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# Introduction to the Modern Spirit of Asia

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*This is the introduction to *The Modern Spirit of Asia. The Spiritual and the Secular in China and India* by Peter van der Veer (Princeton University Press 2014). A Chinese translation of the book is under way.*

This is a book about India and China and about the ways in which they have been transformed by Western imperial modernity. In my understanding the onset of modernity is located in the nineteenth century and is characterized politically by the emergence of the nation-state, economically by industrialization, and ideologically by an emphasis on progress and liberation. What I call 'imperial modernity' is the formation of modernity under conditions of imperialism. I present here an essay in comparative historical sociology, informed by anthropological theory. Comparative historical sociology of culture is a field that was founded by Max Weber and practiced by his followers of whom Robert Bellah and the late S.N. Eisenstadt are among the best known. It has been connected to interpretive anthropological theory and to insights gained in ethnography, especially in the work of Clifford Geertz. However, the overwhelming increase of specialist historical work with great sophistication has led scholars to limit themselves to the nation-state as unit of analysis. Moreover, the emphasis on economics and politics in comparative work has made it hard to pursue this line of interpretive analysis.<sup>1</sup> The complexities of Indian and Chinese societies and their modern transformation are huge and our knowledge of them has increased greatly since Weber wrote his studies. This makes it difficult to do a comparative project, but I am convinced that in an era of

increasing specialization it is important to do comparative work if it succeeds in highlighting issues that are neglected or ignored because of the specialist's focus on a singular national society. The nation-form itself is a global form<sup>2</sup> that emerges in the nineteenth century and cannot be understood as the product of one particular society. It is the dominant societal form today and India and China have been gradually developed into nation-states. That is why one can compare India and China at the level of nation-states, although these societies are internally immensely differentiated and the particular nation-form they have taken is historically contingent. While India and China are taking a globally available form that is characteristic for modernity they follow pathways that are quite different. These differences can be highlighted and understood through comparison. China's and India's nation-forms are comparable, because they are based on huge societies with deep cultural histories that have united large numbers of people over vast territories and long periods of time. Both have taken the nation-form in interaction with Western imperialism. The comparative analysis that is introduced here takes the nation-form not as something natural or already preconditioned by deep civilizational or ethnic histories, but as something historically contingent and fragmented.<sup>3</sup> In its focus on the comparative analysis of the different pathways of two nation-states in a global (imperial) context the argument goes beyond methodological nationalism.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> See Etienne Balibar, *The Nation Form: History and Ideology Review* (Fernand Braudel Center), Vol. 13, No. 3 (Summer, 1990), pp. 329-361.

<sup>3</sup> See my review of Aviel Roshwald *The Endurance of Nationalism. Ancient Roots and Modern Dilemmas* in *The American Historical Review*, 2008, 113, 4, 1100-1102

<sup>4</sup> This term is used by Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller in the context of studies of transnational migration and by Ulrich Beck in the context of studies of border-crossing risks, but I would claim that, more fundamentally, modern social sciences and their problems and methods are deeply rooted in national society and national traditions; see Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 'Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: nation-state-building, migration and the social sciences' *Global Networks* 2, 4 (2002), 301-334; Ulrich Beck 'The cosmopolitan perspective: sociology of the second age of modernity' *British Journal of Sociology* 51 (2000), 79-105.

<sup>1</sup> In an important overview of the field of historical sociology the topic of religion is absent from the index and interpretive approaches are discarded in favor of the search for macro-causalities, see James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (eds), *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

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## India and China

Why compare India and China in the modern period? Contrary to what might be assumed the reasons for comparison do not lie in a continuous long-term history of interactions between India and China. The words China and Mandarin derive from Sanskrit *cina* (“land of the Chin”) and *mantri* (“minister”). That such principal terms of foreign reference to the Middle Kingdom (*zhongguo*) and to its learned civilization come from India suggests a long continuous history of interaction between the two civilizations till today. However, such a civilizational interaction was in fact largely limited to the first millennium AD. While this exchange was of great importance and continued for a millennium it was very much limited to the spread of Buddhism. It therefore gradually ended when Buddhism more or less disappeared from India under the influence of new Hindu devotional movements as well as the spread of Islam. Buddhism in China lost its connection with India and became now entirely Chinese. This is obviously not to underestimate the enormous influence of Buddhism on Chinese thought or to deny its Indian origins. Concepts of ‘belief’ in Chinese (信, *xin*) may well be derived from Buddhist thought and thus from Sanskrit *shraddha* that gives doctrine and the act of believing a central place in religious discipline. It follows that by recognizing this Indian influence the notion of ‘belief’ might be much more important in Chinese religious practice than is often assumed by those who emphasize orthopraxy rather than orthodoxy in Chinese religion.<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, while one can hear Sanskrit mantras being chanted in Buddhist monasteries in China today and every literate Chinese knows Wu Chen-En’s 16th century classic novel *Journey to the West*, in which a monkey king, inspired by the Hindu monkey-god Hanuman, goes to India to find wisdom, the interaction with India has long come to a halt.

Certainly, there is a continuous story, largely untold, of Indian, Chinese and Arab traders plying the coasts of the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean with their goods and one does have the inspiring narrative of Admiral Zheng He (a Muslim Chinese from South China) going to India and Africa with enormous fleets in the fifteenth century.<sup>6</sup> However, while they are important, those stories do not

<sup>5</sup> Hymes, Robert, “Some thoughts on Asad, Geertz, ‘belief,’ and *xin*.” “Religion in China: Rethinking Indigenous and Imported Categories of Thought,” Paper presented at Fairbank East Asian Center, Harvard Univ., Cambridge, MA, 21-22 May, 2005.

<sup>6</sup> Tansen Sen, *Buddhism, Diplomacy, and Trade. The Realignment of Sino-Indian Relations, 600-1400*. Delhi: Manohar, 2003.

show an interaction in terms of the expansion of empires and/or religious traditions, such as Buddhism, between India and China in the second millennium A.D. What one needs to acknowledge is a universe of exchanges in the Far East in which China plays a dominant role over the centuries till today. This universe includes countries now called Korea, Japan, and Vietnam.<sup>7</sup> At the same time there is also a universe of exchanges between India and the Islamic World on the one hand and the Malay world on the other, including countries now called Yemen, Indonesia, and Malaysia.<sup>8</sup> While these universes of exchange and interaction touch each other at the edges, especially in the Malay world, they do not interact in their cores. From the 16<sup>th</sup> century onwards these exchanges and interactions come to be gradually controlled by Western maritime expansion in the entire region while connecting it up to a more global system of exchanges.<sup>9</sup>

Whatever the importance of exchanges and interactions between India and China in the pre-modern world may have been they are not the basis of the comparison that is offered here. This is a book about the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, about religion and nationalism in the imperial context. It takes as its starting-point the 19<sup>th</sup> century imperial history of Western interactions with India and China. As such it is in terms of world history a relatively short, though recent history of Western dominance that emerged out of the Industrial Revolution. It is also a period of dramatic transformation in the entire world.<sup>10</sup> The ascendancy of the West is accompanied by the decline of India and China. This book compares the interactions between India and Western modernity with the interactions between China and Western modernity.

Indian and Chinese modernities are produced by interactions with imperial formations that can be compared to further our general understanding of the cultural history of modernity. This comparison is not only fruitful because they are large-scale neighboring societies with deep cultural histories that have had far-reaching influence on all the societies around them, but they also

<sup>7</sup> Alexander Woodside, *LOST MODERNITIES; China, Vietnam, Korea, and the Hazards of World History*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2006

<sup>8</sup> Engseng Ho, *The Graves of Tarim; Genealogy and mobility across the Indian Ocean*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006.

<sup>9</sup> Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680. Vol.I: The Lands below the Winds*. New Haven, Yale University Press (1988) and *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680. Vol.II: Expansion and Crisis*. New Haven, Yale University Press (1993).

<sup>10</sup> Jürgen Osterhammel: *Die Verwandlung der Welt*. München: C.H. Beck, 2009.

share a number of similar and comparable features. From the sixteenth century India is ruled by the Mughals, while China is ruled by the Qing. Both are dynasties that come from outside and remain distinct from the rest of society in a number of ways, but while Islam plays an important role in the distinctiveness of the Mughals, it is Manchu ethnicity that is central in the case of the Qing. Both dynasties are toppled under Western influence in the nineteenth century. India is colonized after the Mutiny of 1857 and included in the British Empire, while the Qing dynasty is fundamentally weakened by the Opium Wars (1839-1842 and 1856-1860) and replaced by the Republic of China in 1912. This Republic never achieved hegemony over Chinese territory, but was subjected to constant fragmentation due to a series of wars and rebellions as well as a Japanese invasion. It is only the foundation of the People's Republic of China in 1949 by the Communists after the defeat of the Nationalist army and its escape to Taiwan that Mainland China comes to be unified again under one regime. The current state of India is also a product of the Second World War and the collapse of the old colonial arrangements. It became the Republic of India in 1950, after the separation of Pakistan, a Homeland for Muslims. Colonial rule had brought a substantial unification of India and an institutional framework to build on, but Independence immediately occasioned an important division of territory and people for reasons of religious nationalism.

The post 1950s history of India and China also shows both remarkably comparable similarities and differences. India has a democratic government, chosen by the people in regular, free elections, with a multi-party system, although dominated over the larger period by the Congress, a party characterized by a secular, democratic socialism. China has communist rule without free elections. Although their starting-point in 1950 was very similar, the economic development of both societies has also been quite different. While both are agrarian societies that went on a path of industrialization China has been growing much faster over the last three decades after it had suffered tremendously during the upheaval caused by the enormous failures of the Great Leap Forward and the Great Cultural Revolution. The Chinese state under communism has launched a much more radical and successful attack on agrarian hierarchical society (including its religious aspects) than the Indian state has been able or willing to do. This is immediately clear when one looks at literacy rates, relative poverty, land cultivation rights and gender

relations.<sup>11</sup> Both states have had a policy of self-sufficiency and relative closure to the world market, but both of them also in the 1980s have liberalized their economies and opened them up for the world market. These economic policies have been implemented in India under conditions of a vibrant civil society and a public sphere with a free press, while China implemented them under conditions of authoritarian rule without free criticism from civil society or public sphere.

While there are a great many issues in the comparison of Modern India and China that need to be addressed in social science if it is to be less Euro-America centered, this is still very insufficiently done. Issues of democracy versus authoritarian rule and their impact on economic development, issues of urbanization and rural industrialization, the rise of middle classes in India and China; these are all just instances of a possible comparative sociological analysis. One may expect that such analysis will be forthcoming with the growing centrality of India and China in global economy. However, it is also to be expected that the main emphasis in such a future comparative sociology will be on political economy rather than on culture and religion. This is at least the experience with the field of world history that is dominated by economic analysis.<sup>12</sup>

From the perspective developed in this book the impact of imperial encounters on culture and religion also deserves comparative analysis. Culture and religion are not marginal, but central to the formation of imperial modernity. What is not attempted here is to provide a coherent, encompassing model from which what we know about these two societies can be understood. While one needs narrative coherence, one should also, to an extent, be allowed to leave space for the fragmented nature of cultural processes. Narrative coherence is attempted by the following focal viewpoints and arguments that guide the present analysis.

## Spirituality of the East

In the imperial encounter the cultures of India and China gradually come to be seen as “spiritual” and thus as different from and in opposition to the materialism of the

<sup>11</sup> For an economic comparison of India and China, see: Pranab Bardhan, *Awakening Giants, Feet of Clay: Assessing the Rise of China and India*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010

<sup>12</sup> Emanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System, 4 Volumes*. (1974-2011). Kenneth Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.

West. It is this concept of “spirituality” that is critically engaged in this book both in its Western universalistic genealogy and in its application to translate Indian and Chinese traditions. What is the “spiritual”? It is a term scholars would like to avoid as much as possible because of its vagueness. This is most easily done by treating it as a marginal term, used only at the fringes of intellectual life, as in our period, for instance, in the New Age Movement. I want to suggest that that is not a correct approach and that spirituality is in fact a crucial term in our understanding of modern society. At the same time it is necessary to reflect on the nature of this kind of concept. Certainly, it does conjure up all the conceptual difficulties that one also encounters with terms like ‘religion’ and ‘belief’, and perhaps even more so. Obviously, its very conceptual un-clarity and un-definability make it so useful for those who want to use it. It suggests more than it defines. Spirituality takes the universalization of the concept of religion a crucial step further by completely severing the ties with religious institutions. The term “religion” has developed in modern European thought as a cross-cultural, global concept that captures a great variety of traditions and practices. The universalizing deployment of the concept of religion has its roots in notions of Natural Religion and Rational religion that came up in the aftermath of the religious wars in Europe and in conjunction with European expansion in other parts of the world. A milestone in this development has been the relativizing of Christianity in relation to other religions by the 18<sup>th</sup>-century publication of Picart and Bernard’s Religious Ceremonies of the World.<sup>13</sup>

The concept of “spirituality” is discussed here in relation to another equally potent modern concept that is often seen as its opposite, namely the “secular”. In doing so I will have to clear the ground for a new perspective on spirituality that does not make it into a marginal form of resistance against secular modernity, but shows its centrality to the modern project and a new perspective on secularity that shows the extent to which it is deeply involved with magic and religion.

Already in the nineteenth century the concept of “religion” becomes part of a narrative of decline or displacement that has been systematized in the sociological theory of secularization. The gradual transformation of a transcendent hierarchical order into a modern immanence that is legitimated in popular sovereignty, and characterized by the market, the public

sphere, and the nation-state has transformed the role of institutional religion and in some historical instances (but not in others) marginalized it, but at the same time it has freed a space for spirituality. Spirituality escapes the confines of organized, institutionalized forms of religion and thus the Christian model of churches and sects that cannot be applied in most non-Christian environments. It is thus more cross-culturally variable and flexible and defies sociological attempts of model building. At the same time all the concepts that are used in this context (religion, magic, secularity, spirituality) either emerge or are transformed at the end of the nineteenth century and enable both anti-religious communism in China and religious (Hindu and Muslim) as well as spiritual (Gandhian) nationalism in India.

## Religion and Nationalism

A central concern in this book is to understand the differences between nationalist understandings of religion in India and those in China. In other words, this is a study of the relation between nationalism and religion from a comparative perspective. Both nationalisms have ideas about progress, rationality, equality and anti-imperialism in common, but the location of religion in Indian and Chinese nationalist imaginings is very different. In short, religion is a valued aspect of Indian nationalism, whereas it is seen as an obstacle in Chinese nationalism. I will argue that such a difference in the location of religion in modernity can be understood by comparing the ways in which India and China have been transformed by imperial modernity. As I have argued in an earlier book on the case of Britain and India, imperial interactions have been crucial to the formation of imperial modernities<sup>14</sup>. In this book I will alternately speak about Western or Euro-American imperialism with an emphasis on British imperialism which is the global hegemonic force till the Second World War. The relation between religion and nationalism is constitutive to Indian and Chinese modernities and forms the general problematic of this book.

Globalization in its current phase has forced us to go beyond nationalist histories, but world history more often than not emphasizes economics and politics and in an established secularist fashion underplays the formative role of religion.<sup>15</sup> What I want to present here is an interactional history that emphasizes interactions

<sup>13</sup> Lynn Hunt, Margaret C. Jacob, and Wijnand Mijnhardt, *The Book that changed Europa: Picart and Bernard’s Religious Ceremonies of the World*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2010.

<sup>14</sup> Peter van der Veer, *Imperial Encounters*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.

<sup>15</sup> A good example is C.A. Bayly’s *The Birth of the Modern World*. Oxford: Blackwell 2004.

between Euro-America (also known as ‘the West’) on the one hand and India and China on the other with an emphasis on what I would like to call a ‘syntagmatic chain of ‘religion-magic-secularity-spirituality’. I borrow the term ‘syntagmatic’ from Saussurean linguistics to suggest that these terms are connected, belong to each other, but cannot replace each other. They do not possess stable meanings independently from one another and thus cannot be simply defined separately. They emerge historically together, imply one another, and function as nodes within a shifting field of power. This syntagmatic chain occupies a key position in nationalist imaginings of modernity.

Obviously, the emphasis on religion in this book is not to deny the importance of the history of capitalism and of developmental politics. However, the problem with an emphasis on economic development is that the history of modernization takes central stage in world history and that within this history a teleologically unfolding story of secularization takes care of religion. What I offer in this book is a non-secularist counter-narrative. In one sense my narrative is secular, since it takes a position of non-partisanship towards religion. I am not arguing from a religious point of view when I put forward that there is no opposition between being modern and being religious. Surely, there are religious arguments against certain forms of modernity just as there are secular arguments against certain forms of religion. These are arguments that need to be studied from a sociological perspective which, in itself, is only possible within certain secular conditions. The social sciences emerge within the framework of the modern nation-state which is in a number of crucial respects a secular state. Simply put, my arguments about religion will not lead to my persecution by the state as a heretic. On the other hand, my narrative is non-secularist in the sense that secularism and secularization are not taken for granted, but are seen as projects which have to be studied in relation to other political projects. While this is often hard to do because secularism is so much a part of the modern intellectual world view both in Asia and in Euro-America, it is certainly necessary to distance oneself from secularist intellectual projects, such as the Marxist-Leninist party ideology that is taught in Chinese universities, especially when they are supported by the power of modernizing states. I do not take this position in the spirit of a general critique of ‘the’ secularist state, as some Indian scholars like Ashis Nandy and T.N. Madan have done, because I will show that their critique may apply to the Communist state of China, but is not

applicable to the Indian state.<sup>16</sup> What I want to show is that religion-magic-secularity-spirituality is an integral part of modernity. Realizing this as an empirical fact rather than as an ideological statement is necessary for a better understanding of contemporary society.

## Comparative framework

To understand the connections in what I loosely call the syntagmatic chain of religion-magic-secularity-spirituality one needs an explicitly comparative framework. In fact, social and cultural analysis is always within a comparative frame. Some of us are acutely aware of this, others less so. However, in general there is not enough reflection on the extent to which our approaches depend on arguing and comparing with the already existing literature on a topic, on the use of terms that have emerged in entirely different historical situations and thus carry in them implicit comparison (like middle class or bourgeoisie, or like religion), and also on the ways in which those we study themselves are constantly comparing the present with the past or their situation with that of others. To therefore claim that one is a Sinologist or Indologist or Africanist and think that specialization in a region and subject, given sufficient linguistic and cultural competence, is enough to claim mastery over a subject, as if one is not standing constantly in a reflexive relation to both discipline and subject, gives perhaps a certain psychological fortitude, but is untenable.

The sociology of India, as conceptualized by Louis Dumont and David Pocock at the end of the 1950s, was meant to place the study of India in a comparative framework.<sup>17</sup> The principle that guided Dumont and Pocock was that the sociology of India, like the sociology of any other society, could be developed as a form of knowledge that is not fatally determined by a national(ist) framework. While Indian sociology, again like any other sociology, originates in a national space and is developed within it, comparative sociology may transcend that framework.

However, there are serious problems in developing comparative sociology. To give an example that is central to Dumont’s work, it would seem obvious that the study of caste is a crucial element of the comparative analysis of

<sup>16</sup> Ashish Nandy, ‘An Anti-Secularist Manifesto’, *India International Quarterly*, 22, 1 (Spring 1995), 35-64. T.N. Madan, *Modern Myths, Locked Minds: Secularism and Fundamentalism in India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997.

<sup>17</sup> Louis Dumont and David Pocock, ‘For A Sociology of India’, *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, 1960.

class. Nevertheless, there is a strong tendency in general sociology to simply assume that caste, while an essential characteristic of Indian society is merely a special case that does not shed much light on other societies and thus can more or less be ignored. To an extent, this tendency is reinforced by using caste as a metaphor for Indian society.<sup>18</sup> A similarly unfortunate tendency comes across in discussions on secularization and secularism, in which the secular is a metaphor for modern society. Even in the more recent critiques of Western models of modernization and secularization one finds only few examples of comparison with non-Western societies, while the communist world escapes attention altogether in these discussions.<sup>19</sup> The universal pretensions of Western sociology derive from assumptions that are implicit in the modernization paradigm. Because India has been relatively marginal to post-Second World War developments in the West there has been very little interest in developing a comparative sociology that includes findings and theories from India. It is only in the current phase of globalization that comparisons with India and China, as emerging markets and players on the global scene, become again interesting for those social scientists who are primarily interested in modern, industrial society.

Current forms of globalization have made it important to study forms of transnational interaction that by definition escape the comparative frame of nation-states. Some might argue that globalization makes comparative sociology irrelevant, since global forces shape societies everywhere at the same time and it is these forces that have to be studied. But one may argue that they shape societies in very different ways, ways that need to be compared. To give an example: the IT revolution has changed societies worldwide, but this happened very differently in Europe and in India, and even very differently within India in, for instance, Bangalore and Lucknow. In an earlier period of globalization imperialism shaped Britain and India simultaneously, but quite differently, and the differences and similarities call for comparative analysis. What needs to be compared in relation to the increasing importance of transnational flows is the transformation of nation-states and their relation to transnational forms of governance. The nation-state is not in decline but undergoes significant

transformations due to the globalization of the world economy. The different roles that transnational diasporas can play in these transformations is part of the comparative enterprise. For example, the role of the Chinese diaspora in the development of China after the opening up of the economy in 1978 is significantly different from that of the Indian diaspora (if only already in terms of the size of foreign direct investments from the diaspora) and it is the Chinese model that has inspired the Indian state to develop policies to attract investments from its diaspora.

One of the greatest flaws in the development of comparative sociology seems to be the almost universal comparison of any society with an ideal-typical Euro-American modernity. It would be a step forward to compare developments in modern India and modern China with each other. That does not simply a straightforward ‘provincializing’ of Europe, since Europe and America are crucial in the formation of Indian and Chinese modernity, but an understanding of the ways in which similar challenges and influences have produced very different societies in India and China.<sup>20</sup> Even within the modernization paradigm there is considerable debate about the nature of modernity. While some would emphasize the Western origins of a singular modernity that is exported and responded to in the East, others would emphasize the indigenous development of capitalist modernity without much of a role for imperialism. In the last decade there are more voices arguing for multiple modernities, diversifying both the nature of Western modernity and its impact as well as diversifying the histories in which Western influences have been received.<sup>21</sup> More and more the dynamic character of cultural encounters is also taken into account, as well as the ways in which these encounters are productive in creating new cultural formations. This variety is impossible to capture in one guiding interpretive framework. The step forward is to fully acknowledge variety and multiplicity without losing sight of the need to compare.

Comparison should not primarily be conceived in terms of comparing societies or events, or institutional arrangements across societies, but as a reflection on our conceptual framework as well as on a history of interactions that have constituted our object of study. One can, for instance, say that one wants to study church-state relations in India and China, but one has to bring to that a critical reflection on the fact that that kind of

<sup>18</sup> Arjun Appadurai, “Putting Hierarchy in its Place,” *Rereading Cultural Anthropology*. G. E. Marcus (Ed.). Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1992.

<sup>19</sup> There is some work on secularism in India, but hardly on secularism in China: Donald E. Smith: *India as a Secular State*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. Rajeev Bhargava (ed), *Secularism and Its Critics*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998.

<sup>20</sup> Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001

<sup>21</sup> Shmuel Eisenstadt (ed), *Multiple Modernities*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002.

study already presupposes the centrality of church-like organizations as well as the centrality of Western secular state formation in our analysis of developments in India and China. That critical reflection often leads to the argument that India and China (and other societies outside the West) should be understood in their own terms, and cannot be understood in Western terms. However, Indian and Chinese terms have to be interpreted and translated in relation to Western scholarship. Moreover, such translation and interpretation is part of a long history of interactions with the West. In the Indian case it is good to realize that, despite its foreign origins, English is now also an Indian vernacular and in the case of China it is good to realize that, despite the prevailing notion that everything has an ancient Chinese origin, communism did in fact not originate in the Song dynasty. So, any attempt to make a sharp (often nationalist) demarcation of inside and outside is spurious in the period under investigation. Moreover, today due to further evolved patterns of globalization this field of comparison has been widely democratized by modern media, so that everyone is in mediated touch with everyone else and has views on everyone else, mostly in a comparative sense. Chinese and Indians compare themselves with Europeans and Americans, and increasingly Indians compare themselves with Chinese (much less the other way around). Whatever we write today falls within the orbit of these increasingly available popular forms of comparison.

Comparison is thus not a relatively simple juxtaposition and comparison of two or more different societies, but a complex reflection on the network of concepts that both underlie our study of society as well as the formation of those societies themselves. So, it is always a double act of reflection.

While there is a huge literature examining the interactions between India and the West as well as China and the West there is hardly any attempt at comparative analysis of these interactions. Indian scholars look at the West and Chinese scholars do the same, but neither looks at each other's societies. There is enormous dearth of China scholarship in India and India scholarship in China. Stereotypes about each other are amply available, but a deeper engagement with each other's history and society can hardly be found. This is surprising when we consider that India and China are the two dominant societies in Asia with huge populations and deep civilizations that have radically influenced all the societies around them. Till 1800 they not only dominated their region but were also the motor of the world economy. This picture is more and more confirmed by the new economic history of India and China. In the last two centuries, however, there has

been the hegemony of Western power and of modes of thought that come out of the encounter with the West. The relative neglect of each other's society and history can thus be explained by the enormous impact of western modernity on Asia, including the dominance of Western academic institutions and scholarship. Western societies have been taken to be the model of developmental change in Asia and modernization theory, the long dominant paradigm of the social sciences, has lent its academic power to this common sense. Much of this thinking is now under revision, partly because of enormous economic growth in China over the last two decades and, to a lesser extent in India, partly because modernization theory has lost much of its credibility. This has led, for instance, to an insistence on fundamental differences between East and West, particularly on 'Asian values', as promoted by the long-term leader of Singapore (one of the most modern and 'Western' of Asian cities) Lee Kuan Yew. However, since these 'Asian values' are primarily 'East Asian values' this turn to the East has not led to more interest in the comparison between India and China.

Another, related, obstacle to comparisons between India and China are orientalist conceptions of unbridgeable differences. India and China come to stand for the total Other in 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century European imaginations. Such imaginations can be very positive, as in *Chinoiserie* and *Indomania*, but also very negative as in rejections of 'barbaric customs' such as foot-binding and widow-burning. Basically, understandings of India and China in the pre-colonial period were limited and exoticizing, but not without a sense of equality.<sup>22</sup> Different from African or Oceanian societies that are more easily represented as 'the primitive' and thus as a stage in human evolution Asian societies were (and continue to be) seen as civilizations that are potentially equal to Western civilization. With the expansion of modern power in the East such understandings are replaced with more precise knowledge, necessary to rule or dominate these regions, but also with a new sense of civilizational superiority. Such sentiments are often based on reified differences, as exemplified in Kipling's "East is East, and West is West and never the twain shall meet". Colonial rule over India has made India and the Indians less of an unreachable Other than China. Especially the spread of English in India over large elites has made cultural conversations easier. China, however, has despite its radical modernization, remained more of an Other in linguistic terms, as illustrated by Foucault's famous reference to Luis Borges's fake Chinese

<sup>22</sup> David Mungello, *The Great Encounter of China and the West, 1500-1800*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009.

encyclopedia, arguing that Chinese categorizations are fundamentally un-understandable.<sup>23</sup>

## Comparison and Translation

It is precisely the Chinese language with its characters and tones that provide the West its image of a deeply alien civilization. Sanskrit and the major modern languages of Northern India belong to the Indo-European family of languages and were thus seen as linguistically (and racially) connected to Western civilization. Chinese, however, was totally different. Nineteenth-century linguists, like William Dwight Whitney in 1868, argued that Chinese was hardly a language since it had no grammatical structure.<sup>24</sup> In Wilhelm von Humboldt's foundational text on comparative linguistics *On the Variety of Human Languages* (1836) it is argued that "of all known languages, Chinese and Sanskrit stand in the most decisive opposition...The Chinese and Sanskrit languages stand as the two extremes in the field of known languages, not perhaps comparable in their suitability for the development of the mind, but certainly so in the internal consistency and perfect execution of their systems".<sup>25</sup> Sanskrit, then, is a perfect language, as its very name indicates, with a perfect grammar that is at the origin of Indo-European languages of which indeed the European languages are one off-shoot. Indo-European is in the nineteenth century often called Indo-Aryan and stands for the uniqueness of European heritage against the total difference of Semitic languages (especially Hebrew) and the Chinese language. Sanskrit in its grammatical perfection shows the original genius of the Indo-Aryan race that has created it. While the Indians as a race have deteriorated and are in need of colonization by their Aryan brethren the Semites and Chinese are totally Other.

While these fascinating and complex theories about language and race have been slowly discredited, especially after World War II, questions about language and thought, about universality and difference have remained with us. The central issue in it is that of cultural translation and interpretation. The fact remains that modernity is a universalizing process which has to take on both translation and transformations of traditional conceptual

universes. It is precisely that process that produces similarities and differences in a history of power which is the subject of the present book. The difficulties of correct translation of key concepts seem simply insurmountable.

I.A. Richards, one of the most the most important literary critics before the 1960s in Britain and one of the major influences on American New Criticism, realized this problem during his visits of China.<sup>26</sup> However, he was determined to solve it, since he thought that miscommunication had caused the Great War that had wiped out many of his generation. Solving cultural misunderstandings was one of the great tasks he conceived for linguists and literary scholars as well as the impetus behind his book *The Meaning of Meaning* that he co-authored with C.K. Ogden and behind his attempt to bring Ogden's Basic English project to China. Basic English was the invention of the logician Ogden and was simplified English that could be used as a second language for all those who did not already speak English. This was not an artificial language like Esperanto, but based on natural English. It was developed to contain not more than 850 words and 18 verbs and, as such, easy to be learnt. In his *Mencius on the Mind* Richards argues that to understand the way Mencius (ca 372 –ca 289 B.C.E) used language to communicate meaning, totally alien to the Western mind, is crucial for the future of world communication and for the survival of Chinese civilization.<sup>27</sup> Both projects, that of promoting Basic English in China with help from the Rockefeller Foundation and that of translating Mencius failed. But it is important to see that Richards shared with Bertrand Russell and T.S. Elliott, his friends and contemporaries, a sense that although the gap between conceptual universes was almost unbridgeable, miscommunication, as a cause of war, had to be avoided at all cost.

This view is less eccentric than it sounds. One of the most instructive disputes between the British and the Chinese before the Opium Wars is about the use of the term *yi* in trade negotiations which has been wonderfully analyzed by Lydia Liu.<sup>28</sup> In the Treaty of Tianjin of 1858 Article 51 says: "It is agreed that, henceforward, the character *Yi* (barbarian) shall not be applied to the Government or subjects of Her Britannic Majesty in any

<sup>23</sup> Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things* (New York: Pantheon, 1970) xv.

<sup>24</sup> Haun Saussy, "Always Multiple Translation, Or, How the Chinese Language Lost Its Grammar" in Lydia Liu (ed) *Tokens of Exchange; The Problem of Translation in Global Circulations*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1999, 107-127.

<sup>25</sup> Cited in Haun Saussy, op.cit, p. 115

<sup>26</sup> Rodney Koeneke (2004) *Empires of the Mind: I.A. Richards and Basic English in China*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004

<sup>27</sup> I.A. Richards (1932) *Mencius on the Mind: Experiments in Multiple Definition*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner.

<sup>28</sup> This passage is based on Lydia H. Liu (2004) *The Clash of Empires; The Invention of China in Modern World Making*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.



official document issued by the Chinese authorities either in the Capital or in the Provinces.” The preceding Article 50 says: “All official communications addressed by the Diplomatic and Consular Agents of her Majesty the Queen to the Chinese Authorities shall, henceforth, be written in English. They will for the present be accompanied by a Chinese version, but it is understood that in the event of there being any difference in meaning between the English and Chinese text, the English Government will hold the sense as expressed in the English text to be the correct sense. This provision is to apply to the Treaty now negotiated, the Chinese text of which has been carefully corrected by the English original”. Striking is the language of command used in what is supposed to be a bilateral trading agreement.<sup>29</sup> But equally striking is that the British wanted to fix the translation “barbarian” to the character for yi (夷), while the Chinese used this character for “non-Han people” and were taken by surprise that the British took it as a sign of disrespect. In an early response to British objections against the use of the word yi Admiral Wu Qitai quoted Mencius saying King Shun was an eastern yi and King Wen was a western yi and both were a virtuous model for later kings so how could it be wrong to apply this word to the British? The issue here is not that of correct translation, since the use of the term yi has a complex history in China, just as the use of the word barbarian in English has a complex history. The issue here is that this term is part of a set of interactions between the Chinese authorities and the British that center around notions of honor and respect and that culminate in the Opium Wars. It is this kind of inimical connection that Richards tries to prevent by his efforts to create possibilities of translations that bridge differences.

The concept of cultural translation is, obviously, foundational for comparative analysis. In an important critique of Ernest Gellner’s view that cultural translation should not be excessively charitable (arguing basically that primitive nonsense stays primitive nonsense also in translation) Talal Asad starts with the way the concept is used by Godfrey Lienhardt: “The problem of describing to others how members of a remote tribe think then begins to appear largely as one of translation, of making the coherence primitive thought has in the languages it really lives in, as clear as possible in our own”, but then goes on to point out that translation always happens within a

history of power<sup>30</sup> Languages are unequal, especially in the production of desirable, universal knowledge. Cultural translation thus requires an exploration of this inequality and of the power relations that are inherent in them. This means that cultural analysis and comparison is always itself a product of power. This recognition does not lead to paralysis but perhaps to a realization of how power works. Social science is a modern discipline, originating in the West, and the translation of life worlds in social science language is one of the elements of Western cultural power. The universalization of social science language, however, also implies that this form of knowledge is applied by practitioners in India and China and elsewhere to understand their own societies. It is not anymore the old problem of anthropologists visiting a place where people do not read or write, but a new situation of increased cultural contact in everyday life virtually everywhere (but primarily in the West) thanks to international migration as well as of the development of social science disciplines in the places the West compares itself with.

## The Study of Civilizations

While this is an essay in comparative historical sociology it differs from the influential model, developed by Max Weber, in that it does not assume civilizations as units that can be compared, but looks at a series of interactions between Western imperial power and Indian and Chinese societies to compare historical choices and consequences.

The concept of civilization is problematic because it is hard to historicize and obscures the ways in which nationalisms have produced teleological histories of the nation as the result of civilizing processes. However, we cannot ignore the enormous influence on the study of religion especially by the theoretical understanding of civilizations and their possibilities to become modern developed by Weber and his followers. Weber’s understanding of Western modernity is based on a theory about the rationalization of religion in Europe which he compares with processes of rationalization in India and China. It has inspired a group of scholars around the late S.N. Eisenstadt to suggest a deeper history of civilizational (religious) patterns that lead to differences in their modernities. Eisenstadt argues that a disjunction (but not a split) between the transcendental and the mundane was for the first time made in a number of civilizations

<sup>29</sup> See B.S. Cohn, *An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987.

<sup>30</sup> Godfrey Lienhardt, „Modes of Thought“, in E. Evans-Pritchard (ed) *The Institutions of Primitive Society*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1954, p. 97 cited in Talal Asad, *Genealogies of Religion*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993, 172.

in roughly the same period, the first millennium before the Christian era.<sup>31</sup> These civilizations include Ancient Israel, Ancient Greece, Early Christianity, Zoroastrian Iran, early Imperial China, and the Hindu and Buddhist civilizations. Sociologically this development assumed the emergence of intellectual elites (e.g., Confucian Literati, Brahmins, Buddhist sangha) that wanted to shape the world in accordance with its transcendental vision. Moreover, Eisenstadt and his colleagues included theories by the anthropologists Tambiah and Redfield to point at a concomitant development of a galactic network of sacred centers and of a Great Tradition in them. This revolution in civilizational thought that occurred in all these civilizations in a relative short time span around 500 BC was called “the Axial Age Breakthroughs”, using a concept developed by the philosopher Karl Jaspers, who argued that in this period a shared framework for universal historical self understanding emerged.<sup>32</sup> The central idea in this theory is that in the Axial Age a new emphasis on the existence of a higher transcendental moral order was developed across civilizations as well as the concomitant emergence of the problem of salvation and immortality. How this problem is addressed differs from civilization to civilization. The philosopher and social theorist Charles Taylor calls this the Great Disembedding, in the sense that the Axial Religions break at least one of the ways in which religion was embedded: social order, cosmos, human good; In early religion “human agents are embedded in society, society in cosmos, and the cosmos incorporates the divine”, according to Taylor, and the Axial transformations break this chain at least at one point.<sup>33</sup>

The emergence of world renunciation in Indic religions (Hinduism, Jainism, and Buddhism) is, in principle, a perfect example of this disembedding, since the renouncer leaves society and in some radical version of Nirvana even the cosmos. What one should, however, keep in mind is that every disembedding is specific. The dyad of transcendental/immanent is configured in every civilization in specific ways and cannot be subsumed under an abstractly conceived (ideal-typical) universal dyad. The problematic of the transcendent in India is intimately tied to the specific immanence of caste hierarchy. On the one hand we have the caste society

under the aegis of the Brahman priest (and the Vedic fire-rituals), on the other hand we have the Axial religions (the Upanishads, Buddhism, Jainism) under the aegis of the renouncers. Both are inextricably connected, so that what Taylor calls disembedding gets its specific meaning from what it is disembedded from. Ultimately, what happens in India is a creative use of the notion of renunciation for all kinds of social and religious innovations that in the end do not fundamentally challenge hierarchical society, although they may challenge it. While the emergence of the renunciatory idea is certainly of great significance in world history one needs to avoid essentializing its nature by ignoring the ways in which it is related to a particular society. Similarly, if one would like to include Confucius’ thought among the Axial Breakthroughs (as Jaspers and Eisenstadt do) one needs to see that his teachings and that of his fellow literati develop a worldview that seems to create a dyad of the transcendent Heaven and the immanent World, but at the same time emphasizes its ultimate unity and embeds the socio-political order in it. While in India the renouncer is different from the priest and the king, in China we do not find a renouncer, but a King-Priest who executes the Mandate of Heaven. Unfortunately, his generalization of the notion of the Axial Age Breakthrough leads Eisenstadt to suggest in a totally expected (if not cliché) manner that Hinduism and Buddhism stand for an entirely transcendental (other-worldly) approach to salvation, while Confucianism stands for an entirely this-worldly approach.<sup>34</sup>

Jaspers and Eisenstadt’s Axial framework is the background to Charles Taylor’s work on Western modernity which he characterizes as ‘a secular age’ without prejudging what might have been the evolution of, for example, Chinese civilization. In this connection Taylor mentions in passing that “one often hears the judgment that Chinese imperial society was already “secular”, totally ignoring the tremendous role played by the immanent/transcendent split in the Western concept which has no analogue in China”.<sup>35</sup> In Taylor’s view the Axial dyad of immanent/transcendent (these two belong to each other) was radically split in European thought from the 17<sup>th</sup> century onwards and that split gave rise to the possibility of seeing the immanent as all there is and to see the transcendent as a human invention. This-worldly in the Chinese case then does not mean exactly the same as secular in the Western case. All these ultimately Weberian

31 S.N. Eisenstadt (ed), *The Origins & Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986.

32 Karl Jaspers, *Von Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte* (About the Origin and Goal of History. Frankfurt: Fischer, 1955, p. 14

33 Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008, p. 152.

34 Eisenstadt, o.c., p.16

35 Charles Taylor, in Michael Warner, Jonathan Van Antwerpen and Craig Calhoun Eds., *Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010

arguments, however, essentialize civilizational units that can be compared without exploring the highly fragmented and contradictory histories of these societies. They also tend to underestimate the influence of thought that does not fit easily in the immanent-transcendent framework, such as all those religious movements in India and China that emphasize the Unity of Being and the denial of Difference.

Weber's historical sociology compares processes of rationalization in Europe, India, and China, but arrives at a conclusion that is similar to that of Hegel's philosophy of history according to which personal and collective rationality (Spirit) develops in the West and cannot develop in the East because of a lack of individuality in India and China. In the Hegelian argument it is in India the caste system that robs people from their individual rationality, while in China it is the overwhelming power of the State.<sup>36</sup> It is remarkable how much of this basic conceptual scheme still informs our understanding of the differences between India and China. Let me give two recent examples. The economist Pranab Bardhan's recent interpretation of democracy in describing issues of governance in India and China focuses on the fact that in India society can be constantly mobilized for a number of issues, while the state lacks central commanding authority, while in China it is the opposite. This seems to simply reiterate Hegel's observation that China is all state and India is all society.<sup>37</sup> The anthropologist Watson in his elaborate reflections on Chinese ritual argues that the Chinese state unified the forms of Chinese ritual practice and thus created a cultural unity, and remarks that in comparison there is no unification of ritual in India. According to Watson one does not find in India a state-regulated pantheon nor can caste ideology provide a unified culture.<sup>38</sup> In short China is all state unification and India is all religious and social diversity.<sup>39</sup>

To assess these Hegelian assertions that have become common sense one would need to compare state formation in India and China. When one examines the

empires that preceded the modern political formations of colonized India and republican China it is remarkable that both are empires ruled by 'outsiders' to the Hindu or Han civilizations and that the Mughals kept to Islam while the Manchu (Qing) assimilated to the Confucian worldview. There are structural tensions at the heart of these empires: Manchu-Han and Muslim-Hindu. When one examines contemporary society one needs to avoid interpreting the contemporary communist state as representing ancient ideas of state power in China, since it understates the fragmentary nature of pre-modern empires as well as the importance of the 'warlord' period of half a century between the fall of the Qing and the foundation of the communist state. Similarly to explain the weakness of the Indian state in terms of caste as the essence of Indian society underestimates the enormous transformations of caste under British rule and in postcolonial India under conditions of democratic rule.

Weber, despite all his subtlety and genuine insights, offers a historical analysis of oriental deficiency or, in other words, what the East lacks to develop modernity, and in that way essentializes its differences with the Modern West. Hegel and also Marx see a historical role for Europe in transforming the East, but understand this simply as an impetus from outside to create change. A history of the interactions between East and West has to open up the fragmentary and contradictory nature of imperial encounters as well as the ways in which they produce new formations at both sides of the interaction. This is not a plea for providing more 'local histories', but a plea for doing 'interactional history' of modernity. One continues to have a need to engage with the traditions that are central to societies and the ways in which they have been interpreted to form the civilizational core of national history, but one needs, at the same time, to acknowledge the contradictory and fragmentary nature of discursive traditions.

## Wounded Civilizations

The imperial encounter with the West has produced, to use V.S. Naipaul's term, "wounded civilizations" in India and China.<sup>40</sup> Of course, it is above all the military superiority of Western powers, enabled by economic growth and technological progress that was the immediate cause of the defeat and humiliation of the powers that were prevailing in India and China. But more subtly, it is the encounter with Western modernity that has left a much more lasting

<sup>36</sup> Prasenjit Duara, 1995 *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* U. of Chicago Press.

<sup>37</sup> Pranab Bardhan, *India and China: Governance Issues and Development*. The *Journal of Asian Studies*, Volume 68, Issue 02, May 2009, pp 347-357.

<sup>38</sup> James Watson, "Rites or Beliefs, The Construction of a Unified Culture in Late Imperial China", in Lowell Dittmer and Samuel Kim, *China's Quest for National Identity*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993, 80-104.

<sup>39</sup> For a nuanced critique of Watson's state standardization in China thesis, see Donald Sutton and others, „Ritual, Cultural Standardization, and Orthopraxy in China: Reconsidering James L. Watson's Ideas", *Modern China*, 2007, 33.

<sup>40</sup> V.S. Naipaul, *India: A Wounded Civilization*. London: Andre Deutsch, 1977

wound creating deep emotions of insignificance and backwardness, of hurt pride. Such feelings are still very much alive today long after national independence and a more recent history of spectacular economic growth.

An important field of culture in which the clash with imperial modernity has created such wounds is that of artistic creation. This is a field that is in important ways interwoven with that of religion, since image, icon, imagery, artistic representation as well as iconoclasm are central to devotional practices. As we will see in the next chapter modern art is also deeply connected with the notion of spirituality. In discussions of the imperial encounter this cultural battlefield is seldom mentioned, possibly because the wounds are so deep. The arts of India and China, ranging from miniature paintings and calligraphy to sculpture and architecture, were not only rich but in a number of technical aspects also superior to Western art, especially in applied arts, such as textiles and porcelain. They had not only lost patronage with the decline of indigenous empires but, more significantly, they had lost their command over the politics of distinction and cultural power. While there is some interaction between Western and Chinese and especially Japanese art one is struck by the ways in which Western paintings have been able to absorb oriental art, give it a place within its own overall structure without imitating it, like in Van Gogh's *Le Pere Tanguy* (1887) which features several Japanese prints that serve as the background of van Gogh's portrait of Tanguy. In the nineteenth and early twentieth century it is the West that produces modern art and thus the power to give meaning to modern life, while it is the East that seems condemned to mimic it (with all the ambivalence and instability of mimicry that produces something "that is almost the same but not quite").<sup>41</sup>

Although there are constant attempts at creating a Chinese and Indian modern art after the decline of traditional art these attempts have not yet succeeded in producing a space that is rooted in regional aesthetics and producing an alternative cosmopolitanism to the Western one in the way cinema has done that.<sup>42</sup> Certainly, in Chinese art this seems to be quickly changing today. One way in which this change is indicated is at auctions of contemporary art, where works by artists like Zhang Xiaogang fetch prices that continue to rise drastically and

show international recognition. Another indication is the development of independent studio sites, like Dashanzi (Factory 798), located in disused factories in Beijing.<sup>43</sup> The question whether contemporary Chinese art is simply produced for international (predominantly Western taste) is deeply contested. At the same time it should be clear that typical Chinese art traditions, such as ink painting, continue to be practiced and appreciated by millions in China today.<sup>44</sup> The transformation of Chinese and Indian conceptions of beauty and art into modern ones shows the complexity of the imperial encounter.

This picture emerges also from the field of literature in which India's single Nobel Prize Winner in literature Rabindranath Tagore rode the wave of interest in Eastern Spirituality at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century but is almost entirely forgotten now (except in Bengal), while Gao Xingjian who received the Nobel Prize in literature in 2000 as the single Chinese recipient for literature, is hardly recognized as an important novelist in China itself (but is recognized in Taiwan and Singapore). This situation is the more remarkable given the enormous historical depth and richness of Indian and Chinese literary traditions. To an extent it is a product of the complex relation of culture and language –which partly explains that Indian literature directly written in English is so much more appreciated all over the world than translated Indian literature, originally written in vernacular languages- and thus raises the question of the translatability of these cultures. To put it differently, it raises questions about cultural diversity and universality and therefore about modernity as a process of universal abstraction from concrete difference that we will address later.

How do we understand tradition? Modernity is often seen as a break with the traditional past and the attitudes towards what is seen as "tradition" in India and China is one of the central issues in this book. Talal Asad has given the following definition of tradition: "A tradition consists essentially of discourses that seek to instruct practitioners regarding the correct form and purpose of a given practice that precisely because it is established, has a history. These discourses relate conceptually to a past (when the practice was instituted, and from which the knowledge of its point and proper performance has been transmitted) and a future (how the point of that practice

<sup>41</sup> Homi Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*. London: Routledge 1994, p.86.

<sup>42</sup> For a fascinating illustration of this dilemma, see Anita Chung (ed) *CHINESE ART IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTION: FU BAOSHI (1904–1965)*. Catalogue of an exhibition at the Metropolitan Museum (New York), January 21– April 15, 2012.

<sup>43</sup> Puay-peng Ho, "Consuming Art in Middle Class China", in Christophe Jaffrelot and Peter van der Veer (eds), *Patterns of Middle Class Consumption in India and China*. Delhi: Sage, 2008, 277-299.

<sup>44</sup> Jerome Silbergeld, "Modernization, Periodization, Canonization in Twentieth-Century Chinese Painting", in Josh Yiu (ed) *Writing Modern Chinese Art*. Seattle: Art Museum, 2007: 9-15

can best be secured in the short or long term. Or why it should be modified or abandoned), through a present (how it is linked to other practices, institutions, and social conditions)".<sup>45</sup> Central to a tradition is therefore the debate about authenticity and transgression. Traditions project themselves as timeless, transcending history and their discursive authority lies precisely in that claim. It is thus not so much that in the modern period traditions are cast away in a process of westernization, but that the debate about how indigenous traditions relate to the necessity to measure up against the modern power of the West becomes central.

## Themes and Perspectives

The relation between spirituality, secularity, religion and magic in Indian and Chinese modernity is the main theme of this book. The emergent form of Indian and Chinese societies in which these relations are taking shape is that of the modern nation. While both sociology and political ideology have tended to conceptualize the modern nation-state and its democratic form of governance as secular and its emergence as dependent on a replacement of religious sentiments of community the present study does not want to assume any given relation between nationalism and religion. Similarly assumptions about secularization and secularism that are inherent in sociological theories of modernization and ideological views of the nature of Western modernity are not taken at face value. As Jose Casanova has shown, the democratic nation-state can emerge and thrive in societies with public religions.<sup>46</sup> To give a personal example, I was born in a Dutch society that was dominated by religious groups and parties but has had democratic elections from the end of the nineteenth century. There are several possible connections between democracy and secularity, but there is no necessary one. Secularity can be promoted in a society by democratic means, which was Jawaharlal Nehru's aspiration, but it can also be promoted by authoritarian means, which happened in China under Communist rule. The establishment of democratic rule is relatively independent from a process of secularization.

While there are various forms of state secularity, only in Western Europe we can find some secular societies in which religion does not anymore play a major role.

As a form of political participation and representation democracy is typical for the liberal modern nation-state, a particular state formation that emerges in Europe and the Americas in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and has been spreading over the world ever since. Liberal secularists may demand that the state is secular and that it treats religions equally and neutrally, but they will have to acknowledge that if one allows freedom of religious expression religion more often than not will play an important role in the democratic process. One therefore needs to distinguish between the relative secularity of the state and the relative secularity of society and make clear how one defines that secularity. Modern states like England, Holland, and the US all have had their own specific arrangements for guaranteeing a certain secularity of the state, but these states have found their legitimation in societies in which religion plays an important public role. To give one clear example: It can be safely said that the wall of separation in the USA is a demand that has emerged not from secularists, but from religious dissenters that were persecuted in England and therefore that, at least in this case, the secularity of the state is in fact a religious demand.<sup>47</sup> The cases of India and China are relevant for a more complex understanding of the relation between nation and religion. China has witnessed a continuous secularist attack against religion for a century but has not been secularized, while India has made religion to a core element of its national culture and, at the same time, has created a secular state that attempts to take a neutral stance towards religion. None of these developments can be understood within the framework of existing theories of secularization, but their comparison can throw light on how religion and the secular relate to processes of state formation.

Secondly, the category of religion that has been critically deconstructed in recent anthropological and historical writing as well as in religious studies is a prime example of the productive character of the imperial encounter. It is a Western category that undergoes an enormous transformation in this encounter before it can absorb and produce "religions" like Hinduism, Daoism, and Confucianism. In such a transformation not only Christian missionaries and Western orientalis have agency, but Indian and Chinese thinkers are as much involved in creatively producing new concepts and configurations. Moreover, this is not a history of ideas and their effects only, but very much also a history of state power and institutional change. It is not possible

<sup>45</sup> Talal Asad, "The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam," Occasional Paper Series, Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, March 1986

<sup>46</sup> Jose Casanova, *Public Religions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

<sup>47</sup> Daniel L. Dreisbach. *Thomas Jefferson and the Wall of Separation Between Church and State*. New York: New York University Press, 2003.

to see the transformation of concepts like religion as the passive reception of Western categories in the rest of the world. Indians and Chinese are actively involved in this transformation as are Europeans and Americans.

Thirdly, the emergence of a public sphere is crucial for the problematic of nation and religion. I have argued in earlier work on religion and the nation-state in 19<sup>th</sup> century England that the secular perception of the public sphere, as argued by authors like Habermas, is a secularist prescription rather than a historical description.<sup>48</sup> In fact, one can easily discern the mobilization of religious groups at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century for causes that are both religious and secular, such as the modern missionary movements that protest against East India Company support of Hindu temples in India and the anti-slavery movements that protest against England's involvement in global slave trading as well as slave labor in plantations. These religious groups transform the public sphere and make the modern nation form of society possible.

An important development accompanying the rise of the modern nation-state in England is the nationalization of religion. Religion becomes less a form of political identification that pitches Protestants against Catholics than an element in unifying the nation under god and in giving the state a moral purpose. In my view this also implies a major shift in the understanding of "religion". Rather than opposing "true religion" against "false religion" pitching all kind of groups against each other religion emerges as an umbrella under which different persuasions can be active without violent conflict. The emergence of the category of "world religion" as a moral category that transcends actually existing churches and religious groups as well as the emergence of "spirituality" as alternative to institutionalized religion are elements of this transformation which implies a pacification of religious conflict. At the same time, however, in the Indian colony Hindus and Muslims are pitched against each other with the rise of nationalism, while in China religion becomes the object of secularist persecution. The new, universal concept of religion encompasses the pacified religions of the Western nation-states and the communalized religions of South Asia as well as the politically repressed religions under Communism.

Fourthly, the issues in this book are connected to a history of power, primarily of the state but also of social movements that are sometimes transcending

the boundaries of the state. Religions like Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism have always been formations that transcend ethnic and territorial boundaries. In the age of empire, however, this transcendence of boundaries is transformed by modern imperialism. In Europe we see in the 19<sup>th</sup> century an emergence of a religious concern for the heathens who come under imperial rule. This connects with the civilizing mission of empire, although in an uneasy way since the colonial state always had to prevent being seen as a Christian state bent on converting the colonized. Despite its professed neutrality empire had to intervene in society, already for the simple reason that it had to be largely ruled by natives and thus had to educate the natives. There is an enormous expansion of missionary activity under the umbrella of empire that focuses on education. Through the effort to produce modern Christians by converting and educating the colonized to both Christianity and Modernity the missionary societies had a lasting effect on colonized societies. This effect is less to be measured in terms of converts (relatively few in countries like India and Indonesia) than in terms of producing modern forms of Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, Daoism, and Confucianism and so on as counter-movements against Christianity. It is these so-called revivalist, but basically modernist movements that one encounters everywhere in the colonial and post-colonial world. What we see today as political religion in the post-colonial world is very much a product of the imperial encounter.

While the nation-state is to an extent the territorial container of much of what is discussed in this book it is itself a product of globalization and always interacting with the global system of nation-states.<sup>49</sup> Many of the groups that are in an uneasy relation to state hegemony are related to worldwide movements of, for example, Christianity and Islam, but at the same time they operate within the framework of the globalizing effects of ideas, money, labor, and consumption. In the current phase of globalization religion continues to connect people and societies over great distances that are now more readily connected by various new forms of communication. Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism have developed several new global missionary movements that connect to this phase of globalization. They can all be called evangelical movements. Some of these worldwide movements are connected to minorities in the nation-state. The nation is not only the product of its interaction

<sup>48</sup> Jürgen Habermas, (1962 trans 1989) *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a category of Bourgeois Society*, Cambridge, Polity Press. Peter van der Veer, *Imperial Encounters*, Princeton: Princeton University Press 2001.

<sup>49</sup> Etienne Balibar, "The Nation Form: History and Ideology", in *Race, nation, class: ambiguous identities* by Étienne Balibar, Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, London: Verso, 1991.

with the wider world but also of the constant processes of homogenization and heterogenization that are a necessary element of nationalism. Nation, like religion and modernity, is never finished, never already there, but is produced by its contradictions and tensions.

This book, then, is about the effects of universalizing categories like spirituality, magic, and secularity on ideas of the nation in India and China. The second chapter shows how in the nineteenth century the category of spirituality receives a global modern meaning. It becomes part of an alternative modernity in different places around the globe. In India and China indigenous forms of spirituality are invoked as alternatives to Western imperialism and materialism. Spiritual superiority becomes part of Panasianism in the writings of some Indian and Chinese intellectuals. At the same time state-centered religious ideologies as well as nation-centered ideologies focus on spirituality as part of national character. These ideologies are crucial even today in China, India, Taiwan, and Singapore.

The third chapter concerns the making of oriental religion. This chapter explores the emerging field of oriental studies and comparative religion, especially the project of Sacred Books of the East, headed by Friedrich Max Muller. It builds on recent reappraisals of the indologist Friedrich Max Muller and the sinologist James Legge. It goes beyond the study of orientalist scholarship by examining the role of the World Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893. The major analytical issue is to what extent these products of Western scholarship and imagination have produced forms of religious categorization that have had an actual impact on religious belief and practice in India and China.

In the fourth chapter conversion to Christianity and the impact of missionary movements in India and China is discussed. Christian missionaries have played a major role in the creation of modern vocabularies and modern attitudes in India and China. Reform-movements but also popular resistance movements derive much of their discourse from Christianity. The chapter analyzes the different trajectories of Christianity in India and China. It examines the concept of conversion in relation to the discourse of modernity.

Chapter V engages the question of “popular religion” and the relation between religion and magic in India and China. The categories of “popular belief”, “superstition” and magic have been used by modernizers in India and China to intervene in people’s daily practices and remove obstacles to the total transformation of their communities. These attempts have developed in different ways in India and China, but in neither case they have been entirely successful. After a historical discussion of heterodoxy,

messianic movements, and political protest the chapter delineates the transformation of popular religion in India and China under the influence of liberalization of the economy and globalization.

In chapter VI the discussion of anti-superstition movements in the previous chapter is taken up in a broader discussion of secularism as a political project with its own utopian elements. The great differences in the nature of that project in India and China are used to illustrate the historical specificity of the secular in relation to religion within different historical trajectories.

In chapter VII yoga, a system of bodily exercise and spiritual awakening is compared with taiji (shadow boxing) and qigong (bodily skills to connect to qi or primordial force). The argument here is that these forms of movement, while connected to notions of health, have strong political and social implications and can be important in nationalism. The chapter discusses, among others, the Falun Gong and the Ravi Ravi Shankar movement.

In the penultimate chapter the construction of minority and majority ethnicities, cultures, and religions is discussed. This is in the case of India the construction of a Hindu majority versus Muslim, Christian, and Sikh minorities, while in the case of China it is the construction of a Han majority versus a variety of recognized ethnic minorities, among whom the Hui Muslims are the most significant. The most important comparative case of a minority religion in India and China is Islam. The chapter looks at the position of Muslim minorities in India and China in relation to the nation-state and the ways in which the majority population feels the existence of these minorities as a threat. This involves a discussion of the relation between central authority and regional minorities.

In the conclusion some of the threads woven in the book are recapitulated and put in the context of current anthropological understanding of Indian and Chinese society.

# 《亚洲的现代灵性》之 导论

范笔德

本文是范笔德教授于2014年出版的专著《亚洲的现代灵性——中国与印度的灵性和世俗》的导论，本书的中文版即将在中国出版。

本书讨论印度和中国两个社会，以及它们如何被西方的帝国现代性（modernity）改变了。在我看来，现代性开始于19世纪，其特征是在政治上出现了民族—国家（nation-state），经济上是工业化，意识形态上是强调进步和解放。我所说的“帝国现代性imperial modernity”是在帝国主义条件下形成的现代性。本书是一部比较的历史社会学，并涉及人类学理论。比较的历史人类学这门学科，是由韦伯（Max Weber）创立的，并由其追随者所实践，其中最著名的有贝拉（Robert Bellah）和艾森斯塔特（S.N. Eisenstadt）。它一直与人类学理论以及由民族志所提供的洞察（尤其是格尔茨Clifford Geertz的论著）相关联。然而，大量精致的专业历史论著的巨大增长，使得学者们将自己于民族—国家，并将其作为分析的单位。此外，在比较的论著中对经济和政治的强调，使得人们难以追踪这种解释分析的线索。<sup>1</sup> 印度社会与中国社会的复杂性及其现代的转变十分巨大，而我们对它们的了解自韦伯所做的研究以来不断增长。这使得比较的项目难度加大，但是我确信，在专业化日益发展的时代里，假若比较的工作能够阐明那些被忽视的问题，那就十分重要，因为专家们往往关注的是单个的民族社会（national society）。民族形态（nation-form）本身就是一个全球形态<sup>2</sup>，它出现于19世纪，而不能将它理解为某个特定社会的产物。如今它是主导的社会形态，而印度和中国也已经逐渐发展为民族—国家。这就是为何要在民族—国家的层面上比较印度与中国，尽管这两个社会的内部差异极大，而且在历史条件下形成特定的民族形态。虽然印度与中国具有全球到处可见的、构成现代性的特征，但是它们所走的道路却是完全不同的。这些差异只有通过比较才能说明和理解。中国的民族形态与印度的民族形态是可比较的：它们都基于庞大的社会，其所具有的深厚的文化历史将广阔领土上且历史长久的众多民众统一起来。印度与中国在与西方帝国主义的相

<sup>1</sup> 在历史社会学领域中的一个重要概述中，索引中没有宗教的主题，而解释的探讨被宏观因果关系的探讨所取代；请参考 James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds., *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003)。

<sup>2</sup> 请参考Etienne Balibar, *The Nation Form: History and Ideology Review* (Fernand Braudel Center), Vol. 13, No. 3 (Summer, 1990), pp. 329-361.

互作用中形成其民族形态。<sup>3</sup> 本书所做的比较分析是民族形态的，它不是以非自然的或已经以深厚的文明的或种族的历史为前提条件的，但却是因历史条件而异的和碎片化的。本书所做的比较分析关注的是这两个民族—国家在全球（帝国的）背景中所走的不同道路，论证已经远远超越方法论上的民族主义。<sup>4</sup>

## 印度与中国

为什么要比较现代的印度与中国？与人们所假定的理由相反，比较并不是因为印度与中国之间长久的、连贯不断的相互作用。China与Mandarin来自梵语的cina（Chin之地）和mantri（使节）。这些外来的对“中国”（中央的王国）的基本术语表明，这两个文化延续至今的、长期且持续的相互作用的历史。然而，这种文化的相互作用仅限于公元后的第一个千年之间。而且这种十分重要并延续千年的交流，大部分仅限于佛教的传播。当佛教在新印度教的虔诚派运动以及伊斯兰教传播的影响下，或多或少在印度消失时，这种交流便逐渐结束。中国的佛教失去了与印度的联系，变成完全中国的佛教。显然，我们不能低估佛教对中国思想的巨大影响，也不能否认佛教起源于印度。中国的信仰（belief）概念也许来自佛教的思想（因此来自梵语shraddha），它使信仰的学说与实践在宗教修行中占有核心的地位。假若我们认识到来自印度思想的“信仰”的这种影响，对于了解中国的宗教实践十分重要，因为中国宗教并非像某些人强调的那样orthopraxy（而非orthodoxy）。<sup>5</sup> 人们虽然可以在今天中国的佛教寺院中听到梵语的颂唱（或咒语），而且每个识字的中国人人都知道16世纪吴承恩创作的《西游记》（其中的猴王受印度猴神哈鲁曼的启发，他去印度寻找智慧），但是与印度的相互作用早就停止了。

当然，始终有大量的、多得数不清的印度的、中国的和阿拉伯的商人在中国南海与印度洋的沿海从事贸易的故事，令人感兴趣的故事之一是：郑和（来自中国南方的穆斯林）在15世纪率领庞大的船队到过印度和非

<sup>3</sup> 请参考我对Aviel Roshwald *The Endurance of Nationalism. Ancient Roots and Modern Dilemmas*的评论 in *The American Historical Review*, 2008, 113, 4, 1100-1102.

<sup>4</sup> Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller在研究跨国移民的背景中，Ulrich Beck在研究越境风险的背景中，使用了这个术语，但我认为，从根本上说，现代社会科学及其问题与方法，深植于民族社会与民族传统；see Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 'Methodological Nationalism and Beyond:nation-state-building, migration and the social sciences' *Global Networks* 2, 4 (2002), 301-334; Ulrich Beck 'The cosmopolitan perspective: sociology of the second age of modernity' *British Journal of Sociology* 51 (2000), 79-105.

<sup>5</sup> Robert Hymes, "Some Thoughts on Asad, Geertz, 'Belief,' and Xin," in "Religion in China: Rethinking Indigenous and Imported Categories of Thought," paper presented at Fairbank East Asian Center, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 21-22 May 2005.



洲。<sup>6</sup> 尽管这些故事都十分重要，却不能表明中国与印度在公元后的第二个千年间，文明间的交流随着帝国和（或）宗教传统（诸如佛教）的扩展而增长。人们要认识到，在过去的几百年间，中国在远东的交流天地中占有主导地位。这个世界包括现在称为韩国、日本和越南等国。<sup>7</sup> 与此同时，还有一个交流的天地：印度一边与伊斯兰世界交往，另一边是与马来世界（包括现在称作也门、印度尼西亚和马来西亚等国家）的交往。<sup>8</sup> 这些交流和相互作用的天地，彼此在边缘地带有所接触（尤其在马来世界），但在核心地带并没有相互的影响。在16世纪以后，西方在海上扩张到整个地区，这些交流与相互作用逐渐由西方人所控制，并且将其与更大的全球交流体系连接起来。<sup>9</sup>

无论印度与中国之间在前现代世界中的交流和相互作用多么重要，都不是本书在此所做比较的基础。本书的关注点，是19世纪和20世纪，是帝国主义背景中的宗教与民族主义。本书将19世纪西方与印度和中国相互作用的帝国主义历史作为出发点。虽然就世界历史而言，这段历史比较短暂，但它是工业革命后西方形成主导的历史阶段，也是整个世界戏剧性转变的时期。<sup>10</sup> 西方的支配地位伴随着印度与中国的衰落。本书比较了印度与西方现代性之间的相互作用，以及中国与西方现代性之间的相互作用。

印度与中国的现代性是在与帝国主义形成的相互作用中产生的，这可以促进我们比较现代性之文化史的整体理解。这种比较不仅由于他们是大量的相邻社会（它们都有深厚的文化历史且对其周边社会产生深远影响）而富有成效，而且它们共有许多相似的和可比较的特征。从16世纪开始，印度由莫卧儿人（Mughals）统治，而中国由清朝统治。两个王朝的统治者都来自外部，与社会其他部分在许多方面截然不同，在莫卧儿人的特殊性中，伊斯兰教扮演了重要的作用，而在清朝方面则是满族人的族群性。两个王朝在19世纪都在西方的影响下被推翻了。印度在1856年兵变后被殖民化并被纳入英帝国，而清王朝在鸦片战争（1839—1842和1856—1860）中被根本地削弱，1911年被中华民国取代。中华民国并没有统治中国的整个疆域，而是在一系列的內战，叛乱

以及日本人的入侵中陷入破碎。1949年中国共产党战胜国民党（逃到台湾）建立中华人民共和国，大陆再次统一于一个政权之下。印度的现政权也是第二次世界大战和旧殖民体系崩溃的产物。1950年印度与巴基斯坦（成为穆斯林国家）分离，成立印度共和国。殖民统治给印度带来牢固的统一和制度的框架，但是独立直接导致疆域和民众因为宗教民族主义（religious nationalism）的缘故而分裂。

在1950年代后，印度与中国的历史展现出明显的相似性和差异性。印度有一个民主政府，由民众定期选举，自由选择和多党政体，但在大部分时间里由国大党（其特征是世俗的民主社会主义）执政。中国则由共产党执政。尽管这两个国家在1950年时的出发点非常相似，但两个社会的经济发展却极其不同。这两个农业社会都要走一条工业化的道路，中国在经历“大跃进”和“文化大革命”的惨重挫折后，有了连续30年的快速发展。与印度政府能做的和想做的相比，中国政府在共产主义的指导下对农业的等级社会（及其宗教诸方面）进行了根本的和成功的改造。这一点可以从识字率、相对贫困率、土地耕种权、性别关系等方面有直观的了解。<sup>11</sup> 两个政府都有自给自足的政策，对世界市场相对封闭，但是这两个国家在1980年代都在经济领域搞自由化并向世界市场开放。在印度，这些经济政策是在充满活力的公民社会和出版自由的公共领域里贯彻的，而在中国，这些政策是在强有力政府的主导下实现的。

在比较现代印度与中国时有许多问题，虽然要用社会科学的话语讨论，但却很少成为欧美学界的核心话题，至少做的非常不够。在印度与中国，民主与权威的问题及其对经济发展的影响，都市化与乡村工业化的问题，中产阶级兴起的问题，这些全都是比较社会学的分析例证。人们可以预料此类分析随着印度与中国日益成为全球经济的中心而日益增多。然而，还可以预料的是，在这种未来的比较社会学中重点将是政治经济而非文化与宗教。经济分析起主导作用，乃是世界历史之近期发展所经历的。<sup>12</sup>

从本书提出的观点来看，帝国相遇对文化与宗教上的影响恰恰值得做比较分析。文化与宗教不是边缘的，而是帝国现代性之构成的核心。在此我们不想提出一种前后连贯的和包容一切的模式，能够将两个社会的方方面面一网打尽。尽管人们需要叙述的连贯性，但在某种程度上也应为文化进程的碎片化性质留有空间。叙述的连贯性要遵循指导我们分析的核心观点与论证。

<sup>6</sup> Tansen Sen, *Buddhism, Diplomacy, and Trade: The Realignment of Sino-Indian Relations, 600–1400* (Delhi: Manohar, 2003) .

<sup>7</sup> Alexander Woodside, *Lost Modernities: China, Vietnam, Korea, and the Hazards of World History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006) .

<sup>8</sup> Engseng Ho, *The Graves of Tarim: Genealogy and Mobility across the Indian Ocean* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006) .

<sup>9</sup> Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450–1680, Vol. I: The Lands below the Winds* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988) and *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450–1680, Vol. II: Expansion and Crisis* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993) .

<sup>10</sup> Jürgen Osterhammel, *Die Verwandlung der Welt* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2009) .

<sup>11</sup> 关于印度与中国经济的比较研究，请参看 Pranab Bardhan, *Awakening Giants, Feet of Clay: Assessing the Rise of China and India* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010) .

<sup>12</sup> Emanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*, 4 vols. (1974–2011) ; Kenneth Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001) .

## 东方的灵性

在帝国的相遇中，印度与中国的文化逐渐被看作“灵性的”（spiritual）而与西方的物质主义不同并形成对比。这个“灵性”（spirituality）的概念，本书既从西方普救说（universalistic）的谱系上，亦从其应用到翻译和解释印度与中国的传统上加以批评。何为“灵性”？这是个学者尽量避免使用的术语，因为它很含糊。人们很容易将其看作个边缘的术语并只用于理智生活的边缘，例如我们这个时代的“新时代运动”（New Age Movement）。我认为这不是个正确的路径，“灵性”实际上是我们理解现代社会的核心术语。同时，它必然反映此类概念的本质。尤其是当它与“宗教”（religion）和“信仰”（belief）等术语相遇时，呈现出概念上的困难。显而易见，它在概念上的不清晰和不确定性，对想使用它的人很有用。它的意味超出它的定义。灵性为宗教概念（完全与宗教体制捆绑在一起）的普遍化迈出关键的一步。“宗教”这个术语在现代欧洲思想中，已经发展成一个跨文化的、全球的概念，覆盖了极其多样的传统和实践。宗教概念的普遍化展开，在自然宗教（Natural Religion）和理性宗教（Rational religion）的观念中有其根基，它是在欧洲宗教战争和欧洲在世界上其他地方扩张之后兴起的。这种发展中的里程碑是基督教在与其他宗教的关联中相对化了：如18世纪 Picart 与 Bernard 出版了《世界宗教礼仪》。<sup>13</sup>

我们在此讨论的“灵性”概念，涉及到另一个同样强有力的现代概念，它经常被看作它的对立面，即“世俗”（secular）。我将澄清关于灵性这个新视角的基础：不是使之成为阻碍世俗现代性的一种边缘形式，而是显示其在现代进程中的核心地位和有关世俗的新视角，从而展现其深深卷入巫术与宗教的程度。

在19世纪，“宗教”的概念已经成为落后或取代之叙事的组成部分，这在世俗化的社会学理论中被系统化了。超越的等级秩序逐渐被转换成现代的本有特性（immanence）：合法性在于民众统治，并以市场、公共领域和民族—国家为特征，这改变了体制宗教的作用，在某些历史例证中被边缘化（但在其他情形中不是），与此同时，却为灵性开放了空间。灵性摆脱了宗教之组织化、体制化的藩篱，因为基督教的教会和教派的模式不能应用于大多数非基督教的环境。由此来看，灵性概念在社会学的模式建构中更具有跨文化的可变性和灵活性。所有这些用于此背景中的概念（宗教，巫术，世俗，灵性），或在19世纪末出现或在那时被改变，这既见之于中国的反宗教的共产主义，亦见之于印度的宗教的（印度教的与伊斯兰教的）和灵性的（甘地主义的）民族主义。

<sup>13</sup> Lynn Hunt, Margaret C. Jacob, and Wijnand Mijnhardt, *The Book That Changed Europa: Picart and Bernard's Religious Ceremonies of the World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

## 宗教与民族主义

本书的核心关注是阐明印度与中国的民族主义者对宗教之理解的差异。换句话说，是从比较的视角研究民族主义（nationalism）与宗教的关系。印度与中国的民族主义都具有进步、理性、平等和反对帝国主义的观念，但是宗教在印度的和中国的民族主义者的意象中具有非常不同的地位。简言之，宗教在印度的民族主义中是一个有价值的方面，相反，在中国的民族主义中，宗教被看作障碍。我认为宗教在现代性中定位的这种差异，可以借助比较印度与中国被帝国现代性改变的不同方式得以理解。正如我在以前讨论英国与印度的论著中所阐述的，帝国的相互作用是构成帝国现代性的关键。<sup>14</sup> 在本书中，我将讨论西方的或欧美的帝国主义，重点是英帝国主义，因为它在全球称霸直到第二次世界大战前。宗教与民族主义之间的关联，对于印度与中国的现代性都是构成要素，这是全书讨论的总问题。

现阶段的全球化已推动我们超越民族主义的历史，但是世界史往往强调经济与政治，并建立一种世俗主义的淡化宗教之建构作用的风尚。<sup>15</sup> 我想在此提出一种相互作用的历史观：强调欧美（也称作“西方”）为一方，印度与中国为另一方的相互作用，并关注我所说的“宗教—巫术—世俗—灵性”的“结构体链”（syntagmatic chain）。“结构体”（syntagmatic）这个术语来自索绪尔（Saussurean）的语言学，我在此以非语言学的方式使用它，意味着这些术语是有关联的，彼此互属，但不能彼此取代。它们离开了彼此关联便没有独立的固定意义，因此不能简单的将它们分别定义。它们在历史上是一起出现的，彼此必然包含，而在功能上则是力量（power）变动场域中的一些节点。这个结构体链在民族主义之现代性的意象中占有关键的位置。

显然，本书对宗教的强调并非否定资本主义历史和政治发展的重要性。然而问题在于强调经济发展实际上是强调现代化的历史占据了世界历史的中心舞台，亦即强调在这个历史中，目的论的展演了世俗化对付宗教的故事。我在本书中提出的是一种非世俗化的反向叙述（non-secularist counter-narrative）。在某种意义上我的叙述是世俗的，因为我的立场是对宗教无宗派之见的。当我提出现代与宗教之间没有什么对立时，我不是立足于宗教的观点。的确是有一些宗教的论证反对现代性的某些形式，恰如有些世俗的论证反对宗教的某些形式。有些论证有必要从社会学的视角加以研究，因为它们本身只有在特定的世俗条件下才是可能的。社会科学出现在现代民族—国家（在许多关键的方面是一个世俗国家）的框架里。简言之，我对宗教的论证不会导致政府将我作为异端分子而加以迫害。另一方面，

<sup>14</sup> Peter van der Veer, *Imperial Encounters*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.

<sup>15</sup> A good example is C. A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2004).

我的论述在下述意义上又是非世俗主义的：世俗主义（secularism）和世俗化（secularization）不是理所当然的，而是要看作一种方案（project），是一种需要联系其他政治方案加以研究的方案。这往往难以做到，因为世俗主义无论在亚洲还是在欧美，都已经成为现代知识界世界观的重要组成部分，但是肯定有必要使自己与世俗主义的知识方案保持距离。我在精神上并不像某些印度学者（如Ashis Nandy和T.N. Madan）那样采取总体批评世俗政府的立场。<sup>16</sup> 我想说明的是“宗教—巫术—世俗—灵性”是现代性的一个重要组成部分。将它看作一个经验观察到的事实而非意识形态的陈述，能够更好地理解当代社会。

## 比较的框架

要理解我所提出的“宗教—巫术—世俗—灵性”的结构体链，就需要一个明确的比较框架。实际上，社会的和文化的分析总是在比较的框架内进行。只不过某些人深刻地意识到这一点，某些人稍差一些。然而总的来说，对于某一论题的探讨如何依赖对已经存在的文献进行论证和比较，对于将术语运用于完全不同的历史情境以及由此暗含的比较（如中产阶级，如宗教），对于在研究过程中我们将现在与过去相比较、将此情境与其他情境相比较等问题，我们的反思还远远不够。说一个人要成为汉学家、印度学家或非洲学家，只要他是某个领域或主题的专家，具备足够的语言的和文化的技能，就足以把握那个主题，似乎并不需要经常不断地反省学科与主题间的关联，这尽管具有某种自信，但却站不住脚。

Louis Dumont与David Pocock在1950年代末提出了“印度社会学”的概念，意味着将印度的研究置于比较的框架中。<sup>17</sup> Dumont与Pocock的印度社会学中贯穿的原则，如同其他任何社会的社会学一样，乃是比较社会学的组成部分，因此可以发展出一种知识形态，使之不会命中注定地受制于民族（主义）的框架。印度社会学，也再次如同其他的社会学，产生于一个民族的空间内，并且是在其内发展起来的，但是比较的社会学可以使之超越那个框架。

然而，在发展比较社会学时会有一些严肃的问题。例如，在Dumont的论著中，种姓研究是对阶级做比较分析时的关键因素。但是，在普通社会学中有一种强烈的趋势，它简单地假设种姓（尽管是印度社会的本质特征）只是一个特殊的案例，不能用来阐明其他的社会，因此或多或少地被忽视。在某种程度上，这种趋势又被

将种姓或阶级作为印度社会的隐喻而强化了。<sup>18</sup> 一个相似的令人遗憾的趋势见之于世俗化（secularization）与世俗主义（secularism）的讨论：世俗成为现代社会的一个隐喻。甚至在新近的对于现代化与世俗化之西方模式的批评中，人们只能看到个别的与非西方社会的比较，同时共产主义世界在这些讨论中完全不见踪影。<sup>19</sup> 西方社会学的普世主张所依据的假设，隐含在现代化的范式之中。因为第二次世界大战后，印度在西方的发展中处于相对边缘的地位，所以想从印度获得发现和理论从而发展比较社会学的兴趣不大。只是到了全球化的现阶段，比较印度与中国（作为新兴市场及其在全球场景中的作用），才再次引发那些对现代、工业社会感兴趣的社会科学家的关注。

全球化的当下形态使得研究这些跨国相互作用的不同形式更为重要，并通过定义而避开民族—国家的比较框架。某些人也许认为全球化使得比较社会学成为多余之举，因为全球的力量正在同时地塑造各地的社会，而这些力量恰恰是需要研究的。但是另一些人认为，它们是以不同方式塑造社会的，这些方式需要比较。当然，IT革命在世界范围内改变了社会，但是这种革命在欧洲和印度是以不同方式发生的，甚至在印度内部也是以极为不同的方式发生的，例如班加罗尔（Bangalore）<sup>20</sup>和勒克瑙（Lucknow）<sup>21</sup>就十分不同。在全球化的早期，帝国主义同时塑造了英国与印度，但却完全不同，这些差异与相同点需要做比较的分析。比较需要关联到跨国流动具有了日益增长的重要性，关联到民族—国家的转变及治理（governance）的跨国诸形态。民族—国家并没有衰落，但正在经受世界经济之全球化带来的重要改变。跨国的“移民”（diasporas）<sup>22</sup>在这些转变中具有的不同作用，成为比较的组成部分。例如1978年中国改革开放后，“移民”在中国发展中的作用与印度之“移民”（仅以来自海外“移民者”的直接投资为例）的作用极为不同，而且中国的模式正在启发印度政府改进政策以吸引“移民者”的投资。

在比较社会学的发展中，最重要的缺陷之一是人们所做的比较，几乎普遍的是以某个社会与作为理想类型（ideal-typical）的欧美现代性模式相比较。但是将现代

<sup>16</sup> Ashish Nandy, “An Anti-Secularist Manifesto,” *India International Quarterly* 22, 1 (Spring 1995), 35–64; T. N. Madan, *Modern Myths, Locked Minds: Secularism and Fundamentalism in India* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997).

<sup>17</sup> Louis Dumont and David Pocock, ‘For A Sociology of India’, *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, 1960.

<sup>18</sup> Arjun Appadurai, “Putting Hierarchy in its Place,” *Rereading Cultural Anthropology*. G. E. Marcus (Ed.). Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1992.

<sup>19</sup> There is some work on secularism in India, but hardly on secularism in China: Donald E. Smith: *India as a Secular State*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. Rajeev Bhargava (ed), *Secularism and Its Critics*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998.

<sup>20</sup> 印度南部著名城市，近年来以其计算机软件业闻名世界，被誉为亚洲的硅谷。——译者注

<sup>21</sup> 印度北方邦首府，为北印度仅次于德里的第二大城市。——译者注

<sup>22</sup> 一般将Diasporas译作“离散”，特指历史上的犹太人被迫流离失所，但现代意义上的diasporas已有主动之意，故译为“移民”。参见赵一凡等主编《西方文论关键词》，外语教学与研究出版社，2006年，第113-125页。——译者注

印度与现代中国相互比较，能够推进比较研究。这并非暗含着一种简单的欧洲“地方化”，虽然欧美在印度与中国的现代性形成中起关键作用，但是要理解相似的挑战和影响为何在印度与中国形成了极为不同的社会。<sup>23</sup> 在现代化的范式中，关于现代性的本质有太多的争论。尽管某些人强调只有一种现代性并起源于西方（它被输出到东方并形成回应），但是其他人更多的强调资本主义现代性在没有帝国主义作用下的本土发展。近十年来，有越来越多的声音主张多种多样的现代性，这不仅使西方现代性的本质及其作用变得多种多样，而且接受西方影响的历史也变得多种多样。<sup>24</sup> 文化相遇的性质在解释中具有越来越强的动态特征，这些相遇在创造新的文化形态中也成为有益的。这种多样性不可能置于一种定向的解释框架里。而要充分地认知变化和多样性，就不能没有比较的眼光。

比较主要地不是比较社会或事件，也不是跨社会的制度安排，而是反思我们的概念框架，反思相互作用的历史，这种反思建构了我们的研究对象。例如，人们想研究印度与中国的教会与国家（church-state）的关系，但是人们必须对此持有批评的反思：这种研究已经预先假设了某种教会那样的组织，以及西方是以世俗国家的核心地位，这些会影响我们对印度和中国发展的分析。批评的反思往往导致人们主张印度与中国（以及非西方的其他社会）应当按照其自有的术语来理解，而不能按照西方的术语来理解。然而，印度与中国的术语已经是在与西方学术的关联中被解释和翻译。此外，这些翻译和解释已经成为其与西方相互作用之长久历史的组成部分。在印度，好的方面是英语虽然是外来语，但已成为本土语言；而在中国，好的方面是尽管主导观念是认为各种事物都源于古代中国，但共产主义实际上并不能归源于宋代，所以任何（往往是民族主义者）在内部与外部间划出明确界线的努力，在调查研究中都是欺骗性的。除此之外，如今全球化在这个比较领域中已有更多的演进模式，并被现代媒体广泛的民主化了，以至于几乎是在比较的意义上，每个人都间接地接触其他人，每个人都在观察其他人。中国人与印度人都在以自己与欧洲人和美国人比较，如今，印度人又越来越将自己与中国人相比较（更不要说反向的比较）。我们今天无论写些什么，都会进入这些日益增长的、随处可见的、流行的比较方式的轨道。

因此，比较不是将两个或多个不同的社会进行相对简单的并列和比较，而是对观念网络做复杂的反思，这些观念既是我们研究社会的基础，也是这些社会自身的形态。所以，反思总是一种双重的行动。

尽管在考察印度与西方以及中国与西方之间的相互作用方面，已有大量的文献，但几乎都没有对这些相互

作用做出比较分析。印度学者关注西方，中国学者做同样的事情，但是两者都没有观察彼此的社会。在印度极其缺乏有关中国的学问，在中国也极其缺乏有关印度的学问。陈腐的彼此成见比比皆是，然而更深层的了解彼此的历史和社会却凤毛麟角。令人惊讶的是，印度与中国这两个具有众多人口和悠久历史的亚洲大国，在根本上影响着它们周边的社会。在1800年以前，它们不仅在其地区居主导地位，而且也是世界经济的主要引擎。这个图景正越来越被印度与中国的经济新发展所确认。然而在近二个世纪，印度和中国在与西方的相遇中一直遭受西方力量的霸权与思维模式。对彼此社会和历史的相对忽视，可以用西方现代性对亚洲的巨大影响来解释，包括西方学术机构与研究的主导作用。西方社会一直被当作亚洲发展变化和现代化理论的楷模，社会科学界长时期的主导范式，西方社会也一直运用其学术力量强化这种普遍意义。如今这种思想的许多部分已在修改，这部分地由于中国经济在过去20年间突飞猛进（印度稍逊一筹），部分地由于现代化理论的可信度已丧失许多。这导致人们强调东西方之间的根本差异，尤其是新加坡（亚洲最现代化和最西方的城市）长期执政的领导人李光耀所倡导的“亚洲价值”。然而，由于这些“亚洲价值”基本上是“东亚价值”，因而“东方”这个词对比较印度与中国助益不大。

另一个与比较印度和中国相关的障碍，是东方学者所说的差异不可逾越的概念。印度与中国在18和19世纪欧洲人的意象中，代表着完全的“他者”（Other）。此类意象可能是十分积极的，如“中国风”（Chinoiserie）和“印度迷”（Indomania），但也可能是非常消极的，如对缠足和寡妇自焚等“残忍习俗”的厌恶。在前殖民时代，对印度和中国的理解基本上是有限的和异国风情的，并非没有平等的意味。<sup>25</sup> 这不同于非洲和大洋洲的社会，他们很轻易的被描绘成“原始的”，在人类进化的阶段上，亚洲社会被看作（而且继续被看作）文明的，潜在的与西方文明平等。随着现代力量在东方的扩张，这种理解被较严谨的知识，有必要统治这些地区的观念所取代，而且有了文明优越感的新意义。这种态度往往基于具体的差异，其典型的说法如Kipling，“东方是东方，西方是西方，两者就从未相遇”。对印度的殖民统治，使得印度和印度人不像中国那样成为不能得到的“他者”。特别是英语在印度的传播，大部分的印度精英是讲英语的，这使得文化的对话较为容易。然而中国，尽管有着激进的现代化，但却依然是个“他者”，福柯（Foucault）在谈论Jorge Luis Borges之假冒的中国百科全书时有句名言：中国的编目方法基本上是不能理解的。<sup>26</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

<sup>24</sup> Shmuel Eisenstadt, ed., *Multiple Modernities* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002).

<sup>25</sup> David Mungello, *The Great Encounter of China and the West, 1500–1800* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009).

<sup>26</sup> Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things* (New York: Pantheon, 1970) xv.

## 比较与翻译

严格说来，中国的语言以及汉字及音调，为西方提供了完全异己之文明的意象。梵语和北印度主要的现代语言，都属于印欧语系，因此在语言上（和种族上）看作是与西方文明相关联的。而中国则完全不同，19世纪的语言学家，如William Dwight Whitney在1868年提出，汉语几乎就不是一种语言，因为它没有语法结构。<sup>27</sup> Wilhelm von Humboldt在比较语言学基础教材*On the Variety of Human languages* (1836)中指出，“在已知所有的语言中，汉语和梵语是根本对立的……汉语和梵语位于已知语言的两极，在它们如何适应思想的发展方面也许没什么可比较的，但在内在的连贯性和系统的完美执行方面，却是确定无疑的”。<sup>28</sup> 因此，梵语是一种完美的语言（sanskrit意为“完美”），其完美的语法起源于印欧语系，欧洲的各种语言都是其枝蔓而已。印欧语系的人在19世纪经常被称作印度—雅利安人，意味着欧洲语言是一种完全不同于闪族语言（尤其是希伯来语）和汉语的独特遗产。梵语在语法上的完美表明它是印度—雅利安种族的原始天才创造的。尽管印度人作为一个种族衰退了，需要其雅利安兄弟的殖民化，但是闪族人和中国人则是完全的“他者”。

这些既迷人又复杂的关于语言和种族的理论已经逐渐不足为信了，特别是在第二次世界大战以后，但是关于语言和思想的问题，关于普遍性与差异性的问题，依然与我们同在。核心的问题是文化的翻译与解释。事实依然是，现代性是个普遍化的进程，它必须既要翻译又要转换传统的观念世界。严格说来，这是在一个权力的历史中产生相似性与差异的过程，此为本书的主题。关键概念之正确翻译的困难，似乎难以逾越。

I. A. Richards是1960年代以前英国最重要的文学家，他对美国的主要影响是*New Criticism*，他在书中阐述了他在访问中国期间遇到的问题。<sup>29</sup> 然而他决心要解决它，因为他认识到，错误的信息传达引发了第一次世界大战，并且拖垮了他那一代人中的许多人。他认为，解决文化的误解是语言学家和文学家的重要任务之一，这使得他与C. K. Ogden合作了*The Meaning of Meaning*，并促使Ogden将*Basic English*项目引入中国。*Basic English*是逻辑学家Ogden的发明，它能够让不会讲英语的人可以将其作为第二语言使用。这不是像世界语那样属于人工语言，而是以自然的英语为基础。它包括不超过850个单词和18个动词，因此很容易学会。Richards在其*Mencius on the Mind*中指出，理解了孟子运用语言交流

意义的方式（那对西方思维来说是完全陌生的），也就把握住世界交流之未来的关键，把握住中华文明延续的关键。<sup>30</sup> 这两个项目，即在洛克菲勒基金会（Rockefeller Foundation）的帮助下在中国推广*Basic English*和翻译《孟子》都没有成功。但是重要的在于Richards以及朋友和同事Bertrand Russell与T.S. Elliott认识到，尽管观念世界之间的鸿沟难以逾越，但作为战争起因的错误的信息传达，必须不惜代价地加以避免。

这种观点并非乍听起来那么古怪。在鸦片战争前英国与中国之间最有启发性的争论，是在贸易谈判中如何使用“夷”这个词，Lydia Liu对此做了令人惊奇的分析。<sup>31</sup> 1858年的《天津条约》第51条说：“双方同意，今后在中国当局（无论是首都的还是各省的）发出的官方文件中，都不应再将‘夷’（未开化人）这个字运用于英国政府或国王陛下的属臣”。条约第50条说：“女王陛下的外交部或领事馆给中国当局发出的正式照会，今后应当以英文书写。目前虽附有中文版，但是万一在中英文在意义有所不同时，英国政府将以英文表达的意义为准。这个规定也适用于现在的贸易谈判，中文文本需以英文原意加以仔细纠正”。令人吃惊的是，这是将语言的要求写入双边贸易协定中。<sup>32</sup> 但是同样令人吃惊的是，英国人却想固定地将“未开化人”（barbarian）翻译成“夷”，然而中国人用这个字表示“非汉族人”，而英国人却认为它是不尊敬人的符号。在较早的回应英国人反对使用“夷”这个字中，海军将领吴启泰（Wu Qitai）引用孟子的话说，舜是东方的夷，文王是西方的夷，两者都是后世王者的楷模，这个词用于英国怎么就错了呢？在此不是翻译是否正确的问题，因为在中国“夷”这个词有非常复杂的历史，恰如“未开化人”在英国也有其复杂的历史。因此问题成为中国当局与英国当局一系列相互作用的一部分，其核心涉及到荣誉和尊敬的观念，这在鸦片战争之际达到顶峰。正是这种有害的关联，促使Richards努力创建翻译的可能性，以便在差异之间架起桥梁。

显然，文化翻译的概念构成比较分析的基础。Ernest Gellner提出一个重要的批评观点：文化翻译不能过度地宽厚（基本的看法是原始的无意义在翻译中还是原始的无意义）。阿萨德（Talal Asad）以Godfrey Lienhardt提出的概念作为其出发点：“描述他者的问题，如一个偏远部落的成员如何思考，在很大程度上是随着翻译开始出现的，即要使原始思维在语言中和在实际生活中如同在我们自己的生活中一样明显的保持一致”。他由此

27 Haun Saussy, “Always Multiple Translation, or, How the Chinese Language Lost Its Grammar,” in *Tokens of Exchange: The Problem of Translation in Global Circulations*, ed. Lydia Liu (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), 107-127.

28 Cited in Haun Saussy, “Always Multiple Translation,” 115.

29 Rodney Koeneke, *Empires of the Mind: I. A. Richards and Basic English in China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).

30 I. A. Richards, *Mencius on the Mind: Experiments in Multiple Definition* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1932).

31 This passage is based on Lydia H. Liu, *The Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in Modern World Making* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).

32 See B. S. Cohn, *An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987).

进一步指出，翻译的问题总是发生在权力的历史中。<sup>33</sup> 语言是不平等的，尤其是在形成可用的和普遍的知识过程中。因此文化翻译需要考察内在于其中的这种不平等和权力关系。这意味着文化分析与比较本身就是一种权力的产物。这种认识并不会导致瘫痪，而是有可能导致对这种权力作用的领悟。社会科学是起源于西方的现代学科，在社会科学语言中对生活世界的翻译，是西方文化权力的要素之一。然而社会科学语言的普遍化，也暗含着这种知识形态要被印度和中国以及其他地方的从业者所运用，并以之理解他们自己的社会。今天的问题已不是人类学家访问一个不会读写的人群，而是一种新状态：日常生活中的文化接触（得益于国际间的移民）在世界各地（主要是在西方）日益增长，社会科学诸学科在西方将自己与之比较的地方发展起来。

## 文明研究

比较的历史社会学研究，不同于由韦伯发展而成的、影响较大的模式，即不是假设文明是可以比较的诸个单元，而是考察西方的帝国力量与印度社会和中国社会之间的一系列相互作用，以比较历史的选择及后果。

文明（civilization）的概念是有问题的，因为它很难历史化，而且模糊了民族主义将目的论的民族历史说成是文明进程结果的取向。然而，我们不能忽视由韦伯及其追随者对文明的理论理解及其可能变成模式等待对宗教研究的巨大影响。韦伯对西方现代性的理解，基于欧洲宗教理性化的理论，这一理论还比较了印度与中国的理性化进程。这一理论激励着以S.N. 艾森斯塔特为首的学者群体，他们提出文明（宗教）的深层历史导致它们在现代性方面的差异。Eisenstadt认为超越（transcendental）与平凡（mundane）间的分离（而非破裂），第一次出现在大约同时期的许多文明中，即基督教纪元前的一千年间。<sup>34</sup> 这些文明包括古代以色列，古希腊，早期基督教，琐罗亚斯德教的伊朗，早期中华帝国，印度教与佛教的文明等。从社会学上说，这种发展是出现了知识精英（如儒生，婆罗门，佛教的僧伽等），他们想按照超越的幻想塑造世界。此外，Eisenstadt和他的同事（人类学家Tambiah和Redfield的理论）提出，在此过程中还发展出一个有神圣中心的庞大网络和大传统（Great Tradition）。这种文化思想的革命出现在所有这些文明中，时间集中在大约公元前500年的很短的区间内，哲学家亚斯贝尔斯（Karl Jaspers）将此称作“轴心时代的突破点”，他认为在这

个时期出现了用以普遍的历史的自我理解的共享构架。<sup>35</sup> 在这种理论中，核心理念在于轴心时代出现一种新的跨文化的强调：存在着较高的超越的道德秩序，同时伴随有拯救与不朽的问题。然而不同的文明对此问题的表述各有不同。哲学家和社会理论家Charles Taylor称之为“大显现”（Great Disembedding），意指“轴心的宗教”（Axial Religions）至少以某种方式被植入了社会秩序，宇宙论和人性善。而在以前的宗教中，“人类行动者体现在社会中，社会体现在宇宙中，宇宙与神圣合一”，在Taylor看来，轴心时代的转变至少在某一点上打破了这个链条。<sup>36</sup>

印度宗教（印度教、耆那教、佛教）中的弃世（renunciation）观念，从原则上说是这种显现的佳证，因为弃世者离弃社会，在某些激进的看法中，甚至会以涅槃（Nirvana）离弃宇宙。然而，人们应当牢记的是，每一种显现都是特定的。超越的（transcendental）/本有的（immanent）这一对子（dyad），在每一种文明中，都以其特定的方式成形，不能被归入一个抽象认知的（理想类型）的普遍对子。印度的超越问题内在地与其特有的种姓等级制度相关联。一方面，种姓社会处在婆罗门祭司（以及吠陀的火祭仪式）的庇护之下，另一方面，在弃世者的推动下，又形成轴心时代的宗教（奥义书，佛教，耆那教）。两者难解难分，所以Taylor说要从其所被显现的东西中了解“显现”的意义。无论在印度如何创造性的将弃世观念运用于各种社会的和宗教的创新，最终都没有根本上动摇等级社会（尽管有所挑战）。弃世观念的出现在世界历史中肯定具有重要的意义，但人们在概括其本质时要避免忽略其与特定社会的关联。与此相似，假若人们将孔子包括在“轴心时代的突破”中（如雅斯贝尔斯和艾森斯塔特所做的），那么人们必须认识到，他及其弟子们的说教发展了一种世界观，其所创造的超越的“天”与本有的世界形成一个对子，但他们同时又强调其终极的统一性，社会—政治秩序是嵌入其中。印度的弃世者不同于祭司和国王，但在中国没有弃世者，国王—祭司体现了“天命”。遗憾的是，艾森斯塔特将“轴心时代的突破”的观念普遍化，他认为整体上可以假定（假若不是陈词滥调的话）印度教与佛教是完全超越的（彼岸的）探索拯救，而儒教是完全此岸的探索。<sup>37</sup>

雅斯贝尔斯<sup>38</sup>与艾森斯塔特的轴心时代框架，对社会哲学家Charles Taylor关于西方现代性的论著有着深刻的影响，他认为西方现代性的特征在于是个“世俗的时代”，他并没有预先假定（例如）什么是中国文明的演

33 Godfrey Lienhardt, "Modes of Thought," in *The Institutions of Primitive Society*, ed. E. Evans-Pritchard (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1954), 97, cited in Talal Asad, *Genealogies of Religion* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 172.

34 S. N. Eisenstadt, ed., *The Origins and Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986).

35 Karl Jaspers, *Von Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1955), 14.

36 Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, UK: Harvard University Press, 2008), 152.

37 Eisenstadt, *The Origins and Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations*, 16.

38 雅斯贝尔斯 (Karl Jaspers, 1883–1969)，德国哲学家，精神病学家，存在主义的主要代表。——译者注



进。对此他在书中提到，“人们经常可以听到这样的判断：中国的帝国社会早已是‘世俗的’，在西方概念中起巨大作用的本有/超越的二分法，在中国就没有对应物”。<sup>39</sup> Taylor认为，轴心时代的本有/超越的对子（彼此互属），在17世纪以来的欧洲思想中是根本分裂的，这种分裂导致将本有的看作正常的，将超越的看作人类的发明。但在中国，“此世”（This-worldly）与西方的“世俗”（secular）意味并非完全等同。所有这些根本上属于韦伯的论证，将文明的单元本质化了，然而它们只是比较而没有深入研究这些社会的碎片和矛盾的历史，因而往往对那些不能轻易放进本有/超越框架的思想的影响估计不足，诸如在印度和中国出现的许多宗教运动，都强调存在的合一而否定差异。

韦伯的历史社会学比较了欧洲、印度和中国的理性化进程，他的结论与黑格尔的历史哲学有许多共同点，他们都是着眼于西方的个体的和集体的理性（精神）发展，但认为它们不能在东方发展，因为在印度与中国都缺乏个性。在黑格尔的论证中，印度的种姓体系剥夺了民众的个体理性，而中国则是压倒一切的国家权力。<sup>40</sup> 引人注目的是，这种基本的概念框架至今依然见之于我们对印度与中国之差异的理解。让我们看看当代的两个例证。经济学家Pranab Bardhan运用民主这个词解释印度与中国的治理问题，他注意到印度社会能够不断地为许多问题动员起来，但是政府却缺乏核心的权威，而在中国则正好相反。这似乎只是简单地重复黑格尔的观察：中国的一切是政府，印度的一切是社会。<sup>41</sup> 人类学家James Watson在对中国仪式的敏锐反思中指出，中国的政府统一了中国仪式实践的形式，因而创造出文化的统一性，相比之下，印度则没有仪式的统一。在Watson看来，人们在印度见不到国家管理的万神殿，种姓意识形态也不能提供一种统一的文化。<sup>42</sup> 总之，中国全都是政府的统一，印度全都是宗教与社会的分化。<sup>43</sup>

要评估黑格尔的主张有多大的普遍性，人们需要比较印度与中国的国家形成。在前于现代政治构成的帝国时期，即印度被殖民之前和中华民国之前，那时的两个帝国都是由“外来者”（针对于印度人与汉人的文化而言）统治的，莫卧儿人信仰伊斯兰教，而满人却同化于

儒家世界观。这两个帝国都有内在的结构张力：满人一汉人和穆斯林—印度教徒。当人们考察当代社会时，需要避免将共产党执政的当代政府解释为代表了中国国家权力的古代观念，因为这没有体现前现代的帝国所具有的碎片性质，也没有体现在清朝垮台和共产党执政之间半个世纪“军阀”混战的重要性。与此相似，以种姓作为印度社会的本质来解释印度政府的虚弱，也是低估了在英国统治下种姓制度的巨大变化，以及后殖民时期印度民主制的作用。

韦伯的见解尽管是细微的和真诚的，但其历史分析却没有超越东方的缺位，换句话说，东方没有发展出现代性，与现代西方有本质的不同。黑格尔以及马克思认识到欧洲在转变东方中的历史作用，但只是简单地理解为是一种外部创造变化的推动作用。东方与西方相互作用的历史，展现出帝国相遇中的碎片化与矛盾的性质，以及造就双边相互作用新形式的途径。这不是为提供更多“地方历史”的借口，而是为现代性的“相互作用的历史”张目。人们会继续运用构成社会之核心的传统以及解释缘何如此的方式构成民族历史的文明内核，但与此同时，人们必须认识到这两个传统的矛盾的与支离破碎的性质。

## 受伤的文明

帝国与西方的相遇，用V.S. Naipau的话说，在印度与中国形成了“受伤的文明”。<sup>44</sup> 当然，首要的是西方军事上的优势，经济增长与技术进步，这些是挫败与羞辱印度与中国当权者的直接原因。但是更深层的是，与西方现代性的相遇，留下了比较持久的伤害，它促发某种卑微和落后的情感，伤自尊的情感。这些情感即使在民族独立和经济显著增长之后，还存在着很长时间，可以说至今犹存。

文化中造成这些伤害的帝国现代性相抵触的重要领域之一，是艺术创作。这个领域在许多方面与宗教相互交织在一起，因为意象（image）、偶像（icon）、形象（imagery）、艺术表现，以及反偶像崇拜（iconoclasm），对于宗教的虔诚实践来说，都是至关重要的。我们在第2章还会看到，艺术与灵性观念有深层的关联。在讨论帝国相遇时，人们却很少谈论这个文化的战场，可能是因为伤害如此之深。印度与中国的艺术，从工笔画与书法到雕塑和建筑，不仅丰富，而且在技术的许多方面优于西方艺术，特别是应用艺术，诸如织物与瓷器。随着本土帝国的衰败，它们不仅失去了资助，而且更意味深长的是，它们失去了政治优越感和文化权力。尽管西方与中国的、尤其是日本的艺术之间有些相互作用，有些西方的绘画为东方艺术所吸引并在自身整体结构内给予它一席之地而不是仅限于模仿：如梵

<sup>39</sup> Charles Taylor, See above in biblio.

<sup>40</sup> Pranab Bardhan, “India and China: Governance Issues and Development,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 68, no. 2 (2009), 347–357.

<sup>41</sup> Pranab Bardhan, *India and China: Governance Issues and Development*. The *Journal of Asian Studies*, Volume 68, Issue 02, May 2009, pp 347–357.

<sup>42</sup> James Watson, “Rites or Beliefs: The Construction of a Unified Culture in Late Imperial China,” in *China’s Quest for National Identity*, ed. Lowell Dittmer and Samuel Kim (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 80–104.

<sup>43</sup> For a nuanced critique of Watson’s state standardization in China thesis, see Donald Sutton et al., “Ritual, Cultural Standardization, and Orthopraxy in China: Reconsidering James L. Watson’s Ideas,” *Modern China* (2007), 33. see above.

<sup>44</sup> V. S. Naipaul, *India: A Wounded Civilization* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1977).

高 (Van Gogh) 的 *Le Pere Tanguy* (1887) 具有日本绘画的某些特征, 但只是作为梵高之 *Tanguy* 肖像的背景。在 19 世纪和 20 世纪初, 西方产生了现代艺术, 并因此具有赋予现代生活以意义的力量, 而东方则似乎被迫在模仿之 (模仿的矛盾心理和不稳定性导致某种“似是而非”的东西)。<sup>45</sup>

尽管在中国和印度在传统艺术衰落后, 都不断的创造现代艺术, 然而这些努力都未成功地开创一个空间: 无论是扎根于本土美学, 还是像电影业所做的那样诉诸西方的世界大同主义 (cosmopolitanism)。<sup>46</sup> 当然, 今天的中国艺术似乎正在迅速改变。这种变化的标志见于当代艺术品的拍卖, 像张晓刚这样的艺术家的作品, 价格不断地飚升, 并获得国际的承认。另一个标志是独立画室的发展, 诸如坐落在北京的废旧工厂区的大山子 (798 工厂)。<sup>47</sup> 人们深入争论的是当代中国艺术是否只是为国际 (显然是西方口味) 生产的问题。与此同时, 显而易见的是, 中国艺术传统, 诸如水墨画, 今天依然为今天的千百万中国人欣赏和实践。<sup>48</sup> 中国与印度的美与艺术的观念转变为现代观念, 显现出帝国相遇的复杂性。

这种景象也见于文学领域, 如泰戈尔<sup>49</sup>, 他是印度唯一的诺贝尔文学奖获得者, 曾在 20 世纪初引领东方灵性 (Eastern Spirituality) 的潮流, 但是如今几乎被人完全忘记 (除了孟加拉)。而在 2000 年获得诺贝尔文学奖的高行建, 在中国几乎没有人把他看作重要的小说家 (但是在台湾和新加坡得到承认)。若考虑到印度与中国的文学传统的历史深度与丰富, 这种状况则更加引人注目。在某种程度上, 这是文化和语言复杂关联的产物——部分地表明那些直接用英语写作的印度文学作品, 会比那些用方言写就的作品获得更普遍的欣赏——由此形成了这些文化的可译性问题。换句话说, 这提出了文化之多样性与普遍性的问题, 由此引出现代性是从具体的差异 (我们稍后要论述) 中抽象出来的普遍进程。

我们如何理解传统? 现代性往往被看作是对传统的过去的决裂, 而在印度与中国如何看待被当作“传统”的东西, 乃是本书关注的焦点。Talal Asad 对传统的定义是:

45 Homi Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994), 86.

46 For a fascinating illustration of this dilemma, see Anita Chung, ed., *Chinese Art in an Age of Revolution: Fu Baoshi (1904–1965)*, catalogue of an exhibition at the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, 21 January–15 April 2012.

47 Puay-peng Ho, “Consuming Art in Middle Class China,” in *Patterns of Middle Class Consumption in India and China*, ed. Christophe Jaffrelot and Peter van der Veer (Delhi: Sage, 2008), 277–299.

48 Jerome Silbergeld, “Modernization, Periodization, Canonization in Twentieth-Century Chinese Painting,” in *Writing Modern Chinese Art*, ed. Josh Yiu (Seattle: Seattle Art Museum, 2007), 9–15.

49 泰戈尔 (Rabindranath Tagore, 1861–1941), 印度孟加拉语诗人, 神秘主义者。1913 年获诺贝尔文学奖, 是向西方介绍印度文化精华和把西方文化精华介绍到印度的最有影响的人物。

一个传统由一些根本的话语组成, 它们指引参与者在既定的实践中遵循正确的方式与目的, 它们是明确的, 因为是定制的, 有来历的。这些话语在观念上通过现在 (如何与其他的实践、体制和社会条件态相关联), 将过去 (初建实践之际, 那是认知的起点, 正确的展演由此传播开来) 与未来 (实践如何在或长或短的时期内得到最好的把握。或者为什么它要被改变或被抛弃) 联系在一起。<sup>50</sup>

所以, 传统的核心是关于真确 (authenticity) 与违规 (transgression) 的争辩。传统将自身表达为无时间的, 超越历史的, 其推论的权威存在于那种论断之中。争论的焦点不是在现阶段西方化的进程中传统是否被抛弃, 而是本土的传统如何并在多大程度上与反对西方的现代力量相关。

## 主题与视角

在印度与中国的现代性中, 灵性、世俗、宗教与巫术之间的关联, 是本书的主要论题。印度与中国社会展现的形态表明这些关系正在塑造现代民族。社会学与政治意识形态往往将现代民族—国家及其治理的民主形态概念化为世俗的, 它的形成取决于替代共同体的宗教态度, 但是我们现在的研究还不想对民族主义与宗教的关联提出什么论断。与此相似, 在现代化的社会学理论中和在西方现代性之本质的意识形态观念中的关于世俗化与世俗主义的假设, 实际上也不名不副实。正如 Jose Casanova 指出的, 民主的民族—国家能够在具有公共宗教 (public religions) 的社会里出现并繁荣昌盛。<sup>51</sup> 以个人的例证来说, 我出生在荷兰社会, 那里由宗教群体与神职人员控制, 但是从 19 世纪末就有了民主选举。民主与世俗之间有多种可能的关联, 但是没有不可避免的一种。在一个社会里, 世俗化可以民主手段推进 (这是 Jawaharlal Nehru 的志向), 也可以权威手段推进 (如共产党执政的中国)。民主管理的建立, 相对独立于世俗化进程。

尽管国家的世俗化有不同的形态, 但我们只是在西欧看到在某些世俗社会里, 宗教现已不再起重要作用。作为政治参与和表达的一种形态, 民主制对于现代民族—国家的自由形态是典型的, 这种特殊的国家构成在 19 世纪出现在欧美并在此后传播到世界各地。自由的世俗主义者可以要求国家是世俗的, 它要平等的和中立的对待诸宗教, 但是他们也必须认识到, 假若允许宗教表达的自由, 那么宗教往往会在民主进程中起重要作用。所以需要区分国家的相对世俗性和社会的相对世俗性, 并厘清人们如何界定世俗性。诸如英国、荷兰和美

50 Talal Asad, “The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam,” *Occasional Paper Series*, Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, March 1986.

51 Jose Casanova, *Public Religions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, ).



国等现代国家，全都有各自的确保国家某种世俗性的特殊安排，但是这些国家在社会中建立其合法性时，宗教也都是一个重要的公共角色。例如，可以有把握的说，美国的“隔离墙”不是出自世俗主义者的要求，而是出自那些曾在英国遭受迫害的宗教异端者的要求，所以，至少在这个案例中，国家的世俗性实际上是一种宗教要求。<sup>52</sup> 印度与中国的情况需要更复杂的理解民族与宗教之间的关联。在中国，世俗主义者对宗教的攻击持续了一个世纪却没有被世俗化，而印度将宗教作为其民族文化的核心要素、同时形成其世俗国家并试图对宗教采取中立的立场。在现有的世俗化理论中，无一将这些发展纳入其理解的框架，但是对它们的比较将会说明宗教与世俗如何关联着国家形成的进程。

其次，宗教的范畴在当代人类学和历史学的论著中，以及在宗教研究中被批评地解构，乃是帝国相遇中富有成果之特征的佳证。“宗教”这个西方范畴在这种相遇中经历了巨大的改变，才使之能够吸纳并产生诸如印度教、道教和儒教等“宗教”。在这种转变中，不仅有基督教传教士和西方的东方学者成为媒介，而且印度和中国的思想家们也积极投身于创建新概念和新构造。此外，这不仅仅是观念及其影响的历史，而且还是国家权力与体制改变的历史。我们不当将诸如宗教之类的概念转变看作世界其他地方对西方范畴的被动接受。印度人和中国与欧美人一样积极参与了这种转变。

第三，公共领域（**public sphere**）的出现对于民族（**nation**）与宗教（**religion**）的问题至关重要。我曾在以前探讨19世纪英国宗教与民族—国家的论著中指出，公共领域的世俗观念，正如哈贝马斯（**Habermas**）所论证的，是世俗主义者的权利要求而非一种历史的描述。<sup>53</sup> 实际上，人们很容易看到18世纪末宗教群体为了宗教的和世俗的缘故进行社会动员，诸如现代传教运动反对东印度公司资助印度的印度教寺庙，同时解放奴隶运动又反对英国参与全球贩卖奴隶和在种植园里使用奴隶劳作。这些宗教群体改变了公共领域，并使社会的现代民族形态（**modern nation form**）成为可能。

随着现代民族—国家在英国的产生，一个重要的发展是宗教的民族化。“宗教”变得不再是新教反对天主教的一种政治身份形式，而是将民族统一在上帝之下的一个因素，并给予一个国家以道德的意图。在我看来，这也意味着对“宗教”的理解有一个重要的转变。我们与其将“宗教”看作各种群体彼此以“真正宗教”反对“虚假宗教”的战场，还不如将“宗教”的出现看作一个保护伞，它令不同的信仰没有暴力冲突地发挥作

用。“世界宗教”范畴作为一个道德范畴，它实际上超越了现存的教会和宗教群体，而“灵性”（**spirituality**）范畴的出现，作为制度化宗教的替代，乃是这种转变的一个要素，它意味着宗教冲突的一种和解。然而与此同时，在殖民地印度，随着民族主义的兴起，印度教徒和穆斯林彼此争斗，而在中国，宗教变成世俗主义者的攻击对象。新的普遍化的“宗教”概念，将西方的民族—国家中的宗教与南亚的社团宗教（**communalized religions**），以及共产党执政下的宗教，全都包容在一起。

第四，本书讨论的问题涉及权力的历史，主要是国家权力的历史，但也涉及社会运动。这些社会运动有时超越了国家的疆界。诸如基督教、伊斯兰教和佛教这样的宗教，已经形成了超越种族和领土边界的形态。然而在帝国时代，这种边界的超越为现代帝国主义所改变。在19世纪的欧洲，出现了帝国统治下的异教徒的宗教关注。这种关注与帝国的文化传播相关，虽然这是一种令人不快的方式，因为殖民政府总是被看作一个基督教的政府，热衷于让被殖民者改信基督教。尽管帝国声称自己是中性的，但不得不干预社会，其原因很简单：它不得不主要地由本地人参与统治，不得不教育本地人。在也致力于教育的帝国保护伞下，传教活动有了巨大的扩展。尽管通过改信和教育使之在基督教和现代性两个方面被殖民化，由此努力产生现代的基督教，但是传教团体在殖民地社会留下了持久的影响。这种影响很少（在印度和印度尼西亚等国家中几乎没有）根据改信者来度量，更多地是在伊斯兰教、佛教、印度教、道教、儒教中所产生的、成为针对基督教之反向运动的现代形式。这就是所谓的复兴运动，而且基本上属于现代主义的运动，见之于殖民的和后殖民的世界各地。我们今天在后殖民世界看到的政治宗教，在很大程度上是帝国相遇的产物。

尽管本书所讨论的民族—国家在某种程度上是个领土所有者，但它本身却是全球化的产物，并且总是与民族—国家的全球体系相互作用。<sup>54</sup> 与国家霸权处于不稳定关联中的群体，许多是与全球范围的运动（如基督教和伊斯兰教）相关联的，但是与此同时，它们又是在观念、金钱、劳工、消费的全球化作用的框架中发挥作用的。在全球化的现阶段，宗教继续更广泛、更长距离的关联民众与社会，但是如今人们有各种各样新的更轻松的交流方式。伊斯兰教、基督教、印度教和佛教，都在进行与此全球化阶段相关联的新的全球传教运动。它们全都可以称为福音运动。这些世界范围的运动，某些是与民族—国家中的少数民族群（**minorities**）相关联的。民族（**nation**）不仅是与广泛的世界相互作用的产物，而且也是均质化与异质化的持续过程的产物，而异质化乃是民族主义（**nationalism**）的必不可少的要素。民族，

<sup>52</sup> Daniel L. Dreisbach, *Thomas Jefferson and the Wall of Separation between Church and State* (New York: New York University Press, 2003).

<sup>53</sup> Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1962; trans. 1989); Peter van der Veer, *Imperial Encounters* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

<sup>54</sup> Etienne Balibar, “The Nation Form: History and Ideology,” in *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, ed. Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein (London: Verso, 1991).

与宗教和现代性一样，从来就不是完成时，绝不是个既成物，而是其矛盾与张力的产物。

本书讨论灵性、巫术与世俗等普遍化范畴对印度与中国之民族观念的影响。第2章讨论灵性的范畴在19世纪如何获得了全球的现代意义。它在全球的不同地区成为替代现代性的组成部分。在印度与中国，灵性的本土形式被唤醒，用来替代西方的帝国主义和物质主义。在印度和中国的某些知识分子的论著中，灵性的优越性成为泛亚主义（Pan-Asianism）的组成部分。与此同时，以国家为中心的宗教意识形态和以民族为中心的意识形态，强调灵性并将其作为民族特征的组成部分。这些意识形态在今天的中国、印度、中国台湾和新加坡，日益成为关键的因素。

第3章关注的是东方宗教的形成。这一章探讨了东方研究领域和比较宗教的出现，尤其是缪勒<sup>55</sup>领衔的《东方圣书》（Sacred Books of the East）项目。它以新近的对印度学家缪勒和汉学家James Legge的再评价为基础。它还超越东方学的研究，考察了1893年芝加哥举行“世界宗教议会”（World Parliament of Religions）的作用。分析的主要问题是，这些西方的学术与意象的产物，究竟在多大程度上产生了宗教分类的诸形态，并在多大程度上对印度和中国的宗教信仰与实践产生了实际的影响。

第4章转向基督教，并讨论印度与中国的传教运动的影响。基督教的传教士在印度和中国的现代词汇表，以及对印度与中国的现代观念的形成过程中，起着重要的作用。改革运动以及民众的抵抗运动许多都来自基督教的话语（discourse）。这一章还分析了基督教在印度与中国的不同轨迹。它还联系现代性的话语考察了改信（conversion）的概念。

第5章讨论印度与中国的“民间宗教”（popular religion）问题，以及宗教与巫术的关系。在印度与中国，现代化者一直以“民间信仰”（popular belief）或“迷信”（superstition）与巫术（magic）等范畴，干预民众的日常实践，消除障碍并以此完全改变民众的社区生活。这些努力在印度与中国有着不同方式的发展，但在这二个国家中都没有完全成功。在历史的讨论异端、弥赛亚运动和政治抗议之后，这一章还勾画了印度与中国的民间宗教，在经济自由化和全球化影响下的转变历程。

第6章继续讨论第5章所提到的反迷信运动，它在广泛的世俗主义讨论中成为带有乌托邦因素的某种政治进程。这个进程在印度与中国的性质上有极大差异，说明了与宗教相关联的世俗在不同历史轨迹中的历史特殊性。

第7章讨论瑜伽，这是个身体训练和精神觉悟的体系，我将其与太极和气功（与“气”或原初力量相关联的身体技巧）相比较。我认为，这些运动形态虽然与健康观念相关联，但却具有强烈的政治的和社会的内

含，而且在民族主义中会变得十分重要。这一章以及其他章节，还讨论了法轮功和Sri Sri Ravi Shankar运动。

第8章讨论的是少数群体和多数群体在种族特性、文化和宗教上的建构。这在印度是针对穆斯林、基督徒和锡克教徒等少数群体的印度教多数群体的建构，而在中国则是针对各种公认为少数民族（其中回族穆斯林最为重要）的汉族的建构。在印度和中国，少数群体之宗教的比较案例是穆斯林。这一章还关联到民族—国家考察了穆斯林少数群体的地位，以及作为多数人口的群体如何将少数民族的存在看作某种威胁。此外还讨论了中央的权威与地方少数群体的关系。

在第9章里，扼要概述本书的基本思路，并将其置于当下人类学对印度和中国社会的理解之中。

55 缪勒（Friedrich Max Muller, 1823–1900），德国出生，工作在英国的东方学家和语言学家，开创比较宗教学。——译者注