brings the recipient's uninformed knowledge state into the

picture. This may be why *yo*-marked informings highlight the information's significance for the recipient, and thereby often, but not necessarily, implement such actions as offers or recommendations upon which the recipients are invited to act.

3.3.2 Bare declaratives

While the use of a final particle is prevalent in Japanese conversation, there are informings with only bare declaratives as well. By bare declaratives, I mean sentential TCUs in the declarative form that are not marked with sentence final objects such as sentence final particles, tag question markers or politeness marking auxiliary verbs.

In the last section, it was suggested that *yo*-marked informings index the recipient's as well the speaker's knowledge states and highlight the information's relevance to the recipient. In contrast, bare declaratives do not refer to the recipient's lack of information as explicitly as *yo*-marked informings do. In fact, some utterances in the form of bare declaratives leave it unspecified whether the speaker considers recipients to be informed or uninformed. Accordingly, bare declarative do not appear to claim the information's relevance to recipients as explicitly or imposingly as *yo*-marked informings do.

For instance, see Extract 3-11. Kazu and Yoko are chatting at Kazu's house having tea and *yookan*, sweet bean jelly, which was a souvenir gift from Kazu's daughter. Kazu takes a bite of it and reports to Yoko, who has not tried the *yookan*, that it is not that sweet (line 1) in the form of a bare declarative. This assessment is recognizable as a positive one, for *yookan* is often known to be excessively sweet.

Extract 3-11 [IL: yookan]

```
1 ->   Kazu:   ^sonnani amaku nai.
                that    sweet not
                (It's) not ^that sweet.

2 =>   Yoko:   honto,=
               really
               Really,=
```

```
3       Kazu:   =nn,
                ITJ
                =Yeah,

4       Yoko:   me  ga sa:,
                eye SP IP
                (My) eye,
```

In this case, since it is immediately visible to Kazu that Yoko has not tried the *yookan*, Kazu's assessment is recognizable as an informing, and Yoko responds to it as such (line 2). However, this assessment is not specifically formulated as an informing. Without the particle *yo*, it sounds more like a spontaneous remark about what Kazu has just experienced, not making an explicit reference to Yoko's knowledge state or the information's relevance to her.

It should be noted that Kazu's assessment is not responded to as a recommendation: it is a positive assessment of a referent that Yoko has not experienced but could immediately experience. In Extract 3-5 and Extract 3-10, *yo*-marked assessments in the same situation were produced and/or responded to as a recommendation. While Yoko in Extract 3-11 responds to Kazu's assessment as an informing with a newsmark (line 2), she does not respond to it as a recommendation, and she initiates a completely new sequence at line 4. Uehara and Fukushima (2004) claim that bare declaratives are used when speakers' only concern is to convey information or intention and are not trying to convey any further implications. While this generalization seems too strong, bare declaratives may not present an additional action (i.e., recommendation in this case) as explicitly or imposingly as *yo*-marked informings do.

In the next example, Aki is telling Emi about talks that she listened to at a recent conference. Aki and Emi research roughly in the same area but their supervisors are different. Aki made positive comments about one paper presented at the conference (prior to the excerpt), and then made a critical comment about another (line 1). She then moves on to talk about another talk, a talk by her supervisor, Professor Cheng. This informing is in the form of a bare declarative followed by the past tense marker.

Extract 3-12 [TD: Prof. Cheng]

```
1       Aki:    sore de:::, nannimo  wakan nai to omou.
                that with   anything know  not QT think
                (I) don't think that would prove anything.
```

```
2       Emi:    nn_

3               (0.4)

4       Aki:    nn.

5               (0.8)

6 ->    Aki:    #Che:ng# sensee  no happyoo     ^mo   yokatta.
                 Cheng   teacher L  presentation also good.PST
                Professor Cheng's presentation was good, ^too.

7               (0.6)

8 ->    Aki:    °sugoku yokatta.
                 very   good.PST
                °(It) was very good.

9       Emi:    hntoo,=
                really
                Really,=

10      Aki:    =nn, mae    kara  kojintekini kininatteta bubun
                 ITJ before since personally  interested  part
                =Yeah, (it) is a topic (I) have been personally

11              de mo   aru kara:, ...
                CP also be  so
                interested, so ...
```

This case is different from Extract 3-11 in that some time has passed since Aki gained epistemic access to the referent (the talk by Professor Cheng). Thus, the use of *yo* would not be inappropriate here. By not using *yo* and instead providing the information in a bare declarative, however, Aki seems to design the turn as a self-directed reflection while downgrading the information's relevance to Emi. Indeed, Aki does not direct her gaze to Emi when she is producing the utterance until around line 11. Moreover, when she elaborates on the topic at lines 10-11, she further downplays the information's possible relevance to Emi: she says that the talk was interesting to her because it was on the topic that she has been *personally* interested in. Thus, although Aki is obviously providing Emi new information, this informing is not specifically and explicitly formulated as news that has relevance or significance to Emi.

Furthermore, it may not be an accident that Emi does not immediately respond to this informing (line 7) but does so only after Aki pursues her response by restating the assessment with upgraded intensity (line 8, line 9). It may be

suggested that Aki's informing lacks an epistemic resource to indicate an epistemic gap, which would help to 'mobilize a response' (Stivers and Rossano 2010) or fuel into 'the epistemic engine' (Heritage 2012b). Stivers and Rossano (ibid.) show that an utterance about the recipient's epistemic domain and/or which is formulated as an interrogative is more likely to solicit a response than an utterance that does not address such epistemic asymmetry and/or is formulated as a declarative. Heritage (2012b) expands this to argue that any epistemic asymmetry, whether it is speaker-tilted or recipient-tilted, serves to drive sequences forward. In the above case, although Aki's informing poses speaker-tilted epistemic asymmetry, its force to mobilize a response may not be as strong as *yo*-marked informings, which explicitly present information as news to recipients.

In summary, informings seem to be produced in the form of bare declaratives when speakers are not in a position to claim epistemic primacy and/or when they present the information as of reduced significance or relevance to recipients. Although both *yo*-marked informings and those in the bare declarative form perform the action of informings, making it relevant for recipients to provide newsmarks or news receipts, they differ from each other at the finer level of stance that they adopt.

3.3.3 *No* (*da*)

Another linguistic resource that is often found in informings is *no*(*da*). *No* can be the final element of a sentential TCU or can be followed by other final particles or a copular *da* (plain form) or *desu* (polite form), in which case *no* usually realizes as *n* (*da/desu*). Noda (1997) suggests that the primary function of *no* in declarative sentences is to present an established fact – a fact that the recipient has not realized. Consequently, it often marks an utterance as "instructive", "confessional" or "emphasizing" (see also Aoki 1986). In this sense, *no(da)*-marked informings are distinct from bare declaratives: whereas bare declaratives are often used to voice a view or information that has just been formed based on the here-and-now experience (see Extract 3-11), *no*(*da*)-marked informings present information or assessments that have already been formed prior to the ongoing interaction.

It should be noted that it is not reasonable to characterize *no* as an epistemic marker claiming a certain knowledge state relative to an interlocutor, for

it co-occurs with various epistemic stance markers whose functions are contrastive to one another: *yo* (epistemic primacy marker), *ne* (equivalent knowledge marker), *yone* (equivalent knowledge marker) and even a question particle *ka* or the interrogative rising intonation. As will be shown in Chapter 4, the use of *no*(da) in polar questions conveys the speaker's reduced preparedness to accept confirmation as an answer. That is, polar questions are marked with *no*(*da*) to convey that speakers are finding the proposition unexpected or unbelievable. This stance of a speaker regarding unexpectedness can be relevant regardless of the speaker's epistemic stance concerning the relative distribution of knowledge. Indeed, this characterization seems to hold for the use of *no*(*da*) in declaratives as well: when an informing is marked with *no*(*da*), the speaker is presenting the information as counter to expectation, surprising or newsworthy.

Let us turn to Extract 3-13. After talking about when her husband will be done with final exams, Hatsue (HAT) announces to Michi (MIC) that she is going to Disney World with her family the following Monday, marking it with *no* (line 6).

Extract 3-13 [CallFriend 2167: Disney World]

```
1      HAT:    nn.  doyoobi  de owa    cchau no kana?
               ITJ  saturday on finish AUX   P  Q
               Yeah. (my husband's courses) will be over on Saturday,
               I think.

2      MIC:    a::: a    d- konshuu   de owa    cchau [no::?]
               ITJ  ITJ     this.week in finish AUX    P
               Oh::: oh (they) will be over this week?

3      HAT:                                             [nn:.]
                                                         ITJ
                                                         Yeah:.

4      MIC:    .hh aa [sore wa] ^ii   ne:::,=
                      ITJ that TP   nice FP
               .hh Oh that is ^nice ne:::,=

5      HAT:           [soo.]
                       right
                       Right.

6 ->   HAT:    =getsuyoobi kara dizunii waarudo ni i[ku no:.=
                Monday    from disney   world   to go   P
               (We) are going to Disney World on Monday no.=

7      MIC:                                          [.hh=
```

```
8 =>   MIC:    =^uso:::::::::::::::::, .hh ↓konderu zo:[:.
                 lie                      crowded FP
               ^No wa:::::::y, .hh (It) will be crowded (be prepared
               for that).

9      HAT:                                              [soo=
                                                          that
                                                          Right
10     HAT:    =kurisumasu mae    da kara ne:[::,
                Christmas  before CP so   FP
                since (it) is pre-Christmas,

11     MIC:                                  [u::n.=
                                              ITJ
                                              Yeah.
```

The use of *no* in Hatsue's announcement seems to contribute to presenting the news as remarkable and newsworthy. Michi's response resonates with this analysis; she receipts Hatsue's announcement as particularly newsworthy both through the lexical choice (*uso,* which literally means "a lie", conveying a strong sense of surprise) and the manner of delivery (i.e., with a heightened pitch and substantial prolongation).

Thus, it appears that *no*(*da*) marks an informing as particularly newsworthy or counter to one's expectation, and responses to *no*(*da*)-marked informings often embody marked surprise that is congruent with such a stance.[27] Extract 3-14 is a similar example from the same telephone conversation as Extract 3-13. Michi is telling Hatsue that her cousin is visiting her in Philadelphia. The cousin used to live in a town in New Jersey, but that was almost 15 years ago. Michi and the cousin went to the town the other day, and found that the cousin's old friend still lives there even though it has been such a long time. In lines 1-2, Michi delivers the climax of the telling. With the heightened pitch on the word *mada* 'still' (indicated by the caret '^') and the particle *no*, this is presented as an unexpected, surprising event.

Extract 3-14 [CallFriend 2167: Old Friends]

```
1 ->   MIC:    shitara sa,tomodachi ga ^mada  sundeta
               then    IP friend    SP  still lived
               then, the friend ^still
```

[27] As is shown by Wilkinson and Kitzinger (2006), 'surprise' is interactionally achieved: one designs a turn to solicit a surprise display and its recipient aligns by producing one.

```
2 ->            no::[:.]
                P
                lived there no.

3 =>   HAT:          [a ]  ho:n[t o n i  :  :  :  : , .h h]
                      ITJ  really
                      Oh re:ally::::, .hh

4      MIC:                    [moo juugo nen   gurai ta]tte n
                                EMP 15    years about pass   N
                                (It) has been almost 15 years

5               da [kedo::]
                CP  but
                but,

6      HAT:        [.hh ee]:: sugo:::[i.]
                        ITJ   amazing
                     .hh ee:: amazi:::ng.
```

In response to Michi's telling, Hatsue responds with a newsmark *a ho:ntoni::::,* 'oh re:ally::::' (line 3), emphasizing it with stress and prosody. After Michi adds that it has been almost 15 years since her cousin lived in the area, Hatsue produces a response cry − a spate of talk that is designed to be heard as "a natural overflowing" of one's "presumed inward state" (Goffman 1981:89) − prefaced by *ee::*, an interjection that indexes a 'departure from expectation' (Hayashi 2009) (line 6). This response is thus designed to display a marked surprise, which again congruently receipts the informing as of particular remarkableness.

To summarize, the final particle *no(da)* in informings appears to present the information as particularly surprising, noteworthy or unexpected. The small set of samples from this corpus suggests that recipients tend to take a stance that is congruent with this by embodying a marked surprise through lexical choice and/or paralinguistic features.

So far, we have examined resources used in informings that present a piece of information as news. Thus, in above cases, the basic epistemic stance conveyed by the form (*yo*, bare declaratives and *no*) and the action that the turn in which they are used are matched. However, some informings are marked with particles *ne* and *yone*, which are commonly used to mark shared information. The next section discusses interactional contexts in which informings are marked with these particles.

3.3.4 *Ne* and *yone*

Chapter 2 reported that final particles *ne* and *yone* are markers to claim shared equivalent knowledge (see also Kamio1990; Koyama 1997; Katoh 2001). Accordingly, the use of *ne* or *yone* and the action of informing, which by definition provides information as unshared, seem incompatible. There are many cases, however, when a speaker uses *ne* or *yone* in delivering a piece of information that is, or that turns out to be, news or informative to a recipient. This section describes the function *ne* and *yone* serve in informings. Two interactional motivations can be identified for the use of *ne* and *yone* in informings: 1) when *ne* or *yone* is used as a 'try-marker' to check a recipient's knowledge state, and 2) when a speaker declines to claim epistemic primacy or authority despite the recipient's 'unknowing' epistemic state (Goodwin 1979).

In their work on person reference, Sacks and Schegloff (1979) argue that 'minimization' and 'recipient design' are the two preferences that underlie the choice of person reference forms in interaction: one should use a form that is minimal and suited for the recipient's knowledge about the person being referred to. For instance, in English, the use of a first name is preferred as far as the first name is sufficient for a recipient to recognize the person who is being referred to. As one of the pieces of evidence for their argument, Sacks and Schegloff describe a practice that they call 'try-markers' - a person reference that lexically presupposes recipient recognition but is delivered with a rising contour (e.g., "... well I was the only one other than than the uhm tch Fords?, Uh Mrs. Holmes Ford? ..."). If a recipient shows some sign of recognition following a try-marker, speakers proceed with the turn, and if not, they replace the try-marked reference form with another reference form. Try-markers are means for speakers to observe the preference for minimization and recipient design when they are not certain that the particular form that they are 'trying out' will be recognized by a recipient.

Sacks remarks that when speakers have a piece of information that they want to bring up in conversation, a general principle reads "under-tell and over-suppose" (Sacks, personal communication cited in Terasaki (2004[1976]:185). Some of the *ne*- or *yone*- marked informings seem to serve the function parallel to try-markers in "over-supposing" recipient knowledge. That is, a speaker first presupposes the recipient's epistemic access with *ne* or *yone*: if the recipients show that they indeed have epistemic access to the issue, then the sequence develops as an assessment sequence: if it turns out that they do not have epistemic access, the

speaker re-presents the information, this time claiming exclusive knowledge. Extract 3-15 is an example of this usage. E and S work at the same company. E has been working part-time for a few years, and S recently started as a full-time assistant. They are discussing how bad the atmosphere of the office is. At lines 1-2, E brings up the subject of a staff member Mr. Sato, who also started recently, saying that the office atmosphere has changed a little since he came.

Extract 3-15 [IF: Mr.Kato][28]

```
1 ->   E:     Sato-san ga haitte kara  sukoshi  kawatta n
              Sato-TL SP enter   since a.little changed N
              But still, since Mr. Sato came (to the office),

2 ->          desu yone soredemo.
              CP   FP   still
              (the atmosphere of the office) has changed a
              little yone.

3      S:     soo na n desu ka.
              so  CP N CP   QP
              (It) has?

4 =>   E:     Satoh san kaeru  n desu yo.
              Satoo HL  change N CP   yo
              Mr. Satoh changes (the atmosphere) yo.

5      S:     he[hhehhe]

6      E:       [hitori hitori].
                 one    one
                 One (colleague) after another.
```

At lines 1-2, E marks his utterance with *yone,* conveying his expectation that S shares this information and inviting agreement. However, S responds to this with a news receipt (*soo nan desu ka.* '(it) has?') (line 3), indicating that she did not know this and does not have any epistemic basis on which to agree or disagree.[29] Thus, incongruence between E's and S's epistemic states emerges here. E then reformulates what he said at line 4, this time switching the particle from *yone* to *yo*, embodying an epistemic stance that is congruent with the one that S took at line 3.

[28] This excerpt is drawn from a face-to-face, audio-recorded conversation, which I did not use in this thesis except for this example.

[29] Such a display of lack of epistemic basis to agree or disagree can be a way to project a disagreement (Pomerantz 1984a, 1984b). However, in this case, E does not orient to S's news receipt response as such.

In this case, it can be inferred that E was not sure about S's epistemic state; S is new, but unlike E, S works as a full time assistant, spending more hours at the office and possibly having had a chance to arrive at the observation that E has made. The *yone*-marked utterance at lines 1-2 appears to function to provide S with an opportunity to take an epistemic stance and disambiguate this issue.

Speakers may also mark a piece of information that is clearly unknown to the recipient with *yone* or *ne,* as in Extract 3-16. A beautician and a customer are talking about a festival they had in their neighborhood the previous week. Having told the customer that many people came to the festival, the beautician says that the sales were good (line 1). The customer responds to this with a newsmark (line 2) (See Section 3.4.2) and then an interjection that marks receipt of new information *hmm:* 'I see' (line 4), conveying that she did not know this (See Section 3.4.3). Thus, it has become clear that the customer is uninformed regarding the sales of the festival. Nonetheless, the beautician provides more detailed information as to how good the sales were with the final particle *ne* at line 5.

Extract 3-16 [BSA: Sales]

```
1      Beau:   uriage mo   kekkoo atta mi[tai de.]
               sales  also fairly was  seem   CP
               It seems that the sales were quite good as well.

2      Cust:                              [a   soo] [desu ka.]=
                                          ITJ that  CP   Q
                                           Oh were (they).=

3      Beau:                                       [ e e.   ]=
                                                     ITJ
                                                     Yes.
4      Cust:   =[ h m m : : :_  ]
5 ->   Beau:   =[|ano  ichiban da] tte itte mashita ne:.
                  well best    CP  QT  say  AUG.PST FP
               =(They) said (it) was best ne.

6      Cust:   >ima de-< ima- (.) kako, de?
                now at   now      past  at
               (Best) in ever- eve- in the past ((compared with
               the sales in the festivals in the past))?

7              (0.3)
```

```
8       Beau:   ano: yon  no [ni: no:-
                well four L   two L
                Well, ((compared with the past sales)) of the 4-2
                block-

9       Cust:                [a! yon  no ni  no-=
                             ITJ four L  two L
                              Oh, of the 4-2 block,=

10      Beau:   =yon  no ni  no, [hai.
                 four L  two L    ITJ
                =Of the 4-2 block, yes.

11      Cust:                    [-burokku de [aa  soo desu ka.
                                    block  at  ITJ that CP   Q
                                   -In the block, oh was it.

12      Beau:                                 [ee
                                               ITJ
                                              Yes.
```

By the time the beautician produces the end of the TCU at line 5, he has learned that the customer did not know that the sales were good. This indicates that she would not know that the sales of the particular block were in fact the best ever either. Nonetheless, he marks this informing with *ne.* This use of *ne* or *yone* can be understood as conveying that the speaker has not accepted the information as his (see Katagiri 2007). Indeed, the beautician presents this information as hearsay, portraying himself not as the one with first-hand knowledge but as one with only second-hand knowledge. Thus, even when it is clear from the context that a recipient lacks epistemic access to the issue and thus an utterance serves as an informing, the utterance can be formulated with markers of equivalent knowledge to decline to claim a strong epistemic status, thereby reducing the epistemic asymmetry between interactants.

3.3.5 Summary

This section has illustrated common forms of informings: *Yo*-marked informings stress the information's relevance to recipients and often implement an additional action such as offers and recommendations; bare declaratives are typically found to report based on newly-gained epistemic access and/or to downgrade the information's relevance to recipients; *No(da)*-marked informings

present the reported event or view as surprising or unexpected and tend to get a response that aligns with such a stance by embodying a marked surprise. The section also examined cases where a speaker delivers new information with equivalent knowledge markers *ne* and *yone*, either to try out the recipient's knowledge state or to decline to claim a strong epistemic status. Though they all perform the action of informings making relevant receipts of new information, the different grammatical resources adopt different stances as to the epistemic state or significance of the information, bearing different interactional consequences. The next section turns to the linguistic repertoire for informing responses, and how their distributions relate to the stances informing speakers have adopted.

3.4 Responses to Informings

It was discussed at the beginning of this chapter that responding to an informing involves at least three interactional tasks: receipting (or not receipting) the informing turn as news (epistemic congruence/incongruence); encouraging (or discouraging) expansion of the informing; affiliating (or disaffiliating) with the informing speaker's evaluative stance toward the reported event/referent. It was suggested that the four-part structure of informing sequences − an informing, a newsmark/news receipt, elaboration/minimal confirmation and an evaluative comment − allows recipients of informings to address each of these three tasks.

A variety of responses are produced following informings in Japanese. Four categories of common responses can be identified among them: (i) surprise displays *honto(ni)?* 'really' or *uso* 'no way/ no kidding'; (ii) anaphoric responses, which refer back to the preceding informing with an anaphor *soo* and can roughly be translated as "Is that so?"; (iii) interjections *hee* and *hmm*; and (iv) evaluative comments. While all of the first three of these categories - surprise displays, anaphoric responses and interjections - receipt the prior turn as news, they are not randomly nor interchangeably placed in informing sequences. Instead, there is a strong tendency for these responses to occur in a fixed order, as is represented in 3-17.

3-17

1 a->	A:	informing
2 b->	B:	*honto(ni)/uso* or anaphoric response
3 c->	A:	elaboration or minimal confirmation
4 d->	B:	*hee* / *hmm* or evaluative comment

As is discussed in the literature, when an informing is produced (arrow a), its recipients commonly produce newsmarks to provide an opportunity for informing speakers to elaborate at varying degrees of encouragement (arrow b) (Jefferson 1981; Heritage 1984a; Maynard 1997). In Japanese, the form of response that is most commonly found in this slot is *honto(ni)/uso* or an anaphoric response. These initial responses are followed by either elaboration of the informing or a minimal confirmation, which passes on the opportunity to elaborate. In the next turn (arrow d), informing recipients tend to produce either an interjection (e.g., *hee* or *hmm*) or an evaluative comment. This ordered pattern is repeatedly observed in excerpts that are examined in this section, but let us look briefly at two examples here. In Extract 3-18, Barber tells Customer that he learned earlier that day that another customer had been hospitalized for a cancer operation and had left the hospital the day before. In response, Customer first produces an anaphoric response (line 4). After Barber's brief elaboration at line 5, Customer produces the interjection *hee*.

Extract 3-18 [BB: cancer]

```
1 a->  Barb:   an:nojoo    ne:,
               as.expected P
               As (we) were suspecting,

2      Cust:   nn,
               ITJ
               Mm-hm,

3 a->  Barb:   nikagetsu  kan nyuuinshiteta.
               two.months for hospitalized.PST
               (He) was in the hospital for two months.

4 b->  Cust:   aa  soo  na no.
               ITJ that CP P
               Oh is that so,

5 c->  Barb:   kinoo     taiin              shite kita bakkashi.
               yesterday left.the.hospital  do    came just
               (He) left the hospital just yesterday.
```

```
6 d->  Cust:   hee:

7              (1.0)

8      Barb:   zettee     ore wa gan    ni nan    nai n da tte
               absolutely I   TP cancer to become not N CP QT
               A guy who was saying "I will never get a cancer"

9              itteta      hito   ga gan  ni (  )
               saying.pst  person SP cancer  to
               "I will never get a cancer"
```

In other cases, an informing is receipted with a surprise display, and an evaluative comment is produced in the subsequent response slot. Below is an example, which was examined earlier as Extract 3-14. Michi tells Hatsue that she found her cousin's very old friends still living in their hometown (lines 1-2).

Extract 3-19 [CallFriend2167:OldFriends]

```
1 a->  MIC:    shitara sa,tomodachi ga ^mada  sundeta
               then    P  friend    SP  still lived
               then, the friends ^still
2 a->          no::[:.]
               P
               lived there.


3 b->  HAT:          [a]  ho:n[t o n i  :  :  :  : , .h h]
                      ITJ really
                      Oh re:ally::::, .hh

4 c->  MIC:                   [moo juugo nen   gurai ta]tte n=
                               EMP 15    years about pass   N
                              (It) has been almost 15 years

5 c->          =da [kedo::]
                   CP  but
                   but,

6 d->  HAT:        [.hh ^ee]:: su^go:::i.
                          ITJ   amazing
                    .hh ^ee:: a^mazi:::ng.
```

In response, Hatsue first displays a surprise (*a ho:ntoni::::,* 'Oh re:ally::::, line 3). After a brief elaboration, she then provides an evaluative comment (line 6).

This pattern is robust. Table 3-2 shows distributions of the different response forms in the initial and second response slot. (The 'second response slot'

means second possible completion of an informing. Thus, the table does not include continuers or responses that are produced in the third or later response turns.)

Table 3-2: Distribution of responses to informing in first (a) and second (b) response slots[30]

	First response (a)	Second response (b)	Total
Honto(ni)/ uso	15 (19%)	2 (3%)	17
Anaphoric response	28 (36%)	2 (3%)	30
Hee / *hmm*	5 (6%)	26 (20%)	31
Evaluative comment	1 (1%)	15 (19%)	16
Other initiation of repair	9 (12%)	0 (0%)	9
Minimal acknowledgement	5 (6%)	8 (10%)	13
Others	15 (19%)	25 (32%)	40
Total	78 (100%)	78 (100%)	156

Honto(ni) / *uso* and anaphoric responses predominantly occur as an initial response to an informing while *hee*/*hmm* and evaluative comments are found in the second response slot. This distribution pattern will be repeatedly observed in excerpts that will be shown.

The following sections, by examining the workings of each type of the informing response, illustrate the mechanism that underlies this ordered structure.

[30] In Table 3-2, I did not include sequences that were launched as informing sequences but developed into other types of sequences or those that get interrupted before they fully develop. Thus, the numbers of cases that will be mentioned to discuss the likelihood of each response type leading to elaboration do not necessarily match the numbers shown in the table.

Section 3.4.1 examines surprise displays *honto(ni)* and *uso*. Section 3.4.2 focuses on anaphoric responses. Section 3.4.3 deals with interjections *hee* and *hmm*. In Section 3.4.4, different types of evaluative comments that index different epistemic stances are analyzed. Section 3.4.5 revisits the three issues involved in informing sequences − epistemic congruence, alignment and affiliation − with findings altogether in hand.

3.4.1 *Honto(ni)* 'really' and *Uso* 'lie'

The most common informing responses in Japanese are *honto(ni)* ('really') and *uso* (lit. 'a lie', roughly translatable as 'no way' or 'no kidding') and their phonetic variants.[31] These responses convey a sense of surprise or disbelief, conveying that what has just been told is news or informative. Thus, *honto(ni)* and *uso* index an epistemic stance that is congruent with that of informings that present information as news. Most of the tokens of *honto(ni)* and *uso* occur as an initial response immediately following the first possible completion of an informing, and 63% (n=12/19) of them are followed by elaboration of the informing. These suggest that *honto(ni)* and *uso* serve as newsmarks, encouraging elaboration of an informing.

In Extract 3-20 (presented earlier as Extract 3-14/19), Hatsue (HAT) responds to Michi's (MIC) story with *hontoni* prefaced with *a,* which is equivalent to the English "change-of-state" token 'oh' (Heritage 1984).[32]

---

31 The morpheme *ni* that may be attached to *honto* is a morpheme that derives an adverb from a noun. However, the stem noun *honto* (*hontoo* in the orthography) is commonly used by itself as a response that displays surprise in the same way *hontoni* is.

32 Jefferson (1981) notes that the presence or absence of an *oh*-preface is consequential to whether a partial repeat response encourages elaboration or not; while an *oh*-prefaced partial repeat (e.g., "oh do they,") is regularly followed by elaboration, a free-standing partial repeat (e.g., "Do they,") leads to a sequence closure (see also Heritage 1984a: footnote 13). In the current Japanese corpus, such a tendency is not observed with the Japanese equivalence *ah*.

Extract 3-20 [CallFriend2167: OldFriends]

```
1       MIC:    shitara sa,tomodachi ga ^mada  sundeta
                then    P  friend    SP  still lived
                then, the friends ^still

2               no::[:.]
                P
                lived there.

3 ->    HAT:          [a]  ho:n[t o n i  :  :  :  : , .h h]
                       ITJ really
                       Oh re:ally::::, .hh

4       MIC:                   [moo juugo nen   gurai ta]tte n
                                EMP 15    years about pass   N
                               (It) has been almost 15 years

5               da [kedo::]
                CP  but
                but,

6       HAT:       [.hh ^ee]:: su^go::[i.]
                        ITJ   amazing
                    .hh ^ee:: a^mazi::ng.

7       MIC:                          [(so]ide) odoroi       chatte
                                       and     was.surprised AUX
                                      ∅ was/were surprised,

8               tomodachi no hoo  ga:(h) [h h h .hh]
                friend    L  side SP
                the friends (were surprised) h h h .hh

9       HAT:                               [nn ::::, ]
                                            ITJ
                                            Yeah::::,
```

In this case, as well as in many other cases of *honto(ni)*, despite the semantics of the phrase, *honto(ni)* 'really' is not treated as a request for confirmation. In the following turn (line 4), instead of providing a confirmation, Michi elaborates on the story without providing confirmation, and Hatsue does not take issue with this. Thus, *hontoni* here receipts the informing as newsworthy and solicits elaboration.

Compared to *honto(ni)* 'really', *uso* is found less often: there are only three cases in which this response is used in the corpus. Yet, it seems to serve the same function as *honto(ni)* in that it is produced as an initial response to an informing and encourages elaboration of the informing (*uso* is accompanied by informing

speakers' elaboration in all three cases). An example is Extract 3-21, part of which was presented as Extract 3-13. Hatsue (HAT) produces a *no*-marked announcement that she is going to Disney World (line 1). In response, Michi (MIC) produces a prolonged, emphasized token of *uso* at line 3.

Extract 3-21 [CallFriend 2167: DisneyWorld]

```
1      HAT:    getsuyoobi kara dizunii waarudo ni i[ku no:.=
               Monday    from disney   world   to go   P
               (We) are going to Disney World on Monday no.=

2      MIC:                                          [.hh=

3 ->           ^uso:::::::::::::::::, .hh ↓konderu zo:[:.
                lie                          crowded FP
               ^No wa:::::::y, .hh (It) will be crowded (be prepared
               for that).

4      HAT:                                                [soo=
                                                           that
                                                           Right

5              =kurisumasu mae    da kara ne:[::,
                Christmas  before CP so   FP
                since (it) is pre-Christmas,

6      MIC:                                    [u::n.=
                                                ITJ
                                                Yeah.

7      HAT:    =un  kurisumasu no hunniki    o ta:noshimi ni
                ITJ Christmas  N  atmosphere O enjoy      to
               Yeah just to enjo:y the atmosphere of Christmas

8              [dake [ikoo   to omotte.]
                only  go.VOL QT think
                (we) are going there, (we) are thinking.

9      MIC:    [.hh [ i i : : : n e ] :::[:: yorokobu  ne]:=
                      nice       FP        happy.get FP
               .hh (That's) ni:::ce ne:::, (∅) will be happy ne:=

10     HAT:                                [u : : : : : n.]
                                           ITJ
                                           Yea:::h.

11     MIC:    =kodomo tachi ga : : : : : .
                child  PL    SP
                (The) children.
```

Though Hatsue does not elaborate on the announcement following *uso*, Michi appears to be inviting Hatsue to do so when she is extensively prolonging *uso* and taking an inbreath at line 3. Michi then makes a negative remark (that it will be crowded) presumably to convey her (mock) jealousy. Hatsue agrees with Michi with a confirmation token *soo* (line 4), adds why it will particularly be crowded (line 5), and then elaborates on the announcement explaining why Hatsue decided to go to Disneyland despite the anticipated crowdedness (line 7-8). Michi then provides an affiliative comment (lines 9/11).

As the above two cases exemplify, newsmarks *honto(ni)* and *uso* are produced to show surprise at the informing, taking an epistemic stance that is congruent with the informing speaker's and invites elaboration. These functions are compatible with their semantic meanings: they literally convey surprise or disbelief, and thus make it relevant for their recipients to provide more information on the issue.

3.4.2 Anaphoric responses

Another type of informing response commonly produced in the initial response slot is what can be termed anaphoric responses: responses that take the form of confirmation requests and include an anaphoric deictic *soo* 'that'.[33] They literally mean 'Is that (the case)?' but seem to be translated better as a partial pro-repeat question in English (e.g., "Was he?" in response to an informing "He was in the hospital for two months,"). They are nearly always produced as an initial response to an informing.

The anaphor *soo* may be followed by turn-final elements such as a nominalizer, copula or sentence final particle(s), which mark politeness, epistemic stance and/or tense/aspect. Most of the anaphoric responses in the corpus are

[33] An exception to this category is *soo ka* (or *so kka* in the contracted variation)---the anaphoric deictic term followed by a question particle produced with a falling final pitch. Unlike other forms of anaphoric responses, this form sounds introspective and seems to convey acceptance and understanding of information, rather than spontaneous surprise that encourages its recipients to elaborate on what they have said. The sequential position in which *soo ka* and *so kka* is found is not the first possible completion of an informing but when "topic attrition" is happening (Jefferson 1993:26), filling the gaps between sequences. Thus, *soo ka* and *so kka* do not serve the same function as other anaphoric responses and will not be included in the focus of my analysis.

prefaced with an interjection *a/ah/aa* 'oh'. Resulting forms are exemplified below. Extract 3-22 is an *aa*-prefaced bare anaphoric response that does not accompany any turn-final object. This turn is still hearable as a confirmation request due to the prosody (sharp rise-fall) as well as its position.

Extract 3-22

```
Tomo:   aa ^soo,
        ITJ that
        Oh do they,
```

Extract 3-23 is also prefaced with *aa* 'oh' and is followed by a particle *no*, which requires the occurrence of the copular *na* in order to be attached to the nominal reference *soo*. We will see in Section 4.7.1 in Chapter 4 that the particle *no(da)* in a question marks suspicion or lower readiness to accept a confirmation as an answer. Thus, *no(da)*-marked anaphoric responses appear to convey stronger sense of surprise or disbelief than those that are not marked with it.

Extract 3-23

```
IKU:    a   ^soo  na no?
        ITJ  that CP P
        Oh ^is he?
```

Tense, aspect and politeness may also be marked in anaphoric responses as in Extract 3-24 and Extract 3-25. In Extract 3-24, the anaphor *soo* is followed by the first copula *na,* which hosts a particle *n*, the contracted form of *no*, then by the second copula *desu* that marks politeness, and then finally the question particle *ka.*

Extract 3-24

```
B:      soo  na n desu   ka.
        that CP P CP_HNR Q
        Did you.
```

And in Extract 3-25, the copula is marked with the perfective aspect with *tta.*

Extract 3-25

```
Cust:   aa  soo  da tta.
        ITJ that CP PST
        Oh did you.
```

Though these different turn-final forms that accompany *soo* should have some interactional consequences, as far as the chances of leading to elaboration are concerned, they do not differ from one another. Prosody is another factor that is expected to make a difference in how anaphoric responses are treated. Selting (1996) shows that a German token *bitte* serves different functions and has different sequential implications for subsequent exchange depending on prosody with which it is produced. Indeed, prosodic features seem to make differences in how an anaphoric response is heard: it can convey astonishment or indifference, appreciation or disbelief. However, I have not found empirical evidence that prosody systematically functions to shape subsequent courses of interaction. Overall, anaphoric responses lead to informing expansion slightly less often than *honto(ni)* and *uso*: 45% (n=15) of anaphoric responses in the corpus are followed by informing elaboration while 55% (n=18) are not. Some examples are provided below.

In Extract 3-26 (presented earlier as 3-6), Tomo responds to Hiro's telling about his experience in Germany with an anaphoric response *aa soo* (line 12), after which Hiro minimally confirms.

Extract 3-26 [DWT: Germany]

```
1       Hiro:   =wain no tsu-ano: [gurasu wain no tsugi ga=
                 wine L  pou well  glass  wine L  pour  SP
                =(They) pour wine- uh:m, for a glass of wine,

2       Tomo:                     [nn,
                                   ITJ
                                  Mm hm,

3       Hiro:   =ooku naru   n [(da  )
                 much become N   CP
                =(they) pour more.
4 ->    Tomo:                  [aa  soo,
                                ITJ that
                               Oh do they,
```

```
5      Hiro:   n[n,]
               ITJ
               Yeah,

6      Tomo:     [so]re wa ii   ne:,
                  that  TP nice FP
                  That's nice ne:,

7      Hiro:   ((nods))

8              (1.2)
```

Tomo's anaphoric response at line 4 conveys that Hiro's informing was indeed news. Also, it returns the turn to Hiro by asking for a confirmation, providing Hiro with an opportunity to elaborate on his informing if he wants to. In this case, Hiro passes the opportunity and provides a minimal confirmation. Tomo then makes an affiliative response (line 6), with which the sequence leads to closure (this case will be revisited in Section 4.4.2).

In contrast, an anaphoric response in Extract 3-27, earlier presented as Extract 3-18, is followed by elaboration. Barber tells Customer about another customer who was in the hospital until the previous day.

Extract 3-27 [BB: Cancer]

```
1 a->  Barb:   an:nojoo    ne:,
               as.expected P
               As (we) were suspecting,

2      Cust:   nn,
               ITJ
               Yeah,

3 a->  Barb:   nikagetsu  kan nyuuinshiteta.
               two.months for hospitalized.PST
               (He) was in the hospital for two months.
4 b->  Cust:   aa  soo  na no.
               ITJ that CP P
               Oh was he.

5 =>   Barb:   kinoo     taiin              shite kita bakkashi.
               yesterday left.the.hospital  do    came just
               (He) left the hospital just yesterday.

6      Cust:   hee:
```

```
7              (1.0)

8      Barb:   zettee     ore wa gan    ni nan    nai n da tte
               absolutely I   TP cancer to become not N CP QT
               A guy who was saying "I will never get a cancer"

9              itteta      hito   ga gan     ni (  )...
               saying.PST  person SP cancer  to
               "I will never get a cancer"...
```

When Barber's informing comes to possible completion at line 3, Customer produces an anaphoric response *aa soo na no*. 'Oh was he'. It should be observed that even though this response takes the form of confirmation request, Barber does not confirm it in the next turn (line 5). Instead, he elaborates on the informing, following which Customer provides a token of *hee* (line 6). A case like this shows that anaphoric responses do not literally request confirmations but function as newsmarks, providing an opportunity for elaboration.

Considered together with the fact that they are produced in the initial response slot, it can be concluded that anaphoric responses serve as newsmarks, providing informing speakers with an opportunity to elaborate, though at the lesser degree of encouragement than the surprise displays *honto(ni)* or *uso*.[34]

The two types of informing responses illustrated thus far − anaphoric responses and *honto(ni)*/*uso* − adopt an epistemic stance that is congruent with that of the informing in the initial response slot, receipting the informing as informative or newsworthy. In contrast, *hee* and *hmm*, to which the next section will turn, are oriented to sequence closure.

3.4.3 *Hee* and *hmm*

The last two sections focused on newsmarks *honto(ni)/uso* and anaphoric responses, which provide informing speakers an opportunity to elaborate on the informing, though at different degrees of encouragement. In contrast, interjections

[34] Other-initiations of repair (Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks 1977) are another format that is recurrently used to display surprise and provide an opportunity for informing elaboration. For instance, a repeat of an element of the informing turn with rising intonation or proffering an element that was not articulated but is clearly available from the context serves as a display of surprise and often solicits elaboration (Hayashi and Hayano 2013).

hee and *hmm* take an active step toward closure. These two interjections occupy the same position and serve very similar roles in informing sequences.

The interjection *hee* is said to display the speaker's appreciation of the preceding talk as informative or newsworthy (Hayashi 2001:326; Mori 2006). Indeed, *hee* is often produced as a 'sequence closing third' (Schegloff 2007) in a question-answer sequence (Hayashi 2001). Below is an example.

Extract 3-28 [BB: Karaoke]

```
1      Cust:   sore mo:  nanka- karaoke na no?,
               that also like   karaoke CP FP
               Is that a karaoke (bar) as well?

2              (0.2)

3      Barb:   Karaoke da yo?,
               karaoke CP FP
               (It's) a karaoke (bar) yo?,

4 ->   Cust:   hee::

5              (3.0)
```

Customer asks Barber a polar question regarding a bar in their neighborhood. When an affirmative answer is provided (line 3), Customer produces *hee*, with which the sequence closes (line 4).

Another interjection *hmm* is often used in the same sequential environment. According to Aoki (2008: 255), *hmm* conveys that its "producers have just received a piece of information that is new to them and that they have not yet analyzed it for evaluation". Extract 3-29 is an example. Kei brought smoked meat as a souvenir from her recent trip. Looking at the meat, Yoko asks if it is pork meat.

Extract 3-29 [IL2: pork]

```
1      Yoko:   kore buta da yone:,
               this pig  CP FP
               This is pork, right?

2      Kei:    buta desu.
               pig  CP
               (This is) pork.

3 ->   Yoko:   hmm
```

```
4               (2.0)
```

Following Kei's confirming answer, Yoko produces a token of *hmm*, with which the sequence closes.

Heritage (1984a) demonstrates that the turn following an answer to a question is where it is relevant for the questioners to convey that they have now been provided with the requested information and thus have undergone a "change-of-state", which is commonly conveyed through *oh* in English. The recurrent use of *hee* and *hmm* in this position suggests that they are used to convey that the preceding turn has provided its producers with information that they previously did not have. Thus, it is not surprising that *hee* and *hmm* are very often produced as responses to informings as well: they adopt an epistemic stance that is congruent with informings.

Hee and *hmm* can be produced as continuers during an informing or as an initial response after the completion of the informing (see Mori [2006] on *hee* and Aoki [2008] on *hmm*). However, in the corpus used for this chapter, their occurrence in these positions is rare. Most commonly, they occur as subsequent responses after newsmarks.

Extract 3-30 is an example of *hee* as a subsequent response to an informing. Hiro is looking for a new apartment. He tells Taka about an apartment that he went to look at, and says that one of his concerns about this apartment is a shortage of parking spaces. After an initial response, Hiro expands the informing by supplying another piece of information that shows that there is indeed a shortage of parking spaces for the residents: that he saw on the bulletin board of the apartment many flyers asking for parking spaces (lines 1/3-4).

Extract 3-30 [CallFriend4261: parking]

```
1       Hiro:   nanka::: i-ppai kookoku ga atte sa:, [s-
                like     many   ad      SP be   IP
                Uh:::m there are lo-ts of ads, and,

2       Taka:                                        [nn,
                                                      ITJ
                                                      Yeah,

3       Hiro:   paakingu supeesu sagashitemasu! tte kanji de sa:,
                parking  space   looking.for    QT  like  CP IP
                (it's) like "Parking space wanted!"
```

```
4              [hoshii! toka de,
                want    etc. CP
               "(I) want (it)!," etc,

5 ->   Taka:    [hontoni::?
                 really
               Really::?

6      Hiro:    .hh ippai atta yo,
                      many  CP   FP
               .hh There were many yo,

7              (0.7)

8      Hiro:    yuzutte kure tte.
               give    AUX  QT
               Please give (it to me), (they said).

9 =>   Taka:    hee:_


10     Hiro:    nn.
               ITJ
               Yeah.
```

In response to Hiro's informing, Taka first produces a newsmark *hontoni::?* 'really::?' as an initial response (line 5). This is followed by Hiro's elaboration at line 6 and line 7. Taka then produces *hee* as a subsequent response, after which Taka provides a minimal confirmation (line 10).

Likewise, the sequential position in which *hmm* is typically found is following an initial, newsmark response. In Extract 3-31, Barber and Customer have been discussing that the average age of the population in their town is increasing. At lines 1-2, Barber makes a *yo*-marked informing about the transition in the main age group of his customers.

Extract 3-31 [BB: 60s]

```
1      Barb:    de: rokujuusan kara rokujuugo kurai no hito   ga
               and 63         from 65        about L  person SP
               A:nd those at the age of about 63 to 65

2              fuete    kite masu yo.
               increase come PL   FP
               are increasing yo.
```

```
3 ->   Cust:   aa  soo.
               ITJ that
               Oh are they.

4      Barb:   nn,
               ITJ
               Yeah,

5 =>   Cust:   hmm:::.

6              (1.2)

7      Cust:   hora ima are  annd  sa:, nenkin  no kankee  de ne:,
               see  now that CP(?) P    pension L  concern CP FP
               See, nowadays, because of the pension issue,
```

In response, Customer first produces an anaphoric response (line 3). Barber passes this opportunity to elaborate and provides a minimal confirmation at line 4. Customer then produces a token of *hmm* (line 5). Barber does not continue on the sequence after this, and Customer starts a new sequence on a related topic at line 7.

As is exemplified in Extract 3-30 and Extract 3-31, *hee* and *hmm* typically occur as a subsequent response to an informing following an initial newsmark (*honto(ni)/uso* or an anaphoric response in position (d)) that may or may not solicit elaboration. While *honto(ni)/uso* and anaphoric responses invite elaboration of an informing, *hee* and *hmm* are not encouraging of elaboration. In Extract 3-30 and Extract 3-31, the tokens of *hee* and *hmm* are followed by a minimal confirmation by the informing speaker or a silence, and it is the speaker of *hee* or *hmm* who takes the next turn. Although there are cases where these interjections are followed by the informing speakers' elaboration, it does not appear to be occasioned or encouraged by *hee* or *hmm*. This difference observed between the newsmarks *honto(ni)/uso* and anaphoric responses, on the one hand, and *hee* and *hmm* on the other, match their formal features. The newsmarks take the form of confirmation requests and thus keep the sequence open. On the other hand, *hee* and *hmm*, being responsive interjections, do not formally make a response relevant, and thus do not keep the sequence open. Thus, newsmarks are an aligning as well as epistemically congruent response form fitted to the initial response position, while interjections are more fitted to subsequent positions. By virtue of being used as subsequent responses after an initial opportunity of elaboration, and by virtue of taking the form that does not make a response relevant, *hee* and *hmm* take a step toward a sequence closure.

In rare cases in which *hee* or *hmm* occurs as an initial response, it displays low commitment to the topic introduced by the informing turn and thus is discouraging of elaboration. Extract 3-32 is an example. In the following exchange, Aya is visiting her daughter Kumi. Aya is considering buying a new cell phone that has a big font size and can be used for international calls. She tells Kumi what she learned about which telephone companies do or do not sell such a phone. In response to this informing, Kumi does not produce a newsmark. Instead, she produces a token of *hmm* at the initial response turn (line 10).

Extract 3-32 [MD: CellPhone]

```
1      Aya:    ji      ga ookikute kokusaidenwa ga
               letters SP big.and  international.call SP
               One (cell phone) with big letters and that can be
               used to make
2              dekiru no ga[:, ]
               can.do N SP
               international calls,

3      Kumi:              [°hn,°]

4      Aya:    XXXXXXXX    shika nai (no). mukashi no- (.) na(n)i-
               proper.name only  not  P    past    L       what
               Only X sells such a phone (no). The company that used
               to be- (.) what-

5              Y-[YYYYYY?,]
                  proper name
               Y- Y ((X's former name))?,

6      Kumi:     [YYYYYY]     ne?,
                  proper name FP
                 Y ne?,

7      Aya:    n[n,]
               Yeah,

8      Kumi:    [°n]n°
                 °Yeah,°

9              (0.2)

10 -> Kumi:    hmm::::
```

11 Aya: ZZZZZ ni ittara damena **no.**
proper name to went.then impossible P
(I) went to Z ((another company's name)) and it was impossible (to find such a phone) **no.**

12 (.)

13 Aya: nai **no.**
not P
(They) don't (have it) **no.**
14 Kumi: ((nod [nod nod nod))

15 Aya: [kokusai denwa de ji ga okkii no ga.]
international phone CP letter SP big N SP
An international telephone with a big font size.

16 Kumi: [[nod]]

17 (0.4)

18 Kumi: (datte) sono mukashi kara do-AAAA fon ga
because that before so Proper Name phone SP
Well since long time ago, phone A ((a major telephone model that the phone company X sells)) has been

19 nanka are da tta mon ne:, kokusai denwa- (0.4)
like that CP PST P FP international call
like, in terms of international phone ((services)) (0.4)

20 kappatsu da tta mon ne:,
active CP PST FP FP
(they) have been active ne:,

When Aya displays a trouble in recalling the company's former name (Y) (see Goodwin [1987]), Kumi supplies it though in overlap with Aya, who produces the name herself as well (lines 5 and 6). Aya acknowledges Kumi's contribution anyway at line 7, which is followed by Kumi's minimal acknowledgement token (line 8). Though this word-search sequence makes it less transparent, Aya's informing has reached possible completion. She has produced a complete sentential TCU (lines 1-2/4) and has added an alternative way to refer to the company. The gap at line 9 further suggests that Aya's turn has come to possible completion. Thus, the next turn is an initial response slot. However, instead of producing a newsmark, Kumi produces the interjection *hmm*. The production of *hmm* in this sequential

position gives an impression that Kumi is not appreciating the information that has just been provided, which fits what she does in the ensuing exchange.

Although the token of *hmm* does not sound encouraging of elaboration, Aya does so in the next turn: she adds that another company Z does not have the kind of phone that Aya wants (line 11). There is a short gap at line 12 and then Aya 're-completes' (Pomerantz 1984c) the turn by providing an alternative predicate (line 13). Kumi produces multiple nods at this point (line 14), but Aya does not treat them as an adequate response and further re-completes her informing by (unnecessarily) clarifying the topic of the preceding TCU − a phone that has a big font size. Kumi nods again (line 16), and after 0.4 seconds of silence, she says that a major model of cell phone (Phone A) that X (former Y) sells has long been active in providing international phone services. The implication is that it is not news to Kumi that X is the only company that sells the kind of phone that Aya is looking for. Therefore, throughout this exchange, Kumi does not acknowledge or appreciate the newsworthiness of Aya's informing. The production of *hmm* at the initial response slot seems to convey and foreshadow the lack of news appreciation. As is the case with this example, *hmm* (or *hee* alike) produced as an initial informing response is disaligning, discouraging elaboration, and usually not followed by affiliative comments.

Now, let us consider what function *hee* and *hmm* serve relative to evaluative comments. The second (or even later) response slot is where an evaluative comment is often produced. Then, should we consider *hee* and *hmm* as a complementary alternative to an evaluative comment? Mori (2006:1181) argues that *hee* as a subsequent response to an informing functions rather like an assessment toward the informing, expressing its producer's appreciation, surprise or disbelief toward the informing. Indeed, there are cases when an informing sequence closes with *hee* without a sequence closing assessment (e.g., Extract 3-30, Extract 3-31). However, in the majority of cases, *hee* and *hmm* are followed by the informing speakers' pursuit of a more substantive comment.

In Extract 3-33, Yoko has been telling Kazu that two weeks earlier her eye bled internally, making its white bright red. Yoko said she was shocked when she saw it in the mirror but then found out at the hospital that this was not a serious disease that she had to worry about. It has been an extended telling and Kazu has been producing continuers often loaded with gasps and surprise. The extract starts where Yoko is saying that she was told by a nurse at the hospital that she had had

the same experience. When this reported interaction comes to completion at line 3, Kazu produces a prolonged token of *hee* at line 4.

Extract 3-33 [IL: eye bleeding]

```
1       Yoko:   E   so:nna igaito       popyuraana no ne [tte=
                ITJ such   unexpectedly popular    FP FP  QT
                (I) said "Wow (it's) unexpectedly common,"

2       Kazu:                                              [h:m::

3       Yoko:   =ittara soo  yo tte i[tte.
                 said   that FP QP  said
                and (she) said "that's right,"
4 ->    Kazu                          [h e e [: : : [: :?,

5       Yoko:                                [hn.   [nn.
                                              ITJ    ITJ
                                             Yeah.  Yeah.

6               (0.2)

7       Yoko:   [dakedomo ne:,=
                 however  FP
                  Anyways,

8       Kazu:   [(nan-)
                  wha-
                 (Wha-)
9       Kazu:   =nn,
                 ITJ
                =Mm-hm,

10              (.)

11 ->   Yoko:   bukimi yo:.
                eerie  FP
                (It's) eerie.

12              (0.2)

13 =>   Kazu:   nn  chi   ga deru     to   <yada yo[ne:::>
                ITJ blood SP come.out then  bad  FP
                Yeah, (it's) awful when (∅) bleeds, isn't it?
```

The reported conversation that Yoko had with the nurse brings resolution to the whole experience; Yoko was shocked about the internal bleeding in her eye, and then was relieved to learn that it is a common non-serious condition. At this point, Kazu produces a token of *hee* (line 4), displaying appreciation of what has been

told (Mori 2006). While this token of *hee* is being stretched, Yoko produces two minimal acknowledgment tokens (line 5). These tokens indicate that Yoko does not have more to add to the story at this point and is passing on an opportunity to do more, thus returning the floor to Kazu and inviting her to say more. However, Kazu, too, seems to be suggesting that she has no further response to provide at this point; she stretches *hee* extensively despite two of Yoko's acknowledgement tokens and waits a further 0.2 seconds before she finally starts to say something in overlap with Yoko. What Yoko does after this struggle to solicit a response is to produce a summative assessment of the experience (line 7/11), which then solicits Kazu's second assessment (line 13).[35] That is, after waiting for Kazu to take a turn, Yoko produces an assessment, inviting Kazu to respond to the evaluative aspect of the story. Thus, in this case, Yoko treats *hee* as insufficient as a response and therefore pursues a different assessment response.

Aoki (2008:260) makes the same observation about *hmm*, concluding that it is "treated as a dispreferred response in the sequential position where a display of news-receipt alone is not adequate". Thus, though *hee* and *hnn* occur at the same, subsequent position as evaluative comments, they can be regarded as inadequate when an evaluative, affiliative comment is relevant. These interjections accept and appreciate the informativeness of the informing but do not take a valenced evaluative stance to affiliate or disaffiliate with the informing speaker's. As Jefferson (1993) states, an assessment as a response is an "engaged" response in that its producer exhibits a valenced evaluative position, which is not the case with *hee* or *hmm*.

3.4.4 Evaluative comments

Thus far, three types of informing response have been discussed − *honto* 'really'/*uso* 'no way', anaphoric responses and interjections *hee* and *hmm*. *Honto(ni)*, *uso* and anaphoric responses are epistemically congruent and aligning, while they do not take either affiliative or disaffiliative stance. *Hee* and *hmm* are epistemically congruent to the extent that they acknowledge the informativeness of the previous utterance, but they are not aligning when they are produced as an initial response, and are often treated at inadequately affiliative. Let us now turn to informing

[35] We will come back to this case as Extract 3-42. As we will see then, this assessment by Kazu turns out to be problematic to Yoko for another issue.

responses that attend to the informings' evaluative stances. While some informing sequences close with *hee* or *hmm*, more commonly, closure involves recipients' evaluative comments or assessments, many of which affiliate with the informing speakers' evaluative stance toward the reported matter. This section illustrates three types of evaluative comments found in the current Japanese corpus, each of which has different interactional significance and consequences to sequence development and closure: response cries (Goffman 1981), 'propositional comments' and 'parallel assessments' (Heritage 2011).

3.4.4.1 Response cries

Response cries are interjections designed to be heard as a producer's spontaneous state of mind that has been prompted by an immediate, here-and-now input (Goffman 1978, 1981). They are not full-fledged words and they are usually produced with marked prosody and/or prolongation. When they are produced as a response to informings, they are treated as a spontaneous reaction to the just prior utterance (i.e., the informing) and they do not index independent or previous epistemic access. With response cries, informing recipients can affiliate with informing speakers without treading into their experience (Heritage 2011). Below is an example that Heritage (2011) discusses. Pat's house burned down the previous night and she is recounting what happened.

Extract 3-34 [Heritage 2011 Houseburning: 122-151]

```
 1  Pat:     =cz ih wz j'st like en hou:r one weh- .hhhhhh Oh:: hh!
 2           We coulda been, if we were sleepi:ng, (0.2) we would
 3           not be here.=
 4  Pat:     =or one of us.would probly not be here becuz .hhhh w-
 5           our whole bedroom would'v caved in.the whole house is
 6           jist three feet of ashes. hh[hhhh
 7  Pen:  ->                              [Oh:: whho:[w
 8  Pat:                                           [It happened
 9           within minutes..hh Within a half hour the house wz
10           go:ne I guess,=
11  Pen:  -> =Ohhh go:(d),
12  Pat      So it's jist l[i:ke, we wouldn' we just would'na been
13  Pen:                   [.hhh
14           here. hh yihkno:w,
15  Pen:  -> [Ohhh ba:by.
16  Pat:     [There's no way ih wz ih wz jus:, we're jist lucky I
17            guess:,
18  Pen:     .hhhh Okay waidaminnit I don'know if yer cryi-in b't I
19           hhh(h)a[hhhm uh hu:h] .hhh=
20  Pat:            [(hhhh No.)
```

At possible completion points of Pat's telling, Penny produces response cries (line 7, line 11, line 15), with which she expresses an evaluative stance that is clearly in sympathy with Pat. Heritage points out that in this case as well as in others, response cries often lead to more substantive, propositional comments (lines 18-19).

Let us now examine an example in Japanese. In Extract 3-35 (earlier presented as Extract 3-14/19/20), Michi is telling Hatsue that she and her cousin went to a town where the cousin grew up, and found that his old friends still lived there. Hatsue first responds with a newsmark *a ho:ntoni::::,* 'Oh re:ally::::,' (line 3). After Michi's elaboration (lines 4-5), Hatsue produces another response, this time adopting an evaluative stance, designing it as a response cry (line 6).

Extract 3-35 [CallFriend 2167: old friends]

```
1      MIC:    shitara sa,tomodachi ga ^mada  sundeta
               then    IP friend    SP  still lived
               then, the friends ^still lived there

2              no:[::.
               P
               no.

3      HAT:       [ a ]=ho:n[t o ^n i  :  :  :  : , .h h]
                    ITJ really
                  Oh=^re:ally::::, .hh

4      MIC:                 [moo juugo nen   gurai ta]tte n
                             EMP 15    years about pass   N
                            (It) has been almost 15 years

5              da [kedo::]
               CP  but
               but,

6  ->  HAT:       [.hh ^ee]:: su^go::[i.]
                          ITJ   amazing
                    .hh ^ee:: a^mazi::ng.

7      MIC:                          [su]goi odoroi    chatte
                                      very   surprised AUX
                                    (Ø was/were) very surprised
```

```
8       MIC:    tomodachi no hoo  ga:(h) [h h h .hh ]
                friend    L  side SP
                (his) friends were(h) h h h .hh

9       HAT:                              [nn::::,]
```

Recall that Michi's informing at lines 1-2 presents the information as newsworthy with the particle *no* as well as with the high pitch on the word *mada* 'still' and Hatsue's newsmark at line 3 acknowledges the newsworthiness by producing a newsmark with marked prosody and stretch. Thus, they agree that the reported event is remarkable. Michi's elaboration (lines 4-5) stresses the remarkableness of the event by emphasizing that a long time (15 years) had passed since the cousin had moved out of the town. Hatsue then produces an evaluative comment that is designed as "a natural overflowing" of her "presumed inward state" (Goffman 1981:89). She first produces an interjection *ee*, which indexes 'departure from expectation' (Hayashi 2009), emphasized via heightened pitch and prolongation. The interjection is followed by *su^go::i* Although *sugoi* is a lexical item that can roughly be translated as 'amazing', being produced by itself with prosodic emphasis and prolongation, the token sounds more akin to 'wow' in English than a propositional comment 'that's amazing'. With this turn, Hatsue displays spontaneous surprise in response to and in affiliation with Hatsue's informing.

Michi further elaborates the telling after Hatsue's evaluative comment. This is a common feature of response cries as a response to informings. That is, although they are produced after elaboration and affiliate with the informing speaker, they are often followed by further elaboration instead of sequence closure. This is compatible with Heritage's (2011) remark that response cries often lead to more substantive, propositional comments. Indeed, as we will see in Section 4.4.3, Hatsue produces a more substantive comment later in this exchange. In summary, although response cries are produced in a subsequent response slot and convey affiliation with the informing speaker, they may not be affiliative enough with which to close the sequence.

3.4.4.2 Propositional comments

In contrast to response cries, evaluative comments that take the form of a full-fledged propositional comment tend to lead the sequence to closure. Such evaluative comments will be called 'propositional comments'. For instance, in Extract 3-36 (earlier presented as Extract 3-6/26), Tomo's affiliative comment is in the form of a full sentential TCU, and it leads the sequence to closure.

Extract 3-36 [DWT: Germany]

```
1       Hiro:   =wain no tsu-ano: [gura]su wain no tsugi ga=
                 wine L  pou well  glass   wine L  pour  SP
                =(They) pour wine- uh:m, for a glass of wine,

2       Tomo:                     [nn,]
                                   ITJ
                                  Mm hm,

3       Hiro:   =ooku naru   n [(da  )]
                 much become N   CP
                =(they) pour more.

4       Tomo:                  [ a a  ] soo,
                                ITJ     that
                                 Oh do they,

5       Hiro:   n[n,]
                ITJ
                Yeah,
                           [((Tomo looks away from Hiro))
6 ->    Tomo:     [so]re wa [ii   ne:,
                   that  TP  nice FP
                   That's nice ne:,

7       Hiro:   ((nods))

8               (1.2)

9       Hiro:   nn.

10              (0.4)

11      Hiro:   hn:toni moo=
                really  EMP
                (It's) re:ally=

                          [((extends arm toward Kazu to show caviar))
12      Tomo:   =nn, (.) [demo kore ^chotto koofuni
                 ITJ     but  this a.little like.this
                =Yeah, (.) but this, if (I) make (it) fancy like this
                ((=caviar on bread))

13              oshareni shite ta:beru kara tabe reru.
                fancy    make  eat     so   eat  can
                (it) tastes okay.
```

Tomo's comment at line 6 is in the form of a full sentence: it has the topic *sore* 'that' marked with the topic marker *wa*, and the predicate adjective *ii* 'nice' is

followed by a final particle *ne*. The epistemic basis of this assessment is Hiro's informing that precedes it (Pomerantz 1984a): Tomo evaluates the occasion that has just been made accessible via Hiro's report. In the middle of this turn, Tomo, who has been gazing at Hiro, withdraws her gaze to look at caviar on a piece of bread that she is eating. The informing speaker Hiro provides two tokens of minimal acknowledgement after Tomo's affiliative comment, projecting nothing further to add on the issue. Although he appears to be starting to add on the topic at line 11, Tomo declines to engage with the topic by launching another sequence about caviar (lines 12-13). Thus, at least Tomo treats her propositional comment as sufficient to leave the sequence.

Interestingly, in the present Japanese corpus, the majority of propositional comments in response to informings are marked with the final particle *ne*, as is the case in Extract 3-36. Extract 3-37 is another example. Rumi has told Miki that she has been troubled by harassing calls: someone repeatedly calls her in the middle of the night and hangs up right after she answers the phone. Miki has produced a news receipt (*hmm:::*) and a belated newsmark but has not made any affiliative or sympathetic comment. Miki then starts her story, saying that she also had the same experience. When Miki explains that she had harassing calls every time around the same time of day, Rumi says that she receives calls early in the morning (lines 6). This bit of information is receipted as newsworthy and develops into an informing sequence on its own.

Extract 3-37 [CallFriend6666: NuisanceCalls2][36]

```
1      Miki:  a^tashi mo   ne:, ichiji  sooiu koto  ga atta n da yo.
              I       also P    one.time such thing SP was  N CP FP
              ^I, too, once had such things yo.

2      Rumi:  soo  na n da:.
              that CP N CP
              Did you.

3      Miki:  nanka ne::, #ano::::::::# (.) nn.<nanka
              like  P      well             ITJ like
              (It's) like, #uh:::::::m# (.) yeah.<Like

4             jikantai  mo   onnaji yoona
              time.zone also same   AUX
              the time (the telephone rings) is about
```

[36] Gaps between turns are prevalent in this conversation, and interactional significance cannot be attributed to all of them. This is especially so in the exchange in 3-37.

5 Miki: kanji na no [ne.
like CP P FP
the same no ne.

6 -> Rumi: [soo, a:sagata na **no:.**
right early.morning CP P
Right, (it's) early in the mo:rning **no.**

7 Miki: ^^asagata:?
early.morning
Early in the ^^mo:rning?

8 Rumi: u:n. asa no ne:, n:i: ji toka san ji
ITJ morning L P two o'clock or three o'clock
Yea:h. (It's) like two o'clock or three o'clock

9 toka u- yo ji toka go ji toka roku
or four o'clock or five o'clock or six
or four o'clock or five o'clock or six o'clock in the morning,

10 ji toka sooyu jikantai na **no.**
o'clock or such time.zone CP P
that kind of hours **no.**

11 => Miki: .h sora::::(h)
that.is
.h Tha::::(h)t's

12 (0.5)

13 => Miki: cho:tto:,
a.little
a li:ttle,

14 (0.5)

15 => Miki: sugoi meewa(h)ku(h) da **ne:.**
very annoying CP FP
very anno(h)yi(h)ng **ne:.**

16 (0.3)

17 Rumi: nn.
ITJ
Yeah.

18 (1.2)

```
19     Rumi:   meewaku.
               annoying
               (It's) annoying.

20             (0.5)

21     Miki:   hmm:::

22             (1.5)

23     Miki:   watashi no baai wa sa:, yuugata datta  no ne:?
               I       L  case TP P    evening CP.PST P  FP
               In my case, (it) was in the evening.
```

Here, Miki produces a newsmark in the form of a repair initiation: she displays surprise through a partial repeat with heightened pitch (line 7), after which Rumi elaborates on the issue (lines 8-10). Miki then makes an evaluative comment, that it is very annoying (lines 11/13/15). This comment is again marked with *ne*. Although this propositional comment is followed by Rumi's confirmation (lines 17, 19) and a token of *hmm* (line 18), the topic is not further elaborated. At line 20, Miki returns to her experience without producing more affiliative comments.

In Chapter 2 as well as earlier in this chapter, it was shown that when *ne* is used reciprocally in assessment sequences, interactants establish that they share equivalent access to the referent. Since informing recipients have just acquired epistemic access to the reported event through the informing, it is not plausible for them to claim equivalent access to the informing speaker's experience. However, by the time recipients of informings have reached this point of an informing sequence, after having been informed, produced a newsmark (and change-of-state interjection *hee* or *hmm*, too, in some cases), they are informed enough to form an evaluative comment about the issue. This warrants Miki's use of *ne* at line 15. After all, in order to show affiliation and sympathy, one has to have a good understanding about the other's experience and must reach the affiliative comment spontaneously. Thus, in this environment, the action of making an affiliative response and the use of *ne* are compatible with each other.

However, since propositional comments are recipients' comments on what they have just heard about, they do not refer to or invoke their *own* experience. The exchange stays in the informing speakers' "territory of experience" (Heritage 2011), where the informed participants stays in the position of an audience. Alternatively, they can also affiliate by partially exiting the informing speaker's territory and entering into their own. Interestingly, this type of evaluative comment − parallel

assessments − is marked with another particle of shared access, *yone*. The next section will discuss the epistemic stance that parallel assessments index and its consequence to the structure of informing sequences.

3.4.4.3 Parallel Assessments

'Parallel assessments' are based on an informing recipient's own experience that is similar to an event or object that has been reported (Heritage 2011: 168-169). Extract 3-38 is an example. Dianne is describing an asparagus pie that Jeff made, saying "it was s:::so: goo:d."

Extract 3-38 [Heritage 2011, originally discussed in Goodwin & Goodwin 1987:24]

```
1  Dia:     Jeff made en asparagus pie
2  Dia:     it was  s:::so[: goo:d.
3  Cla:  ->              [I love it. °Yeah I love [tha:t.
4  Dia:                                           [<He pu:t uhm,
```

Though she did not taste this particular asparagus pie, Clacia affiliates with this by proffering an evaluation of a generic asparagus pie, which she has experienced. Goodwin and Goodwin (1987) point out that the present tense is used as a means to change the referent from the specific asparagus pie to a generic asparagus pie, the closest she can get to what was eaten.

Although there are only five cases of parallel assessments found in this Japanese corpus, they are all marked with the final particle *yone*. Let us look at two such cases. Extract 3-39 is a continuation from Extract 3-35. Michi is telling Hatsue that she and her cousin found the cousin's old friends still living in the same town. Hatsue produces a response cry (lines 2-3) in affiliation, but the sequence expands further. Michi adds that the cousin's friends were surprised to see him (lines 2-5) and then suggests that that may happen to Hatsue's child Hiro in the future. Hatsue and her family live in a town in the U.S. for her husband's job but are moving back to Japan in a few years. Michi is suggesting that Hatsue's child might have a reunion with his playmates when he returns to visit the town they

now live in. After agreeing with this suggestion, Hatsue makes a comment: *omoshiroi **yone**:, sooiu no ne:*. 'It's interesting ***yone***, such things.'[37]

Extract 3-39 [CallFriend 2167: old friends_continued]

```
1     MIC:   moo juugo nen  gurai ta]tte n da [kedo::]
             EMP 15    year about pass   P CP  but
             (It's) been about 15 years, but

2     HAT:                                    [.hh ^ee]::=
                                                   ITJ
                                              .hh ^ee::=
3             =su^go::[i.]
               amazing
              =a^mazi:::ng.

4     MIC:           [(so]ide) odoroichatte
                       and     be.surprised
                     And ∅ was/were surprised,

5             tomodachi no hoo  ga:(h) [h h h .hh ]
              friend    L  side SP
              The friend was,

6     HAT:                             [nn : : : ,]
                                        ITJ
                                       Yeah:::,
7     MIC:  .hh dakara- ssa:::, .hh nanka hiro kun toka mo   sa::,
                 so      IP          like  Hiro END etc. also IP
              .hh so Hiro as well,

8             isshoni- ne:, asondeta ko  na[nka toka sa]:,=
              together P    played   kid like   etc. IP
              with (his) playmates,=

9     HAT:                                [|n: ehh hh]

10    MIC:    =na:n ne(h)n go    ka(h) ni(h)hh hehhe
               some year   later or    in
              =in so(h):me yea(h)rs, hh
```

[37] The particle *ne* attached to the right-dislocated noun phrase (*sooiu no* 'such things') is not a final particle but is an interjection particle. As was mentioned in Chapter 2, *ne* in the non-final position should not be treated as an epistemic stance marker.

```
11     MIC:    [hhe .hhe]

12     HAT:    [.hh soo] [ne::::] [u::::n hh]
                     that  FP       ITJ
                .hh That's true ne:::: yea::::h hh

13     MIC:             [atte:::][::.hh shashin o] motte[tte]:,=
                         see             photo   O  bring
                          see (the playmates), .hh bringing photos
                             (with them),

14     HAT:                                                [.hh]

15     HAT:    =hhh [hh]

16     MIC:         [nanka](h) de(h)kiru n jana[::i?, na(h)hh]
                     like       can.do    N TAG
                    Maybe (he) will be able to do that, won't he? hh

17     HAT:                                    [.hh  soo  ne ]::_
                                                     that FP
                                                .hh That's true ne::

18     MIC:    .hh [soo  yo:::.]
                     that FP
                .hh It is yo:::.

19 ->  HAT:        [omoshiroi   yone:,] sooiu no ne[:.]
                    interesting FP      such  N  IP
                    (It's) interesting yone, such things.

20 =>  MIC:                                          [u:]n=
                                                     Yea:h=
21 =>  MIC:    =odoroicha[tta]::[:.]
                surprised.PST
               =(I) was surprised.

22     HAT:             [.hh]  [he]e:[:::?,]

23     MIC:                           [>nanka-<] (0.3) yappa
                                        like           after.all
                                       >Like< (0.3) after all,

               ^nijuuni san sai:- da kara:-
                22      3   years CP so
               because (they are) ^22 or 23,

24     HAT:    nn::,=

25     MIC:    =moo     minna:   dokka     chigau    tokoro ni
                already everyone somewhere different place  to
               =(we) thought everyone would have gone to
```

```
26     MIC:    itte [ne, seekatsu shiteru] kana:: [to omotta
               go    IP  life     do       FP      QT thought
               somewhere else to live

27             n da ke]do:,
               N CP but
               but
```

Hatsue's evaluative comment at line 19 is produced in the environment where Michi has suggested that Hatsue's son will someday have the same experience as the one that Michi's cousin has experienced. In other words, she has moved away from the particular event to a generic type of event that could happen to others. Hatsue agrees with this idea in the form of 'anaphoric agreements' (line 12), which do not to claim epistemic independence (Hayano 2007b). But at line 19, she makes an evaluative comment on this issue; she vaguely and generally sets the referent as *sooiu no* 'such things'. Thus, by generalizing the scope of referent from the specific event that happened to Michie's cousin to "such things" as meeting one's old friends after a long time, Hatsue can draw parallelism between what Michi has reported and what is commonly experienced and therefore claim epistemic independence. As is the case here, these evaluative comments - parallel assessments - are marked with the particle *yone*.

It is interesting that at line 21, Michi, following Hatsue's parallel assessment, re-specifies the referent to the particular experience that she and her cousin had, even though it is she who suggested possible relevance of the experience to Hatsue: she says she was surprised, using the past tense. As Goodwin and Goodwin (1987) point out in regards to the example presented earlier (Extract 3-38), the past tense is a resource to specify the referent to a particular referent, whereas the present tense is used to broadly refer to a referent as a generic class. This specification of the referent by Michi may be seen as subtle resistance of Hatsue's parallel assessment. Indeed, following this turn, the focus of the exchange returns to Michi's territory of experience: Hatsue produces a news receipt *hee* (line 22) and Michi resumes talking about her particular experience.

A possible conflict that a parallel assessment may lead to is more clearly observable in the next case. In Extract 3-40 which was partially discussed as Extract 3-33, Yoko has been telling Kazu about some internal eye bleeding that made the white of her eye bright red. As was demonstrated earlier, in pursuit of an evaluative comment, Yoko explicitly states her evaluative stance toward the event

at lines 7/11 − that it is eerie. Kazu's response to this is a *yone*-marked evaluation (lines 13-14).

Extract 3-40 [IL: eye bleeding]

```
1       Yoko:   E   so:nna igaito       popyuraana no ne [tte=
                ITJ such   unexpectedly popular    FP FP  QT
                (I) said "Wow (it's) unexpectedly common,"

2       Kazu:                                             [hmm::

3       Yoko:   =ittara soo  yo tte i[tte.
                 said   that FP QP  said
                and (she) said "that's right,"

4       Kazu                         [h e e [: : : [: :?,

5       Yoko:                                [hn.   [nn.
                                             ITJ    ITJ
                                             Yeah.  Yeah.

6               (0.2)

7       Yoko:   [dakedomo ne:,=
                 however  FP
                 Anyways,

8       Kazu:   [(nan-)
                  wha-
                 (Wha-)

9       Kazu:   =nn,
                 ITJ
                =Mm-hm,

10              (.)

11 ->   Yoko:   bukimi yo:.
                eerie  FP
                (it's) eerie yo.

12              (0.2)
```

13 => Kazu: nn chi ga deru to
ITJ blood SP come.out then
Yeah, when (∅) bleeds,

14 => <yada **yo**[**ne**:::>
bad FP
(it's) awful **yone***:::.*

15 Yoko: [nn sorede ne?,
ITJ then P
Yeah, and then,

16 Kazu: chi kowa[i: n nn, nn,
blood scary ITJ ITJ
Blood is scary:, yeah yeah.

17 Yoko: [ko kkara sa ko koo
here from P th- this
From here, like th-this,

18 shitara ano: ^pyu:: tto chi ga de soona
do.then uhm MIM QT blood SP come.out seem
(It) feels as though blood would spurt out

19 kibun ni naru wake °**yo**°.
feeling to become N FP
if (I) do like this ((gesturing rubbing the eye) **yo***.*

20 (0.4)

21 -> Kazu: gh::[:::
((gasping))

22 Yoko: [de dakara so- zenzen sore wa nai no.
then so th- at.all that TP not P
Then so, (it's) not like that at all.

23 (1.0)

24 Kazu: naishukketsu na w[ake.
internal.bleeding CP N
(It's) internal bleeding.

25 Yoko: [naishukketsu (°na wake°).
internal.bleeding CP N
(It's) internal bleeding.

26 (0.2)

27 Kazu: hee::::

28 (0.2)

```
29    Kazu:   maa  me  wa-no kono hen  wa maku wa toomeeda    kara
              well eye TP L  this area TP film TP transparent so

30            so[o naru   no ka ne:,
              that become N  QP FP
              Well that happens since because eyes, around this
              area of eyes, the film is transparent (I suppose)?
31    Yoko:     [nn, nn,
                 ITJ ITJ
                 Yeah, yeah.

32            (0.8)

33    Kazu:   kowa:::_
              scary
              Scary:::_

34            (0.3)

35    Yoko:   sorede ne:,
              then   P
              And then,
```

Kazu' evaluative comment at lines 13-14 is not simply responsive to Yoko's telling about internal eye bleeding. Instead, in this turn, she broadens the scope of the issue from internal eye bleeding to bleeding in general, which she herself has experienced. In fact, when Yoko's extended story finally comes to completion later in this conversation, Kazu tells a 'second story' (Sacks 1992) about how scared she was when she coughed up some blood. Thus, it can be reasonably assumed that Kazu's turn at lines 13 and 14 is based on her own bleeding experience and is produced as a pivotal utterance (Jefferson 1984) to exit Yoko's telling and launch her story.

However, this generalization undermines the unique and striking qualities of Yoko's experience: not all of bleeding makes the white of the eye bright red. She does not accept the generalization proposed by Kazu. At line 15, Yoko interrupts Kazu with an additional description of how red her eye was, saying that it felt as though blood would spurt out if she touched her eye (lines 15, 17-19). This vivid, almost gory, description is not what really happened but is what she imagined (or claims she imagined) could have happened, and is quickly taken back as impossible (line 22). Nonetheless, this additional description has an interactional import; it presents her experience as more dramatic and different from a bleeding experience in general. Kazu, this time, displays affiliation with Yoko without claiming epistemic independence through a token of *hee* (line 27), response cry

(lines 21) and a lexical but spontaneous exclamatory response that seems to function similarly to a response cry (line 33). In this way, Yoko rejects Kazu's parallel assessment and then proceeds to tell another sequel to her bleeding experience.

The use of *yone* in parallel assessments is contrastive with the common use of *ne* in propositional comments and absence of *ne* in parallel assessments. As was noted in Section 3.4.4.2, the epistemic source of propositional comments is the preceding informing itself. On the other hand, parallel assessments draw on recipients' own first-hand experiences and thus their assessments were putatively formed prior to the ongoing interaction. This difference in the distributions of *ne*-marked evaluations and *yone*-marked evaluations in informing sequences is compatible with what was argued about their use in assessment sequences. In Chapter 2, it was argued that when a *ne*-marked assessment is followed by a *yone*-marked assessment, or vice versa, the speaker who uses *yone* has stronger epistemic basis than the one who uses *ne*. This section has shown that *ne* is used in evaluative comments when the epistemic access has just been obtained via informings, while *yone* is used when the comment is based on the recipient's independent experience. Thus, while *yone* and *ne* can be used reciprocally to establish equal epistemic access, *yone* marks a stronger, older or more independent stance than *ne* does.

3.4.5 Summary

This section has examined the placement and function of four types of informing responses that are commonly used in Japanese interaction: newsmark *honto(ni)* 'really' or *uso* 'no kidding/ no way', anaphoric responses, interjections *hee* and *hmm*, and evaluative comments. These response forms were shown to have particular interactional functions. They differ from one another in the stance they adopt with regard to alignment, epistemic congruence and affiliation. *Honto(ni)/uso* and anaphoric responses are oriented to elaboration at different degrees of encouragement, while the interjections and evaluative comments are oriented to sequence closure. While *honto(ni)*/*uso* and anaphoric responses adopt epistemic stances that are congruent with informings, they do not display affiliation with the evaluative stance that informing speakers have conveyed. *Hee* and *hmm* acknowledge the informativeness of informings but are often treated as

inadequately affiliative, and when they are used in the initial response slot, they do not appreciate the newsworthiness of the informing as much as newsmarks do. It was also shown that different forms of evaluative comments index or claim different kinds of epistemic bases, having varying consequences for the development of the sequence: response cries do not claim independent epistemic access and are usually followed by more substantive comments; propositional comments are based on the information that has just been provided and stay in the informing speaker's epistemic and experiential territory but claim equivalent access with *ne*; *yone*-marked parallel assessments are based on independent first-hand access and may be produced as a way into the recipient's own story. Table 3-3 summarizes the findings.

Table 3-3: Types of responses to informings and stances they adopt

	Response	Receipt of the informing as newsworthy	Affiliation	Claim of independent access
Initial response	*honto/ uso*	+	−	−
	anaphoric	+	−	−
	hee/ hmm	Δ	−	−
Subsequent response	*hee/ hmm*	Δ	−	−
	response cries	+	+	−
	propositional comments	−	+	−
	parallel assessment	−	+	+

\+ ... adopts the stance
− ... does not adopt the stance
Δ ... adopts the stance but to an extent that may be treated as inadequate

3.5 Discussion and Conclusion

In his recent paper, Heritage (2012b) proposes the idea of an 'epistemic engine'. He states that the imbalance or asymmetry in information between participants warrants and drives a sequence of interaction, and the sequence closes when the imbalance is equalized. There are two ways in which the information

imbalance is proposed to launch a sequence: (i) posing a question, suggesting that the initiating party lacks information and the recipient has it, and (ii) producing an informing, suggesting that the initiating party has information while the recipient does not. Heritage suggests that the provision of an assessment is an indication that the uninformed party is now informed enough to make assessments about the issue, and thus marks sequence closure. From this standpoint, informing sequences can be seen as an interactional process through which an information gap is posed and then filled.

The orderly configurations of different informing responses in Japanese examined in this chapter provide empirical support for Heritage's theory. Let us review. In 3-41, "K+" indicates that the speaker has the piece of knowledge in question and "K-" indicates the speaker lacks it.

3-41

```
1 a->  A: Informing (K+)
2 b->  B: Newsmark [honto(ni)?/uso, anaphoric responses] (K-)
3 c->  A: Minimal confirmation / elaboration (K+)
4 d->  B: evaluative comments (K+, at varying degrees)
```

Informing speakers present a piece of information as news to a recipient, thereby posing an information gap (arrow a). In the initial response slot (arrow b), informing recipients display surprise, suggesting that they are indeed in the K- state, formally making a confirmation relevant. At this point, a steep 'epistemic gradient' (Heritage 2008, 2010) is posed between them, further fueling the interactional engine.[38] In the next turn (arrow c), informing speakers either elaborate on the informing or provide a confirmation token. It is then that recipients indicate that they are now informed with an interjection *hee* or *hmm* or evaluative comments (arrow d). Even at this point (arrow d), however, informing recipients display varying degrees of informedness. *Hee* and *hmm* show that they are informed but "have not yet analyzed it for evaluation" (Aoki 2008: 255). Response cries are designed as a spontaneous reaction to the just preceding information. With *ne-*

[38] It may be further suggested that the bigger the information gap is posed to be, the more it fuels a sequence, thus making a sequence long and expanded. Newsmarks *honto(ni)* or *uso* indicate that its producers were not aware of the information at all, and thus present themselves to be in the completely uninformed position. On the other hand, *hee* or *hmm* does not treat the information as unexpected or newsworthy to the same degree. This may be why *hee* and *hmm* are rarely produced at the initial response slot and when they are, they sound disaligning and unengaging.

marked propositional assessments, recipients claim to have obtained equivalent access. *Yone*-marked parallel assessments are produced to index epistemic access they have had independently. In this way, the recurrent four-part structure of informing sequences equipped with these linguistic resources allows participants to deal with the three interactional tasks − achieving alignment, epistemic congruence and affiliation - altogether. The findings of this chapter provide an example of a streamlined organization in mundane interaction.

Another issue that the findings address is the conflicting orientations to involvement and attachment. Heritage and Raymond (2005) state that the practice of claiming epistemic authority while agreeing with an interlocutor on the basic evaluation is a manifestation of the dilemma between involvement and detachment. One is oriented to being of the same mind with others and at the same time to being different from others. This same dilemma pervades informing sequences as well: informing speakers produce informings to share their information or experience and their evaluative stance toward it, but at the same time, they are defensive of its uniqueness or territory. Whether interactants can find the balance between these two orientations on which they can both settle, and at what balance, may be consequential to, as well as reflexive of, their social relationship with one another.

Chapter 4

When 'Yes' is Not Enough: Repetitional Answers and Interjection Answers to Polar Questions

4.1 Introduction

In the previous two chapters, I explored interactants' orientations to relative epistemic statuses in two different environments: assessment sequences, when the assessed object is accessible to both parties, and informing sequences, when the first speaker has or claims exclusive epistemic access. We saw in both environments that who knows what and to what extent can be subject to interactional negotiation. Various linguistic resources are employed to claim certain epistemic stances as well as to give support to the claim, and sequences tend to be expanded for interactants to achieve congruent views regarding how knowledge is distributed among them. It followed from the analyses that interactants are oriented to achieving congruent epistemic views, in addition to achieving affiliative evaluative stances they hold toward the object in question. In this chapter, I turn to yet another interactional environment, namely, sequences of polar questions and confirming answers.

When speakers ask a polar question to request information, they claim a lack of sufficient information regarding the issue, and at the same time, index their expectation that the recipients have the relevant information (Heritage 1984a, 1984b). If question recipients (i.e., answerers) provide the requested information in the next turn, then epistemic congruence is established: they establish that the answerers had the information that the questioners expected them to have. On the other hand, if it transpires that there is epistemic incongruence between interlocutors, and the questioners were wrong to assume that the recipients have the information, they may receive such ‘non-answer responses’ as "I don't know". In that case, a sequence that was launched as a question-answer sequence turns into a

sequence of a question followed by a non-answer response, where the answer is "officially absent" (Schegloff 1968:1083), and the "I don't know" response is provided to account for the absence (Heritage 1984b). Thus, basic epistemic congruence is a prerequisite for the very production of polar questions and the relevant answer responses.

However, the production of polar questions and answers involves far more than the simple transfer of information. Most languages that we know of have more than one way to ask polar questions. Different forms of questions adopt different epistemic stances and provide different interactional contingencies, preferring different kinds of answers. Similarly, answers can be done in a variety of forms, each of which has different interactional functions and consequences. In this chapter, I explore interactants' orientations to epistemic stances at a finer level of granularity than the basic epistemic asymmetry that defines the action of questioning and answering. I focus on two alternative forms of confirmation in Japanese, namely, interjection answers and repetitional answers. Interjection answers are answers that convey confirmation or disconfirmation through dedicated response tokens, *nn/un, hai* or *ee* 'yeah/yes', whereas repetitional answers are those that confirm or disconfirm a question by partially or fully repeating the question (e.g., *Mita yo,* '(I) saw (it),' as a response to a question *Mita?* 'Did (you) see (it)?'). These alternative forms of answers are shown to convey different degrees of commitment and assertiveness to the answer and that the different forms are used depending on the level of the questioners' (un)certainty as conveyed through the design of questions. It is then argued that through such coordination of epistemic stances, interactants align their attitudes regarding what they consider to be expected, unexpected, surprising or unsurprising while at the same time evening out the knowledge gap between them. It is this aspect of epistemic congruence that this chapter addresses.

This chapter investigates sequences of polar questions and confirming answers in Japanese interaction. Disconfirming answers, though they figure in our discussion, are not the focus of the analyses. Polar questions that serve as a vehicle for another action (e.g., suggesting, offering, asking for permission, other-initiation of repair (Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks 1977) are included in the collection as long as they make relevant the provision of confirmation at least as a part of a possible response. Polar questions that are asked as a newsmark (Jefferson 1981) or news receipt are not included in the collection, since they do not necessarily solicit confirmations (See Chapter 3, Section 3.4 for discussions on the course of

interaction that newsmarks and newsreceipts launch). Following these criteria, 70 cases of interjection answers and 70 cases of repetitional answers were collected.

As is pointed out by Levinson (1983:242-243), such terms as 'interrogative,' 'question' and 'request for information' are used differently and somewhat confusingly across studies and across disciplines. In the linguistic and pragmatic literature, 'interrogative' tends to be used to refer to a sentence type indexed by lexical and/or morphosyntactic resources, while 'question' is sometimes used to refer to the form of an utterance but also to the speech act performed by the utterance (Searle 1969; Schegloff 1984). 'Request for information' has been kept more strictly for the social action that an utterance implements whether it is interrogative or declarative (e.g., Stivers, Enfield and Levinson 2010). In this chapter, I use these three terms as follows. By 'interrogative', I mean an utterance with morphosyntactic or prosodic resources that are conventionally understood to mark an utterance as a question, regardless of the actual social action that is implemented by a particular utterance. I use the term 'question' to refer to the social action implemented by an utterance that makes a confirmation or disconfirmation relevant as a response, whether the utterance is in the interrogative form or not. Thus, an utterance in the declarative syntactic form (e.g., "So you're not gonna come to the campus today.") can be a question, and an utterance in an interrogative syntactic form may not be a question (e.g., "How could you do this to me?"). In addition, a question may be in the service of implementing another action. For instance, an utterance "So are you busy tonight?" is a question, making a confirmation or disconfirmation relevant as a response, but it may not be simply requesting for information but is serving as a 'pre-invitation' (Terasaki 2004[1976]; Schegloff 2007). I reserve the term 'request for information' for when it is relevant to discriminate a question that is devoted to soliciting information from a question that implements another social action.

The organization of this chapter is as follows. In Section 4.2, I briefly discuss two distinct features of Japanese polar question-answer sequences: the position in which markers of question appear and the system of answering positive and negative questions. In 4.3, I illustrate basic linguistic resources that are used to formulate polar questions in Japanese and discuss different epistemic stances marked with them, paying particular attention to a particle *no*, which I argue is consequential to the form of answers. Section 4.4 reviews previous studies and discusses three aspects of preference organization that operate in question-answer sequences. In Section 4.5, I illustrate Japanese interjection answers and repetitional

answers. In Section 4.6, I demonstrate that interjection answers convey acquiescent, elicited confirmation while repetitional answers convey committed assurance of the proposition. Section 4.7 discusses the interrelationship between the epistemic stance of questioners and the form of answers. It is demonstrated that repetitional answers are used not to resist the terms of questions but to counter-balance the questioners' orientation to disconfirmation. Section 4.8 introduces yet another interactional contingency that is consequential on the form of an answer, namely, orientation to avoiding and minimizing disaffiliation. Section 4.9 is devoted to discussing the findings and drawing conclusions.

4.2 Polar question-answer sequences in Japanese

Before we examine in detail how polar questions are formulated and responded to, let us briefly discuss two features of polar question-answer sequences which make the Japanese polar question-answer system quite different from that of English.

First, Japanese polar questions are formulated differently than those in English. While an English interrogative question is marked as such at the beginning of the utterance through the subject/auxiliary inversion, in Japanese, an utterance is marked as a polar question through sentence-final items − through sentence final particles, tag-like items or final rising intonation (Kuno 1973; Hayashi 2010; Hayano 2012). Thus, in Extract 4.1, a beautician's utterance is formally recognizable as a polar question only when the final particle *ka* is produced, though, of course, the context may make it clear that the utterance is a question earlier than that.

Extract 4-1 [BSA: blood test]

```
1 ->   Beau:  ketsueki desu ka?,
              blood    CP   Q
              (Do you take) blood (tests)?
```

Another difference is found in the way positive and negative questions are responded to. In English, response interjections *yes* and *no* encode the polarity of the answer regardless of whether it matches the polarity of the question. In response to a negatively formulated tag question "You didn't go to the party last

night, did you?", an answer "No" would mean that the answerer did *not* go to the party. In Japanese, on the other hand, response interjections encode whether the answer confirms or disconfirms the question (see Sadock and Zwicky [1985]). The confirming response interjections *nn, hai* and *ee* convey that their producers are confirming the proposition raised by the questioner whether it is positive or negative, while disconfirming response interjections *iie, iya* and *uun/nnn* convey that their producers are disconfirming the questioner, again regardless of the polarity of the question.[39] We will revisit this issue in Section 4.4.1.

These two differences between English and Japanese systems are quite notable and well documented. However, they are not the only differences between the two systems by any means. An examination of how polar questions and answers to them are designed in Japanese interaction shows that they convey subtle but consequential speaker stances that may or may not be observed in English interaction.

4.3 Forms of polar questions in Japanese[40]

When speakers ask a polar question, they present a hypothesis for confirmation (Bolinger 1978:104; Pomerantz 1988). By definition, questioners display a lack of knowledge or certainty about the hypothesis. However, they subtly and adeptly display stances as to how certain or lacking their knowledge is through their question design (Quirk et al. 1985; Raymond 2010; Heritage and Raymond 2012). In this section, I illustrate Japanese linguistic and prosodic resources that are conventionally used to formulate polar questions. I first describe the most basic, unbiased forms of polar questions (Section 4.3.1). I then illustrate other particles and tag-question markers that index different degrees of certainty and different stances toward the proposition: the particle *no* (Section 4.3.2), a tag question marker *desho* (Section 4.3.3) and final particles *yone* and *ne* (Section

[39] In the standard orthography, an affirmative interjection is often spelled as *un*, but it is often pronounced as "*nn.*", and disaffirmative response interjection is spelled as *uun* but is often pronounced as "*nn-nn*?," with fall-rise contour. Although these two response tokens may look difficult to distinguish in the transcript, different lengths of the sounds and the different contours make them audibly distinct from each other.

[40] The forms of polar questions I discuss here are not exhaustive by any means. For a fuller description of forms of Japanese polar questions, see Hayashi (2010).

4.3.4).[41] I pay special attention to the particle *no*, since, as will be discussed later, this particle marks an epistemic stance that invites the use of repetitional answers as opposed to interjection answers.

It has been recognized that the action that an utterance implements can be ascertained only by reference to the sequential position of its occurrence as well as its composition (Schegloff 1993). The interrogative morphosyntax by itself does not guarantee that the utterance implements a request for information. Instead, a sentence that is morphosyntactically marked as an interrogative may serve as an assertion (Heritage 2002b; Koshik 2002; Sugiura 2011), agreement (Schegloff 1984), request (Brown and Levinson 1987; Curl and Drew 2008), offer (Curl 2006), challenge (Steensig and Drew 2009; Heinneman 2008) among many others (see also Hayano [2012], Levinson [2012a]). Conversely, an utterance in the declarative form can serve as a request for information or confirmation when the recipient has exclusive or primary access to the issue ('B-event' knowledge, Labov and Fanshel 1977) or right and obligation to know the issue in question ('Type 1 knowable', Pomerantz 1980). Heritage (2012a) concludes that whether an utterance serves as an information request or as an informing can never be determined irrespective of the 'epistemic statuses' of participants. He says:

> "(...) when there is consensus about who has primary access to a targeted element of knowledge or information, that is, who has primary epistemic status, then this takes precedence over morphosyntax and intonation as resources for determining whether a turn at talk conveys or requests information (Heritage 2012a:3)."

Heritage's view allows us to explain how an utterance with interrogative morphosyntax comes to function as an informing on the one hand, and how an utterance with declarative morphosyntax comes to function as an information request on the other. It follows that it is crucial for analysts to take into account both the form oft the utterance and the epistemic statuses that are presumably shared and oriented to by participants. Bearing this in mind, I shall illustrate

[41] Of course, there are other ways to formulate polar questions. For instance, a "B-event statement" (Labov and Fanshel 1977) is a common way to solicit an answer (Hayashi 2010). Also found in the data are questions marked with a "retrospective particle" *kke* (Martin 1975, Hayashi 2010, 2012), which claims that the speaker once knew the answer but has forgotten it (Hayashi 2012). *Kana*, a final particle that is often translated as 'I wonder if...", is also used to solicit an answer. It is not possible to examine all of these resources and their interactional functions here.

linguistic and prosodic resources that are recurrently utilized to formulate an utterance as recognizable as a question, whether it is a question that simply requests information/confirmation or a question that is a vehicle for another action.

4.3.1 Question particle *ka* and rising intonation

A sentence-final particle *ka* is a question marker that is used mostly in the formal register (Shibatani 1990). *Ka* follows a copula *desu* or an auxiliary *masu*, which indexes formality and/or politeness. It is not impossible to use *ka* in the informal register, but that occurs rarely in spontaneous conversation.[42] In Extract 4-2, a customer (Cust) has told a beautician (Beau) that she regularly goes to the hospital for checkups. At line 1, the beautician asks her if it is a blood test that she takes. The utterance is recognizable as an information request because of the use of *ka* and semi-rising intonation as well as a presumably shared view that the relevant piece of information belongs to the customer's domain of knowledge.

Extract 4-2 [BSA: blood test]

```
1 ->   Beau:   ketsueki desu ka?,
               blood    CP   Q
               (Do you take) blood (tests)?

2              (1.2)

3      Beau:   [(tora nai demo ii  )
                 take not then ok
                    (You) don't have to get blood taken

4 =>   Cust:   [un, ketsueki kensa to:,=
                ITJ blood    test  and
               Yeah, blood tests and,=

5      Beau:   =ee.
                ITJ
               =mm hm.

6 =>   Cust:   sorekara::: eeto rentogen?
               then        uhm  x-ray
               a:::nd uhm x-rays?
```

[42] The use of *ka* in the plain form is associated with the masculine speech or has a sense of a self-addressed question and is more common in literary texts than in spontaneous conversation. My collection has three *ka*-marked polar questions in the plain form.

Although her response is delayed, the customer clearly hears the beautician's turn as an information request as evidenced by her response to it with an expanded answer (lines 4/6). As is exemplified in this case, *ka* is often used in polar questions in the polite register and solicits answers from their recipients.

In the informal register, the most unmarked way to ask polar questions is with rising intonation or with 'recipient-tilted epistemic asymmetry' (Stivers and Rossano 2010). It should be noted that Japanese polar questions that are marked with these two resources are not functionally equivalent to declarative questions in English. English declarative questions are said to be used when speakers have relatively high degree of certainty about the proposition (Heritage 2008, 2010; Heritage and Raymond 2012). That is not necessarily the case with Japanese polar questions without grammatical interrogative markers, for they are, at least in many contexts, used as an informal counterpart of *ka*-marked questions.

Extract 4-3 is an example. Emi and Aki are looking at the program of an upcoming conference. At line 1, Emi remarks on one presenter, Nina Roberts. After 1.2 seconds of silence, Aki comments on the presenter, saying she would like to read her papers and then asks Emi if she has read one.

Extract 4-3 [TD: Nina]

```
1       Emi:    Niina Robaats_
                Nina Roberts_ ((reading out from a conference
                program))

2               (1.2)

3 ->    Aki:    ^Niina no ronbun yon- yomi tai na:.=yonda koto aru?
                 Nina  L  paper  read read want FP  read  N    be
                (I) want to read Nina's papers.=Have (you) read
                (one)?

4               (0.4)

5       Emi:    aru aru:_
                be  be
                (I) have, (I) have.

6              (0.2)

7       Emi:    yun-   eh?, ^aru desho:?,
                (rea-) ITJ   be  TAG
                (Rea-) eh? (You) have read (one), haven't (you)?
```

Aki's question at line 3 *yonda koto aru?* "Have (you) read one?" is marked as a question not by a morphosyntactic resource but by rising intonation. The question is asked as a simple information request and does not particularly convey a high degree of certainty. The same syntactic construction would be hearable as a statement if it is produced with falling intonation (i.e., *yonda koto aru.* "(I) have read (one)."). Emi responds to this with multiple repeats at line 5, and then suggests to Aki that she, too, should have read one (she is taking many classes together with Emi).

The use of a question particle *ka* or rising intonation is the most common, unmarked way to ask for confirmation. In Extract 4-2, Beautician was simply expecting confirmation, and so was Aki in Extract 4-3. When polar questions are formulated in other ways, they tend to convey that the speaker has a stronger predisposition or certainty. The particle *n(o)* is one such item that indexes questioners' predispositions.

4.3.2 Particle *n(o)*

Although some researchers treat *n(o)* as a question particle that is equivalent to *ka* (Iwasaki 2002; Hayashi 2010), I follow Noda (1997) in arguing that this it is not a question particle for two reasons. First, *n(o)* often co-occurs with various sentence-final elements including question markers (i.e., *ka* or rising intonation) as well as other epistemic stance markers (e.g., *yo*, epistemic primacy marker and *ne/yone*, equivalent epistemic stance markers). Thus, actions implemented by the turn vary depending on the elements that follow *n(o)*. Second, *n(o)* alone does not function to mark a sentence as a question. Without other resources (question particle *ka,* rising intonation or reference to the recipient's territory of information), a *n(o)*-marked utterance can well be heard as a statement (see Chapter 3) (Noda 1997: 118). Indeed, Hayashi (2010) reports that *n(o)*-marked questions co-occur with a rising intonation 71.9% of the time, whereas only 40.9% of *ka*-marked questions are accompanied by rising intonation. This asymmetry suggests that *n(o)* requires another resource to mark a sentence as a question whereas *ka* does not. Therefore, it is more plausible to consider *n(o)* as a marker

that is recurrently used to index an additional stance in questions rather than as a question marker.[43]

In the polite register, *n(o)* usually realizes as *n* followed by a copula that marks politeness, *desu.*[44] See Extract 4-4a for an example. Barber (Barb) and Customer (Cust) have talked about Customer's daughter earlier in the conversation. At line 1, Barber asks Customer if he has only one child, the daughter they talked about, which Customer misunderstands to be about his daughter's child instead of his own and inappositely answers at line 8. Barber's question contains the particle *n*.

Extract 4-4a [BB: child]

```
1 ->   Barb:   o   hitori  na n desu ka?
               HNR one.NC  CP P CP   Q
               (There is) one n?

2              (.)

3      Cust:   e?,
               ITJ
               Huh?

4      Barb:   ohitori.
               one.person
               One.

5              (0.2)
6      Barb:   okosan wa.
               child  TP
               Child.

7              (0.2)

8 =>   Cust:   o-okosan wa mada  i nai.
               c-child  TP still be not
               There is no child yet.
```

Barber's turn at line 1 is recognizable as a question because of the particle *ka* and the rising intonation. Almost the same question could have been asked without *n*, as in the invented Example 4-4b below. (The copula *na* that precedes *n* in Extract 4-4a (line 1) is there to host the particle *n*, since *n(o)* cannot be directly attached to

[43] The use of this particle I focus on here derives from its use as a nominalizing particle (Noda 1997).

[44] It is possible to formulate a sentence without the copula, as in *ii no ka?* 'Is (it) ok?', but that would not index politeness and the use is limited to certain registers and speakers.

a nominal phrase. Thus, if a question does not contain *n*, it would not have *na* either.)

cf. Extract 4-4b

```
Barb:   o   hitori  desu ka?
        HNR one.NC  CP   Q
        (There is) one?
```

Example 4-4b is still hearable as a question. This supports our position that *n(o)* is not a question marker but is a stance marker that can be incorporated in a question. Moreover, without the question particle *ka* and the rising intonation, the same sentential TCU could function as a statement. See Extract 4-4c.

cf. Extract 4-4c[45]

```
Barb:   hitori na n desu.
        one.NC CP N CP
        (There is) one.
```

The made-up utterance 4-4c is marked with the particle *n* but not with the question particle *ka* or rising intonation. The utterance then is hearable as a statement rather than a question. See Chapter 3, Section 3.3.3 for cases from spontaneous data in which *no*-marked informings appear.

When *n(o)* is used in a question in the informal register, it often appears in sentence-final position, as in Extract 4-5a. Emi is asking Yui if it is okay to use the towel that she has found in Yui's kitchen.

[45] Another resource that marks the utterance at line 1 in Extract 4-4a is the honorific prefix *o* attached to a numerical noun *hitori*. This prefix is attached to nouns referring to objects that belong to recipients to show respect or deference. Thus, when referring to one's own belongings or family members, *o* should not be used, as in Extract 4-4c.

Extract 4-5a [TD: towel1]

```
1      Emi:   kore tsukatte ii no?,
              this use      ok P
              Is (it) ok to use this no?,

2      Yui:   nn,
              ITJ
              Yeah,
```

Emi's turn at line 1 is recognizable as a question because of the semi-rising intonation as well as the fact that it is a piece of information that falls into Yui's territory. Almost the same question could be asked without it, as in an invented example (4-5b) below.

Example 4-5b

```
Emi:    kore tsukatte ii?,
        this use      ok
        Is (it) ok to use this?
```

It was demonstrated in Chapter 3 that *n(o)* in an informing conveys that speakers consider the issue surprising or counter to expectation. *N(o)* in questions seems to convey the same stance, that the questioners find the proposition embedded in the question counter to their expectation. In other words, *n(o)*-marked questions convey that speakers are not quite ready for affirmative answers. Thus, compared to the unmarked question in 4-5b, Emi has a reason to suspect that it may not be okay to use the towel.

One basis for this analysis comes from the fact that *no* is often used in questions that treat the information provided in the preceding turn as surprising or unexpected. For example, see Extract 4-6 (examined in Chapter 1 as Extract 1-1). Yui, Emi and Aki are having Thai food that they got from a restaurant in their neighborhood. After appreciating the food (lines 1-5), Emi says that it was nice that the restaurant opened, which implies that the restaurant opened fairly recently. Marking this turn with the particle *yone*, Emi conveys that she assumes her interlocutors share the knowledge about the restaurant's opening and invites an agreement. However, it turns out that neither Yui nor Aki shares this knowledge. Yui's question at line 10 makes it explicit that it is news to her that the restaurant is

new (line 10), and this question is marked with the particle *no*. Emi has lived in the area longer than Aki and Yui, and Aki has lived there longer than Yui.

Extract 4-6 [TD: Thai restaurant]

```
1       Yui:    mhhm. ((speaking with mouth full))
                good
                (It's) good.

2               (1.2)

3       Yui:    niku.
                meat
                Meat (is good).

4               (1.6)

5       Emi:    umai.
                good
                (It's) good.

6               (3.1)

7       Emi:    koko dekite yokatta  yone,
                here built  good.PST FP
                It was nice that this (restaurant) opened.

8               (1.0)

9       Aki:    [nn?
                 Mm?
10 ->   Yui:    [atarashii no?,
                 new       P
                (Is it) new no?,

11      Emi:    guriin ville?
                ((Name))
                Green Ville?

12      Yui:    ((nods))

13 =>   Emi:    atarashii yone:,
                new       FP
                (It's) new yone:,
14              (0.2)

15      Aki:    shira na:i,=
                know  not
                (I) don't know,=
```

```
16     Emi:    =nakatta    mon.
                 be.not.PST FP
               =(It) wasn there.

17     Aki:    a   soo  na no:,=
               ITJ that CP P
               Oh it wasn't no:,=

18     Emi:    =hn,
                 ITJ
               =Yeah,
```

Yui's question *atarashii **no**?,* "Is (it) new ***no***?," is asked in the position where an agreement or disagreement with Emi's assessment is due but missing. This question conveys that the information that the restaurant opened recently was unknown to the speaker. Thus, the project here is not to present a hypothesis Yui is confident in but to convey that it was surprising or unexpected for her to hear that. How Emi receives this question supports this analysis. After a repair sequence to establish what they are talking about (line 11-12), Emi, instead of directly answering Yui's question, turns to Aki, who has lived in the area longer than Yui has, and invites her to confirm that it is new. This shows that Emi does not hear Yui to be simply inviting an affirmative answer, but is showing doubt about the information. The particle *no* is crucial for this hearing of this question, to adopt a stance that the question is not simply expecting an affirmative answer but the speaker is experiencing surprise or doubt and is not quite ready to accept the proposition that would be expressed in an affirmative answer as a fact.

Extracts 4-7 and 4-8 below provide contrastive cases that show that questions marked with *no* and those that are not marked with *no* are different from each other precisely in this respect. In both examples, polar questions are asked as a way to ask for permission for the speaker's future conduct. In Extract 4-7, the question is not marked with *no*, and in Extract 4-8, the question is marked with *no*. First, see Extract 4-7, which transpires several minutes before Extract 4-6. Aki, Emi and Yui are getting ready to eat. While others are preparing utensils and drink in the kitchen, Aki is standing by the table and asks if she can start to take her portion of food onto her plate (line 2).

Extract 4-7 [TD: my portion]

```
1              (5.0)

2 ->   Aki:    jibun no bun     tocchatte ii:?,
               self  N  portion take.AUX  fine
               Can (I) take my portion?

3              (0.2)

4      Yui:    tocchatte:?,[46]
               take.AUX
               Please take (it)?,
```

Aki's turn at line 2 is marked as a question with rising intonation. As I said in the previous section, this is the most common and basic way to formulate polar questions in the informal register. Questions in this form, unless the context provides contingencies that alter the preference, simply invite confirmation. In this case, Yui grants Aki's request for permission (in the form of a request), following which Aki starts serving herself.

Extract 4-8 (partially presented as Extract 4-5a earlier) also includes a question asking for permission, but this time, the question is marked with *no* and the stance adopted by its speaker is more loaded than Aki's question in Extract 4-7. This exchange transpires a few minutes prior to the exchange in Extract 4-7. Emi is preparing for the dinner in Yui's kitchen, and asks Yui if it is okay to use a kitchen towel that she found there. This question is marked with *no* (line 1).

Extract 4-8 [TD: towel1]

```
1 ->   Emi:    kore tsukatte ii no?,
               this use      ok FP
               Is (it) ok to use this ((towel)) no?

2      Yui:    nn,
               Yeah,

3              (0.8)
```

[46] As was indicated in the list of transcript symbols (pp. v, this thesis), a question mark (?) and the combination of a question mark and comma (?,) are used not to suggest that an utterance functions as a question but to mark rising or semi-rising intonation respectively. At line 4 in Extract 4-7, Yui grants Aki's request for permission in the form of a request, and this request is produced with semi-rising intonation.

```
4 =>   Emi:    dare no ka (0.3) [(shira nai kedo),
               who  N  Q          know  not but
               Whose ((this towel is)), (0.3) (I) don't know (it),
               but,

5      Yui:                     [ruumii no da kedo- (0.2)
                                 roomie N  CP but
                               (It's) (my) roomie's, but (0.2)

6      Yui:    tsuka washite moratteru.
               use  let     getting
               (I'm) using (it) ((she lets me)).
```

The question form ... *ii*? "is it okay to...?" is a very common way to ask for permission, but doing it without the particle *no* is more common and basic than doing it with *no*. The *no* particle in Emi's question is adding a stance that is not essential to implement the action of asking for permission. As it turns out at line 4, Emi suspects that it may not be okay to use the towel because it might not belong to Yui but to her roommate. Such an orientation toward a possibility that it is not okay to use the towel is conveyed with the particle *no*. While the unmarked question in Extract 4-7 was simply asking for permission, the *no*-marked question here is loaded with the speaker's orientation to a negative response.

To summarize, questions are marked with *n(o)* when speakers have a reason to see confirmation as an unlikely, unexpected or surprising answer. This is not to say that *n(o)*-marked questions prefer disconfirmation to confirmation, since affirmative responses are more frequent than disaffirmative responses following *n(o)*-marked questions in the corpus. Moreover, the fact that affirmative response tokens (*hai*, *ee* and *nn/un*) communicate positive confirmation following *n(o)*-marked questions suggests that the valence is not reversed by *n(o)* (see Section 4.2). It is a more subtle inclination toward the (un)likelihood of the state of affairs that is indexed with *no*. Such a stance makes it relevant for answerers to offset this predisposition to establish that the proposition is positive. I will come back to this issue later in Section 4.7.1 and argue that repetitional answers are a way to do so.

4.3.3 Tag question marker *desho*

A tag question marker *desho* marks a relatively high degree of certainty compared to other linguistic resources to mark a sentence as an interrogative

(McGloin 2002; Hayashi 2010). *Desho* conveys "the speaker's epistemic stance, from simple inference to strong assumption of knowledge on the part of the interlocutor" (McGloin 2002: 140) and makes confirmation relevant. For instance, see Extract 4-9. This is a telephone conversation between female friends, Kyoko and Mayu. Kyoko is telling Mayu about a problem with her boyfriend, and implies that she is thinking of breaking up with him (line 1). Presumably as a way to encourage Kyoko to pursue the relationship, Mayu asks Kyoko if she still likes/loves him (lines 3-4).

Extract 4-9 [CallFriend1684: Richard1]

```
1      Kyo:    mo::::: [hh doo shi yo  kkanaa mitaina ne,=
               EMP         how do  VOL Q      like    FP
               (It's) like what am (I) gonna do,

2      Mayu:           [tch.hhh

3 ->   Mayu:   =koko ga- demo datte   Kyoko mada  suki na n
                here SP  but  because Kyoko still like CP N
               =Here is, but, because Kyoko (=you) still
4 ->           desho:? (.) mochiron.
               TAG         of.course
               like/love (him), desho? Of course.

5      Kyo:    .hh nn.  otagai   suki tte itteru n desu yo.
                   yeah mutually like QT  saying P CP   FP
               .hh Yeah. (We) both say "(I) like/love (you)" to each
               other.
```

This question is not asked as a sheer information request but as a way to suggest that Mayu disagrees with Kyoko that she should give up the relationship on the grounds that Kyoko still has feelings for the boyfriend. This stance is conveyed through the design of the question: Mayu starts the turn with connectives *demo* 'but' and *datte* 'because', both of which are recurrently used to project disagreement with the preceding turn (Mori 1999). *Mochiron* 'of course' that is added after the possible completion (line 4) also conveys Mayu's strong presupposition that Kyoko still likes her boyfriend. *Desho* is often used in such cases, i.e., cases in which the question speaker has a high degree of certainty regarding the issue and is asking for confirmation.

4.3.4 Final particles *yone* and *ne*

Another linguistic resource often used in questions is final particles *yone* and *ne*. As was discussed in Chapter 2, these particles are used to claim shared access to the object or issue (Kamio 1990; Morita 2002, 2005; Kanai 2004), and when its use is reciprocated by a second speaker, they co-establish that they have shared, equivalent knowledge. However, *yone* and *ne* are also used when speakers are relatively confident in their hypothesis but ask for confirmation from the recipient who has sufficient or primary knowledge about the issue. For instance, see Extract 4-10. Kei is cutting ham into slices. Looking at the ham, Yoko asks what meat it is. This is ham that Kei bought in a region that she recently visited. Thus, it can be expected that Kei knows what meat it is while Yoko only has here-and-now visual access, based on which she guesses it is pork (line 1). Kei confirms that it is (line 2).

Extract 4-10 [IL: pork]

```
1->   Yoko:   kore buta da yone,
              this pork CP FP
              This is pork yone,

2     Kei:    buta desu.
              pig  CP
              (This is) pork.

3     Yoko:   hmm_
              ITJ
              I see.
```

Note that the reciprocal use of *yone* in the response turn (line 2) would be completely relevant if Kei were also uncertain about the kind of meat, which would agree with and support Yoko's guess but would not confirm it. However, since it is shared between Kei and Yoko that Kei bought the meat herself and thus should know what kind of meat it is, a confirmation (or disconfirmation) is the relevant response at line 2. As Heritage (2012a) proposes, while many linguistic elements conventionally mark certain epistemic stances, the interactional function they are used to serve can be overridden by 'epistemic statuses' of participants − "relative epistemic access to a domain or territory of information as stratified between interactants" (Heritage ibid.:4). When *yone*, or *ne*, is used in a first pair part (FPP) (Schegloff and Sacks 1973) to mark a referent that is accessible both to the FPP

speaker and the second pair part (SPP) speaker, it serves to invite an agreement. When it marks a piece of information that is known to belong to the recipient, it invites a confirmation.[47]

Similarly, *ne* can be used to mark an utterance as a confirmation request when the recipient holds superior knowledge about the issue. An example is found in Extract 4-11. Maki is complaining to Kayo that it is difficult to make friends in the town she recently moved to. When Kayo tells her that she has to take the initiative instead of staying at home, she defends herself explaining that she is making an effort for example, by going to a community meeting where she met some people, including one woman she particularly liked. However, Maki continues that everyone is too busy (line 1). Kayo at line 2 asks if the woman Maki has mentioned has a job as well.

Extract 4-11 [CallFriend1605]

```
1      Maki:   demo minna    i^sogashii kara:,
               but  everyone busy       so
               But everyone is ^busy, so:,

2 ->   Kayo:   a   sono hito   mo   oshigoto shiteru wake ne?
               ITJ that person also job      do      N    FP
               Oh that person also has a job ne?

3      Maki:   ee:::,
               ITJ
               Yeah:::,

4      Kayo:   hmm:::.
               ITJ
               I see:::.
```

Kayo's question at line 2 is an understanding check of what Maki has said: Kayo is asking if "everyone who is busy" (line 1) includes the particular woman that Maki mentioned and whether she is busy with a job. We can infer from the preceding exchange that Kayo should be quite confident that her candidate understanding is

[47] The kind of proposition of an utterance is also relevant to the function that the particles serve. When the proposition is something that can be either true or false (e.g., a piece of meat is either pork or not pork), then an utterance that proffers a guess about the matter invites a confirmation or disconfirmation. On the other hand, when the proposition is an evaluative assessment, participants can have different views (e.g., a glass of wine can be perfect for one person and too sweet for another), and a relevant response is an agreement or disagreement. While *yone* and *ne* mark shared epistemic access in both cases, the interactional import of an utterance cannot be understood without taking this into account as well as epistemic statuses of participants.

correct, and it does turn out to be correct (line 3). As is the case with this example, *ne*, as well as *yone*, are often used in questions when they are confirmation requests for a hypothesis with which the speakers are quite confident.

4.3.5 Summary

In this section, I have illustrated Japanese linguistic resources that are recurrently used in polar questions: Question particle *ka* and rising intonation are the most common, unmarked resources to formulate polar questions; final particle *no* is used to convey that the speaker sees the proposition to be surprising or counter to expectation; *desho* indexes a relatively high degree of certainty that the proposition is true; *yone* and *ne* are usually used in confirmation requests, to establish something that has already been implied or made inferable. As I said earlier, the action an utterance implements cannot be determined by reference to its form alone. It is only by reference to the sequential position in which it occurs and participants' epistemic statuses as well as the turn form that an utterance can be identified as a question. The linguistic resources described in this section should be considered as epistemic stance markers that often contribute to the hearing of an utterance as a question, instead of dedicated question markers.

Different epistemic stances marked with these different linguistic resources invoke different interactional contingencies for answerers to deal with. In the next section, I will discuss the conversation analytic literature that investigates interactional contingencies that are invoked by different forms of questions.

4.4 Multiple preferences in polar question-answer sequences

Conversation analysts have revealed some aspects of interactional contingencies that are consequential to the forms of questions and answers, mostly based on interactional data in English. These issues are discussed under the rubric of 'preference organization' − participants' orientations to what responses are sought and thus are treated as more preferable than others. In what follows, I discuss two aspects of preference that are essential to understanding the use of interjection answers and repetitional answers, namely, a preference for answers that affirm questioners' expectations over those that disaffirm them (Section 4.4.1)

and a preference for answers that take the form that is "type-conforming" over those that take a "nonconforming" form (Section 4.4.2). I will then discuss studies of nonconforming responses as opposed to type-conforming answers in English interaction, specifically, repetitional answers as opposed to interjection answers (Section 4.4.3).

4.4.1 Preference for confirmation over disconfirmation

A polar question is formulated so as to convey whether the speaker is biased toward a positive answer or a negative answer. Answers that are matched to the question speaker's displayed bias are preferred to those that do not (Heritage 1984, 2003; Pomerantz 1984a; Sacks 1987 [1973]; Clayman and Heritage 2002; Koshik 2002). Extract 4-12 is a case in point.
Extract 4-12 [Sacks 1987[1973]:63]

```
1      A:      'N they haven't heard a word huh?
2      B:      Not a word, uh-uh. Not- not a word. Not at all.
3              Except- Neville's mother got a cal...
```

A's question, being in the form of a negative statement with a tag question maker "huh?", adopts a stance that A "expects" to receive a negative answer. More accurately, it is biased in favor of a negative answer through this design. As it transpires, Neville's mother, who clearly is one of 'them', *has* heard a word. However, instead of immediately producing the positive, dispreferred answer, B delays it, prefacing it with a negative, preferred answer ("Not a word, uh-uh. Not-not a word. Not at all."), and only after then produces the positive answer in the form of qualification ("Except- Neville's mother got a cal..."). This is a phenomenon we recurrently observe: answers that counter the bias conveyed through the question's design (dispreferred answers) are delayed with an inter-turn gap or with 'pro forma agreements' (Schegloff 2007) and/or mitigated while answers that affirm the proposition as designed (preferred answers) are produced without a delay or mitigation. This suggests that polar questions are not neutral requests for information. Instead, through their formulation, they convey their speakers' predispositions and respondents design their answers such that they display their orientation to whether the answer is preferred or dispreferred. In general, in English interaction, positively formulated questions prefer positive

answers and negatively formulated questions or questions that include 'negative polarity items' (e.g., "Do you have *any* questions?") prefer negative answers (Horn 1989; Clayman and Heritage 2002; Heritage et al. 2007).

In Japanese grammar, preference for the matched polarity answer is manifested quite differently than in English. As we noted earlier in Section 4.2, Japanese answer interjections are used to convey confirmation or disconfirmation regardless of the polarity of the preceding question: *nn, hai* or *ee* ('yes') means that the questioners' hypothesis is correct, and *uun, iie* or *iya* ('no') means that their hypothesis is wrong. For instance, in Extract 4-13, Saki's question about a kind of cucumber they are trying is negatively formulated and prefers an answer that confirms that the cucumber is *not* tough. Tomo's response confirms that it is *not* tough, and that is done with the multiple tokens of the confirming response interjection *nn* 'yeah'.

Extract 4-13 [DWT: cucumber]

```
1      Saki:   kore anmari kataku nai desho?
               this so     tough  not TAG
               This isn't very tough, right?

2      Tomo:   nn.=nn.
               ITJ ITJ
               Yeah.=Yeah.

3              (1.2)

4      Tomo:   shio futte    oishii.
               salt sprinkle tasty
               (It's) tasty with salt sprinkled.
```

With the tokens of an interjection *nn* (line 2), Tomo agrees with Saki that the cucumber is *not* tough. Here, *nn* is not used to indicate the valence of the statement but to show agreement with the previous speaker. If Tomo's response were done with a disconfirming response interjection *uun* 'no', that would mean that Tomo thinks the cucumber *is* tough. In this response system in Japanese, therefore, regardless of the polarity of the question, answers done with confirming interjections *nn*, *hai* and *ee* can be assumed to implement preferred answers while disconfirming responses *iie, iya* and *uun/nnn* are dispreferred answers.

Issues can be more complicated when a question implements another social action that poses a 'cross-cutting' preference (Schegloff 2007:73-78). That is, there

are cases in which a question, as far as its formulation is concerned, prefers confirmation, while it prefers disconfirmation at the level of action it is produced to implement. Consider the question *You're busy, aren't you?* as an example: the question's format prefers confirmation, but if produced as a pre-request, a preferred, aligning response would be a go-ahead, i.e., "no". Questions designed to pose a cross-cutting preference mitigate the face-threatening nature of the projected action (here, for instance, a request) (Brown and Levinson, 1987; Heritage, 2010). As we will see in Section 4.7, this issue influences the use of interjections and repeats in responding to polar questions.

4.4.2 Preference for type-conforming answers over nonconforming answers

In addition to this preference for confirmation over disconfirmation, Raymond (2003) reports another layer of preference that concerns the forms of answers: preference for "type-conforming answers" over "nonconforming answers". Type-conforming answers to polar questions are answers that incorporate a *yes* token or *no* token and nonconforming answers are those that convey confirmation or disconfirmation through means other than a *yes* token or *no* token. Raymond (2003) argues that type-conforming answers are preferred to nonconforming answers based on three pieces of evidence: type-conforming answers are found much more frequently; nonconforming answers are produced only for "cause" or a particular reason; and nonconforming answers lead to sequence expansion or disruption of the course of action being pursued by the question.

Raymond focuses on one type of nonconforming answer: repetitional answers, i.e., answers that convey confirmation or disconfirmation via partial or full repeats of the question with or without the reverse in the polarity. Extract 4-14 and Extract 4-15 are contrastive cases that he provides to illustrate differences between a type-conforming response and nonconforming response. In both cases, Leslie makes phone calls and asks almost identical questions to proffer candidate recognitions of the person who has answered the phone (line 2 in Extract 4-14, line 3 in Extract 4-15 respectively). In Extract 4-14, her question receives a nonconforming, repetitional answer while in Extract 4-15 a conforming answer is provided.

Extract 4-14 [Raymond 2003:953]

```
1      Dan:    (eight) [two two one five si[x.
2      Les:            [.hhhhhhhhh         [Oh hello is that Dana,
3 ->   Dan:    It tis.
4      Les:    .hhhh Oh Dana:- (.) eh: Gordon's mum's he:re?=
5      Dan:    =Oh hello:
```

Extract 4-15 [Raymond 2003:953]

```
1      Tre:    Hello?
2              (.)
3      Les:    Oh is that Trevor,
4 ->   Tre:    Yes it's me.
5              (0.2)
6      Les:    Oh: it's your posh voice.
7              (0.2)
8      Tre:    °hheh he° Yes this's my posh voice.
```

Raymond's (2003) analysis goes as follows. In both cases, Leslie's fully articulated questions about the call recipients ("is that Dana," instead of "Dana?", for instance) convey that Leslie does not think the recipients sound like themselves (see Schegloff [1979] on voice recognition at the beginning of telephone calls). While Trevor's type-conforming answer in Extract 4-15 treats Leslie's trouble in recognizing his voice to be legitimate, Dana's nonconforming answer in Extract 4-14 treats it as unreasonable. How Leslie responds to these two different answers displays that that is the way she hears them: while Leslie elaborates on the unfamiliar quality of the voice of Trevor and thereby treats him to be accountable for her trouble in recognizing his voice (Extract 4-15), she holds herself accountable for not having recognized Dana's voice by indexing the infrequency of her communication with Dana by identifying herself as "Gordon's mum" (Extract 4-14). Thus, while both type-conforming interjection answers and nonconforming repetitional answers straightforwardly affirm polar questions, repetitional answers convey the speakers' resistance against an aspect of the stance that the question speaker has conveyed through the design of the question.

In summary, Raymond (2003) demonstrates that preference for confirmation over disconfirmation is not the only principle operating in polar question-answer sequences. There are various possible forms one can use to affirm or disaffirm a question, and the alternative forms do not have equivalent values.

Polar questions make *yes* or *no* relevant and responses that do not include such tokens are marked, dispreferred responses that are used only for a reason. While Raymond (2003) significantly advanced our understanding of interactional contingencies in question-answer sequences that are dealt with through grammar, he left 'nonconforming' answers as a single category of answers. However, it is clear that different forms of nonconforming answers address different interactional problems. In more recent studies, attempts have been made to discriminate different classes of nonconforming answers to illustrate specific interactional issues each of them addresses (e.g., Stivers and Hayashi 2010; Stivers 2011; Heritage 2008, 2010). Repetitional answers are one such class of nonconforming answers, to which we will turn in the next section.

4.4.3 Preference for interjection answers over repetitional answers in English interaction

Heritage (2008, 2010) and Heritage and Raymond (2012) pursue the analysis Raymond (2003) offers and specify precisely what about the question it is that repetitional answers are used to resist.[48] They argue that when questions are answered with repeats, answerers exert "epistemic agency" and claim that "primary rights to the information that [speakers] claim, is fully within their purview." While interjection answers in English acquiesce to the terms set by the questioner, repetitional answers exert more agency over those terms than was granted by the questioner. Such an assertion of agency can be relevant and appropriate in cases when the preceding question was asked to implement other actions that require the addressee's strong commitment. For instance, studies report that an interjection is not treated as a sufficient response to a deferred action request (i.e., a request that cannot be fulfilled immediately) (Houtkoup-Steenstra [1987] on Dutch; Lindström [forthcoming] on Swedish). In English, a response to a question "Do you take this woman to be your lawful wedded wife?", only a repetitional answer "I do." is appropriate (Heritage 2008; Heritage and Raymond 2012). Otherwise, however, repetitional answers are dispreferred responses that convey that their speakers have a problem with the question. In fact, they are often deployed to adumbrate departure from the terms of the question. Extract 4-16 is an example.

[48] See also Schegloff (1996a), where repeats in a particular environment are shown to do "confirming allusions" instead of merely agreeing with interlocutors. See Chapter 5, Section 5.2.

Extract 4-16 [Sacks 1987 [1973]; Heritage [2008] Heritage and Raymond [2012]]

```
1      A:      How about friends. Have you friends?
2      B:      I have friends. So called friends. I had friends.
3              Let me put it that way.
```

Here, B's affirmative answer that is done through a repeat "I have friends." is followed by a series of qualifications, and B settles with an answer that is more disaffirmative than affirmative in the end ("I had friends. Let me put it that way."). The use of a repetitional answer at the beginning of this turn, Heritage [2008; 2010] argues, is leverage for the departure that follows: B prepares the groundwork for this departure with a repetitional answer. Thus, with some exceptional contexts, repetitional answers are a dispreferred form of answer that display emerging or incipient resistance to the terms of the questions.

Preference for interjection answers over repetitional answers is found to be robust cross-linguistically: interjection answers are more common than repetitional answers as responses to polar questions in many languages (Enfield [2010] on Lao, Englert [2010] on Dutch, Hayashi [2010] on Japanese; Heinemann [2010] on Danish, Levinson [2010] on Yélî Dnye, Rossano [2010] on Italian, Stivers [2010] on American English, Yoon [2010] on Korean). In a recent project on question-response sequences in 10 languages (Stivers et al. 2009 and Stivers, Enfield and Levinson 2010), only two (Tzeltal (Brown 2010) and ǂAkhoe Hai||om (Hoymann 2010) out of ten languages were reported to have the reverse tendency.

4.4.4 Summary

These layers of preference organization − preference for the matched polarity answers and preference for type-conforming answers − help us understand what underlies the use of different forms of polar questions and answers in interaction. Questions convey through their formulations the speakers' expectation or preference for the answer and specify the preferred form it should take. Answerers exhibit their orientation to the questions' preference in designing their answers. When they produce a response that is dispreferred in some respect, this leads to interactional consequences.

Studies report data that suggest that these aspects of preference are in play in question-answer sequences in Japanese as well: confirmations are produced faster than disconfirmations are (Stivers et al. 2009), and type-conforming answers are more common than nonconforming answers (Hayashi 2010). However, Hayashi (2010) reports an interesting statistic that makes Japanese question-answer sequences different from those in English. That is, repetitional answers, a class of nonconforming answers, are almost three times as common in Japanese as in English: 18% of answers to polar questions are repetitional in Japanese while they account for only 6% of answers in English. It should further be noted that Hayashi's collection includes responses to other-initiations of repair and news receipts, where minimal confirmations are relevant (see Aoki [2008]). It can be predicted that if we narrow our focus to information-requesting questions, the ratio of repetitional answers would be even bigger. This raises a research question: what accounts for the significantly more common occurrence of repetitional answers in Japanese interaction? Do Japanese speakers produce dispreferred responses three times more often than American English speakers? In this chapter, I explore this issue and demonstrate that while repetitional answers in Japanese serve an interactional function that is similar to those in English, an epistemic stance adopted through a certain form of question provides an environment in which their occurrences are more apt than interjection answers. To begin with, the next section will illustrate how interjection answers and repetitional answers look in Japanese interaction.

4.5 Interjection answers and repetitional answers in Japanese interaction

As was discussed in the last section, in English interaction, interjections are the default, preferred form of answer to polar questions while repetitional answers are marked and dispreferred (Raymond 2003; Heritage 2008, 2010; Heritage and Raymond 2012). In this section, I illustrate how interjection answers and repetitional answers appear in Japanese, and how they can both serve as unproblematic affirmative answers to polar questions.

4.5.1 Interjection answers in Japanese

Affirmative interjections *hai*, *ee* and *nn/un* are commonly used to respond to polar questions in Japanese. It is generally believed that *hai, ee* and *nn/un* are used depending on the social register in which one is speaking; *hai* and *ee* are polite forms and *nn/un* is the plain form. Extract 4-17 is an example of *hai*. Mari and Ami are chatting at a cafe, and there is a video camera placed by their table to record their conversation. Waitress comes to pour water in their glasses, and asks if she can leave the water bottle on the table, showing concern that it can possibly obstruct the filming. Mari and Ami affirm the question with tokens of *hai*. Waitress's question is in the polite register (indexed by the copula *desu*), and Mari's and Ami's answers are in the polite form (*hai*) as well.

Extract 4-17 [MM: bottle]

```
1      Wait:   koko- daijobu desu [ka.oi]te shimatte.
               here  alright CP    Q  put   AUX
               Here- Is it alright.To put(it).

2      Mari:                      [hai!]
                                   ITJ
                                   Yes!

3      Mari:   [hai.
               ITJ
               Yes,

3      Ami:    [hai,
               ITJ
               Yes,

4      Wait: ((places the bottle on the table and leaves))
```

When Waitress's question almost comes to the first possible completion, Mari produces an affirmative response *hai* at line 2, and both Mari and Ami produce *hai* after the right-dislocated subject clause 'to put (it)'. Waitress then places the bottle on the table and leaves. Here, *hai* is produced as an affirmative answer to a polar question, and the question speaker treats this answer as sufficient for her to act upon.

An affirmative interjection that is often considered to be the counterpart in the informal register of *hai* is *un/nn*.[49] See Extract 4-18. Tomo is visiting Saki and Ken for dinner. Prior to the excerpt, Ken opened a bottle of sparkling wine that was sitting in the refrigerator and let it spout out onto the floor. As they are cleaning it up, Tomo asks Saki if the bottle was lying (line 1). As it turns out, Tomo is asking if the bottle was lying in the refrigerator, but Saki first does not understand this and starts to respond not by providing the requested information but by taking the 'uninformed' position (Heritage 1984a, 1984b) (line 2) presumably thinking that Tomo was asking about how the bottle was positioned when the sparkling wine spouted out. She then displays recognition (line 5) and initiates a repair to check her understanding of what Tomo was asking about (line 6). After this understanding check is confirmed (line 7), Saki affirms Tomo's question (line 8).[50]

Extract 4-18 [DWT: Fridge]

```
1 ->   Tomo:   ko-  yokoni  natteta n?,
               thi- sideway was     P
               Thi- was (it) lying?,

2              (1.2)

3      Saki:   do- doo shita n [daroo.
               ho- how did   P  Q
               (I) wonder what happened,
4      Tomo:                   [n

               (0.8)

5      Saki:   AA  AA  AA!
               ITJ ITJ ITJ
               OH OH OH!

6 ->   Saki:   ano reezoo[ko:?
               uhm refrigerator
               Uhm (in the) refrigerator?

7 =>   Tomo:             [nn,=
                          ITJ
                         Yeah,=
```

[49] This interjection is orthographically spelled as 'un', but in spontaneous speech, it is pronounced as "mm [m:]" or "nn [n:]" as well as [un].

[50] Aoki (2008) studies *un/nn* in diverse sequential context. She reports that while this interjection is insufficient as a response to an utterance that conveys the speakers' evaluative stance, *un/nn* is prototypically used as a response to repair-initiating questions. My collection confirms her observation.

```
8 =>   Saki:   =un:,
                ITJ
               =Yeah:.

9      Tomo:   ^hunde: [nanka:   a[re shi tara natta  n kana:,
                 then   something that do  then became N Q
               (I wonder) ^that's why (it) happened when (Ø) did
               that ((=when Ken tried to open it)),
```

Both Saki's repair initiating question (line 6) and Tomo's FPP question (line 1) are answered with the affirmative interjection *nn/un* (line 7 in response to line 6 and line 8 in response to line 1), leading the sequences to a closure.

Ee is another affirmative interjection that is typically used in the formal/polite register. *Ee* occurs much less frequently than *hai* or *nn/un*. Extract 4-19 provides an example of *ee.* Akio is a marketing researcher and is consulting with another senior marketing researcher, Taka, about his current project, i.e., promotion of portable electrocardiographs produced by a client company. In discussing where and how to place the product in hospitals and drug stores, Taka asks Akio if the company that Akio is working with produces sphygmomanometers in order to see if they can sell portable electrocardiographs displayed together with them.

Extract 4-19 [MRS: Sphygmomanometer]

```
1 ->   Taka:   XXXX ketsuatsukee     motteta kke.
                    sphygmomanometer have    Q
               Does X (company name) produce sphygmomanometers
               (remind me)?

2              (0.3)

3 =>   Akio:   -ee. ano:: (doko-) [     ]
                yes uhm    where
                Yes, uhm:: (         )

4 ->   Taka:                      [Gyu tte ne?,
                                   MIM QT  IP
                                   Like gyu (squeezing)?,

5 =>   Akio:   ee.=
               ITJ
               Yes.

6 ->   Taka:   =yatsu motteru?
                N     have
               (Do they) have (those)?
```

```
7 =>   Akio:   ee:.
               ITJ
               Ye:s.

8      Taka:   a  shitara-shi^tara sono yoko da ttara, (0.3)
               oh then    then     that side CP if
               Oh then- ^then if (they place electrocardiographs)
               by (sphygmomanometers),

9              .ss yari yasui n janai ka naa.
                   do   easy  N CP    Q  FP
               .ss (that) would be easy to do, (I suppose).
```

Akio affirms this question with the interjection *ee* three times. First at line 3, immediately after which he starts to add something but in overlap with Taka. Taka, even though he has already received confirmation, adds a mimetic word for squeezing (*gyu*) to describe sphygmomanometers. Akio provides another token of *ee* at line 5; because what immediately precedes it is not a full question but an additional description of the referent, this *ee* is equivocal between the redoing of the confirmation of the question and a minimal acknowledgement token of the additional description. It seems that Taka heard this *ee* in the latter way, for he further pursues confirmation by restating the predicate of his question, designing it as a continuation of his previous turn (*yatsu* is a nominalizer and thus retroactively reformulates the preceding 'turn constructional unit' (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974, TCU for short) *gyu tte ne* 'like *gyu*' as a part of a larger, sentential TCU, as in *gyu tte ne, yatsu motteru?* "Do they have those (that go) like *gyu*?" Akio affirms this yet again with *ee* (line 7), after which this question-answer sequence closes with Taka's provision of a suggestion (lines 8-9).

As these three cases exemplify, interjections *hai, un/nn* and *ee* are all used to affirm a polar question. Some researchers oppose the idea that *hai*, *ee* and *nn/un* are interchangeable tokens that are used simply depending on the register in which one is speaking. For instance, Kitagawa (1980) explores functional differences between *hai* and *ee*, both of which are said to be used in the polite register. He suggests that while *hai* is an acknowledgement token that merely conveys that the speaker has heard and understood the previous utterance and it comes to function as an affirmative answer only via a pragmatic inference, *ee* conveys that the speaker is 'of the same mind with the addressee in regard to the comment just made to him by the addressee' (Kitagawa 1980:110). In my corpus, I do not observe such a difference between *hai* and *ee* as far as question-answer sequences are concerned. In fact, there seem to be individual differences involved: some speakers use *ee*

quite often while others hardly use it and use only *hai* or *nn/un*. While investigating distinctive functions of *hai*, *ee* and *nn/un* would be an interesting and important research topic to pursue, it lies outside the scope of this chapter. The argument this chapter develops regarding interactional functions of repetitional answers as opposed to interjection answers is mostly based on cases with *nn/un* and *hai*, as a result of the more frequent occurrences of them compared to occurrences of *ee*.

4.5.2 Repetitional answers in Japanese

This section provides a basic illustration of repetitional answers in Japanese and how they are different from those in English. In this study, answers are treated as repetitional answers if they convey confirmation by partially or fully repeating the question. Possible variations of repetitional answers are listed in Table 4-1.

Table 4-1: Repetitional answers and non-repetitional answers

Q: *osushi wa tariru no?* sushi TP suffice P *Is there enough sushi* no*?*	
Repetitional answers	Non-repetitional answers
a) partial/ full repeat *tariru no.* enough P (There is) enough *no.* *osushi (wa) tariru no.* sushi TP suffice P (There is) enough *sushi no.* b) partial/ full repeat, without particle(s) *tariru / osushi (wa) tariru.* enough sushi TP suffice (There is) enough. c) repeat of the predicate + different particle *tariru yo.* suffice FP (There is enough) *yo.* d) multiple repeat of the predicate *tariru tariru.* suffice suffice (There is) enough, enough.	a) simple interjections *un /ee/ hai.* ITJ *Yes.* b) anaphoric answers *soo/ soo da yo/ soo desu.* that that CP FP that CP *(That is) so.* c) interjection + repeat *un (ee/ hai),* tariru. ITJ suffice *Yes, (there is) enough.* d) various kinds of nonconforming answers other than repetitional answers

Unlike English repetitional answers, it is not common to confirm a question with a pro-verb *suru* 'do' in place of the main predicate of the question.[51] Repetitional answers may repeat particles used in questions, leave them out, or include other particles. Answers that consist of both an interjection and repeat (e.g. *nn, adobansu shiteru* 'yes, he has advanced') are *not* included in the collection for this chapter, for they seem to be produced to accommodate to specific localized contingencies.

[51] An exception to this is when the question consists of a compound predicate (e.g., *shuuri suru* 'do repair'). An answerer can affirm the question either by repeating the entire verb (*shuuri suru* 'do repair') or by repeating only the 'light verb' (*suru* 'do'). See Extract 4-23 for an example.

As I said earlier, repetitional answers are used far more often in Japanese than in English. And most of the time, they do not seem to take issue with the degree of epistemic rights that questioners have already conceded, as has been suggested for repetitional answers in English interaction. For instance, see Extract 4-20. Kyoko is telling Mayu about a new job that she recently got in an Asian market. At line 1, Mayu asks if the owner is a Japanese. Kyoko affirms this question by repeating the main nominal predicate, *nihonjin* 'Japanese'.

4-20 [CallFriend1684: Japanese owner]

```
1      Kyo:    .hh demo maa- ne[::,
                   but  well IP
               .hh But well,

2      Mayu:                   [un,
                                Mm-hm,

3              (0.2)

4      Kyo:    nai     yori wa ii   ya:  mitaina=
               nothing than TP good FP   like
               better than nothing

5      Kyo:    =[kanji de.
                like  CP
                (it's) like.

6      Mayu:    [dem- oonaa toka nihonjin.
                 but  owner etc. Japanese
                 But- is the owner a Japanese.

7              (0.4)

8 =>   Kyo:    nihonjin.
               Japanese
               (S/he) is a Japanese.

9      Mayu:   aa ^yokatta °ne.
               ITJ good     FP
               Oh (that's) ^good °ne.
```

Here, Kyoko's repetitional answer to the question does not seem to assert any particular epistemic right, and the sequence closes without revealing any interactional problem. After Kyoko's confirmation, Mayu produces a sequence closing assessment *yokatta ne.* "oh (that's) good *ne*." Thus, a repetitional

confirming answer in this example seems to be produced as a simple confirmation instead of a marked token to take issue with the question in terms of epistemic rights its speaker has conceded to the answerer.

When a question is negatively formulated, a confirming repetitional answer should also be negative. Extract 4-21 is an example. Yui and Emi are talking about their mutual friend. Yui asks Emi if he, who is from Hiroshima, does *not* speak the Hiroshima dialect. Emi confirms Yui that he indeed does *not* speak it (line 3).

Extract 4-21 [TD: dialect]

```
1 ->   Yui:    Hiroshima ben     ^de wa nai no?,
               Hiroshima dialect  CP TP not P
               (It) is ^not the Hiroshima dialect ((that he speaks))
               no?,

2              (0.8)
3 =>   Emi:    Hiroshima ben:::  de wa nai:: nai. ^deteru
               Hiroshima dialect CP TP not   not  ^comes.out
               (It) i::sn't- isn't the Hiroshima dialect.

4 =>           to omou demo.
               QT think but
               (I) think (it) comes out, though.
```

Emi's answer is a confirmation because it is in the same valence as Yui's question. A positive answer ("He *does* speak Hiroshima,") would be understood as a disconfirmation.

While the repetitional answers in the previous examples are in the same predicate form that was used in the question form (e.g., the predicate in the form of a bare noun *nihonjin* "a Japanese"), a repetitional answer can also involve elements that are different from or were not used in the question formulation. Sentence-final particles, which often embody speakers' epistemic stances, are the locus of such changes. Extract 4-22 is an example. Yuki asks the host of a dinner, Kazu, if there is enough sushi for everyone. Yuki's question is marked with a particle *no*, which, as was discussed earlier, conveys that Yuki thinks that it would be counter to her expectation if there *is* enough sushi. Instead of repeating this particle and adopting the same stance, Kazu drops the particle and uses another particle *yo* instead in her answer.

Extract 4-22 [TMD: sushi]

```
1 ->   Yuki:   anta osushi wa tariru  no?
               you  sushi  TP suffice P
               Hey, (is there) enough sushi no?

2              (0.2)

3 =>   Kazu:   -tariru  yo?,
                suffice FP
                (There is) enough yo?,
```

As was discussed in the previous two chapters, *yo* is a particle to claim epistemic primacy. By not re-using the particle *no* and instead using *yo*, Kazu declines to join Yuki in seeing it as unexpected that there is enough sushi, and instead claims epistemic primacy over the issue.

In other cases, an answer speaker aligns with the question speaker and agrees that the state of affair in question is unexpected by using the particle *no* in response to a question that is marked with *no* as in Extract 4-23. Aki, Emi and Yui have had dinner at Yui's place and are now getting ready to plan a trip using the Internet for booking and researching. At line 1, Aki asks whether the Internet connection Yui has at her place is wireless. The particle *no* marking this polar question conveys Aki's stance towards Yui having wireless Internet as something unexpected or remarkable. Yui's affirmative answer to this question is also marked with *no*.

Extract 4-23 [THAI: Wireless]

```
1      Aki:    n- koko waiaresu na no?
                  here wireless CP P
               N- is (it) wireless (Internet) here no?

2              (.)

3      Yui:    waiaresu na no.
               wireless CP P
               (It) is wireless no.

4              (0.5)

5      Aki:    haiteku:_
               high-tech
               High-te:ch_
```

In contrast with Kazu's answer in Extract 4-22, here, Yui aligns with Aki in treating the wireless Internet connection as an unexpected thing to have at home. This use of the particle *no* in her answer, therefore, has a sense of bragging, that she herself finds it remarkable to have the wireless Internet. Here again, the repetitional answer does not seem to assert epistemic rights more than was conceded by Aki in any observable way, nor is it produced as leverage for disagreement and the sequence closes without any discernible interactional consequence: Aki, though after 0.5 seconds of delay, produces a sequence closing assessment, articulating the appreciation of wireless that seems to have been underlying the sequence from the get-go ('High-te:ch').

In short, while repetitional answers by definition fully or partially repeat the preceding questions, their turn-final forms vary to index the speakers' stances. Table 4-2 below shows the distribution of different turn-final forms of repetitional answers.

Table 4-2: Turn-final forms of repetitional answers

Bare	*yo*-marked	*n(o)*-marked	*ne/yone*-marked	others	Total
29 (41%)	19 (27%)	11 (16%)	4 (6%)	7 (10%)	70 (100%)

The most common turn-final form of affirmative repetitional answer in my corpus is the bare form, i.e., predicates without any epistemic stance marking particles (e.g., *nihonjin.* "(S/he is) a Japanese." in Extract 4-20). The second most common form is a repetitional answer marked with the final particle *yo*: 27% (n=19) of repetitional answers are marked with *yo*. *No* is also commonly found, while *ne* and *yone* are rather rare. It is interesting that we do not see the particle *yo* more often in this sequential position, since, as we discussed in the previous two chapters, *yo* is a marker to claim epistemic primacy, and providing information that was requested by questioners puts the answerers in an epistemically primary position. I argue that this can be accounted for by seeing *yo,* as well as other epistemic stance marking particles, not as a particle that a speaker is *obliged* to use when in a certain epistemic status, but as a resource that speakers *can* use when there is interactional relevance in explicitly claiming an epistemic status. Under the circumstance where

questioners have already yielded epistemic primacy to the question recipients by the very act of asking, it is not relevant or necessary to claim epistemic primacy with *yo* in the answer position. When they do mark answers with *yo*, there tends to be additional interactional contingencies that make it relevant to assert more epistemic primacy than is asserted by simply providing an answer. For instance, in Extract 4-22 (shown earlier), Yuki's question is not a simple information request. Yuki is concerned about the amount of sushi that Kazu prepared because her husband, who has not arrived at Kazu's yet, decided to join the dinner at the last minute, and she is worried that Kazu might not have counted him in when she got sushi. When answering this question, Kazu is not only providing the requested information but also is conveying that Yuki needn't worry about it. In this situation, claiming epistemic primacy with *yo* may be relevant to her answer's credibility and to reassure Yuki.

Below is another example of a *yo*-marked repetitional answer. Here again, we can observe a particular interactional contingency that makes it relevant for its speaker to specifically claim epistemic primacy. Emi, Aki and Yui are talking about their mutual friend Ken. Emi is known to be the closest to him. They have been trying to decide when to have a dinner party, and have been discussing when Ken is or is not available. Emi has told the others that he will be gone for a certain period of time. This prompts Yui to ask whether he is already an advanced PhD candidate, since this is the middle of a quarter and students would not be able to leave the town if they were still doing course work. When Yui asks if he has advanced (i.e., if he has passed the qualification exam to be a PhD candidate), she addresses it to Emi by looking at her. While Emi affirms the question with an interjection, a non-addressed participant Aki also affirms the question. This answer is done with a repeat marked with *yo*.

Extract 4-24 [Thai1: Advance]

```
1 ->   Yui:    kare wa, sokka, (.) adobansu shiteru n da kke.
               he   TP  right      advance  done    P CP Q
               He is, I see, (.) (is he) advanced (remind me).

2              (0.2)

3 =>   Emi:    h[n.

4 =>   Aki:     [shiteru yo?,
                 done    FP
                (He) is yo?,
```

```
5              (0.4)

6      Yui:    dakara jiyuujin    na n da.
               so     free.person CP N CP
               That's why (he) is a free person.
```

Sitting at a round table, Aki can see that Yui is addressing her question to Emi, conveying that Yui sees Emi to be the person who should have the information about Ken and thus Emi has epistemic primacy. Aki, who also turns out to know that Ken is advanced but did not receive such a recognition from Yui, is in the position to have to claim her "informed" state (Heritage 1984a, 1984b). It is in this environment that Aki's repetitional answer is marked with *yo*. The particle is used here to claim epistemic primacy, which has not be granted by an interlocutor. As Extracts 4-22 and 4-24 exemplify, repetitional answers are marked with *yo* when there is an extra interactional contingency that makes it relevant or when a speaker's epistemic primacy is at stake.

In this section, I have illustrated repetitional answers in Japanese and argued that they do not necessarily resist the terms of questions or raise interactional problems. However, this does not imply that they have a different function than repetitional answers in English. In fact, the basic functions of repetitional answers and interjection answers seem to be the same in English and in Japanese. In the next section, I will demonstrate how that is the case.

4.6 Interactional functions of interjection answers and repetitional answers in Japanese

This section illustrates interactional functions of interjection answers and repetitional answers. It is demonstrated that interjection answers are sometimes treated as insufficient while repetitional answers are not. It is suggested that interjections are used to acquiesce to the questions without conveying active commitment of answerers, while repetitional answers convey more assertive and agentive commitment. In what follows, I first examine cases that show the functional difference of the two forms of answers (Section 4.6.1) and then present contrastive cases that further provide support for my analysis (Section 4.6.2).

4.6.1 Interjection answers can be treated as insufficient, repetitional answers are not

As discussed earlier, interjection answers in English conversation are type-conforming responses to polar questions whereas repetitional answers are used only for a reason (Raymond 2003). Interjections have been discussed as insufficient only in cases where the preceding questions implement such actions as solicitation of marriage vows or deferred action requests (see Houtkoup-Steenstra [1987] for Dutch; Lindstrom [forthcoming]; Heritage and Raymond 2012). In my Japanese corpus, in contrast, there are cases in which interjections are treated as inadequate even though a question does not implement one of these actions, whereas repetitional answers are always treated as adequate. For example, in Extract 4-25 (partially presented as Extracts 4-5a and 4-8 earlier), a *yes*-answer is given to a question that asks for permission to use a towel, but it is not received as a sufficient response and the recipient of the answer initiates repair on it. As mentioned earlier, Emi, Yui and Aki are preparing dinner at Yui's apartment that she shares with a roommate.

Extract 4-25 [Thai: towel1]

```
1 ->   Emi:    kore tsukatte ii no?,
               this use      ok P
               Is (it) ok to use this ((towel)) no?


2 =>   Yui:    nn,
               ITJ
               Yeah,

3              (0.8)

4 =>   Emi:    dare no ka (0.3) [(shira nai kedo),
               who  N  or         know  not but
               Whose ((this towel is)), (0.3) (I) don't know (it),
               but

5      Yui:                     [ruumii no da kedo- (0.2)
                                 roomie N  CP but
                                (It's) (my) roomie's, but (0.2)

6              tsuka washite moratteru.
               use   let     getting
                (I'm) using (it) ((she lets me)).
```

```
7      Emi:    nee sono::, (1.0) ano:::,
               ITJ that          well
               Hey ((can you pass me)) that, uhm, ((asking Yui to
               pass  something other than the towel))

8              (15.0)
```

At line 1, Emi asks if she can use the kitchen towel. Yui responds with a *yes*-answer at line 2. After 0.8 seconds of silence, Emi produces a TCU that can be hearable as an incremental continuation of the question (*dare no ka, (0.3) shira nai kedo* 'I don't know whose it is, but'), thus treating the *yes*-answer as insufficient and annulling it. In other words, she is pursuing a response despite the interjection response that has been provided. This pursuit addresses a concern that could be a reason why Emi should not use the towel, that it might not be Yui's, and thus makes relevant a more substantial endorsement than *n:*. Yui at line 5 responds to this by saying that the towel is her roommate's but is shared, which Emi takes as sufficient enough to move on to another sequence (Emi and Aki are off the screen during this exchange, but the turn at line 7 seems to be a request for something else which Yui nonverbally granted and we can imagine that Emi is using the towel by then).

While the question in Extract 4-25 implements a request for permission, a question does not have to implement such an action in order to require more than an interjection to be affirmed. In Extract 4-26 below, the recipient of an interjection answer explicitly treats it as insufficient. Here, Shin and Jun are talking on the phone to arrange a dinner in Tokyo. Shin is arriving from the airport and has been asking Jun how to get to the restaurant from the airport even though, as it turns out, he has done that many times (line 18). At line 1, Shin asks Jun if it will take about an hour. Jun, instead of straightforwardly affirming or disaffirming the question, says that just the first of the several trains that Shin will need to take will take one hour (line 3). After Shin displays surprise at this information at line 4, Jun modifies what he said at line 5, saying it takes about 50 minutes. This leads to an expansion sequence, which is the focus of our analysis.

Extract 4-26 [CallFriend6166:Skyliner][52]

```
1      Shin:   ichi jikan gurai?,
               one  hour  about
               About an hour?,
```

[52] I owe Makoto Hayashi for drawing my attention to this data piece.

2 (0.5)

3 Jun: mazu:: nippori made ichi jikan daroo?
first ((Proper Name)) to one hour INF
Fi::rst, (it's) an hour to (get to) Nippori, right?

4 Shin: a sonna kaka(h) n da(h).
ITJ that.much take P CP
Oh (it) ta(h)kes that long.

5 Jun: gojuu nan pun dakara are [tashika.
50 what minute so that if_I_remember_correctly
Cuz (it's) 50 minutes or so if I remember correctly.

6 -> Shin: [sukairainaa de?
Skyliner by
On Skyliner (airport express)?

7 => Jun u:n.
ITJ
Yea:h.

8 -> Shin: ^sukairainaa de?
Skyliner by
On ^Skyliner?

9 => Jun: sukairainaa de da yo?,
Skyliner by CP FP
On Skyliner yo?,

10 -> Shin: goju ppun kakan **no**?,
50 minute take P
(It) takes 50 minutes **no***?,*

11 => Jun: soo da yo?,
that CP FP
It does yo?,

12 Shin: uwa!
ITJ
Wow!

13 (1.0)

14 Shin: maji kai.hh
really Q
Really.hh

15 (0.5)

```
16    Jun:    hhh kimi- [(.) tsukatta toki nai no?
                    you       used     time not P
              hhh You've never used (Skyliner)?

17    Shin:             [un.

18    Shin:   a::: zutto  tsukatte kkedo oboete   nee wa.
              ITJ  always use      but   remember not FP
             Uh::m (I) always use (it) but (I) don't remember (it).
```

At line 6, Shin initiates repair with a question clarifying Jun's preceding turn, *sukairainaa de?* "On Skyliner?". To Shin, who has asked if the entire trip from the airport to the restaurant takes an hour (line 1), that it takes 50 minutes just to get to a transfer station (*Nippori*) is counter to expectation. In this sequential context, he seems to be entertaining with this question a possibility that it may take just an hour to get to the restaurant if he takes the airport express, Skyliner. In other words, although the question is positively formulated and grammatically prefers confirmation, Shin is displaying his orientation to disconfirmation, that 50 minutes is the time it takes to get to Nippori only if he does *not* take Skyliner.

Thus, Jun's confirmation at line 7 is an unexpected response. Shin does not accept this response as sufficient to proceed with. Instead, he repeats the same question with an animated pitch and emphasis at line 8. Jun then affirms the question again at line 9, but this time, he uses a repeat instead of an interjection. Shin further expresses his surprise at line 10 by asking if it really takes 50 minutes, but he no longer questions the means of travel (Skyliner). In short, an interjection confirmation is rejected as insufficient in the situation, and the answerer switches from an interjection to a repeat when a need for a more upgraded, assuring confirmation emerges.

4.6.2 Contrastive cases

The different functions of interjection answers and repetitional answers illustrated in the last section are further attested in the two, contrastive cases I present in this section. In these two extracts from a single conversation, Yoko is asked whether she is comfortable with two different matters: the smell of incense (Extract 4-27) and the spice in food served to her (Extract 4-28). These cases are contrastive in that Yoko affirms the question with an interjection in the first case and with a repeat in the second. Through a detailed examination of the two

environments, we can see that the use of the contrastive forms of confirmation reflects Yoko's different stances toward the questions: Extract 4-27, she is merely acquiescing with the question speaker, while in Extract 4-28, she is more committed to the proposition.

First, consider Extract 4-27. Yoko has been looking at a picture book that her grandfather wrote and drew over fifty years ago. Kazu recently found the book when she was organizing the family's altar, which her mother-in-law (i.e., Yoko's mother) had kept there until she recently moved to a nursing home. After looking at and appreciating it for a while, Yoko remarks on the smell of incense coming from the book (it is a Buddhist ritual to burn incense in an altar). One piece of background information that figures in is that Yoko suffers from severe asthma and that is common knowledge between the interlocutors. After a short exchange about the incense, Kazu asks Yoko if she is alright with it (line 11). Yoko's answer to this question (lines 12-13) is our focus.

Extract 4-27 [IL: incense]

```
1      Yoko:   >sugoi< okoo    no nioi  ga suru.
                 very   incense L  smell SP do
               (It) smells of incense >very much<.

2              (1.0)

3      Kazu:   aa  sooo?
               ITJ that
               Oh really?

4      Yoko:   nn,
               Yeah,

5              (0.4)

6      Kazu:   ii   nioi  warui nio[i?
               good smell bad   smell
               Is (it) a good smell or a bad smell?

7      Yoko:                        [^watashi wa heekida kedo
                                      I       TP alright but

8              ne,anmari tsuyoi to   dame.
               FP very   strong then no
              ^I'm fine (with it), but if (the smell is) too strong,
              (I) can't (take it).
```

```
9      Kazu:   aa  a[a
               ITJ  ITJ
               Oh oh

10     Yoko:        [nn,
                     Yeah,

11 ->  Kazu:   daijoobu?[kore.
               alright   this
               (Are you) alright? (With) this.

12 =>  Yoko:            [nn,
                         ITJ
                        Yeah,

13 =>  Yoko:   nn, [nn,
               ITJ  ITJ
               Yeah, yeah,
14     Kazu:       [nn,
                    ITJ
                    Yeah,

15                  (0.6)

16     Kazu:   iya  ho^ttondo ne:, da->ano,< hh saikin,  sukoshi
               well almost    IP   so  well     recently a.little
               Well, hardly, so, well, recently, a little g-

17             i-ano- ii   nioi  no (okoo-)
               g-well good smell L   incense
               well, good smelling incense ((I used))
```

Let us examine the exchange that leads up to the question-answer sequence of our focus. At line 1, Yoko remarks on the smell of the incense. Two aspects of the design of this turn make it hearable as a negative assessment or even a complaint. First, it is produced in a low-pitched voice with a relatively flat intonation, giving no indication of appreciation of the smell. Secondly, the semantics of the word *nioi* (smell, not necessarily pleasant) instead of *kaori* (pleasant scent) makes relevant the possibility that she does not find the smell pleasant although the strictness in distinguishing the two words varies across individuals. This stance, which is hinted at in Yoko's turn, is in potential disaffiliation with Kazu's stance, for as it turns out later, Kazu chose to use the incense because she thought it had a good smell (lines 16-17).

The way Kazu responds to this adumbrates this emerging conflict. She delays her response (line 2), which provides an opportunity for Yoko to notice an incipient disaffiliation and modify her stance to stop it from emerging (Pomerantz

1984; Sacks 1987. Then Kazu initiates repair at line 3 (*aa sooo?* 'oh really?'), conveying that she does not sense the smell that Yoko describes as *sugoi* '((smells) very much)', which gives Yoko another hint of incipient disaffiliation.

Kazu then tries to elicit an explicit assessment from Yoko by asking an alternative question (*ii nioi warui nioi?* 'Is it a good smell or bad smell?'). All these moves can be seen as Kazu's attempt to avoid a possibly emerging disaffiliation, since, as it turns out at lines 16-17, she used incense thinking that it smelled good. However, Yoko declines to answer the question within the terms it has set (lines 7-8): instead of saying the smell is good or bad, Yoko implies that others might not be alright with the smell (the articulation of grammatically non-obligatory subject with a pitch emphasis (^*watashi*, "^I") marked with a contrastive topic particle *wa* indicates that other people may not be alright). She then adds that if it is too strong, she cannot take it, when she has earlier said that the book smells of incense *very much*. The resulting implication is that she is barely alright with the smell.

Kazu receives this answer with an interjection *aa aa* (line 9). *Aa* is a Japanese 'change-of-state token' (Heritage 1984a) and in this case, it seems to be indexing Kazu's recognition of the underlying issue. Namely, for Yoko, who is asthmatic, it is not a matter of whether the smell is good or bad but is of whether she is alright or not with it. Kazu then asks the question *daijoobu? kore.* 'are you okay? with this?' (line 11). Thus, this question is asked in the environment where Yoko has already indicated that she is barely okay with the smell. The interjection answers at lines 12 and 13 can thus be seen as an acquiescent, solicited response rather than representing Yoko's committed stance.

A repetitional answer in Extract 4-28 occurs in a contrastive environment. Kazu, the host of this get-together, had served marinated sardines to Yoko, but the spice in it began to give her slight asthma symptoms. Yoko told Kazu that she would not be able to finish the food and apologized for it. The segment starts about 18 minutes later, when Kazu started to eat what Yoko had left, which re-opens a talk about Yoko's asthma that constrains her from eating certain kinds of food.

Extract 4-28 [IL: spice]

```
1       Yoko:   chuuka  taberu toki nanka [mo   ne:,
                chinese eat    when etc.   also IP
                Also when (I) eat Chinese or something,

2       Kazu:                              [nn,
                                            mm-hm,

3               (0.3)

4       Kazu:   n[n:
                mm-hm,

5       Yoko:    [moo zetttaini karai no ga damena no,ima,
                  EMP always    hot   N  SP no     P  now
                  (I) definitely can't handle spicy (food),=now.

6              (0.2)  ((Kazu nodding))

7       Yoko:   nn, karaku nai no da to[ka.
                yes spicy  not N  CP etc.
                Yeah, ((I'd have)) something not spicy or,

8       Kazu:                           [nn  daijoobu da tta? moo.
                                       ITJ alright  CP PST  EMP
                                       Yeah were (you) alright?

9       Yoko:   nani [ga?
                what  SP
                With what?

10 ->   Kazu:        [heeki?
                      okay
                      Are (you) okay?

11 =>   Yoko:   >hee[ki=heeki=he[eki=heeki,=nn<
                 okay   okay  okay   okay   yes
                  (I'm) okay okay okay okay, yeah.

12      Kazu:       [nn,        [nn,
                     Yeah,       Yeah

13              (0.2)

14      Yoko:   moo ne, damena toki tte no wa ippenni hi:: tte
                EMP IP  no     when QT  N  TP once    MIM  QT
                When (it) is bad, (it/ I) becomes like "hi::"
```

15 Yoko: naru.
become
on the instant.

16 Kazu: h::[:nn::?,
ITJ
I see:::::?,

17 Yoko: [nn,
Yeah,

After Yoko explained to Kazu she could not eat anything spicy (lines 1, 5, 7), Kazu asks Yoko if she was alright (line 8). Yoko initiates a repair asking what the question was about (line 9), which conveys that she did not understand the relevance of the question and thereby implies that she feels nothing wrong at the moment. Kazu, responding to this repair initiation, merely substitutes the word *daijoobu* (alright) with its synonym *heeki* (okay). Yoko takes it as an adequate repair and responds to the question with multiple repeats *heeki heeki heeki heeki* 'okay okay okay okay' (line 11). The fact that this repair was enough for Yoko to produce the response to the question supports the analysis that Yoko's repair initiation was not to deal with a genuine understanding problem. Thus, this repetitional answer occurs in the context where its speaker is working to reassure that the answer to the question is positive, that she is okay. This is the environment in which Yoko answers with a repeat.

In the two examples examined above, Kazu asks Yuko two similar questions: questions that show her concern for Yuko. In the first case, the question was answered with an interjection while in the second, it was answered with a repeat. It was shown that while Yoko uses both forms of answers to affirm the questions and assure Kazu that she is fine, they are used to convey different degrees of commitment. The interjection answer is an elicited acquiescent confirmation, while the repetitional answer is used to convey more assertive and committed confirmation.

This supports our analysis that interjection answers are used to acquiesce to the question without conveying agentive commitment, while repetitional answers convey more assertive and agentive commitment to the answer. Thus, the semantics of interjections and repeats in Japanese are similar to those of English interjections and repeats (Heritage 2008, 2010; Heritage and Raymond 2012). This leads us to the remaining puzzle: what accounts for the much more frequent occurrences of repetitional answers in Japanese than English? In the next section, I

explore this issue and identify the interactional contingencies that make a repetitional answer more apt and relevant than interjection.

4.7 Environments that provide relevance of repetitional answers

Raymond (2003) shows for English that answers to polar interrogatives that include a *yes* or a *no* are type-conforming and are preferred to those that do not, and it is reported that interjection answers are more common than repetitional answers in Japanese as well (Hayashi 2010). However, the use of repetitional answers is reported to be approximately three times more common in Japanese than English (Hayashi ibid.; Stivers 2010). Moreover, contrary to Raymond's finding, repetitional answers in Japanese are not produced to problematize questions: they are produced and treated as unproblematic, appropriate responses in many of the cases examined above (Extracts 4-20, 4-23, 4-24, 4-28). Then, what triggers the use of repeats instead of interjections in Japanese interaction? When does it become relevant to produce a committed, assured answer to confirm a question? In this section, I suggest that it is a certain epistemic stance of questioners that solicits repetitional answers. Specifically, it is when questioners convey through the design of the questions or sequential environment that they do not consider the proposition to be the likely or expected state of affairs that answerers treat the use of repeats as more relevant in order to convey a more committed, assured confirmation than an interjection would convey. I illustrate two ways in which a question becomes loaded with such a stance: the use of the particle *no* (Section 4.7.1) and the sequential environment (Section 4.7.2).

4.7.1 *N(o)*-marked questions

In Section 4.2.2, it was shown that the particle *n(o)* is used in polar questions to convey that speakers find the proposition unlikely, surprising or counter to expectation and thus do not view a confirmation as a likely answer. When a question speaker adopts such a stance, it makes it relevant for answerers to provide a committed, assured confirmation to counter the questioner's stance and establish the proposition to be true. Indeed, we recurrently encountered cases in which *n(o)*-marked questions are followed by repetitional answers (Extracts 4-23,

4-24, 4-25). Thus, it can be hypothesized that the stance marked with *no* creates an environment in which repetitional answers are better fitted and arguably preferred over interjection answers. To test this hypothesis, I extracted 90 cases of unmarked questions − utterances marked as polar questions with either the question particle *ka* or rising intonation (See Section 4.3.1.) and 90 cases of *n(o)*-marked questions from the corpus and saw how they are responded to. Results are summarized in Tables below. Table 4-3 shows how often the two types of questions are confirmed and disconfirmed. Table 4-3 shows the breakdown of forms of confirmations.

Table 4-3: Distribution of confirming and disconfirming answers to unmarked and *n(o)*-marked questions

	unmarked questions	*n(o)*-marked questions
confirmation	73 (81%)	53 (59%)
disconfirmation	17 (19%)	37 (41%)
total	90 (100%)	90 (100%)

Note that *n(o)*-marked questions are disconfirmed twice as often as unmarked questions are. This supports our analysis that the particle *no* tilts the preference, though it does not reverse it. It indicates that the speaker finds the proposition unexpected or remarkable and is oriented to the possibility of disconfirmation. Provision of disconfirming answers in response to *n(o)*-marked questions is, therefore, 'less dispreferred' than doing so in response to simple, unmarked questions, which display the speaker's orientation to and higher readiness to accept the proposition.

Now, Table 4-4 shows the breakdown of forms used to confirm unmarked and *n(o)*-marked questions. As you can see, while interjections and repeats are almost evenly distributed for unmarked questions, *n(o)*-marked questions are more commonly confirmed with repeats than with interjections.[53]

[53] The propotion of repetitional answers reported in this table is much bigger than what Hayashi (2010) reports: Hayashi says that repetitional answers account for 18% of the cases while interjections account for 59%. This difference is likely to stem from the difference in the scopes our studies. While Hayashi's collection includes newsmarks (Jefferson 1981) and news receipts, which tend to receive minimal confirmations rather than repetitional answers, the collection used for this chapter consists of questions that request information.

Table 4-4: Distribution of forms of confirming answers to unmarked and *n(o)*-marked questions

	Unmarked questions	*N(o)*-marked questions
Interjection confirmation	29 (40%)	13 (24%)
Repetitional confirmation	26 (36%)	28 (53%)
Other forms of confirmation	18 (24%)	12 (23%)
Total	73 (100%)	53 (100%)

That *n(o)*-marked questions are more likely to be confirmed with repeats than unmarked questions are is compatible with our analyses of the particle *no* and repetitional answers: *no* indexes the speaker's orientation towards disconfirmations, and thus, to confirm a *n(o)*-marked question and offset such orientation takes more than an acquiescent confirmation with an interjection.

What we observe here is a coordination of epistemic stances between questioners and answerers. By marking questions with *no*, questioners indicate that they do not consider the hypothesis they are putting forward to be the likely, expected state of affairs. Such an epistemic stance then suggests that it will take more than a minimal acquiescent confirmation for them to accept the proposition to be true. I argue that this accounts for the frequent occurrences of repetitional answers after *n(o)*-marked questions. By indexing stronger commitment and assertiveness to the answer through repeats, answerers counter the questioners' uncertainty about the issue. On the other hand, when questioners convey a relatively high degree of confidence in their hypotheses with *ka*, rising intonation, *desho* or *ne/yone*, an acquiescent, minimal confirmation, which is done with interjections, suffices.

We can observe participants' orientation to such an epistemic stance of questioners in the data. Let us examine Extract 4-29, part of which we earlier saw as Extract 4-22. This is drawn from a conversation at a dinner party hosted by Kazu and her husband. Among various foods, a plate of sushi is served to each party. A little after they started the dinner, Yuki, one of the guests, asks a question at line 1.

Extract 4-29 [TMD: Sushi]

```
1 ->   Yuki:   anta osushi wa tariru  no?
               you  sushi  TP suffice P
               Hey, (is there) enough sushi?

2              (0.2)

3 =>   Kazu:   -tariru  yo?,
                suffice FP
                 (There is) enough yo?,

4              (.)

5 =>   Kazu:   masao san no mada:- [aru,
               Masao HT  L  still   be
               (There) still is Masao's.

6      Yuki:                      [na-kuru yotee shiteta   no?=
                                      come plan  doing_PST P
                                   Were (you) planning to have (him)
                                   come no?

7      Kazu:   =mochiron.
                Of course.

8              (0.8)

9      Kazu:   m:ochiron.
               O:f course.

10             (0.6)

11     Yuki:   osewa   kakema[su.
               trouble cause ((formulaic))
              (I'm) giving (you) a trouble. ((=Thank you/Sorry for
              the trouble.))

12     Kazu:                 [m:ochiron.
                              O:f course.

13     Maki:   itadakimasu.
               ((formulaic expression to say before starting to
               eat))
```

As it turns out later in this conversation, Yuki's husband Masao decided to join the party at the last minute, and he is expected to arrive later. Without seeing an extra sushi plate on the table, Yuki has reason to suspect that Kazu might not have gotten a chance to prepare a sushi plate for Masao. Although the reason for asking the question is not articulated at this point, the orientation toward a disaffirmative

answer is conveyed through *no*. At line 3, Kazu responds to this question with a repetitional answer to offset Yuki's concern and assures her that there is enough sushi for Masao with upgraded confirmation and agentivity. She then reassures her further that there is another sushi plate saved for Masao (line 5). The follow-up question at line 6 is also *n(o)*-marked, indicating that Yuki would find it unexpected and surprising if Kazu was planning to have her husband join the dinner. This question is responded to not with a repetitional answer but with another type of upgraded confirmation, *mochiron* 'of course' (lines 7 and 9).[54]

Extract 4-30 (partially presented as Extract 4-21 earlier) is another example of a *n(o)*-marked question responded to with a repetitional answer. Yui, Aki and Emi are talking about their mutual friend Hiro and, in particular, about his accent. Emi is from Kansai, the west region of Japan, while Yui and Aki are from the Tokyo area and speak the Tokyo dialect. As is confirmed through a question-answer sequence at lines 2/4, Hiro is originally from Hiroshima but then lived in Kyoto, a major city in Kansai, when he was a student.[55] According to Emi, although Hiro thinks he is a Kansai dialect speaker (line 1), his Kansai dialect sounds strange (line 17) (Hiroshima is geographically a part of the Kansai area, as Aki points out at line 10, but its dialect is often considered not to be a variety of the Kansai dialect.) Our focus is on the question-answer sequence at lines 12-15, in which Yui asks Emi if it is *not* the Hiroshima dialect that Hiro speaks and Emi confirms that it is *not*.

---

[54] Stivers (2011) studies the use of the English "of course" as an answer to questions. She demonstrates that this token conveys that the question was "not askable", and shows that the Japanese equivalent token *mochiron* serves the same function. Adopting such a stance here is another way to offset Yuki's orientation to the possibility that there may not be enough sushi for Masao.

[55] While our focus is on the question and repetitional answer at lines 12-15, Yui's question at line 2 is also answered with a repeat (line 4). This repetitional answer is slightly different from other repetitional answers examined in the chapter in that it is not the main predicate or the entire question that is repeated in the answer. Emi repeats the word "Hiroshima", not "tsutta" (the reduced of a quotation maker and a report verb 'say'). A practice like this − repeating part of the question other than its main predicate to confirm it − is a research topic in its own right, which we cannot pursue in this thesis.

Extract 4-30 [TD: dialect]

```
1       Emi:    jibun de wa are  da to o[motte[ru kedo,
                self  by TP that CP QT think       but
                (He) thinks (he) is ((a Kansai dialect speaker)),

2       Yui:                             [Hiro [shima ttsutta kke,
                                          Hiroshima   QT.say  Q
                                          Did (you) say (he is from)
                                          Hiroshima?

3       Aki:                                   [hh,

4       Emi:    >Hiro[shima.<
                >(He is from) Hiroshima.<

5       Aki:         [nantoka ya naa, tte iu  yone:,
                      blah    CP FP   QP  say FP
                     (He) says blah-blah yanaa ((a particle used only
                     in the Kansai dialect)), doesn't he?

6       Emi:    nn[:,
                Yeah,

7       Yui:      [<e   demo Hiroshima da ke^do kansai ben-
                    ITJ but  Hiroshima CP but   Kansai dialect-
                    <E but, (he is) from Hiroshima but (he speaks)
                    the  Kansai dialect-

8               (0.6)

9       Yui:    [Hiroshi-
                 Hiroshi-

10      Aki:    [Hiroshima tte kansai jan.
                 Hiroshima TP  Kansai TAG
                 Hiroshima is (a part of) Kansai.

11              (0.4)

12 ->   Yui:    Hiroshima ben     ^de wa nai no?,
                Hiroshima dialect  CP TP not P
                (It) is ^not the Hiroshima dialect ((that he speaks))
                no?,

13              (0.8)

14 =>   Emi:    Hiroshima ben:::  de wa nai:: nai. ^deteru
                Hiroshima dialect CP TP not   not  ^comes.out
                (It) i::sn't- isn't the Hiroshima dialect.
```

```
15 =>  Emi:    to omou demo.
               QT think but
               (I) think (it) comes out, though.

16             (0.2)

17     Emi:    nanka    hen.
               somewhat weird
               (His Kansai dialect) is somewhat weird.
```

After verifying that Hiro is from Hiroshima (lines 2/4), Yui asks Emi if he does *not* speak the Hiroshima dialect even though he is from there. It is reasonable to imagine that people would speak a dialect with which they grew up (Hiroshima dialect) rather than the one with which they spent only several years (Kansai dialect), and that seems to be the point that Yui is raising with the turn at line 7, which was cut-off and reissued at line 12 as a *no*-marked question. This *no*-marked question (line 12) conveys Yui's stance that she would find it unexpected and surprising if it is *not* the Hiroshima dialect that Hiro speaks. Emi confirms this question with a repetitional answer at lines 14-15. Her initial response includes sound stretches (*Hiroshima ben::: de wa nai:: nai.* 'It is no::t, is not the Hiroshima dialect.'), displaying that she is reflecting on how Hiro sounds in answering the question. She then adds that the Hiroshima accent is hearable in his Kansai dialect. This addition may be responsive to the stance Yui has taken: although he does not speak the Hiroshima dialect, Yui is right in expecting him to speak it, and it does show itself in his speech. Here again, a question is formulated with the particle *no* and conveys its speaker's low readiness to accept the proposition, and it is responded to with a repetitional answer.

The third example of a *n(o)*-marked question is found in Extract 4-31. Kumi is a potter and gives lessons to her student Eiko at her home. They are taking a lunch break, and Kumi's daughter Nami, who lives in the neighborhood is joining them for lunch. Eiko brought a lunch box for herself, and Kumi and Nami are preparing drinks and food to be shared. At line 1, Nami asks Eiko (=Miss Sasaki) if she has brought chopsticks, marking it with the final particle *no.*

Extract 4-31 [Pottery: chopsticks]

```
1 ->   Nami:   Sasaki san ohashi     an   no:?,
               Sasaki HT  chopsticks have P
               Do Miss. Sasaki ((=you)) have chopsticks no?

2              (.)
```

```
3 =>   Eiko:   aru  yo?, me(h)zura(h)shiku motteru no yo
               have FP   unusually         have    P  FP
               (I) have (them) yo? Unusually, I have (them)

4 =>           [kyoo  wa. .HHH itsumo sensee [no ohashi      to-
                today TP       always teacher L  chopstick   with
               today  no  yo.  .hhh  Usually,  (I)  ((borrow))  the
               teacher's-

5      Nami:   [hh

6      Kumi:                                      [gomen ne=
                                                   sorry FP
                                                  (I'm) sorry

7              =ochitukana[kute ne:.
                calm.not        FP
                it is busy.
```

There is nothing observable in the context that indicates that Nami has a reason to suspect that Eiko does not have chopsticks. However, Eiko's response shows that she takes the question to have such an implication. Eiko responds with a repetitional answer (*aru yo?,* 'I have them?,' and then extends the turn saying that she *unusually* has chopsticks; unusually because she *usually* borrows Kumi's. This explanation, together with the use of the particle *no* in this TCU, embodies Eiko's stance that is congruent with Nami's in seeing the fact that Eiko has chopsticks this day as unexpected. [56]

In contrast, when a *n(o)*-marked question is responded with a *yes*-answer, it is treated as insufficient. Extract 4-32 (examined earlier as Extracts 4-5a, 4-8 and 4-25) is an example.

Extract 4-32 [Thai: towel1]

```
1 ->   Emi:    kore tsukatte ii no?,
               this use      ok P
               Is (it) ok to use this ((towel)) no?

2      Yui:    nn,
               Yeah,

3              (0.8)
```

[56] In this context, the question is asked as a 'pre-offer' (Terasaki 2004[1976]) of chopsticks: if Eiko disaffirms Nami's question at line 3, Nami is most likely to offer chopsticks for her. In this context, the use of the particle *no* in the question and making it easier for Eiko to provide a disaffirmative answer can be understood as a pro-social move.

```
4      Emi:    dare no ka (0.3) [(shira nai kedo),
               who  N  or         know  not but
               Whose ((this towel is)), (0.3) (I) don't know (it),
               but,

5      Yui:                     [ruumii no da kedo- (0.2)
                                 roomie N  CP  but
                                (It's) (my) roomie's, but (0.2)

6              tsuka washite moratteru.
               use   let     getting
                (I'm) using (it) ((she lets me)).
```

As we discussed earlier, Emi is concerned about the possibility that the towel belongs not to Yui but to Yui's roommate and thus it is not okay to use the towel. The particle *no* in Emi's question conveys such a stance. Yui's interjection is not sufficient to offset this predisposition, and Emi declines to act upon this response and solicits a further account from Yui.

In summary, Japanese *n(o)*-marked polar questions convey that the speakers consider the proposition to be surprising, counter to expectation or unlikely to be true. They are thus not ready to accept a confirming answer, and it takes more than an acquiescent minimum confirmation (i.e., an interjection) for them to be convinced that the proposition is true. This questioner stance makes it relevant for recipients of *n(o)*-marked questions to respond with a repetitional answer and provide committed, assuring confirmation to counterbalance the questioner's stance. The availability of this grammatical resource (i.e., the particle *no*) thus provides an environment in which repetitional answers are produced and treated as an appropriate, unproblematic response: they do not resist the terms of the questions but provide the right degree of assurance that was made relevant by questioners.

This finding helps us identify other interactional contingencies that invite repetitional answers. That is, even when a question is not marked with *no*, it may convey the speaker's low readiness to accept a confirming answer. The following section will focus on such cases.

4.7.2 Sequential environment

As we saw in Table 4-4, 36% of unmarked questions are confirmed with repeats. Thus, the particle *no* alone does not account for the usage of repeats as a

means to confirm a polar question. After all, it is possible for answerers to use repetitional answers arbitrarily to indicate strong commitment to the answer. However, in most of the cases in which unmarked questions are confirmed with repeats, we can identify an interactional contingency that suggests that the questioner is oriented to a disconfirmation. That is, the sequential environment in which a question is asked can contribute to mark the question as tilted toward a disconfirmation and thus to invite a repetitional answer.

In Extract 4-33, Yoko has been looking at a picture book that Kazu showed to her. She was flipping the pages, making comments on each page, and then stopped flipping, returned to the cover page and produced what were hearable as summative comments at lines 1 and 5. These moves display that Yoko has finished looking at the book. It is then that Kazu asks a question at line 6, *ryoohoo mita?* 'Did (you) look at both ((sides))?'. Since the book is bound in an unusual way, one might not notice that the book is double-sided.

Extract 4-33 [IL: both sides]

```
1       Yoko:   sugoi   na kore.
                amazing FP this
                This is amazing.

2       Kazu:   ne:,
                FP
                I know,

3       Yoko:   nn,
                ITJ
                Yeah,

4               (1.5)

5       Yoko:   omoshiroi.
                interesting
                (It's) interesting.

6 ->    Kazu:   ryoohoo mita?
                both    saw
                Did (you) look at both ((sides))?

7               (.)

8 ->    Kazu:   ura[omo-
                back.front
                The front and back ((sides))-
```

```
9 =>  Yoko:      [mita yo?,ura  o[mote tte koko kara hajimatte
                  saw  FP  back front  QT  here from starting
                  (I) looked yo? Back and front, starting from here

10    Kazu:                      [un.
                                  ITJ
                                  Yeah.

11    Kazu:   un.
              ITJ
              Yeah.
```

Questioning Yoko if she has looked at both sides in this context, where Yoko has displayed that she has finished looking at the book, indicates that Kazu is orienting to the possibility that Yoko has *not* sufficiently looked at the book − she may not have looked at the back side of the book. Yoko seems to be aware of this orientation; she responds with an upgraded confirmation through a repeat (*mita yo?,* '(I) looked.'). She then demonstrates that she did look at both sides (instead of 'claiming' or 'exhibiting', see Sacks [1992]) by showing how she started and then proceeded to the back side (line 9). This addition indicates that Yoko finds it relevant to provide evidence for her confirming answer, which then suggests that she hears Kazu to be oriented to the possibility that Yoko has *not* read the book through. Thus, in this turn, Yoko consistently orients to and works to offset Kazu's predisposition toward a disconfirmation.

Extract 4-34 is another example in which a question conveys the speaker's orientation toward a disaffirmative answer through its sequential positioning. This is an excerpt from a telephone conversation between two females both of whom live in the United States. Sumi recently moved from Colorado to Wyoming and has been complaining that the community is very small and it is difficult to socialize. At lines 1-2/3-4, Sumi says that although people in the community know of her because she is the only Japanese there, people cannot remember her Japanese name. Kayo asks whether there are young people at line 9.

Extract 4-34 [CallFriend1605: young people]

```
1     Sumi:   dakara: i- minna    watashi no koto  wa shitteru n da
              so        everyone I       L  thing TP know     N CP
              So everyone knows me,
```

2 Sumi: kedo:, [.hh
but
but

3 Kayo: [nn
Mm-hm

4 Sumi: watashi ga yappari: nantenoka na:, .hh nn,
I SP after.all how.do.I.say FP yeah
I, after all, how do (I) say, .hh yeah,

5 mutsukashii. namae o oboeru no ga?,
difficult name O remember N SP
(it's) hard. (For them) to remember (my) name.

6 (.)

7 Sumi: ehhe

8 Kayo: aa aa nn hm: hm: hm: hm:
ITJ ITJ yeah yeah yeah yeah yeah
Oh oh, yeah yeah yeah yeah yeah.

9 -> Kayo: [.hh ano: wakai hito i nai?sochira ni.=
well young person be not there at
.hh Uhm, aren't there young people? there?

10 Sumi: [.hh de-
.hh and-

11 => Sumi: =i nai **n** desu.
be not P CP
There aren't **n.**

12 (0.2)

13 Kayo: a minna- nenpai no hito,
ITJ everyone elderly N person
Oh is everyone elderly?

14 Sumi: e- ano otoshiyori no kata ka:, ano:
yes/ITJ well elderly L person or well
Yes, well, (they are) elderly people, or, uhm

15 watashi gurai no nendai no kata demo minasan yappa
I about L age L person also everyone
of.course
if (they) are at about my age,

16 .hh kodomo...
child
.hh everyone (has) children...

It is evident from the context that Kayo is asking the question at line 9 as a way of suggesting another thing Maki could do in order to improve her social life, i.e., find young people and socialize with them. Thus, Kayo is oriented to getting an answer that there *are* young people. Recall that in Japanese, confirmation tokens *nn* or *hai* and disconfirmation tokens *nnn* or *iie* are used to mark confirmation or disconfirmation with the preceding speaker, not the positivity or negativity of the propositional content of the preceding utterance (see 4.3.1). Thus, this question conveys Kayo's expectation − not through the particle *no* but through its placement within the sequential context − for a disconfirming positive answer: 'No, there are young people'.[57] Instead, Maki provides a negative answer with a repeat: *i nai n desu* 'there aren't' (line 3). Here again, a repetitional answer is used to respond to a polar question that is loaded with an orientation toward disconfirmation to counter the orientation embodied in the question (see Koshik 2002; Heritage 2002b, 2012b).

This section has shown that questions that convey the speaker's orientation toward a disconfirming answer recurrently make a repetitional answer more relevant than an interjection answer. I argue that it is because the commitment and assurance conveyed with a repeat is pertinent to counter the questioner's lack of readiness to accept the proposition, while the minimal confirmation marked with an interjection is adequate when the questioners have conveyed that they are anticipating an affirmative answer.

However, it is not to say that answerers *always* respond with a repeat when a question speaker is oriented to a disconfirmation. There are cases when repeats are avoided even though questioners have displayed orientation to a disconfirmation. In the next section, I will examine such cases and address yet another issue that is consequential to the stances conveyed in questions, namely, orientation to minimizing disaffiliation.

[57] Heritage (2002b) demonstrates that negative interrogatives in English are treated as statements rather than questions. Although I do not have qualitative evidence, it seems that only a certain subset of negative interrogatives in Japanese are heard as statements, and the negative interrogative in line 9 in Extract 4-34 is treated as a question, not as a statement.

4.8 Commitment to a position vs. avoiding disaffiliation

In the previous section, I demonstrated that when a questioner has conveyed an orientation to a disconfirmation, a confirming answer is recurrently done with a repeat to convey strong commitment and assurance to counter-balance the question speaker's predisposition. However, there is another issue on which this pattern is contingent: orientation to minimizing disaffiliation. When strongly committing to an answer with a repeat implies committing to a stance that is confrontational or disaffiliative with an interlocutor, repeats may be avoided.

As has been discussed in the literature, questions can be a vehicle to convey incipient disaffiliation (e.g., Pomerantz 1984a; Schegloff 1984; Heritage 2002b; Koshik 2002, 2005; Heinemann 2008). When a question is loaded with such an implication, providing a committed confirmation with a repetitional answer may amplify the incipient disaffiliation, and thus tends to be avoided. For example, let us look at Extract 4-35 (partially shown as Extract 4-18 earlier). Tomo has brought a bottle of sparkling wine to a dinner hosted by Saki and her husband Ken, and when he tried to open the bottle, Ken let it spout out onto the floor. While waiting for Saki to get a cloth to clean the floor with, Tomo asks if the bottle was lying down (line 1), and Saki affirms this with an interjection (line 8). Tomo's question is marked with the particle *n(o)*.[58]

Extract 4-35 [DWT: fridge]

```
1 ->   Tomo:   ko-  yokoni  natteta n?,
               thi- sideway was     P
               Thi- was (it) lying n?,

2                    (1.2)

3      Saki:   do- doo shita n [daroo.
               ho- how did   P  Q
               (I) wonder what happened,

4      Tomo:                   [n

                    (0.8)
```

[58] In the Tokyo dialect, the particle *n(o)* is realized as *no* at the turn-final position. However, in Tomo's dialect (Osaka dialect), it realizes as *n* at the turn-final position.

```
5       Saki:   AA  AA  AA!
                ITJ ITJ ITJ
                OH OH OH !

6 ->    Saki:   ano reezoo[ko:?
                uhm refrigerator
                Uhm (in the) refrigerato:r?

7 =>    Tomo:             [nn,=
                           ITJ
                          Yeah,=

8 =>    Saki:   =un:,
                 ITJ
                =Yeah:,

9       Tomo:   ^hunde: [nanka:    a[re shi tara natta  n kana:,
                 then    something that do  then became N Q
               (I wonder) ^that's why (it) happened when (Ø) did that
               ((=when Ken tried to open it)),

10      Saki:           [(   )      [soo  ka ree-
                                     that Q  refri-
                                     I see, refri-
11      Saki:   wakara n  [kedo are-
                know   not but  that
                (I) don't know but-

12      Tomo:             [i^tsumo koo- konai sena nakanak
                           usually this this  do   easily
                           ^Usually (they) don't

13              aka  hen noni   naa. migotoni,
                open not though FP   amazingly
                open easily unless Ø do like this. (It did open)
                amazingly,
```

As has been discussed, *n(o)*-marked questions are more likely to solicit repetitional answers than interjection answers. Thus, Saki's use of an interjection at line 8 here is rather marked. An account for this can be found by closely analyzing the interactional context in which Tomo's question emerged. Tomo's question is hearable as asking for an account for why the sparkling wine spouted out. As it becomes explicit later at line 9, Tomo suspects that it might have happened because of how it was placed in the refrigerator. This can then be hearable as a possible accusation against Saki, who is the one who received the bottle from Tomo and put it in the refrigerator. The particle *n* in this turn, by conveying Tomo's stance that lying the bottle in the refrigerator is something that she would

not expect, makes the turn sound even more accusatory. Under this circumstance, confirming Tomo's question with a repeat and assertively committing to the proposition that the bottle was lying is not in Saki's interest: a repetitional answer could be vulnerable to a hearing that Saki is taking an agentive stance toward having placed the bottle lying down in the refrigerator, which could be treated as confrontational. Thus, although our analysis thus far predicts the use of a repeat following the *n(o)*-marked question, the orientation to avoiding and minimizing disaffiliation accounts for Saki's use of an interjection in this extract.

In contrast, when a question that conveys an incipient disaffiliation is responded to with a repetitional answer, it can be heard as an outright confrontation, as is the case in Extract 4-36, a telephone conversation between Megu and Yuta. They are talking about movies, and Yuta has been criticizing Oliver Stone's movies while Megu has been defending them.

Extract 4-36 [CallFriend1841: Awakening]

```
1       Megu:   demo oribaa sutoon no aweekuning to wa:: ii   toka-
                but  Oliver Stone L   Awakening  QT TP   good etc.
                But didn't (you) think Awakening by Oliver Stone

2               ii   to omowa   nakatta?
                good QT thought not
                was good?

3       Yuta:   .hh awee[keningu:[:?
                .hh Awa:kening?

4       Megu:           [t-      [nn,
                                  ITJ
                                  Yeah,

5 ->    Yuta:   ii   to omotta:?
                good QT thought
                Did (you) think (it) was good?

6 =>    Megu:   .hh atashi wa are  wa kekoo  ii   to omotta  kedo:?
                    I      TP that TP fairly good QT thought but
                .hh I thought that was fairly good?,

7       Yuta:   so   kka::,
                that Q
                I see,

8       Megu:   nn_
                ITJ
                Yeah_
```

```
9     Yuta:   ma   omoshiroi   eega  da tta kedo:,
              well interesting movie CP PST but
              Well (it) was an interesting movie, but

10    Megu:   nn

11    Yuta:   n::::[::
              Hmmmmm

12    Megu:         [.hh teka- ^engi   ga yoka tta no ka[na,
                         rather acting SP good PST N  Q
                     .hh Maybe (it) was ^acting that was good.

13    Yuta:                                              [engi   wa=
                                                          acting TP
                                                          (I)=

14                =umai to omotta.
                   good QT thought
                  =thought the acting was good.
```

At line 1, Megu brings up another movie that she thinks is directed by Oliver Stone, *Awakening*, and asks Yuta if he liked it. This question explicitly conveys Megu's positive evaluation of the movie: its preface *demo* 'but' (line 1) works to invite an evaluation from Yuta that is contrastive with his negative evaluation of Oliver Stone's other movies that they have already discussed; it is formulated as a negative interrogative, which, in English, and presumably in Japanese as well, is used to indicate the speaker's position (Heritage 2002b; Koshik 2002), that she thought the movie was good.

Following this question is not Yuta's answer but an insert expansion sequence. Yuta initiates a repair sequence by repeating the part of question (*Awakening?)* at line 3, which is hearable as a harbinger of a disaffiliating response (Schegloff 1996b). Yuta then produces another utterance that is not an answer to the question (line 5), asking a counter question if Megu liked it. This again conveys Yuta's disaffiliative stance, i.e., negative evaluation of the movie, given that Megu has already indicated that she liked the movie (lines 01-02). Thus, giving an affirmative answer to this question would be disaffiliating from Yuta's evaluation of the movie. Here, instead of attempting to minimize the possible disaffiliation with a *yes*-answer as Saki did in Excerpt 4-35, Megu responds with a repetitional answer (line 6). This answer is designed to be explicitly contrastive with or challenging of Yuta. Non-obligatory articulation of the subject *atashi* 'I' marked

with the contrastive topic particle *wa* indicates that Megu is contrasting her view with the view Yuta has implied, and finishing the utterance with the conjunctive *kedo* 'but' accompanying the rising intonation sounds to be eliciting an opposing view from Yuta. The repetitional answer, together with these resources, is used in this example to commit to the evaluative stance that disaffiliates from the interlocutor's to directly confront him.

We saw earlier that repeats are used to mark strong commitment to an answer and counter-balance the questioner's orientation to disconfirmation. This in turn means that repetitional answers are to be avoided if committing to the answer risks amplifying incipient disaffiliation. Thus, interactants' orientation to minimizing disaffiliation is another, cross-cutting interactional contingency that underlies the use of repeats and interjections in answering polar questions.

4.9 Conclusion

As I said at the beginning of the chapter, the production of question-answer sequences hinges on epistemic congruence: interactants agree on an epistemic asymmetry in which questioners lack the relevant information and answerers have it. What we have observed throughout this chapter is participants' orientations to a finer level of epistemic stances. Speakers of polar questions index varying degrees of certainty or readiness to accept the proposition to be true: the particle *no* conveys that the speaker is oriented to the possibility that the proposition is *not* true, and thus is not quite ready to accept the proposition, while other turn final forms of polar questions adopt a stance that they are biased toward confirmation. Repetitional answers are found to be produced to provide just the right degree of assurance that has been made relevant by the questions, either through the use of *no* or through the sequential context. Thus, the different forms of polar questions and answers we have examined here are linguistic resources through which interactants negotiate and establish what is a likely, expectable state of affairs and what is surprising or counter to expectation in their intersubjective world. As Levinson (2012a) suggests, information has "economical" values in our social world, and it matters to interactants who owns and is able to provide how much information to whom. The findings of this chapter may be considered to suggest that the quality of information also matters: some pieces of information are more surprising or unexpected than others, and thus have more values. When questioners

mark a question with the particle *no*, admitting that the proposition is unlikely or counter to expectation, this warrants the occurrence of an assertive, assured answer done with a repeat. This can be seen as a way for a questioner to attribute a high value to the information and answerer endorsing it. It is this level of fine congruence of epistemic stances, in addition to information transfer, that we observed in this chapter.

The chapter also addressed another interactional contingency that can be consequential to the use of interjections and repeats. Questions can convey or adumbrate disaffiliation or challenge (Pomerantz 1984a; Schegloff 1984; Heritage 2002b; Koshik 2002, 2005; Heinemann 2008). When a question is loaded with a disaffiliative stance, committing to the proposition through a repetitional answer can amplify the emerging disconfirmation and thus may be avoided. This orientation to avoiding and minimizing disaffiliation was shown to be a possible factor that underlies the use of interjections.

The findings have an important implication for our understanding of preferred answers to polar questions. Raymond (2003) argues that interjection answers are the type-conforming, preferred form of responses to polar questions: the interrogative syntax inherently makes relevant confirmation or disconfirmation, and the linguistic resources that are devoted to doing that, i.e., *yes* or *no*, are the default, type-conforming response. However, as has been demonstrated throughout this chapter, this preference for type-conforming answers needs qualifying. In some languages including Japanese, repetitional answers are used far more often than in others. It is not an adequate account to consider that the tolerance for nonconforming, dispreferred answers is higher in some languages than in others. Instead, each language provides different paradigmatic systems by reference to which different forms of answers have to be studied and characterized. For instance, Sorjonen (2001a, 2001b) reports that in Finnish interaction, repetitional answers are the prototypical form of responses to a specific class of questions ('V-interrogatives') while interjection answers are the most common form of responses to other classes of questions. This chapter has observed a similar division of labor between alternative forms of answers in Japanese interaction. Repeats are used to convey the speakers' commitment to and assurance of the proposition while interjections convey acquiescent acceptance of the proposition. And repeats are more relevant and appropriate when questioners have conveyed low readiness to accept the proposition through the use of *no* or through preceding sequential context, while interjections are more relevant when such a stance has not been

marked. Thus, it is participants' orientation to this finer level of attunement or congruence of epistemic stances that the alternative forms of answers are used for, and we cannot assume that ‘polar questions’ is a reliable homogeneous category that makes a single form of responses relevant across contexts and across languages. A repetitional answer, which is an agentive, disagreement implicative and dispreferred response in one context or language, can be a fitted, appropriate and preferred response in another.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

In Chapter 1, I started this thesis with a discussion of how knowledge is socially distributed and how territories of knowledge are patrolled, maintained and negotiated in everyday interaction. It is from this standpoint that the subsequent chapters (Chapters 2, 3 and 4) investigated how participants' orientation to epistemicity – relative distribution of information and knowledge – is manifested in Japanese everyday interaction. Adopting the methodology of conversation analysis (CA), I have demonstrated that participants attend to, negotiate and establish who knows what to what extent better than whom, while at the same time assessing a referent together, telling stories or requesting information. To conclude this thesis, this chapter summarizes the study's findings and discusses their theoretical implications.

5.1 Summary of findings

The examples discussed in this thesis have repeatedly borne witness to the prevalence and significance of epistemicity in social interaction. In all three environments examined − assessment sequences, informing sequences and polar question sequences − we observed interactional practices that are dedicated to deal with this issue. More specifically, we saw how interactants achieve epistemic congruence − compatible, matching views about knowledge distribution and states of information in question. Table 5-1 summarizes the aspects of epistemic concerns we observed in each environment.

Table 5-1: Manifestations of epistemic congruence

	Relevant epistemic concern
Assessment sequence	Whether interactants have equivalent epistemic access to a referent, or one has epistemic primacy over the other
Informing sequence	Whether information presented as news/ informative is receipted as news/ informative
Polar question-answer sequence	Whether the proposition is expected or counter to expectation

In Chapter 2, I examined how participants negotiate and establish who has epistemic primacy while at the same achieving agreement or disagreement on the evaluation of referents. The primary focus of the analysis was the distribution of final particles like *yo* in contrast with *ne* and *yone*, and their correlation with the use of intensifiers. It was demonstrated that the particle *yo* is a resource for *claiming* epistemic primacy, and the practice of intensification is a resource for *providing support* to the epistemic claim when it is challenged by interlocutors. The notion of epistemic congruence and incongruence emerged from our observation of sequence expansion, which is an indication of the 'dispreferred' status of a response (Schegloff 2007). When interactants agree on their relative epistemic states, whether they are symmetrical or asymmetrical, sequences tend to close without elaborate expansion. On the other hand, when they disagree on their epistemic states, the sequence expands even if they agree on their assessments. Based on this, it was argued that participants not only accomplish agreement on their evaluations of a referent in assessment sequences, but they also establish agreement regarding who knows what better.

It was also discussed in this chapter that a claim of epistemic primacy, which generally diminishes affiliation and social solidarity (Heritage and Raymond 2005), can be an affiliative move if it is in a disagreement with an interlocutor's self-deprecating comments. It follows that interactional consequences that an epistemic stance leads into cannot be understood without taking other interactional contingencies into account.

Chapter 3 examined informing sequences, where first speakers deliver information as newsworthy or informative while adopting an evaluative stance to

the reported matter. In this chapter, the analysis shed light on the dilemma between acknowledging interlocutors' experiences as unique and remarkable on the one hand, and relating to and affiliating with them, on the other. My analyses showed that three interactional issues motivate the four-turn organization that we recurrently find in informing sequences: achieving epistemic congruence, affiliation and alignment. It was demonstrated that different forms of informing responses – newsmarks *honto(ni)* 'really' or *uso* 'no way' and anaphoric responses: interjections *hee* and *hmm*, and affiliative comments – attend to these three different but intertwined aspects of cooperation at varying degrees. The chapter also discussed different epistemic bases for affiliative comments and their consequences to the development of the sequence: some affiliative comments do not index or require independent epistemic bases and stay in the domain of the informing speaker's experience, while others index independent epistemic bases and move away from the informing speaker's experience to the informing recipient's. Final particles *ne* and *yone* were shown to be used to distinguish these two types of affiliative comments.

Chapter 4 turned to sequences of polar questions and answers. The focus was on alternative means of affirming polar questions: interjections (*hai* or *nn* 'yes' or 'yeah') and repeats. First, it was shown that the former form of answer is a default way of confirming while the latter conveys an upgraded, more committed confirmation. It was then demonstrated that unmarked polar questions convey that the speakers are expecting confirmative answers, while *n(o)*-marked questions suggest that they consider the proposition to be unexpected or surprising. The different degrees of committedness to the proposition that answerers display through interjections and repeats were shown to match the question speaker's expectation to the answer: when questioners convey high expectation of confirming answers, a minimal confirmation done with interjections is sufficient and appropriate, but when they exhibit lower readiness to accept confirming answers, more assured, committed confirmation done with repeats are due. An implication is that participants do not only transfer information in polar question sequences. They also achieve an aligned view as to whether a matter is expected and unsurprising, or, unexpected and remarkable. It was also suggested that what makes an answer formally fitted to a question or 'type-conforming' (Raymond 2003) cannot be specified across all forms of polar questions. Instead, it depends on the epistemic stance that was adopted by answerers. After all, managing 'who knows what better than whom and to what extent' is one central means for us to

structure our social reality. A husband is expected to be, and had better be, more informed about his wife than others (see Sacks [1992 vol. 2:437-443]). A teacher of linguistics should have better knowledge of linguistics than a teacher of physics. Owning and claiming to own privileged knowledge about someone or something, and respecting others' privileged knowledge about certain domains, is a way of defining and maintaining social identities and social relationships. Thus, it amounts to positive politeness to esteem others' territories of knowledge and to negative politeness to respect them (Brown and Levinson 1987).

All these findings are empirical evidence that 'who knows what better than whom and to what extent' is interactionally negotiated, thus shaping turns and sequences of talk. Many grammatical resources that do not look like epistemic stance markers at first sight are employed to 'patrol' and 'defend' one's epistemic territories (Goffman [1971:52], see also Kamio [1990]), as well as respect or challenge those of others. We can thus say that epistemicity is one of the major principles that organize human interaction.

In the following sections, I discuss implications of these findings from three viewpoints. First, I reconsider the notion of epistemicity or epistemic stances in contrast with the notion of action (Section 5.2) and discuss why it is beneficial to tease these notions apart in studying interaction. Second, I discuss this thesis's contribution to the body of literature on Japanese final particles (Section 5.3), and more generally, on Japanese linguistic theory. Third, I consider the rather competitive aspect of human interaction that this thesis has documented in contrast with the view that sees human interaction as generally cooperative (Section 5.4). As final remarks, in Section 5.5, I discuss directions for future research that this study is hoped to motivate.

5.2 Action and epistemicity

The contributions of CA to sociology, linguistics and other fields started with the notion ‘action’: utterances in interaction are produced to accomplish ‘actions’, and turns at talk are tied as coherent sequences not by reference to ‘meanings’ or ‘topics’, but by reference to ‘actions’. Now, we have treated the phenomena that involve participants' orientation to epistemicity as epistemic ‘stances’ that constitute sub-categories of actions. For instance, an agreement can be done with or without a claim of epistemic primacy, an informing can present the

information to be of particular significance, or a polar question may be asked with or without an expression of doubt. In all these accounts, epistemic stances were treated as constitutive of a stance, or a sub-type of an action, but not as an action per se.[59]

Alternatively, one may argue, for instance, that an agreement that claims epistemic primacy and one that does not are two different actions. Schegloff (1996a) takes this latter position in his study of a class of confirmations that are done via exact repeats of the confirmation requests. This is a practice of 'confirming allusions,' conveying 'That's what I have already said', in contrast with interjections (e.g., 'Yeh'), which simply affirms the prior turn without such an implication. Schegloff says that confirming allusions are an 'optional action' (Schegloff 1996b:209) in that their occurrence is not mandated by the previous turn. That is, a confirmation request mandates the production of a confirmation (or disconfirmation) as a response, but whether a confirmation is done with an interjection or repeat is an option left to its recipient. This way, Schegloff treats confirming allusions as an action, while acknowledging that it is an action of a different kind than greetings, requests, or confirmations. Now, which is a more adequate label for epistemicity, as a stance or as an action?

As Levinson (2012b) says, this is not a trivial issue, for it concerns our basic understanding of the organization of interaction. Levinson suggests that we restrict our notion of actions to the "main business" that "the response *must* deal with in the next turn in order to count as an adequate next turn", and on this ground, epistemicity should be treated as a second-order business that is distinct from actions, the first-order business. The findings of this thesis support Levinson's position, for it provides empirical evidence that interactional consequences that result from epistemicity are different from those of a participant's orientation to actions, indicating that epistemicity is usually treated as a second-order business. Let us reflect on this issue for a moment.

At the heart of coherent social interaction lies adjacency pairs, which are organized by reference to actions: once a speaker produces a first pair part (FPP) action, its recipient is normatively obliged to produce a second pair part (SPP) action. When this normative obligation or 'conditional relevance' (Schegloff 1968)

[59] However, as discussed in Chapter 1, knowledge distribution can be a constitutive feature of an action as well (Heritage 2012a). For instance, a question is understood as a request for information by reference to the fact that its speaker supposedly lacks the information (Labov and Fanshel 1977; Pomerantz 1980). Otherwise, the question is likely to be understood as, among other possibilities, a challenge (Heritage 2002b).

is not met, for instance, when an answer is absent after a question, the absence is treated as "official" and "accountable" (Schegloff ibid.; Heritage 1984b). Participants' orientation to this normative constraint is exhibited in various aspects of their conducts in interaction: the violation occurs infrequently (Schegloff ibid.); a failure in providing a SPP is often accounted for (Heritage 1984b);[60] the producer of a FPP may 'sanction' its recipient for *not* providing a SPP (Stivers and Robinson 2006; Stivers and Rossano 2010); a response that is not relevant tends to be produced after a delay (Stivers et al. 2009).

Another aspect of 'business' that has to be dealt with in SPPs is the issue of preference. Most types of FPPs make two alternative responsive actions relevant, and they display which one of them is the 'preferred' response. For instance, assessments prefer agreements to disagreements, invitations prefer acceptance to rejection, and requests prefer compliances to rejections (Pomerantz 1984a; Sacks 1987). This aspect of the constraints that FPPs impose on SPPs leads to consequences similar to those of conditional relevance: dispreferred responses are produced more infrequently than preferred responses; they are often accounted for and/or mitigated; they tend to be delayed. Thus, the constraints that FPPs impose on SPPs with regard to actions – whether it is about the production of conditionally relevant responsive actions, or preferred responsive actions – are significantly consequential to the design and timing of SPPs.

What, then, about interactional consequences that a participant's orientation to epistemicity leads to? We learned that epistemic congruence is preferred to epistemic incongruence. We also saw that the remarkableness of information indexed by first speakers tends to be acknowledged by recipients. These orientations manifest themselves in the form of sequence expansion (Chapters 2, 4), and uneven distribution of epistemically congruent responses and incongruent responses, the former being more frequent than the latter (Chapters 3 and 4). However, we did not observe cases where speakers explicitly account for their epistemic stances or delay epistemically incongruent responses. For instance, agreements that adopt an incongruent epistemic stance were *produced as* a relevant,

[60] When speakers fail to provide an answer in response to a question, the account they often provide is "I don't know" (Heritage 1984b). This 'no-knowledge' response is also used to account for an absence of an agreement or disagreement after an assessment (Pomerantz 1984a, see also Excerpt 1-1, Chapter 1, this thesis). These are cases where epistemic incongruence endangers violation of conditional relevance. However, this is not always the case. In examples we examined in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, speakers perform a single action with various epistemic stances, which may or may not be congruent with their interlocutors' stance.

preferred response, an agreement – without a delay, account or mitigation. In other words, agreements that challenge the preceding speaker's epistemic claim were not officially or demonstrably produced as dispreferred responses. Rather, the epistemic incongruence was 'sneaked in' in the guise of affiliation achieved at the level of action, i.e, agreements.

Therefore, while both the imposition at the level of actions and imposition at the level of epistemicity have observable consequences, they are not the same. It may be argued that there is a continuum in the degree of explicitness or consequentiality among the series of constraints that FPPs impose on SPPs. It follows that participants orient to multiple rules or principles that operate simultaneously in the organization of interaction, and that it is more plausible to tease actions and epistemic stances apart as different entities and consider the latter as stances that may be laminated on the former.

5.3 Japanese particles

In all three environments studied in this thesis, Japanese particles play crucial roles in managing knowledge distribution. The particle *yo* is used to claim epistemic primacy. *Ne* is used to claim shared access, granting interlocutors' access. When it is used in an affiliative response to an informing, it suggests that the basis of the response is the experience that has just been reported. *Yone* is also used when epistemic access is shared between participants, but in contrast with *ne*, it marks a stronger stance based on independent epistemic basis. Affiliative responses to informings are marked with *yone* when they are based on their producer's own, independent experience that is parallel to the informing speaker's. Chapters 3 and 4 examined the use of the particle *no* in informing sequences and in polar question-answer sequences respectively. In Chapter 3, it was discussed that *no* is attached to an informing to present the reported event or matter as of particular significance or newsworthiness. In Chapter 4, we saw that the particle serves the parallel function in polar questions. When polar questions are marked with *no*, it suggests that the questioner sees the proposition to be remarkable or counter to expectation. Thus, while some particles inherently invoke the relative distribution of knowledge among parties, others index the speaker's attitude toward the piece of knowledge in question.

The particles *yo*, *yone* and *ne* have been intensively studied by linguists. Some suggest that these particles are epistemic stance markers, and among them are descriptions that are quite similar to what has been presented in this thesis (e.g., Kamio 1990, 1994; Koyama 1997; Katoh 2001). However, these previous studies and this thesis approach the particles quite differently. The goal of the majority of linguists is to extract a general semantics of the particles from their various usages, and the unit of the analyses is individual utterances or sentences. In contrast, the general semantics of the particles was not the goal but a starting point of the analysis of the current study. It has attempted to describe various interactional significances they achieve when used in sequential context. By adopting this conversation analytic approach, I demonstrated that their interactional significances can be understood only by reference to interactional contingencies. For instance, the use of the particle *yo* can be confrontational in one context (e.g. when the speaker is claiming epistemic primacy despite the interlocutor's resistance) but it can be quite affiliative in another (e.g. when the speaker is denying an interlocutor's self-deprecating comment). These findings deepen our understanding of these grammatical resources and how variable and productive they are in serving their functions in spontaneous interaction.

We also observed that an epistemic stance sets up a context in which the epistemic stance adopted in the following turn is inevitably understood as either congruent or incongruent with it. For instance, the particle *no*, the particle that I characterized as a marker of remarkableness or unexpectedness of the issue, sets up a context for recipients where their response would either acknowledge or deny the remarkableness of the issue (Chapter 4). Also, there were cases when a single speaker switches from one particle to another, thus from one epistemic stance to another, in referring to a single referent over the course of interaction. It was shown that such shifts in epistemic stances are part of the interactional process to resolve epistemic incongruence and accomplish epistemic congruence. Therefore, these particles are used not simply to represent a speaker's individual knowledge state vis-à-vis a referent. Instead, interactants use them so as to align their views with regard to territories of knowledge and information through turn-by-turn talk in interaction (see Heritage 1984a, 1998, 2002a; Haviland 1987; Fox 2001; Morita 2005, etc.). In other words, they are interactional resources to (re)construct intersubjective social reality, just as many other, if not all, grammatical resources are. I hope to have shown how the methodology of CA allows us reveal this aspect of grammar.

5.4 Cooperation and competition in human interaction

Various disciplines agree that the human orientation to cooperate is a prerequisite to human interaction (e.g. Tomasello 2008; Boyd and Richerson 2009). From the perspective of language philosophy, Grice (1975) states that the cooperative principle is what makes understanding possible in interaction: we can infer communicative meanings of utterances only because we can take it for granted that interlocutors talk sincerely, relevantly and clearly, or, more generally, cooperatively. Even hostile or disaffiliative messages are conveyed based on this cooperative principle. Anthropological linguists report various communicative rituals and language usages that speakers of a community rely on to maintain and enhance solidarity. For instance, we know from the literature that languages universally have means to attend to others' wants – wants to be understood and liked and wants to be unimpeded (Brown and Levinson 1987). Conversation analysts find the orientation to cooperation manifested in the structure of interaction. Interactants are generally cooperative in producing relevant responses at the precise moment when they are relevant (Schegloff 1968; Heritage 1984b), and in producing 'preferred' responses (Pomerantz 1984a) rather than dispreferred responses. Deviations from these basic principles are held accountable and sanctionable. We can expect others to cooperatively share information with us when desired, unless there is a particular reason not to, and we do the same with others. In short, from various perspectives, human interaction can be characterized as a cooperative endeavor, in which uncooperative, anti-social hostile conduct is deviant and accountable.

This thesis has shed light on a different aspect of human interaction. While cooperating with one another and working together to achieve affiliation, alignment and solidarity, interactants also work to distinguish themselves from each other with respect to the knowledge or experience they have: they claim to know better than others, care in detail about how their experience is more remarkable than and distinct from others', or make fine distinction of the levels of their (un)knowledgeability. We observed that this orientation can diminish the solidarity that could have been there if they were not concerned about epistemic territories. Why is it that epistemic territories matter, matter enough to compromise solidarity?

One possible answer may be that it matters because it is closely tied to our social identities and relationships. At the beginning of this thesis, we discussed that

knowledge is socially distributed and it is managed in and through everyday interaction: medical knowledge is owned by the category of people 'physicians', not 'patients', and this distribution is reconstructed through details of interactional conduct in medical encounters. Thus, what we know, and what we are known to know, is immediately tied to who we are in our social relations. While constructing solidarity is vital in leading a social life, so is establishing our social identities. In most of the data presented in this thesis, institutional identities of participants had little relevancies. It was friends, family members or sisters-in-law having ordinary conversations. These are people who, by and large, are close to one another, who are in symmetrical friendly relations. This does not mean, however, that they cannot transform their identities into asymmetrical ones at some point during their conversation. Two friends who usually position themselves as equal when talking about a common friend, respective families, etc., may suddenly position themselves as 'a grandmother' on the one hand and 'a mere acquaintance' on the other of a referred-to child (Heritage and Raymond 2005; Raymond and Heritage 2006). Or, cousins who are in a symmetrical relation as long as they are talking about another cousin in the family can get into an asymmetrical relation once the topic is Boston, where one of them is 'a local' and the other 'an alien'. These identities grant interactants different kinds of access to the body of knowledge (Sharrock 1974), different levels of entitlement to talk about the referent (Sacks 1992), or different degrees of power (Drew 1991). Also at stake are social norms. If you are a grandmother of a child and do not have as much information about the child as your friend does, that would make you a 'bad' or 'indifferent' grandmother. It is for these social constructs that we strive to claim our epistemic territories in everyday interaction.

5.5 Future directions

As a final remark, let us consider implications of this thesis for future research. As I discussed at the beginning of this thesis, researchers in various fields are interested in the topic of epistemicity. This is because the management of our own and others' knowledge is acknowledged to be a foundational component of interactional competence, whether we see it cognitively, linguistically or socially. Our findings thus can feed into future work in various fields.

First, much work remains to be done in order to understand the extent to which epistemicity shapes turns and sequences in interaction. This thesis has demonstrated that grammatical resources that are usually not considered as epistemic stance markers in the linguistic literature can be employed to manage epistemic territories. In Chapter 2, for instance, we found that the intensity of an evaluative term is manipulated to provide support for a claim for epistemic primacy. Thus, we cannot limit the scope of our analysis a priori to certain linguistic categories. Further investigation is necessary to fully reveal how an utterance as a whole is designed to manage epistemic territories in interaction.

Another important line of research that should ensue is one that applies the findings to institutional interaction. While some researchers examine how knowledge is dealt with in such contexts as medical interaction (Peräkylä 1998; Stivers 2007; Heritage 2010), legal interaction (Drew 1991) or commercial interaction (Mondada 2011), there are many more institutional contexts to be investigated. For instance, how experts in different professions work out their epistemic statuses when they are engaged in an interdisciplinary collaborative project may be an interesting site to observe interactional constructions of epistemic territories and social identities. Parent-teacher meetings would also be interesting to study, for they are epistemic authorities of the child in different ways. The analytical framework this thesis has adopted together with the findings would help us reveal interactional processes through which participants negotiate their epistemic territories and social relations in such institutional contexts.

This thesis also has implications for future work in the area of the cognitive sciences. It has described ways in which interactants manage epistemic territories. In other words, it has revealed how Theory of Mind (ToM) manifests itself in interactants' conduct in naturally occurring interaction. Thus, our findings can inform us of the functioning of, or malfunctioning of, ToM. For instance, our findings regarding the range of linguistic resources for adopting various epistemic stances may be used as an analytical tool to study interactional behavior of normally developing children in contrast with those with autism spectrum disorders. Autistic people are known to have problems in judging others' knowledge states in false-belief tasks in experimental settings (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985). This is observed in their everyday interactional conduct as well. For instance, Watamaki (1997) finds that a child with autism does not use the Japanese particle *ne*, a marker for shared knowledge, whereas a normally-developing child and a non-autistic child with mental retardation do. Thus, it is considered that autistic children

cannot properly recognize others' knowledge states. However, the appropriate use of epistemic stance markers in spontaneous interaction takes far more than simply 'recognizing others' knowledge states'. As the current thesis has shown, interactants have to attend to social identities and relations among themselves, and rights, responsibility and entitlement that come with them. Affiliation and disaffiliation can interfere with epistemic concerns as well. They have to be able to *negotiate* epistemic territories over sequences of utterances, insisting on or conceding their epistemic claims. A detailed and systematic investigation of interaction with autistic participants may reveal specifically which aspects of these makes their interactional conduct distinct from that of others and allow us to have a finer understanding of the nature of their, and reflexively, normally-developing children's, social cognition.

Finally, the interrelation between social cognition and language is another interesting topic to pursue. As was illustrated in previous chapters, Japanese has a highly systematic grammatical repertoire to adopt epistemic stances: the language places epistemic stance markers primarily at the end of sentential turn constructional units. The particles that adopt epistemic stances examined in this thesis are only part of the repertoire: there are many more. Furthermore, the use of these epistemic stance markers is considered to be obligatory under certain circumstances (Kamio 1990). In other languages, epistemic stance markers are less grammaticized, or grammaticized less systematically. This gap in the availability of grammaticized linguistic resources across languages is said to have influence on the development of ToM of children in different language communities. For instance, Matsui et al. (2008) compare the performances of Japanese-speaking and German-speaking children in a false-belief task. They assert that German does not have an explicit grammaticized means, other than lexical terms, to distinguish the level of certainty while Japanese has a particle *yo*, which they characterize as a marker of certainty and *kana,* a marker of uncertainty. They report that Japanese children display higher sensitivity to others' level of certainty than German children do, and suggest that Japanese children profit from the availability of explicit, grammaticized epistemic markers in developing their cognitive skills to orient to others' knowledge states. Now, with the findings of the current study, we can ask if the availability of grammatical resources interferes with the development of social cognition in a broader sense. Do Japanese children learn to attend to social identities earlier than German children? Would Japanese children acquire the interactional competence to calibrate epistemic stances for the sake of enhancing

affiliation earlier? Future work on these topics will help us deepen our understanding of the interaction between language, cognition and culture.

References

Aoki, Haruo. (1986). “Evidentials in Japanese.” In W. Chafe and J. Nichols (eds.), *Evidentiality: The linguistic coding of epistemology.* Norwood, NJ: Ablex, pp. 223-238.

Aoki, Hiromi. (2008). *Hearership as interactive practice: A multi- modal analysis of the response token* nn *and head nods.* Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Department of Applied Linguistics and TESL, University of California, Los Angeles.

Atkinson, J. Maxwell and Heritage, John (eds.). (1984). *Structures of social action: Studies in conversation analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Baron-Cohen, Simon, Leslie. Alan M and Frith, Uta. (1985). “Does the autistic child have a 'theory of mind'?.” *Cognition* 21(1): 37-46

Boas, Frantz. (1911). *Handbook of American Indian languages.* Washington, DC: Government Publication.

Bolinger, Dwight. (1957). *Interrogative structures of American English: The direct question.* Alabama: University of Alabama Press.

Bolinger, Dwight. (1978). "Yes-no questions are not alternative questions." In H. Hiz (ed.), *Questions*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, pp. 87-105.

Boyd, Robert and Richerson, Peter. J. (2009). "Culture and the evolution of human cooperation." *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society (B)* 364: 3281-3288.

Brown, Penelope. and Levinson, Stephen C. (1987). *Politeness: Some universals in language usage*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brown, Penelope. (2010). "Questions and their responses in Tzeltal." *Journal of Pragmatics* 42: 2627–2648.

Chafe, Wallace. (1976). "Givenness, contrastiveness, definiteness, subjects, topics and point of view." In C. Li (ed.) *Subject and topic*. New York: Academic Press, pp. 25-55.

Chafe, Wallace. (1986). “Evidentiality in English conversation and academic writing.” In W. Chafe and J. Nichols (eds.), *Studies in evidentiality*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, pp. 261-272.

Chafe, Wallace. (1994). *Discourse, consciousness and time: The flow and displacement of consciousness experience in speaking and writing.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Chafe, Wallace. (1998). "Language and the flow of thought." In M. Tomasello (ed.), *The new psychology of language: Cognitive and functional approaches to language structure.* New Jersey/London: Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 93-112.

Chafe, Wallace and Nichols, Johanna. (1986). *Evidentiality: The linguistic coding of epistemology.* Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Cheng, Changhao. (1987). "Shuujoshi: Hanashite to kikite no ninshiki no gyappu o umeru tame no bun-setsuji [Sentence-final particles: sentence clitics for closing the gap between the speaker's and the hearer's recognition]." *Nihongogaku* 6:93-109.

Chomsky, Noam. (1965). *Aspects of the theory of syntax.* Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Clark, Herbert H. (1996). *Using language.* Camridge: Cambridge University Press.

Clark, Herbert H. and Susan E. Brennan (1991). "Grounding in communication." In L.B. Resnick, J.M. Levine and S.D. Teasley (eds.), *Perspectives on socially shared cognition* . Washington: APA Books, pp. 127-149.

Clayman, Steven E. and Heritage, John. (2002). *The news interview: Journalists and public figures on the air.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Clift, Rebecca. (2006). "Indexing stance: Reported speech as an interactional evidential." *Journal of Sociolinguistics* 10(5):569-595.

Comrie, Bernard. (1976). *Aspect: An introduction to the study of verbal aspect and related problems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cook, Haruko Minegishi. (1992). "Meanings of non-referential indexes: A case study of the Japanese sentence-final particle *ne*." *Text* 12:507-39.

Couper-Kuhlen, Elizabeth and Ono, Tsuyoshi. (2007). "'Incrementing' in conversation: A comparison of practices in English, German and Japanese." *Pragmatics* 17(4):513-552.

Curl, Traci S. (2006). "Offers of assistance: Constraints on syntactic design. *Journal of Pragmatics* 38:1257-1280.

Curl, Traci S. and Drew, Paul (2008). "Contingency and action: A comparison of two forms of requesting." *Research on Language and Social Interaction* 41(2):129-153.

De Ruiter, Jan Peter, Mitterer, Holger and Enfield, Nick J. (2006). "Projecting the end of a speaker's turn: A cognitive cornerstone of conversation." *Language* 82(3): 515-535.

Drew, Paul. (1991). “Asymmetries of knowledge in conversational interactions.” In I. Marková and K. Foppa (eds.), *Asymmetries in dialogue*. Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp. 29-48.

Drew, Paul. (1997). "'Open' class repair initiators in response to sequential sources of trouble in conversation." *Journal of Pragmatics* 28:69-101.

Du Bois, John. (1986). "Self-evidence and ritual speech." In W. Chafe and J. Nichols (eds.), *Evidentiality*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex, pp. 313-336.

Enfield, Nick J. (2006). "Social consequences of common ground." In N.J. Enfield and S.C. Levinson (eds.), *Roots of human sociality: Culture, cognition and interaction.* Oxford/New York: Berg, pp. 399-430.

Enfield, Nick. J. (2010). "Questions and responses in Lao." J*ournal of Pragmatics* 42:2649-65.

Englert, Christina. (2010). "Questions and responses in Dutch conversations." *Journal of Pragmatics* 42: 2666–2684

Fauconnier, Gilles. (1975). “Pragmatic scales and logical structure.” *Linguistic Inquiries* 4: 353-375.

Ford, Cecilia, Fox, Barbara A. and Thompson, Sandra A. (2002). “Constituency and the grammar of increments.” In C. Ford, B.A. Fox and S.A. Thompson (eds.), *The language of turn and sequence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 14-38.

Ford, Cecilia E. and Thompson, Sandra A. (1996). “Syntactic, intonational and pragmatic resources for the management of turns." In E. Ochs, E.A. Schegloff and S.A. Thompson (eds.), *Interaction and grammar*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 134-84.

Fox, Barbara A. (1987). *Discourse structure and anaphora: Written and conversational English.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fox, Barbara A. (2001). “Evidentiality: authority, responsibility, and entitlement in English conversation.” *Journal of Linguistic Anthropology* 11(2):167-192.

Garfinkel, Harold. (2008). *Toward a sociological theory of information*. London: Paradigm.

Gipper, Sonja. (2011). *Evidentiality and intersubjectivity in Yurakaré*: *An interactional account*. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Radboud University Nijmegen.

Givón, Talmy. (1982). “Evidentiality and epistemic space.” *Studies in Language* 6(1):23-49.

Givón, Talmy. (2001). *Syntax, Vol. I.* Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Goffman, Erving. (1971). *Relations in public: Microstudies of the public order*. New York: Harper and Row.

Goffman, Erving. (1978). “Response cries.” *Language* 54:787-815.

Goffman, Erving. (1981). *Forms of talk.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Goodwin, Charles. (1979). “The interactive construction of a sentence in natural conversation.” In G. Psathas (ed.), *Everyday language: Studies in ethnomethodology*. New York: Irvington Publishers, pp. 97-121.

Goodwin, Charles. (1981). *Conversational organization: interaction between speakers and hearers*. New York: Academic Press.

Goodwin, Charles. (1984). “Notes on story structure and the organization of participation.” In J.M. Atkinson and J. Heritage (eds.), *Structures of social action: Studies in conversation analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 225-246.

Goodwin, Charles. (1986). “Audience diversity, participation and interpretation.” *Text* 6(3): 283-316.

Goodwin, Charles. (1987). “Forgetfulness as an interactive resource.” *Social Psychology Quarterly* 50(2):115-131.

Goodwin, Charles and Goodwin, Marjorie Harness (1987). “Concurrent operations on talk: Notes on the interactive organization of assessments.” *IPrA Papers in Pragmatics* 1(1):1-52.

Grice, Paul H. (1975) [1967]. "Logic and conversation." In P. Cole and J.L. Morgan (eds.), *Syntax and semantics, Vol. 3: Speech acts*. New York: Academic Press, pp. 41-55.

Haakana, Markku. (2001). "Laughter as a patient's resource: Dealing with delicate aspects of medical interaction." *Text* 21:187-219.

Halliday, Michael A. K. (1967). *Intonation and grammar in British English.* The Hague : Mouton .

Hasunuma, Akiko. (1995). "Taiwa ni okeru kakunin kooi: 'Daroo' 'janaika' 'yone' no kakunin yoohoo [Confirmation in discourse: The use of '*daroo' 'janaika'* and *'yone'* as confirmation request] In Y. Nitta (ed.), *Fukubun no kenkyuu* [Research on Complex Sentences], *Vol. 2.* Tokyo: Kuroshio, pp. 389-419.

Hayano, Kaoru. (2007b). *Repetitional agreement and anaphorical agreement: Negotiation of affiliation and disaffiliation in Japanese conversation.* Unpublished master's thesis. Department of Applied Linguistics and TESL, University of California, Los Angeles.

Hayano, Kaoru. (2011). "Claiming epistemic primacy: *yo*-marked assessments in Japanese." In T. Stivers, L. Mondada and J. Steensig (eds.), *The morality of knowledge in conversation.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 58-81.

Hayano, Kaoru. (2012). "Question design in conversation." In T. Stivers and J. Sidnell (eds.), *Handbook of conversation analysis*. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 395-414.

Hayashi, Makoto. (1997). "An exploration of sentence-final uses of the quotative particle in Japanese spoken discourse." In H. Sohn and J. Haig (eds.), *Japanese/Korean Linguistics*, *Vol. 6*, Stanford: CSLI, pp. 565-581.

Hayashi, Makoto. (2001). "Postposition-initiated utterances in Japanese conversation: an interactional account of a grammatical practice." In M. Selting, and E. Couper-Kuhlen (eds.), *Studies in interactional linguistics*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, pp. 317–343.

Hayashi, Makoto. (2003). *Joint utterance construction in Japanese conversation.* Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Hayashi, Makoto. (2009). "Marking a 'noticing of departure' in talk: *eh*-prefaced turns in Japanese conversation." *Journal of Pragmatics* 41(10):2100-2129.

Hayashi, Makoto. (2010). "An overview of the question-response system in Japanese." *Journal of Pragmatics* 42(10):2685-702.

Hayashi, Makoto. (2012). "Claiming uncertainty in recollection: A study of *kke*-marked utterances in Japanese conversation." *Discourse Processes* 49(5), 391-425.

Hayashi, Makoto and Yoon, Kyung-eun. (2006). "A cross-linguistic exploration of demonstratives in interaction: with particular reference to the context of word-formation trouble." *Studies in Language* 30(3):485-540.

Hayashi, Makoto and Hayano, Kaoru. (2013). "Proffering insertable elements: A study of other-initiated repair in Japanese." In M. Hayashi, G. Raymond, and J. Sidnell (eds.), *Conversational repair and human understanding.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 293-321.

Haviland, John. (1987). “Fighting words: Evidential particles, affect, and argument.” *Berkeley Linguistics Society; Proceedings of the 13th Annual Meeting*: Parasession on grammar and cognition, pp. 343-354.

Heinemann, Trine. (2008). "Questions of accountability: yes-no interrogatives that are unanswerable." *Discourse Studies* 10(1):55-71.

Heinemann, Trine. (2010). "The question-response system of Danish." *Journal of Pragmatics* 42: 2703–2725

Heinemann, Trine, Anna, Lindstöm and Steensig, Jakob. (2011). "Addressing epistemic incongruence in question-answer sequences through the use of epistemic adverbs." In T. Stivers, L. Mondada and J. Steensig (eds.), *The morality of knowledge in conversation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.107-130.

Heritage, John. (1984a). "A change-of-state token and aspects of its sequential placement." In J.M. Atkinson and J. Heritage (eds.), *Structures of social action: Studies in conversation analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 299-345.

Heritage, John. (1984b). *Garfinkel and ethnomethodology*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Heritage, John. (1998). "Oh-prefaced responses to inquiry." *Language in Society* 27:291-334.

Heritage, John. (2002a). "Oh-prefaced responses to assessments: A method of modifying agreement/disagreement." In C. Ford, B. Fox and S.A. Thompson (eds.), *The language of turn and sequence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 196-224.

Heritage, John. (2002b). "The limits of questioning: Negative interrogatives and hostile question content." *Journal of Pragmatics* 34:1427-1446.

Heritage, John. (2002c). "Ad hoc inquires: Two preferences in the design of routine questions in an open context." In D. W. Maynard, H. Houtkoop-Streenstra, N.C. Schaeffer and J. van der Zouwen (eds.), *Standardization and tacit knowledge: Interaction and practice in the survey interview*. New York: Wilen Interscience, pp. 313-333.

Heritage, John. (2003). "Designing questions and setting agendas in the news interview." In C.D. LeBaron, P.J. Glenn, J.S. Mandelbaum (eds.), *Studies in language and special interaction.* New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 57-90.

Heritage, John. (2008). "Constructing and navigating epistemic landscapes." *The Journal of Studies in Contemporary Sociological Theory* 2:14-25.

Heritage, John. (2010). "Questioning in medicine." In A.F. Freed and S. Ehrlich (eds.), *Why do you ask?: The function of questions in institutional discourse.* New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 42-68.

Heritage, John. (2011). "Territories of knowledge, territories of experience: Empathic moments in interaction." In T. Stivers, L. Mondada and J. Steensig (eds.), *The morality of knowledge in conversation.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 156-183.

Heritage, John. (2012a). "Epistemics in action: Action formation and territories of knowledge." *Research on Language and Social Interaction* 45:1-29

Heritage, John. (2012b). "The epistemic engine: Sequence organization and territories of knowledge." *Research on Language and Social Interaction* 45:30-52.

Heritage, John and Atkinson, J. Maxwell. (1984). "Introduction." In J.M. Atkinson and J. Heritage (eds.), *Structures of social action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-16.

Heritage, John and Raymond, Geoffrey. (2005). "The terms of agreement: Indexing epistemic authority and subordination in assessment sequences." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 68(1):15-38.

Heritage, John, Robinson, Jeffrey D., Elliott, Marc N., Beckett, Megan and Wilkes, Michael (2007). "Reducing patients' unmet concerns: The difference one word can make." *Journal of General Internal Medicine* 22: 1429-1433.

Heritage, John and Raymond, Geoffrey. (2012). "Navigating Epistemic Landscapes: Acquiescence, Agency and Resistance in Responses to Polar Questions." In J.P. de Ruiter (ed.), *Questions: Formal, functional and interactional perspectives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 179-192.

Holzner, Burkart. (1968). *Reality construction in society.* Cambridge: Schenkman.

Horn, Laurence R. (1989). *A natural history of negation.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Houtkoop-Steenstra, Hanneke. (1987). *Establishing agreement: An analysis of proposal-acceptance sequences.* Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam.

Hoymann, Gertie. (2010). "Questions and responses in ǂAkhoe Haiǁom." *Journal of Pragmatics* 42: 2726–2740.

Matsui, Tomoko, Rakoczy, Hannes, Miura, Yui and Tomasello, Michael. (2009). "Understanding of speaker certainty and false-belief reasoning: a comparison of Japanese and German preschoolers." *Developmental Science* 12(4):602-613.

Iwasaki, Shimako. (2008). *Collaborative construction of talk in Japanese conversation.* Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Department of Applied Linguistics and TESL, University of California, Los Angeles.

Iwasaki, Shoichi. (2002). *Japanese.* Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Jefferson, Gail. (1981). "The abominable 'ne': A working paper exploring the phenomenon of post-response pursuit of response." *Occasional Paper No.6*, Manchester: University of Manchester, Department of Sociology.

Jefferson, Gail. (1984). "On stepwise transition from talk about a trouble to inappropriately next-positioned matters. J.M. Atkinson and J. Heritage (eds.), *Structures of social action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 191-221.

Jefferson, Gail. (1993). "Caveat speaker: Preliminary notes on recipient topic-shift implicature." *Research on Language and Social Interaction* 26(1):1-30.

Kamio, Akio. (1990). *Joohoo no nawabari riron [The theory of territory of information]*. Tokyo: Taishukan.

Kamio, Akio. (1994). "The theory of territory of information: the case of Japanese." *Journal of Pragmatics* 21:67-100.

Kamio, Akio. (1995). "Territory of information in English and Japanese and psychological utterances." *Journal of Pragmatics* 24:235-264.

Kamio, Akio. (1997). *Territory of Information*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Kamio, Akio. (2002). *Zoku joohoo no nawabari riron* [*The theory of territory of information II*]. Tokyo: Taishukan.

Kanai, Kaoru. (2003). *The negotiation of coherence in narrative: A comparative study between American English and Japanese.* Unpublished master's thesis. Japan Women's University.

Kanai, Kaoru. (2004). "Kaiwa ni okeru ninshikiteki ken'i no koushou: Shuujoshi yo, ne, odoroki hyouji no bunpu to kinou [Negotiation of epistemic authority in conversation: On the use of final particles *yo*, *ne* and surprise markers]." *Studies in Pragmatics* 6:17-28.

Katagiri, Yasuhiro. (2007). "Dialogue functions of Japanese sentence-final particles 'yo' and 'ne'." *Journal of Pragmatics* 39:1313-1323.

Katoh, Shigehiro. (2001). "Bunmatsujoshi *ne, yo* no danwakooseekinoo [Discourse structuring functions of sentence-final particles *ne* and *yo*]." *Bulletin of the Department of Humanities, Toyama University* 35:31-48.

Keevalik, Leelo. (2011). "The terms of not knowing." In T. Stivers, L. Mondada and J. Steensig (eds.), *The morality of knowledge in conversation.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 184-206.

Kinsui, Satoshi. (1993). "Shuujoshi *yo, ne* [Final particles *yo, ne*]." *Gengo* 22(4):118-121.

Kitagawa, Chisato. (1980). "Saying "yes" in Japanese." *Journal of Pragmatics* 4:105-120.

Koshik, Irene. (2002). "A conversation analytic study of yes/no questions which convey reversed polarity assertions." *Journal of Pragmatics* 34.1851-77.

Koyama, Tetsuharu. (1997). "Bunmatsushi to bunmatsu intoneeshon [Sentence-final particles and final intonation]." In Onseibunpookenkyuukai (ed.), *Bunpoo to Onsei* [Speech and Grammar]. Tokyo: Kuroshio Publisher, pp. 97-119.

Kuno, Susumu. (1973). *The sructure of the Japanese language*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Kushida, Shuya. (2002). "Kaiwa no naka no *un* to *soo*: washasei no koushou to no kakawari de [*un* and *soo* in conversation: By reference to the negotiation of speakership]." In T. Sadanobu (ed.), Un *to* soo *no gengogaku [Linguistics of* un *and* soo*]*. Tokyo: Hituzisyobo, 5-46.

Labov, William and Fanshel, David. (1977). *Therapeutic discourse: Psychotherapy as conversation*. New York: Academic Press.

Lambrecht, Knud. (1994). *Information structure and sentence form: Topic, focus and the mental representations of discourse referents.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lee, Duck-Young. (2007). "Involvement and the Japanese interactive particles ne and yo." *Journal of Pragmatics* 39:363-88.

Levinson, Stephen C. (1983). *Pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Levinson, Stephen C. (2000). *Presumptive meanings: The theory of generalized conversational implicature.* Cambridge: MIT Press.

Levinson, Stephen C. (2006). "On the human 'interactional engine'". In N.J. Enfield and S.C. Levinson (eds.), *Roots of human sociality: Cognition, culture, and interaction.* London: Berg, pp. 39-69.

Levinson, Stephen C. (2010). "Questions and responses in Yélıˆ Dnye, the Papuan language of Rossel Island." *Journal of Pragmatics* 42: 2741–2755.

Levinson, Stephen C. (2012a). "Interrogative intimations: On a possible social economics of interrogatives." In J. P. De Ruiter (ed.), *Questions: Formal, functional and interactional perspectives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 11-32.

Levinson, Stephen C. (2012b). "Action formation and ascription." In T. Stivers and J. Sidnell (eds.), *Handbook of conversation analysis*. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 103-130.

Lindström, Anna. (forthcoming). "Accepting remote proposals." In G. Raymond, G.H. Lerner and J. Heritage (eds.), *Enabling human conduct: Naturalistic studies of talk-in-interaction in honor of Emanuel A. Schegloff.* Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Liszkowsky, Ulf. (2006). "Infant pointing at 12 months: Communicative goals, motives, and social-cognitive abilities." In N.J. Enfield and S.C. Levinson (eds.), *Roots of human sociality: Cognition, culture, and interaction.* London: Berg, pp. 153-178.

Lyons, John. (1977). *Semantics, Vol. 2*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

MacWhinney, Brian. (2007). "The TalkBank project." In K.P.C. Joan, C. Beal and H.L. Moisl (eds.), *Creating and digitizing language corpora: Synchronic database, Vol. 1*. Houndmills: Palgrave-Macmillan.

Martin, Samuel E. (1975). *A reference grammar of Japanese*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Masuoka, Takashi. (1991). *Modality no bunpoo [Grammar of modality]*. Tokyo: Kuroshio.

Matsui, Tomoko, Rakoczy, Hannes, Miura, Yui, and Tomasello, Michael. (2009). "Understanding of speaker certainty and false-belief reasoning: a comparison of Japanese and German preschoolers." *Developmental Science* 12:602-13.

Maynard, Douglas. (1997). "The news delivery sequence: Bad news and good news in conversational interaction." *Research on Language and Social Interaction* 30(2):92-130.

Maynard, Douglas. (2003). *Bad news, good news: Conversational order in everyday talk and clinical settings*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

McGloin, Naomi Hanaoka. (2002). "Markers of epistemic vs. affective stances: *desyoo* vs. *zyanai*." In N.M. Akatsuka and S. Strauss (eds.), *Japanese/Korean linguistics* 10, Stanford: CSLI, pp. 136-149.

Mondada, Lorenza. (2011). "The management of knowledge discrepancies and of epistemic changes in institutional interactions." In T. Stivers, L. Mondada and J. Steensig (eds.), *The morality of knowledge in conversation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 27-57.

Mori, Junko. (1999). *Negotiating agreement and disagreement in Japanese: Connective expressions and turn construction.* Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Mori, Junko. (2006). "The workings of the Japanese token *hee* in informing sequences: An analysis of sequential context, turn shape, and prosody." *Journal of Pragmatics* 38: 1175-1205.

Morita, Emi. (2002). "Stance marking in the collaborative completion of sentences: Final particles as epistemic markers in Japanese." In N. Akatsuka and S. Strauss (eds.), *Japanese/Korean linguistics 10*. Stanford: CSLI, pp. 220-233.

Morita, Emi. (2005). *Negotiation of contingent talk: The Japanese interactional particles ne and sa.* Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Noda, Harumi. (1997). *No(da) no kinoo [Functions of no(da)]*. Tokyo: Kuroshio.

Nuyts, Jan. (2001). *Epistemic modality, language, and conceptualization: A cognitive-pragmatic perspective.* Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Oso, Mieko. (1986). "Goyoo bunseki 1: 'kyoo wa ii tenki desu ne.' -- 'Hai, soo desu.' [Analysis of false usage 1: 'It's a good day *ne*' -- 'Yes it is.']" *Nihongogaku* 5(9):91-94.

Palmer, Frank R. (1986). *Mood and modality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Peläkylä, Anssi. (1998) "Authority and accountability: The delivery of diagnosis in primary health care." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 61(4):301-320.

Pomerantz, Anita. (1975). *Second assessments: A study of some features of agreements/disagreements*. Unpublished Ph.D dissertation. School of Social Science, University of California, Irvine.

Pomerantz, Anita. (1980). "Telling my side: 'Limited access' as a 'fishing' device." *Sociological Inquiry* 50:186-198.

Pomerantz, Anita. (1984a). "Agreeing and disagreeing with assessments: Some features of preferred/dispreferred turn shapes". In J.M. Atkinson and J. Heritage (eds.) *Structures of social action: Studies in conversation analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 57-101.

Pomerantz, Anita. (1984b). "Giving a source or basis: The practice in conversation of telling 'how I know'." *Journal of Pragmatics* 8:607-625.

Pomerantz, Anita. (1984c). "Pursuing a response." In J.M. Atkinson and J. Heritage (eds.), *Structures of social action: Studies in conversation analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 152-163.

Pomerantz, Anita. (1988). "Offering a candidate answer: an information seeking strategy." *Communication Monographs* 55:360-373.

Pomerantz, Anita and Heritage, John. (2012). "Preference." In T. Stivers and J. Sidnell (eds.), *Handbook of conversation analysis*. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Premack, David and Woodruff, Guy. (1978). "Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?" *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 1:515-526.

Quirk, Randolph, Greenbaum, Sydney, Leech, Geoffrey and Svartvik, Jan. (1985). *A comprehensive grammar of the English language.* New York: Longman.

Raymond, Geoffrey. (2003). "Grammar and social organization: Yes/no interrogatives and the structure of responding." *American Sociological Review* 68:939-967.

Raymond, Geoffrey. (2010). "Grammar and social relations: alternative forms of yes/no-type initiating actions in health visitor interactions." In A.F. Freed and S. Ehrlich (eds.), *"Why do you ask?": The function of questions in institutional discourse*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 87-107.

Raymond, Geoffrey and Heritage, John. (2006). "The epistemics of social relations: Owning grandchildren" *Language in Society* 35:677-705.

Rossano, Federico. (2010). "Questioning and responding in Italian." *Journal of Pragmatics* 42: 2756–2771

Sacks, Harvey. (1972). "An initial investigation of the usability of conversational materials for doing sociology. In D.N. Sudnow (ed.), *Studies in social interaction*. New York: Free Press, pp. 31-74.

Sacks, Harvey. (1974). "An analysis of the course of a joke's telling in conversation." In R. Bauman and J. Sherzer (eds.), *Explorations in the ethnography of speaking*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 337-353.

Sacks, Harvey. (1984). "On doing 'being ordinary'." In J.M. Atkinson and J. Heritage (eds.), *Structures of social action: Studies in conversation analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 413-429.

Sacks, Harvey. (1987). "On the preferences for agreement and contiguity in sequences in conversation." In G. Button and R.R.E. Lee (eds.), *Talk and social organisation*. Clevendon: Multilingual Matters, pp. 54-69.

Sacks, Harvey. (1992). *Lectures on conversation. Volumes I and II.* Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Sacks, Harvey and Schegloff, Emanuel A. (1979). "Two preferences in the organization of reference to persons and their interaction." In G. Psathas (ed.), *Everyday language: Studies in ethnomethodology*. New York: Irvington Publishers, pp. 15-21.

Sacks, Harvey, Schegloff, Emanuel A., and Jefferson, Gail. (1974). "A simplest systematics for the organization of turn-taking for conversation." *Language* 50:696-735.

Sadock, Jerry M. and Zwicky, Arnold M. (1985). "Speech act distinctions in syntax." T. Schopen (ed.), *Language typology and syntactic description*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 155-96.

Saft, Scott. (1998). "Some uses and meanings of utterance: initial *iya* in Japanese discourse." In N. Akatsuka, H. Hoji, S. Iwasaki, S-.O. Sohn (eds.), *Japanese/Korean linguistics, Vol. 7*. Stanford: CSLI, pp. 121-37.

Saussure, Ferdinand de. (1959). *Course in general linguistics.* Translated and annotated by Roy Harris. London: Duckworth.

Schegloff, Emanuel A. (1968). "Sequencing in conversational openings." *American Anthropologist* 70:1075-1095.

Schegloff, Emanuel A. (1972). "Notes on a conversational practice: Formulating place." D. Sudnow (ed.), *Studies in social interaction*, New York: Free Press, pp. 75-119.

Schegloff, Emanuel A. (1979). "Identification and recognition in telephone openings." In G. Psathas (ed.), *Everyday language*. New York: Erlbaum, pp. 23-78.

Schegloff, Emanuel A. (1980). "Preliminaries to preliminaries: 'Can I ask you a question'." *Sociological Inquiry* 50:104-52.

Schegloff, Emanuel A. (1982). "Discourse as an interactional achievement: Some uses of 'uh huh' and other things that come between sentences." In D. Tannen (ed.), *Analyzing discourse*. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, pp. 71-93.

Schegloff, Emanuel A. (1984). "On some questions and ambiguities in conversation." In J.M. Atkinson and J. Heritage (eds.), *Structures of social action: Studies in conversation analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 28-52.

Schegloff, Emanuel A. (1991). "Conversation analysis and socially shared cognition." L. Resnick, J. Levine and S. Teasley (eds.), *Perspectives on socially shared cognition*. Washington DC: American Psychological Association, pp. 150-71.

Schegloff, Emanuel A. (1993) "Reflections on quantification in the study of conversation." *Research on Language and Social Interaction* 26: 99-128.

Schegloff, Emanuel A. (1996a). "Confirming allusions: Toward an empirical account of action." *American Journal of Sociology* 102:161-216.

Schegloff, Emanuel A. (1996b). "Turn organization: One intersection of grammar and interaction." E. Ochs, S. E.A. Schegloff and S.A. Thompson (eds.), *Interaction and grammar*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 52-133.

Schegloff, Emanuel A. (2007). *Sequence organization in interaction: A primer in conversation analysis*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Schegloff, Emanuel A., Jefferson, Gail, and Sacks, Harvey. (1977). "The preference for self-correction in the organization of repair in conversation." *Language* 53:361-382.

Schegloff, Emanuel A, and Sacks, Harvey. (1973). "Opening up closings." *Semiotica* 8:289-327.

Schutz, Alfred. (1964). *Collected papers II: Studies in social theory*. Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Searle. John. (1969). *Speech acts: An essay in the philosophy of language*. Cambridge: Cambdridge University Press.

Selting, Margret. (1996). "Prosody as an activity-type distinctive cue in conversation: The case of so-called 'astonished' questions in repair initiation." In E. Couper-Kuhlen and M. Selting (eds.), *Prosody in conversation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 231-70.

Sharrock, Wesley. (1974). "On owning knowledge." R. Turner (ed.), *Ethnomethodology*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, pp. 45-53.

Shibatani, Masayoshi, (1990). *The languages of Japan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sidnell, Jack. (2010). *Conversation analysis: An introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Sorjonen, Marja-Leena. (2001a). *Responding in conversation: A study of response particles in Finnish*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Sorjonen, Marja-Leena (2001b). "Simple answers to polar questions: the case of Finnish." In M. Selting and E. Couper-Kuhlen (eds.), *Studies in interactional linguistics*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, pp. 405-32.

Sorjonen, Marja-Leena, and Hakulinen, Auli. (2009). "Alternative responses to assessments." In J. Sidnell (ed.) *Conversation analysis: Comparative perspectives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 281-303.

Stalnaker, Robert. (2002). "Common ground. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 25:701-721.

Steensig, Jakob. and Drew, Paul. (2009). "Introduction: Questioning and affiliation/ disaffiliation in interaction." *Discourse Studies* 10(1):5-15.

Stivers, Tanya. (2005). "Modified repeats: One method for primary rights from second position." *Research on Language and Social Interaction* 38(2):131-158.

Stivers, Tanya. (2007). *Prescribing under pressure: Parent-physician conversations and antibiotics.* New York: Oxrford University Press.

Stivers, Tanya. (2008). "Stance, alignment, and affiliation during storytelling: When nodding is a token of affiliation." *Research on Language and Social Interaction* 41(1): 31-57.

Stivers, Tanya. (2010). "An overview of the question-response system in American English conversation." *Journal of Pragmatics* 42(10):2772-2781.

Stivers, Tanya. (2011). "Morality and question design: 'Of course' as contesting a presupposition of askability." In T. Stivers, L. Mondada and J. Steensig (eds.), *The morality of knowledge in conversation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 82-106.

Stivers, Tanya., Enfield, Nick J., Brown, Penelope, Englert, Christina, Hayashi, Makoto, Heinemann, Trine, Hoyman, Gertie, Rossano, Federico, de Ruiter, Jan Peter. Yoon, Kyung-Eun, and Levinson, Stephen C. (2009). "Universality and cultural specificity in turn-taking in conversation." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Science* 106(26):10587-92.

Stivers, Tanya., Enfield, Nick J., and Levinson, Stephen C. (eds.) (2010). "Question-response sequences in conversation: a comparison across 10 languages." *Journal of Pragmatics* 42(10).

Stivers, Tanya. and Hayashi, Makoto. (2010). "Transformative answers: One way to resist a question's constraints." *Language in Society* 39:1-25.

Stivers, Tanya, and Robinson, Jeffrey D. (2006). "A preference for progressivity in interaction." *Language in Society* 35:367-392.

Stivers, Tanya., and Rossano, Federico. (2010). "Mobilizing response." *Research on Language and Social Interaction, 43*(1): 1-31.

Stivers, Tanya, Mondada, Lorenza and Steensig, Jakob. (2011). "Introduction." In T. Stivers, L. Mondadan and J. Steensig (eds.), *The Morality of knowledge in conversation.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3-26.

Sugiura, Hideyuki. (2011). "Tsuyoi dooi wa donoyooni ninshiki kanoo to naru ka: Nichijoo kaiwa ni okeru dooi taan no maruchimoodaru bunseki ['Strong agreements' and their recognizability: A multimodal analysis on agreements in everyday Japanese conversation]." *The Japanese Journal of Language in Society* 14(1):20-32.

Tannen, Deborah. (1989). *Talking voices: Repetition, dialogue, and imagery in conversational discourse.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Takubo, Yukinori., and Kinsui, Satoshi. (1997). "Discourse management in terms of mental spaces." *Journal of Pragmatics* 28:741-758.

Tanaka, Hiroko. (1999) *Turn-taking in Japanese conversation: A study in grammar and interaction.* Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Tanaka, Hiroko. (2000). "The particle *ne* as a turn-managing device in Japanese conversation." *Journal of Pragmatics* 35(8):1135-1176.

Terasaki, Alene K. (2004) [1976]. "Pre-announcement sequences in conversation." In G. Lerner (ed.), *Conversation analysis: Studies from the first generation*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, pp. 171-223.

Tomasello, Michael. (2008). *Origins of human communication*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Traugott, Elizabeth C. (1989). "On the rise of epistemic meanings in English: An example of subjectification in semantic change." *Language* 57: 33-65.

Uehara, Satoshi and Fukushima, Etsuko. (2004). "Shizen danwa ni okeru 'hadaka no bunmatsu keeshiki' no kinoo to yoohoo [On the use and function of 'bare sentence final form' in Japanese conversational discourse". *Sekai no Nihongo Kyooiku [Japanese Pedagogy]* 14: 109-123.

Uyeno, Tazuko. (1971). *A study of Japanese modality: A performative analysis of sentence-final particles.* Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan.

Van Dijk, Teun A. (1972). *Some aspects of text grammars.* The Hague: Mouton.

Watamaki, Toru. (1997). "Jiheeshooji ni okeru kyookanteki kakutoku hyougen joshi 'ne' no shiyoo no ketsujo: jiree kekyuu [Lack of the particle-ne in conversation by a child with autism: A case study]." *Japanese Journal on Developmental Disabilities* 19:146-157.

Wiggins, Sally. and Potter, Jonathan. (2003). "Attitudes and evaluative practices: Category vs. item and subjective vs. objective constructions in everyday food assessments." *British Journal of Social Psychology* 42:513-531.

Wilkinson, Sue and Kitzinger, Celia. (2006). "Surprise as an interactional achievement: Reaction tokens in conversation." Social Psychology Quarterly 69(2): 150-182.

Willett, Thomas. (1988). "A cross-linguistic survey of the grammaticization of evidentiality." *Studies in Language* 12:51-97.

Wimmer, Heinz and Perner, Josef. (1983). "Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception. *Cognition* 13:103-128

Wittenburg, Peter, Brugman, Hennie, Russel, Albert, Klassmann, Alex, Sloetjes, Han. (2006). "ELAN: A professional framework for multimodality research." *Proceedings of LREC 2006*, Fifth International Conference on Language Resources and Evaluation.

Wu, Ruey-Jiuan Regina. (2004). *A conversation analysis of Mandarin final particles.* Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Yoon, Kyung-Eun. (2010). "Questions and responses in Korean conversation." *Journal of Pragmatics* 42: 2782–2798

Samenvatting

Dit proefschrift beschrijft een aspect van sociale interactie dat *kennisbeheer* genoemd kan worden. Om beschouwd te worden als competent in sociale interactie moeten gesprekspartners niet alleen een taal delen, maar ook technieken van kennisbeheer. Dit omhelst het laten zien en het manipuleren van hoe kennis tussen hen gedeeld is —dus wat ze gezamenlijk weten— maar ook hoe kennis tussen hen verdeeld is: waar hun verschillen in kennis liggen en of de kennis symmetrisch of asymmetrisch verdeeld is. Met gebruik van de methodologie van de conversatieanalyse onderzoekt dit proefschrift hoe gesprekspartners zich bezighouden met kennisbeheer en in het bijzonder hoe dit tot uiting komt in hun taalgebruik en in de sequentiele structuur van alledaagse conversatie in het Japans. Het proefschrift kijkt specifiek naar drie omgevingen waarin kennisbeheer belangrijk is: waarderingen, informeringen, en ja/nee-vragen (deze termen worden verderop toegelicht).

Hoofdstuk 1 geeft een overzicht van eerder onderzoek naar kennis in sociale interactie vanuit vier perspectieven: sociologie, psychologie, taalwetenschap, en conversatieanalyse. Dit overzicht laat zien dat er al veel bekend is over cognitieve processen van kennisverdeling en over de grammaticale codering van kennis, maar dat we veel minder weten over de interactionele competenties die komen kijken bij kennisbeheer, en over hoe kennisbeheer zich verhoudt tot andere belangrijke zaken zoals het onderhouden van persoonlijke relaties en sociale aansluiting. Dit motiveert de volgende drie onderzoeksdoelen van het proefschrift:

1. Ons begrip vergroten van hoe mensen omgaan met kennis.
2. Beschrijven welke technieken voor kennisbeheer mensen gebruiken in alledaagse gesprekken.
3. Beschrijven welke interactionele principes en motivaties ten grondslag liggen aan het gebruik van finale partikels in het Japans.

Om deze doelen te bereiken is een corpus van alledaagse gesprekken in het Japans verzameld en geanalyseerd — in totaal 22 uur video-opnames van gewone gesprekken en 7 uur geluidsopnames van telefoongesprekken. De opgenomen gesprekken werden getranscribeerd volgens de conventies van de conversatieanalyse. Voor de identificatie en beschrijving van technieken voor kennisbeheer bouwt het proefschrift voort op eerdere bevindingen van de conversatieanalytische literatuur.

Hoofdstuk 2 onderzoekt hoe mensen omgaan met kennis in de sequentiele context van waarderingen — uitingen waarin een bepaalde evaluatie wordt uitgesproken over iets (bv. *het weer is matig*, *die film was fantastisch*). Er wordt gekeken naar hoe bezit van kennis of ervaring samenhangt met recht van spreken in beweringen. De focus is op de Japanse finale partikels *ne*, *yone*, en *yo*, en hoe deze samenhangen met waarderingen die verschillen in intensiteit (bijvoorbeeld of iets als matig, leuk, of heel erg leuk gewaardeerd wordt). De analyse laat zien dat een *bewering* niet altijd genoeg is voor de gesprekspartner: soms is er een *demonstratie* van de kennis nodig, soms moet er *ondersteunend bewijs* geleverd worden voor de mate van kennis, en soms wordt de intensiteit van de waardering achteraf bijgesteld in het licht van de kennis van de ander. De bevindingen suggereren dat gesprekspartners zich actief bezighouden met het bereiken van een overeenkomstige visie op de kennisverdeling tussen hen beiden, of deze verdeling nu symmetrisch of asymmetrisch is. Het beheren van kennis en het onderhouden van sociale relaties hangen dus nauw samen.

Hoofdstuk 3 richt zich op informerende sequenties. Waar aangrenzende paren doorgaans bestaan uit twee beurten (bijvoorbeeld vraag-antwoord), bestrijken informerende sequenties meerdere beurten (cf. Sacks 1974; Terasaki 2004 [1976]). Recipiënten van informerende sequenties produceren doorgaans een reeks van responsen zoals *honto* ‘echt?’ of *aa* ‘oh’ samen met allerlei finale partikels. Gesprekspartners benutten deze technieken in de context van de uitgebreide structuur van informerend sequenties om te onderhandelen over —en samen een balans te vinden tussen— ervaring, aansluiting, en empathie. De analyse laat verder zien hoe gesprekspartners technieken van kennisbeheer toe kunnen passen om subtiel hun onafhankelijke perspectief te benadrukken of juist aansluiting te zoeken bij elkaar.

Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoekt hoe kennisbeheer figureert in de afhandeling van ja/nee-vragen. Het hoofdstuk begint met een contrastieve analyse van eenvoudige “ja”-antwoorden zoals *hai/nn/ee* tegenover antwoorden die bevestigen door middel van herhaling. Gedemonstreerd wordt dat de eerste soort respons relatief toegevend en minimaal is, terwijl de herhalendende respons assertiever en sterker gecommiteerd is. De soort respons hangt samen met hoe de vraag gepresenteerd wordt: als uit de vraagstelling blijkt dat bevestiging verwacht wordt, dan wordt vaak gekozen voor de minimale bevestigende respons. Als de vraag daartegen gesteld wordt op een manier die laat zien dat er onzekerheid bestaat of het antwoord bevestigend zal zijn, dan wordt er eerder gekozen voor een

herhalende respons. Deze bevindingen verrijken en preciseren de notie van *type conformity* (Raymond 2003): of een respons 'type conforming' is hangt kennelijk niet alleen af van de handeling (bv. vraag of bewering) maar ook van verschillen in de kennisniveaus van de gesprekspartners.

Hoofdstuk 5 vat de bevindingen van het proefschrift samen en bespreekt de bredere implicaties. Het proefschrift laat zien dat veel aspecten van taalgebruik en interactionele organisatie diepgaand worden beïnvloed door het feit dat gesprekspartners zich voordurend bezig houden met hoe kennis gedeeld en verdeeld is: kennisbeheer. De studies van drie interactionele omgevingen brengen verschillende facetten van kennisbeheer aan het licht. In het geval van waarderingen wordt de vorm die de uitingen aannemen sterk beïnvloed door wie van de gesprekspartners het gewaardeerde object beter kent. Wanneer informatie wordt uitgewisseld in informerende sequenties of in ja/nee-vragen wordt er subtiel maar doorlopend onderhandeld over hoe informatief of nieuwswaardig de informatie is. Gesprekspartners doen aan kennisbeheer met een hele set aan talige technieken —voor een deel al bekend als 'stance markers', voor een deel hier voor het eerst beschreven— en zijn tegelijkertijd bezig met het bevorderen van sociale aansluiting en het onderhouden van persoonlijke relaties.

Op het gebied van de conversatieanalyse levert het proefschrift een bijdrage aan ons begrip van technieken en mechanismen die observeerbaar zijn in sociale interactie. De resultaten suggereren dat *kennisbeheer* een fenomeen is dat empirisch onderscheiden kan worden van de primaire communicatieve *handeling* die met een uiting verricht wordt. Dit is duidelijk te zien in het gebruik van Japanese finale partikels in sociale interactie. Deze partikels kunnen gezien worden als gereedschappen voor kennisbeheer in sociale interactie: ze worden niet slechts gebruikt als signalen die aangeven hoe de zaken er voor staan, maar voor de co-constructie van een gedeelde sociale realiteit. Het proefschrift sluit af met een bespreking van een aantal richtingen voor toekomstig onderzoek in de taalwetenschappen (evidentiality en finale partikels), de cognitiewetenschappen (Theory of Mind en autisme) en in de studie van sociale interactie in institutionele contexten.

Curriculum Vitae

Kaoru Hayano studied at Japan Women's University, Tokyo, receiving a M.A. in 2003. She then studied at the department of Applied Linguistics and TESL at University of California, Los Angeles as a Fulbright scholarship grantee and earned her second M.A. in 2007. After graduating from UCLA, she was awarded a Ph.D. scholarship by Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics and joined the Multimodal Interaction project of the Language of Cognition group. Her dissertation focuses on the negotiation of knowledge in social interaction and how the Japanese grammar is employed as a resource to adopt epistemic stances. She currently works at the Center for Foreign Language Education at Ochanomizu University, Tokyo. Her research interests include the organization of bodily behavior and its consequences to knowledge distribution, social values embodied in institutional and ordinary talk and the production of assessments in interaction.

MPI Series in Psycholinguistics

1. *The electrophysiology of speaking. Investigations on the time course of semantic, syntactic and phonological processing.* Miranda van Turennout
2. *The role of the syllable in speech production. Evidence from lexical statistics, metalinguistics, masked priming and electromagnetic midsaggital articulography.* Niels O. Schiller
3. *Lexical access in the production of ellipsis and pronouns.* Bernadette M. Schmitt
4. *The open-/closed-class distinction in spoken-word recognition*. Alette Haveman
5. *The acquisition of phonetic categories in young infants: A self-organising artificial neural network approach*. Kay Behnke
6. *Gesture and speech production*. Jan-Peter de Ruiter
7. *Comparative intonational phonology: English and German*. Esther Grabe
8. *Finiteness in adult and child German*. Ingeborg Lasser
9. *Language input for word discovery*. Joost van de Weijer
10. *Inherent complement verbs revisited: Towards an understanding of argument structure in Ewe*. James Essegbey
11. *Producing past and plural inflections*. Dirk Janssen
12. *Valence and transitivity in Saliba: An Oceanic language of Papua New Guinea*. Anna Margetts
13. *From speech to words*. Arie van der Lugt
14. *Simple and complex verbs in Jaminjung: A study of event categorization in an Australian language*. Eva Schultze-Berndt
15. *Interpreting indefinites: An experimental study of children's language comprehension*. Irene Krämer
16. *Language specific listening: The case of phonetic sequences*. Andrea Weber
17. *Moving eyes and naming objects*. Femke van der Meulen
18. *Analogy in morphology: The selection of linking elements in Dutch compounds.*
    Andrea Krott
19. *Morphology in speech comprehension*. Kerstin Mauth
20. *Morphological families in the mental lexicon*. Nivja H. de Jong
21. *Fixed expressions and the production of idioms*. Simone A. Sprenger

22. *The grammatical coding of postural semantics in Goemai*. Birgit Hellwig
23. *Paradigmatic structures in morphological processing: Computational and cross-linguistic experimental studies*. Fermin Moscoso del Prado Martin
24. *Contextual influences on spoken-word processing*. Daniëlle van den Brink
25. *Perceptual relevance of prevoicing in Dutch*. Petra M. van Alphen
26. *Syllables in speech production: Effects of syllable preparation and syllable frequency*. Joana Cholin
27. *Producing complex spoken numerals for time and space*. Marjolein Meeuwissen
28. *Morphology in auditory lexical processing*. Rachèl J.J.K. Kemps
29. *At the same time ...: The expression of simultaneity in learner varieties*. Barbara Schmiedtová
30. *A grammar of Jalonke argument structure*. Friederike Lüpke
31. *Agrammatic comprehension: An electrophysiological approach*. Marlies Wassenaar
32. *The structure and use of shape-based noun classes in Miraña (North West Amazon)*. Frank Seifart
33. *Prosodically-conditioned detail in the recognition of spoken words*. Anne Pier Salverda
34. *Phonetic and lexical processing in a second language*. Mirjam Broersma
35. *Retrieving semantic and syntactic word properties: ERP studies on the time course in language comprehension*. Oliver Müller
36. *Lexically-guided perceptual learning in speech processing*. Frank Eisner
37. *Sensitivity to detailed acoustic information in word recognition*. Keren B. Shatzman
38. *The relationship between spoken word production and comprehension*. Rebecca Özdemir
39. *Disfluency: Interrupting speech and gesture*. Mandana Seyfeddinipur
40. *The acquisition of phonological structure: Distinguishing contrastive from non-contrastive variation*. Christiane Dietrich
41. *Cognitive cladistics and the relativity of spatial cognition*. Daniel B.M. Haun
42. *The acquisition of auditory categories*. Martijn Goudbeek
43. *Affix reduction in spoken Dutch*. Mark Pluymaekers
44. *Continuous-speech segmentation at the beginning of language acquisition: Electrophysiological evidence*. Valesca Kooijman
45. *Space and iconicity in German Sign Language (DGS)*. Pamela Perniss

46. *On the production of morphologically complex words with special attention to effects of frequency*. Heidrun Bien
47. *Crosslinguistic influence in first and second languages: Convergence in speech and gesture*. Amanda Brown
48. *The acquisition of verb compounding in Mandarin Chinese. Jidong Chen*
49. *Phoneme inventories and patterns of speech sound perception*. Anita Wagner
50. *Lexical processing of morphologically complex words: An information-theoretical perspective*. Victor Kuperman
51. *A grammar of Savosavo: A Papuan language of the Solomon Islands*. Claudia Wegener
52. *Prosodic structure in speech perception and production*. Claudia Kuzla
53. *The acquisition of finiteness by Turkish learners of German and Turkish learners of French: Investigating knowledge of forms and functions in production and comprehension*. Sarah Schimke
54. *Studies on intonation and information structure in child and adult German*. Laura de Ruiter
55. *Processing the fine temporal structure of spoken words*. Eva Reinisch
56. *Semantics and (ir)regular inflection in morphological processing*. Wieke Tabak
57. *Processing strongly reduced forms in casual speech*. Susanne Brouwer
58. *Ambiguous pronoun resolution in L1 and L2 German and Dutch* Miriam Ellert
59. *Lexical interactions in non-native speech comprehension: Evidence from electro-encephalography, eye-tracking, and functional magnetic resonance imaging.* Ian FitzPatrick
60. *Processing casual speech in native and non-native language*. Annelie Tuinman
61. *Split intransitivity in Rotokas, a Papuan language of Bougainville*. Stuart Robinson
62. *Evidentiality and intersubjectivity in Yurakaré: An interactional account*. Sonja Gipper
63. *The influence of information structure on language comprehension: A neurocognitive perspective*. Lin Wang
64. *The meaning and use of ideophones in Siwu*. Mark Dingemanse
65. *The role of acoustic detail and context in the comprehension of reduced pronunciation variants*. Marco van de Ven

66. *Speech reduction in spontaneous French and Spanish*. Francisco Torreira
67. *The relevance of early word recognition: Insights from the infant brain*. Caroline Junge
68. *Adjusting to different speakers: Extrinsic normalization in vowel perception* Matthias Sjerps
69. *Structuring language: Contributions to the neurocognition of syntax*. Katrien R. Segaert
70. *Infants' appreciation of others' mental states in prelinguistic communication*. Birgit Knudsen
71. *Gaze behavior in face-to-face-interaction*. Federico Rossano
72. *Sign-spatiality in Kata Kolok: How a village sign language of Bali inscribes its signing space*. Connie de Vos
73. *Who is talking?* Attila Andics
74. *Lexical processing of foreign-accented speech: Rapid and flexible adaptation*. Marijt Witteman
75. *The use of deictic versus representational gestures in infancy*. Daniel Puccini
76. *Territories of knowledge in Japanese conversation.* Kaoru Hayano