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Robustly Coalition-Proof Incentive Mechanisms for Public Good Provision are Voting Mechanisms and Vice Versa

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Bierbrauer,  Felix
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

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Hellwig,  Martin
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

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Bierbrauer, F., & Hellwig, M. (2016). Robustly Coalition-Proof Incentive Mechanisms for Public Good Provision are Voting Mechanisms and Vice Versa. Review of Economic Studies, 83, 1440-1464.


Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0029-4B5D-4
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