


# “CIVILISATIONS”

[Günther Schlee]



HALLE (SAALE) 2015

MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY  
**DEPARTMENT 'INTEGRATION AND CONFLICT'**  
FIELD NOTES AND RESEARCH PROJECTS XI

# SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

(GÜNTHER SCHLEE)

## ABOUT THE SERIES

This series of *Field Notes and Research Projects* does not aim to compete with high-impact, peer reviewed books and journal articles, which are the main ambition of scholars seeking to publish their research. Rather, contributions to this series complement such publications. They serve a number of different purposes.

In recent decades, anthropological publications have often been purely discursive – that is, they have consisted only of words. Often, pictures, tables, and maps have not found their way into them. In this series, we want to devote more space to visual aspects of our data.

Data are often referred to in publications without being presented systematically. Here, we want to make the paths we take in proceeding from data to conclusions more transparent by devoting sufficient space to the documentation of data.

In addition to facilitating critical evaluation of our work by members of the scholarly community, stimulating comparative research within the institute and beyond, and providing citable references for books and articles in which only a limited amount of data can be presented, these volumes serve an important function in retaining connections to field sites and in maintaining the involvement of the people living there in the research process. Those who have helped us to collect data and provided us with information can be given these books and booklets as small tokens of our gratitude and as tangible evidence of their cooperation with us. When the results of our research are sown in the field, new discussions and fresh perspectives might sprout.

Especially in their electronic form, these volumes can also be used in the production of power points for teaching; and, as they are open-access and free of charge, they can serve an important public outreach function by arousing interest in our research among members of a wider audience.

MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY  
DEPARTMENT 'INTEGRATION AND CONFLICT'  
FIELD NOTES AND RESEARCH PROJECTS XI  
"Civilisations"

Published by Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle (Saale)  
P.O. Box 11 03 51  
D-06017 Halle/Saale (Germany)  
Phone 491034512 92 70  
<http://www.eth.mpg.de>

ISSN 2193-987X

Author: Günther Schlee

Assisted by: Viktoria Zeng and Robert Dobsław

Cover: Drawing by W. Marshall from Wolfgang Marshall 1972,  
*Transpazifische Kulturbeziehungen: Studien zu ihrer Geschichte*,  
München: Klaus Renner Verlag

Printed 2015 by Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle (Saale)  
© 2015 Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Published Volumes .....	iv
ABOUT THIS BOOKLET .....	vi

“CIVILISATIONS”, EURASIA AS A UNIT, AND THE <i>HOCHKULTURGÜRTEL</i> : AN ESSAY ABOUT HOW TO SUBDIVIDE THE WORLD IN TERMS OF CULTURAL HISTORY AND WHAT TO EXPLAIN WITH THE UNITS THEREBY CREATED .....	1
--	---

SUGGESTIVE VISUALISATIONS: MAPPING CIVILISATIONS AND CULTURAL DISTRIBUTIONS .....	23
--	----

APPENDIX	
Index of Persons .....	49
Subject Index .....	51
Book Publications .....	55

# PUBLISHED VOLUMES

In the FIELD NOTES AND RESEARCH PROJECTS Series the following titles have been published so far:

2012

(I) Schlee, Günther (ed.): *Pastoralism in Interaction with other Forms of Land Use in the Blue Nile Area of the Sudan: Project Outline and Field Notes 2009–10*

(II) Schlee, Isir, Beleysa Hambule, and Günther Schlee: *The Moiety Division and the Problem of Rendille Unity: A Discussion among Elders, Korr, 21<sup>st</sup> January, 2008*

2013

(III) Awad Alkarim and Günther Schlee (eds): *Pastoralism in Interaction with other Forms of Land Use in the Blue Nile Area of the Sudan II: Herbarium and Plant Diversity in the Blue Nile Area, Sudan*

(IV) Lenart, Severin: *The Complexity of the Moment – Picturing an Ethnographic Project in South Africa and Swaziland: Vol. I: Photo Essays and Fieldwork Reports, 2007–11*

(V) Lenart, Severin: *The Complexity of the Moment – Picturing an Ethnographic Project in South Africa and Swaziland: Vol. II: Photo Essays and Court Cases, 2007–11*

(VI) Finke, Peter, and Günther Schlee (eds): *CASCA – Centre for Anthropological Studies on Central Asia: Framing the Research, Initial Projects*

2014

(VII) Schlee, Günther: *The Social and the Belief System of the Rendille – Camel Nomads of Northern Kenya: English Version: Halle 2014/German Original: Berlin 1979*

(VIII) Schlee, Günther: *Das Glaubens- und Sozialsystem der Rendille – Kamelnomaden Nord-Kenias: German Original of Volume VII, Reprint*

(IX) Isir and Günther Schlee: *Rendille and Ariaal – A Linguistic and Cultural Affiliation Census I: Logologo: Sabamba, Odoola, Manyatta Juu; Nama-rei: Ong’eli (Lomorut, Harugura, Ilmongoi); Goob Lengima; Korr: Bosnia, Lorora; Laisamis: Rengumo; Lepindira*

2015

(X) Awad Karim, Elhadi Ibrahim Osman, Günther Schlee and Jutta Turner: *Pastoralism in Interaction with other Forms of Land Use in the Blue Nile Area of the Sudan III: The Methods of Citizen Science in the Study of Agropastoralism*

(XI) Schlee, Günther: “*Civilisations*”

For teaching purposes, all volumes are available as online PDFs under [www.eth.mpg.de/dept\\_schlee\\_series\\_fieldnotes/index.html](http://www.eth.mpg.de/dept_schlee_series_fieldnotes/index.html)

# ABOUT THIS BOOKLET

(GÜNTHER SCHLEE)

Originally, the following text on “*Civilisations*”, *Eurasia as a Unit, and the Hochkulturgürtel: An Essay about how to Subdivide the World in Terms of Cultural History and what to Explain with the Units thereby Created* was meant to be published in the Working Papers series of our institute. I invited my colleague and co-editor of that series, Chris Hann, to comment on the paper “Current Anthropology style: 800 words or 1000 if you like”.

He not only rejected this offer but vehemently opposed having the paper published in our series, suggesting that I place it in an academic journal. I tried just that.

I submitted my text to *Current Anthropology* where Chris Hann sent a version of one of the papers that I criticise, because I thought that this journal might be an appropriate forum for the debate that could not be had in our working paper series. The paper got two positive reviews, one recommending it to be published alongside Hann’s paper, if the latter was accepted, the other one strongly recommending to publish it irrespective of the fate of Hann’s paper. It was rejected nevertheless – a decision that the journal editors justified by referring to the “circumstances of the submission of your manuscript and that of Chris Hann’s.” Without wishing to conceal my disappointment, I must say that I find this argument quite acceptable. Journals normally deal with submissions which are quite independent of each other, and obviously this was not so in this case. I was, however, invited to write a comment. I gratefully accepted that invitation and wrote a 800 word comment on the article by Chris Hann, referring the reader to a fuller version of my criticism which is the content of this booklet. I have been told that the issue of *Current Anthropology* with Hann’s article and its discussion will appear in early 2016.

The following text is practically identical with the one submitted to *Current Anthropology*. The only additions are a few paragraphs towards the end. Focusing on James Carrier and embeddedness as a feature of types of transaction, rather than civilisation-based kinds of moral economy, I marked this addition by interruptions in the brown margin.

Because a booklet offers more space than a journal article, I have added a little picture essay on ‘Suggestive Visualisations: Mapping Civilisations and Cultural Distributions’.

The present series of ‘Field Notes and Research Projects’ may at first glance be an unusual place to publish an already rather polished article which has already been positively reviewed, but there are precedents. This series has been a place for documentation which could not be included in other publications. The volumes by Severin Lenart on *The Complexity of the Moment* (vols. IV and V) include such documentation which accompanies his

doctoral thesis. In the same way, the following text can be seen as accompanying my comment in *Current Anthropology*. It contains the fuller argument with illustrations and proper references.

The next round of this discussion, of which another version of this paper will be a part, will take place in the *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* which plans a thematic issue on 'Rethinking Culture, Area, and Comparison' for 2016.

# “CIVILISATIONS”, EURASIA AS A UNIT AND THE *HOCHKULTURGÜRTEL*: AN ESSAY ABOUT HOW TO SUBDIVIDE THE WORLD IN TERMS OF CULTURAL HISTORY AND WHAT TO EXPLAIN WITH THE UNITS THEREBY CREATED<sup>1</sup>

## ABSTRACT

Cultures as discrete, isolated, countable units have been contested in anthropological writings in recent decades, and few anthropologists would now subscribe to a notion of humankind being the sum of culturally and neatly defined sub-units.

This scepticism about cultural classification on different scales has not done away with the need for just such classification. We need to discuss who is more or less similar to whom in terms of language, economic behaviour, religion, or whatever in order to explore co-variation: what else changes if one of these features changes?

The present paper discusses alternative ways of subdividing the world into cultural units. The major focus is on Hann’s notion of Eurasia being somehow different from the rest and made up by a number of civilisations that differ less from each other than one would expect if they were found anywhere on the globe (“the unity of the landmass”) (Hann 2008: 147). Another focus is on civilisation belts running all around the globe. Yet further delineations of regions meaningful for anthropological purposes are discussed in passing. Generally, the question is how and under which methodological conditions the units thus constructed can be used for the anthropological study of variation and co-variation.

---

<sup>1</sup> Acknowledgements: I thank Michael Banton, Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, Aleksandar Bošković, John Eidson, and Patrick Heady for comments on an earlier version of this paper and in particular J. Christoph Winter, who taught me a great deal at an earlier stage of my career and to whom I owe valuable hints for the present paper. Chris Hann has made some helpful clarifications. The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect the views of those whose help I acknowledge.



## INTRODUCTION

In 1823, opposing European and particularly British interests in Latin America, where one country after the other gained independence, the U. S. President Monroe issued the Monroe Doctrine. It is a lengthy document, but it is best known by the short formula summarising it: America for the Americans! European powers should not meddle in the Americas, where the United States sooner or later would have a hegemonic status. By way of reciprocity, Monroe generously promised not to meddle in Old World affairs and allowed the European powers to solve the problems the Greek were having with the Ottomans all by themselves.

In 1936, Kluckhohn criticised his American colleagues for applying the Monroe Doctrine to anthropology<sup>2</sup>. Until then, the German/Austrian *Kulturkreislehre* had been quite influential internationally, drawing attention to cultural similarities, which could only be explained by historical connections right across continents and beyond, i. e. between continents. Its *Kulturkreise* in several instances comprised parts of more than one continent. It was a well-established school with which it was difficult to compete. In this situation, it was quite convenient to claim that the cultural-historical connections between Native American ‘cultures’ could be studied within America, because there were no links to other continents. Any trans-Pacific links, apart from the original immigration across what is now the Bering Strait, were denied<sup>3</sup> and a smaller version of the *Kulturkreise*, the ‘culture areas’, was defined, for which local (American) anthropologists would become specialists, rather than German/Austrian anthropologists who were then more global in the double sense of dealing with farther-reaching cultural connections and being accorded more importance in different parts of the world.<sup>4</sup>

The Monroe doctrine of anthropology has had a negative impact on the development of the discipline. It has privileged a perspective that split the world along meridians, putting the Americas in one category and the rest (Eurasia, Oceania and Australia which are undoubtedly connected by migra-

<sup>2</sup> Kluckhohn 1936: 185, FN 88, where he explains that he has borrowed the expression ‘the ethnological Monroe doctrine’ from [Pater Wilhelm] Schmidt.

<sup>3</sup> While trans-Pacific links were prematurely rejected, pre-Columbian trans-Atlantic links were not a matter of serious discussion anyhow, maybe rightly so. The Vikings appear to have left no traces in North America and recurrent speculations about links between Egypt and Mesoamerica seem to be a matter of popular fantasy. The Clovis culture was no issue then, and if Bradley and Stanford (2004) are correct in seeing it as linked to Europe, this link dates from a very ancient past when the water table was much lower, the ice-rim much farther south and neither Europe nor America had their present coastlines.

<sup>4</sup> It is clear that this hierarchy has been reversed since then. This academic strategy can be compared with an economic policy, namely that of the Asian Tiger economies in their early stage: Protectionism and import substitution. Like the Tiger economies, American anthropology first shielded itself from competition and then, in relative isolation, grew to become a strong competitor.

tion routes and cultural exchange) in another. In contrast to this perspective, which isolates America and studies cultural variation only within it, historical linguists have no problems with language families extending through parts of Eurasia and parts of North America. The Na-Dene-Yeniseian language family is widely accepted (Comrie 2010). Its wider and older connections to Sino-Tibetan and other Eurasian language families are disputed but still associated with the names of important linguists like Morris Swadesh (Fleming n.d.) and Edward Sapir (Vajda 2010: 114). From prehistory to recent forms of globalisation, an exclusive focus on one continent or another would prevent us from seeing important links across the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. Even if there were cultural peculiarities restricted to a single continent, we would not be able to identify them without comparisons with other continents.

For me, it is more inspiring to analyse the forms of culture and their distribution in following the latitudes rather than the longitudes of the world map. Parallel to the eco-climatic zones and cutting across the meridians separating the Americas from the rest at a right angle, we find belts characterised by certain features going all around the globe. Jack Goody (1970: 127), citing earlier work by Lowie and Murdock, has shown the strong statistical correlation between Omaha and Crow type kinship terminologies and unilinear descent groups (patrilineal and matrilineal, respectively). These are found in Eurasia, Africa, North and South America. In other words, to look at them continent by continent does not reveal much. But there is one belt around the world, both the New and the Old, where they are not found, namely the belt of ancient civilisations, the *Hochkulturgürtel*<sup>5</sup> of German cultural history. Systems of ‘bifurcate merging’ like Crow and Omaha are frequently encountered to the north and south of the ‘high cultures’. To the north of the *Hochkulturgürtel*, we find them in North America, where after all, the groups which gave them their names are located; and we find Omaha terminologies and “Descriptive” terminologies with Omaha elements among Mongol and Turkic speaking groups of Central and East Asia.<sup>6</sup> To the south, they abound in sub-Saharan Africa, and “Lowland South America is an especially rich terrain for the study of Crow-Omaha kinship” (Trautmann and Whiteley 2012: 25). We do not find them among the Aztecs or their Nahuatl speaking

<sup>5</sup> For maps, see Marquardt 2009: 27, 41.

<sup>6</sup> According to Krader, the Ordos Mongols kinship terminology, which he typologically equates with Ancient Turkic and Classic Mongol, clearly shows Omaha features (Krader 1963: 44). Dole classifies Chahar and Khalkha Mongol, Kazak and, moving on to East Africa in the same breath, Maasai terminologies as being of the ‘Lineage’ type (her term for “Descriptive”) with Omaha vestiges (Dole 1965: 52, cf. also 51). On Maa and other Omaha type kin classifications in East Africa, see Schlee (2009: 130 and 1994).

descendants<sup>7</sup>, the Maya<sup>8</sup>, the Inca and their Quechua speaking descendants, or in the entire chain of ancient Old World civilisations from the Nile to the Yellow River. There, kinship terminologies predominate that combine well with more cognatic ways of tracing relationships. With changing material resources and forms of political organisation, in this belt in the middle, in which ‘high cultures’ developed, lineage-based systems, along with the forms of kinship organisation, terminology, and frameworks of social solidarity associated with them, appear to have changed – a process which may have gone through different stages culminating in the spread of modern isolating (Dole 1968: 202) kinds of terminology, among them our own (e. g., German, English, French) terminology, which is of the Eskimo type.<sup>9</sup> There is a vast literature about the directions in which types of kinship terminology systems can change into each other and the circumstances that may cause these changes. This is not the place to advance this kind of theory. In this context, I only want to make one point, namely that, if we look at the world in terms of the zones, which go all around it, parallel to the equator, rather than continent by continent, separating Eurasia from the Americas by mak-

<sup>7</sup> The Uto-Aztec languages tend to have Hawaii-type cousin terminologies (Kellogg 1995: 168). For classic Aztec, see Rammow (1964): The Aztecs referred to first cousins by the same term, distinct from siblings, marking, however, the status differential between ego and the person referred to (junior/senior). If they extended sibling terms to cousins, a usage found in a number of sources, they did so with qualifiers. This makes the Aztec terminology look like Eskimo with some Hawaiian tendencies. The consideration of more kin types, like nephews and grandchildren, however, shows that Aztec is a type of its own with concentric circles the radius of which is the number of links between the kin type in question and ego, without terminological distinctions by generation (nephews and descendants which are equidistant from ego are called by the same terms).

<sup>8</sup> Haviland (1968) assumes the ancient southern lowland Maya and the proto-Mayan kinship terminologies to have been of the Hawaiian type, with occasional changes to Iroquois as an option. He describes the emergence of patrilineages and the later changes brought about by the Spanish conquest, which comprised individualisation and the emergence of Eskimo type terminologies in some places. Also Ensor (2013) stresses variation, along the dimensions time, space, and class, on the ground of archaeological evidence.

<sup>9</sup> Because these modern terminologies have lost distinctions and reverted to the Eskimo type, they are also distinguished from it as ‘secondary isolating’ (Winter 1986: 440), which is synonymous with ‘modern isolating’. The loss of distinction between patrilineal and matrilineal kin types that leads to ‘modern isolating’ or Hawaii type terminologies seems, in some marginal areas of the *Hochkulturürtel*, into which ‘civilisation’ penetrated not so long ago, to be a fairly recent or still on-going process. In German, for example, we still have the archaic ‘Oheim’ (MB) and ‘Vetter’ (FB, now obsolete in this sense; modern meaning: ‘cousin’) alongside the French-derived ‘Onkel’, which applies to both of these plus other kin types. In early Russian, *stryi* (*stroj*) (MB) used to be “distinguished from *ui* (*wui*) FB, and *strychich* MBS from *uichich* (*wuichich*) FBS” (Krykov 1998: 296). According to Dal’ (1998, IV: 344) it is the other way round: *stryi* means FB and *ui* MB. In modern Russian, there are terms that distinguish only gender and generation, but not laterality (patri- vs. matri-).

ing analytical cuts parallel to meridians, we find patterns which undermine the idea that continents form the relevant units for cultural history.

Since 2011, Chris Hann has put out a number of publications sounding like a distant echo of or, rather, an answer to the Monroe doctrine: Eurasia for the Eurasians! He laments the dominance of U.S. anthropology in the years since Kluckhohn's article. U.S. anthropology has become globally dominant, reducing other traditions to merely regional or local significance. He criticises U.S. style economic liberalism and individualism and contrasts it with some 'Eurasian' values he wants to maintain or revive; and he propagates his ideas about the cultural unity of Eurasia,<sup>10</sup> which he associates with a social democratic, or more generally a socially embedded, redistributive economic ethos. Since 2014, these publications are also centrally concerned with his new project, funded by the European Research Council, 'Realising Eurasia: civilisation and moral economy in the 21st century (project number 340854)', short reference: REALEURASIA.

REALEURASIA has set out to examine the influence of civilisations on moral economy or economic morality, i. e., the values that guide transactions of goods and services in addition to or instead of costs and benefits accruing to the decision maker according to a classic rational choice model with an exclusively individual focus. "It is generally acknowledged that individuals are motivated by socially formed values and not solely by instrumental considerations of personal advantage" (Hann 2014c: 60).

The 'problem' of altruism is a classic field of research in many social and behavioural sciences. Most people, who have dealt with it, have not approached it from the side of 'civilisation'. Sociobiologists have developed concepts like 'group selection', 'kin selection', and 'inclusive fitness' to explain helpfulness and cooperation. Evolutionary psychologists postulate that helpfulness is hardwired into human beings. We all help when helping is cheap, without any thought of future rewards. Prior to language learning, i. e., without having learned any socially transmitted or civilisation-specific 'values', an infant will push an object on a table towards you if you pretend you want to have it and cannot reach it. The infant is genetically pre-disposed to make the first move in cooperative games (Liszkowski et al. 2008;

---

<sup>10</sup> At the time of writing, a war is being waged in eastern Ukraine. Although this paper is not about politics but about cultural history, it must be stressed at this point that the similarity of the positions of Hann and Putin is limited to some terminological overlap and some shared aversions. From informal discussions with colleagues, I got the impression that this similarity risks being polemically overstated. They both use the term 'Eurasia', but Hann's concept is much wider than Putin's, they are both critical of the U. S., and they both talk a lot about 'values', but that is basically it. It would be unfair to criticise Hann for being close to Putin on the ground of these superficial similarities. Hann's ideas about 'Eurasia' have had a long incubation period, pre-date the present crisis, and are much older than the present media discussion about 'Eurasia' in a different sense.

Warneken and Tomasello 2007). If his or her kindness is reciprocated, he or she will be able to learn the complex cooperative games that constitute society; if not, he or she will learn to live the tough way, permanently mistrusting others and out for the short-term individual benefit.

In my own writing, ‘identification’ and ‘alliance’ are the central categories I use to explain behaviour that deviates from what basic, strictly individualistic models of rational choice would predict. In cost/benefit calculations (which may be explicit, implicit, habitualised or routinised, including ‘rules of thumb’ based on the experience of earlier generations, which now provides us with ready-made reactions to recognised situations) (Gigerenzer and Selten 2002), people take not only their narrow selves as reference points to which costs and benefits accrue; rather, they widen their selves to include others (identification). Identification implies that criteria are chosen that allow the drawing of a group boundary in a way that includes the persons or groups with whom one identifies. These identifications may be narrower or wider, and they come with different degrees of commitment. Family, friends, and local community normally are close to the narrow and dense end of social identification, while something like ‘humankind’ is the widest, vaguest, and weakest identification. Identification is not the only binding mechanism of this sort. One can also cooperate, build mutual trust and espouse common causes with people whom one defines as different and who belong at certain levels of classification to groups and categories that exclude oneself. In certain contexts, e. g. exogamous marriage, diplomacy, or warfare, one even has to do just that. Such a relationship is called an alliance. Like identifications, alliances may also shrink and widen under identifiable circumstances (Schlee 2008; Donahoe et al. 2009; Bošković and Ignjatović 2012). With this shrinking and widening, in-group morality may shrink and widen as well.

Chris Hann does not discuss these many alternative ways of dealing with ‘morality’. Instead, REALEURASIA is based on a rather simple theory. There is basically one independent variable, civilisation, and one dependent variable, moral economy.<sup>11</sup> ‘Civilisation’ comes at different levels. There are the modern civilisations, which are identified largely with religious communities, and there is the wider and more ancient Eurasian unity, which comprises them all. For this kind of theory, Weber is claimed as an intellectual ancestor (Hann 2014c: 61, 53). I am not sure Weber would agree. After all, in his later work (*Economy and Society*) he takes a much more complex approach and gives much more room to choice, agency, and strategy than one finds in the

---

<sup>11</sup> Hann (2014d: 14) cites Mauss as a predecessor with whom he shares the concept of civilisation. A fundamental difference, however, should not be overlooked: For Mauss, civilisation is the dependent variable. He wants to explain civilisation, not to use it as an explanation. “In reality, the true way to understand civilisation is to find the causes from which it has resulted, that is to say the collective interactions of diverse orders of which it is the product.” (Mauss 2006: 39)

*The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, which emphasises the role of religion and which is taken as a model for REALEURASIA. Be that as it may. I am not a specialist on Weber and can only refer the reader to authors who are (Banton 2011, 2014). I am more confident when it comes to the methods of reconstructing historical relations from observable elements of present day culture and have applied them in my own writing (Schlee 1989); so I think I have to say something about the postulated civilisations and, in particular, about the concept of ancient Eurasian civilisational unity.

## HANN'S RESEARCH QUESTION: AN ATTEMPT AT SYSTEMATISATION

Civilisation, however, is only one of the three elements of the theory REAL-EURASIA has set out to test. Here is the full list of the three components.

1. Civilisation (at various levels; those of sub-regions of Eurasia as part of a wider unit coterminous with the entire 'landmass' of Eurasia)
2. Moral economy
3. The relationship between the two

The last, the relationship (3), refers to (1) somehow shaping (2). The project descriptions are not very explicit about the strength of this relationship. Obviously that is a matter of future empirical research. A plurality of civilisations is assumed, with a level of difference limited by the 'unity of the landmass', a shared civilisational framework so to say. But this level of difference is high enough to result in varieties of moral economy sufficiently different to deserve a comparative study. However strong or weak this relationship may be, it is remarkable that the exclusive focus is on one direction. People belong to one or the other 'civilisation' and act accordingly in their moral dealings. There seems to be no room for manipulating such wider identifications in order to accommodate economic or political ambitions. To look at the effects of such acts of choice or manipulation would mean to regard 'civilisations' as a dependent variable, a perspective which, as has just been explained, is not Hann's. This theoretical choice is quite remarkable in the light of the past 150 years or so of social theorising. It excludes most of it. It is also remarkable in terms of everyday experience. Is 'civilisation', and more directly the 'Wirtschaftsethik' derived from it, really the obvious candidate if we want to explain the economic behaviour of people? I propose a mental experiment.<sup>12</sup> In a country high up in the corruption index, the head of the anti-corruption committee is answerable to the president of the country and bound to the principle of confidentiality. The president himself is a suspect. In response to international pressure or the pressure of the street or for whichever reason, parliament decides that henceforth the head of that committee should report to parliament and is also allowed free access to the judiciary and the media. Should one not expect that such a change, which can take place by the stroke of a pen from one day to the next and changes the rules of the game, can have a deeper impact on the political and economic culture of a country than the question of whether it is Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, Orthodox, Confucian, and whether it is Eurasian or African? If Hann wants to explain economic behaviour and business conduct, why does he start with factors, such as religion, which we know<sup>13</sup> to be weak?

<sup>12</sup> For a real story of this kind, see Wrong 2009.

<sup>13</sup> To the best of my knowledge there is no clear relationship between religious affiliation and any direct or indirect measurement of 'morality' from criminal statistics or corruption indices.

A brief comment on the second component of the research design, the moral economy, may also be in order. It is planned to have data collected by participant observation in businesses and households and through interviews about business morality. Does ‘moral economy’ then stand for what respondents say in these situations? If some actors have narrowly defined group solidarity and have no quibbles about cheating strangers, is that what they are going to state and explain? Or how is the dependent variable to be measured?

I have been brief on these two points (points 2 and 3 listed above), and I have omitted many other aspects of Hann’s recent writings about REAL-EURASIA or Eurasia in general. Under the common denominator of embedded economy, he combines heterogeneous phenomena, e. g., an egalitarian (social democratic) ethos and hierarchical, paternalistic systems of ideas such as Confucianism<sup>14</sup>, contrasting them with economic liberalism, which is somehow less ‘Eurasian’ than more communitarian ideologies. (Hann 2014d: 9-10) He links these ideas about the unity of embedded economies with a utopia (an attractive one, I admit) of political unity of a social democratic Eurasia, with a joint currency, the Avra, to replace the Euro and all other currencies, and with an anthropologist on one of the banknotes.<sup>15</sup> For a start, transforming the European Association of Social Anthropologists to a Eurasian Association of Social Anthropologists would do, as long as that limits North American influence (Hann 2014b: 2). South Americans, Africans, and Australians are not specifically excluded. I leave the question of the viability of a Eurasian currency to the economists and put the various political issues aside. Here, I limit myself to the methods of cultural history in light of which I will examine the assumptions about civilisation and civilisations (element 1 in the list above).

---

<sup>14</sup> The Confucian ideal is not the egalitarian who wants to limit inequality in the name of justice, but the benevolent patriarch who cares for those under him. Todd (2011: 133f) takes this insistence on seniority as a characteristic of the stem family and not to be causally connected to religion. Beyond the framework of the family, hierarchy, not equality, is the foundation of social order in Confucian terms. “A core premise of the Confucian tradition is that righteousness is best sustained through the maintenance of hierarchical reciprocity (...).” (Ballard 2009: 303)

<sup>15</sup> Hann 2014a: 136. He calls this anthropologist ‘Jack Goody’.



## CIVILISATION AND CIVILISATIONS

There are many historical usages of the terms civilisation and civilisations, including normative ones (civilised versus uncivilised). At the latest since Boas' moderate version of relativism became mainstream in anthropology (Lewis 2013)<sup>16</sup>, all human groups, irrespective of their technological advancement and societal complexity, have been viewed as part of one or the other civilisation. Civilisation has become a concept used for grouping localised ways of living into wider units, not unlike cultural areas in the anthropology of the U. S. or the *Kulturkreise*, which served as a model for them.<sup>17</sup> Civilisations in the French speaking world are rough equivalents of *Kulturen* and *Kulturkreise* in the German speaking world, and different branches of the Anglo-Saxon world have borrowed from one or the other of these sources or from both.

To say that a group in locality A and one in locality B belong to the same civilisation implies

1. That the two share similarities to a degree so significant that it establishes a unity between them, which does not include other, randomly chosen groups.
2. That these similarities are due to shared origins – or at least to early contacts between the ancestral cultural configurations from which the civilisation derives, if one assumes more than one ancestral form. The concept 'civilisation' has an inherent historical dimension.

In this, the concept of civilisation differs from definitions of cultural or ethnic groups only by being on a different scale. 'Civilisation' usually refers to large units of this kind, comprising a plurality of smaller ones, and this plurality implies a corresponding time depth. (One can go even further, noting the similarity between civilisations and genealogies. The more contemporary collateral relatives one includes in a genealogy, the more generations one will have to go back to find the ancestors they share.) In fact, a method has already been developed for drawing conclusions about historical connections among 'cultures' without writing and historical records by examining contemporary cultural elements. In the course of debates about which similarities between cultures can be attributed to independent invention and which to diffusion (historical connectedness), the following criteria were developed:

<sup>16</sup> Lewis, by the way, would challenge Hann's assertion that otherness and difference from the 'high cultures' were the basis of anthropology in the North Atlantic region (Hann 2014c: 66).

<sup>17</sup> For details, see Kluckhohn 1936.

1. Something which has an obvious function or utility is likely to have been invented over and over again in different places. That people have found similar ways to satisfy functional needs is, in itself, not evidence for or against historical relations between them.
2. Cultural elements which are not determined by such functions (e. g., one of many possible ways of fixing the sinew to a bow or shaping a pot out of clay) may point to derivation from a common source. So it is not the usefulness of a feature but its specific form or elaboration which may point to historical relations (criterion of form).
3. The more frequently such elements – elements which are not functionally determined – are found in the same association with each other in different places, the more likely relations of diffusion from a common source or shared inheritance of a ‘civilisation’ become (criterion of quantity; Graebner 1911).<sup>18</sup>

How does economic morality match up with these criteria? Economic morality, of course, responds to social pressures, changing political and legal frames, the necessity to convince a customer, or the need to get away with a little extra benefit. That is, it is subject to all kinds of functionality which may cause constant change and constant re-invention of similar forms and would therefore not qualify by the criterion of form for historical reconstructions. Languages (which are functionally equivalent and based on pure convention), kinship systems (of which there are many variants, all of which satisfy the basic needs of production and reproduction)<sup>19</sup>, forms of houses,

<sup>18</sup> The main methodological argument can be found in Graebner 1911: 98-125. I apply this method in great detail in Schlee (1985). As an illustration of the method, this article is probably better than the two book-length studies which evolved from it later (Schlee 1989 and Schlee with Shongolo 2012). Against the fashions prevalent at the time, I made explicit use of diffusionist ideas (to which the then emerging globalisation theory was closely related, unbeknownst to its proponents, who, had they known, might even have denied such a link) and *Kulturgeschichte*, which was then ‘mega out’. I am not opposed to considering the influence of earlier cultural configurations on present-day ways of interaction, and I have always tried to combine the diachronic and the synchronic perspectives. But as early cultural connections are also the stuff of romantic phantasies and the raw material of national ideologies and other, even supra-national, identity constructs, their investigation requires a high degree of methodological rigour if one wants to distinguish between those which might have some factual reality and those which are pure inventions serving personal ambitions or social or political needs. Major segments of our discipline have taken the easy way out and given up any claim to historical truth, all in the name of various, radicalised forms of relativism. For critiques of this development, see contributions to Zenker and Kumoll (2010) and Lewis (2013).

<sup>19</sup> Both languages and systems of kinship change and adjust to historical circumstances and practical requirements, but they do so in ways which are governed by rules. In language development we find regular sound shifts which allow us to distinguish similarities due to shared origins from similarities due

garments, methods of eating (sticks, hands, and spoons as equivalent tools with the same functionality and different forms) are more likely candidates for formal analysis, which would allow conclusions about cultural relations. This means that any similarities Hann finds in the field of moral economy cannot be used for delineating ‘civilisations’.

There is another argument why moral economy cannot be used to define units of this kind. If it is used in this way, then Hann’s argument about civilisation influencing moral economy becomes circular. To say that a ‘civilisation’ is correlated with a specific form of ‘moral economy’ is a mere tautology if we have used the ‘moral economy’ to define the ‘civilisation’. While for his smaller units, the different civilisations which make up the larger Eurasian cultural unity, Hann rather mechanically uses categories found in the literature (Weber’s world religions), the postulated wider unity of Eurasia seems to be based on such a tautology. In Hann’s writings, I have found nothing that defines this unity outside of the assumed shared moral economy.

In addition to the observable cultural variables to which the diffusionists at the turn of the twentieth century referred in trying to make sense of cultural relations in Africa, Oceania, and Amazonia, we find, on the Eurasian continent, written documents in a great variety of languages and writing systems and a rich archaeological record. These may provide abundant evidence of how cultural features have travelled in the past and how their present day distribution has come about; but, if we want to examine how cultural givens impact economic behaviour in present-day societies, the cultural units we compare have to be based on indicators that are currently observable, i. e. not the historical processes but the cultural sediments they have left behind and that still endure.

Some people associate the methods of *Kulturgeschichte* with cultural relations of great antiquity or, at any rate, with cultural relations pre-dating written records. But this is only one use of them. I have used them fruitfully, in combination with other methods, for the reconstruction of ethnic fission and fusion in northern Kenya over the last 500 years. Further, I find this method

---

to parallel developments. That ‘thought’ is English for ‘*dachte*’, ‘sought’ for ‘*suchte*’ and ‘brought’ for ‘*brachte*’, allows us to see a regularity which points to a derivation (chte → ght (pronounced t). The similarities between English and Chinese are also impressive, despite the absence of shared origins. Having shed many morphological features, so that sentences are formed through concatenation of words with little or no inflection, English has come to resemble ‘analytic’ languages such as Chinese. In this case, however, we know that shared forms indicate parallel developments, rather than historical relations. In assessing relations among English, German, and Chinese, we have historical evidence, but even in the absence of such evidence the formal characteristics would allow us to come to the same conclusions. Likewise, kinship terminologies change over time, but they do so following rules which allow a number of transitions from one particular type of system to another particular type, so that it is possible to establish chains of derivation (Dole 1957).

indispensable to prove cultural transfer or borrowing even in the presence of a rich written record. To know that two cultural settings have been in contact does not allow us to explain a particular similarity by that contact (i. e. by diffusion). Even people who have or have had some contact may still invent similar things independently from each other. So there is no way around the application of formal criteria for distinguishing borrowing from independent invention or convergent development from independent sources.

How can one arrive at meaningful cultural units based on these kinds of similarities derived from shared sources in earlier cultural configurations? What defines them, what sets them off against each other? Barth offers one solution to the problem. He speaks of ethnic boundaries as ‘cultural discontinuities’ (Barth 1995). That means that culture may change gradually as we move from one location or group of bearers of culture to another, maybe just one feature at a time – and even that one may change only slightly. Then, all of a sudden, many features (or markers from a more emic perspective<sup>20</sup>) change at the same time as we stumble on an ethnic boundary.<sup>21</sup> If Eurasia really represents a cultural unit, then similar changes would be observable on a much larger scale as we leave the Eurasian continent and move to another part of the world. What could these possibly be?

While this Barthian perspective is dominant in anthropology, other disciplines approach the problem of cultural discontinuities and of cultures forming groups or clusters as well, referring to other authors and other approaches. More recently, and largely unaware of their predecessors in the *Kulturgeschichte* school, political scientists and economists from business schools have attempted to measure cultural distance and to group clusters of culture by degrees of cultural proximity (e. g., Shenkar 2001; Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov 2010; for a critique, see Ailon 2008). According to Kaufert “(...) culture clusters are ‘groupings’ of similar cultures which are more similar to each other than they are to other cultures.” (Kaufert 1980: 43). If we applied this perspective to Eurasia it would imply that, for Eurasia to qualify as such a ‘grouping’ of ‘cultures’, the Portuguese would have to be more similar to the Koreans than to the Brazilians<sup>22</sup>.

To salvage the notion of the cultural ‘unity’ of the ‘landmass’ of Eurasia, we would have to go for a much weaker version of it. Maybe Jack Goody,

<sup>20</sup> For ‘symbols’, ‘emblems’, ‘features’, ‘markers’, and the like, see the more systematic discussion in Schlee 2009: 61-74.

<sup>21</sup> This, of course, is not Barth’s main point but just his starting point. His main interest is not in the ‘objective’ distribution of features but in what people make of it (cf. Barth, ed. 1969).

<sup>22</sup> The similarities between Portugal and Brazil are due to the expansion of European modernity during the last 500 years. There are parts of Eurasia to which this modernity spread later than it did to Brazil, and there are parts of Brazil and parts of Eurasia where this modernity has not yet arrived or is only now arriving. All this suggests dividing lines across continents, not between them.

so often invoked by Hann, is of some help? Even he, however, does not claim any connection between all Eurasian cultures. Agricultural nuclei like Europe and China share important features, but Goody would certainly agree that the Kyrgyz, with their nomadic organisation and their Omaha type kinship terminology, are more like the Rendille of Kenya, who are clearly outside the 'most inclusive' delineations of 'Eurasia' (Goody 1976; Schlee and Heady 2010 on Eurasian/African comparison; Ismailbekova 2012 on Kyrgyz). Also, in his more recent volume, *The Eurasian Miracle* (Goody 2010), there is no place where he postulates the cultural 'unity of the landmass' or even raises the question what distinguishes Eurasia as a whole from the rest of the world. He does mention "Eurasian civilization" (Goody 2010: 105), dating back to the Bronze Age; but it is clear that this is "the culture of the cities" (Goody 2010:110), of special spots of refinement and economic growth, which have influenced each other through the millennia in a continent-wide network, not the 'unity of the landmass' in a Hannian sense. This should also have become clear from Hann's own summary of Goody's work: "Jack Goody (...) has placed 'diverging devolution' (a term he prefers to bilateral inheritance) at the center of a *longue durée* account of Eurasian history" (Hann 2008: 146), and "divergent devolution is associated with advanced agriculture (defined by the use of the plough and/or irrigation)" (Hann 2008: 147). This makes clear that 'Eurasia' in Goody's usage is shorthand for a type of society in a particular agro-ecological zone and does not stand for anything specifically or exclusively Eurasian. Hann too dates "the basic unity of Eurasia" from the "urban revolutions of the late Bronze Age" (Hann 2014d: 9). He follows Goody in attributing importance to these revolutions but goes far beyond what Goody says in his conclusions about the resulting 'unity'. To discover the collectivist, community-oriented *Urkultur* of Eurasia as a whole, however, Hann will have to dig deeper than the Bronze Age, maybe until he gets to the level of human universals. Or does he really expect to find some form of economic ethics that is shared by all of Eurasia and exclusive to it? Are not the social norms of all human beings marked by some degree of communitarianism? Is there any religion or belief system on Earth that preaches unbridled egotism? In recent periods of the modern age, among the so-called WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich and Democratic) people, there has been some ideology production and some 'preaching' about self-realisation and individual liberty ('Think of yourself!'), but most religions throughout history seem to have assumed that individualistic drives are strong enough without being encouraged. Moral efforts are required as a counterforce to them. They are needed to bridle, contain and tame them. This seems to be a fairly universal feature of education and moral discourse. The Rendille have 'generosity' and 'respect' as their core values. Does this make them Eurasians or even Confucians? Or are they just Social Democrats? The 'egalitarianism' of East African Pastoralists is a much discussed

topic (Schneider 1979; Bonte 1981; Schlee 1984), and they too have served as examples of ‘democracy’ (Lewis 1961). So, somewhat paradoxically from Hann’s perspective, some of the best examples of ‘social democratic’ values in non-modern societies might be found outside Eurasia.

The literature about Africa abounds with examples of redistribution, shared labour, punishment of individual success (the whole of the more recent literature on witchcraft accusations), communitarian values, shared parenthood (fosterage), and even shared wives. There is no doubt that Africa is pervaded by a collectivist spirit, or large parts of it are. The relevant works are too numerous to cite, so such generalisations must suffice. Similarly, one might note that research students from Germany who go anywhere south or east in Europe (not even as far as Asia) report collectivist values, overwhelming hospitality, and lack of privacy (to mention one of very few negative experiences they report). Anecdotal evidence from anywhere north or west of Germany (and, often, in Germany itself) points in a quite different direction: privacy, individualism, and social distance. Is it possible that the real dividing line runs not between Eurasia and the other continents but between much of Europe, most of Asia, plus Africa and the rest, on one hand, and some special (one is tempted to say pathological) development in north-western Europe and its North American outlier, on the other? Hann is not very explicit about what defines the unity of Eurasia. He does not give us a list of pan-Eurasian shared features. Eurasians presumably share a moral economy, but that is what he wants to explain, so it cannot be his starting point. Still, he postulates the unity of Eurasia repeatedly and emphatically, seeming to refer to some shared cultural heritage, not just the absence of an ocean between Europe and Asia.

Maybe one track to follow when interpreting what Hann means with the unity of the landmass is his strongly affirmative use of Polanyi’s notion of embeddedness. Eurasian economies are embedded in a web of societal connections. Yes, but would this not be true for most settings outside Eurasia as well? And where would north-western Europe fit with its unbridled capitalism (‘Manchester’<sup>23</sup> capitalism), not to speak of its transatlantic offshoot? Would this not lead us back to the ‘European exceptionalism’ which Hann so strongly opposes, with Europe or parts of Europe – this time with a negative value judgment attached – playing a special role? And would this not split the cultural unity of the ‘landmass’?

On the level below ‘Eurasia’, Hann identifies five civilisations, which are coterminous with the world religions postulated by Weber. (Also with ref-

---

<sup>23</sup> That Manchester is located on an island, and not on the ‘landmass’, cannot be the solution to this riddle, because other core areas of modern industrial capitalism are located on the continent.

erence to these, Goody takes a completely different course).<sup>24</sup> The project design of REALEURASIA provides for research sites in one central and one marginal location in each of these ‘civilizations’, in order to study how the moral economy of households and family businesses is influenced by the respective ‘religions’. It does not consider any of the many other possible ways of conceiving of wider cultural units. For example, the perceived unity of the Mediterranean world has given rise to a branch of anthropology and related disciplines called ‘Mediterranean’ studies. The central Eurasian steppe has been compared to the Mediterranean, as it is the corridor of movement connecting the ‘cultures’ around it (Scheliha 2013: 20, citing P.N. Savickij). Fox (1989) discusses water-based and land-based spheres of communication, control and exchange which meet only at certain nodal points. Linguistic mega-nationalisms (e. g., pan-Slavic and Turanian) have been on offer for a while. Contact zones also establish a cultural unity that cross-cuts linguistic divides (Schorkowitz 2012). Also former political affiliation (having been part of one or the other empire) provides useful units for comparison (Barkey 2008, Schlee 2013). Because there are many alternative ways of grouping cultures into more encompassing units, beyond Weber’s world religions, which have long been defunct in many places, one’s reasons for choosing some units of analysis over others must be explained and justified, rather than being taken for granted. If I were to study the factors influencing the morality of economic actors, I would look first of all at legislation, then at political order, forms of control, business organisation, kinship, and friendship. My second to last option, just before funeral customs (which, as Goody (1962) has shown, still have a lot to do with economics), would be religion.

For such a fresh look at the matter it might also be useful to disaggregate concepts like ‘moral economy’ or ‘embedded economy’. Maybe it is more fruitful to regard moral characteristics or ‘embeddedness’ as referring to types of transaction, not to entire ‘economies’ (which then might have a spa-

<sup>24</sup> While Hann takes the *Protestant Ethic* as his paradigmatic case and the prototype of the kind of study he wants to replicate across Eurasia, Goody treats it with distance and irony. Studies across time and space do not confirm “the special position of Protestantism with regard to entrepreneurial activity. It is true that Catholicism, like Islam and Judaism, prohibited usury. But members of all three religions nevertheless practiced mercantile activity, and ways around the prohibition were easily available” (Goody 2010: 11, 12). For Goody, Weber’s world religions are *not* civilisations. He criticises Braudel when the latter writes about Islam and Christianity as civilisations confronting one another in the Mediterranean (Goody 2010: 41). Taking up Weber’s thesis ironically, Goody talks about ‘puritanism’ in Buddhism and Hinduism (Goody 2010: 75). Some aspects of Eurasia always have been more like Africa, and, when explaining those, Goody freely moves back and forth between sub-Saharan African examples from his own field research and his own family history in England, as if there was no continental divide between Eurasia and Africa. There is not a trace of religious determinism in Goody’s writings. For Goody, religions seem to respond to practical demands rather than shaping things.

tial dimension and some connection to civilisation or civilisations). Dealing with a similar problem, namely, discussing whether commodity exchange in the market is really so characteristic of the West (an ‘Occidental’ construct in his terms) and gifts are really so characteristic of Melanesia, Carrier finds types of exchange which blur this neat dichotomy. Commodity exchange is certainly related to individualism and economic liberalism, while ‘gifts’ in the Maussian sense, taken up by Carrier, are not coextensive with but certainly an instance of ‘moral economy’. Therefore Carrier’s critique might also apply to the Hannian dichotomies discussed here.

Carrier gives the following examples of ‘embedded’ or gift-like transactions at the core of the capitalist ‘Occident’: The extension of credit by shopkeepers to good customers who then stay loyal even if prices are lower elsewhere; and Tupperware parties in which buying and selling is far from anonymous and clearly socially embedded. Often these instances of a strong social component in economic transactions are found in a working class setting or in the domestic/neighbourhood/traditionally female sphere; but also at the heart of capitalism. Carrier citing Dore (1983) on Japan and Britain, finds “manufacturers and their suppliers [...] who] see themselves as bound by durable obligations” (Carrier 2003: 93). Also in American firms “continuing economic relations [...] often become overlaid with social content that carries strong expectations of trust and abstention from opportunism” (Carrier 2003: 93 citing Granovetter 1985: 490). Conversely, in Melanesia, one finds straight market interactions alongside the socially embedded forms of exchange which, by selective perception, have been described in a vast literature as characteristic of Melanesia (Carrier 2003: 96).

This suggests that both socially embedded economic actions and de-personalised (‘alienated’) market transactions can take place in different forms of economy and different civilisations and geographic settings. If this is so, the resulting question is: In which situations do people interact in one way or the other? There may well be settings in which situations which require embedded economic interaction predominate and others which favour pure, depersonalized or even anonymous market exchange. If these settings have, say, religious or geographic characteristics, this may lead to embedded or disembedded economic interaction being more or less characteristic for one or the other religious/civilisational unit or region. But such a correlation would be a far cry from any clear cut causal connection.

Hann’s agenda is to demonstrate the civilisational unity of the Eurasian landmass and to show the formative impact of the various Eurasian ‘civilisations’ on the ‘moral economy’ and the economic behaviour of their bearers. My guess is that this will hardly be possible without changing these hypotheses beyond recognition. Refuting them might be easier and more convincing.



## REFERENCES

- Ailon, Galit. 2008. 'Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: *Culture's Consequences* in a Value Test of its own Design,' *Academy of Management Review* 33(4): 885–904.
- Ballard, Roger. 2009. 'Human Rights in Contexts of Ethnic Plurality: Always a Vehicle for Liberation?' in Ralph Grillo, Roger Ballard, Alessandro Ferrari, André Hoekema, Marcel Maussen and Prakash Shah (eds.), *Legal Practice and Cultural Diversity*. Farnham: Ashgate, 299–330.
- Banton, Michael. 2011. 'A Theory of Social Categories,' *Sociology* 45:187.
- Banton, Michael. Forthcoming 2014. 'Updating Max Weber on the Racial, the Ethnic, and the Mational,' *Journal of Classical Sociology* 14(3). (Published online before print on August 1, 2013, doi: 10.1177/1468795X13494134)
- Barkey, Karen. 2008. *Empire of difference: the Ottomans in comparative perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Barth, Fredrik, ed. 1969. *Ethnic groups and boundaries*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Barth, Fredrik. 1995. 'Ethnicity and the Concept of Culture,' Paper presented to the Conference *Rethinking Culture*, Harvard 1995. Available online at: <http://www.tau.ac.il/tarbut> (accessed August 8, 2014).
- Bonte, Pierre. 1981. 'Les eleveurs d'Afrique de l'est sont-ils égalitaires? A propos de travaux récents,' *Production pastorale et société* 9: 23–37.
- Bošković, Aleksandar and Suzana Ignjatović. 2012. 'Understanding Ethnic Conflicts through Rational Choice: A Review Article,' *Ethnos* 77(2): 89–295.
- Bradley, Bruce and Dennis Stanford. 2004. 'The North Atlantic Ice-edge Corridor: A Possible Palaeolithic Route to the New World,' *World Archaeology* 36(4): 459–478.
- Carrier, James G. 2003. 'Maussian Occidentalism: Gift and Commodity Systems,' in: James G. Carrier, ed. *Occidentalism: Images of the West*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 85–108.
- Comrie, Bernard. 2010. 'The Dene-Yeniseian Hypothesis: An Introduction,' in James Kari and Ben A. Potter (eds.), *The Dene-Yeniseian Connection* (= *Anthropological Papers of the University of Alaska, New Series*, vol. 5 (1–2)). Fairbanks: Department of Anthropology, University of Alaska Fairbanks, 25–32.
- Dal', Vladimir Ivanovich. 1998. *Tolkovy slovar' zhivogo velikorusskogo yazyka. V chetyrekh tomakh. Vozproisvedenie vtorogo izdaniya (1881–1882gg.)*. Moscow: Russkii yazyk

- Donahoe, Brian, John Eidson, Dereje Feyissa, Veronika Fuest, Markus V. Hoehne, Boris Nieswand, Günther Schlee, and Olaf Zenker. 2009. 'The Formation and Mobilization of Collective Identities in Situations of Conflict and Integration.' *Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology Working Paper* No. 116. Halle/Saale: Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology.
- Dole, Gertrude A. 1957. *The Development Patterns of Kinship Nomenclature*. PhD thesis, University of Michigan. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International.
- Dole, Gertrude A. 1965. 'The Lineage Pattern of Kinship Nomenclature: Its Significance and Development,' *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 21(1): 36–62.
- Dole, Gertrude A. 1968. 'The Development of Japanese and Anglo-American Kinship,' in *Proceedings of the VIIIth International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences. Vol. III*. Tokyo: Science Council of Japan, 202–206.
- Dore, Ronald. 1983. 'Goodwill and the Spirit of the Market Capitalism,' *British Journal of Sociology*, 34: 459–82.
- Ensor, Bradley E. 2013. *Crafting Prehistoric Maya kinship*. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press.
- Fleming, Harold C. n.d. *Afrasian and its Closest Relatives: The Borean Hypothesis*. Available online at: [http://www.greenberg-conference.stanford.edu/Fleming\\_Abstract](http://www.greenberg-conference.stanford.edu/Fleming_Abstract) (accessed October 11, 2014).
- Fox, Edward W. 1989. 'The Argument: Some Reinforcements and Projections,' in Genovese, Eugene D. and Leonard Hochberg (eds.), *Geographic Perspectives in History*. New York: Basil Blackwell, 331–342.
- Gigerenzer, Gerd and Reinhard Selten (eds.). 2002. *Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Goody, Jack. 1962. *Death, Property and the Ancestors: A Study of the Mortuary Customs of the LoDagaa of West Africa*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Goody, Jack. 1970. 'Cousin Terms,' *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 26(2): 125–142.
- Goody, Jack. 1976. *Production and Reproduction. A Comparative Study of the Domestic Domain*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Goody, Jack. 2010. *The Eurasian Miracle*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Graebner, Fritz. 1911. *Methode der Ethnologie*. Heidelberg: Winter.
- Granovetter, Mark 1985. 'Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness,' *American Journal of Sociology*, 91: 481–510.
- Hann, Chris. 2008. 'Reproduction and Inheritance: Goody Revisited,' *Annual Review of Anthropology* 17: 145–158.

- Hann, Chris. 2014a. After the Euro, the Avra: Would We Have a better Chance of Reconciling Democracy and Capitalism if We Had a Rethink on Europe?' *Soundings: A Journal of Politics and Culture*. 56: 123–136. Available online at: [http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/soundings\\_a\\_journal\\_of\\_politics\\_and\\_culture/v056/56.hann.html](http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/soundings_a_journal_of_politics_and_culture/v056/56.hann.html) (accessed October 15, 2014).
- Hann, Chris. 2014b. 'Imperative Eurasia. Guest Editorial,' *Anthropology Today* 20(4):1–2, doi: 10.1111/1467-8322.12117.
- Hann, Chris. 2014c. 'Realising Eurasia: Moral Economy and Civilizational Pluralism in the Twenty-first Century.' Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology. Department 'Resilience and Transformation in Eurasia': *Resilience and Transformation in Eurasia 1999–2014*. Available online at: [http://www.eth.mpg.de/cms/de/publications/reports/d2\\_report\\_resilience\\_transformation\\_2014.html](http://www.eth.mpg.de/cms/de/publications/reports/d2_report_resilience_transformation_2014.html) (accessed October 15, 2014).
- Hann, Chris. 2014d. 'Towards a Maximally Inclusive Concept of Eurasia.' *Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology Working Papers* No. 157. Halle/Saale: Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology. Available online at: [http://www.eth.mpg.de/cms/de/publications/working\\_papers/wp0157.html](http://www.eth.mpg.de/cms/de/publications/working_papers/wp0157.html) (accessed October 15, 2014).
- Haviland, William A. 1968. *Ancient Lowland Maya Social Organization*. New Orleans: Middle American Research Institute, Tulane University, Publication No. 26: 93–117.
- Hofstede, Geert, Geert Jan Hofstede, and Michael Minkov. 2010. *Cultures and Organisations: Software of the Mind*. 3rd edition. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Ismailbekova, Aksana. 2012. "*The Native Son and Blood Ties*": *Kinship and Poetics of Patronage in Rural Kyrgyzstan*. Unpublished PhD thesis. Halle/Saale: Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg and Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology.
- Kaufert, Joseph M. 1980. 'Ethnic Unit Definition in Ghana: A Comparison of Culture Cluster Analysis and Social Distance Measures,' in John N. Paden, ed. *Values, Identities and National Integration: Empirical Research in Africa*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 41–51.
- Kellogg, Susan. 1995. *Law and the Transformation of Aztec Culture, 1500–1700*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Kluckhohn, Clyde. 1936. 'Some Reflections on the Method and Theory of the *Kulturkreislehre*,' *American Anthropologist* 38: 157–196.
- Krader, Lawrence. 1963. *Social Organization of the Mongol-Turkic Pastoral Nomads*. The Hague: Mouton.
- Krykov, M.V. 1998. 'The Synchro-diachronic Model and the Multidirectionality of Kinship Transformations,' in Maurice Godelier, Thomas R. Trautmann, and Franklin E. Tjon Sie Fat (eds.), *Transformations of Kinship*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 294–313.

- Lewis, Herbert S. 2013. *In Defense of Anthropology: An Investigation of the Critique of Anthropology*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Lewis, Ioan M. 1961. *A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa*. London: London University Press.
- Liszkowski, Ulf, Malinda Carpenter, and Michael Tomasello. 2008. 'Twelve-month-olds Communicate Helpfully and Appropriately for Knowledgeable and Ignorant Partners,' *Cognition* 108: 732–739.
- Marquardt, Bernd. 2009. *Universalgeschichte des Staates: von der vorstaatlichen Gesellschaft zum Staat der Industriegesellschaft*. Münster: Lit.
- Mauss, Marcel. 2006. *Techniques, Technology and Civilization*. Edited and introduced by Nathan Schlanger. New York: Berghahn
- Rammow, Helga. 1964. *Verwandtschaftsbezeichnungen im klassischen Aztekisch*. Hamburg: Museum für Völkerkunde und Vorgeschichte.
- Scheliha, Wolfgang von. 2013. 'Die Geschichte der *Slavia Asiatica* als Forschungsproblem. Einführung,' in Christian Lübke, Ilmira Miftakova, and Wolfgang von Scheliha (eds.), *Geschichte der Slavia Asiatica. Quellenkundliche Probleme*. Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 9–38.
- Schlee, Günther. 1984. 'Une société pastorale pluriethnique: Oromo et Somalis au nord du Kenya,' *Production pastorale et société* 15: 21–39.
- Schlee, Günther. 1985. 'Interethnic Clan Identities among Cushitic Speaking Pastoralists,' *Africa* 55(1): 17–37.
- Schlee, Günther. 1989. *Identities on the Move: Clanship and Pastoralism in Northern Kenya*. Manchester: Manchester University Press for the International African Institute.
- Schlee, Günther. 1994. 'Kuschitische Verwandtschaftssysteme in vergleichenden Perspektiven,' in Thomas Geider and Reimund Kastenholz (eds.), *Sprachen und Spracherzeugnisse in Afrika*. Köln: Rüdiger Köppe, 367–388.
- Schlee, Günther. 2008. *How Enemies are Made: Towards a Theory of Ethnic and Religious Conflicts*. New York: Berghahn.
- Schlee, Günther. 2009. 'Descent and Descent Ideologies: The Blue Nile Area (Sudan) and Northern Kenya Compared,' in Günther Schlee and Elizabeth E. Watson (eds.), *Changing Identifications and Alliances in North-East Africa II: Sudan, Uganda and the Ethiopia-Sudan Borderlands*. New York: Berghahn, 117–135.
- Schlee, Günther. 2013. 'Ruling over Ethnic and Religious Differences: A Comparative Essay on Empires.' *Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology Working Papers* No. 143. Halle/Saale: Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology. Available online at: [http://www.eth.mpg.de/cms/de/publications/working\\_papers/wp0157.html](http://www.eth.mpg.de/cms/de/publications/working_papers/wp0157.html)

- Schlee, Günther and Patrick Heady. 2010. 'Terminology and Practice: European Kinship in a World-wide Perspective,' in Heady, Patrick and Martin Kohli (eds.), *Family, Kinship and State in Contemporary Europe, Vol. 3. Perspectives on Theory and Policy*. Frankfurt: Campus, 347–374.
- Schlee, Günther with Abdullahi Shongolo. 2012. *Islam and Ethnicity in Northern Kenya and Southern Ethiopia*. Woodbridge: James Curry.
- Schneider, Harold K. 1979. *Livestock and Equality in East Africa. The Economic Basis for Social Structures*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Schorkowitz, Dittmar. 2012. 'Cultural Contact and Cultural Transfer in Medieval Western Eurasia,' *Archaeology, Ethnology and Anthropology of Eurasia* 40(3): 84–94.
- Shenkar, Oded. 2001. 'Cultural Distance Revisited: Towards a more Rigorous Conceptualization and Measurement of Cultural Differences,' *Journal of International Business Studies* 32(3): 519–535.
- Todd, Emmanuel. 2011. *L'origine des systèmes familiaux. Tome I. L'Eurasie*. Paris: Gallimard
- Trautmann, Thomas R. and Peter M. Whiteley (eds.). 2012. *Crow-Omaha: New Light on a Classic Problem of Kinship Analysis*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
- Vajda, Edward J. 2010. 'Yeniseian, Na-Dene, and Historical Linguistics,' in James Kari and Ben A. Potter (eds.), *The Dene-Yeniseian Connection* (= *Anthropological Papers of the University of Alaska, New Series*, vol. 5 (1–2)). Fairbanks: Department of Anthropology, University of Alaska Fairbanks, 100–118. Reprinted with corrections 2011.
- Warneken, Felix and Michael Tomasello. 2007. 'Helping and Cooperation at 14 Months of Age,' *Infancy* 11(3): 271–294.
- Weber, Max. 1968. *Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (eds.). Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Winter, J. Christoph. 1986. 'Structural Specifics of Hunter-gatherer Kinship Nomenclatures: Comparative African Evidence from Khoisan, Mbuti, and Dorobo,' *Sprache und Geschichte in Afrika* 7(2): 433–451.
- Wrong, Michaela. 2009. *It is Our Turn to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistleblower*. New York: Harper Collins.
- Zenker, Olaf and Karsten Kumoll (eds.). 2010. *Beyond Writing Culture: Current Intersections of Epistemologies and Representational Practices*. New York: Berghahn.

# SUGGESTIVE VISUALISATIONS

## MAPPING CIVILISATIONS AND CULTURAL DISTRIBUTIONS

The following is a pictorial essay, most of the pictures being maps. It aims at showing how suggestive maps can be. We should be aware of this suggestive power and not be deceived by it. Additionally, we can use unusually cut maps, which subdivide the world in different ways from the ones we are used to, for inspiration and for discovering connections. My aim is to de-familiarise the reader with conventional ways of depicting the world and subdividing it into zones and continents and to make her more open for alternative perspectives.

The cover of the report by Chris Hann's department on their research about 'Resilience and Transformation in Eurasia, 1999-2014' (on the right) reflects, in an ingenious way, some of Hann's ideas about Eurasia:

1. It sets it off from the rest of the world by a colour contrast and by a selection of what it depicts. Where the Aleutian islands and Alaska should be, there is just the deep green sea.

2. It stresses the 'landmass', to use one of Hann's favourite expressions, by cutting off much of insular South-East Asia.

3. By simply rotating the cardinal points against the orientation of the page by 90°, having the west at the bottom of the page rather than the south, Hann makes us think about arbitrary conventions and the hierarchies they imply.

When looking at this map, our reading habits (top left to bottom right) additionally make us direct more attention to the Russian Far East, Japan and China than would be the case with an ordinary map. Good manners when interacting with persons have a similar effect. We should focus our communicative efforts on the face and the upper part of the body. The 'head and upper body' of Eurasia in this depiction are its eastern parts. This fits well with Hann's rejection of 'Eurocentrism', a justified position shared by most anthropologists.

Source: Department 'Resilience and Transformation in Eurasia',  
Institute Report's cover



MAX-PLANCK-GESELLSCHAFT

**Max Planck Institute  
for Social Anthropology**

**Department 'Resilience and  
Transformation in Eurasia'**

**Resilience and  
Transformation in  
Eurasia, 1999–2014**



By simply holding a conventional map of the world upside down, one can produce a strange effect, reminiscent of an upturned table or a dead animal with its legs pointing upwards. Held up the 'right way', north pointing up, the broad continents of the northern hemisphere solidly rest on three southern extensions, like on a tripod, South America, southern Africa and SE-Asia/Australia being the three legs of the tripod. Held upside down, the landmasses of the northern hemisphere (the 'Global North') rather sadly seem to have succumbed to the law of gravity. As long as we stay on the symbolic level, subversion of the world order appears easy.

A visitor from another planet, mapping the world as she flies by in her spacecraft and takes pictures, may decide with a probability of 0.5 that the south pole should be on top of the map, if she thinks that the vertical dimension of her depiction should be the axis from pole to pole. She (if indeed they have gender) may also have learned as part of her alien geography to put the direction from which any point on the surface rotates away (east) or the direction to which the planet is rotating (west) on top of her screen or sheet of paper or whatever aliens have, if indeed they have a stable body axis and terms like 'top' or 'up' make sense to them. Any of these conventions is as good as the other three.

Source: Marquardt, Bernd: *Universalgeschichte des Staates*. Münster, LIT Verlag 2009, p. 27, upside down.



Turning the map the right way around, we see what it is meant to represent: cultural distributions which form belts all around the globe.

Source: Marquardt, Bernd: *Universalgeschichte des Staates*. Münster, LIT Verlag 2009, p. 27.

DIE VIER KULTURÖKOSysteme DER ERDE UM 1500 n. Chr.




Abb. 2<sup>38</sup>

As the Atlantic Ocean was an effective barrier to communication until the Columbian Exchange in early modern times, folklorists and anthropologists preferred to have the Pacific Ocean in the middle of their distribution maps to show cultural features found around and across it.

Berezkin's maps about two motifs of folk tales, 'the Sun caught in a snare' and 'hero in guise of doctor kills his adversary'/'hero in skin of another person' are recent examples of this type of map.

Source: Berezkin, Yuri E. 2010. 'Selecting separate episodes of the peopling of the New World: Beringian–Subarctic–Eastern North American Folklore Links,' In Kari, James and Ben A. Potter. *The Dene-Yeniseian Connection*. (Anthropological Papers of the University of Alaska, New Series, Vol. 5(1-2): 257-278), illustrations from p. 265, 266.

World distribution of the ensnared Sun motif




FIGURE 3. World distribution of Sun caught in snare

- Hero wounds monstrous enemy, then masks as a doctor, kills his patient instead of curing him
- Hero kills a person from enemy group, takes hers or his appearance dressing himself in a skin (rare: clothes) of the killed one, comes to his enemies unrecognized
- Both motifs combined





FIGURE 5. World distribution of the hero in guise of a doctor kills his adversary and hero in skin of another person

Frobenius used maps on which the Americas were represented twice, so that both distributions of cultural features which extended across the Pacific and those which extended across the Atlantic could be depicted.

The map on the right represents the occurrence of a certain character found in folk tales, namely a woman who inhabits the moon and is either spinning or weaving. On the islands of the Pacific, where people wore bark cloth, this character is represented by a woman who beats tamarind cloth.


Source (this map and the following three are from): Frobenius, Leo. 1923.  
*Vom Kulturreich des Festlandes*. München-Nymphenburg: Forschungsinstitut für Kulturmorphologie, p. 67, 131, 133 and 31, respectively.



Die Spinnerin oder Weberin im Mond; in Japanien (punktirt) eine Frau, die Sparrindensstoffe Klopft.




The map on the right depicts the location of the high cultures ('the Indian, Chinese and American high culture to the east, the Babylonian, Arab, Egyptian, Aegean and Gothic high cultures to the west'). This belt of high cultures is shown as separating regions to the north and to the south of it, where the numbers 2 and 3 convey different kinds of mythological significance.



Die Lage der 8 Hochkulturen zwischen den Räumen der 2 und der 3 (I die Herrschaft der 3; II das Bereich der 2; III die 8 Hochkulturen).


This map shows the location of the 'high cultures' within the region in which the sun is perceived as male and the moon as female.

Starting to learn Rendille, a Cushitic language of northern Kenya, at the age of 23, I had a strange feeling of familiarity. Coming from an area north of the high culture belt and solar mythology, Germany, here we say *die Sonne* (feminine) and *der Mond* (masculine) and having learned Latin and a number of Romance languages as well as Arabic – languages associated with 'high cultures' and a male sun – I then found out that the Rendille word for sun is feminine and for moon masculine. It felt a bit like being back home. In Frobenius' terms, I had crossed the high culture belt and the space of solar culture and come out at the southern end of it.



Die Lage der 8 Hochkulturen im Raume der solaren Kultur (I das Gebiet der solaren Kultur; Sonne ☉, Mond ☾; II die 8 Hochkulturen).

The theme of pendular movements of cultural influences depicted here was later taken up by Jack Goody. Hann discusses this in his article in *Current Anthropology* (cf. above, 'About this Booklet').



Die Kulturpendelung am mittelländischen Meer (W = Westen, O = Osten. Das H im O bedeutet den Hiatus).

As the regional expertise of anthropologists, linguists and folklorists often ends at national boundaries or continental divides, distribution maps like the one on the right are relatively rare. I thank Tobias Holzlehner for this one.


Source: 2005. State of the Salmon, a joint program of Wild Salmon Center and Ecotrust





Cultural and linguistic distributions cross continental divides. At least one language family, Dene-Yeniseian, is represented in both North Asia and North America.

Source: Kari, James and Ben A. Potter. 2010. 'The Dene-Yeniseian Connection: Bridging Asia and North America. (Editor's Introduction)', In *The Dene-Yeniseian Connection* (Anthropological Papers of the University of Alaska, New Series, Vol. 5(1-2): 1-24, the map is on page 7).




MAP B. General Linguistic Map of Northeast Asia and North America (data from Goddard 1996, Dolgikh 1960, Jetté and Jones 2000; see text)

The Afroasiatic language family is derived from one language, reconstructed as proto-Afroasiatic, which was spoken over 8,000 years ago. Taking into account that all but one of the branches of Afroasiatic are spoken in Africa and only one, Semitic, in Southwest Asia, proto-Afroasiatic very likely was spoken in Africa. Through its Semitic branch, comprising Assyrians, Phoenicians and Hebrews, 4,000 years of presence of Semitic languages in Southwest Asia can be proven by written documents. Possibly this language family has connected Africa and Asia for much longer. Several Ethiopian languages go back to Semitic-speaking people from the southern part of the Arabian peninsula returning to the African shore of the Red Sea.

The map shows the present distribution of the non-Semitic subbranches of Afroasiatic and the location of ancient Egyptian about 4,000 years ago. It does not represent the post-Islamic expansion of Arabic into Northern Africa.


Source: Hayward, Richard J. 2000. 'Afroasiatic', In Heine, Bernd and Derek Nurse. *African Languages: An Introduction*. Cambridge University Press: 74-98, the map is on page 75.



Map 4.4. Afroasiatic.

The drawings on the right stand for the discoveries one can make if one does not stop wherever one's feet get wet. They stand for strange correspondences across oceans. The top two animals on wheels are from pre-Columbian Mexico, the bottom two from India.

Source: Marshall, Wolfgang. 1972. *Transpazifische Kulturbeziehungen: Studien zur Geschichte*. München: Klaus Renner Verlag.



8 Tierfiguren auf Rädern. A und B: Tres Zapotes und Panuco, Mexiko (nach Ekholm 1946, 1944). C und D: Indien (nach Mode 1959 und Heine-Geldern 1964b). Zeichnungen: A. Marschall. Zu S. 186

# INDEX OF PERSONS

**A**ilon, Galit 18

**B**allard, Roger 9|18  
Banton, Michael 1|7|18  
Barkey, Karen 16|18  
Barth, Fredrik 13|18  
Berezkin, Yuri E. 30  
Boas, Franz 10  
Bonte, Pierre 15|18  
Bošković, Aleksandar 1|6|18  
Bradley, Bruce 2|18  
Braudel, Fernand 16

**C**arpenter, Malinda 21  
Carrier, James G. vi|17–18  
Comrie, Bernard 18

**D**al', Valdimir Ivanovich 18  
Dereje Feyissa 19  
Dole, Gertrude A. 3–4|12|19  
Donahoe, Brian 6|19  
Dore, Ronald 17|19

**E**idson, John 1|19  
Ensor, Bradley F. 4|19

**F**eyissa Dereje  
see Dereje Feyissa  
Fleming, Harold C. 3|19  
Fox, Edward W. 16|19  
Frobenius, Leo 32|36  
Fuest, Veronika 19

**G**eider, Thomas 21  
Genovese, Eugene D. 19  
Gigerenzer, Gerd 6|19  
Godelier, Maurice 20  
Goody, Jack 3|9|13–16|19|38  
Graebner, Fritz 11|19  
Granovetter, Mark 17|19

**H**ann, Chris vi|1|5–6|8–10|12|  
14–15|17|19–20|24|38  
Haviland, William A. 4|20  
Hayward, Richard J. 44  
Heady, Patrick 1|14|22  
Heine, Bernd 44  
Hochberg, Leonard 19  
Hoehne, Markus V. 19  
Hofstede, Geert 13|20  
Hofstede, Geert Jan 13|20  
Holzlehner, Tobias 40

**I**gnjatović, Suzana 6|18  
Ismailbekova, Aksana 14|20

**K**ari, James 18|22|30|42  
Kastenholz, Reimund 21  
Kaufert, Joseph M. 13|20  
Kellogg, Susan 4|20  
Kluckhohn, Clyde 2|5|10|20  
Krader, Lawrence 3|20  
Krykov, Mikhail V. 4|20  
Kumoll, Karsten 11|22

**L**enart, Severin vi  
Lewis, Herbert S. 10–11|21  
Lewis, Ioan M. 15|21  
Liszkowski, Ulf 5|21  
Lowie, Robert H. 3  
Lübke, Christian 21

**M**arquardt, Bernd 3|21|26|28  
Marshall, Wolfgang 46  
Mauss, Marcel 6|21  
Miftakhova, Imira 21  
Minkov, Michael 13|20  
Monroe, James 2  
Murdock, George P. 3

**N**ieswand, Boris 19  
Nurse, Derek 44

**P**otter Ben A. 18|22|30|42  
Putin, Vladimir V. 5

**R**ammow, Helga 4, 21  
Roth, Guenther 22

**S**apir, Edward 3  
Savickij, Petr N. 16  
Scheliha, Wolfgang 16|21  
Schmidt, Pater Wilhelm 2  
Schneider, Harold K. 15|22  
Schorkowitz, Dittmar 16|22  
Selten, Reinhard 6|19  
Shenkar, Oded 13|22  
Shongolo, Abdullahi A. 11|22  
Stanford, Dennis 2|18  
Swadesh, Morris 3

**T**jon Sie Fat, Franklin E. 20  
Todd, Emmanuel 9|22  
Tomasello, Michael 6|21–22  
Trautmann, Thomas R. 3|22

**V**ajda, Edward J. 3|22

**W**arneken, Felix 6|22  
Weber, Max 6–7|12|15–16|22  
Whiteley, Peter M. 3|22  
Winter, J. Christoph 1|4|22  
Wittich, Claus 22  
Wrong, Michaela 8|22

**Z**enker, Olaf 11|19|22



# SUBJECT INDEX

**A**dvanced agriculture 14

Aegean 34

Africa 3|12|15–16|26|44

Afroasiatic 44

agro-ecological zone 14

Alaska 24

Aleutian islands 24

alienated 17

alliance 6

altruism 5

Amazonia 12

America 2–3|26|32|42

Arab 34

Arabic 36|44

Assyrians 44

Atlantic 2|10|32

    Atlantic Ocean 30

Australia 2|9|26

Avra 9

axis 26

    body axis 26

Aztecs 3–4

**B**abylonian 34

belief 14

belt(s) 1|3–4|28|34|36

bifurcate merging 3

borrowing 13

Brazil 13

Britain 17

Bronze Age 14

Buddhism 16

business 8–9|13|16

**C**apitalism 15|17

Catholic 8

Chahar 3

China 14|24

    Chinese 12|34

choice 5–6|8

Christianity 16

classification 1|6

Clovis culture 2

cluster(s) 13

cognatic 4

Columbian Exchange 30

Commodity exchange 17

communitarianism 14

Confucian 8–9

contact 10|13

control 16

convention 11|24|26

convergent development 13

corruption 8

cost/benefit 5–6

credit 17

criterion of form 11

criterion of quantity 11

Crow 3

cultural area 10

Cultural History vii|1|3|5|9

culture area 2

currency 9

Current Anthropology vi|38

**D**ata 9

democracy 15

Dene-Yeniseian 18|42

dependent variable 6|8–9

determinism 16

diffusion 10–11|13

discontinuities 13

distance 13|15–16

distribution map(s) 30|40

diverging devolution 14

**E**cotrust 40  
egalitarianism 14  
egotism 14  
Egypt 2  
    Egyptian 34|44  
embeddedness vi|15–16  
    embedded economy 9|16  
emic 13  
England 16  
    English 4|12  
equality 9  
Eskimo 4  
Ethiopian 44  
ethnic group 10  
ethos 5|9  
Euro 9  
Europe 2|14–15|20|22  
Evolutionary psychologists 5

**F**amily 3|9|16|42|44  
Far East 24  
feature 1|3|12–15|30|32  
folk tales 30|32  
fosterage 15  
French 4|10  
friendship 16  
function 11  
funeral customs 16

**G**enealogy 10  
generosity 14  
German 2–4|10|12  
gifts 17  
Global North 26  
Gothic 34  
group selection 5

**H**awaii 4  
Hebrews 44  
hierarchy 2|9  
high cultures 3–4|10|34|36  
Hinduism 16  
historical dimension 10  
*Hochkulturgürtel* 1|3–4  
hospitality 15  
household 9|16  
humankind 1|6  
human universals 14

**I**dentification 6  
Inca 4  
independent invention 10|13  
India 46  
    Indian 3|34  
    Indian Ocean 3  
indicator 12  
individualism 5|15|17  
interview 9  
Islam 16  
    Islamic 44

**J**apan 17|19|24  
Jewish 8

**K**azak 3  
Kenya 12|14|36  
kin selection 5  
kinship 3–4|11–12|14|16  
Korea 13  
*Kulturgeschichte* 11–13  
*Kulturkreislehre* 2|20  
Kyrgyz 14

**L**abour 15  
landmass 1|8|13–15|17|24  
Latin 2|36  
liberalism 5|9|17  
locality 10  
*longue durée* 14

**M**aa 3  
Maasai 3  
marker 13  
market 17  
marriage 6  
Maya 4  
Mediterranean 16  
Melanesia 17  
Mesoamerica 2  
method(s) 7|9|12  
Mexico 46  
modern isolating 4  
Mongol 3  
    Khalkha Mongol 3  
Monroe Doctrine 2|5  
    ethnological Monroe doctrine 2  
moral economy 5–6|8–9|12|15–17  
Muslim 8  
myth 34

**N**a-Dene-Yeniseian 3  
Nahuatl 3

**O**ccident 17  
    Occidentalism 17  
ocean 15  
Oceania 2|12  
Omaha 3|14  
opportunism 17  
organisation 4|14|16  
origin 10–12  
Orthodox 8

**P**acific 32  
    Pacific Ocean 3|30  
parenthood 15  
participant observation 9  
patriarch 9  
pendular movements 38  
Phoenician(s) 44  
Polanyi 15  
Portugal 13  
privacy 15  
process 4|12  
production 11|14  
Protestant 7–8|16  
punishment 15  
puritanism 16

**Q**uechua 4

**R**EALEURASIA 5–9|16  
reciprocity 2|9  
Red Sea 44  
religion 1|7–9|14|16  
    religious communities 6  
Rendille 14|36  
reproduction 11  
Resilience and Transformation in  
    Eurasia 24  
resources 4  
respect 14  
Russian 4|24

**S**cale 10|13  
secondary isolating 4  
Semitic 44  
seniority 9  
Sino-Tibetan 3  
Slavic 16  
social order 9

sociobiologists 5  
solar mythology 36  
solidarity 4|9  
South American 9  
Spanish 4  
stem family 9

**T** autology 12  
terminology 3–4|14  
time depth 10  
transaction 16  
trans-Atlantic links 2  
trans-Pacific links 2  
trust 6|17  
Turanian 16  
Turkic 3

**U**kraine 5  
*Urkultur* 14  
utility 11  
Uto-Aztecán 4  
utopia 9


**V**alues 5|14–15

**W**arfare 6  
Wild Salmon Center 40  
*Wirtschaftsethik* 8  
witchcraft 15  
world order 26  
world religion 12|15–16


**Z**one 3–4|16|23

# BOOK PUBLICATIONS

Schatz, Merle  
*Sprache und Identität der  
 Mongolen Chinas heute*  
 (Köln: Rüdiger Köppe Verlag, 2014)



Schatz, Merle  
*Ögedei mergen qayan-u üiger: Die Geschichte  
 vom weisen Qayan Ögedei. Transkription,  
 Glossar, Index und Zusammenfassung*  
 (Köln: Rüdiger Köppe Verlag, 2012)



Schlee, Günther, and Abdullahi A. Shongolo  
*Islam and Ethnicity in Northern Kenya  
 and Southern Ethiopia*  
 (Woodbridge: James Currey, 2012)

Zenker, Olaf, and Karsten Kumoll (eds.)  
*Beyond Writing Culture: Current  
 Intersections of Epistemologies and  
 Representational Practices*  
 (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2010)



Schlee, Günther  
*Upravlenie Konfliktami: Teorija I Praktika*  
 (Moskau: Deutsch-Russischer Austausch,  
 2004)



An gheallge: thart timpeall orainn

IRISH/NESS IS ALL  
AROUND US

OLAF ZENKER

LANGUAGE REVIVALISM AND  
THE CULTURE OF ETHNIC IDENTITY  
IN NORTHERN IRELAND

VOLUME 6



WHO OWNS THE  
STOCK?

EDITED BY  
AMANTYLA M. SHAKHMOVA & JUSTINE G. HERR

COLLECTIVE AND MULTIPLE  
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN ANIMALS

VOLUME 5



DOMESTICATING  
YOUTH

SOPHIE ROCHE

YOUTH BULGES  
AND THEIR SOCIO-POLITICAL  
IMPLICATIONS IN TAJIKISTAN

VOLUME 8






VARIATIONS ON  
UZBEK IDENTITY

PETER FINKE

STRATEGIC CHOICES, COGNITIVE SCHEMAS  
AND POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS  
IN IDENTIFICATION PROCESSES

VOLUME 7





# EMERGING ORDERS IN THE SUDANS

EDITED BY  
Sandra Calkins, Enrico Ille  
and Richard Rottenburg

