



This paper was originally published by Cambridge University Press as:

Häberlen, J. C., & Spinney, R. A. (2014). **Introduction**. *Contemporary European History*, 23(4), 489–503.

<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0960777314000289>

This publication is with permission of the rights owner freely accessible due to an Alliance licence and a national licence (funded by the DFG, German Research Foundation) respectively.

Nutzungsbedingungen:

Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die Nutzungsbedingungen an.

Terms of use:

This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, nontransferable, individual and limited right to using this document. This document is solely intended for your personal, non-commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain all copyright information and other information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the document in public. By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated conditions of use.

Provided by:

Max Planck Institute for Human Development
Library and Research Information
library@mpib-berlin.mpg.de

Contemporary European History

<http://journals.cambridge.org/CEH>

Additional services for **Contemporary European History**:

Email alerts: [Click here](#)
Subscriptions: [Click here](#)
Commercial reprints: [Click here](#)
Terms of use : [Click here](#)



Introduction

JOACHIM C. HÄBERLEN and RUSSELL A. SPINNEY

Contemporary European History / Volume 23 / Special Issue 04 / November 2014, pp 489 - 503
DOI: 10.1017/S0960777314000289, Published online: 02 October 2014

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0960777314000289

How to cite this article:

JOACHIM C. HÄBERLEN and RUSSELL A. SPINNEY (2014). Introduction. Contemporary European History, 23, pp 489-503 doi:10.1017/S0960777314000289

Request Permissions : [Click here](#)

Introduction

JOACHIM C. HÄBERLEN
AND RUSSELL A. SPINNEY

It might seem trivial and mere common sense to note that revolts and revolutions are deeply emotional moments. In history books and newspapers, we read about the tense and emotionally charged atmosphere that leads to violence when protestors confront police forces, or about furious and passionate crowds acting in defiance of the ideal of rational and coldblooded politics.¹ But rage and anger are not the only emotions involved in the politics of protest. Consider the iconic photographs of the summer strikes during the French Popular Front in 1936, depicting smiling workers occupying their factories and construction sites, or the cheering crowds storming the Berlin Wall in November 1989. Or consider the genre of protest songs, telling stories of solidarity and hope as well as deep sorrow. At times, social and political movements even made feelings their central concern, such as the hippy movement with its calls for free love. On the other side of the political spectrum, conservative as well as social democratic observers often denounced protests and riots as politically irrelevant outbreaks of hatred, or mocked the ‘hysterical’ fear of the peace movement during the 1980s.² Somehow, these examples suggest, feelings mattered, yet how precisely they mattered is rarely investigated. The essays in this special issue will address this question in order to enrich our understanding of protest movements, revolts and revolutions. Collectively, they intend to open a theoretical

Dr Joachim C. Häberlen, Department of History, University of Warwick, Humanities Building, University Road, Coventry, CV4 7AL; J.Haerberlen@warwick.ac.uk; Dr Russell A. Spinney, Santa Fe Preparatory School, 1101 Camino de la Cruz Blanca, Santa Fe, NM 87501, USA; rspinney@sfprep.org

¹ The latest example of this is perhaps the discourse about ‘furious citizens’ (*Wutbürger*), in the German context, see Dirk Kurbjuweit, ‘Der Wutbürger: Stuttgart 21 und Sarrazin-Debatte: Warum die Deutschen so viel protestieren’, *Der Spiegel*, 41 (11 Oct. 2010), 26–5.

² See, e.g., Hans Ulrich Wehler’s critical assessment of the peace movement, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, v: 1949–1990 (Munich: Beck, 2008), 250. For critical comments, see e.g., Holger Nehring and Benjamin Ziemann, ‘Führen alle Wege nach Moskau? Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss und die Friedensbewegung – eine Kritik’, *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 59 (2011), 83.

and methodological debate on the role of emotions in the politics of protest and resistance.

Yet this goal comes with considerable methodological challenges. It is, first of all, anything but clear what emotions actually are. Scholars from a variety of disciplines are far from agreeing upon how to theorise and study emotions empirically, especially from a historical perspective. As editors of the present issue, we do not privilege any specific approach, but seek to highlight how different conceptions and approaches to emotions yield different questions, make use of various sources, and thus lead to a multitude of new insights and interpretations about social movements, political protests and revolutions across twentieth-century Europe. This issue seeks both to contribute to our understanding of a variety of protest movements and revolts and to provide a methodological intervention into the debate on how to study emotions historically. For this reason, we will begin our introduction with a brief discussion of different approaches to the history of emotions and specifically the role of emotions in contentious politics, and then explain how the essays in this issue build upon these approaches and develop them further. We conclude our introduction with some preliminary observations about how the role of emotions in protest movements changed throughout the twentieth century and questions for further research raised by these observations.

Beyond rational actors: emotions in history and contentious politics

For a long time, emotions were of little interest to scholars of protest movements and contentious politics. Reacting against an earlier scholarship that denigrated protesting and revolting crowds by depicting them as deeply emotional and irrational, and hence outside the realm of real, serious politics, scholars – most notably sociologists – since the 1970s were eager to show that protestors were, in fact, rational actors in their own right, trying to make use of political opportunities that were open to them. It is against this backdrop that sociologists of contentious politics have, since the late 1990s, tried to reintroduce emotions into the analysis of protest movements without falling back on old stereotypes of the irrational masses.³ For example, as Deborah Gould has suggested, the model of ‘rational actors’ and ‘political opportunities’ fails to explain why people engage in collective activism against all odds (or not), and at times even succeed.⁴

³ An excellent overview over these debates is offered by Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, ‘The Return of the Repressed: The Fall and Rise of Emotions in Social Movement Theory’, *Mobilization: An International Journal*, 5 (2000), 65–83. Examples of the ‘irrational crowd’ position include Gustave LeBon, *The Crowd* (New York: Viking Press, 1960 (1895)); Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer* (New York: Harper and Row, 1951). For the ‘rational actors’ position, see, e.g., William A. Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1975); Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978).

⁴ Deborah Gould, *Moving Politics: Emotion and ACT UP’s Fight Against AIDS* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 10–15.

Since then, scholars of contentious politics and social movements from a variety of different intellectual and disciplinary backgrounds have studied the role of emotions in multiple ways. They have asked how emotions help in shaping a political identity, how political movements appeal to feelings to mobilise support, how they make use of emotional practices to form bonds of solidarity, and how social movements deal with fear.⁵ While there is growing attention to emotions in scholarly work on social movements, more work remains to be done on the nature and roles of emotions in the great ideologically driven movements of the twentieth century like communism and fascism.⁶ No doubt, these are important contributions. They help us understand the formation of movements and the dynamics of conflict in ‘hot’ situations, as well as the decline and dissolution of movements. Yet the link between emotions and politics often remains rather instrumental. In this reading, emotions such as rage or hope can simply be incited by leaders of the movement to support the mobilisation of protestors, whereas disappointment and fear tend to lead to dissolution. Emotions themselves, however, often remain an under-theorised ‘black box’, as does the political relevance of emotions beyond the question about their ‘function’ in social movements.

This is all the more striking since there has been a vivid theoretical debate within the humanities and the natural sciences on the nature of emotions. Much of the debate has been shaped by a binary distinction between nature and nurture, that is the question whether emotions are universal and part of the human condition, as some

⁵ See the contributions in Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper, eds, *Rethinking Social Movements: Structure, Meaning, and Emotion* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004); Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, eds, *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2001). See also Christian Koller, “‘Es ist zum Heulen’: Emotionshistorische Zugänge zur Kulturgeschichte des Streikens”, *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 36 (2010), 66–92.

⁶ In the push to take ideologies more seriously in the study of fascism and communism, emotions generally remain crucial, albeit ahistorical, narrative devices or are ignored altogether, and if anything, still reinforce the impression of the interwar period as a time in which outbursts of feelings prevailed over reason. See most recently Alon Confino, *Foundational Pasts: The Holocaust as Historical Understanding* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 127–8. Confino highlights the importance of emotions, but does not engage with them as historical categories. See similarly Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century* (New York: Vintage, 1999); Claudia Koonz, *The Nazi Conscience* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2003). It is perhaps telling that one of the few scholars who has explicitly addressed emotions in National Socialism, Jill Stephenson, simply asserts that the Nazis appealed to people’s emotions and not their rationality, without ever questioning these dichotomist categories, see Jill Stephenson, ‘Generations, Emotions, and Critical Enquiry: A British View on Changing Approaches to the Study of Nazi Germany’, *German History*, 26 (2008), 272–83. Emotions in the Third Reich have been addressed under the rubric of morality, see Raphael Gross, *Anständig geblieben: Nationalsozialistische Moral* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2010). However, scholars of neither the fascist movements nor of fascist states have, as far as we see, made use of the conceptual tools discussed by historians of emotions, as was recently noted by Alexandra Przyrembel, ‘Ambivalente Gefühle: Sexualität und Antisemitismus während des Nationalsozialismus’, *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 39 (2013), 528–9. Przyrembel herself speaks about ‘doing emotions’ in her analysis of practices of shaming in the context of ‘race defilement’, but without referring to any of the theoretical literature on the history of emotions. Beyond the German case, see Simonetta Falasca, *Fascist Spectacle: The Aesthetics of Power in Mussolini’s Italy* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1997), and, on emotions in communism, Igal Halfin, *Terror in My Soul: Communist Autobiographies on Trial* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003).

psychologists argue, or whether the way we feel is culturally and historically specific, as primarily anthropologists have argued.⁷ Recently, however, scholars have begun moving beyond this binary. The historian Nicole Eustache, for example, argued in a 2012 *American Historical Review* Conversation about emotions, that ‘cutting-edge neuroscientists’ actually confirm what ‘linguistic theorists have been arguing all along: that language fundamentally shapes both the expression and the experience of emotion’.⁸ This is not the place to offer yet another review of the diverging and competing conceptualisations of emotions;⁹ suffice it to note that there is no consensus among the authors of the articles in this issue. What interests us here is how conceptualising and understanding emotions might further inform inquiries into the dynamics of power relations and thus the politics of protest. It is, indeed, politics that has motivated some conceptualisations of emotions as at least in some way grounded in human nature. Remarkably, though, many of the scholars reflecting on the political significance of emotions have concentrated on forms of domination, with the notable exception of Deborah Gould.¹⁰ In this introduction, we therefore want to think through some of these conceptions to see how they might also help to understand forms of resistance.

Perhaps the most famous example for this is William Reddy. Frustrated by the lack of a firm grounding to make political value judgments within post-modern theory and practice, he turned to emotions.¹¹ According to Reddy, there is an amorphous, unbound and unspecified ‘thought material’ within us, as human beings, that we have to name and thereby transform into specific, goal-oriented ‘emotions’.¹² This very act of naming has both transformative and performative functions, as Reddy’s term ‘emotive’ suggests. Saying, or even imagining saying, for example, to a spouse

⁷ See Lila Abu-Lughod, *Veiled Sentiments: Honor and Poetry in a Bedouin Society* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1986); Catherine Lutz, ‘Emotion, Thought, and Estrangement: Emotion as a Cultural Category’, *Cultural Anthropology*, 1 (1986), 287–309; Catherine Lutz, *Unnatural Emotions: Everyday Sentiments on a Micronesian Atoll and Their Challenge to Western Theory* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Catherine Lutz and Lila Abu-Lughod, eds, *Language and the Politics of Emotion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). For a summary of the debate, see, with further references, Nicole Eustace, Eugenia Lean, Julie Livingston, Jan Plamper, William M. Reddy and Barbara H. Rosenwein, ‘AHR Conversation: The Historical Study of Emotions’, *American Historical Review*, 117 (2012), 1487–531. See also the synthesis by Jan Plamper, *Geschichte und Gefühl: Grundlagen der Emotionsgeschichte* (Munich: Siedler, 2012).

⁸ Eustace et al., ‘AHR Conversation’, 1506.

⁹ A recent review has been provided by Bettina Hitzer, ‘Emotionsgeschichte – ein Anfang mit Folgen’, *H-Soz-u-Kult*, <http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/forum/2011-11-001> (23 Nov. 2011).

¹⁰ See Deborah Gould, ‘Passionate Political Processes: Bringing Emotions Back into the Study of Social Movements’, in Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper, eds, *Rethinking Social Movements: Structure, Meaning and Emotion* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 155–75; *Moving Politics*; and ‘On Affect and Protest’, in Ann Cvetkovich, Ann Reynolds and Janer Staiger, eds, *Political Emotions: New Agendas in Communication* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 18–44.

¹¹ This turn is most obvious in William M. Reddy, ‘Emotional Liberty: History and Politics in the Anthropology of Emotions’, *Cultural Anthropology*, 14 (1999), 256–88, and ‘Against Constructionism: The Historical Ethnography of Emotions’, *Current Anthropology*, 38 (1997), 327–51; and, for a more elaborate version of this argument, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

¹² Reddy, *Navigation*, 88–96.

'I don't love you anymore' transforms an unclear, undecided mix of feelings into a clear emotional statement. In that sense, statements like 'I (don't) love you', 'I'm (not) afraid', or 'I'm (not) sad', do not simply describe 'objective' emotional states, but also create them by giving shape and meaning to what was before unclear and unspecified.

How such 'thought material' can be articulated and thus specified is, Reddy argues, subject to a society's emotional normative order. According to this line of thinking, how, where and when unspecified 'thought material' can be expressed as emotions is shaped and limited by social norms, which Reddy describes as 'emotional regimes'. Such an 'emotional regime' can be, in Reddy's view, more or less liberal; it can allow for more or less emotional liberty and induce more or less emotional suffering by restricting how the unspecified 'thought material' can be transformed into specific expressions of feelings. This conception allows Reddy to make political value judgments about any given society based on, in his view, an 'objective' foundation. Reddy's attempt to firmly ground politics in an understanding of emotions that some might describe as ultimately biological is certainly open to criticism. Yet, even if one does not buy into his understanding of emotions, we believe that the notion of 'emotional regimes' and 'emotives' might provide novel ways to think about emotions and the politics of protest. Above all, we would propose that emotional regimes, to employ Reddy's term, are created and, crucially, contested by historical actors. They are part of what William Sewell has described as the 'built environment' in which human beings act and feel; our job as historians is, then, to explore not only how emotional regimes shape the possibility of expressing feelings, but also to examine how emotional regimes are created.¹³ As historians of protest movements, we should inquire if protest movements did not aim, at times explicitly, at times implicitly, at altering suppressive emotional regimes, and ask if they succeeded, or simply created a different, but not necessarily less suppressive emotional regime in the process. Conceiving emotional regimes in this way would imply, as Nicole Eustache has argued in the AHR conversation cited above, that emotions are a 'key index of power relations in any society', and, we would add, a key field for political struggle.¹⁴ Importantly, however, we would also caution against too much of a dualistic understanding of more or less 'liberal' emotional regimes. Instead, it might be more helpful to consider the ambivalences of emotional regimes and how they change: what might look like more permissiveness, for instance, might just be a different rule of feeling.¹⁵

¹³ William H. Sewell Jr, *Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 362–69.

¹⁴ Eustache et al., 'AHR Conversation'.

¹⁵ On this point, see Monique Scheer, 'Are Emotions a Kind of Practice (and Is That What Makes Them Have a History)? A Bourdieuan Approach to Understanding Emotion', *History and Theory*, 51 (2012), 193–220. See similarly, with regard to (only seemingly) more permissive communicative norms, Joachim Scharloth, *1968: Eine Kommunikationsgeschichte* (Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink, 2011).

What Reddy has described as ‘thought material’, sociologist Deborah Gould calls ‘affects’. These, too, are amorphous, unspecified and untamable.¹⁶ But whereas Reddy is interested in emotional regimes and the liberty they grant or prohibit, Gould is more concerned with the political implications of affects. As Gould argues, naming an affect, categorising an unbound, bodily feeling, always leaves a ‘residuum’, that is, ‘the unnamed excess of the interpretative process’. This affective residuum carries on an ‘uncontained potential’, which ‘continues to exert force and motivate.’ Untameable affect, in other words, has, for Gould, always the ambivalent potential to challenge existing power relations, either in a liberating or a reactionary way, and can lead to social change or inaction. Her approach would thus quite directly help us understand the role of emotions in motivating politics of protest. As scholars, we could investigate how people ‘feel’, in an almost bodily way, that something with the existing order is wrong, and that changes could be made, even though they are not quite able to name what they ‘feel’ is wrong. This might enable an understanding of why people engage in collective action, despite all odds and contrary to what a ‘political opportunities’ approach would predict.¹⁷

But we need not necessarily turn to conceptions of emotions, or affects, that are ultimately grounded in some understanding of human nature to conceptualise emotions as deeply political. Monique Scheer’s praxeological approach to emotions offers an alternative. Emotional practices are, in Scheer’s terms, ‘things people do *in order to* have emotions, or “doing emotions” in a performative sense, which would implicate thinking of emotions themselves *as* a kind of practice’.¹⁸ Such practices can look very different. They can be, in William Reddy’s sense, emotional speech acts such as expressing love, but also playing and listening to music at social gatherings, showing and viewing photographs of war atrocities to incite moral outrage, or observing other bodies performing an emotion, for example, crying, itself an emotional practice. Building upon Pierre Bourdieu’s work and notably his understanding of the socially ingrained ‘habitus’, Scheer rejects the very distinction between an ‘autonomous’ body and the social world. The human body is, as Michel Foucault argued, itself deeply social, and so are emotions. Social power is thus, as Scheer continues, relying once again on Bourdieu, incorporated into the body, ‘and produce[s] corresponding thinking, feeling and behavior’. Ultimately, this approach denaturalises emotions, including bodily impulses. Instead, it proposes that even the seemingly most intimate

¹⁶ Gould, *Moving Politics*. Gould relies on the theoretical work of Brian Massumi: ‘Notes on the Translation and Acknowledgements’, in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), xvi–xix; *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002); and ‘Navigating Movements: An Interview with Brian Massumi’, in Mary Zornazi, ed., *Hope: New Philosophies for Change* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 210–42.

¹⁷ Gould, *Moving Politics*, 18–29. See also Jan Plamper’s comment that a history of emotions might help us understand why mostly middle- and upper-class students around the globe turned to Marxism, ‘a choice that defies Marxist and rational choice explanations’, in Eustace et al., ‘AHR Conversation’, 1512. See, from a feminist perspective, on the political and epistemological potential of emotions, Alison Jagger, ‘Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology’, *Inquiry*, 32 (1989), 151–76.

¹⁸ Scheer, ‘Emotions’, 216.

and natural spheres, that of emotions and bodily feelings, are shaped by social power relations. It is exactly this (conscious!) insight that allows for a ‘recognition of the politics of emotions’.¹⁹ In line with Bourdieu, Scheer thus pursues an explicitly emancipatory project. Her emancipatory project, however, differs sharply from the arguably equally emancipatory project Gould pursues. Whereas, for Gould, affect, that is the ‘non-rational’, can be a ‘key force in social change’, it is the insight into the social nature of emotions that, for Scheer, can increase the ‘domain of agency’. Interestingly, the potential for emancipatory politics would thus be located within, and not beyond, the realm of presumably intellectual insights.

We are attracted by Scheer’s praxeological approach because it supports, we believe, our reformulation of the notion of emotional regimes. Indeed, Scheer is quite sceptical both vis-à-vis the concept of ‘emotional regimes’ and that of ‘emotional communities’ (Barbara Rosenwein), because they imply, in Scheer’s reading, ‘coherent, somewhat mentalized, and rather static systems of shared values, behaviors, and so on’. To avoid such static conceptions, Scheer urges historians to analyse how emotional styles, a term Scheer prefers, are practically enacted in everyday social life. To our minds, the same holds true of emotional regimes and emotional communities. The enactment of such emotional norms, whatever one may call them, however, never works entirely smoothly. Practices can fail to generate the emotions they are supposed to achieve, and dominant emotional styles, regimes or communities can be reinforced, but also challenged and contested.²⁰ Whether such challenges go hand in hand with a critical explication of emotional norms, or whether they remain unconscious and implicit, will depend on the specific circumstances. These questions are thus subject to close historical investigation.

These approaches thus provide different ways to study the ‘politics of emotions’. While William Reddy’s concept of ‘emotional regimes’ highlights the limitations and prohibitions of expressing feelings, Deborah Gould’s work draws attention to the unnamed and unspecific affective residua that might motivate collective action. Finally, Monique Scheer’s notion of ‘emotional practices’ urges historians to study closely what people did, thereby confirming existing emotional styles or challenging them. Scholars will certainly continue to debate the merits and problems of these concepts and terminologies, and it is not our intention here to privilege one or the other. Indeed, the contributors to this special issue draw on a wide variety of

¹⁹Scheer, ‘Emotions’, 216. On praxeological approaches more generally, see Andreas Reckwitz, ‘Toward a Theory of Social Practices: A Development in Culturalist Theorizing’, *European Journal of Social Theory*, 5, 2 (2002), 243–63; Andreas Reckwitz, ‘Affective Spaces: a Praxeological Outlook’, *Rethinking History*, 16 (2012), 241–58.

²⁰Scheer, ‘Emotions’, 216–17. On emotional communities, see Barbara Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006) and ‘Worrying about Emotions in History’, *American Historical Review*, 107 (2002), 821–45. The notion of ‘emotional styles’ has been proposed by Benno Gammerl, ‘Emotional Styles: Concepts and Challenges’, *Rethinking History*, 16 (2012), 161–75. In a different context, Scheer has developed, together with Pascal Eitler, the notion of ‘trying emotions’, see Pascal Eitler and Monique Scheer, ‘Emotionengeschichte als Körpergeschichte: Eine heuristische Perspektive auf religiöse Konversionen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert’, *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 35 (2009), 293, 311–12.

conceptual, and arguably mutually exclusive, approaches to the study of emotions in history. Adam Zientek's study of the mutinies in the French army in 1917, for example, makes use of neuroscientific understandings of basic emotions that are hard-wired in the body and hence subject to stimuli like alcohol consumption,²¹ whereas Jake Smith and Joachim C. Häberlen combine Reddy's notion of 'emotional regimes' and Monique Scheer's praxeological approach to analyse the alternative left and youth revolts in Germany from the 1970s to the early 1980s. Approaching their subjects from different theoretical understandings of what emotions are, the articles presented here demonstrate the potential yield – and, importantly, limits – of different conceptualisations of emotions for empirical studies. Independently of the terminology one chooses, however, the articles demonstrate that it is essential to combine studies of both emotional rules and norms, how they are created, formulated and enacted, with studies of challenges to these rules and norms, both practical and theoretical.

Beyond emotional discourses: feelings and bodies in protest movements

Beyond the theoretical differences, all the approaches presented in this issue show that a mere study of the emotional lexica and languages of social activists and protestors does not suffice.²² They highlight, in one way or another, the role of the body – be it as locus of some unnamed affective potential, or be it by focusing on what might be called, in a rather loose sense, 'emotional practices', even though the articles do not always employ this language. The articles address what people did to influence, shape and perform their own and others' emotions and feelings; or, to phrase this in a way that implies perhaps less intentionality and agency, how people's 'doings' (Scheer) shaped their emotions. Moving beyond emotional languages, the articles pay particular attention to the necessarily gendered body, to the brain and to the senses as well as to bodily practices and how they relate to feelings. They analyse how the space in which bodies moved shaped, for example, deeply gendered emotional communities; they discuss material objects activists used to express, perform, or incite emotions. These practices are perhaps of particular relevance to the study of protest movements, in which bodies played and play such a crucial role – in the form of protesting and marching bodies, of bodies engaging in violence or suffering from violence, or of bodies dressed up to defy cultural norms.²³ Even today in a

²¹ See Daniel Lord Smail, *On Deep History and the Brain* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2008). For a critique, see William M. Reddy, 'Review Essay: Daniel Lord Smail, *On Deep History and the Brain*', *History and Theory*, 49 (2010), 412–25.

²² For a study of emotional lexica, see Ute Frevert, Christian Baily, Pascal Eitler, Benno Gammerl, Bettina Hitzer, Margrit Pernau, Monique Scheer, Anne Schmidt and Nina Verheyen, *Emotional Lexicons: Continuity and Change in the Vocabulary of Feeling, 1700–2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

²³ On bodies in protest movements, see e.g., with numerous further references, Andrea Pabst, 'Protesting Bodies and Bodily Protests: "Thinking through the Body" in Social Movement Studies', in Timothy Brown and Lorena Anton, eds, *Between the Avant-Garde and the Everyday: Subversive Politics in Europe from 1957 to the Present* (New York: Berghahn, 2011), 191–200.

seemingly increasingly virtual world, it is hard to imagine protest movements, revolts and revolutions without the involvement of bodies.

Taken together, the different methodological approaches pursued in these articles offer a rich repertoire for how a study of feelings and bodies will enhance our understanding of contentious politics. Adam Zientek's approach to emotions is perhaps the most radical and provocative for historians. In line with current neuroscientific research, Zientek locates basic emotions in the human brain. There is, then, no difference between emotions and the neurological and physiological processes of the body. According to this logic, emotions can be stimulated or suppressed by consuming drugs, such as alcohol, that affect specific neural pathways, as Zientek explains. In this sense, Zientek's work looks at how bodies and material objects – alcohol – not only interact, but fuse. Whether or not the neuroscientific theories Zientek draws on – notably Jaak Panksepp's model of 'core emotional affects' – are correct will be open to debate. Not everyone will agree with his reliance on neurobiologists to understand the hard-wired nature of emotions across human cultures and time. It may, as any reliance on biology, face charges of reductionism. As editors, we do not want to hide our preference for other approaches. Yet, given that 'neuro-history' has often been discussed, and criticised, in rather abstract terms, we believe it is crucial to see what such an approach can yield in practice. Indeed, Zientek's careful micro-study of one decisive day during the French army mutinies in spring 1917 demonstrates, first, that historians, and especially historians of emotions, would do well to consider alcohol as well as other drugs as a historical agent that can shape people's feelings and thus actions.²⁴ Second, by focusing on 'micro-situational' factors, namely that soldiers were sober at 2:30 pm, but drunk by 6:00 pm, rather than depending on 'distal macro-structural factors', Zientek shows how neuroscientific insights can inform historical studies and, in Zientek's reading, provide the situational reasons in the brain for why something happened at a specific point of time in a specific way, something that arguments operating on a 'grand' cultural level fail to do.

Turning to neuroscience is, however, by no means the only option for incorporating the body into our analyses. The body's senses play a central role in Christophe Traïni's article on animal rights activists from the nineteenth to the twentieth century. He specifically focuses on 'sensitising devices', that is the ensemble of material objects activists use to provoke affective reactions and mobilise involvement and support for a political cause. 'Affective states', he writes, 'are inscribed into the materiality of objects'. By virtue of their materiality, objects appeal to our senses – we hear, see, smell and touch them. If exposed to objects that in a particular way speak to our senses, which we find horrifying or disgusting, then we are sensitised over time, forced to respond and no longer able to remain neutral, as activists hope. However, how these objects are inscribed with the intended emotional strategies of activists also reflects the social conventions of both the activists

²⁴See in this regard the discussion of rape and the role alcohol played therein by Catherine Merridale, *Ivan's War: Inside the Red Army, 1939–45* (London: Faber & Faber), 263–98.

and their intended recipients, as well as the position of the scholar making his or her observations, all of which requires careful reconstruction. Similar to alcohol as discussed by Adam Zientek, albeit in a less directly chemical way, material objects gain agency in Traïni's argument. Objects can incite affective states but, as Traïni cautions, how the intended affective states are received and experienced by others is often ambiguous, 'sometimes incomprehensible even to the person feeling the emotion', and only indirectly discernible to the observer through a 'tangle of clues'.²⁵ This approach allows Traïni to trace how mobilisation strategies of animal rights activists changed from the nineteenth to the twentieth century and to relate these changes to the altered social basis of the animal rights movement, not only by noting the different social statuses between activists, but also 'the norms and representations that brought them into contact with the affective experiences that shaped them', including a lowering in the tolerance threshold for violence, the increasing popularity of pet animals and an increased propensity to identify with animals in general found in the late twentieth century.

How anyone could stand up to, let alone sustain and reinvigorate resistance against an oppressive regime is the subject of Eduardo Romanos's long-term study of Spanish anarchists' ongoing struggle against the Franco regime from 1939 to 1975. Whereas bodies have been central in Zientek's and, to a lesser degree, Traïni's articles, Romanos looks at how multiple emotional practices continued to influence the high-risk activism of Spanish anarchists in ambivalent ways, during brief windows of opportunity like 1945 and the early 1960s, thus challenging more narrow sociological approaches that typically would only focus on one emotion. By way of an underground print culture, Romanos not only provides a glimpse into some of the older forms of clandestine political activism and related emotional practices of anarchist reading cultures and émigré correspondence, but he also shows how the strategic dramaturgy of hope and indignation enabled the reactivation of anarchists' networks and even the possibility of new alliances under changing circumstances, as well as how other feelings like resentment among anarchists actually worked to divide the movement in the years after the Second World War.

Music allows Nikolaos Papadogiannis to further explore the performative dimensions of multiple and overlapping emotional communities of left-wing Greek migrants in West Germany from the late 1960s to the early 1980s. Drawing on Barbara Rosenwein's work, Papadogiannis investigates how Greek migrants performed specific emotions by listening to music and singing, a performance which created at once a national community of Greeks in West Germany, centred around feelings of suffering due to migration and longing for the homeland, and a distinctly left-wing emotional community that sought to turn suffering into strength for struggling. Yet this left-wing emotional community also transcended national boundaries on the

²⁵ See in this context the work of Bruno Latour, who argued that material objects have agency, Bruno Latour, *The Pasteurization of France* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988) and *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

basis of international solidarity through socialising with left-wing German activists. What emerges through Papadogiannis's analysis is thus an image of dynamic and overlapping emotional communities interlinked through the emotional practices of Greek music.²⁶ Collectively singing and listening to music, Greek migrants performed *kefi*, a Greek term deriving from the Arabic *kaif* that can be roughly translated as 'spirit of joy', in the original Arabic meaning under the influence of marijuana. Space played a key role in this formation of an emotional community, since members of different political factions of the left gathered at the same taverns, sang together and thus jointly performed *kefi*, which allowed them to overcome political differences. *Kefi* is a highly cultural specific emotion with its own performative scripts. In this sense, it could be interpreted as a prime example of a habituated emotional practice in Monique Scheer's sense that had to be enacted in new contexts – West Germany rather than Greece – and thereby changed in the process.

Emotional practices, albeit consciously developed rather than unconsciously habituated practices, are also the subject of the article by Smith and Häberlen about radical left-wingers in West Germany from the late 1960s into the early 1980s. At the same time, Smith and Häberlen draw on Reddy's notion of 'emotional regimes' to understand how emotional rules and practices interacted. The radical left-wing authors which Smith and Häberlen examine argued that capitalism would yield only negative feelings, such as frustration, boredom or fear, or produce a general emotional void that left no space for the expression of positive feelings. In a way, these left-wing authors thus analysed what might be called a 'capitalist emotional regime'. However, Smith and Häberlen argue that they effectively created an emotional regime for their own milieu, in which it became imperative, for example, to admit how emotionally damaged one was. Smith and Häberlen thus show how a particular interpretation of a socio-political system, that is, capitalism, resulted in more or less firm rules concerning the appropriate expression and performance of feelings. At the same time, radical left-wingers developed a set of what Smith and Häberlen call 'alternative emotional practices' that would break with these rules and yield the feelings left-wingers were desperately looking for, ranging from openly talking about emotions, showing bodily signs of affection, to resorting to violence as a means to overcome fear. The article by Smith and Häberlen thus shows how an analysis of emotional norms and discourses can be combined with an examination of emotional practices that were meant to enact or to counteract these norms.

Finally, Juliane Fürst discusses a similarly increased propensity to construct one's identity in emotional terms among hippies in the Soviet Union during the 1960s and 1970s. Weaving together different approaches taken by authors of this issue, Fürst engages with a variety of 'emotional practices' (Scheer). While Häberlen and Smith make use of written sources to study emotional practices, Fürst turns to interviews with former activists. These hippies, Fürst shows, engaged in emotional practices

²⁶On the relation between music and emotions from a variety of disciplinary perspectives, see the contributions in Patrik N. Juslin and John A. Sloboda, eds, *Handbook of Music and Emotion: Theory, Research, and Applications* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

that would help them escape the overly rationalist world of state socialism and an official youth culture focused on lectures and study circles. Like the West German left-wingers studied by Häberlen and Smith, Soviet hippies used colourful fashion to oppose the 'grey' and rational socialist world. They listened to music and consumed alcohol and other drugs to create new modes of experience and expression, and reach a state of *kaif*, the deeply bodily feeling of pleasure stimulated by drugs. For these hippies, as for West German radical left-wingers, emotions themselves became a form of protest. Hippies, Fürst argues, created an 'emotional universe' that 'frequently put them at least in a parallel, if not an opposing, universe to the emotional regime propagated by official Soviet culture'. Soviet attempts to reintegrate not only hippies, but also broader segments of Soviet youth never succeeded. Ultimately, this development undermined the official 'scientific world-view' of the regime and hence its ideological legitimacy. In this sense, the emotional protests of Soviet hippies had arguably more far-reaching consequences than the protests of their counterparts in the Western world.

Read in combination, the articles in this issue present a wide array of aspects in which the historical study of emotions can be developed still further, in particular in protest movements. While not everyone will agree with all the methodological arguments of our authors, the articles suggest multiple ways to integrate the body and material objects, as well as space, into our analyses of emotions. We need, first, to consider how the body and external stimuli interact – be it alcohol or other drugs, graphic images, or even the weather.²⁷ Whether such reactions are hard-wired into the human body and brain, or whether they are themselves the result of cultural norms and traditions, will be subject to further debate. Second, we need to combine analyses of feeling rules and emotional regimes with analyses of emotional practices, which include, but are not limited to bodily practices.²⁸ Feeling rules might set standards for how to express and perform feelings, but the enactment of such rules always has the potential to fail. Practices do not always yield the feelings they are supposed to yield, which might make people revolt against these rules. Third, we need to take seriously the social aspect of emotions.²⁹ Whether it is collective drinking, singing or violence, emotions are usually performed collectively, or with a collective audience in

²⁷ Despite common knowledge that sunshine and rain can have profound impacts on feelings, such issues have not been studied extensively historically, although it is a common trope in literature (think, for example, of Goethe's *The Sorrows of Young Werther*). Anecdotal evidence suggesting that it might be worth looking at weather conditions and their (emotional) consequences includes Sebastian Haffner, *Defying Hitler: A Memoir* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002), 23. Haffner contrasts the publicly displayed enthusiasm over the outbreak of the First World War with the generally depressed mood during the November Revolution in 1918 and links this, among other things, to different weather conditions. Another example is the May Day riot of 1 May 1987 in Berlin. According to one participant, it was the first warm summer night after a long and harsh winter, and people simply wanted to celebrate.

²⁸ On feeling rules, see Arlie R. Hochschild, 'Emotion Work, Feeling Rules and Social Structure', *American Journal of Sociology*, 85 (1979), 551–75.

²⁹ The social dimensions of emotions are particularly stressed by Mustafa Emirbayer and Chad Alan Goldberg, 'Pragmatism, Bourdieu, and Collective Emotions in Contentious Politics', *Theory and Society*, 34 (2005), 469–518.

mind. Thus we need to understand how collective emotional practices can facilitate the formation of communities that can become active in moments of revolt, be they Greek immigrants, mutinying French soldiers or West German squatters.

Beyond the means to an end: political emotions

Is it possible, beyond the richness of the methodological approaches presented in this issue, to see how the role of emotions in protest movements changed within the twentieth century? Of course, much depends on theoretical understandings of emotions: if emotions are transhistorical and transcultural neurochemical processes in the brain, then it might be difficult and debatable to think about how their role changes, for instance, as media and social media practices evolve over time. And, of course, the very diversity of the case studies presented here, both in terms of space, time, and different groups of actors, allows only for some preliminary and hesitant remarks that call for further attention. That said, however, some observations can be made.

Maybe most interestingly, the contributions by Juliane Fürst, and Jake Smith and Joachim C. Häberlen suggest a trans-European turn towards emotions in protest movements in the post-1968 years.³⁰ The Soviet hippies examined by Fürst, the left-wing Greek immigrants interviewed by Papadogiannis, and the radical left-wingers in the article by Smith and Häberlen all made feelings their key political concern. They thus reshaped the very contours of the political. This observation raises a series of questions for further research. First, it would be worthwhile investigating whether a similar turn towards emotions can be found in other countries as well, both in Europe and beyond, most notably the in the United States. It seems at least likely that a similar trend might be observed among French and Italian radical left-wingers (the *Indiani Metropolitani*, for example), as well as within oppositional youth cultures in Eastern Europe.³¹ Second, the gendered nature of this turn requires greater attention. At the time, many activists combined a critique of capitalist rationality with a critique of male rationality, arguing that men's social roles forced them to deny their feelings, whereas

³⁰Of course, the slogan that 'boredom is counter-revolutionary' was already popular during the May 1968 revolt itself, especially in France; see, e.g., René Viénet, *Enragés and Situationists in the Occupation Movement, France, May '68* (New York: Autonomedia, 1992; London: Rebel Press, 1992); Kristin Ross, *May '68 and Its Afterlives* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Michael Seidman, *The Imaginary Revolution: Parisian Students and Workers in 1968* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004). For the Italian context, see Luisa Passerini, *Autobiography of a Generation: Italy, 1968* (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1996), 31–2.

³¹See, e.g., Maud Anne Bracke, 'Building a 'Counter-Community of Emotions': Feminist Encounters and Socio-Cultural Difference in 1970s Turin', *Modern Italy*, 17 (2012), 223–36; Rebecca Clifford, 'Emotions and Gender in Oral History: Narrating Italy's 1968', *Modern Italy*, 23 (2012), 209–21; William Jay Risch, 'Soviet "Flower Children": Hippies and the Youth Counter-culture in 1970s L'viv', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 40 (2005), 565–84; Zdenek Nebrensky, 'Early Voices of Dissent: Czechoslovakian Student Opposition at the Beginning of the 1960s', in Martin Klimke, Jacco Pekelder and Joachim Scharloth, eds, *Between Prague Spring and French May: Opposition and Revolt in Europe, 1960–1980* (New York: Berghahn, 2011), 34–48.

society attributed emotionality to women, a dichotomy at least some feminists bought into, praising women's allegedly inherently greater emotional capabilities. Today, few scholars would agree with such gendered dichotomies. Nevertheless, it would be important to know how such dichotomies, as well as gender more generally, shaped the emotional practices and experiences of men and women involved in these movements, a question partially addressed by the authors of this issue.

Furthermore, the very nature of this turn would require more attention. How novel was the concern with 'alternative' or 'better' emotions within left-wing movements since the late 1960s? Dominant emotional regimes or styles were continually challenged by countercultures, as Monique Scheer notes, and activists in the post-1968 era could rely on some of these antecedents: left-wing bohemians, and the *Lebensreformbewegung* from the later German Empire to the Weimar Republic, which, for example, founded the community at Monte Verità in Switzerland, a place to which radical left-wingers and drop outs in the 1970s returned;³² Wilhelm Reich and his 'sexual political organisation' in Weimar Germany; and finally countercultural movements like the American Beat Generation, French Situationists and Dutch Provos.³³ In one way or another, they all had made emotions one of their central political, social or cultural concerns, for example, the struggle against loneliness and boredom in modern, urban society. Though scholars have recognised that these movements constituted important sources for radical activists and the broader counterculture of the 1960s and 1970s, the question if and how they laid a basis for the emotional politics since the 1970s remains to be examined more closely.

One fascinating aspect of this turn to emotions is its transnational nature that seems to have crossed the Iron Curtain. How precisely did this happen? Did countercultural youth movements from East and West mutually influence each other, or was this a Western import to Eastern Europe? Why did ideas developed in one country or socio-political system, the capitalist West, resonate so well in other places such as Eastern Europe? All these questions deserve closer research. The trans-European scope of the turn towards emotions in protest movements also calls for a broader contextualisation. First, the social, political and cultural impact of this turn needs to be examined. Did, as Smith and Häberlen suggest, a different 'emotional regime' emerge within Western societies, beyond the radical left? Were the radical left-wingers they examine just part and parcel of a broader 'therapeutisation' of society,

³² On Monte Verità, see, e.g., Ulrike Voswinkel, *Freie Liebe und Anarchie: Schwabing – Monte Verità: Entwürfe gegen das etablierte Leben* (Munich: Allitera-Verlag, 2009).

³³ Scheer, 'Emotions', 217. She is referring to the work of Andreas Reckwitz, who analyses dominant and countercultural forms of subjectivity since the 19th c., see Andreas Reckwitz, *Das hybride Subjekt: eine Theorie der Subjektkulturen von der bürgerlichen Moderne zur Postmoderne* (Weilerswist: Velbrück, 2006). See also Uffa Jensen, 'The Lure of Authenticity: Emotions and Generations in the German Youth Movement of the Early 20th Century', in Hartmut Berghoff, Uffa Jensen, Christina Lubinski and Bernd Weisbrod, eds, *History by Generations: Generational Dynamics in Modern History* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2013), 109–24; Anthony D. Kauders, 'Drives in Dispute: The West German Student Movement, Psychoanalysis, and the Search for a New Emotional Order, 1967–1971', *Central European History*, 44 (2011), 711–31; Richard Kempton, *Provo: Amsterdam's Anarchist Revolt* (Brooklyn: Autonomedia, 2007).

or were they one of the driving forces of these changes?³⁴ And, taking a comparative perspective, were capitalist regimes better able to integrate these alternative emotional cultures than their Communist counterparts in Eastern Europe? In other words, how far might alternative youth movements like the hippies and their turn towards emotions have paved the way for the revolutions of 1989? Second, the relation between dominant ‘emotional regimes’ and movements challenging these regimes deserves attention. If activists on both sides of the Iron Curtain turned to similar emotional practices to challenge both the capitalist regime in the West and the socialist regime in the East, then one might ask whether these regimes were not so different after all. More importantly, did the (emotional) regimes of capitalism *and* socialism change in some ways during the post-war period that ‘triggered’ a turn towards emotions among oppositional movements? The dynamic relations between hegemonic emotional regimes and social or political movements calling for different emotional experiences thus remain to be explained and understood.³⁵

³⁴See Sabine Maasen, Jens Elberfeld, Pascal Eitler and Maik Tändler, eds, *Das beratene Selbst: Zur Genealogie der Therapeutisierung in den “langen” Siebzigern* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2011); Uffa Jensen and Maik Tändler, eds, *Das Selbst zwischen Anpassung und Befreiung: Psychowissen und Politik im 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2013).

³⁵It would be worthwhile to investigate links and relations between (dominant) emotional regimes and emotional countercultures on the one hand, and the dynamic between hegemonic and marginal forms of subjectivity studied by Reckwitz in *Das hybride Subject* on the other.