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Underground Railroads of Christian Conversion: North Korean Migrants and Evangelical Missionary Networks in Northeast Asia

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Abstract: This article examines the processes by which North Korean migrants encounter and convert to Christianity in the Sino-Korean border area and en route to South Korea. Since the mid-1990s when North Korea began suffering from severe famine, many North Koreans began crossing the border into China in search of food. It is the Korean Protestant Church that not only established the Underground Railroad through which many of the border crossers travel via China to South Korea, but that also provides various religious and non-religious services for North Koreans when they settle in South Korea. With this “Christian passage,” as I call it, and settlement, a startling 80–90 percent of the migrants identify themselves as Protestant after reaching South Korea. My ethnography asserts that their conversion should not be considered as merely a matter of a liberal individual’s ontological transformation without also considering both institutional interventions (missionary networks) and specific geopolitical conditions (the Cold War, famine, and globalization). I argue that Christianity serves as a window through which we can better understand how the complex ideological, political, and cultural tensions (i.e., nationalism, imperialism, freedom, human rights, etc.) all meet in the reconfiguration of the migrants’ identities. More precisely, through an examination of conversion as a cultural project joined with citizen making, this article sheds light on the ways in which religion both creates and demolishes North Korean-ness in favor of a national future—a Christianized reunified nation.

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“I believe we Christians, the descendents of God, must see [the arrival in South Korea] from God’s viewpoint and from the Spirit’s viewpoint. North Korea worships Kim Il-Sung. North Korea is a religion that worships Kim Il-Sung. None other than the Gospel (*pogŭm*) can destroy the Kim Il-Sung religion and reunify the two Koreas. The reunification is a spiritual war in which South Korea confronts North Korea. It is God’s intent that a reunification of the Koreas takes place. God has led many North Korean defectors, including myself, from North Korea to here [South Korea] by way of many routes, such as Southeast Asia and Europe. In the Exodus, God saved us [as we walked] through the pillar of fire and of clouds in the Bible, and experienced the Lord.” — Myung-ok, a female North Korean Christian

In the above public testimony given at a South Korean church, Myung-ok, the pseudonym of a female North Korean migrant Christian convert in her late thirties, asserts with great conviction that a reunification of the two Koreas is indeed a “spiritual war.” At the end of her testimony, she claims a leadership role for South Korean Christians in envisioning a Christianized and reunified Korea. This article examines the process of Christian conversion undergone by North Korean migrants like Myung-ok, as they cross multiple national borders amid the on-going geopolitical and ideological tensions in Northeast Asia.

It is the pro-US conservative Korean Protestant Church that established not only the Underground Railroad through which many of the refugees travel via China to South Korea, but that also provides various religious and non-religious services for North Koreans upon settling in South Korea. As a result of this “Christian passage,” as I call it, and settlement, a startling 80-90 percent of refugees identify themselves as Protestant in South Korea (Chung B.-h. 2009; Jeon W.-t. et al. 2010). And 70 percent of them continue to rely on church services in South Korea (Jeon W.-t. 2007). North Korean refugees were exposed to Christianity, which, in the eyes of Kim Il-Sung, the founder of North Korea, was a means of Western imperialism. However, in the course of their Christian-supported stay in China and their passage to South Korea, Christianity

has come to represent freedom and democracy for the North Koreans, and to serve as a vehicle through which they are exposed to the “South Korean Dream” of material prosperity and a middle-class Christian way of life (see Ong 2003; Weber 1963; van der Veer 1996). While in the past North Korean defectors were publicly celebrated as national heroes and heroines by authoritarian regimes (from the 1960s to the 1980s), it is now only within the church space and within the logic of conversion that North Korean migrants are empowered to criticize the North. The language of human rights and religious freedom is always conflated with their conversion to Christianity.

I consider the conversion of the North Korean migrants to Christianity as a cultural process and project that reveals the political aspirations of conservative Korean megachurches, which have served as an anticommunist bulwark while achieving an explosive growth in the Cold War era. These churches make South Korea the world’s second largest missionary-sending country, while at the same time Protestantism in general faces severe social criticism for its “bigness syndrome,” radical missionary works, and lack of substantial contribution to society. Helping North Korean “brothers and sisters” and undertaking the North Korean mission are not separate projects in terms of how they both envision national evangelization and in terms of how their efforts are aimed at revitalizing their hegemonic position in society. This article, with its focus on the transnational life trajectories of North Korean migrants, demonstrates ambiguous and complex conversion processes between the socialist being and the Christian one, and by doing so, it also discusses why and how Christianity is intertwined with, and competing against, political power in the context of Korean national division and in envisioning a reunification.

Earlier scholarship addresses the concerns of both governmental and civil support systems for the migrants and the ways in which the migrants struggle to adjust to their new society (e.g., Choo H-y. 2006; Chung B-h. 2004, 2009; Chung, B-h., Wook Taek Jeon and Jean-Kyung Chung 2006; Jeon W-t. 2000, 2007; Kang J-w. 2006; Kim Y-s. 2004; Kim Y-y. 2009; Lankov 2006; Suh J-j. 2002; Yoon I-j. 2007; Yoon Y-s. 2002). These previous works acknowledge that the migrants’ Christian experiences and their reliance on church services are all significant throughout their life trajectories. However, they tend to consider Christianity or religious matters mostly as merely incidental or side issues for migrants. When the church is mentioned, it is done most often in instrumentalist terms, namely the services that the church does or should provide.

This article regards the church as the primary intra-ethnic “contact zone,” which Mary Louise Pratt defines

as “social spaces where disparate cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in highly asymmetrical relations of domination and subordination” (1992:4). I argue that religion serves as a window through which we can better understand how the complex ideological, political, and cultural tensions (i.e., nationalism, imperialism, freedom, human rights, etc.) all meet in the reconfiguration of the migrants’ identities. More precisely, through an examination of conversion as a cultural project joined with citizen making, this article sheds light on the ways in which religion both creates and demolishes North Korean-ness in favor of a national future—“a figured world” (Holland et al. 1998:52) where the migrants are projected to be “the chosen” who will save the North and revive Korean Christianity “as if” the two countries were already a reunified nation.

This article consists of two main parts and a conclusion. The first part provides a brief historical analysis of the relationship between Christianity and Communism since they arrived as religious and ideological alternatives at the dawn of Korean modernity. The second part has two subsections. First, I present ethnographic accounts of North Korean migrants in church settings in China and South Korea. Second, I introduce a megachurch-run training program, the Freedom School, as an exemplary church service for North Korean migrants. I consider the Freedom School as emblematic of the role of Korean evangelical churches in envisioning a Christianized reunified Korea. In this new citizen-making project, nationalist imaginings mixed with global dreams are contested against the cultural heterogeneity of North Korean migrants.

Two Guests: Christianity and Communism in Korea

This part provides a brief historical overview essential for understanding the politico-cultural meanings of the Christian encounters between North Korean migrants and the South Korean Church. Christianity (Protestantism in particular)¹ and Communism (socialism) arrived in Korea as new and foreign forces. Yet they grew rapidly as alternative vehicles, mobilizing the Koreans at the

¹ Christianity translates into Korean as *Kitokkyo*, which is likely to mean only Protestantism, while Catholicism is called *Ch’önnchukyo*. *K’ürisüch’an* (Christian) refers to Protestants in Korea. Following this local trend, Christianity in this article mainly means Protestantism and Evangelicalism, and Catholicism is mentioned separately if necessary.

time to envision a new modern nation-state while they were in the midst of what was not a Western colonization process, but rather a Japanese imperialist process. Korean nationalists and socialists were nurtured and fostered in Protestant churches and schools, and Protestant leaders and socialists both allied with, and competed against, each another during the colonial period (1910-1945). It is interesting that Christianity grew to dominate the South, and Communism dominated the North (Lee T. 2010). As a result, anti-communism as a national policy has enjoyed a long history of support, mainly from evangelical churches that signified modern spiritual superiority over secular socialist North Korea.

By reviewing the relationship between Christianity and Communism as the main forces in the imagining of a new independent nation, I assert that the seemingly irreconcilable relationship between the two, observed for over half a century, should be considered as a historical construct engendered and reinforced in the context of the Cold War-inflicted national division, as is also the case with the North Korean policy on religion/Christianity (Wells 2008; cf. Hawk 2005).

Catholicism was first brought to Korea in the late eighteenth century, not by missionaries, but by local scholars and merchants as “Western learning.” It was then persecuted for over a century in a brutal campaign that took numerous lives. In the late nineteenth century, when internal power conflicts and Japanese interventions increased, American Protestant missionaries began arriving in Korea as medical doctors, educators, and as exemplary citizens from a model country.

The rapid rise of Christianity between 1895 and 1910, Kenneth Wells asserts, “can be accounted for by the weakening of the traditional neo-Confucian, *yangban* [noble class]-dominated social and political structure caused by the Sino- and Russo-Japanese wars and the imposition of the Japanese Protectorate in 1905” (1990:44). It is not surprising that Protestant believers were the most active in anti-Japanese movements, ranging from massive nonviolent protests (e.g., the 3.1 Uprising in 1919) to various militant resistance movements (e.g., bombing buildings or assassinating Japanese officials and Korean collaborators, etc.).

Beginning in the early twentieth century, communism became another alternative in scenarios envisioning an independent nation-state, but tensions between Korean communists and evangelicals did not emerge, at least on the surface. This was because during the Japanese colonial period (1910–1945), all Koreans, except for collaborators, were brutally oppressed by the colonizer (Lee T. 2010: 62; cf. Wells 2008). The two forces led various national

independence and enlightenment movements against Japan.

It wasn’t until shortly after the country’s liberation that large-scale antagonistic differences between the two emerged, as Korea was divided into two states by the Big Powers. Between 1945 and 1953, more than one million people (11 to 15 percent of the northern population) migrated to the South, including 35 to 40 percent of the Protestant population in the North (Kang I-c. 2005, quoted in Lee T. 2010: 65). Evangelicals took brutal revenge against the Communists. In addition to the loss of life suffered during the Korean War (1950–1953), tens of thousands of people were slaughtered on Cheju Island in April 1948, in Yösu in October 1948, and in Sinch’ön in October 1950,² by the Northwest or Söbuk Youth, an anticommunism organization formed at the Seoul YMCA under evangelical leadership, the South Korean Army force, and backed by the United States Army Military Government (USAMGIK) (Lee T. 2010: 66-69).

Meanwhile, the socialist Christian leadership cooperated in post-liberation nation-state building in the North.³ It is worth mentioning that Christians constituted about 2.1 percent of the population in the northern part in 1945, while their counterparts in the south accounted for only 0.6 percent. After the division, the Protestant leadership made a considerable attempt to organize the Christian Socialist Democratic Party (*Kitokkyo sahoe minchutang*). However, the party was soon forcibly dismissed because it was denied the right to participate in a nationwide election, which had been scheduled on Sunday, November 11, 1946. Following this, the Rev. Han Kyöngjik (Han Kyung-Chik), one of the leaders of the party, was forced to migrate south of the 38th parallel. He later established the Yongrak Presbyterian Church, the

² As Timothy S. Lee briefly points out in his book, the Sinchön massacre, in which more than 35,000 people, a quarter of the town’s population, were killed in one month, has recently been the subject of popular attention thanks to Hwang Sögyöng (Hwang Sok-yong)’s novel *Sonnim* (The Guest). In his novel, Hwang indicates that Communism and Christianity are all merely guests—foreign elements disturbing a host family (i.e., the Korean nation). In light of the term *sonnim*, which was a figurative expression for smallpox believed to be caused by a ghost possession in local folk religion (i.e., shamanism), the guests are also seen as ghosts in need of a local healing ritual to make them leave the patient’s body, i.e., the Korean peninsula. Pablo Picasso’s painting “Massacre in Korea” (1951) is based on the Sinchön incident.

³ Kenneth Wells asserts: “The relation of Protestants to socialism was rather complex. The founder of the first Korean socialist and then Communist party, in 1918, was a Protestant, Yi Tonghwi, while the Communist Manifesto was translated into Korean by another Protestant activist, Yö Un-hyöng” (Wells 2008: 8).

world's largest Presbyterian congregation. Those who did not migrate to the south were all allegedly executed, sent to concentration camps, or were born again as socialist revolutionary subjects. According to an official figures announced by the Korean Church Martyrs Missionary Association (KCMMA) in 2001, about 90 percent of Protestant martyrs (191 by 2001) were executed by Communists between 1945 and 1953 (see Kang I-c. 2007).⁴

In post-war North Korea, the anti-American fighting spirit was widely fostered in addition to the anti-Japanese spirit in the name of revolutionary nation-state building in competition with the South Korean “puppet” regime of imperialist America. While carrying out “mirrored” antagonistic competitions in claiming legitimacy over the other, both the South and North Korean regimes drove their respective citizens to achieve more rapid economic growth. Although both sides placed unification at the forefront of their policies, modern state building along with economic achievement was always justified in practice. In such a bitter post-war race, the Cold War-engendered identity in the South was conflated with Christian nationalism, which had already been playing a foundational role in Korean nationalism since the late nineteenth century, and its “self-reconstruction tradition” (Wells 1990) influenced the state-led post-war national restoration movements.⁵ South Korea was founded on a model that was different from the Western model of modernity in which the separation of state and church is assumed. Rather, South Korea was founded by a relatively large evangelical leadership. Syngman Rhee (Yi Sŭngman), a Methodist church elder, served as the first president of South Korea and was supported by the United States. Over 39 percent of the high-ranking officials in his administration were Protestant, compared to 0.6 percent of the population in 1945 (see Yi M-y. 2006; Lee T. 2010; Kang I-c. 2007; Ryu 2009 for more discussion about the

relationship between the Rhee regime and Protestantism).

Was Christianity, which was once had a strong presence in North Korea, uprooted and replaced by communism? In principle, Christianity was seen not only as being equivalent to American imperialism, but other religions were also targeted as being superstitious and false ideologies, and were subsequently erased in the name of the socialist revolution that had eliminated the previous feudal, colonial, and imperialistic systems. And as time went by, North Koreans in North Korea responded without hesitation. “We don’t need such a thing,” they said when asked about religion by an outsider. In addition, North Korean wartime stories recounted the brutality of “inhuman” American soldiers. This generated feelings of both fear and vengeance, which were also associated with American missionaries, who had supposedly perpetrated evil deeds for as long as they had been in North Korea.⁶ Whether those stories were true or were merely state propaganda aimed at brainwashing its subjects is another matter. It is important to understand the robust anti-Christian, anti-religious sentiments of North Koreans in terms of their own historical experiences, which are, in turn, reiterated in particular forms of language and narrative.⁷ Given the terms of performance and the practice

⁶ For instance, the “unforgettable” atrocities committed by American missionaries as described in school textbooks are as follows: An American imperialist, who came to Korea under the pretense of being a missionary, let his dog attack a young Korean boy who had picked an apple from his orchard, and then inscribed “thief (Tojök)” with hydrochloric acid on the boy’s forehead; American missionary doctors took organs from Korean patients and sold them to the United States, and so on. Wartime stories about the merciless killings of innocent Koreans by the US army include one about a group of people who were all killed as they hid in a church building, believing that US bombers would not drop bombs on a church. Such stories are not only reiterated in classes and workplaces, but are also recounted in the places where incidents of such “brutality” took place. North Koreans repeatedly visit sites like the Sinchŏn museum where the massacre occurred, as mentioned in footnote 4, to strengthen and reconfirm their anti-American sentiment.

⁷ Under the banner of “Our own way!,” anti-imperialism in general and anti-Americanism in particular are intrinsic parts of the concept of Juche. In a video recorded in 1999 by a non-governmental relief agency working in North Korea, a six- or seven-year-old boy was asked to say something addressed to South Korean students. In a decisive voice he spoke, as though he had been prepped: “What I just wanted to say to South Korean friends (*Namjosŏn dongmu-dŭl*) is that let us kick imperial Yankees out of our country as soon as possible and study and play together.” At the heart of this young boy’s formulaic account is a strong sense of blood purity among ethnic Koreans and North Korean national pride. North Koreans in North Korea “officially” believe that their country is a truly independent state, which has never been afraid of, but rather has always stood against, “imperial” America.

⁴ In the same vein, all other preexisting religions, including Buddhism and Ch’ŏndogyo (religion of the heavenly way, a grassroots indigenous religion that first emerged in the late nineteenth century), rapidly began losing or giving up their structural foundations as a result of land and educational reforms implemented by the Communist regime at the beginning of North Korean state building (Wells 2008).
⁵ There is a debate among scholars working on the modern history of Christianity in Korea. Not all, but most Korean scholars tend to emphasize the nationalist anti-Japanese movements led and organized by Christian leaders as well as laypersons, while foreign experts are likely to argue that such an interpretation is itself nationalist. Instead they focus on the strong evangelical tendency and theology influenced by American missionaries who persisted in upholding the logic of state-church separation, and ended up collaborating with, rather than resisting, the colonizers (see Ryu 2008, 2009; Lee T.S. 2010; Buswell and Lee 2006; Wells 1990; Park 2009).

of language, one could see why many North Korean migrants find similarities between South Korean church rituals and systems and what they have been accustomed to in North Korea. Yet simultaneously important are the differences between the two, not only in their nature but also in people's narratives and discourses.

The following section consists of multi-sited ethnographic vignettes illuminating the ways in which North Korean border crossers encounter, experience, resist, or convert to Christianity in China, en route to South Korea, and in South Korea.

Crossing Borders and Conversion in a Divided Nation

In South Korean state-building, there has never been a separation between the church and the state. As Byung-ho Chung (2010) asserts, North Korean society can be understood using Clifford Geertz's concept of a "theater state" in which religious rituals and performances play a central role in continuing the exercise of political power. I suggest that North Korean migrants' Christian encounter and the conversion process they undergo reveal how conversion is entangled in the power games engaged in by states and transnational religion/churches in the context of a rapidly transforming Northeast Asia. Simultaneously, I should stress the importance of Korean ethnic nationalism, which both facilitates and disturbs intra-ethnic interactions at the micro level.

South Korean missionary work aimed at China and North Korea is directly and indirectly linked to the purview of religious freedom and human rights, and therefore disturbs the states' policies on religion. It reveals that religious conversion nearly always intersects with particular political conditions (van der Veer 1996: 10–14). Robert Hefner argues that conversion is "influenced by a larger interplay of identity, politics, and morality" (1993: 4). Throughout this article, I shall consider structural conditions or forces that push and pull North Korean migrants into the terrain of religion. My ethnography asserts that their conversion should not be considered as merely a matter of a liberal individual's ontological transformation without a serious consideration of both institutional interventions (i.e., missionary networks) and specific geopolitical conditions (i.e., the Cold War, famine, and globalization).

Korean ethnic nationalism is by no means homogeneous. Nevertheless, the underlying and equally shared idea among ethnic Koreans, including Korean-Chinese and Koreans in both North Korea and South

Korea, is that all Koreans are ethnically and thus culturally "homogeneous." This myth of ethnic homogeneity based on blood ties can be observed elsewhere in the world, but one could say that Koreans take this notion to an extreme (e.g., Grinker 1998). As such a notion is likely intolerant of heterogeneity among ethnic Koreans, it engenders inconvenient problems in intra-ethnic interactions in church settings.

The following observations demonstrate Christianity as an intra-ethnic contact zone in which North Korean migrants interact with Korean-Chinese and South Korean Christians, in which conversion is learned and performed through such interactions, and in which the life trajectories of individual migrants are reshaped and reconstituted by visible and invisible powers and institutions. This section consists of two ethnographic vignettes describing the migrants' passage: one takes place in the Sino-Korean border area and the other takes place in Seoul, the capital of South Korea. In between these two spaces, North Korea is situated.

Crossing and the Cross: North Korean border crossers and the church in China

North Korea is known as the most closed society in the world. Undocumented border-crossing was unimaginable until the mid-1990s when the Great Famine took place. For North Koreans, crossing the Sino-North Korean border is a matter of life and death. In contrast to North Korea, northeast China is much wealthier. It is known as the Yanbian area, the Korean-Chinese Autonomous Prefecture.⁸ It is through this area that increasing numbers of migrants risk their lives to make their way to South Korea in search of a better life (Yoon Y-s. 2003; Suh J-j. 2002; Chung B-h. 2009). The kind of better life they envision varies among individual migrants. But many of those who succeeded in arriving in South Korea say that they decided to take to the underground railways because of the extreme sorrows resulting from statelessness (*nara ōpnūn sŏrum*). Physical and psychological sufferings associated with the condition of statelessness, as most

⁸ As of today, however, we do not even know how many North Koreans are living in China, but it is estimated that there are about 100,000. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the number was once estimated to be over 300,000. About 80 percent of them are women who married Korean- or Han-Chinese, or who are working in the red light districts as a result of human trafficking.

human rights reports and studies⁹ continue to stress, mark these people as “an extraordinarily vulnerable population” (Haggard and Noland 2011: 1). I argue that Christianity in its various forms contributes to nurturing and reviving their imaginations and mediates their movement into a new environment.

In many human rights accounts that construct the image of a North Korean victim, the role of religion and religious activities is not visible on the surface. Indeed, human rights discourses and practices, humanitarian aid, many survey studies, and even my own field research are all inevitably carried out through religious networks, in particular, Protestant ones.¹⁰ In effect, failing to examine the role and presence of religion in North Korean human rights discourses and practices silences and makes invisible the border crossers’ own agency in imagining and realizing their journeys.

It is clear that for North Korean asylum seekers, Christianity provides financial and spiritual resources, and that Christianity also needs the migrants to keep the resources flowing in. In 2007, just a year before the Beijing Olympics, Chinese law enforcement and the North Korean secret police increased arrests and deportations of North Korean “illegal” border crossers.

One humanitarian organization in Yenji city was helping North Korean refugees. This organization was, however, officially registered as a foreign trade company running small manufacturing factories, which produced and exported hand-made accessories (e.g., cross-shaped pendants) and porcelain items to the United States. While the organization barely made a profit, it continually put

more than a million dollars back into the company on a yearly basis. The money came from the headquarters in the United States. This company was a modified form of a refugee camp. Under an American CEO (a director, refugee specialist, and minister), South Koreans and Korean-Americans took team manager positions, and much larger numbers of Korean-Chinese and Han-Chinese office workers (field managers) were in charge of so-called house factories, which were, in fact, secret shelters scattered here and there that housed hundreds of individual North Korean women, families, and orphans who needed special care. Most of these house shelters were actually the homes of Korean-Chinese church deacons or deaconesses. They received money to run their “house” factories.¹¹ North Koreans staying in these shelters were not free to leave, but were confined for security reasons. It was not unusual, however, for some of these people to just disappear at night. It is assumed that they had left for South Korea or for some other place. Otherwise, only some school-age children could leave and attend a private Chinese tutoring program developed by the company.

I met Sunghee, a fourteen-year-old girl, at the home of her Chinese tutor. She spoke in a very low voice, something to which she had become accustomed while living at the shelter for the last several months. I asked her what else she did at home (the shelter). She told me that she enjoyed watching South Korean television shows that were aired all the time in the Yanbian area, and often helped her mother copy Bible verses onto blank pages, a task she did for hours. Her family caregiver, a Korean-Chinese church deaconess, gave her mother some money for the copied pages. Copying the Bible was one of the common “jobs” that North Korean asylum seekers were offered in shelters. But a field manager of the company clarified that they never gave such a task to their “refugees.” However, it was not unusual for such a job to be offered in such house shelters, as local Korean-Chinese caregivers found various ways to supplement their own income.

This case reflects the multiple dimensions of perceptions, both positive and negative, that the refugees come to hold in light of the Christianity they are taught and the intra-ethnic relationships they are encouraged to build. First, North Koreans experience Christianity through symbols like the cross, the Bible, and the vocabulary of the church hierarchy (deacon, pastor, etc.), and these

⁹ In recent years, numerous activist reports have been published to raise awareness about North Korean “refugees” in China and beyond. These include Amnesty International’s *Report: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea* (2007), International Crisis Group’s *Perilous Journeys: The Plight of North Koreans in China and Beyond* (Seoul; Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2006); Congressional Research Service’s *North Korean Refugees in China and Human Rights Issues: International Response and U.S. Policy Options* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2007).

¹⁰ The institutions of two main religions are working as humanitarian agents for the border crossers: Buddhism (i.e., Good Friends, a South Korean Buddhist NGO) and Protestantism. The activities of the former are much less visible, but much more systematically organized than those of the latter. Because of security reasons, I have not been able to acquire sufficient ethnographic data about Good Friends that would allow me to compare its activities with those of Protestant institutions. But according to its public profile, Good Friends provides secret aid, including the distribution of food packs, running of shelters, and conducting of survey researches, under the direction of its headquarters. This organization provides substantial data about the conditions of North Korean border crossers and also produces various reports about North Korean society for South Koreans.

¹¹ Owing to security reasons, “Don’t trust anyone” is one of the unspoken company rules. Thanks to my personal relationships and previous career as an NGO worker in a similar field, I received help from several field managers and was able to conduct interviews with North Korean young people.

symbols are directly tied to the provision and allocation of substantial resources—shelter, medicine, money, and often “train tickets” for the Underground Railroad. Second, as many of my informants in South Korea told me, it was quite frustrating for them to recognize the existence of an internal ethnic hierarchy in which they were often treated no better than “a monkey in a zoo.” It is important to note that North Koreans in general have a very strong sense of self-respect, which often drives them to violence when humiliated. They often perceived that the Korean-Chinese caregivers intercepted “their” money, given by South Korean missionaries, who are situated at the top of this international ethnic hierarchy. It is true that South Korean state citizenship and Christianity are conceived as one holistic identity, granting economic and cultural superiority in northeastern Asia, and that North Korean border crossers know that they are automatically granted South Korean citizenship upon their arrival in South Korea.

In addition to these substantial needs, their new imaginations are affected by the broader sociocultural environment. In this area, Christianity is the fastest growing and the most prevalent religion according to a report presented by a professor from Yanbian University in 2010.¹² Indeed, ever since South Korea and China established formal diplomatic relations in 1992, the area has long served as a bridgehead for South Korean missionaries aiming to reach out to both northeast China and North Korea. Although the Chinese state tries to place all religious activities under its control, it is reported that almost all Korean ethnic house churches are connected to, and are managed and supervised by, South Korean Christian networks, which also support registered Korean ethnic churches in the area. This border area is important for missionary activities not only because it physically connects China and North Korea, but also because it has always enjoyed a special place in Korean national sentiments. Indeed, this Manchurian area has always had a special place in South Korean nationalist imaginations. Koreans are taught that this land had been governed by their ancestors and is thus the origin of the Korean nation and of the Korean national spirit.¹³

¹² At a forum organized by the National Council of Churches in Korea (NCKK), Professor Jeon Shin-ja (Ch’ŏn Sin-ja) stated that the number of Christians in the Yanbian area in 1985 was 3,500, 11,990 in 1990, 32,500 in 1995, and 38,694 in 2004 (Sŏnkyŏsinmun 2010. 08. 27, www.missionnews.co.kr/lib/news/28031/page/23).

¹³ Mt. Baekdu (Changbai, ever-white mountain), the highest mountain located across the Sino-Korean border, is their spirit mountain (*Yŏngsan*). It is visited by South Korean tourists, long- and short-term missionaries, college students, shamans (see Kendall 2009), and

In addition, the South Korean form of commercialism and the South Korean Dream dominate the cultural landscape of this border area. South Korean-style restaurants, coffee shops, PC bangs (computer game rooms), karaoke bars, fashion, ways of talking, pop culture, and reinvented traditions are prevalent, reflecting the flow of ideas and the shaping of tastes and cultural preferences. Korean-Chinese make up the largest number of foreign brides and migrant workers in South Korea. It is obvious that the widespread South Korean Wave (Hallyu, 韓流) and the presence (and dominance) of South Korean capitalism are intimately tied to the expansion and influence of Korean Christianity. Many, if not all, South Korean missionaries enjoy economic, cultural, and thus spiritual superiority.¹⁴ Simultaneously, South Korean tastes are propagated and circulated through missionary networks, just as Western modernity and American culture were in the past.

In sum, this section has attempted to shed light on religion, an area that has been largely neglected in discussions about the conditions of, and social mobility among, North Korean border crossers in the Sino-Korean border area. Transnational Protestant Christianity in conjunction with human rights advocacy competes with seemingly secular states, and North Korean “refugees” are likely to be produced as “enunciating subjects” (Anagnost 1997: 4) who speak for human rights organizations. I also examined how Christianity mediates intra-ethnic interactions and negotiations. I will examine the complexity of the meanings of such religious dimensions in detail later, but here I argue that it is Korean Christianity, manifesting this-worldly prosperity and salvation that

others who want to feel as if this is their territory. For North Koreans, Manchuria is important because this is the place where the “Great Leader” Kim Il Sung defeated Japanese imperialists and led the national liberation movement. Mt. Baekdu is also especially worshiped because it is the birthplace of the “Dear Leader” Kim Jong Il.

¹⁴ Most South Korean missionaries carry out their “calling” mainly by following the Nevius Plan, which was first formulated by John L. Nevius, an American Presbyterian missionary in China in the nineteenth century. His method was not successful in China at the time, but new American missionaries in Korea invited him and learned his method, which ended up enjoying great success. The Nevius Plan’s principles became the main principles in South Korean missionary work. The three self-principles (to be self-sufficient, to be self-propagating, and to be self-governing) of the Nevius Plan encourage missionaries to be independent financially. Except for some missionaries who receive financial support from their mother church or organization, many rely on personal networks and work for money in their mission field. I have come across South Korean missionaries who identified themselves as a businessman, a small store owner, a dentist, a teacher, and so on in Yenji, the capital of Yanbian prefecture.

are tied to capitalism, that plays a significant role in engendering and fostering the new imagined world of North Korean border crossers.

Freedom School in Seoul

This section describes the settlement processes experienced by North Korean migrants who arrive in South Korea after a long journey. By examining the Freedom School (as I call it), I focus on the subject-making of former socialist citizens (North Korean migrants), who are being made into religious citizens in capitalist South Korea.

The South Korean government offers all new arrivals from North Korea a basic introduction to South Korean society for about three months at Hanawon, the government resettlement center for North Korean migrants, and additional job training opportunities after being released from Hanawon.¹⁵ After the government, Protestant churches play an important role in the settlement of the migrants. The churches provide the second-largest set of resources, including financial aid, household goods, and Sunday lunch and prayer/Bible study gatherings. Some of the churches run special training programs aimed at increasing the migrants' spirituality and improving their job opportunities. The churches imagine themselves to be social laboratories that simulate the conditions of a reunified nation. I argue that the conversion of the migrants to Christianity is a cultural project with considerable political and ideological significance that reveals the key characteristics of South Korean evangelicalism.

¹⁵ Hanawon was first established in 1999. It grew in size and extended its functions as the number of North Korean migrants increased rapidly. After arriving at the Incheon international airport or harbors individually or in groups, North Korean individuals are sent immediately to a joint interrogation center where they are screened to see whether they are "true" defectors or not, and then sent to Hanawon. This place offers programs for improving the mental health of the North Koreans, introduction to South Korean capitalism, and skill training, for example, driving classes for getting a driver's license, computer classes for passing a qualifying examination, etc. Hanawon is heavily secured with barbed wire, security guards, and cameras, and the inmates are subject to heavy restrictions for security reasons. They are mobilized to participate in religious services provided by Protestant, Catholic, Buddhist, and Won Buddhist priests. Each religious organization contributes to the Hanawon programs and to the inmates as well. For example, followers of Won Buddhism, a Korean Buddhism, run a boarding school for young people, and the Hana Protestant church at Hanawon often mediates between North Korean converts and churches in cities where the converts will be sent after leaving Hanawon.

"I am the future of the nation!" This motto of the Freedom School sounds decisive, heroic, and definitely nationalistic. The school's name suggests that "freedom" is what the migrants didn't have in North Korea. The dean of the school, Mr. Song, emphatically stated that the motto is given by God to empower these "brethren" to be born-again national leaders. The motto is a sacred message, inscribed on banners hung on the wall, interestingly printed in a "cute" font on a square cloth, which also displays a map of the Korean peninsula. The motto is attached to a pink heart with wings, and smaller pink hearts are embroidered here and there. It was made several years earlier and represents a vision of a unified Korea, a unification that must be carried out not by warriors of God, but through love. On the other side of the room, banners proclaiming "Love and bless you (*Saranghago ch'ukbok-hapnida!*)!", written in various colors, are attached to the wall right above a school board panel. The wall and ceiling decorations of the Freedom School are reminiscent of a Sunday school classroom for children in church. And in a sense, it is, "What we are doing for them is simple. That is, just like *fixing a necktie* if it is not put on in the right way, we assist them to make up for some minor shortcomings," stated a deacon of the Freedom School advisory board.

Fixing a necktie is a metaphor for the North Korean mission of the South Korean Evangelical Church, and the Freedom School is actually carrying out a task for North Korean migrants in South Korea. In the account described above, "we" and "they" are all Koreans, sons and daughters of the Father. But "they" have been living far away for a while, and have recently "returned" to the bosom of Our Father. They need to be refashioned to become "normal" in the South. Unlike the attitudes of foreign missionaries who often immediately find major apparent cultural differences in their mission subjects, South Koreans at the Freedom School assume that they need to fix only the very "minor errors" of their northern counterparts. "We" and "they" are ethnically homogeneous, and the presumption is that Korean culture is inherently embodied in all Koreans. Such ethnic nationalism—in which race, ethnicity, and nation are conflated throughout the history of modern Korea (Shin 2006; Palais 1998) is at the heart of the Christian mission for North Korean migrants and for North Korea.

As the metaphor of fixing a necktie indicates, the Freedom School is designed to help the migrants to be born again as modern citizens of South Korea. Traits such as sincerity, hard work, self-reliance, and independence are emphasized as the "truth" for a successful life in South Korea. Interestingly, these values were also equally

stressed in the principles of North Korean Juche ideology. However, South Koreans stereotypically perceive North Korea migrants as somewhat lazy, as lacking will, and as dependent, as commonly observed in post-communist transitions. Such stereotypes are often simply interpreted as being a byproduct of Juche ideology, and thus the North Koreans are regarded as needing to be refashioned into “sincere” returning brethren. What makes North Korean assimilation cases different from other post-communist cases is that—as in Sheila Jager’s (2003) analysis of the Korean War Memorial, a carving of a South Korean big brother soldier (literally rendered much larger) embracing a smaller North Korean soldier—North Korean migrants are positioned as younger siblings in the Korean family system, and automatically subordinated in the Korean ethnic hierarchy.

In examining the Freedom School as a contact zone between South Korean Christians and their northern counterparts, I highlight the ways in which North Korean migrants are trained to refashion their “outdated” ways of thinking and to conform to those of South Korean Protestant capitalist norms. At the same time, I want to stress that the process of “fixing” also suggests complicated reactions on the part of and negotiations between the migrants and the South Korean Christians. Intra-ethnic relations are mediated by Christianity/God; emotional struggles are often silenced in the name of Jesus Christ and through the deployment of the metaphor of the family; the apparent socioeconomic inequality and difference in class status between South Korean hosts and North Korean migrants is likely to be obscured by the principle of ethnic homogeneity; rational misunderstandings are skipped over or are simply negated by the belief that God will speak to “your hearts” (Harding 2000); and present individual sufferings are shared or ignored for “the future of the nation” that God has already prepared for “us.” As such, overt tensions and tacit harmonies coexist and are mediated by biblical idioms (love, mercy, blessing, chosen, provision, and so forth) and by the shared sense of ethnic homogeneity. That is, the Bible and Korean ethnic consciousness manage co-ethnic relations in the Freedom School, an emblem of the Korean church.

Sincere citizen-believer

It is in this context that the concept of sincerity (*seongsil*) emerges as the most important trait that the migrants are supposed to have in South Korea, and at the same time the most problematic trait when it comes to displaying “true” Christianity. For example, sincerity in religion has to do with “publicly recognizable, socially indexical, materially

embodied forms of speech” for Sumbanese Protestants (Keane 2007: 84), and reciting *al-Fatihah* correctly in Indonesian Islam (Rowen 2000). This suggests that sincerity is about relations, in particular, social relations, and not merely about the relation with divine power. In the Korean Protestant teachings that North Korean migrants learn at the Freedom School, sincerity means cultivating one’s body and mind; they are becoming sincere not by behaving sincerely, but by learning not to be seen as insincere by others.

First, sincerity (*seongsil*) means a complex set of mental and physical activities or qualities, which include being modest, obedient, gentle, patient, hardworking, and unselfish. According to the logic of conversion, the individual’s past cultural dispositions, or habitus in Bourdieuan terms, are likely presumed to be lazy, violent, stubborn, and thus backward in personality, a product of the would-be convert’s pre-conversion culture.¹⁶ The North Korean personality is often described in terms such as *akman namattda*, or “being possessed by the wicked” (in North Korean terms) and *gakpakhada*, or “hardhearted” in South Korean terms. To be sincere in this sense requires that North Koreans learn how to express that they are sincere, and how to do so in certain terms.

For instance, the Freedom School organized a lecture series called “Image making and business manners” which was taught by a female professional trainer whose tall and glamorous appearance impressed all the North Korean trainees.¹⁷ They learned how to carry themselves so that they didn’t look like they had *ak*, wicked or violent anger, in their minds. Indeed, they learned how to smile a “charming smile,” how to shake hands, how to

¹⁶ Unlike former colonized nation-states in Africa and Latin America where missionaries played pioneering roles in implanting Western moralities as modern, Christianity and its missionaries in Korea were accepted by people at the grass roots and by the elites who were seeking alternatives to Neo-Confucianism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Historical literature on Korean Christianity at this time shows that modern subject making was associated with conversion to Christianity led by both American missionaries and educated Korean evangelicals (see Lee, T.S. 2010: 16–19; Choi, H. 2005).

¹⁷ When she first appeared at the classroom podium, I sensed incompatibility between her body, which signified well-nourished, white, and rich South Korean capitalist femininity, and the bodies of the North Korean migrant trainees, both male and female, who were short, malnourished, tanned, and poor. Such a disparity generated a greater cultural distance between the two sides on the first day of the lecture series. The lecturer also seemed uncomfortable, as though she were standing before a group to which she did not belong. But by the second day, the distance decreased because the time was devoted to practicing actual bodily expressions as described in the paragraph above.

exchange business cards, and how to greet people politely by “imitating” the lecturer’s facial expressions—making artificial smiles look natural step by step—and her vocal intonations.

This “image making” most likely corresponded to a key spiritual teaching that they learned repeatedly through phrases such as “I can do it. I only need to do it!” This positive mind-making exercise is seen as part of the charismatic nature of Korean Pentecostalism that the Rev. David Cho, the founder of the Yoido Full Gospel Church, the world’s largest congregation, has disseminated through his concept of the Threefold Blessing (salvation for the soul, good health, and prosperity) (see Cho et al. 2004). The northerners had previously learned that religion was a false illusion, yet some had become disillusioned with their past belief system—Juche ideology. In the North, they also learned how to adopt the North Korean way of smiling and other bodily behaviors. Although the famine was taking people’s lives, they sang “We are happy!” and danced and smiled for national events. Perhaps ironically, some came to acknowledge what they could not have predicted—that there were striking similarities between the ideological behaviors in the North and those they were learning in the South, in the Freedom School.

In light of the metaphor of the “family,” *seongsil* represents the familial, social, and religious obligation that the newcomers are expected to adopt in place of the outdated Juche habits. As the deacon’s metaphorical phrase “fixing a necktie” shows clearly, Korean Christians who work for (and with) the migrants tend to measure the latter’s degree of social adjustment, personality change, and, more important, their religiosity, in terms of their bodily appearance and behavior. Speaking the Seoulite dialect, whitening one’s skin, and exhibiting obedient bodily manners are some examples of the many lessons that are taught for the sake of making “sincere” North Korean subjects suitable for the job or religious “market.” It is ironic, however, that the Freedom School staff always stressed the importance of the “interior” mind over the “exterior” body.

This tendency seems to have multiple roots: a militant method of education that stresses to an exceptional degree the mental and/or spiritual armament along with meting out physical punishment; an enforced ethnic consciousness that is intended to homogenize Korean bodies; and, obviously, the nature of evangelical Christianity itself, which attaches great importance to the faith. In the Korean Protestant “cultures,” the internal levels of belief of individual believers are supposed to be visible through the substantive practices of these believers; these substantive practices are not necessarily

indicated by religious signs, but rather are represented by the performance of agreed upon activities that are endorsed by each denomination and church. What is relatively neglected in the historical literature on the growth of Korean Christianity is an analysis of the church techniques used for mobilizing members to organize their daily life around church-centered activities, such as dawn prayers, special prayers, cell meetings, volunteering, online participation, and short-term mission trips. Morality, spirituality, and thus true Christian subjectivity can be affirmed and appreciated by participating passionately in such regular and special church services in South Korea (Lee T. 2010).

Healing Ritual

It is thus clear that in addition to, and indeed as part of, the refashioning process encapsulated in the idiom of “fixing a necktie,” healing as both a metaphor and as a ritual is a key goal of the Freedom School program. I will share a story that illustrates this point. In mid-September 2006, the Freedom School designed a two-day outdoor activity called *Ch’i yu* or “healing camp” for North Korean trainees, which I attended as a visitor. The purposes of the camp were (1) to heal wounded souls through an experience of God’s advent; (2) to enable these wounded souls to find the true dignity of their existence within God; and (3) to shed the past life and to rebuild a new life with Jesus Christ. It was apparent that the ultimate goal of the camp was to convert the North Korean migrants. Historically, this goal is not that new, as throughout the history of Christianity the ultimate healing is completed only when the person converts to Christianity (Porterfield 2005; Wightman 2008). The list of purposes, which is short and concise, also represents the more or less negative image that most South Korean adults have of North Korean migrants—believing that their souls and hearts are wounded, that their self-esteem is low, and that their past lives in North Korea are ruined and contaminated.

On the night of the first day, after a series of lectures and worship services, an intensive healing ritual took place, lasting for about four hours. It was very intense. Young South Korean volunteers, who led all the gospel worship services, kept weeping together with North Koreans. We were all praying loudly, and at one point I found myself speaking in tongues. So-yong, a female North Korean in her early forties, suddenly fell down on the floor, as if she were possessed by a spirit. Her face was wet with tears, and her arms and legs were shaking. The director of the Freedom School, Mr. Kang, and an invited pastor, Pastor Choi, immediately approached her and started shouting,

“Go away! I command you in the name of Jesus, go away!” It was a spectacular scene, which I felt excited peoples’ emotions. I was looking forward to witnessing more such dramatic moments, such as So-yong springing up from the floor and praising God. However, no such drama occurred for about half an hour. Both Mr. Kang and Pastor Choi looked exhausted. Mr. Kang asked another woman to take So-yong back to the second floor and to lay her down on a bed.

The next morning, I talked briefly to Mr. Kang and Pastor Choi. Kang whispered in a low and disappointed voice, “Well, it was almost done, but eventually they didn’t fully open their minds.” And then he stated seriously, “You know, we are all the same nation (*han minjok*). I talked to myself, one step more, one step more . . . Last night, I felt that I was almost there. But they didn’t fully open . . . I don’t know, but there is something like a *glass* between us and them. I can’t break it. As I want to break it, they seem to make the glass thicker. I don’t know what the *glass* is and why I have felt that way always . . . I think it may be due to the fact that they were drowned in Kim Il-Sung Ideology for too long . . .”

His last account reveals that what both Kang and Choi were attempting to do to So-yong was to “cure” her soul, which was presumably possessed by the demon of Kim Il-sung, not by the Holy Spirit. A little while after this conversation, I happened to have a brief conversation with So-yong and another woman, Chae-eun. At the time, both were attending a theological college. So-yong, who had woken up late, was looking pale. I said to her, “I guess you were possessed by a spirit last night. How do you feel now?” She replied, “Well, I don’t know what it was, but I just couldn’t move. Maybe because I was too tired, since I haven’t taken a rest in recent days.” She then added, “I had taken exams. You know, it’s hard to read books and there are lots of things to memorize . . . So I haven’t slept for three days . . .”

Comparing Kang’s account with that of So-yong, I was struck by the differences in their narratives. Kang perceived So-yong’s state to be a spirit possession by an inner demon, the deeply embedded “evil” Juche. Meanwhile, So-yong claimed that her condition was the result of being burnt-out and fatigued, which in turn was caused by carrying out onerous duties as a mother and a student in her forties. This episode is significant because it represents on-going miscommunication, conflict, and negotiations between North Korean migrants and South Korean Christians, and thus raises the question about the ambivalent nature of Korean evangelical nationalism in practice. *Seongsil* or “sincerity” and healing embody the key virtues

of South Korean Christians who serve their northern counterparts and who work tirelessly for the North Korean mission. Sincerity is also a norm omnipresent in South Korea, which works in favor of a neoliberal subjectivity because it (sincerity) is armed with a self-disciplined body that is essential for surviving and succeeding in this era of infinite competition. Many young North Korean migrants tend to perceive and accept this norm as a core value of liberal individualism while interacting with their southern counterparts (see Park Y-a. 2010). Healing in a secular sense can also be seen as equivalent to a daily survival strategy adopted by most migrants who find that it is much better to conceal or deny their North Korean identity, and to pretend that they are Korean-Chinese at school and in the job market (Kim Y-y. 2009). Sincerity and healing (self-denial in secular terms) reflect the harsh realities of the powers to which the individual migrants belong, and that project North Koreans as others and as outsiders.

Conclusion

I have examined the processes of conversion to Christianity experienced by North Korean migrants in China, both among those en route to South Korea and among those in the Freedom School in South Korea, where the spectra of ideological negotiations between North Korean migrants and South Korean evangelicals can be seen. The Freedom School imagines itself as a social laboratory that offers essential programs aimed at helping selected migrants adjust to life in South Korea. I have demonstrated that along with embracing or imbibing the notion of *seongsil*, or sincerity, the migrants are also expected to erase the outdated Juche mindset that they supposedly bring with them from North Korea and to become productive citizens. The notion of productive citizenry is closely linked with experiential capitalism, which, as shown above, has long been joined with Christianity in South Korean state-building and politics. As South Korea surged forward economically, it did so under the leadership of a Christian-guided government.

Christian conversion does more than convert subjects to a new religious life. Along the way, financial and capitalist resources give the North Korean migrants a sense of the kind of finances and life they could have in their future. Refugee camp companies and the copying of Bible verses for sale demonstrate the extent to which shelters and house-churches are dependent on not only the resources provided by leading South Korean churches, but also on the ways in which religious iconography can

be translated into profit, albeit for the altruistic means of helping the “refugees” return to “Our Father.” The “fixing” of the necktie in the Freedom School not only serves to shore up the migrants’ much-needed Christian spirit so that the outdated Juche ideology can be replaced, but it also positions them, and their bodily behaviors, squarely within a capitalist society that expects them to “look” like sincere South Korean Christian capitalist subjects.

Yet there remains a high degree of ambivalence among the migrants who experience this transformative healing and also among those who provide it. The healing camp, in particular, was first designed to mobilize the migrants to reestablish their personal relationship with God. But the rebuilding requires an absolute break from the past. The healing thus means a recovery of dignity that can come about only by destroying the Juche ideology, which is thought to remain in the migrants’ souls. After the healing ritual, however, I encountered unexpected reactions and interpretations from both sides. Here I have argued that rather than reconciliation between the North Korean newcomers and the South Korean Christians, there are on-going conflicts, negotiations, and miscommunication. Through an analysis of the respective accounts of the supposed healer and the supposed healed, I open up the ambivalent nature of Korean evangelical nationalism for further discussion.

As for the causes and nature of conflicts, which remain largely unspoken in the name of love and blessing, my findings suggest that it is not only “the antagonistic identity constructs . . . that emerged with the division of the peninsula that will undoubtedly survive and pose problems” (Bleiker 2005: 99) in the assimilation process between South Koreans and the migrants in the Freedom School setting. From the migrants’ standpoint, it is also the South Korean “myth of modernization,” which is produced through what most Koreanists call “compressed modernity” (Koo H. 2001; Cho H-j. 2000; Abelman 2003) and a “culturalist view” embedded in the hegemonic sense of Korean ethnic homogeneity. For South Korean Christians, it is Juche ideology that has contaminated the migrants’ mind and body. Such views see Juche as having produced the migrants’ refugee mentality. However, Korean psychologists and neuropsychiatrists have pointed out that 30 percent of the migrants show PTSD (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder), caused by the famine and dangerous life in China, which only worsened as a result of the culture shock they experienced in the South (Jeon W-t. 1997, 2000; Jeon W-t. et al. 2005; Hong C-h et al. 2005). Ultimately, once the North Korean migrants are in the South, while they may continue to depend on church resources for some time, they are expected to assimilate

eventually and to invest and re-invest continually in South Korean life, spiritually as sincere Christians, politically as denunciators of North Korea, and financially by contributing to church networks.

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皈依基督教的地下通道：北朝鲜移民与东北亚的新教传教士²

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摘要

本文探讨了北朝鲜移民在中朝边境接触并开始信仰基督教从而逃亡韩国的过程。自90年代中期以来，北朝鲜发生了多次饥荒，许多北朝鲜人开始跨越中朝边境到中国来谋求生路。在这个过程中，韩国新教会建立了帮助许多北朝鲜越境者借道中国到达韩国的地下通道，并向韩国境内的北朝鲜人提供了多种多样的宗教或者非宗教服务以帮助他们定居下来。因为这个“基督教走廊”的存在，多达80—90%定居韩国的北朝鲜人在到达韩国之后成为了新教徒。

通过民族志研究，笔者认为他们在宗教上的皈依并不应该只被当作是独立个体本体论性的转变，而应该考虑到教会的介入（传教网络）和特殊的地理政治情况（冷战、饥荒和全球化）。在这里，基督教服务就像一个窗口，透过它，我们可以更好地理解如此复杂的思想、政治和文化的张力（例如民族主义、帝国主义、自由、人权等等）是如何在移居者的身份重置过程中相遇的。更确切的说，这一宗教上的转变实际上是伴随着公民身份产生的文化活动，通过研究这项转变，我们可以厘清宗教同时产生和销毁移民者北朝鲜身份的这一过程以及它所指向的一个国家前景——一个再次统一的基督教国家。

皈依基督教的地下通道：北朝鲜移民与东北亚的新教传教士

“我相信我们基督徒，主的后裔，必须从圣父和圣灵的眼光来看待（来到韩国的人）。北朝鲜人崇拜金日成。北朝鲜是崇拜金日成的宗教。只有福音（복음）才能摧毁金日成教，也只有福音才能重新统一北朝鲜和韩国。重新统一是一场韩朝对立的灵性上的战争。主支持韩朝统一。主引领很多脱北者，也包括我自己，从朝鲜通过许多不同的渠道，比如东南亚和欧洲，来到这里（韩国）”

1 为了避免混淆，本文中，North Korea 一词译为北朝鲜，而North Korean一词则译为北朝鲜人/北朝鲜（人）的，这里的北朝鲜即指现在的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国。——译者

2 本文曾发表于《相遇》第四期 163–189，作者感谢该期刊授权在此重印。

。在《出埃及记》中，主救赎了我们，圣经里，主用云柱和火柱引领我们（走出埃及），并让我们感知到我主的存在。”³

在韩国的一座教堂里，明玉（Myung-ok，化名，音译）发表了这段的公开见证。明玉是一位信仰基督教的北朝鲜女性移民。她在快四十岁的时候皈依了基督教，并且坚定地认为韩朝统一实际上是一场“灵性之战”⁴。在这段见证的最后，她向韩国基督徒们呼吁一个设想，她希望他们能够领导出一个基督教化的重新统一的朝鲜。本文对那些像明玉这样的北朝鲜移民，在东北亚的地理政治和意识形态持续地紧张的环境下，越过了多条的国境线所经历基督教皈依的过程进行了考察。

输送过大量北朝鲜难民经中国抵达韩国的地下通道是由前美国保守派韩国新教会建立的。该教会同时向给韩国境内的北朝鲜人提供了多种多样的宗教或者非宗教服务以帮助他们在这里安居乐业。笔者称该地下通道为“基督教走廊”。因为这个“基督教走廊”的存在，多达80—90%定居韩国的北朝鲜人在到达韩国之后成为了新教徒⁵。而且，他们中70%的人仍在依靠教会的服务为生⁶。北朝鲜难民皈依基督教这件事这在北朝鲜建国领袖金日成的眼里就意味着西方的帝国主义。但是，在逗留中国和被移送韩国期间，作为支持方的基督教成为了北朝鲜人心目中自由和民主的代名词，和他们通向富足的中产阶级基督徒生活的“韩国梦”的媒介⁷。在过去，脱北者被当局推上了国家英雄的圣坛，被公开赞美（从

3 明玉（Myung-ok，音译），一位北朝鲜女性基督教徒。本处原文为：I believe we Christians, the descendents of God, must see [the arrival in South Korea] from God's viewpoint and from the Spirit's viewpoint. North Korea worships Kim Il-Sung. North Korea is a religion that worships Kim Il-Sung. None other than the Gospel (pogŭm) can destroy the Kim Il-Sung religion and reunify the two Koreas. The reunification is a spiritual war in which South Korea confronts North Korea. It is God's intent that a reunification of the Koreas takes place. God has led many North Korean defectors, including myself, from North Korea to here [South Korea] by way of many routes, such as Southeast Asia and Europe. In the Exodus, God saved us [as we walked] through the pillar of fire and of clouds in the Bible, and experienced the Lord.” —Myung-ok, a female North Korean Christian.

4 原文为“spiritual war”，也指“与上帝有关的战争”。在基督教中，该词具有“上帝与恶灵之间的战争”的含义。——译者

5 Chung, B-h. 2009. “Between Defector and Migrant: Identities and Strategies of North Koreans in South Korea.” *Korean Studies* 32: 1–27; Jeon, W-t. et al. 2010. T’ongil silhŏm, kŭ 7 nŏn: Bukhan italjumin ūi namhan sari paenŏl yŏn’gu [Unification Experiment, for Seven Years: Study of North Korean Migrants’ Life in South Korea]. Seoul, South Korea: Hanul Academy.

6 Jeon, W-t. 2007. Saram-ŭi T’ongil ttang- ūi T’ongil [Unification of People, Unification of Land]. Seoul, South Korea: Yonsei University Press.

7 参见Ong, Aihwa. 2003. *Buddha is Hiding: Refugees, Citizenship, the New America*. Berkeley: University of California Press; Weber, Max. 1963. *The Sociology of Religion*. Boston: Beacon Press; van der Veer, Peter. ed. 1996. *Conversion to Modernities: The Globalization of Christianity*. New York: Routledge.

20世纪60年代到80年代), 而现在, 只有在教会里, 只有在讨论到宗教转变的想法时, 北朝鲜人才能批评他们的国家(北朝鲜)。关于人权和宗教的话题总是和他们对于基督教的皈依联系在一起。

笔者认为北朝鲜移民对基督教的皈依是一个文化过程, 该过程反映了韩国保守派巨型教会的政治抱负: 他们希望能成为抵挡共产主义入侵的堡垒, 并同时希望在冷战时期实现教会的爆炸性发展。这些教会使韩国成为了世界上第二大传教士输入国, 与此同时, 也使新教面临着严厉的社会指责。这些指责包括教会的“巨型症候群”(“bigness syndrome”), 过于激进的传教工作, 以及缺少实质性的社会贡献。帮助北朝鲜的“弟兄姐妹”(“brothers and sisters”) 和在北朝鲜传教实际上是一件事情, 因为这两者的目的都在于使这个国家基督教化, 并且都致力于使基督教恢复到其在这个社会中原本的支配地位。在本文中, 笔者将会对焦北朝鲜跨国移民的生活轨迹, 从而求证他们介于社会主义存在和基督教存在之间暧昧又复杂的转化过程。同时, 本文也将探讨在南北朝鲜(朝韩)国家分裂的现实和重新统一的想象并存的大背景下, 基督教与政治力量相互纠缠和对抗的原因和过程。

此前的研究主要涉及政府和民众对于移民者的资助体系和移民者们努力适应新社会的情况⁸。这些研究承认

北朝鲜移民的基督教经历和他们对于教会服务的依赖始终贯穿于他们的人生轨迹。但是, 这些研究更倾向于认为大多数基督教或者宗教方面的问题仅仅是移民的附带问题或者枝节问题。而提到教会时, 这些研究总是把它当作一个工具性的名词, 也就是说, 它的作用就体现在它对移民提供或者应当提供的服务上。

笔者认为, 教会首先是一个族群内的“交流区”。而该交流区就像Mary Louise Pratt所说的一样: “不同种文化相遇、发生冲突并相互搏斗的社会空间中通常充斥着不对等的支配和从属的关系”(“social spaces where disparate cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in highly asymmetrical relations of domination and subordination”)⁹。在这里, 宗教服务就像一个窗口, 透过它, 我们可以更好地理解如此复杂的思想、政治和文化的张力(例如民族主义、帝国主义、自由、人权等等)是如何在移居者的身份重置中相遇的。更确切的说, 他们的宗教上的转变实际上是伴随着公民身份产生的文化活动。通过研究这项转变, 我们可以厘清宗教同时产生和销毁移民者北朝鲜身份的过程以及它所指向的一个国家前景——“一个定型的世界”(“a figured world”)¹⁰, 在这个世界里, 移民者被有计划的“挑选”(“the chosen”)了出来去拯救北朝鲜和复兴朝鲜的基督教, “就像”(“as if”)这两个国家已经统一了似的。

本文包括两个主要部分和一个结论部分。第一部分提供了对于基督教和社会主义自现代性萌芽时期作为宗教和可供选择的意识形态进入朝鲜以来, 两者之间关系的简要历史分析。第二部分有两个小节。在第一小节中, 笔者将提供北朝鲜移民在中国和韩国的教会内安置情况的民族志报告。在第二小节中, 笔者将会介绍一个面向北朝鲜移民的教会服务: 一个巨型教会运营下的培训项目——自由学校。笔者认为自由学校是新教教会对于基督教化的统一朝鲜进行设想的一个典型代表。而在这个制造新公民身份的计划中, 民族主义想象与全球性梦想相互交杂, 共同面对着来自北朝鲜移民本身文化异质性的挑战。

⁸ 参见 Choo, H-y (Hae Yeon). 2006. “Gendered Modernity and Ethnicized Citizenship: North Korean Settlers in Contemporary South Korea.” *Gender and Society* 20(5): 576–604.

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Jeon, W-t. 2000. *Saram-ūi T’ongil ūl wihayŏ* [For People’s Unification]. Seoul, South Korea: Orūm;

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Lankov, Andrei. 2006. “Bitter Taste of Paradise: North Korean Refu-

gees in South Korea.” *Journal of East Asian Studies* 6(1): 105–37;

Suh, J-j. (Jae-jean). 2002. “North Korean Defectors: Their Adaptation and Resettlement.” *East Asian Review* 14(3): 67–86. http://www.ieas.or.kr/vol14_3/14_3_5.pdf;

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⁹ Pratt, Mary Lousie. 1992. *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation*. New York and London: Routledge 第4页。

¹⁰ Holland, Dorothy C., Debra Skinner, William Lachicotte Jr., and Carole Cain, eds. 1998. *Identity and Agency in Cultural Worlds*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 第52页。

两位客人：朝鲜的基督教和共产主义

本部分为想要了解北朝鲜移民在基督教问题上遭遇韩国教会的政治文化意义所必需的简要历史回顾。基督教（尤其是基督新教）¹¹ 和共产主义（社会主义）对于朝鲜来说既是新鲜事物又是外来力量。然而，在当时处于日本帝国主义（而非西方殖民主义）进程中的朝鲜，这两者均迅速发展了起来，促使朝鲜人产生了一个新的现代的民族国家的设想。当时的朝鲜民族主义者和社会主义者都是新教教会和教会学校里培养出来的，实际上，在殖民时期（1910年-1945年），新教领袖和社会主义者既是同盟军又是竞争者。有趣的是，在当时基督教慢慢地控制了南方，而共产主义则占领了北方¹²。结果，作为一项国家政策的反共主义得到主要来自于新教教会的长期支持，代表现代灵性的新教教会比世俗的社会主义北朝鲜更具优越性。

通过回顾有希望建立新生独立国家两股的力量——基督教和共产主义之间的关系，笔者认为，当我们观察了半个世纪之后再去看这两股势力间表面上的水火不容，就会发现这实际上是由冷战导致的国家分裂和北朝鲜针对宗教/基督教的政策所产生和加强的¹³。

天主教第一次进入朝鲜是在十八世纪后期，当时，将天主教带入朝鲜的并非传教士，而是由本国的学者和商人引导的“西学”（Western learning）运动。在此之后，朝鲜的天主教遭到了长达一个多世纪的迫害，在残酷的战争中。无数的信徒殉道而亡。直到十九世纪后期，国内各派纷争不断加上日本势力逐渐渗入，美国新教传教士才得以开始借助各种身份进入朝鲜，他们中有医师、教育者，甚至仅仅是作为榜样国家来的模范公民。

1895年到1910年间，基督教迅速地发展了起来。究其原因，Kenneth Wells认为这是由于当时的中日战争、日俄战争和日本从1905年起对朝鲜的吞并所导致的曾占统治社会与政治结构统治地位的新儒学和两班（

양반, yangban [noble class]）贵族的没落¹⁴。因此，在大量的多种多样的从非暴力抗议（比如1919年的“三一起义”）到武装抵抗（比如引爆建筑物、暗杀日本官员和朝鲜卖国贼等）的抗日活动中，新教徒成了最活跃的一拨人。

从二十世纪前期开始，共产主义成为了朝鲜追求国家独立民族统一道路上的另一个可行的选择，但是，至少从表面上看，当时的朝鲜共产主义者和新教徒之间的关系并不紧张。这是由于在日占时期（1910年-1945年），除了通敌卖国者，所有朝鲜人都被侵略者残忍地压迫着¹⁵。基督教和共产主义这两股力量引导了众多抗日的民族独立和启蒙运动。

直到全国解放之后不久，朝鲜被分裂成了两个国家，基督教和共产主义之间才出现了大规模的敌对性分歧。在1945年到1953年之间，超过一百万人口（占北方人口的11%-15%）迁移到了南边，这其中包括了当时北方35%-40%的新教徒¹⁶。朝鲜内战（1950年-1953年）中，新教也对共产主义者进行了残酷的报复。内战中，除了战场上的伤亡之外，成千上万的人死于济州岛（1948年4月）、丽水（1948年10月）和信州（1950年10月）的大屠杀中¹⁷，死于西北青年（Söbuk Youth）这一由首尔基督教青年会（YMCA, Young Men's Christian Association）建立的，由新教教会和韩国军方领导的，并在美国军方政府（USAMGIK, United States Army Military Government）支持下的反共组织之手¹⁸。

与此同时，在北方，基督教和社会主义联合领导了解放后的民族国家建设¹⁹。值得一提的是，在1945年

14 Wells, Kenneth. 1990. *New God, New Nation: Protestants and Self-Reconstruction Nationalism in Korea, 1896–1937*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

15 参见Wells, Kenneth. 2008. "The Place of Religion in North Korean Ideology." In *Korea: The Past and the Present: Selected Papers from the British Association for Korean Studies*, edited by Susan Pares and J. E. Hoare. Folkestone, Kent, England: Global Oriental.

16 Lee, Timothy S. 2010. *Born Again: Evangelicalism in Korea*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press 第65页（转引自 Kang, I-c. 2005. "Han'guk Kaesin'gyo Pan'gongjuüi üi hyöngsöng kwa jae-saengsan [Formation and Reproduction of Korean Protestant Anticommunism]." *Yöksapip'yöng* 70: 40–63. Seoul, South Korea: Yöksapip'yöngsa).

17 像Timothy S. Lee在他书中简明地指出的那样，仅仅一个月就有超过350000的人口死在了信州大屠杀里，占该地区人口的四分之一。最近，由于黄皙暎（Hwang Sögyöng/ Hwang Sok-yong,）的小说《客人》（Sonnim）的出版使这一事件开始受到关注。在小说里，黄皙暎指出共产主义和基督教都仅仅是客人一打破主人家（即朝鲜国）平静生活的外来因素。所谓客人，是一个比喻的说法。在本土民间宗教（即萨满教）里，天花往往被认为是鬼上身造成的结果，而客人也就像是需要用当地治疗仪式来驱赶出病人身体（即朝鲜半岛）的鬼魂一样。毕加索的画作“朝鲜大屠杀”（“Masacre in Korea”）（1951）的原型就是信州事件。

18 Lee, Timothy S. 2010. *Born Again: Evangelicalism in Korea*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press 第66–69页。

19 Kenneth Wells 认为“新教和社会主义之间的关系相当复杂。

11 基督教翻译成韩文是기독교 (Kitokkyo)，一般只指代新教，而天主教则称作천주교 (Ch'önjugyo)。在韩国，基督教徒 (기독교인, K'ürisüch'an) 是指新教徒。根据这一情况，本文中的基督教即指新教和福音教派，天主教并不包含在内。

12 Lee, Timothy S. 2010. *Born Again: Evangelicalism in Korea*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

13 Wells, Kenneth. 2008. "The Place of Religion in North Korean Ideology." In *Korea: The Past and the Present: Selected Papers from the British Association for Korean Studies*, edited by Susan Pares and J. E. Hoare. Folkestone, Kent, England: Global Oriental; 参见Hawk, David, and North Korea Study Team. 2005. *Thank You Father Kim Il Sung: Eyewitness Accounts of Severe Violations of Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion in North Korea*. Washington, DC: United States Commission on International Religious Freedom.

时，基督教徒占北方人口的2.1%，而在南方，这个数字仅为0.6%。朝鲜分裂后，新教领袖曾为成立一个基督教和社会主义联合的政党—基督教社会民主党做出了巨大的努力。然而，因为不被允许参加定于1946年11月11星期天的全国大选，该党派很快就瓦解了。紧接着，该党派的领导人之一韩景职（한경직，韩景職）牧师被迫迁往三八线以南。随后，他建立了世界上最大的长老派教会—永乐长老教会。而没有离开北朝鲜的人据说都被处决了，关进了集中营，或者成了社会主义革命的对象。根据一份由韩国基督教伤亡传教士协会（Korean Church Martyrs Missionary Association，KCMMA）于2001年公示的官方数据报告显示，在1945年-1953年间，大约90%²⁰（2001年统计数据为191人）的新教教徒被共产党处死²¹。

战后，北朝鲜内部反美情绪连同反日情绪高涨，在建设革命的民族国家的名义下，北朝鲜同美帝国主义支持下的韩国“傀儡”（“puppet”）政权针锋相对。在展开“镜像式”（“mirrored”）敌对竞争时，为了证明自己比对方更正统，南韩和朝鲜两国政权驱使各自的民众以期达到更快的经济增长。尽管双方都将国家统一放到了国家政策的首位，然而，在实际中国家的现代化建设和经济增长才是重中之重。在这样激烈的战后竞争中，在韩国，冷战产生的身份认同与基督教民族主义混为了一谈，而后者自十九世纪末以来就已经成为了朝鲜民族主义的基础，并且基督教民族主义的“自我重建传统”²²（“self-reconstruction tradition”）影响了战后的由国家引导的复兴运动²³。韩国建立的模式其实与现代西方现代

性所假定的国家与教会分离的模式并不相同，事实上，韩国是由一个较大的新教教会领袖所建立的。卫理公会教派长老李承晚（이승만）成为了韩国的第一届总统，并且受到了美国的支持。在该届政府中超过39%的高官为新教教徒，而在1945年这项数字仅为0.6%²⁴。

曾经在北朝鲜具有强大影响力的基督教真的被连根拔起，并被共产主义所取代了吗？从整体上来讲，不只是基督教被当成了美帝国主义的同义词，其他宗教也被定义为迷信和伪意识形态，因此，北朝鲜政府以推翻先前的封建主义、殖民主义和帝国主义的社会主义革命的名义对这些宗教进行了全面取缔。而且，随着时间的推移，北朝鲜人变得对此深信不疑。“我们不需要这样的东西，”当被外国人问到宗教问题时，北朝鲜人是如此回答的。除此之外，北朝鲜的战争故事详述了美军“非人”（“inhuman”）的暴行，而由此产生的恐惧之情和报复之心被联系到了美国传教士的身上，北朝鲜人觉得他们在北朝鲜的时候一直在做坏事²⁵。究竟这些故事是真

主义倾向和神学观点，这些美国传教士虽然坚决支持政教分离的思想，最后却与殖民者合作而非反对殖民。（参见Ryu, D-y (Dae Young). 2008. “The Origin and Characteristics of Evangelical Protestantism in Korea at the Turn of the Twentieth Century.” *Church History: Studies in Christianity and Culture* 77(2): 371–98; Ryu, D-y (Dae Young). 2009. *Han'guk kūn-hyōndaesa wa Kitokkyo [Korean Modern History and Christianity]*. Seoul, South Korea: p'urūnyōksa; Lee, Timothy S. 2010. *Born Again: Evangelicalism in Korea*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press; Yi, M-y (Mahn-yol). 2006. “Korean Protestants and the Reunification Movement.” In *Christianity in Korea*, edited by Robert E. Buswell and Timothy S. Lee, 238–57. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press; Wells, Kenneth. 1990. *New God, New Nation: Protestants and Self-Reconstruction Nationalism in Korea, 1896–1937*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press; Park, M-s. 2009. “Tachonggyo sahoe esō ūi Han'guk Kaesin'gyo wa kukka kwōllyōk [Korean Protestantism and National Power in the Plural Religious Context].” *Chonggyo yōn'gu [Religious Studies]* 54: 1–37).

²⁴ 更多关于李承晚政府和新教之间关系的讨论参见：

Yi, M-y (Mahn-yol). 2006. “Korean Protestants and the Reunification Movement.” In *Christianity in Korea*, edited by Robert E. Buswell and Timothy S. Lee, 238–57. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press; Lee, Timothy S. 2010. *Born Again: Evangelicalism in Korea*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press;

Kang, I-c. 2007. *Han'guk ūi Kaesin'gyo wa Pan'gongjuūi: Posujōk Kaesin'gyo ūi chōngch'ijōk haengdongjuūi t'amgu [Korean Protestantism and Anticommunism: An Examination of Conservative Protestantism's Political Activism]*. Seoul, South Korea: Chungsim; Ryu, D-y (Dae Young). 2009. *Han'guk kūn-hyōndaesa wa Kitokkyo [Korean Modern History and Christianity]*. Seoul, South Korea: p'urūnyōksa.

²⁵ 例如，在教科书里描述的美国传教士所犯下的“不能被忘记的”（“unforgettable”）罪行如下：一个美帝国主义者假借传教的名义来到朝鲜，一个朝鲜小男孩捡起他果园里的一个苹果，他就让他的狗攻击了这个男孩，还用盐酸在男孩的额头上刻上了“盗贼”（“thief”，Tojōk）的字样；美国传教的医生把朝鲜病人的器官带回美国并对外售卖，等等。战争故事是讲美国军队是如何残杀无辜的朝鲜人民的，比如，有一群人认为美方轰炸机不会轰炸教堂，于是他们躲进了教堂里，但是他们最后在教堂里全部遇难这样的故

朝鲜第一个社会主义党派以及之后1918年建立的第一个共产主义党派的创始人李东辉（音译）就是一名新教徒，而将《共产党宣言》翻译成朝鲜文的则是另外一位激进主义新教徒吕运亨。”（Wells, Kenneth. 2008. “The Place of Religion in North Korean Ideology.” In *Korea: The Past and the Present: Selected Papers from the British Association for Korean Studies*, edited by Susan Pares and J. E. Hoare. Folkestone, Kent, England: Global Oriental 第8页）。

²⁰ 参见Kang, I-c. 2007. *Han'guk ūi Kaesin'gyo wa Pan'gongjuūi: Posujōk Kaesin'gyo ūi chōngch'ijōk haengdongjuūi t'amgu [Korean Protestantism and Anticommunism: An Examination of Conservative Protestantism's Political Activism]*. Seoul, South Korea: Chungsim.

²¹ 与之相同的是，在北朝鲜建国之初，随着共产主义政权对土地和教育的改革，其它所有先前存在的宗教，包括佛教和天道教（천도교Ch'ōndogyo，在十九世纪末期第一次出现在朝鲜底层社会的一种本土宗教）在内，开始迅速地丧失或放弃了他们的地盘（Wells, Kenneth. 2008. “The Place of Religion in North Korean Ideology.” In *Korea: The Past and the Present: Selected Papers from the British Association for Korean Studies*, edited by Susan Pares and J. E. Hoare. Folkestone, Kent, England: Global Oriental）。

²² Wells, Kenneth. 1990. *New God, New Nation: Protestants and Self-Reconstruction Nationalism in Korea, 1896–1937*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

²³ 在研究韩国基督教现代史的学者间存在着一个争论。大多数（不是全部）韩国学者同外行人一样，倾向于强调抗日民族主义运动是由基督教领袖们领导并组织的。然而，外国学者则大多认为这种解释本身就是民族主义的。他们重视受美国传教士影响的强烈的福音

的，还是仅仅是国家为了宣传目的而进行的洗脑在这里并不重要，重要的是我们需要理解北朝鲜人严重的反基督教、反宗教情绪来自于他们自己的历史经验，而这种情绪又反过来复现在特别是语言和叙事方式上²⁶。当考虑到语言的使用和表现时，我们不难理解为什么北朝鲜人会在韩国教会仪式体系中发现这么多与他们在北朝鲜时相似的地方。但是，与此同时，更加需要注意的是他们之间的区别，这种区别不仅仅出现在其本质中，更是出现在人们的叙事和对话里。

接下来的部分将会具体阐述北朝鲜越境者在借道中国去韩国的途中和抵达韩国之后接触、经历、抵制和皈依基督教的多点民族志。

越境和在分裂国家内的转变

在韩国的国家建设中，教会和国家始终没有分开过。而对于北朝鲜社会，郑炳浩（Byung-ho Chung 정병호，音译）认为我们可以用Clifford Geertz的“剧院国家”（“theater state”）概念来理解其宗教性的仪式和表演在维系其政治力量的过程中的核心地位。笔者认为北朝鲜移民接触和皈依基督教的经历揭示了该转变正深陷于在日新月异的东北亚诸国和跨国宗教/教会之间的角力中。与此同时，我必须强调朝鲜特殊的民族主义的重要性，在微观层面上，这种民族主义既促进又扰乱了民族内部的交流和互动。

在韩国，以中国和北朝鲜为目的的传教活动往往直接地或者间接地涉及到宗教自由和人权问题，因此这些活动会影响到国家的宗教政策。这说明宗教上的变化几乎总是贯穿于特定的政治条件中²⁷。Robert Hefner认为宗教的转变“受相互作用的身份认同、政治和道德规范的影响”（“influenced by a larger interplay of identity, politics, and morality”）²⁸。在这篇文章中，笔者会自始至终顾及到推动或者吸引北朝鲜移民进入宗教领域的各

事。提及类似故事的地点往往不只局限在学校和工作场所，在“暴行”（“brutality”）发生的地方，这些故事也被反复详述。在像是尾注4里提到过的信州博物馆这样的发生过惨剧的参观景点，北朝鲜人也会反复讲述类似的故事，以强调和再次确认他们的反美情绪。²⁶ 在“我们自己的路！”（“Our own way!”）的旗帜下，一般意义的反帝国主义和特别的反美国主义是主体思想的内容。一家在北朝鲜工作的非政府救援机构在1999年拍摄了一段视频，内容是邀请一位六七岁的男孩对韩国学生讲几句话。视频中，男孩用一种坚定地口吻（就像他提前准备了一样）说：“我想对韩国的朋友（Namjosŏn dongmu-dŭl）说的是，让我们尽快把美帝国主义踢出我们的国家，然后我们可以一起学习，一起玩耍。”这个男孩套话式的发言，其核心是朝鲜族人严重的血统纯正思想和北朝鲜人强烈的民族自豪感。北朝鲜人“公开地”相信他们的国家是一个真正独立的国家，他们从来没有害怕过美帝国主义，并且始终与之顽强对抗着。²⁷ van der Veer, Peter. ed. 1996. *Conversion to Modernities: The Globalization of Christianity*. New York: Routledge 第10–14页。²⁸ Hefner, Robert W. ed. 1993. *Conversion to Christianity: Historical and Anthropological Perspectives on a Great Transformation*. Berkeley: University of California Press 第4页。

项结构性条件和助力。通过民族志研究，笔者认为他们在宗教上的改变并不应该仅仅被当作是独立个体本体论性的转变，而应该考虑到教会的介入（传教网络）和特殊的地理政治情况（冷战、饥荒和全球化）。

朝鲜族的民族主义并不统一。然而，有一个基本观点是所有朝鲜族人包括中国的朝鲜族、北朝鲜人和韩国人所共有的，即所有的朝鲜人在民族上是“同质”（“homogeneous”）的，因此他们在文化上也是“同质”（“homogeneous”）的。族群同质性这样基于血缘关系的神话在世界上其他地方也可以找得到，但是朝鲜人将这一观念推向了极致²⁹。朝鲜人的这一观念使得他们几乎无法接受族群内的异质性，这为教会中的族群内交流和互动带来了不少麻烦。

以下的观察内容证明了基督教具有作为族群内交流区的作用，在这个交流区内，北朝鲜移民遇到了中国的朝鲜族人和韩国的基督教徒，通过这些接触、互动、学习等，他们发生了宗教上的转变，并且每一个移民者的人生轨迹都被可见或不可见的力量和制度所重塑和再造了。这一部分包括两个描述移民通道的场景：一个发生在中朝边境地区，另一个则在韩国首都首尔。而北朝鲜则位于这两者之间。

越境和越境者：北朝鲜越境者和中国的教会

北朝鲜被公认为是世界上最封闭的国家。对朝鲜人来说，无证越境曾经是不可想象的。直到20世纪90年代中期，朝鲜爆发了大饥荒，跨越中朝边境成了生死攸关的问题。比起北朝鲜来，中国的东北地区要富裕得多。因此，越来越多的北朝鲜人冒着生命危险试图借道中国的朝鲜族自治州—延边地区³⁰到达韩国从而寻找更好的生活³¹。他们想象中的更好的生活因人而异。但是，他们中大多数成功到达韩国的人说他们决定走基督教地下通道（到达韩国）是因为没有国籍（*nara ŏpnŭn sŏrum*）的

²⁹ 参见Grinker, Roy Richard. 1998. *Korea and Its Future: Unification and the Unfinished War*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

³⁰ 但是，时至今日，我们仍旧不知道究竟有多少北朝鲜人生活在中国，但是，据估计这个数字大约是10 0000左右。在九十年代末期和21世纪初期，据估计，这项数字曾一度超过30 0000。他们中大约80%为女性，这些人要么嫁给了中国的朝鲜族人或者汉族人，要么被贩卖进了红灯区。

³¹ Yoon, Y-s (Yŏsang, Yeo-Sang). 2003. “Pukhan it'al chumin kŭpchŭng e ttarŭn chŏngch'aek taean [Policy Options in Response to the Rapid Increase of North Korean Migrants].” *Kukkachŏllyak [National Strategy]* 9(1): 65–88;

Suh, J-j. (Jae-jean). 2002. “North Korean Defectors: Their Adaptation and Resettlement.” *East Asian Review* 14(3): 67–86. http://www.ieas.or.kr/vol14_3/14_3_5.pdf.

Chung, B-h. 2009. “Between Defector and Migrant: Identities and Strategies of North Koreans in South Korea.” *Korean Studies* 32: 1–27.

日子实在是太艰难了。就像大多数人权报道和研究³²不断强调的那样，身心上的磨难连着失去国籍的状态使这些人成为了“一群极度脆弱的人”（“an extraordinarily vulnerable population”）³³。笔者认为基督教通过不同的方式照顾了这些人，使他们恢复了对未来的期望，并帮助他们走进新的环境。

在许多构建了北朝鲜受害者形象的人权报告中，表面上并没有涉及到宗教或者宗教活动。但是，事实上，人权对话和活动、人道主义援助和许多调查研究甚至包括笔者自己田野作业的开展都不可避免的使用了宗教网络，尤其是新教网络³⁴。实际上，没弄清楚北朝鲜人权对话和实践中宗教的角色和作用，就不能够调动起越境者在计划和实现越境过程中的主观能动性。

毫无疑问，基督教为北朝鲜避难者提供了经济和精神上的资源，同时，基督教也需要这些移民来保持资源的流入。2007年，就在北京奥运会前夕，中国的执法机关和北朝鲜的秘密警察加大了逮捕和驱逐北朝鲜“非法”越境者的力度。

在延吉市有一个帮助北朝鲜难民的人权组织。但是，该组织却是以外贸公司的名义正式注册的。该组织经营着一家制造厂，生产手工饰品（比如十字架吊坠）和陶瓷制品并向美国出口。虽然，该组织几乎不盈利，但是，每年都会有百万多美元从设在美国的总部汇入这家公司。这家公司就是一个改良版的难民营：在一名美国来的CEO（总监、难民专家同时也是牧师）的领导下，韩国和美籍韩裔的团队经理和大量中国朝鲜族和汉族的办公室人员（现场经理）需要管理所谓的家庭工

厂；实际上，这些家庭工厂就是秘密避难所，它们到处散落着，为数百名的需要特殊照顾的北朝鲜单身女性、家庭和孤儿提供住宿。事实上，大多数家庭避难所是教会里朝鲜族执事的家，他们用得到的钱来维持这些“家庭”工厂³⁵。为了以防万一，避难所里的北朝鲜人行动受限，不能随意离开。但是，在夜里消失不见这样的事情时有发生。根据推测，这些人已经去了韩国或者其他地方。否则的话，只有学龄儿童可以离开避难所去参加由公司组织的私人汉语辅导项目。

在一个汉语老师家里，我遇到了十四岁的女孩宋熙（Sunghee성희，音译）。她说话的时候声音压得很低，这是因为在过去的几个月里她已经习惯了避难所里的生活。我问她在家（避难所）的时候都干什么。她告诉我她喜欢看延边地区长期播放的韩国电视节目，她也常常帮她的母亲抄写圣经篇章，这项工作她一做就是几个小时。她家庭的看护者是一名中国朝鲜族教堂执事，这名执事会给她的母亲一些抄写费。抄写圣经是在避难所里的北朝鲜人能得到的常见的“工作”之一。然而，一位公司的现场经理澄清说他们从来没有给过他们的“难民”这样的工作。可是在家庭避难所里，这样的工作并不罕见，本地的朝鲜族看护者们总能找到各种各样的方法来增加他们自己的收入。

这些难民所获得的基督教教育和其被鼓励去建立族群内关系的这些例子，反映了正负的多重观点。首先，北朝鲜人是通过象征性符号，像是十字架、圣经和教会内的等级词汇（比如执事、牧师等）等来感受基督教精神的，而这些符号直接与实际资源的供应和分配相绑定，比如避难所、药品和金钱，还有，通常情况下地下通道的“火车票”也是与之有联系。其次，笔者许多身在韩国的调查对象告诉笔者，当意识到族群内部存在着不同等级，而他们自己就跟“动物园里的猴子”（“a monkey in a zoo”）差不多的时候，他们觉得异常难过。有一点需要特别注意，北朝鲜人通常具有很强的自尊心，而羞耻经常会导致暴力行为。他们常常认为中国的朝鲜族看护者截取了“他们的”钱，这些钱来自于身在这个跨国族群内等级最高的韩国传教士，实际上，在东北亚，韩国公民身份和基督教被认为是一个整体性的在经济和文化上领先的身份，而北朝鲜越境者知道当他们抵达韩国之后就会自动获得韩国国籍。

除了物质上的需求，他们的思想也受到了更大的社会文化环境的影响。根据延边大学的一名教授在2010年发表的报告，在这个地区，基督教已经成为了最普遍并且发展最快的宗教³⁶。事实上，自从1992年中韩建交以

32 近年来，大量已经出版的活动报告开始提高对在中国和中国之外的北朝鲜“难民”（“refugees”）的关注。这其中包括国际特赦组织报告（Amnesty International's Report）：朝鲜民主主义人民共和国（2007）（Democratic People's Republic of Korea），国际危机分析组织的危机四伏的旅程（International Crisis Group's Perilous Journeys【2007】）：在中国以及中国之外的北朝鲜难民的困境（首尔；布鲁塞尔；国际危机分析组织，2006）（The Plight of North Koreans in China and Beyond【Seoul；Brussels：International Crisis Group，2006】），美国国会研究服务的在中国的北朝鲜难民以及人权问题（Congressional Research Service's North Korean Refugees in China and Human Rights Issues）：国际回应与美国的政策选择（International Response and U.S. Policy Options）（华盛顿特区：美国国会研究服务部，国会图书馆，2007）（Washington, D.C.：Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2007）。

33 Haggard, Stephan, and Marcus Noland. 2011. Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics 第1页。

34 具有致力于为越境者服务的人道主义救援机构的两大宗教为：佛教（即好朋友Good Friends，一家韩国佛教NGO【Non-Governmental Organization，非政府组织】）和新教。相较而言，前者的活动难见到，但是活动组织更具条理。出于安全原因，笔者没能获得足够的民族志资料来比较好朋友和新教机构的活动。但是根据好朋友的公众形象可知，在其总部的指导下，该组织提供的秘密援助包括食物包分配、避难所和调研指导。该组织向韩国人提供大量关于北朝鲜越境者情况的资料和各种关于北朝鲜社会的报告。

35 为了保证安全，“不要相信任何人”（“Don't trust anyone”）是公司的一条潜规则。多亏了笔者的个人关系和之前在相似领域待过的NGO工作者的经历，笔者得到了几位现场经理的帮助，才能够采访北朝鲜年轻人。

36 在由韩国教会国家理事会组织的一次大会上，全信嘉（Jeon Shin-ja /Ch'ŏn Sin-ja，音译）教授报告了延边地区基督教徒人数在1985年为3500人，1990年为1 190人，1995年为3 250人，2004年为3 8694人（Sŏnkyŏsinmun 2010. 08. 27, www.missionnews.co.kr/

来,该地区已经成为了韩国传教士旨在深入中国东北地区和北朝鲜的桥头堡。尽管中国政府仍在试图控制一切宗教活动,据报道,几乎所有的朝鲜族家庭教会都和韩国的基督教网络接上了头,并且受该网络监管,该网络同时也支持本地的朝鲜族基督教会的注册。这一边境地区对于传教活动的重要性并不仅仅是因为该地区在地理上连接着中国和北朝鲜,而且是因为该地区在朝鲜的民族情感中具有特殊地位。在韩国民族主义者的心中,中国的东北地区(满洲地区)是特别的。朝鲜人从小就被教育说这片土地曾经属于他们的祖先,所以这片土地实际上是朝鲜族和朝鲜民族精神的源头³⁷。

此外,韩国的商业化模式和韩国梦统治了该地区的文化环境。韩国风的餐厅、咖啡店、电脑/网络游戏室、卡拉OK、时尚、说话的方式、流行文化和复古文化在此流行起来,反映了韩流(Hallyu, 韩流)对于本地品味和文化喜好的影响。与此同时,中国籍朝鲜族为韩国提供了最多的外籍新娘和劳工。韩流的广泛传播和韩国资本主义的在场(和统治)同其基督教的扩张和影响密不可分。许多韩国传教士(即使不是所有传教士)享受着他们在经济、文化和由此产生的精神上的优越性³⁸。同时,通过传教网络,韩国风潮就像当年的西方现代主义和美国文化一样得以流传。

总而言之,在关于北朝鲜越境者在中朝边境地区的相关情况和社会流动的讨论中,宗教这一话题常常被忽略了,而本节正是要弄清楚该话题。跨国基督新教与人权宣传一起站在了所谓的世俗国家的对立面上,而北朝鲜“难民”似乎成为代表人权组织讲话的“能够清晰表达的主体”(“enunciating subjects”)³⁹。笔者同时也研

究了基督教对族群内部互动和协商的斡旋过程,并在不久的将来对这样宗教的不同方面意义的复杂性的细节进行调研。然而,在这里,笔者认为朝鲜基督教在现世的繁荣和救援活动与资本主义密切相关,并且对北朝鲜越境者心中的新世界产生了莫大的影响。

首尔的自由学校

本节将描述在经过长途跋涉之后到达韩国的北朝鲜移民的定居过程。通过考察自由学校(笔者称之为自由学校),笔者将会着重关注前社会主义公民(北朝鲜移民)是如何在资本主义韩国转变成宗教公民的。

在哈纳文政府安置中心,韩国政府为所有北朝鲜新移民提供了一项为期三个月的介绍韩国社会基本情况的课程,在被允许离开哈纳文中心后,他们将获得额外的工作培训机会⁴⁰。除了政府,新教教会在安置移民过程中扮演很重要的角色。教会是第二大资源供应方,这些资源包括经济援助、生活用品和周日的共同午餐和祈祷/圣经学习。有一些教会开办特殊的培训课程来提高移民对基督教的理解并获得更多的就业机会。教会想象他们是社会实验室,模仿朝鲜两国统一之后的情境。笔者认为,这样移民对于基督教的皈依是一个具有相当政治和意识形态重要性的文化项目,它体现了韩国福音主义的核心特征。

“我是国家的未来!”自由学校的这座座右铭听起来果断、英勇,并且相当地民族主义化。这个学校的名字是在暗示这些移民在北朝鲜的时候是没有“自由”(“freedom”)的。学校的教务长宋先生(Mr. Song, 音译)强调说这个座右铭是上帝赋予的,上帝是要使这些“同胞”(“brethren”)们重生为国家的主人。这句神圣的座右铭被人用“可爱”(“cute”)的印刷字体印在墙上的方形布质条幅上,条幅上同时也印着朝鲜半岛的地图。条幅上到处绣着粉红色的心形,而上面的座右铭则连着一颗略大的有翅膀的粉红心。这个条幅是几年前做出来的,它代表着朝鲜统一的设想,也代表着朝鲜的统一不能靠战争而是要靠爱。在房间的另一边,在

第4页。

⁴⁰ 哈纳文政府安置中心成立于1999年,随着北朝鲜移民数量的急剧增加,哈纳文的规模和功能也在不断扩大。当北朝鲜移民者或移民者们到达仁川国际机场或者仁川港之后,他们会立即被送往联合审讯中心进行审查以判断他们是否是“真的”(“true”)脱北者,之后他们就会被送往哈纳文。哈纳文会为北朝鲜移民提供心理健康课程、对韩国的资本主义的介绍和技能培训,像是获得驾照的驾驶课,计算机资格考试课程等等。哈纳文中心被带钩的金属丝、保安和监控严密地保护着,出于安全考虑,住在里面的人行动严格受限。移民者被鼓励去参加由新教、天主教、佛教和圆佛教僧人提供的宗教活动。所有这些宗教组织都在协助哈纳文项目和里面住的人。例如,在圆佛教之后,一个韩国佛教派运营起了一家为年轻人开设的寄宿学校,而哈纳文的哈纳新教教会(Hana Protestant church)则经常需要斡旋于北朝鲜皈依者和皈依者离开哈纳文之后被送去的城市里的其他教会之间。

lib/news/28031/page/23).

³⁷ 白头山(即长白山)是中朝边境线上最高的山脉,也是他们的圣山(龙山, Yöngsan). 韩国游客、长期或者短期的传教士、大学学生、萨满(参见Kendall, Laurel. 2009. “The Global Reach of Gods and the Travels of Korean Shamans.” In *Transnational Transcendence: Essays on Religion and Globalization*, edited by Thomas J. Csordas, 305–26. Berkeley: University of California Press), 和其他认为白头山是他们领土的人都会到这里来参观。对北朝鲜人来说,满洲(Manchuria, 中国的东北地区)的重要性是由于“伟大的领袖”(“Great Leader”)金日成曾在这里击败日本帝国主义并且领导朝鲜民族解放运动。白头山也是重要的朝圣地,因为这儿是“亲爱的领袖”(“Dear Leader”)金正日的诞生地。

³⁸ 大多数韩国传教士是通过追随倪维思计划(Nevius Plan)来实现他们的“召唤”(“calling”)的,倪维思计划是由十九世纪在中国传教的美国长老会传教士John L. Nevius制定的。他的方法在当时的中国并不成功,但是在朝鲜的新的美国传教士邀请了他,学习了他的方法,并最终取得了巨大的成功。因此,倪维思计划的原则成了韩国传教工作的主要原则。该计划的三项独立原则(自立、自理和独立宣传)鼓励传教士在经济上独立。除了一些从他们的母教会或者组织获得资金支持的传教士外,许多传教士在传教时是靠个人关系网和兼职工作来获得资金的。在延边州的首府延吉的时候,笔者遇到过的韩国传教士同时也兼任着商人、小店主、牙医、教师等其他职业。

³⁹ Anagnost, Ann. 1997. *National Past-Times: Narrative, Representation, and Power in Modern China*. Durham: Duke University Press

一块学校布告板上边贴着写着不同颜色的“爱你，祝福你”（“Sarang-hago ch'ukbok-hapnida”）字样的旗帜。墙上和天花板上满是教会主日学的孩子们准备的怀旧装饰。从某种意义上说，这是“我们为他们做的都是简单的事情。也就是说，像是当他们的领带系得不对的时候我们去帮他们修整一下领带类似的，我们能帮他们做的，就是这些小事。”一位自由学校的执事如是说。

修整一下领带是对韩国新教教会向北朝鲜人传教的形象比喻。实际上，韩国的自由学校对北朝鲜的移民者是负有责任。在上文中，“我们”（“we”）和“他们”（“they”）都是指朝鲜人，都是天父的子女。但是，“他们”以前去了远方，最近才“回到”（“returned”）天父的怀抱里来。他们需要改变自己，学着去成为“正常”（“normal”）的韩国人。外国的传教士总是能够马上发现他们与自己的传教对象之间巨大而显著的文化差异。与那些外国传教士不同，自由学校里的韩国人认为他们的北方同胞们只有一些“小瑕疵”（“minor errors”）需要修正。“我们”和“他们”是属于同一民族，因此我们可以认为朝鲜文化本来就体现在所有朝鲜人的身上。这样将现代朝鲜史上的种族、族群和国家混为一谈的独特的民族主义⁴¹，是基督教向北朝鲜移民和北朝鲜传教的核心。

就像领带象征所指出的那样，自由学校的建立是为了帮助北朝鲜移民重生为韩国的现代公民。在韩国，像是真诚、勤奋、自立自强这样的特点被认为是走向成功人生的“真谛”（“truth”）。有趣的是，北朝鲜的主体思想也强调着同样的价值观。然而，韩国人刻板地认为北朝鲜人或多或少都有点懒，缺乏意志力，并且总是依赖别人，就像他们平常所看到的那些离开共产主义之后的人一样。这样的刻板印象往往被简单解释为北朝鲜主体思想的副产品，因此韩国人认为北朝鲜人只有通过改变重新变得“真诚”（“sincere”）以后才能称得上是他们的同胞。究竟是什么使北朝鲜人的同化过程迥异于其他离开共产主义的人的情况呢？根据 Sheila Jager⁴² 对于朝鲜战争纪念碑的研究来看，纪念碑是由一个大的象征着韩国哥哥的士兵雕像（确实很大）和他抱着的另外一个小一些的象征北朝鲜弟弟的士兵雕像所组成——在朝鲜半岛上，北朝鲜被当成了弟弟，因此在朝鲜民族等级中自然就处在了从属的地位上。

在研究自由学校作为韩国基督教徒和北朝鲜同胞们交流的区域中，笔者认为改变北朝鲜移民的“落后”（“outdated”）思想和让他们遵守韩国新教资本主义规范培训过程尤为重要。同时，笔者要强调在“修整”

（“fixing”）的进程中，移民的反应是非常复杂的，移民者和韩国教徒之间需要不停地协商与妥协。族群内部的关系由基督教/上帝来调节；感情上的冲突在基督耶稣和关于家庭的隐喻的作用下保持了缄默；韩国的主人和北朝鲜的客人之间明显的社会经济和阶级地位上的差别很可能已经被同族同质的大原则给掩盖了；合理的误解直接被一个简单的信念给略过或否认了：上帝会跟“你的心灵”（“your hearts”）讲⁴³；而现在个人的痛苦也被分享或者忽略了，因为上帝已经为“我们”（“us”）准备好了“国家的未来”（“the future of the nation”）。因此，表面上的紧张关系和心照不宣的和谐相处同时存在着，圣经语言（爱、仁慈、祈祷、拣选、供给等等）和他们共同的民族特质都在进行着斡旋。也就是说，圣经和朝鲜的民族意识在控制着象征韩国教会的自由学校内的共同族群关系。

真诚的公民信徒

正是在这样的背景下，“真诚”（“seongsil”）成了对在韩国的北朝鲜移民的首要要求，同时，这也成了在“真实”（“true”）的基督教活动中最困难的部分。举例来讲，在宗教中，对松巴新教徒来说，真诚就意味着“公众认可的、符合身份的、具体的讲话”（“publicly recognizable, socially indexical, materially embodied forms of speech”）⁴⁴，而对印度尼西亚伊斯兰教来说则意味着可以背诵可兰经的第一章开端章（“al-Fatihah”，“法谛海哈”）⁴⁵。这说明，真诚与关系相关，尤其是社会关系密切相关，而不仅仅取决于神圣的力量。而在自由学校里，韩国新教徒教给北朝鲜移民的真诚包括身体和心灵方面的培养；他们不只需要在行为上变得真诚，还要学习怎样让别人感觉到他们的真诚。

首先，真诚指的是复杂的一组身体和精神上的活动或特质，它包括谦虚、顺从、温和、耐心、勤奋和无私。而根据转换的逻辑关系，与真诚相对立的是，在转变之前的移民者的文化倾向或者说惯习（布迪厄术语）可以被推断为是懒惰的、暴力的和顽固的，即落后的性格⁴⁶。人们常常用像“akman namattda”（“中

⁴¹ Shin, G-w (Gi-Wook). 2006. *Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press; Palais, James. 1998. “Epilogue. Nationalism: Good or Bad?” In *Nationalism and the Construction of Korean Identity*, edited by Hyung Il Pai and Timothy R. Tangherlini, 214–28. Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California.

⁴² Jager, Sheila Miyoshi. 2003. *Narratives of Nation Building in Korea: A Genealogy of Patriotism*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

⁴³ Harding, Susan Friend. 2000. *The Book of Jerry Falwell: Fundamentalist Language and Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

⁴⁴ Keane, Webb. 2007. *Christian Moderns: Freedom and Fetish in the Mission Encounter*. Berkeley: University of California Press 第84页.

⁴⁵ Rowen, John R. 2000. “Imputations of Faith and Allegiance: Islamic Prayer and Indonesian Politics outside the Mosque.” In *Islamic Prayer across the Indian Ocean: Inside and Outside the Mosque*, edited by David J. Parkin and Stephen Cavanaugh Headley, 23–38. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon.

⁴⁶ 对先前其他被殖民的非洲和拉丁美洲民族国家而言，传教士象征着西方现代文明和美德的先驱，然而，与之不同的是，在十九世纪末二十世纪初的朝鲜，接受基督教和其传教士的却是平民阶级和

邪了” “being possessed by the wicked”, 北朝鲜话) 和 “gakpakhada” (“铁石心肠” “hardhearted”) 这样的字眼来描述北朝鲜人的性格。在这点上, 北朝鲜人只能通过学会如果表达真诚和如何特定的情况下如何应对来变得真诚。

例如, 自由学校开设了系列课程 “形象与商务礼仪” (“Image making and business manners”), 授课的老师是一位专业的女性培训师, 她高挑迷人, 给北朝鲜学员们留下了极深的印象⁴⁷。他们认真学习了如何具有良好的举止以便使它们看起来并不 “ak” (坏或者是暴脾气的)。实际上, 他们学习了如何笑出 “迷人的微笑” (“charming smile”), 如何握手, 如何交换名片, 如何通过 “模仿” (“imitating”) 那个讲师的面部表情和说话腔调, 来一步一步让自己笑得更加自然, 从而让自己变得更加彬彬有礼。

这门 “形象” (“image making”) 课程大约相当于关键性的精神课, 在这门课程上他们需要不断地重复 “我可以做到。我只需要做到这一点!” 类似的金句。这种励志练习被认为是韩国五旬节教派所说的魅力天性的一部分, 该教派的牧师赵镛基 (David Cho), 即世界上最大教会汝矣岛纯福音教会的创始人, 通过他的三个祝福的概念 (灵魂兴盛、身体康健和万事繁荣的救世论) 将励志练习传了出去。北朝鲜人过去受到的教育认为宗教是虚假的, 但是, 已经有人从它们过去的信仰体系—主体思想里觉醒了。在北边时, 他们也需要学习适应北朝鲜式的微笑和其他肢体动作。尽管饥荒带走了许多人的生命, 但是在国家节庆中, 他们仍然边舞边笑边高唱 “我们很快乐!”。或许真正讽刺的是, 已经有人承认了他们过去没能预想到的事实—他们在北方时的意识行为和他们在南方, 在自由学校里学到的东西惊人的相似。

考虑到 “家庭” (“family”) 方面, “真诚” 象征着家庭、社会和宗教的义务, 而这些初来乍到的人有义务去适应新的惯习以替代他们原先的落后的主体惯习。就像执事先生 “修整领带” 的那个说法一样, 为移民服务的和同移居者一起工作的韩国基督徒们倾向于通过他们的肢体表现和言行举止来衡量他们社会适应、个性调整和尤为重要的对宗教的虔诚的程度。说首尔话, 美白,

想要寻找儒家理学代替品的上层精英。据朝鲜基督教的历史文献记载, 当时, 现代事物与由美国传教士和受过教育的朝鲜新教徒所领导的对基督教的皈依是连在一起的 (参见 Lee, Timothy S. 2010. *Born Again: Evangelicalism in Korea*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press 第16-19页; Choi, Hyaewool. 2005. “Christian Modernity in Missionary Discourse from Korea, 1905–1910.” *East Asian History* 29: 39–68).

⁴⁷ 当她第一次出现在教室讲台上时, 笔者明显感觉到了她与北朝鲜移民学员之间的不相容, 她的身体是营养良好的、白皙的且富有的韩国资本主义女性的身体, 而不管是男学员还是女学员, 都是一副营养不良、黝黑且贫穷的样子。在系列课程的第一天里, 这样的千差万别导致了双方之间巨大的文化差距。而且, 站在这样一群跟她完全不一样的人的面前, 这名讲师自己都觉得不舒服。但是, 到了第二天, 因为上述的肢体表达的练习开始了, 这种差距也变小了。

举止规范—类似这样的课程都是为了让北朝鲜人变得 “真诚” (“sincere”) 起来, 从而可以更好地适应工作或者宗教 “市场” (“market”)。但是, 讽刺的是, 自由学校的教员们还总是在强调 “内在的” (“interior”) 思想远比 “外在的” (“exterior”) 举止更为重要。

这样的趋势似乎有多重根源: 特别强调思想精神的武装加上一定程度体罚的激进主义教育方法; 试图一统朝鲜人言行的强制性的民族意识; 还有, 基督新教自身的异常重视信念的性质。在韩国的新教文化 (“cultures”) 中, 信徒个人信仰的内在水平被认为是可以通过实质性练习来而显露出来的; 这些实质性练习未必需要宗教的指示, 但是, 需要体现在各自的教派或者教会支持下的活动里。在研究朝鲜基督教发展的历史文献中, 较之其他方面, 分析教会动员其教徒以教会为中心进行日常活动 (像是黎明祈祷、特别祈祷、小组会议、志愿活动、线上活动和短期传教旅行) 的方法并没有得到该有的重视。在韩国, 人们往往通过是否积极热情参加常规或者特别的教会服务来判断是否具有美德、灵性和由此而来的真正的基督徒主观性⁴⁸。

医治仪式

因此, 显而易见的是, 除了被概括进 “修整领带” (“fixing a necktie”) 这句话里的改造进程之外, 既是象征又是仪式的医治活动是自由学校项目的主要内容。在此, 笔者将以一件事情来说明这一点。2006年九月中旬, 自由学校为北朝鲜学员开设了一场名为医治营 (“Ch'i yu”, “healing camp”) 的为期两天的户外活动, 笔者作为访问者参加了此次活动。此次野营的目的有: 1. 通过体验上帝降临来医治受伤的靈魂; 2. 使这些受伤了的靈魂找到与神同在的真正自尊; 3. 摆脱过去的生活, 在基督耶稣的指引下获得新生。很明显, 这次野营的最终目标是使北朝鲜移民能够改变思想皈依基督教。从历史上看, 这个目标一直都在, 从整个基督教史上看, 只有当一个人皈依基督之后医治才算是彻底完成⁴⁹。而以上的目标, 简明扼要地代表了大多数韩国人对北朝鲜移民或多或少的负面印象—韩国人认为他们的灵魂和心灵都受到了伤害, 他们缺乏自尊心, 而且, 他们过去的人生都被北朝鲜给毁灭和污染了。

在第一个晚上, 在一系列的讲座和礼拜之后, 他们举行了大约持续四小时的密集医治仪式, 整个过程非常激烈。领导整个礼拜活动的年轻的韩国志愿者一直在和北朝鲜人一起哭泣。我们一直在大声祈祷, 然后在某个

⁴⁸ Lee, Timothy S. 2010. *Born Again: Evangelicalism in Korea*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

⁴⁹ Porterfield, Amanda. 2005. *Healing in the History of Christianity*. New York: Oxford University Press;

Wightman, Jill Marie. 2008. “New Bolivians, New Bolivia: Pentecostal Conversion and Neoliberal Transformation in Contemporary Bolivia.” PhD diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

瞬间笔者发现自己在用方言。四十岁出头的北朝鲜妇女秀英 (So-yong, 音译) 突然间像被附身了一样倒在地上。她的脸上满布泪水, 四肢都在颤抖。自由学校的校长姜先生 (Mr. Kang, 音译) 和一位特邀的崔牧师 (Pastor Choi, 音译) 立刻跑到了她的面前, 然后高声大喊: “滚开, 我以耶稣的名义命令你滚开!” (“Go away! I command you in the name of Jesus, go away!”)。这是让人惊讶的一幕, 笔者认为这一幕刺激到了在场人们的情绪; 而笔者则期待见证更有戏剧性的后续, 像是秀英从地上弹起然后开始赞美上帝这样的。然而, 在之后的半个小时里面, 再也没有什么特别的事情发生了。姜先生和崔牧师看上去筋疲力尽。姜先生让另外一位女士把秀英带会二楼, 让她上床休息。

第二天早上, 在笔者与姜先生和崔牧师的简短对话中, 姜先生失望地低声对笔者说: “嗯, 基本上要成了, 可是最后他们还是没彻底地敞开心扉” (“Well, it was almost done, but eventually they didn't fully open their minds”)。然后他认真地说: “你晓得, 我们是同一个民族 (韩民族, “han minjok”)。我跟我自己说, 进一步, 再进一步.....昨天晚上, 我觉得我已经快到了。但是他们没完全放开.....我不知道, 但是那儿就像是有层玻璃 (glass) 隔着我们和他们。而且我还打不破它。因为, 一旦我要打破它, 他们就会把玻璃变得更厚。我不知道这玻璃到底是什么, 而且我不晓得我为什么总是有这样的感觉.....我觉得大概是因为他们受金日成的思想影响太久了吧.....”。

姜先生最后的解释表明他和崔牧师都试图“医治”秀英的灵魂 (“cure”), 他们认为她的灵魂被魔鬼金日成附身, 而不是被圣灵充满。在这场对话之后, 笔者又和秀英还有另外一位女士彩恩 (Chae-eun, 音译) 简单地聊了一下。当时, 这两个人都在读同一个神学院。秀英清醒后, 看上去面色苍白。笔者问她: “我猜你昨天晚上被灵魂附身了吧。现在感觉怎么样?” 她回答说: “嗯, 我不知道那是什么, 我就是不能动弹了。也许是因为我最近比较累, 这两天我都没休息。”然后, 她又说: “我有个考试。你知道, 读书蛮难的, 要记的事情有这么多.....所以我都有三天没睡觉了.....”

笔者对姜先生和彩恩女士两者说法的差异感到震惊。姜先生觉得秀英当时是被内心的魔鬼—“邪恶的” (“evil”) 主体思想给附身了。而秀英却说她当时是因为累坏了, 因此, 她的晕厥实际上是因为作为一个四十多岁的母亲和学生, 她需要做太多的事情了。这件事情明显是由北朝鲜移民和韩国基督徒之间持续的误解、冲突和妥协造成的, 而这些交流和互动上的问题导致了朝鲜新教民族主义在实践中的矛盾本质。

“Seongsil”或者“真诚”与医治体现了韩国基督徒对他们的北朝鲜同胞孜孜不倦地服务和传教美德。在韩国处处都要求真诚, 这是因为在新自由主观主义里, 真诚是和自律是连在一起的, 这对在当下这个处处都是竞争的时代里生存和成功至关重要。在和韩国同辈们交流

和互动时, 很多年轻的北朝鲜移民开始意识到并接受这样的标准, 并把它当作是自由主义的个人主义的核心价值来对待⁵⁰。从世俗的角度来看, 以上的医治可以被大多数移民当成是一种对日常生存策略的学习, 因为他们发现在学校里或者在就业市场上, 隐藏或否认他们的北朝鲜人身份并假装是中国的朝鲜族会比较有利⁵¹。真诚和医治 (从世俗的角度上看其实就是自我否认) 反映了移民个人所属势力的残酷现实, 也反映了在韩国的北朝鲜人既是他者又是外人的现状。

结论

笔者对北朝鲜移民在中国---即在去韩国的途中以及在韩国的自由学校里, 皈依基督教的过程进行了研究, 在这个过程中我们可以看到北朝鲜移民和韩国新教教徒之间多种多样的意识形态上的交流和协商。自由学校想象他自己就是一个社会实验室, 提供必要的旨在帮助被选移民适应韩国生活的项目。笔者已经显示了在接受或者吸收“真诚” (“seongsil”) 这一概念的同时, 他们希望移民者能够彻底去除那些从北朝鲜带来的落后的主体思想, 而成为富有成效的公民 (productive citizens)。“富有成效的公民”的概念与经验资本主义密切相关, 如上所述, 基督教已经参与到韩国资本主义国家建设和政治领域里很长时间了。韩国在经济上的发展, 是在受基督教引领的政府领导下进行的。

皈依基督教并不仅仅是改变信仰转向新宗教。除此以外, 金融和资本上的资源也为北朝鲜移民描绘了他们未来可能拥有的物质和生活的蓝图。难民营公司和抄写并销售圣经篇章的事情也说明避难所和家庭教会并不单单依靠来自知名韩国教会所提供的资源, 还依靠可以转化为实际利益的宗教象征, 尽管帮助“难民” (“refugees”) 的利他主义的意义在于把人们带回到“我们天父” (“Our Father”) 的怀抱。在自由学校里, “修整” (“fixing”) 领带的说法并不仅仅是指移民需要用基督教来代替落后的主体思想, 还指他们自己需要被重新定位, 他们的言行举止需要符合资本主义社会的要求, 即他们需要“看上去” (“look”) 像是真诚的韩国资本主义基督教公民。

但是, 在经历这种转换型医治的移民以及提供医治的人中, 始终存在着严重的矛盾。特别是, 医治营的首要目的是为了动员移民者们重建他们与上帝的关系, 但是这种重建要求他们彻底地从过去走出来, 因此, 医治就意味着只有彻底摧毁被认为是仍残存在移民者灵魂里的过去的主体思想形态, 才能使移民者恢复尊严。然而, 当医治仪式结束后, 医治者与被医治者双方却做出

50 Park, Y-a. 2010. “Negotiating South Korea: North Korean Migrants’ Interpretations of Their Socialist Experience.” Paper presented at the Association for Asian Studies conference, Philadelphia, March 25–28, 2010.

51 Kim, Y-y. (Yoon Young). 2009. “Making National Subjects: Education and Adaptation among North Korean Immigrants in South Korea.” PhD diss. in anthropology, University of Hawai’i at Manoa.

了笔者意想不到的反应和解释。笔者认为，在这里，北朝鲜新来者和韩国基督教徒之间仍然存在着冲突、交涉和误解，并非完全的和解。通过以上对所谓的医治者和被医治者的各方面的研究，笔者为展开对韩国新教民族主义之矛盾本性的进一步讨论。

根据笔者的发现，造成这种始终存在但被所谓的爱和祝福所掩盖了的矛盾的原因和本质，并不仅仅是由于在韩国人和自由学校里的移民之间的同化过程中，“伴随着（朝鲜）半岛的分裂而产生的对抗性身份的构建....无疑会造成众多问题.....”⁵²。从移民者的角度来看，这也属于韩国的“现代化神话”（“myth of modernization”），而“现代化神话”则是通过被大多数朝鲜主义者（Koreanists）称为“压缩的现代性”⁵³（“compressed modernity”）和嵌入在朝鲜民族共性的霸权主义意识里的“文化主义观”（“culturalist view”）所产生的。而对韩国的基督教徒来讲，主体思想已经污染了这些移民的身心，这样的观点已然把主体思想作为产生移民者难民心态的原因。但是，韩国心理学家和神经精神病学家指出百分之三十的移民在遭遇了北朝鲜的饥荒和在中国时的颠沛流离之后表现出了PTSD（Post Traumatic Stress Disorder创伤后应激障碍）的症状，而他们在韩国遭遇的文化冲击成了唯一加剧这一状况的原因⁵⁴。最终，一旦北朝鲜移民来到南方，人们就开始期望他们最后能够被同化，同时投入并重新投入他们在韩国的生活（尽管他们有时可能仍需要依赖教会的资源）；人们希望他们在精神上能成为虔诚的基督教徒，在政治

上能坚定地指责北朝鲜，在经济上又能够为教会网络做出贡献。

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52 Bleiker, Roland. 2005. *Divided Korea: Toward a Culture of Reconciliation*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

53 Koo, H. (Hagen). 2001. *Korean Workers: The Culture and Politics of Class Formation*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press;

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