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## Actors, Institutional Change and Reproduction

The Colombian Case of Racial Exclusion and Local  
Socio-economic Performance 1886–1950

Studies on the Social and Political Constitution of the Economy

Irina Rosa España Eljaiek

**Actors, Institutional Change and Reproduction**

The Colombian Case of Racial Exclusion and Local  
Socio-economic Performance 1886–1950

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## Abstract

This research analyzes the effects of an informal exclusionary institution on local socio-economic outcomes. Specifically, focusing on the Afro-descendant population, it analyzes the effects of the informal institution of racial exclusion on local socio-economic outcomes in Colombia in the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries.

The study pursues two major research aims. First, I identify the effect of racial exclusion on socio-economic outcomes. Second, I study how racial exclusion and socio-economic outcomes are causally linked. In other words, I identify a theoretical mechanism. In order to accomplish these research aims, I take a multimethod approach. I use quantitative techniques to estimate the effects of racial exclusion on socio-economic outcomes, and I apply qualitative theory-building process-tracing to identify a theoretical mechanism between racial exclusion and socio-economic outcomes – namely, public good provision.

The quantitative results show that racial exclusion has negative effects on socio-economic outcomes in the Colombian case. They indicate that municipalities with a higher share of Afro-descendant individuals have a lower provision of public goods for development, and a lower level of economic performance. The qualitative analysis identifies a theoretical “mechanism of reaction” between the informal exclusionary institution and local socio-economic outcomes. According to this hypothesis, the informal institution of racial exclusion shapes three specific actors: non-aggrieved actors, mid-aggrieved actors, and aggrieved actors, all of whom react to the exclusionary institution by displaying five different types of behavior: adoption, adaptation, non-cooperation, revision, and contestation of the informal exclusionary institution. These types of behavior, in turn, either alter or reinforce the informal exclusionary institution. The results indicate that alterations and reinforcements have effects on socio-economic outcomes when actors’ behavior is related to initiatives for the local political economy of public good provision. Hence, behavior such as adoption, adaptation, and non-cooperation facilitates low public good provision. In contrast, revision and contestation tend to facilitate effective initiatives for better public good provision.

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# Chapter 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Overview

The effects of historical institutions on socio-economic outcomes are one of the most pressing issues of economic history, development theory and institutional theory. This research uses the historical institution of racial exclusion in Colombia to analyze those effects. Explicitly, I analyze the effects of the informal institution of racial exclusion on local socio-economic outcomes<sup>1</sup>.

The literature on long-term development argues that differences in socio-economic outcomes are explained by two factor groups: economic and non-economic (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2005, Engerman & Sokoloff, 2012, Mahoney J. , 2010).

Nevertheless, these theoretical explanations have important analytical deficiencies. On the one hand, economic explanations do not recognize that economic performance is embedded in broader structures of social organization (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2005, Beckert & Streeck, 2008, Evans, 2006; Mahoney J. , 2010). On the other hand, non-economic factors have a broad scope where cultural and institutional elements are the primary variants used to explain differences in performance. While cultural explanations have weaknesses in proving a strong causal relationship (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2005), institutional explanations are undergoing an intensive theoretical and methodological debate regarding not only what institutions, mechanisms and institutional roles are relevant for fostering development, but also what kind of processes follow institutions to shape final outcomes (Evans, 2006, Mahoney J, 2000, Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, Streeck & Thelen, 2005, Pierson, 2004, Thelen, 2002).

In this debate, I conceptualize racial exclusion as an informal institution and study the effects of this historical exclusionary institution on local socio-economic outcomes in Colombia. The study of the effects of this institution includes two major research aims. First, this research analyzes racial exclusion as an alternative explanation to explicate differences on local socio-economic

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<sup>1</sup> The research question section shows that it refers to racial exclusion of the afro-descendant component of the population.

performance in the Colombian case. This part of the study consists of the identification of what average effect bears this alternative explanation on local socio-economic outcomes.

Second, the research proposes a hypothesis about the theoretical mechanism between the hypothesized cause and the outcome. By analyzing the empirical material, this mechanism helps to elucidate theoretical issues that remain unclear in the literature such as how an exclusionary institution affects socio-economic outcomes. Principally, the mechanism focuses on identifying the specific actors and behavior that contribute to the final outcome, how actors react to exclusionary institutions, and how this process involves institutional revisions and enforcements.

In studying the effects of the historical institution of racial exclusion, the research uses the heuristic and broad approach of historical institutionalism. Generally, I share from the historical institutionalist framework the view that institutions are dynamic, contested, have distributional effects and are affected by historical contexts. Therefore, this research considers that racial exclusion is not a cultural variable that persists for actors' convictions, cognitive scripts, values or beliefs, of what is morally correct (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2005, Mahoney, 2000, p.523). Neither does the research consider racial exclusion as a coordinating mechanism that organizes behavior as mainstream economics would indicate but rather that such exclusion is an informal historical institution dynamic, contextual and with power distributional effects as the literature on historical institutionalism suggests (e.g. Mahoney, 2015, 2010).

Therefore, historical institutionalism guides the accomplishment of the major aims of this research. In particular, it offers insights that guide the search for a more precise specification of the hypothesis for a theoretical mechanism, insights such as the relevance of actors, behavior, tensions, contestations, historical contexts, and distributional effects of the historical institution of racial exclusion.

In line with the research purposes, I use a multimethod strategy. First of all, I use large-N data and econometric techniques to measure the effect of racial exclusion on differential local performance in Colombia. This quantitative approach will elucidate the average causal effect of racial exclusion as an alternative explanation for local socio-economic outcomes. Second, a

qualitative approach empirically arrives at a hypothetical causal mechanism by which racial exclusion affects local socio-economic performance.

The results show that racial exclusion has negative effects on socio-economic outcomes. Moreover, based on the empirical analysis, this research arrives at the hypothesis that there is a mechanism of reaction between an informal exclusionary institution and local socio-economic outcomes. According to this hypothesis, there are patterned manifestations that the informal exclusionary institution shapes three specific actors: non-aggrieved actors, mid-aggrieved actors and aggrieved actors. These actors react to the exclusionary institution by depicting five different regular types of behavior. Such 'impacted' regular types of behavior are adoption, adaptation, revision, contestation and no-cooperation of the exclusionary informal institution. In turn, these regular practices are forms of revisions or enforcements of the informal exclusionary institution. The final link indicates that the revisions or reinforcements have effects on socio-economic outcomes when the behavior of actors is related to initiatives for the local political economy of public goods provision. Consequently, the final link indicates that these initiatives affect public goods provision, i.e. the final outcome.

This research has seven chapters. Chapter 1 presents a brief discussion of the Colombian racial order, the research questions, suggested theoretical explanations in the literature, and the position of this research in this literature. Chapter 2 defines and justifies the theoretical approach to the subject of study. Following on from this, Chapter 3 explains the methodological strategy. Chapters 4 and 5 then develop the quantitative and qualitative analyses respectively. Chapter 6 addresses the hypothesis of the mechanism and the potential applications. Finally, Chapter 7 presents the conclusions.

## **1.2 Colombian racial order**

The Colombian racial order is typical of a Spanish American country. This racial order exists in unspoken racial hierarchies that favor the whiter population. A brief summary will help to gain a broad view of this racial order.

The Colombian racial order has its roots in the colonial times. The Spanish colonization in Latin America was implemented in order to “*meet Spanish needs*” (McFarlane, 1993, p.16). Colonizers established their settlements in areas with suitable resources for their demands: labor and cultivable lands (McFarlane, 1993, Wade, 1989). In present day Colombia, this area corresponds mainly to the current warm central-Andean region. The remaining territory, with the exception of some urban areas in the coasts, was peripheral and lacked of any incentive for the initial interests of the colonizers<sup>2</sup>.

Once established, Spaniards developed social, political and economic structures such as racial exclusion. Racial exclusion was the social structure of Spanish colonialism to ‘manage’ the ‘unintended’ consequences of mestizaje<sup>3</sup>. The mestizaje generated an increased ‘*mixed*’ population and “*social friction*” in the colonial society (McFarlane, 1993, p.36); white people demanded their superior social standing over the non-white (natives and slaves) population as a strategy to maintain control over resources. Therefore, one of the institutional arrangements implemented was to transform the Hispanic old tradition of “*purity of blood*” into a transatlantic policy of socio-racial hierarchies to control access to social status and economic resources (Villegla, 2013, Mahoney, 2010). In this regard, the institutional framework established explicit rules against racial equality. According to these rules, only white people had access to property, political power and social privilege. In addition to this racial exclusion, during the colonial regime, the government was weak and unable to support the royal control of the Colombian territory (Helg, 2004). The weaknesses of royal authorities and the difficulty of communication helped to shape a weak colony with marginal regions for the interest of the Crown (Helg, 2004, McFarlane, 1993).

Colombian historiography shows that during the consolidation of the republic, racial exclusion was in force (Appelbaum, 2003, Larson, 2004, Maya, 2009, Roldán, 2003, Wade, 1989). That is, racial exclusion continued during the republic, especially during the Regeneration period.

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<sup>2</sup> See McFarlane (1993).

<sup>3</sup> Mestizaje was one of the new social phenomena in the new Spanish American society. According to historiography, gender patterns in Spaniard colonization quickly fostered mestizaje (see for instance Vieira, 2002).

The Regeneration was the Colombia's institutional agenda from late 19<sup>th</sup> to early 20<sup>th</sup> century<sup>4</sup>. The literature shows that it was an elite conservative project as a response to national and international conjunctures (Larson, 2004, Appelbaum, 2003, 1999, among others). At a national level, Colombia showed political instability and several civil wars between liberals and conservatives. The Regeneration tried to solve these political struggles by monopolizing political power in the conservative party and establishing the conservative constitution of 1886. At the international level, the capitalist discourse permeated the world economy forcing the new states to contest the new juncture. Larson (2004) states that modern capitalism generated “*modernization projects*” in the new republics of Latin America. These modernization projects had the goal of overcoming the weaknesses of the nations in face of a new era of modernization and globalization. Latin American elites identified the racial composition of the population as one of the major weaknesses. Countries such as Colombia therefore implemented implicit “*racial projects of whitening*” (Larson, 2004, p.17). This elite project and the persistence of the historical (colonial) patterns of settlements was to create “*an interregional geography of race and status that privileged certain places and peoples*” (Appelbaum, 1999 p.632). Colombian experts call this phenomenon regionalization.

Regionalization is visible in two aspects. First, Colombia shows a spatial structure of race, miscegenation and culture, what Wade (1989, p.4) calls a “*regionalization of the race*”. That is to say, on the one hand Colombia has a ‘*warm Andean-center*’ region that, in spite of internal differences, its collective identification is as a whiter, more religious, more civilized and with higher acculturation of the Spaniard tradition (Wade, 1989, p.4, Gutierrez, 1975). On the other hand, the ‘*hot-(negroid) periphery*’ is collectively identified as blacker, “*poor...rural, uncultured, and deviating “from standard patterns of religious, family”* and sexual patterns (Wade, 1989, p.4). Second, regionalization helped to shape dynamics of national and subnational structures of elite power (Villegas, 2012, Múnera, 2005, Melo, 1989, among others). In these dynamics, the national elite designs the general institutional framework of the country. This institutional framework is based on the empowerment of white members of elites (power

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<sup>4</sup> Appelbaum (2003, p.25) mentions that this period is known as the “*White Republic*” and warns us about what kind of racial institutional dynamics were working during this time. This period is also considered as the consolidation of the republic (e.g. Arocha, 1998).

holders) over the rest of the population (subalterns<sup>5</sup>). On the other hand, subnational elites were relatively free from the central authorities and the church. They were also whiter than the local population, especially in the '*hot-(negroid) periphery*' (Múnera, 2005, Gutierrez, 1975). Both national and subnational elites developed implicit institutional arrangements based on racial exclusion that affected individual and collective behavior (Múnera, 2005).

Individual behavior was affected because the negative connotations against the non-white population led to the implementation of "*whitening processes*" through mechanism such as marriage and cultural adaptation, to "clean" racial impurity (Villegas, 2012, Helg, 2004, Wade, 1993, Melo, 1989, among others). At the collective level, it was culturally accepted that authorities and intellectual elites associated the lack of development with the existence of a non-white population<sup>6</sup>. Black and indigenous people were culturally identified with being biologically inferior and ugly; whiteness was associated with progress, beauty and modernity (Wade, 1993, 1989).

Therefore, in this tacit racial order, blacker and more indigenous regions suffered a double process of exclusion at the national and subnational levels, driven by the argument that progress would be achieved by "civilizing" the non-white groups. It was a white elite project where society needed to be "whitened" with the support of the regional elites (Melo, 1989, p.8). Literature shows that this elite 'homogenization' project increased regionalism, discrimination and exclusion of the non-white component in Colombian identity. In turn, this tacit racial order would have consequences on the performance of non-white regions persisting over time.

### **1.3 Research questions**

Exclusion has consequences. Exclusion impoverishes the life of individuals (Sen, 2000, p. 44) and faces many facets. In Latin America, some of these facets have historical institutional roots such as those established by the colonial race relations. This research therefore addresses the effects of racial exclusion on local socio-economic outcomes by using a historical institutional approach.

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<sup>5</sup> Subalterns are non-members of elites.

<sup>6</sup> Intellectuals adapted Spenserian and Darwinian theories of social evolution and applied it to race (Blanchard, 2010, Villegas, 2005).



Two important caveats must be made. The terms racial exclusion and racial discrimination are hereafter used interchangeably without any significant difference in meaning (Quillian, 2006, p.301)<sup>7</sup>. Moreover, in contrast to Mahoney (2015) on racial issues, the work focuses on the afro-descendant population and their blacker-mestizo progenies<sup>8</sup>. The reason is that afro-descendant population suffers a more indirect process of exclusion documented in, for instance, Harguindeguy (2010) and Hoffman & Centeno (2003). Therefore, the analysis of blackness is more propitious for studying the effects on outcomes and behavior of actors in face of this informal institution.

James Mahoney states that in trying to explain outcomes in a historical institutional perspective, we need to specify which institutions shape this outcome and how they do so (Mahoney, 2010 referring to developmental outcomes). With regards to “which institutions”, he argues that those “*institutions that produce hierarchical forms of domination are nearly always of great importance*” (Mahoney, 2010, p.19). Racial exclusion is an example of such hierarchical forms of domination. Hence, the first puzzle to answer is to specify what causal effect racial exclusion bears on local socio-economic outcomes in the Colombian postcolonial context of the late 19<sup>th</sup> and mid-20<sup>th</sup> century.

With regard to how, this research develops a theoretical explanation that clarifies such patterns in local socio-economic outcomes measured by public goods provision. Specifically, it is necessary to build up a mechanistic explanation by specifying the theoretical mechanism between the hypothesized cause racial exclusion and the outcome public goods provision. Hence, the mechanism must address the following questions: How does the exclusionary institution of racial exclusion affect local socio-economic outcomes such as public goods provision? Which specific

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<sup>7</sup> Quillian (2006) mentions the difference between racism and discrimination. Accordingly, he states that “*racism carries a stronger implied moral condemnation than prejudice or discrimination*”. In this matter Schuman et al. (1997) state that racism is related to “*favorable or unfavorable evaluation[s]*” (Schuman et al. 1997 quoted in Morning, 2009, p. 1168). The National Research Council (2004, p. 43) also states that “*Discriminatory behaviors and practices may arise from prejudice and stereotyping, but prejudice need not result in differential treatment or differential effect*” ...Moreover; “*racism is also specific to race, whereas prejudice and discrimination can apply to other social categories*” (Quillian, 2006, p. 301). However, “*the term prejudice or discrimination can be substituted with racist or racism without a significant change in social science meaning*” (Quillian, 2006, p. 301).

<sup>8</sup> In accordance with authors, such as Wade (1993), Roldán (2003), Múnera (2005). The indigenous issue deserves a more precise analysis (for instance, see Mahoney, 2015, Harguindeguy, 2010 and Hoffman & Centeno, 2003). However, this research also controls by indigenous population.

actors shape this institution? How do actors behave in this mechanism? How does such regular behavior contribute to outcomes? How do these processes involve institutional change and institutional reproduction?

By answering these questions, this research brings an alternative theoretical explanation to how mainstream economics views institutions and understands its effects on socio-economic outcomes. Specifically, this research will use historical institutionalism in the Colombian case to shed light on the overlooked aspects of institutional effects, power relations, disparate actors and specific actor' behavior that contribute to final outcomes.

#### **1.4 How does the literature answer these questions?**

This research has two areas of focus. First, it investigates an alternative explanation to differences in local socio-economic outcomes in Colombia<sup>9</sup>. Second, it addresses the how question. Consequently, I structure the analysis of alternatives explanations in the literature based on two parts.

The first part describes alternative explanations for the question of what affects differences in socio-economic spatial performance. In this matter, authors split their explanations for differences in economic or social outcomes between economic and non-economic explanations (Engerman & Sokoloff, 2012).

The second part describes the alternative explanations in addressing the how question. This part emphasizes the theoretical debate regarding how an institutional cause affects an outcome in time, the role of institutions, actors, conditions, enforcements and revisions.

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<sup>9</sup> This work acknowledges that the outcome is the result of multi-causes.

### 1.4.1 What affects differences in socio-economic outcomes

Differences in socio-economic spatial<sup>10</sup> outcomes diverge in academic explanations. Mahoney (2010) and Engerman & Sokoloff (2012) classify this discussion between economic and non-economic causes of economic development.

Economic causes are primary explanations in development theory (Arndt, 1987)<sup>11</sup> and can vary from the original tradition of increasing capital formation (Arndt, 1987) to comparative advantages (Roses, 2003), low-cost of transportations (Krugman, 1991), natural resources (Sachs, 2001, Gallup, Sachs & Mellinger, 1999 and Diamond, 1997), among others<sup>12</sup>. Nonetheless, social factors also affect these differences. That is why the analysis of “non-economic” explanations needs to be incorporated.

Non-economic explanations are more structural and undergo constant theoretical and methodological debate. This debate is related to different variants and how these variants try to incorporate ambivalent or interrelated causal factors. Engerman & Sokoloff (2012, p.318) classify non-economic factors into categories such as cultural, political and institutional explanations.

Accordingly, a cultural approach states that traditional beliefs or religious values are relevant in shaping differences in performance (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2005). For instance, Weber, 1958[1904] argues that the combination of protestant ethos such as austerity, individualism, prosperity and hard work have economic consequences in the development of societies (Weber, 1958[1904])<sup>13</sup>.

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<sup>10</sup> Spatial can be countries, regions, provinces, etc.

<sup>11</sup> These explanations take a limited view of both concepts and causes of development. For instance, Arndt (1987) explains evolution in development concepts. This concept has evolved from a material definition of economic growth to a more complex definition that involves social structures such as distributional equity. A better discussion of the contemporary debate of the development concept is impressively explained by Sen (1999) who claims the relevance of social freedoms and substantive freedoms as components of development.

<sup>12</sup> Structuralist neo-Marxist traditions, population growth, etc. (Engerman & Sokoloff, 2012, Arndt, 1987)

<sup>13</sup> Contemporary authors enlarge this Weberian tradition to demonstrate the relationship between culture and development. In some cases, the argument is fully confirmed (Hayward & Kimmelmeier, 2011, Barro & McCleary, 2003, Grier, 1997), partially accepted (Becker & Wößmann, 2009) or rejected (Acemoglu et al 2005).

On the other hand, the “*nature of political organizations*” is another “*non-economic*” explanation of socio-economic performance. This tradition asserts that there exists a positive correlation between political variables and socio-economic performance. For instance, countries with a high level of economic development show more stable democratic systems<sup>14</sup>.

Mahoney (2010) contends that these perspectives “*share certain problematic ahistorical assumptions*” showing limitations to explain levels of socio-economic outcomes (Mahoney, 2010, p.10). Patterns of development deserve a more structural argument that can be found in their historical and institutional roots (Mahoney, 2010, Nunn, 2009, Beckert & Streeck, 2008, Mahoney, 2003). In this regard, the contemporary debate on differences in performance has turned toward more fundamental causes that include historical and institutional explanations.

The institutional hypothesis claims that formal and informal rules that constraint individual behavior are closely related to long-term economic and social outcomes (Dell, 2010, Iyer, 2010, Huillery, 2009, Banerjee & Iyer, 2005, Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2005, 2002 and 2001, among others). Indeed, authors such as Rodrik et al (2004), Easterly & Levine (2003) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005, 2002 and 2001) suggest that the effects of geographical variables in long-term performance are weak or disappear controlling by institutional variables (Mahoney, 2010). Hence, institutions determine different paths of development among regions or countries.

#### **1.4.2 Racial studies and effects on socio-economic outcomes**

The effects of racial differences on socio-economic outcomes have been systematically analyzed. These explanations depict diverse theoretical and empirical strategies. One of the theoretical approaches sees race and ethnicity as a typical cultural explanation. Other approaches try to analyze this topic as embedded in institutional explanations.

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<sup>14</sup> This approach has its roots in the original work of Lipset (1963) who discovers a positive correlation between economic growth and democracy. This argument is the central point of modernization theory. This theory states that the richer a country, the more democratic it can become (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson & Yared, 2008). These arguments are the point of departure for several academic works that try to establish the initial correlation depicted by Lipset. Nevertheless, as Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson & Yared (2008) posit, this relationship is problematic. For instance, this correlation was weak during the postwar period. Moreover, causality and endogeneity problems arise in specifying a causal relationship.

Race as a cultural explanation is one of the most popular lines in the literature to study the relationship between race and socio-economic outcomes. For instance, Wilson (2010, p. 203) mentions that cultural traits<sup>15</sup> against black people have “*had harmful effects*” on the social and material life of excluded individuals. Those effects have been extensively studied by diverse scholars (Andrew, 1992). A brief review shows that, according to this literature, cultural practices and beliefs associated with black population explain specific socio-economic outcomes such as gaps in income and educational attainment (Jencks & Phillips, 1998, Gafar, 1998), patterns of family instability, child labor and fertility rates (Patterson, 2001), unequal labor relations (Hogan, 2001), unequal access to collective rights (Hooker, 2005), poverty (Gafar, 1998), among other negative outcomes<sup>16</sup>.

In the Latin American case, some studies try to specify those effects and also show diverse methodological and theoretical strategies. Some of this research uses sophisticated quantitative methodologies (Flórez, Medina & Urrea, 2001, doValle, 2000, Telles, 1996, among others), while other works present descriptive analyses of the affected population (Hooker, 2005, Hoffman & Centeno, 2003, Dillon Soares & Reyna, 1967)<sup>17</sup>. Nonetheless, both types of studies coincide in that the differential treatment to black and indigenous population affects variables such as income, education, employment, poverty, wages, occupation, among others (Hoffman & Centeno, 2003).

A different perspective sees the racial issue as a variable embedded in institutional explanations. Accordingly, these works state that ethnicity affects socio-economic outcomes because it favors strategies of exchange and cooperation (La Ferrara, 2003, Fearon & Laitin, 1996, Greif, 1993), explains differences in economic growth and public policies (Easterly & Levine, 1997), affects public goods provision (Gennaioli & Rainer, 2007, La Ferrara, 2003, Easterly & Levine, 1997),

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<sup>15</sup> He refers to national beliefs and/or individual patterns of intragroup interactions, habits, styles, skills, etc.

<sup>16</sup> The number of studies on racial segregation is also immense in the literature. They try to specify the “*race-linked disparities*” in socio-economic outcomes such as education, labor market, consumption, health, legal system, among others. For a review of these studies see Reskin (2012), Pager & Shepherd (2008) and Quillian (2006).

<sup>17</sup> Do Valle (2000) carries out more systematic work on the contemporary “*costs of not being whites*” in Brazil.

or favors the incidence of conflicts (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005 and Besley & Reynal-Querol, 2012)<sup>18</sup>.

For example, some authors focus on specifying the effects on economic outcomes by analyzing the variables ethnic diversity, racial heterogeneity or racial fragmentation. In this regard, Easterly & Levine (1997) argue that ethnic diversity affects school attainment, political stability, infrastructure and the development of fiscal and financial variables.

On the other hand, there are studies that stress the hierarchical character of racial exclusion as an institution. In this regard, in comparative historical analyses Mahoney (2015, 2010, 2003) and Katz, Mahoney & vom Hau (2005) claim that the institution of ethnic hierarchy was a cause of social development in Spanish Latin America. Focusing on indigenous population, these studies conclude that racial hierarchies promote social marginalization and favor poor performance in education and social indicators generating social underdevelopment in countries such as Bolivia and Guatemala. In contrast, countries that did not encourage ethnic stratifications reveal social development above the average for Spanish American countries (Mahoney, 2015).

A different conclusion arises in the African case (Acemoglu, Reed, & Robinson, 2014, Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2012, Gennaioli & Rainer, 2007). For instance, Michalopoulos & Papaioannou (2012) find that ethnically centralized and hierarchical regions reveal higher levels of regional development. According to the authors, the causal relationship among pre-colonial ethnic institutions, political centralization and regional development is positively correlated. Similarly, Acemoglu, Reed, & Robinson (2014) and Gennaioli & Rainer (2007) argue that tax collection and public goods provision were facilitated in highly hierarchical and ethnically centralized societies.

In summary, whether the racial issue is a cultural or institutional variable, or whether it is measured by different empirical strategies, the common factor in the studies is that “*ethnicity matters*” (Gafar, 1998, p. 482). Nonetheless, despite the extensive discussion of the topic in the

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<sup>18</sup> Other studies have related purposes, for example, Fearon & Laitin (1996), Alesina, Spolaore & Wacziarg (2000), etc.

literature, the analysis of racial exclusion as an informal institution needs more empirical work. This empirical work should more precisely explain the mechanism that shows how the effects of race are translated into socio-economic outcomes, what the role of actors is, the specific regular behavior of these actors, and the conditions that they face. This is precisely this research's approach.

### **1.4.3 What affects local socio-economic outcomes in the Colombian case**

The following section will develop a short overview of the major alternative explanations for differences in local socio-economic outcomes in the Colombian case. In this matter, economic explanations are most common in the Colombian literature.

Colombian literature specifies that regional differences in socio-economic outcomes are generated by physical factors such as geographical characteristics, gold production and coffee production. In contrast, non-economic explanations are more structural. This approach presents theoretical and methodological variants. For instance, the New Institutional Economics and Historical Institutionalism approaches are two of those variants. On one hand, the New Institutional Economics approach develops a diverse literature to explain the effects of specific institutions on differences in social and economic local performance. On the other hand, historical institutionalism focuses on the relevance of historical contexts, social actors and power structures in shaping outcomes over time.

#### ***1.4.3.1 Economic causes of differences in local socio-economic outcomes in the Colombian case***

##### **1.4.3.1.1 Alternative explanations I: Geography**

Geography is a common argument to justify differences in regional socio-economic outcomes in Colombia. Colombia depicts clear geophysical heterogeneities among its regions<sup>19</sup>. These heterogeneities are frequently related to variations in socio-economic outcomes which focus on explanations from a geographical perspective.

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<sup>19</sup> Colombia has five geographical regions remarkably different in altitude, temperature, landscape and weather. It is possible to see zones from 0 (zero) to 5775 meters of altitude. Furthermore, a geographical location in the equatorial zone generates diverse climatic zones. Accordingly, temperature can fluctuate from frozen, temperate to hot zones (for more details see for instance Monsalve, 1927).

Literature on the geographical perspective claims that geophysical characteristics explain the differences in long-term development among regions and/or countries. Sachs (2001), Gallup, Sachs & Mellinger (1999) and Diamond (1997) argue that physical elements such as geographical barriers, local ecosystem, location, temperature and other geographical features have effects on income levels. According to the authors, tropical areas lag behind temperate zones in technological and productive levels. This fact is related to difficulties in applying certain technologies in tropical areas. Consequently, physical variables determine long-term economic performance.

This argument could apply to the Colombian case. For example, Palacios (2006, p. XI) states that “*Colombian’s geography was a formidable obstacle to prosperity*”. According to the author, Colombian geography has fragmented regions into isolated enclaves, increased transport costs and affected state capacity at local and national levels.

Nevertheless, even though Colombia shows variance in geographical features among its regions, geographical hypothesis is problematic. This demonstrates that economic explanations lack a deeper understanding when social and political forces are not included (Barro & McCleary, 2003). For instance, Mahoney (2015) and Bonet & Meisel (2007) argue that geography is an indirect cause of differences in development. Specifically, Bonet & Meisel (2007) show that in Colombia, geography has no direct effect on regional developmental differences. The authors argue that the effects of geography are indirect via the institutional design that is specific to historical settlements since colonization<sup>20</sup>. Effects of geography are then only via institutions. On the other hand, McFarlane (1993, p. 23) mentions that deficiencies in the political divisions during colonial government generated geographical fragmentation shaping isolated and different regions and “*compounding the problems of communication and command imposed by distance*”.

Moreover, geographical explanations do not fully apply to the Colombian case where the boom of the industrial era was located in the four main cities of Bogotá, Medellín, Cali and Barranquilla<sup>21</sup>. These cities are different in altitude, temperature and landscape<sup>22</sup>. For instance,

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<sup>20</sup> In summary, colonizers created different institutions in different regions.

<sup>21</sup> España & Sanchez (2010), McGreevy (1971).



the industrial boom occurred in one of the most geographically isolated regions of the country (the mountain region of Antioquia McGreevy, 1971) while regions more favorable to trade, industry and commerce because of their geographic location were unable to prosper as Antioquia did. This fact suggests, as some authors have already demonstrated, that more structural factors better explain such outcomes.

#### 1.4.3.1.2 Alternative explanation II: Gold production

Colombian literature insists that the economic production of exportable goods such as gold and coffee during the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries explains differences in regional socio-economic performance. For instance, the western region (department of Antioquia with Medellín as capital) had important gold production during colonial and postcolonial times. Botero (2007), Brew (2000), Botero (1985) and Safford (1967) state that gold production was an elemental factor in the western region favoring the accumulation and development of capital, an active exchange and banking system. Moreover, the authors contend that gold production fostered a dynamic market<sup>23</sup>. This dynamism was more visible in the western-Andean region where the population benefited from this dynamic more than the majority of the region of the country<sup>24</sup>.

However, McGreevy (1971) states that arguments on mining development is exaggerated. Besides, mining production has been present in regions such as the departments of Chocó and Cauca since colonial times and nowadays these regions are some of the most deteriorated areas in social and economic performance<sup>25</sup>.

#### 1.4.3.1.3 Alternative Explanation III: Coffee production

Coffee production is one of the main explanations by Colombian literature for regional differences in socio-economic outcomes. This explanation suggests that the major reason for

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<sup>22</sup> According to the census of 1912, Bogotá, the capital of Colombia, is 2644 meters above sea level and presents temperate weather. Medellín is 1541 meters above sea level and has temperate mild weather. Barranquilla is 5 meters and has a tropical climate (see for instance Monsalve, 1927). In addition, Barranquilla is located on the shore of the Caribbean Sea (whilst Bogotá and Medellín are in the middle of the Andean mountain system with its geographical barriers) so has better connections to internal and external markets -even today.

<sup>23</sup> España & Sanchez (2012, 2010).

<sup>24</sup> The money market was erratic in Colombia until early 20<sup>th</sup> century. This fact changed with the creation of the Central Bank (Banco de la República). Before then, there was no unified monetary system and the economy was characterized by lack of money supply (for more details see for instance Meisel, 1990).

<sup>25</sup> España & Sanchez (2010, 2012).

such differences is the regional concentration of coffee production during late 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries (Montenegro, 2002, Brew, 2000, Meisel, 1987, 1993, 1999, 2008, Jimenez & Sideri, 1985, McGreevy, 1971, Safford, 1967). This production could explain why Antioquia shows better performance than other regions. Literature on the coffee argument is extensive and ranges from descriptive<sup>26</sup> to quantitative<sup>27</sup>. The major conclusions are that coffee production fostered capital accumulation, created a real export economy, increased fiscal resources, and generated a market for industrial goods and a working class for the manufacturing sector<sup>28</sup>. The literature shows that coffee regions were pioneers in industrial development and maintain a better economic and social performance.

Nonetheless, España & Sánchez (2010, 2012) state that coffee and gold productions were not exclusive to the western Antioqueña region of Colombia. For instance, Cauca, Magdalena and Santanderes reveal favorable conditions for coffee production; nevertheless, these regions were unable to develop a similar path of growth to cities such as Medellín and Bogotá (España & Sánchez, 2010). Moreover, Fernandez (2014) also claims that not all regions with geographical characteristics for coffee production were able to develop benefits associated with the coffee economy such as higher levels of production technology.

### ***1.4.3.2 Non-economic causes of differences in local performance in the Colombian case***

#### ***1.4.3.2.1 Alternative Explanation IV: Cultural and institutional explanations***

Cultural and institutional factors are non-economic explanations for differences in Colombian regional socio-economic outcomes. Regarding cultural differences, Hagen (1963) states that cultural differences are behind regional disparities in economic performance. Hagen argues that in the Antioqueña region (western-Andean region) “*growth began in spite of the supposed economic barriers*” (most of them, geophysical barriers) (McGreevy, 1971, p. 185). The reason, the author says, is the typical stereotype that the Antioqueña race is “*a different breed of men*”. According to the author, Antioqueños are creative, pioneering and entrepreneurial (Hagen, 1971

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<sup>26</sup> Montenegro, 2002, Brew, 2000, Meisel, 1987, 1993, 1999, 2008, among others.

<sup>27</sup> España & Sánchez (2012).

<sup>28</sup> España & Sánchez (2012), Montenegro, 2002, Brew, 2000, Meisel, 1987, 1993, 1999, 2008, Jimenez & Sideri, 1985, McGreevy, 1971, Safford, 1967, among others.

quoted in McGreevy, 1971, p. 185). This issue explains why this region performed better than others.

Institutional arguments also exist in the Colombian literature to explain differences in regional development. Acemoglu, Garcia-Jimeno & Robinson (2014, 2012), Garcia-Jimeno (2005) and Bonet & Meisel (2007) are some examples of these alternative explanations. By using different empirical strategies, these research approaches use historical institutions as explanatory factors. In general, different measurements of colonial institutions explain long term differences in social and material progress. In Acemoglu, Garcia-Jimeno & Robinson (2014 and 2012), the authors show the effects of the local state capacity on local prosperity. Moreover, Acemoglu, Garcia-Jimeno & Robinson (2012) determine the effects of slavery on long-term local performance. Similarly, Garcia-Jimeno (2005) analyzes the effects of colonial institutions such as “encomienda”, the percentage of slave population and the presence of a colonial state in the 18<sup>th</sup> century on current socio-economic performance. Finally, Bonet & Meisel (2007) demonstrate the incidence of the colonial legacy of European settlement as an explanation of unequal regional development.

However, cultural and institutional explanations are debatable in the Colombian case. For instance, the cultural approach of Hagen is highly criticized by authors such as Safford (1967), McGreevy (1971) and Bonet & Meisel (2007). Safford considers that the real reason for better economic performance of the Antioqueña region is gold production rather than regional stereotypes. According to the author, gold production offered Antioquia multiple economic possibilities that other regions did not have. On the other hand, McGreevy (1971) and Bonet & Meisel (2007) discard the cultural explanation. For McGreevy some non-Antioqueña cities show good economic performance despite their different cultural backgrounds. On the other hand, Bonet & Meisel (2007) do not find a significant causal connection between cultural proxies and regional performance.

In the same vein, institutional explanations are questionable. They lack historiographical processes in their explanatory arguments (Mahoney, 2010). For instance, Acemoglu, Garcia-Jimeno & Robinson’s work disregards regional-contextual patterns, historical interactions

between actors and power relations. These explanations therefore overlook relevant components on how institutions shaped regional performance in Colombia. For instance, the problem in the slavery paper is that during the analyzed period slavery, as a colonial institution, is an institution in decadence. After independence process in early 19<sup>th</sup> century, slavery entered in a process of gradual elimination. The abolition of slavery was one of the political goals of independence from Spain (Lasso, 2003). Moreover, the trade in slaves ends as a way of gaining economic and political support from England with the remaining slave population declining gradually from early 19<sup>th</sup> to mid-20<sup>th</sup> century (McFarlane, 1993). Lastly, and not any less important, these authors disregard the impact of slavery on the colonial population. According to historiography, the economic brunt of slavery was minor in Colombia. On this subject, slavery was not as an important composition of the population as in other countries such as Brazil and Cuba (McFarlane, 1993). In concentrating on slavery rather than on regional social and cultural patterns and interactions of the black population, these explanations misunderstand relevant components of how institutions shaped local development. On the other hand, Bonet & Meisel (2007) try to overcome this conceptual sloppiness. However, they do not explain the process through which institutions generate differences in performance.

A different perspective is developed by authors such as Mahoney (2015, 2010, and 2003) and Lange, Mahoney & vom Hau (2006). In a historical institutionalist perspective, these authors offer explanatory causes of differences in performance (such as pre-colonial and colonial structures). However, these works do not focus on explaining subnational differences since the works concentrate on comparative historical analysis at the country level.

In general, institutional explanations share a problem in the Colombian case. They do not disentangle the theoretical mechanisms between institutional causes and socio-economic outcomes. This weakness is evident in quantitative approaches or country level comparative analyses. In particular, quantitative approaches do not disentangle theoretical mechanisms between institutional variables and outcomes. Works with this methodological strategy are limited in these matters. Nevertheless, qualitative approaches do not give an overview of subnational dynamics and how specific actors and behavior are involved in this issue.

In contrast to the traditional Colombian literature on explaining differences in socio-economic outcomes, I maintain that differences are also a consequence of historical institutional causes. This historical institutional approach considers that simultaneous processes of institutional enforcement and revision of an informal institution such as racial exclusion are an alternative explanation for differences in Colombian socio-economic local outcomes. Moreover, this research focuses on a theoretical mechanism of reaction that shows processes of enforcement and revision led by varying regular actor behavior.

This fact differs to consider colonial institutions as the fundamental cause. The social, economic and political context of the republic was not the colonial context. Therefore, in contrast to Acemoglu, Garcia-Jimeno & Robinson (2014, 2012) and Garcia-Jimeno (2005) (and all works in the theoretical line of Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2001), I lay emphasis on avoiding what Evans (2006, p. 2) calls the “double-finesse” or the lack of a theoretical and conceptual specification of institutions<sup>29</sup> by specifying a theoretical causal mechanisms between an informal institution and local socio-economic performance.

### ***1.4.3.3 Race as an alternative explanation in the Colombian case***

In the Colombian case, the analysis of race and socio-economic outcomes is also an academic topic for different disciplines such as economic, sociology, history and anthropology. Similar to research described in Reskin (2012), Pager & Shepherd (2008), and Quillian (2006), these academic disciplines conclude that there are racial disparities in the Colombian case.

For instance, Viáfara, Ramirez & Urrea (2001) find that extreme poverty and poverty lines are higher than the national average for afro-descendant population. Similarly Flórez, Medina & Urrea (2001) indicate that the afro-descendant population reveals spatial segregation from analyzing the data of the census of 1993 for the city of Cali. Specifically, the authors find that afro-descendants are concentrated in the poorest neighborhoods, creating “*ghettos*” in the lowest strata locations of the city (Flórez, Medina & Urrea, 2001, p. 35). With these works, the literature on the negative socio-economic performance of the afro-descendant population is extensive. In this regard, Urrego (2010) provides an account of works on race that descriptively

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<sup>29</sup> Regarding how institutions are measured and what these measurements reflect.

show contemporary differences in poverty, illiteracy, schooling enrollment, life expectancy, income, wages, social conflict and other socio-economic indicators (Urrego, 2010, p. 25)<sup>30</sup>.

From a different perspective, Maya (2009), Appelbaum (2006, 1999), Roldán (2003), Wade (1993) or Helg (1987) suggest in historical and anthropological works that race relations are behind educational policies, regional disaggregation, political conflict and violence. For example, Wade (1993, 1989) describes regional race relations in Colombia as a dominant hegemonic ideology of the whiter population.

On the other hand, researchers in economic history also analyze the racial issue. Accordingly, Bonet & Meisel (2007) and Kalmanovitz (2001) focus on the effects of population of European origin on regional development. These authors concur in that the percentage of population of European origin is related to regional socio-economic performance. For Bonet & Meisel (2007, p. 390) the size of European population during colonization has positive effects on the differences in the material prosperity among regions. Similarly, Kalmanovitz (2001) suggests that those regions with a historically high composition of white population show better access to resources such as property and education (Kalmanovitz, 2001 quoted in Bonet & Meisel, 2007).

However, there are two major concerns that remain underestimated in these works. First, the effects of racial exclusion of the afro-descendant population still deserve a more systematic quantitative approach. Flórez, Medina & Urrea (2001, p. 3) argue that quantitative research on racial discrimination is a recent topic and “*without conclusions at the national level*”. In this regard, the quoted works of Flórez, Medina & Urrea (2001), Viáfara, Ramirez & Urrea (2001), and those described in Urrego (2010) are descriptive and contemporary<sup>31</sup>. On the other hand, the works of Bonet & Meisel or Acemoglu, Garcia-Jimeno & Robinson are not focused on the afro-descendant population and have historiographical shortcomings.

This fact leads to the second concern. The quantitative specification of the effects of racial exclusion is still incomplete. This fact is particularly true for the period of analysis of this

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<sup>30</sup> The author produces this account by referring to works such as Arriaga (2006) or Richani (2003).

<sup>31</sup> These researches use data from the census of 1993, household survey for 1999 or 2000, etc.

research, the so called period of the consolidation of the modern economy (first half of 20<sup>th</sup> century). Works on historical, sociological and anthropological traditions are abundant and useful in historiographical information for this period; however they do not focus on establishing “*average effects*” of racial exclusion on socio-economic outcomes. Secondly, these works do not use an institutional distributional approach to the problem, and finally, the restriction of data is an imperative limitation analyzing this topic in a more systematic approach not only in a historical approach but also from a contemporary perspective (Flórez, Medina & Urrea, 2001).

#### **1.4.4 Alternative explanations of the how question**

The alternative explanations of the how question show a more theoretical than empirical character. To the best of my knowledge, there are no empirical explanations for the specific question of how racial exclusion affects local socio-economic outcomes in a mechanism-centered design for the Colombian case. Nevertheless, the institutional literature presents alternative explanations to the question of how exclusionary institutions affect outcomes. That is why the discussion on alternative explanations to the how question focuses on this institutional theoretical debate.

Institutional continuity is the most plausible explanation on how institutions shape outcomes in the long run for different theoretical approaches. Concepts such as positive feedback, increasing returns and path dependency are frequent arguments. In this matter, the New Institutional Economics (NIE) approach develops alternative explanations on how institutions affect local performance. However, this approach is still weak for methodological and theoretical reasons. For instance, Dell (2010) tries to show channels of institutional persistence between historical institutions and contemporary outcomes in Peru<sup>32</sup>. Unfortunately, she defines mechanisms as average effects of variables and not as systems. Similarly, Amsden, DiCaprio & Robinson (2012) focus on the role of the elite in economic development. For instance, in the edited volume, Robinson (2012) asserts that the role of elites defines how an institution shapes an outcome. The author uses the term “*circulation of elites*” as a mechanism that explains how the path dependent

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<sup>32</sup>The institution is the Mita. “*a forced labor system instituted by the Spanish government in Peru and Bolivia in 1573 and abolished in 1812.*” (Dell, 2010, p. 1863).

strategies of elites maintained low levels of inequalities of the black population in the post-apartheid South Africa (Robinson, 2012, p. 40). In Acemoglu & Robinson (2008, 2006) the authors develop a theoretical model to predict how investment in de facto political power is a mechanism that elites use to maintain institutional structures that favor them. Such investment takes the form of force, violence, clientelism, lobbying, etc. These actions “ensure the continuation of the previous set of economic institutions” (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006, p.326)<sup>33</sup>. Correspondingly, Conning & Robinson (2007) propose a model to explain how (rationally) in the face of a higher probability of reforms, landowners decide to anticipate to these reforms. They then decide to redistribute property rights of land affecting the distribution of land (outcome).

Using a different perspective, Tilly (1998) presents mechanisms that cause and reproduce what the author defines as durable inequalities. According to the author, these mechanisms are opportunity hoarding and exploitation as mechanisms that cause inequalities. Moreover, emulation and adaptation are mechanisms that reinforce inequalities.

On the other hand, historical institutionalism focuses on empirical questions such as how institutions produce historical developments that structure outcomes (Steinmo, 2008, Hall & Taylor, 1996). Authors in the historical institutionalist tradition highlight the dynamism of institutions, the distributional effects, the role of actors, and the relevance of historical contexts on how institutions shape outcomes. Waldner (1999) is an illustrative work in these issues<sup>34</sup>.

For this approach, “*there is nothing automatic, self-perpetuating, or self-reinforcing about institutional arrangements*” (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, p.8). For instance this approach uses mechanisms of institutional change as layering, drift, conversion or displacement to show how institutions behave gradually and endogenously. Moreover, the study of actors and how actors affect outcomes is imperative. In Streeck & Thelen (2005) the interaction between rule makers and rule takers is an important source of institutional revision. Similarly, Jackson (2010) claims that institutionalization and actors’ behaviors are closely related in a dynamic process. In this

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<sup>33</sup> That is why slavery degenerated into Jim Crow laws, monopsony, segregation (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006).

<sup>34</sup> The author studies how contexts, actors and institutions are related in affecting economic development.



dynamic process, the dual role of structure and agency and the historical understanding of institutions are also dominant. Consequently, Jackson agrees that institutional understanding must include the historical context of rules, environments and actors.

An interesting point is described by Pierson (2004). For Pierson (2004), actors are key players in analyzing the effects of institutions over the time. This role also needs to be examined under the perspective of historical contexts and distributional effects of institutions. However, according to Pierson, despite well-situated actors (or institutional designers) are important for designing and revision, a significant issue is the role of what Pierson calls “*previous losers*” of institutional arrangements (Pierson, 2004, p. 135). It is expected that these previous losers foster institutional alterations. Regarding, the author points out that those losers are both agents of revisions and sources of reproduction. Losers might deal with pressures to adapt. In this case, actors reproduce previous institutional frameworks.

On the other hand Hacker, Pierson & Thelen (2013) and Mahoney & Thelen (2010) propose conditions under which the emergence of modes of gradual institutional change is feasible. These conditions are related to characteristic of institutions and the institutional context.

Accordingly, this research builds up on the theoretical conceptualizations develop by the historical institutional approach concerning institutional contexts, distributional effects, contestations and different actors’ roles. This institutional framework will be useful in exploring the empirical material to ascertain how the institution of racial exclusion affects socio-economic outcomes.

### **1.5 Racial exclusion and local socio-economic outcomes and the historical institutional explanation**

As the section on alternative explanations shows, there are different theoretical approaches to explain what affects socio-economic outcomes. The section discussed the role of economic factors such as geographical characteristics, production of specific goods, and the role of non-economic explanations such as culture, race and institutions.

The section shows that geographical, economic and cultural factors are important alternative explanations in the literature. However, empirical and theoretical works have demonstrated that socio-economic outcomes deserve a more institutional argument (Mahoney, 2015, Dell, 2010, Iyer, 2010, Mahoney, 2010, Huillery, 2009, Nunn, 2009, Beckert & Streeck, 2008, Banerjee & Iyer, 2005, Mahoney, 2003, Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2005, 2002 and 2001, among others).

On the other hand, literature on race shows that this variable is an important determinant of socio-economic outcomes either as a cultural variable (Wilson, 2010, Jencks & Phillips, 1998, Gafar, 1998, Hogan, 2001 Patterson, 2001, etc.) or an institutional explanation (Acemoglu, Reed, & Robinson, 2014, Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2012, Aghion, Alesina & Trebbi, 2004). Nevertheless, previous research in this field has underestimated racial exclusion as an institution with power distributional effects, the specific actors and behavior that this institution delimits in studying how institutions affect final outcomes<sup>35</sup>.

The section on alternative explanations also discussed the literature on race relations in Colombia, its different disciplinary approaches, conclusions and scope for improvement. In this regard, the Colombian literature on race relations is still in need of explaining two major issues which have been underestimated in racial literature. These issues are, first, the systematic estimation of the average effects of racial exclusion of the afro-descendant population. One of the reasons for this being an issue is the limitation of data in making conclusions at the national level (Flórez, Medina & Urrea, 2001). This becomes especially complex if the time framework is a historical period as is the case of this research. The second issue is that racial relations in Colombia deserve a historical institutional approach.

On the other hand, the institutional explanations are under intense debate. One of the approaches is rational choice in the form of the New Institutional Economics approach. This considers the theoretical insight that institutions are the fundamental cause of socio-economic outcomes. Institutions coordinate behavior, actors are rational, institutional change is abrupt, and

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<sup>35</sup> Mahoney (2015) studies this issue. However, he concentrates on the indigenous population and has different theoretical intentions to the purposes of this work.

institutional persistence is the most plausible explanation for the effects of institutions on outcomes such as household consumption, public goods provision, land tenure, per capita income, economic growth, etc. (Dell, 2010, Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2005, 2001, etc.). Moreover, in this approach the theoretical concept of institutions is related to the institution of property rights (Mahoney, 2015, Evans, 2006).

However, authors working from a historical-institutionalist perspective such as Mahoney (2015, 2010), Streeck (2010), Evans (2006) and DiMaggio & Powell (1991), among others, severely criticize the lack of theoretical conceptualizations in this approach. According to these authors, institutions are more than coordinating mechanism linked to property rights. Instead, institutions are historical and contextual distributional instruments (Mahoney, 2010 and Streeck & Thelen, 2005). To overlook these theoretical insights is a theoretical ‘sloppiness’ (Evans, 2006).

Moreover, the institutional explanations for the mechanism need further development. The New Institutional Economics approach lacks proper conceptualizations, relates mechanisms to intervening variables and focuses on the role of powerful actors on economic development (e.g. Amsden, DiCaprio & Robinson, 2012, Dell, 2010)<sup>36</sup>. Furthermore, historical institutionalism needs further empirical analysis to detect hypotheses that better specify a mechanism through which an exclusionary institution affects socio-economic outcomes. This mechanism must include the distributional effects of institutions, reproduction, change and different actors and behaviors.

Similarly, Tilly (1998) refers to mechanisms that cause and reinforce inequalities. This argument is completely different to the construction of a hypothesis that shows a mechanism to explain the precise causal link, different aggrieved actors, behavior, simultaneous processes of reproductions and change between the informal institution of racial exclusion and socio-economic outcomes.

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<sup>36</sup> For instance, DiCaprio (2012) mentions different ways through which elites affect economic development. Nevertheless, her work is concerned with explaining these powerful actors and not in showing a mechanism that explains the whole causal link between an exclusionary institution, different actors, different behavior, reproduction, change and socio-economic outcomes.

Therefore, the current research specifies both the average causal effect and a hypothesis of the theoretical mechanism between the cause and the outcome. In order to do so, the work uses the broad theoretical framework of historical institutionalism to analyze the effects of the historical institution of racial exclusion on local socio-economic outcomes. Specifically, it relates those effects to the regular practices of different actors that the institution of racial exclusion generates. This institutional approach provides several significant contributions to the analysis of the historical institution of racial exclusion. First, it allows tracing of the evolution of this historical institution with effects on socio-economic outcomes over time. Second, it allows the conceptualization and study of racial exclusion as an informal institution, which is the character it took in postcolonial times. Third, analysis based on historical institutionalism sheds light on tensions, conflicts and power structures that the institution of racial exclusion generates. Fourth, it allows treating of racial exclusion as a dynamic institution subject to simultaneous processes of revision and enforcement over time. Finally, it permits the identification of different types of specific actors that participate in these processes and their regular practices or behavior (see for instance Mahoney, 2015, 2015, Skocpol, 1995).

The detailed analysis of these actors and their regular practices are a crucial focal point in this work. As scholars acknowledge, these actors and practices are key elements to ascertain the effects of institutions on socio-economic outcomes, and the field is still open to new theoretical improvements (Mahoney, 2010). This fact is especially true with respect to informal institutions, as is the case with racial exclusion in late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century Colombia. In this regard, the theory needs to better specify the different specific actors that the institution of racial exclusion generates, their precise regular behavior, and how these regular practices truly contribute to produce specific socio-economic outcomes. This research will provide additional theoretical insights on these matters by analyzing the empirical material in the Colombian case.

## **1.6 The Colombian case, data resources, empirical strategies and case study**

This research uses the Colombian case of racial relations, geographical distribution of the race and local socio-economic outcomes to analyze the effects of the informal institution of racial exclusion on local socio-economic outcomes.

As already mentioned, there are two major research goals. First, to study the average effects of the cause on the outcome. Second, to establish a hypothesis of the causal mechanism between cause and outcome. The methodological approach to the two general research goals focus on two different strategies. The first uses a quantitative strategy to identify the average effect of the informal institution of racial exclusion on local socio-economic outcomes. To achieve this, this research operationalizes racial exclusion as a vector variable. This vector variable is the percentage of afro-descendant population. Moreover, for local socio-economic outcomes, this research uses measurements of public goods provision and industrial performance. The research operationalizes public goods provision with variables such as number of public schools per inhabitants and literacy rates. Additionally, industrial performance is operationalized by the variables per capita industrial capital and percentage of population in the industrial sector. This research therefore uses proxies for the measurements of racial exclusion and local socio-economic outcomes. All data are at the municipal level. The sources are censuses of population, industrial censuses, reports of education, and other data for the late 19<sup>th</sup> and mid-20<sup>th</sup> centuries in Colombia.

However, quantitative analysis presents some limitations in studying social phenomena from a historical institutional approach. One of the major limitations is the conceptualization and operationalization of cause and outcome. Basically, the uses of proxies and assumptions miss elements important in analyzing from an historical institutional approach (see for instance Evans, 2006). Moreover, in a quantitative approach the causal mechanism is usually limited to intervening variables and lacks a systematic analysis of the mechanism.

Therefore, a second methodological strategy intends to establish a hypothesis of the causal mechanism using a process tracing technique. Process tracing is the methodological tool to analyze causal mechanisms (Trampusch & Palier, 2016, Bennett & Checkel, 2015, Beach & Pedersen, 2013, George & Bennett, 2005, among others). Process tracing has the advantages of dealing with the mechanism as a system and not as an intervening variable; moreover, the cause and outcome are systematized concepts and not vector variables (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Additionally, process tracing is ideal in a multimethod approach to clarify the causal path

(Mahoney, 2004, 2000)<sup>37</sup>. These elements facilitate analyzing institutions as historical and contextual distributional instruments<sup>38</sup>.

From the different variants of process tracing, this research uses theory building process tracing. As the literature states, I generate a hypothesis of the mechanism based on the inductive analysis of the empirical materials of a case study. That is, the hypothesis of the mechanism is built up from the analysis of the empirical material (Trampusch & Palier, 2016, Beach & Pedersen, 2013). These empirical materials are official reports, correspondence, annals of the national congress, local newspapers and historiographical works. The majority of these sources are from the national archives and libraries in Colombia.

An important caveat is that the outcome of interest in this qualitative analysis is public goods provision. There are two reasons for focusing on public goods provision. First, the mechanism intends to detect the dynamics of actors, power, tensions and allocation of resources. In this framework, public goods provision is a more ideal final outcome to analyze such dynamics. Second, the analysis of public goods provision allows tracing processes of formation of laws and reforms. These laws and reforms have the character of public goods and are based on institutional power structures (Mahoney, 2010, Pierson, 2004).

Theory-building process tracing also entails a typical case selection strategy (as the literature states, e.g. Beach & Pedersen, 2013). This work uses as case study the region of Chocó in Colombia. Chocó is a region located in the Northwest of Colombia where on average the 1.3 percent of Colombian population was concentrated during the analyzed period and has as its capital the city of Quibdó.

Its privileged location makes Chocó a strategic region. Chocó shares its coast between the Pacific Ocean and Caribbean Sea; moreover, it is close to the Panama Canal. This region is rich in hydrographic and mining resources (Bonet, 2008). The historiography shows that during the

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<sup>37</sup> For instance, historical data are almost always proxies based on assumptions (Evans, 2006). The limitations of historical data are potential sources of spuriousness in the causal link. Process tracing helps to elucidate this causal link (Mahoney, 2004, 2000).

<sup>38</sup> As Mahoney (2010) and Streeck & Thelen (2005) would recommend.

analyzed period, Chocó was a world leader in the mining of platinum. However, its geographical characteristics also present challenges. The high rain levels, climate and landscape are considered by authors as historical barriers for local prosperity.

Nonetheless, Chocó is selected as a case study for two major reasons. First, Chocó is a typical case of an excluded region. Second, Chocó is a typical case for low local socio-economic outcomes –such as public goods provision. In other words, Chocó is a case where the hypothesized cause and outcome of interest are present. That is, on the one hand, Chocó is a Colombian region with the highest historical percentage of afro-descendant population making it ‘sensitive’ to the informal institution of racial exclusion. In other words, in Chocó, despite the afro-descendant majority, as in the rest of Latin American countries, white supremacy imposes its values and beliefs (Jaramillo-Uribe, 1996). On the other hand, the region presents low socio-economic performance. This region presents historical low coverage of public services, low number of schools per inhabitants, literacy rates, access to road and infrastructure and other indicators of public goods provision. These attributes therefore make Chocó a typical case for analyzing the effects of the informal institution of racial exclusion on low local socio-economic outcomes.

In summary, this introductory chapter has presented a general overview of the research. The chapter has given a brief discussion of the Colombian racial order, the research questions, suggested theoretical explanations in the literature, and the position of this research in this literature. Moreover, the chapter has outlined issues related to theoretical insights, methodological strategies, data and case study selection. The following chapters present in detail each one of these issues. The next chapter, for instance, begins by explaining in detail the theoretical bases of the analysis.

## Chapter 2 Theoretical Approach

This chapter defines and justifies the theoretical approach to the subject of study. The chapter starts by discussing the theoretical framework of historical institutionalism as the most appropriate approach to study the effects of racial exclusion on socio-economic outcomes. The discussion lays emphasis on different theoretical insights of historical intuitionism such as the distributional effects, tensions, contestations, the role of unequal actors, the dynamic character of institutions, and historical contexts.

The second part states the preliminary hypotheses of the study; particularly, the average effects of racial exclusion on outcomes. The chapter then develops systematized concepts and concludes with the theoretical specification of the scope conditions in which the hypothetical mechanism, the cause and the outcome operate.

### **2.1 Historical institutionalism and the study of racial exclusion**

The historical institutionalist approach is a fundamental general framework to address the effects of the informal institution of racial exclusion on local socio-economic outcomes. This approach allows studying racial exclusion as an institution, the actors that this institution generates, the regular practices of these actors, how these actors and practices contribute to specific outcomes, and how these processes involve institutional revisions and reproductions.

Specifically, this research follows the theoretical insights that institutions are rights and obligations enforced in a society (Carruthers, 2012, Mahoney, 2010, Streeck, 2010, Streeck & Thelen, 2005, Pierson, 2004, Knight, 1992, among others). These rights and obligations are formally or informally enforced (Streeck & Thelen, 2005). In this case, racial exclusion is an informal institution. This institution supposes rights and obligations not enforced by an official regulatory framework in the Spanish Latin American postcolonial context. In other words, racial exclusion is present in daily unspoken rules, social practices and in the social behavior of actors.



This research also follows the insight developed in the historical institutionalist approach that institutions have distributional effects. That is, institutions allocate resources unequally among actors (Mahoney, 2010, Streeck, 2010, Streeck & Thelen, 2005, Pierson, 2004, Knight, 1992, among others). In a distributional approach, institutions that produce hierarchical forms of domination are important for studying the effects of institutions on outcomes (Mahoney, 2010). Accordingly, racial exclusion is an example of such hierarchical forms of domination and as an institution has power distributional effects. In fact, the informal institution of racial exclusion allocates resources in the form of tacit social, economic and cultural standings among different actors, delimiting these actors' goals, rights, obligations, conflicts, and producing winners and losers from the institutional distribution (Mahoney, 2015, 2010, Skocpol, 1995, Hall & Taylor, 1996).

This research also shares from the historical institutionalist approach the view that institutions are dynamic because they are subject to permanent and simultaneous processes of change and continuity over time (Campbell, 2010, Thelen, 2002 and Pierson, 2004). These simultaneous processes of change and continuity are rooted in the permanent tensions and conflicts produced by the distributional character of institutions. Indeed, Skocpol (1995, p.105) states that institutions are persistent "*sets of relationships*" in permanent conflict and tension. Consequently, tensions and conflicts are sources for institutional redefinitions.

In this sense, this research emphasizes that change is part of the everyday social realm (Streeck, 2010, Olsen, 2008). Change is frequently a gradual endogenous process (Streeck, 2010, Thelen, 2002, Pierson, 2004, Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). Racial exclusion is therefore an informal dynamic institution. As a dynamic institution, racial exclusion entails permanent conflicts and tensions and simultaneous processes of institutional change and reinforcement.

The research also follows the theoretical view that institutions are subject to these simultaneous processes because institutions shape unequal actors. Jackson (2010), Mahoney, (2015, 2010), Streeck & Thelen (2005) broadly generalize these actors as rule makers and rule takers. From this analysis, this research recognizes that the institution of racial exclusion allocates resources unevenly among actors, shaping rule makers and rule takers. These rule makers are understood

as power holders or dominant white groups. Rule takers are understood as subalterns or the excluded blacker population (or regions).

Historical institutionalism suggests that these actors are in tension, and become sources of institutional redefinitions and reinforcements. Over time, their regular practices affect socio-economic outcomes. Steinmo (2008, p. 118) argues that historical institutionalism focuses its attention on how institutions “*structure and shape behaviour and outcomes*”. Therefore, historical institutionalism is a proper theoretical guide to explain, in the light of empirical material, in which ways the institution of racial exclusion structures and shapes the different behavior of excluded actors and their incidences in the outcomes of interest here.

In summary, I share the view of the historical institutionalist framework that institutions have distributional effects, are dynamic rights and obligations, are contested, and shape unequal actors who broadly are rule makers and rule takers, and that institutions structure behavior and are affected by historical contexts.

Nevertheless, although considerable empirical and theoretical work has been devoted to these analytical insights, it remains unclear how the effects of an informal institution such as racial exclusion are translated into local socio-economic outcomes, which specific unequal actors shape this institution, which specific regular behavior is shown by these actors, which conditions they face, what kind of social practices (or regular behaviors) really contribute to reinforcements or revisions of the informal institution, and how such regular behavior contributes to outcomes.

This theoretical gap must be closed with empirical work. The analysis of the empirical evidence will allow a theoretical mechanism to be established between the hypothesized cause of racial exclusion and socio-economic outcomes. Through empirical investigations, this mechanism will specify the actors and behavior that contribute to final outcomes. This would include when more detailed differentiation is required, the different actors that an institution such as racial exclusion would shape. The empirical work could also show the levels of grievance by the informal institution. Finally, the identification of the levels of grievance could shed further light when

those different levels of grievances lead to different regular practices of institutional reproduction and revisions impacting on local socio-economic outcomes.

## **2.2 Hypotheses**

The hypotheses are in line with the two foci of the research questions. The research questions in this work inquire about causal effects and the causal mechanism of the institution of racial exclusion and local socio-economic outcomes. In order to explain these causal relationships, this research has two major challenges. The first is when evaluating, whether an informal institution has effects on local historical outcomes. The second is explaining the specific mechanism between the hypothesized cause and outcome to identify how the institution affects outcomes. The hypotheses will be addressed in these senses.

The first hypothesis of this research therefore states that the institution of racial exclusion is a supplementary explanation for differences in local socio-economic outcomes in the Colombian case. In other words, this research does not argue that the institution of racial exclusion is the unique cause of differences in local socio-economic outcomes. The research therefore develops the argument that the institution of racial exclusion is an additional explanation among multiple factors that can affect outcomes. Nonetheless, racial exclusion is a relevant explanation because it considers the historical and institutional roots of differences in local outcomes.

I analyze the effects of racial exclusion on local socio-economic performance by identifying the relationship between (local) spatial structures of race, public goods provision and local economic performance. It is expected that the empirical data will show an indirect negative relationship between racial exclusion and local socio-economic performance via public goods provision.

Consequently, my first hypothesis claims that municipalities with a higher presence of non-white population have experienced lower levels of public goods provision such as education and, subsequently, lower local socio-economic performance. This matter suggests that racial exclusion may have effects on local performance via the dynamics of public goods provision which are specific to explanatory dynamics.

The second purpose of the research is the theoretical mechanism. However, since this part of the research relies on the empirical analysis to arrive at a hypothesis for the mechanism through which racial exclusion affects local socio-economic outcomes, a hypothesis in this respect cannot initially be identified.

Nonetheless, the heuristic of historical institutionalism offers some insights about which theoretical concepts could be useful to identify the mechanism hypothesis. In other words, historical institutionalism can guide the search for the mechanism by providing relevant theoretical concepts to analyze the empirical material. This research therefore uses the theoretical insight that institutions are dynamic rights and obligations, have distributional effects, are contested, shape unequal actors and are affected by historical contexts. The research also includes the view that institutions shape two major actors: rule makers and rule takers, or power holders and excluded population. Finally, the theoretical framework supposes that these actors show regular patterns of behavior for reproduction and revision of the institution of racial exclusion.

An initial theoretical concept is therefore the informal institution of racial exclusion itself. Moreover, the broad general framework would indicate that two additional theoretical concepts are relevant in the search of a hypothesis (see for instance Mahoney, 2015, 2010, Streeck & Thelen, 2005). Specifically, as an institution, racial exclusion shapes different actors. These actors may be rule makers or rule takers. In turn, rule makers or dominant groups have regular patterns for reproducing the institution of racial exclusion to control structures of power. On the other hand, racial exclusion also shapes blacker rule takers or excluded population. These actors force revisions and contestations of the exclusionary institution.

However, as already specified, because the research purpose is to establish a hypothesis for the mechanism that better specifies the different actors, their precise regular behavior and how these specific regular practices truly contribute to the effects on socio-economic outcomes, such questions can only be explained with empirical analysis. Only the empirical work can arrive at a hypothesis that shows clearly this mechanism, its specific parts, actors and regular practices.

The research questions and hypotheses will, furthermore, have relevant implications in the methodological structure of the research. It is therefore important to consider that in addition to the distributional and dynamic perspective of institutions, a multimethod approach to the issue needs to be applied. This methodological strategy will be central in overcoming the methodological and theoretical sloppiness of current institutional approaches.

Accordingly, the first hypothesis suggests a correlational conception of causation or a “*effects-of-causes*” approach (Mahoney & Goertz, 2006, p.229). This definition of causation requires a quantitative approach to estimate the average effect of the hypothesized cause on the final outcome. On the other hand, the search for the hypothesis’s mechanism suggests a causal inference in the form of “*causes-of-effects approach*” (Mahoney & Goertz, 2006, p.229). That is to say, it suggests specifying how the cause affects the outcome. Therefore, this part of the research requires a qualitative approach to explain empirically the mechanism by ‘tracing’ how institutions, specific actors, conditions, institutional enforcements and revisions are related to generating outcomes.

## **2.3 Systematized concepts**

Wonka (2007) argues that the theoretical statements in the hypotheses determine the systematized concepts to be explained. Since this work follows an inductive approach to find the mechanism, there is no preliminary hypothesis about this mechanism (see Trampusch & Palier, 2016 and Beach & Pedersen, 2013). However, the heuristic theoretical approach of historical institutionalism indicates which theoretical concepts are relevant in analyzing the empirical material.

Following Wonka (2007) and Adcock & Collier (2001), this section defines the theoretical attributes of the major systematized concepts of this research. The conceptualization begins with the discussion of the theoretical background of each concept. It will then present the formulation of each systematized concept.

### **2.3.1 Racial exclusion: background concept**

The hypothetical statement in this research emphasizes that, as a theoretical cause, racial exclusion should be conceptualized as an informal institution. Nonetheless, in order to achieve such a conceptualization, this section discusses the general understanding of racial exclusion to delimit its explicit attributes as an institution and justify this particular choice (Wonka, 2007 and Adcock & Collier, 2001, p. 532).

Racial exclusion has varied theoretical meanings. Anthropology, psychology and sociology are three disciplines in the social sciences that contribute to the development of its systematized conceptualization (McKee, 1993).

Anthropological studies are pioneers in the analysis of race and racial exclusion (Montagu, 1942, Livingstone, 1965, Washburn, 1963, Benedict & Weltfish, 1943, 1948 quoted in Backer & Patterson, 1994). Fluehr-Lobban (2006) refers to the term racism as judgments of the behavior of an individual because of his or her racial profile. Therefore, racial exclusion should be understood as the differential treatment for belonging to a particular racial profile<sup>39</sup>.

In psychology racial exclusion is also seen as the segregation of ethno racial groups (Foster, 1991). However, this discipline is devoted to studying topics such as the effects of racism on psychological and physiological factors, e.g. stress or mental health (Crocker, 2007, Carter, 1994) or in establishing how individuals develop meaning related to ethno racial categories (Bobo & Fox, 2003).

Backer & Patterson (1994, p. 2) state that the difference among diverse approaches to racism and sociological studies of race is that sociology “*dealt with social problems*”. That is, sociological studies are more concerned with race relations and its association with phenomena such as eurocentrism, imperialism, the rise of the modern capitalist world, the global economy, colonization, and the slave trade (Winant, 2000, Backer & Patterson, 1994).

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<sup>39</sup> Similarly, Patterson & Spencer (1994) analyze the scientific foundations of racial exclusion. The authors analyze scientific discourse during 19<sup>th</sup> century in United States by identifying an association between racial characteristics and the progress/backwardness dualism. According to the authors, this association facilitates the construction of hierarchies and barriers that legitimize social relations.

From a sociological point of view racial exclusion is defined as the unequal treatment on the basis of racialized characteristics that facilitate supremacy of one dominant racial group (Reskin, 2012, Pager & Shepard, 2008, Quillian, 2006, National Research Council, 2004). For instance, Pager & Shepard (2008) define racial discrimination as the “*unequal treatment of persons or groups on the basis of their race or ethnicity*” motivated by racist attitudes, beliefs or ideologies (Pager & Shepard, 2008 p. 182). Similarly, the National Research Council (2004, p. 39) uses the term racial discrimination as “(1) *differential treatment on the basis of race* that disadvantages a racial group and (2) *treatment on the basis of inadequately justified factors other than race that disadvantages a racial group (differential effect)*.” On the other hand, Quillian (2006, p. 302) states that “*racial discrimination is the difference between the treatment that a target group actually receives and the treatment they would receive if they were not members of the target group but were otherwise the same*”. The author also stresses the broad and narrow definitions of this “*unequal treatment*”. As can be noticed, there is no significant difference in the attributes of the concept of racial exclusion in these examples. Racial exclusion is identified with the attribute of differential treatment to particular racial groups. However, the National Research Council (2004) emphasizes also the attribute of differential effects on racialized groups of equal treatment.

Sociological conceptualizations of racial exclusion also include differences between individual and institutional racial exclusion. Pager & Shepherd (2008) and Baez (2000) refer to racial exclusion according to its sources of origin as individual and institutional exclusion. Individual racial exclusion refers to actions motivated by individual beliefs and prejudices of a race as inferior. Additionally, institutional racial exclusion is the result of the racism “*embedded in the system*” (Baez, 2000, p. 332). Consequently, according to the authors institutional racial exclusion is related to policies, laws, regulations with harmful effects on the excluded group.

On the other hand, in empirical studies in economics racial exclusion does not present an explicit systematized concept in the terms of Wonka (2007) or Adcock & Collier (2001). Racial issues are usually presented as indicators that represent a cultural or institutional assumption. For instance, as an institution, racial exclusion is commonly operationalized as a vector variable

affecting rational behaviors and property rights<sup>40</sup> (Aghion, Alesina & Trebbi, 2004, Alesina & La Ferrara, 2004, Easterly & Levine, 1997, Acemoglu, Reed, & Robinson, 2014, Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2012, among others).

Drawing on these different conceptualizations, it could be concluded that the background concept of racial exclusion entails four fundamental attributes. The first is that racial exclusion entails differential treatment to a dominated group or individual based on racialized characteristics. The second attribute entails that there are negative consequences for the excluded individuals or group and benefits for the dominant individuals or groups. The third attribute associates discrimination with behavior (Quillian, 2006, San Roman, 1996 quoted in Pisano, 2012). And, finally, the fourth suggests that racial exclusion could be at individual or at institutional level.

Racial exclusion also presents additional attributes that need to be incorporated in order to gain a better explanation of its effects on outcomes. The following section will discuss this issue.

### **2.3.2 Racial exclusion as an institution**

Winant (2000, p. 169) claims that there is an inadequacy in theoretical explanations of racial issues. Among many things, the author mentions that from a sociological perspective, it is necessary to specify “*the micro-macro linkages that shape racial issues*”. The author emphasizes that it is necessary to focus on the comparative, unstable, contested and iterative dimension of race. On the other hand, the lack of a systematic conceptualization in the economic tradition leads to the indifferent treatment of concepts such as ethnic diversity, racial heterogeneity, racial hierarchies or racial fragmentation as being theoretically equivalent (e.g. Aghion, Alesina & Trebbi, 2004, Alesina & La Ferrara, 2004, Easterly & Levine, 1997, Acemoglu, Reed, & Robinson, 2014, Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2012, among others), and usually related to the institution of property rights (Mahoney, 2015). Moreover, As Evans (2006) would suggest, the specification of a complex institution through empirical proxies underestimates racial exclusion

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<sup>40</sup> As Evans (2006) would indicate.



as an informal institution with power distributional effects and all the implications that this fact supposes for the analysis of the effects of institutions on socio-economic outcomes.

This research explores some of these issues by conceptualizing racial exclusion as an informal institution with power distributional and dynamic effects. However, this fact does not mean that the systematized concept of racial exclusion disregards the attributes of the literature on race. Therefore, this research uses the term racial exclusion as a systematized concept following the historical institutionalist approach and considering the basic attributes in the literature on the sociology of race.

From the discussed literature on race, the systematized concept of racial exclusion therefore applies the following attributes:

- Racial exclusion is the differential treatment of a dominant group against individuals, groups or regions based on racialized characteristics of these individuals, groups or regions. In turn, racialized characteristics are social constructions that include physical characteristics and socio-cultural meanings associated with the afro-descendant world (Wade, 1993 and Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2005).
- Racial exclusion entails the disparate impact of equal treatment for different racialized groups (Pager & Shepard, 2008 and National Council, 2006).
- Racial exclusion is racialized differential treatment at individual or corporate levels.
- Racial exclusion entails benefits for the dominant individuals or groups.

Nevertheless, as already suggested, these attributes are incomplete if they do not include the institutional character of racial exclusion. Explicitly, this means that the conceptualization of racial exclusion should include its power distributional and dynamic character. This theoretical conceptualization will allow disentangling the specific actors and behavior that this institution delimits to study how institutions affect final outcomes (see for instance Mahoney, 2015, Mahoney 2010, Hall & Taylor, 1996, Knight, 1992). Hence, following historical institutionalism and literature on race the attributes of racial exclusion as a systematized concept are:

- Racial exclusion concerns unspoken or tacit rights and obligations, rules or social practices implicitly enforced in a society that discriminates against a racialized population.

This means, first, as the historical institutionalist approach suggests, racial exclusion is an informal institution not enforced by formal law; nonetheless, these rights and obligations are in force (Mahoney, 2015, Carruthers, 2012, Streeck & Thelen, 2005). During the colonial regime, racial exclusion was explicit in the legal institutional framework of Spanish colonies. After the independence process, racial differentiation was illegal in Colombian regulation. However, this institution was in force within the social structure in the form of practices that represent racialized unspoken rights, obligations, rules etc. Second, as the attributes of the literature on race suggest, these unspoken rights and obligations entail a differential treatment against a racialized group, specifically, against racialized afro-descendant groups.

- Racial exclusion represents tacit rules that allocate power resources according to racialized characteristics.

This allocation of resources takes place, as the attributes of the literature on race suggests, through two channels. The first is the individual or institutional<sup>41</sup> differential treatment toward a racialized group. The second channel refers to the disparate impact of equal individual or institutional treatment on different racialized groups (Pager & Shepard, 2008 and National Council, 2006).

This attribute also entails that racial exclusion has greater distributional consequences than functional roles (Mahoney, 2015, Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, Knight, 1992). Therefore, as historical institutionalism suggests, racial exclusion allocates resources unevenly, thereby unevenly shaping actors. These unequal actors are, in general, power holders and the excluded population.

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<sup>41</sup> Related to corporations such as government, etc (Baez, 2000).

Power holders benefit from the institutional arrangements while the excluded population is negatively affected by them<sup>42</sup>. Consequently, in the context of inequalities, racial exclusion guarantees the control of resources by allocating unequal rights and obligations that favor the control of power by power holders.

- Racial exclusion is a dynamic institution that comprises historical and contextual constructions in time. Racial exclusion is reinforced and contested over time.

Following the historical institutional approach (e.g. Jackson, 2010, Campbell, 2010, Streeck & Thelen, 2005, Pierson, 2004); racial exclusion is dynamic because excluded actors make social contestations to the institutional allocation of resources forging gradual endogenous changes (that is why path dependence cannot explain this case). On the one hand, the excluded population demands actions to move upward in the racialized social structure, while power holders can gradually change the institutional structure and/or maintain it. Indeed, racial exclusion is an informal institution that evolves over time and exhibits varied connotations.

By combining attributes in the literature on race and the historical institutionalist approach, the systematized conceptualization of racial exclusion can better show how this informal institution affects socio-economic outcomes over time. It is not proper to deal with racial exclusion without considering that racial exclusion has dynamics of power in the distributional allocation of resources, shapes the roles of unequal actors and the specific social practices or regular behavior of these actors. Historical institutionalism suggests that these elements will finally contribute to socio-economic outcomes (e.g. Mahoney, 2010, Hall & Taylor, 1996). Consequently, the combination of racial and institutional theoretical attributes is imperative.

### **2.3.3 Socio-economic outcomes**

The final outcome is the posited term ‘socio-economic outcomes’ and its attributes are according to the research goals, methodological strategy and data availability.

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<sup>42</sup> See Mahoney (2010), Pierson (2004), Ferranti et al (2004), among others.

Nonetheless, the concept of ‘socio-economic outcome’ is as George & Bennett (2005, p. 79) would say “*too broadly*” stated for a conceptualization of a final outcome. The literature shows that a socio-economic outcome could be any concept, variable or in magnitude. For instance, low income and educational attainment (Jencks & Phillips, 1998, Gafar, 1998), patterns of family instability, high child labor and fertility rates (Patterson, 2001), high poverty (Gafar, 1998), low economic growth and weak public policies (Easterly & Levine, 1997), low public goods provision (Gennaioli & Rainer, 2007, Easterly & Levine, 1997), high probability of civil wars (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005 and Besley & Reynal-Querol, 2012), levels of public infrastructure (Wantchekon, Klasnja & Novta, 2015, Huillery, 2009, Iyer, 2010), and others.

Therefore, “*what exactly and precisely is the dependent (or outcome) variable?*” Explicitly, what is the systematized concept of socio-economic outcome in this research? (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 79). This research uses different attributes for the systematized concept of socio-economic outcome. These attributes accord to the research goals. Explicitly, this mean that in the “*effects-of-causes*” approach, the data and research goal allow relating socio-economic outcomes such as local industrial performance. In the “*causes-of-effects*” approach, the term socio-economic outcome is related to public goods provision. In order to understand the choice of these attributes, it is imperative to explain certain aspects.

The first aspect concerns the “*broad constellations of meanings*” for socio-economic outcomes (Adcock & Collier, 2001, p. 531). The literature shows that socio-economic outcomes are understood as economic, social, and political performances. For instance, Bonet & Meisel (2007), Katz, vom Hau & Mahoney (2005), Mahoney (2003), Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2002, 2001), Easterly & Levine (1997) use as economic outcomes or dependent variables economic growth, per capita GDP, or per capita GDP growth<sup>43</sup>. On the other hand, the term social outcome is defined as substantive freedoms (Sen, 1999), infant mortality, literacy, and life expectancy (Mahoney, 2015), educational attainments, health improvements (Huillery, 2009), etc. Finally, political outcomes are related to political democracy (Mahoney, 2003).

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<sup>43</sup> Similarly, Waldner, (1999) uses the term economic development and defines it as the capacity to create value, production of value added goods, etc.

In relation to the above, this work follows the economic tradition and states that the first attribute of socio-economic outcome is the level of industrial local performance. The level of local industrial performance is an attribute that allows the first posited research question to be analyzed, the respective first theoretical hypothesis to be evaluated, and the potential of the available data to be exploited.

The second aspect refers to the second research goal, the mechanism. However, this aspect has a more theoretical argument. It was stated that to find a hypothesis for the mechanism requires examining the dynamics of actors, power, tensions and allocation of resources. Consequently, public goods provision is a candidate for socio-economic outcomes to observe such dynamics at work.

This insight is supported by both the literature on institutionalism and economic history<sup>44</sup>. For instance, Pierson (2004, p. 31) claims that the provision of public goods is a “*fundamental feature of politics*” and economics. Since some goods are under-produced by private producers, provision by public actors is necessary. Nevertheless, those actors and decisions are embedded in institutional frameworks, power structures and interests that influence the final provision. Therefore, the provision of public goods would be highly influenced by informal institutions that distribute resources unevenly among actors (Mahoney, 2010, Pierson, 2004). The attribute of public goods provision then permits tracing the institutional processes behind the final provision of these goods. That is, public goods provision is an outcome that facilitates better identification of how power structures, the role of actors, tensions and conflicts, behind the institutional framework, shape final outcomes.

Moreover, the provision of public goods also supposes additional political economic outcomes. Explicitly, this means public goods also take the form of laws (Pierson, 2004 and Marwell & Oliver, 1993). Accordingly, Pierson (2004, p. 32) argues that “*laws themselves have the character of public goods for those who benefits from them*”. Laws and reforms are based on power institutional structures. Therefore, an additional attribute of socio-economic outcomes includes laws related to the political economy of public goods provision.

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<sup>44</sup> For instance, Mahoney (2010), Pierson (2004).

A final aspect in understanding socio-economic outcomes in this research is that it usually refers to poor socio-economic performance. In other words, it regularly refers to low industrial performance or low public goods provision.

Therefore, the systematized concept of socio-economic outcomes is shaped by the following set of attributes:

- The socio-economic outcome uses the attribute of local industrial performance as the final outcome in the quantitative “*effect-of-cause*” approach.
- The socio-economic outcome uses the attribute of public goods provision performance as the outcome in the quantitative “*effect-of-cause*” approach.
- The socio-economic outcome uses the attribute of public goods provision performance in the mechanistic approach.
- Generally, socio-economic outcomes usually take the form of low industrial performance and public goods provision such as education.

#### **2.3.4 Actors**

The background understanding of actors is broad in institutional approaches. Hall & Taylor (1996) point out that any institutional approach recognizes that institutions affect human behavior. Furthermore, the effects of institutions on outcomes are produced via actions of individuals (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Therefore, the role of actors will be an imperative theoretical insight in the search of the mechanism.

The institutional analyses specifically concentrate their efforts on disentangling how the micro-decisions of actors affect outcomes. For instance, individual behavior is a relevant subject of study in rational choice approach. Thelen (1999, p. 377) claims that the emphasis on micro-behavior in this approach suggests that “*aggregate outcomes need to be understood in terms of the actions and behavior of individuals behaving strategically*”. However, this approach focuses actors’ behavior on institutional designers. In particular, this approach focuses on the rational character of this actor subtracting reality to analysis (Streeck, 2011, 2010).

Historical institutionalism understands that actors are embedded in historical and contextual situations (Jackson, 2010). For instance, in Streeck & Thelen (2005) the interaction between rule makers and rule takers is an important source of institutional revisions over time. This interaction between actors leads to institutional change. In other words, while institutional makers design, implement and revise the rules, institutional takers “*identify the gaps between*” the rules and their implementation by reinterpreting rules in their specific temporal or historical context (Streeck & Thelen, 2005, p. 13). Similarly, Jackson (2010) claims that institutional understanding must include the historical context of rules, environments, the dual role of structure and agency, and actors. Analogous to Streeck & Thelen (2005), Jackson also considers that actors are rule takers and rule makers and both are sources of institutional redefinitions over time. These sources of change also come from ambiguities and gaps between rules and contexts leading to local creative reinterpretations, adaptations or deviations from the rules. This same theoretical approach is followed in Mahoney & Thelen (2010).

An interesting point of view is described by Pierson (2004). Pierson (2004) also stresses the role of actors and the identification of gaps in institutional changes and continuities. Actors appear as crucial players in analyzing the effects of institutions over time. This role also needs to be examined from the view of historical contexts and distributional effects of institutions.

Hence, it could be said that institutional lines are moving to a detailed analysis of actors’ roles on change and reproduction. For example, Campbell (2010) contends that the analysis of actor roles on dual processes of change and continuity must be a priority in understanding effects of institutions on outcomes. Nonetheless, Campbell claims that it is necessary to redefine the approach of actor reinterpretations, their contexts and their institutional constraints.

Enduring institutions and the role of actors are therefore only one side of the coin (Campbell, 2010 and Pierson, 2004). Authors such as Mahoney & Thelen (2010), Campbell (2010), Streeck & Thelen (2005), and Pierson (2004) emphasize actor roles in institutional reproduction and change. For these authors, rule makers and rule takers are sources of institutional design, implementation, reinterpretations and revisions. Therefore, actors can also revise the institution of racial exclusion. Actors contest the distributional allocation of resources based on racialized

characteristics, especially those actors aggrieved by this unequal allocation. These revisions finally would affect the socio-economic outcomes.

This research also uses the theoretical approach of actors being embedded in historical and contextual situations. Considering this fact allows focusing on actor reinterpretations of rules in specific temporal or historical contexts (Streeck & Thelen, 2005). In this regard, the institution of racial exclusion is a dynamic institution that is affected by the temporal and historical interpretations of actors. Actors reinterpret the rights and obligations that suppose the institution of racial exclusion.

Finally, this research also follows the theoretical insights, regarding the role of actors on socio-economic outcomes. As Hall & Taylor (1996, p.939) suggest, this research uses the theoretical argument that “*it is through the actions of individuals that institutions have an effect on political outcomes*”. Therefore, the empirical study of actors would indicate relevant insights in identifying the hypothesis of the mechanism.

Hence, according to these insights, the systematized concept of actors has the following attributes:

- Entities shaped by the informal institution of racial exclusion.
- Actors can be winners of the distributional allocation of resources of racial exclusion. That is to say, actors are rule makers, power holders, elites, etc. As winners, they would be in favor of institutional reproduction.
- Actors can be losers of the distributional allocation of resources. That is to say, actors are rule takers, the suppressed, excluded population, etc. As losers, they would be in favor of institutional revisions.
- Finally, the concept of actors involves the perception of collectivities without strict implications of aggregation (Collier, 1999). In this regard, an actor could be a region, group or individual as long as these entities are a representation of a regular collectivity.

However, the specification of the systematized concept of actors according to the historical institutional framework is not exempted from improvement. As one of the theoretical issues of



this research is the specification of actors and regular behaviors that contribute to the final outcome, an analysis remains overlooked in this dynamic approach which needs to be addressed. This analysis refers to how specifically institutional makers and takers converge simultaneously in being sources of both change and continuity affecting socio-economic outcomes. Hence, the theoretical framework needs a better specification of different actors and regular behavior. Explicitly, this concerns the questions of: Are actors rule takers or rule makers? Is there a more precise specification of these actors? Are reproduction and revisions the specific behavior? Is there other specific behavior?

This improved specification can be achieved only with empirical work. That is to say, this fact is visible only by processing the theoretical mechanism with empirical material that contends the full performance of actors and their different socio-cultural context.

#### **2.3.4.1 Power holders/rule makers**

The previous section mentions that actors can be rule makers or rule takers. What is specifically the systematized concept of rule maker?

A rule maker is an actor who is easy to identify in the constellations of the background literature. The rational choice approach focuses on institutional designers. For instance, in North (1990), choices of institutional designers will affect the stability and modification of institutional constraints. By institutional designers, this approach refers to what North (1990) calls entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs make choices about constraints and the modification of those constraints. They are “*the agent of change*”. Albeit, more importantly, they are the actors of stability (North, 1990, p. 396).

Following this theoretical line, Dell (2010) argues that the influence of institutional designers or elites maintains the effects of old institutions in the long run during both the implementation of a specific institutional agenda and after this institutional framework disappears (Robinson, 2012). In the same fashion, Robinson (2012) and DiCaprio (2012) Lamberg & Pajunen (2010) consider that institutional persistence and outcomes are related to powerful groups in society. These groups address, maintain and eliminate the institutional structure through strategic decisions.

Hence, institutions persist over time and reflect the interests of institutional designers. Namely, the interests of actors such as power holders, political elites, economic elites, large landowners, etc.

The specification in historical institutionalism is not different. Pierson (2004) describes these actors as well-situated actors in the institutional distribution and important for designing and revisions. Moreover, this approach sees actors as embedded in historical and contextual situations. Therefore, they have a more dynamic role by contesting and/or maintaining institutional designs.

Following these insights, the systematized concept of rule takers includes the following attributes:

- Actors with a better social standing allocated by the institution of racial exclusion.
- Actors with the allocated role of implementing, rewriting and reproducing institutions.
- According to Collier (1999), an actor could be a region, group or individual that is a representation of a collectivity.

#### ***2.3.4.2 Rule takers, subalterns, suppressed***

The concept of rule takers is better developed in the historical institutional approach. Institutional rule takers follow the institutional framework designed by rule makers. However, this approach considers the dynamic character of this actor. In other words, for authors from this tradition, rule takers identify gaps and reinterpret rules. They make local creative reinterpretations, adaptations or deviations from the rules (Campbell, 2010, Streeck & Thelen, 2005).

Being the source of reinterpretations allows the generation of gradual changes. For instance, for Pierson (2004) it is expected that these previous losers foster institutional alterations. On this subject, the author points out that these losers are both agents of revisions and sources of reproductions. Losers might deal with pressures to adapt. In this case, actors reproduce previous institutional frameworks. Notwithstanding, losers might also find space for creative revisions (Campbell, 2010).

An important cautionary aspect must be given. Pierson (2004) highlights the role of what he calls “losers” of institutional distributions. These “losers” are sources of change and/or reproduction. The author quotes that actors “*aggrieved but not co-opted are important sources*” of change (Pierson, 2004, p. 154 quoting Schneiberg & Clemens). However, the author also emphasizes that aggrieved but non co-opted actors cannot be in search of change. Rather, they adapt to the institutional settings.

Therefore, considering these theoretical arguments the attributes of the systematized concept of rule takers are:

- Actors with a lower social standing allocated by the institution of racial exclusion.
- Actors with the allocated role of taking, adapting, revising exclusionary institutions.
- According to Collier (1999), an actor can be a region, group or individual that is a representation of a collectivity.

### **2.3.5 Behavior or regular practices of actors**

As Hall & Taylor (1996) state, the effects of institutions on outcomes are produced via the behavior of individuals. Moreover, Hoffmann (2006) says that individuals have strategies in the face of exclusion<sup>45</sup>. One of the most important elements in the search for the mechanism is the identification of the regular behavior of actors which contributes to final outcomes. As it was already emphasized, this research uses the precept that only the empirical work can arrive at a hypothesis that shows clearly the mechanism and, consequently, these specific regular practices. However, it is necessary to examine theoretical approaches that provide insights for the analysis of specific behavior in the empirical material. This section discusses these theoretical approaches and insights.

Institutional analysis suggests that there are two major ‘aggregated’ terms of relevance. Broadly, these terms are related to reproduction and change. For instance, Clemens & Cook (1999, p. 445) state that the reproduction of institutions is feasible because alternative ways of behaving “remain unimaginable”. In other words, reproduction is a form of referring to a behavior set related to reproduction. Similarly, institutional literature states that change is another possible

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<sup>45</sup> The author mentions for instance negation, affirmation and evasion (Hoffmann, 2006, p. 108).

‘behavior’ which could be exogenous or endogenous and gradual. This means actors can behave regularly using two ‘aggregated types of behavior’: reproducing or changing institutions.

The micro-analysis of the institutional work show that such ‘aggregated behavior’ rely on ‘sub-behavior’. For instance, reproduction could be in the form of what Pierson (2004) refers to as adaptation. Pierson (2004) argues that subalterns can adapt to an environment dominated by institutional designers. This fact is explained by the effects of previous investment by subalterns to adapt to the established institutional framework. This theoretical explanation is similar to the concepts of the circulation of elites in Robinson (2012) or “*opportunity hoarding*” in Tilly (1998)<sup>46</sup>. Indeed, Tilly (1998) uses other terms like exploitation, adaptation and emulation as “mechanisms” that prompt unequal structures. In these cases, members also ‘adapt’ to previous institutional arrangements because this ‘adaptation’ offers them better benefits. DiCaprio (2012) also mentions behavior such as influence, manipulation and actions related to “rent-seekers”. According to the author, these behaviors contribute to the reproduction or cementation of “*positions of a particular group*” affecting economic development (DiCaprio, 2012, p. 6).

Literature on race also sheds light on relevant theoretical insights to analyze the regular behaviors of actors. Pyke (2010) mentions a similar behavior to adaptation. For the author there are processes of subalterns identifying with power holders whereby subalterns take the modes of behaviors of power holders to gain acceptability. The author adds that subalterns distance themselves from those similar to them to be accepted by power holders. In this process of identification, subalterns receive compensation such as a better social standing in the social structure<sup>47</sup>.

Similarly, another sub-behavior related to reproduction is found in the literature on internalized racism. For instance, Bivens (2005) states that:

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<sup>46</sup> Tilly (1998) refers to “mechanisms” such as opportunity hoarding, emulation or adaptation. He defines the concept of opportunity hoarding as a mechanism that causes inequalities for non-elite members. According to this concept, members of non-elites acquire access to resources that are valuable. These members, Tilly (1998, p. 154) says, “...hoard access to resource, creating beliefs and practices that sustain their control”. Moreover “...beneficiaries do not enlist the efforts of outsiders but instead exclude them from access to the relevant resources” (Tilly, 1998, p. 91).

<sup>47</sup> Other behavior could be similar to adaptation such as the negation or evasion mentioned in Hoffmann (2006). Wilson (2000, p. 244) also uses the term “*adapter*” to refer to mestizos living between two cultures in Peru.

Internalized racism is the situation that occurs in a racist system when a racial group oppressed by racism supports the supremacy and dominance of the dominant group by maintaining or participating in the sets of attitudes, behaviors, social structures and ideologies that undergird the dominating group's power and privilege and limits the oppressed group's own advantages. (Bivens, 2005, p. 45-46)

The author adds that internalized racism leads to higher levels of conflict among oppressed people<sup>48</sup>. Indeed, Smith (2010) reports that minorities show higher levels of behavior such as misanthropy and disorder. As in Smith and Bivens, Shasha (2009) claims that subalterns internalize oppressed standards, developing self-hatred and adverse behavior against themselves. In this sense, Baez (2000) says that power is disciplinary. The same is true in Pyke (2010), Smith (2010), Shasha (2009), Bivens (2005), Gaventa (1982) and Luke (1974). Power creates knowledge that is internalized and results in "internalized oppression" (Pyke, 2010, p. 556-557). Likewise, Gaventa (1982, p. 71-73) finds that negative behavior among subalterns could reflect "*an expression of frustrations which...took the form of attack on one another*" which "*arose from the more effective use of power*". And the most pervasive and effective use of power is to avoid any possibility of subaltern groups developing strategies for eliminating oppression (Luke, 1974).

Wade (1993) states that excluded actors can adapt or resist. That means change is also a general regular behavior of actors affected by institutions. Mahoney (2000, p. 518) states that in rational approach "*institutional change occurs when it is no longer in the self-interest of actors to reproduce a given institution*". A different perspective of institutional theory argues that change is in the form of gradual and endogenous revisions, reinterpretations and/or contestations to institutions (Streeck, 2010, Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, Jackson, 2010, Streeck & Thelen, 2005, Pierson, 2004, Thelen, 2002). Nevertheless, in this approach, terms such as revisions and contestations are usually synonymous of the term change without a specific systematized conceptualization that shows variances among these synonyms<sup>49</sup>.

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<sup>48</sup> In this subject, contrary to adapted subalterns there is no clear benefit in following such conflictive behaviors.

<sup>49</sup> This differentiation is not the theoretical purpose of these works.

In summary, the different literature has influenced the search for the specific behavior part of the mechanism in this research. In other words, these theoretical insights guide the empirical analysis of the archival material to build up a hypothesis for the mechanism (see Trampusch & Palier, 2016). The discussion shows that there are two broad theoretical insights related to the behavior of actor affected by institutions. First, behavior shaped by the institution of racial exclusion that reproduces it. This includes ‘sub-behavior’ of the type adaptation, emulation, exploitation, conflict, misanthropy, disorder, rivalries, etc. Second, behavior shaped by the institution of racial exclusion that changes it. It includes ‘sub-behavior’ of the type contestations, complaints, protests, reformulations against the exclusionary institution.

The empirical work will specify better this behavior. Moreover, it is important to emphasize that the major goal in identifying the specific behavior is to demonstrate how such behavior by actors, as part of a mechanism, contribute to final socio-economic outcomes<sup>50</sup> and not just to the categorization of the behaviors.

#### **2.4 Theoretical argument for scope conditions: context of structural inequalities and tacit ideologies of differences**

According to Falletti & Lynch (2009) the context determines how actors, causes and outcomes interact. Therefore, its explicit specification is imperative. The context in which this research proceeds is of structural historical inequalities and tacit ideologies of differences.

The context of historical structural inequalities and tacit ideologies of differences facilitates the rise of informal institutions to maintain control of power and resources (Hoffman & Centeno, 2003). Hence, the mechanism is transferrable to cases that try to explain how exclusionary informal institutions affect socio-economic outcomes, how actors behave in the face of these informal exclusionary institutions, and which specific behavior or social practices contribute to socio-economic local outcomes. That is, the mechanism is portable to cases that try to disentangle how exclusionary informal institutions affect socio-economic outcomes in those particular contexts of structural historical inequalities and tacit ideologies of differences.

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<sup>50</sup> That is, one of the major research questions of this work.

Racial exclusion is an institution that operates in different contexts. Explicitly, this means racial exclusion is present in many countries, societies and time periods. For instance, Easman (1997) mentions that 90 percent of the countries have ethnic minorities and when an ethnic minority group dominates positions of power, they “*exclusively or preferentially, formally or informally*” benefit “*their own constituents*” (Esman, 1997, p. 528).

However, despite the fact that racial exclusion is easily feasible in ethnically diverse societies, the context defines the boundaries of the system that allow racial exclusion to affect local socio-economic outcomes (Pouliot, 2015). For example, racial exclusion is in force in countries such as the United States and Colombia; nonetheless, these contexts are not the same. Neither is the context of racial exclusion the same in colonial or republican times in Colombia. How racial exclusion, actors and mechanism interact in each specific context can therefore result in different outcomes (Falleti & Lynch, 2009).

Historical structural inequality is the first attribute of the context in this research. I define the context of structural historical inequalities, in accordance with Tilly (1998), as a context characterized by categorical differences that persist over time. These categorical differences can be political and economic. In this particular case, the context is characterized by conflicts of historical elites which become categorized as political inequalities, and in a context of concentration of wealth that becomes categorized as economic inequalities.

However, racial exclusion also thrives in countries where these categorized differences are not easy to identify. For instance, racial exclusion is in force in regions with different contextual conditions such as in Latin America, United States or South Africa.

This issue raises the second attribute that defines the context in which the mechanism operates in this research. This attribute refers to a context of tacit ideologies of differences. A context of tacit ideologies of differences means a context where implicit prejudices, moral evaluations and beliefs of considering certain people inferior prevails to uphold domination over this group (Pager & Shepard, 2008, Quillian, 2006, The National Council, 2004). The inferior category could be determined by factors such as race, religion, gender, nationality, or other social

characteristics that allow differences to be established between the dominant and the dominated (Tilly, 1998). In this research, the characteristic determining ‘inferiority’ is afro-descendant race.

But why is the context in which the hypothesized causal link operates a context of tacit ideologies of differences? Why is it tacit? In order to answer these questions it is useful to discuss the analytical aspects that define the Spanish Latin American setting (Falleti & Lynch, 2009). Explicitly, this means it is necessary to answer what is the specific difference between the contexts of Latin America and those contexts where racial exclusion is also in force such as in the United State and/or South Africa? What is the specific contextual difference during the period under analysis?

There are many analytical contextual differences. The major difference is the colonial heritage. Accordingly, despite the fact that in both contexts racial exclusion was explicit during the colonial time, this institution was embedded through different colonial traditions. On the one hand, a British colonial rule, on the other, a Spanish colonial tradition. The literature shows that this difference leads to additional differences such as the pattern of colonization and miscegenation (*mestizaje*) and the political fundamentals of their independence processes. In turn, these differences generate a specific post-colonial context where the institution of racial exclusion affects socio-economic outcomes via the mechanism in different ways.

Specifically and according to the literature, this refers to the gender-pattern of Spanish colonization favoring higher levels of miscegenation in Latin American countries (Garcia Leduc, 2007, Vieira, 2002). In contrast to the United States, the predominance of male immigration increases processes of miscegenation and *mestizaje* among Europeans, the native population and black slaves<sup>51</sup>.

Additionally, political fundamentals differ in the independence processes between Spanish Latin America and the United States. Lasso (2003) and Blackburn (1988) study the differential character of the racial issue in the independence processes of British and Spaniard colonies. For

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<sup>51</sup> Moreover, the patterns of miscegenation and the implementation of the Spanish tradition of “*purity of blood*” resulted in a stronger connotation of race as a social construction more than a physical-genetic construction in Latin America (Wade, 1993).



Lasso (2003), abolitionism and racial democracy were interrelated components of the republican movement in Latin American nations. Lasso argues that in order to receive the support of a majoritarian mixed population, local creoles associated Spaniard rules with imperialism, despotism, slavery, racial hierarchies and un-Americanness. Conversely, in the United States, the “*white man’s democratic republic*” was fundamental during the revolutions (Blackburn, 1988, p. 267). Indeed, some black slaves associated the metropolis with protection, and slave regions strengthened after the independence process (Blackburn, 1988 and Berlin, 1991). Therefore, in contrast to Latin America, in this country “*struggle against slavery and the struggle against empire were separate projects with discordant ends*” (Berlin, 1991, p. 108).

Consequently, these different colonial traditions make the postcolonial context different in each region. First, while in ex-British colonies racial categories are easy to identify, in the Spanish Latin American context boundaries of racial categories “*are much disputed and ambiguous*” during not only colonial but also postcolonial times (Wade, 1993, p. 4). Second, the political fundamentals of independence processes lead to flexibility in race relations in Latin America while in the United States and South Africa inflexibility persisted in race relations (Lasso, 2003). As Lasso argues the flexibility of Latin American race relations includes the republican construction of the myth of the mestizo nationhood that involves assumptions of racial democracy, harmony and equality based on the idea that the countries are shaped by a “mestizo race”. The myth of the mestizo nationhood allows flexibility in the coexistence of racist ideologies with racial democracy (Lasso, 2003, Wade, 1993). This fact became worse during the so called modernization period of late 19<sup>th</sup> century where racial homogenization consisted in the invisibility of racial diversity and stimulation of social implicit pressures for a gradual erasing of non-white components (Appelbaum, 2003, 1999).

By contrast, in countries such as the United States and South Africa, the “*mestizo nationhood*” was an absent concept. Race relations were inflexible and well defined in the legal institutional framework. Therefore, in opposition to Spanish Latin America, inflexibility in race relations consisted of explicit rules against black population such as Jim Crow laws in the United States and apartheid in South Africa (Lasso, 2003).

Due to these analytical insights, in this research, the tacit ideologies of differences context consists of an implicit ideology that promotes inferiority in order to dominate the categorized inferior group. The ideology includes, first, beliefs, prejudices, and stereotypes that consider the afro-descendant population to be racially inferior. Second, the ideology is tacit because it is flexible in the terms of Lasso (2003). In this particular case, it refers to a tacit racist ideology<sup>52</sup>.

Nevertheless, the contextual conditions are debatable. On the one hand, it could be inferred that the tacit racist ideology is the same cause, i.e. racial exclusion. Moreover, it could be inferred that historical structural inequalities are a cause of racial exclusion and racial exclusion a sub-cause of local performance. This element would entail potential causal priority between structural inequalities and racial exclusion.

However, there is a difference between tacit racist ideology as a context and racial exclusion as an institution. Tacit racist ideology refers to ‘thoughts’ of considering a racialized group inferior. Ideology does not then involve the connotation of behavior (The National Research Council, 2004). Contrariwise, racial exclusion refers to an informal institution materialized in discriminatory rights, obligations, behavior and practices based on racialized characteristics (The National Research Council, 2004). Therefore, while the tacit ideology of considering a racialized group as inferior entails beliefs, prejudices, views, sentiments, moral valuations, etc.; tacit racist ideology does not entail racist exclusionary practices and behavior. Namely, racial exclusion may arise from racist ideologies, but racist ideologies “*need not result in differential treatment or differential effect*” (The National Research Council, 2004, p. 43).

Moreover, in order to demonstrate that inequalities and tacit racist ideology “*need to...set aside from the model*” (Bennett & Checkel, 2015, p. 7), it is imperative to clarify that the mechanism explains five basic interrelated questions: 1. How does the informal institution of racial exclusion affect local public goods provision? 2. Which specific actors shape this institution? 3. How do actors behave? 4. How do these behaviors contribute to outcomes? 5. How do these processes involve institutional change and institutional reproduction? Hence, racial exclusion is a specific

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<sup>52</sup> Empirical and theoretical works in social sciences often show that ideologies of racial superiority are a common element to establish hierarchies that allow the control power (e.g. Pyke, 2010, Bivens, 2005, The National Research Council, 2004).

empirical manifestation of an exclusionary informal institution while the general context of inequalities is the framework that allows racial exclusion as an informal institution to generate the effects on the outcome via regular practices of actors (Pouliot, 2015).

In this regard, Hoffman & Centeno (2003, p. 381) argue that “*inequalities is the essential, constant, and defining characteristic*” of Latin America. According to the author, inequalities are the essential framework in which actors behave. In contexts like these, informal institutions are important elements to maintain social structures (Mahoney, 2010). Therefore, exclusion – by social class, gender, religion and/or race – is an empirical manifestation of an exclusionary informal institution; and, as a causal factor, it affects socio-economic performance (Hoffman & Centeno, 2003)<sup>53</sup>. Racial exclusion is, then, a causal factor and structural inequality is the setting that facilitates patterned interactions between the cause and the outcome via the causal mechanism (Falleti & Lynch, 2009). Or in terms of Pouliot (2015, p. 250) the context of general inequalities and tacit racist ideology is the boundary of the system that allows racial exclusion to affect local performance.

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<sup>53</sup> Those informal institutions affect the outcome in a particular way defined by a context of structural inequalities.

## Chapter 3 Methodology

Gerring (2005) claims that the type of causal argument affects a research design. This research has two major research goals. The first research goal tries to identify the causal effect of an alternative institutional explanation (independent variable) on an outcome. The alternative cause is the informal institution of racial exclusion and the final outcome is local socio-economic performance. Second, the work also analyzes the causal link between the alternative explanation and the final outcome via the specification of the causal mechanism.

The methodological strategy is imperative to achieve these goals. In order to identify both the causal effect of the informal institution of racial exclusion on local socio-economic outcomes and the causal mechanism, I use quantitative and qualitative methodologies.

The identification of the average causal effect deserves a quantitative approach. In a quantitative approach, I intend to answer what effects racial exclusion has on local performance. As in a quantitative analysis, the focus is on determining the average effect of independent variables on the dependent variable (Mahoney & Goertz, 2006). It is an “*effects-of-causes*” approach (Mahoney & Goertz, 2006, p.229).

The second goal is related to a mechanistic approach (Maggetti, Gilardi & Radaelli, 2013). In particular, this requires a qualitative approach. The qualitative approach tries to establish, define and clarify the causal mechanism linking racial exclusion with local performance. In order to do this, I use process tracing methodology. Hence, the analysis focuses on a “*causes of effects*” approach (Mahoney & Goertz, 2006). That is, I focus on the identification of the mechanism that contributes to generating the outcome (*Y*) and not on “*the magnitude of causal effects of X upon Y*” (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p.1, Bennett & Checkel, 2012; George & Bennett, 2005, Gerring, 2007).

This chapter provides details of this multimethod-research strategy. First, the chapter presents a discussion on why a multimethod approach is the best empirical strategy to address the different

research questions. The next section explains the quantitative approach. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 then describe the process tracing methodology and the operationalization. The chapter concludes by presenting details of the selected case study.

### **3.1 Why take a multimethod approach?**

Recently, multimethod approaches have become “*increasingly popular*” in the analysis of social issues (Fearon & Laitin, 2008, p. 758). However, the use of a multimethod approach in this research has three fundamental reasons.

The first reason is related to theoretical issues. This research follows the theoretical approach that sees socio-economic outcomes as being explained by disentangling their historical and institutional roots (Mahoney, 2010, Nunn, 2009, Beckert & Streeck, 2008, Mahoney, 2003). In economic history, rational choice theory is one of the most popular theoretical lines to analyze this issue. This rationalistic approach is used in empirical works of the New Institutional Economic (NIE) trend. Much of this research focuses on the effects of ‘historical institutions’ on social outcomes (e.g. Robinson, 2012, Dell, 2010, Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2005, 2002, Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, 2010, 2008a, 2008b, 2006, Nugent & Robinson, 2001, Conning & Robinson, 2007, among many others).

In these works, the institutional arguments that result are highly convincing. However, their strengths are not the theoretical explanations, but the elegant empirical strategy supported by mathematical and econometric models (Evans, 2006). Evans (2006, p.2) claims that these institutional explanations to social outcomes show a lack of theoretical and conceptual specifications of institutions. The author calls this issue the “*double-finesse*” of the institutional analysis.

The theoretical sloppiness consists in considering that actors are rational, and institutions have coordinating effects (Mahoney, 2010 and Evans, 2006). Instead of considering institution as coordinating mechanisms, this research follows the theoretical view that institutions can “*reflect...reproduce and magnify particular patterns of power distribution*” (Thelen, 1999, p.394). Moreover, institutions are historical and have contextual constructions that distribute

resources among actors (Mahoney, 2015, Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, Knight, 1992). Such power distributions generate unequal actors, permanent conflicts and sources for institutional redefinitions in time (Mahoney, 2010, Skocpol, 1995)<sup>54</sup>.

The multimethod approach tries to capture these theoretical issues by using regression analysis and process tracing methodology. Process tracing analysis allows a conceptualization that captures the distributional effects of racial exclusion as an institution, the role of actors, their regular behavior and historical contexts. In general, process tracing unpacks the theoretical complexities that operate between an institutional cause and the final outcome, complementing the correlational approach (Trampusch & Palier, 2016, p. 2).

The second reason is methodological. The multimethod approach permits balancing of the amount of attention devoted to racial exclusion as a quantitative measurement and as a concept (Goertz, 2006, p. 3). Statistical analyses are one of the operational strategies to measure the consequences of exclusion on socio-economic outcomes (Pager & Shepherd, 2008). The multivariate regression analysis is a useful methodological tool for specifying correlations between a hypothesized cause and outcome by using a large-N data set. This methodology allows identifying the empirical quantitative relationship among the variables and the statistical and theoretical arguments (Fearon & Laitin, 2008). Indeed, Quillian (2006, p. 302) states that the most common strategies in identifying racial exclusion are statistical analysis, regressions or other multivariate methods. These methods enable identification of the mean difference between an excluded population and non-members of this group (Quillian, 2006).

Nevertheless, regression models should be used with caution (Pager & Shepherd, 2008). There are strengths and weaknesses in trying to explain the effects of racial exclusion in a quantitative approach (National Research Council, 2004). Assumptions, data limitations, imperfect operationalization are among the major weaknesses. This fact is imperative when racial exclusion is studied as a historical institution. For instance, regression analysis fails to correctly

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<sup>54</sup> Institutions therefore delimit actor goals, capacities, losers, winners, conflicts and revisions (Skocpol, 1995, Hall & Taylor, 1996).

explain and estimate temporal contexts, actor roles, power structures and institutional revisions<sup>55</sup>. That is, “*complex multivariate causal patterns [that] operate in the social world*” cannot be captured in a statistical approach (Liebersohn, 1991, p.309).

In this regard, in the theoretical framework of this research, racial exclusion is a concept and not just an indicator. Chapter 2 shows that racial exclusion is conceptualized as a historical informal institution with power distributional effects and is affected by continuous interactions of historical contexts and actors. These attributes represent substantive issues (Goertz, 2006) that are difficult to be captured in a quantitative methodology. In large-N analyses, ‘historical institutions’ are measured as vector variables. This vector is a “*proxy*” that tries to operationalize the institution of interest resulting in “*reductionist*” measurements (Miller, 2007, p. 84). Indeed, Evans (2006, p.2) states that to simplify a “*complex combinations of institutions*” or historical arrangements into a “*simple ordinal scale is anything but plausible*”. Similarly, Streeck (2011, 2010) suggests that institutions are building-blocks of social order embedded in historical complex backgrounds and subject to modifications over time. Therefore, to omit these conditions is, as the author would suggest, a “*rationalist-constructivist fantasy*” (Streeck, 2011, p. 10).

On the other hand, small-N studies do not escape methodological questioning. These studies deal with the issue of subjective bias in the measurements (Miller, 2007).

To avoid such methodological problems, this research uses two typologies of measurements for the informal institution of racial exclusion. The quantitative measurement follows the operationalization of vector variables taking the advantages of a new large-N data base. However, considering the weakness of this methodological strategy, the qualitative measurement uses process tracing to make “*systematic and rigorous qualitative analysis*” (Trampusch & Palier, 2016, p. 2). This systematic analysis allows better operationalization of institutions, the mechanism, the outcome and the context. In this regard, the research conceptualizes the cause of racial exclusion and the outcome local socio-economic performance as theoretical concepts and not as vector variables.

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<sup>55</sup> And to discard ‘marginal’ causal connections (Mahoney, 2004, 2000).

For instance, racial exclusion in the regression approach is the percentage of the non-white population in each Colombian municipality according to a large-N data set. This operationalization is in terms of a proxy variable that allows detecting whether statistically this variable is correlated to the outcome according to the hypothesized causal argument. However, this specification relies on assumptions. It therefore supposes limitations in interpretations (see for example National Research Council, 2004). In contrast, in the qualitative approach, racial exclusion is operationalized as an informal institution. That is to say, as already mentioned, racial exclusion concerns dynamic unspoken rules, rights, social practices, and constructions that distribute resources shaping unequal racialized actors. For whiter people, racial exclusion assigns an implicit better socio-racial standing in the social structure of the society. Meanwhile, the afro-descendant population is located in a low socio-racial standing. These allocations generate inequalities in the access to resources affecting final outcomes via the mechanism.

Additionally, the mechanism is not an intervening variable<sup>56</sup>. This fact means that this research does not use the logic of inference in terms of King, Keohane & Verba (1994). In contrast, this research emphasizes first that quantitative and qualitative approaches reveal more than differences in style and techniques as these authors suggest<sup>57</sup>. Second, this research follows the argument that the mechanism is more than intervening variables, as indeed is usual in economic historical analysis. The mechanism is a system shaped by entities or actors and their different regular behavior (Pouliot, 2015, Beach & Pedersen, 2013, Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010). The mechanism operates in a specific context of structural inequalities that defines how the cause, actors and outcome interact (Falleti & Lynch, 2009).

A third aspect regards simultaneous processes of institutional reproduction and revision (Campbell, 2010 and Pierson, 2004). This research follows the theoretical insight of that we need to recognize simultaneous processes of change and continuities and the dynamic role of actors in this process. To improve the understanding of these simultaneous processes, this research uses a multimethod approach.

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<sup>56</sup> See, for instance, Dell (2010) who defines mechanisms as *average effects* of variables and not as systems.

<sup>57</sup> See Mahoney & Goertz (2006).



Lewis & Steinmo (2010) claim that most research tools are more useful to explain equilibrium than change. Different variants of institutionalism conclude that institutional continuity is the most frequent social phenomenon (e.g. Dell, 2010, Robinson, 2012, DiCaprio, 2012, among other authors). This tendency is particularly true in theoretical works that use contexts of structural inequalities such as those in developing countries (Letvisky & Murillo, 2009). Indeed, some approaches consider that political life is not dynamic and its major characteristic is stability (Moe, 1987 quoted in DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 5). As already mentioned, one of these approaches is rational choice. DiMaggio & Powell (1991) say that this approach adds realism to the economic analysis. However, as some authors state its strength is not precisely the theoretical conceptualizations, but the elegant empirical strategies supported by mathematical and econometric models to demonstrate the “*causal effect of a broad cluster of institutions on long-run development*” (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2012, p.3081).

What is missing from this literature is how a historical institution has effects over time. In other words, the debate is still weak in explaining the mechanisms of institutional change, evolution and reproduction. This fact has a plausible explanation: ambivalent social phenomena are difficult to understand because the theoretical and methodological strategies used to analyze this relationship do not permit one to elucidate it<sup>58</sup>.

Real social phenomena and actors are not inert over time waiting for abrupt changes or/and maintaining stabilities<sup>59</sup>. Moreover, the long-run is not as static as many approaches suggest. As Campbell (2010), Olsen (2008) and Pierson (2004) argue, we need to consider time in institutional analysis and recognize that “*institutional reproduction and change are flip sides of the same coin*” (Campbell, 2010 p. 108)<sup>60</sup>.

In order to achieve such an undertaking, this work applies a historical-institutionalist approach and both quantitative and qualitative analyses. The quantitative analysis elucidates the causal average effects of the variable of interest and alternative explanations. Subsequently, I use

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<sup>58</sup> Dell (2010) recognizes this weakness. However, in trying to solve it; she defines mechanisms as *average effects* of variables and not as systems. This specification makes her overlook important points (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010).

<sup>59</sup> As Streeck & Thelen (2005) would suggest.

<sup>60</sup> Clemens & Cook (1999, p. 447) say “*outcomes... combine to produce institutional durability and change*”.

process tracing to ‘trace’ how institutions, actors, institutional reproduction and institutional change are related to generate outcomes over time, systematically identifying the institution, the mechanism, the outcome and the contexts. A detailed analysis of this issue will show better insights of simultaneous changes and continuities.

Therefore, the methodological strategy will be central to overcome theoretical and methodological sloppiness of the current institutional approaches. By combining correlational and mechanistic strategies, this research will achieve a more precise explanation of how institutions such as racial exclusion determine outcomes over time.

## **3.2 Quantitative approach**

### **3.2.1 Racial exclusion, public goods provision and local performance**

Hoffman & Centeno (2003, p. 380) argue that in Latin America “*there are strong causal relationships between ethnicity, education and income*”. Similarly, Wade (1993, 1989) describes regional race relations in Colombia as a dominant hegemonic ideology of the whiter population. The author also suggests that there is a self-evident outcome of this hegemonic ideology which consists in a better socio-economic performance in the whiter warm-Andean part, and poverty of the blacker coasts.

However, these assumptions still remain underspecified in a more precise quantitative approach in the Colombian case<sup>61</sup>. This fact is especially true for this research’s period of analysis known as the consolidation and modernization of the republic (Arocha, 1998).

I analyze *the effects of racial exclusion on local socio-economic outcomes* by identifying the average effect that afro-descendant population has on local economic outcomes via public goods provision (social outcome). That is, the effects of exclusion on economic performance are indirect. This argument implies that there are institutional dynamics related to racial exclusion, actors and political economic decisions that affect local performance and that need to be measured.

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<sup>61</sup> Mahoney (2015), Flórez, Medina & Urrea (2001) among others find statistical correlations. However, this issue still remains underspecified in a more systematic approach in the Colombian case and at the municipal level.

According to Pierson (2004, p. 31-32), the provision of public goods is a common element of economics and politics. This relationship is remarkable for those public goods that support modern development and are not easily provided by the market. This is the case in public investment in education. Investment in education contributes to modern development, but this type of good is “*underproduced*” by private markets forcing a higher role of public authorities in the provision<sup>62</sup>.

Nevertheless, public authorities have different dynamics in providing public goods in contexts of inequalities. These dynamics depend on power structures. Mahoney (2010) and Pierson (2004) mention that powerful actors can consolidate their influence with the political economy of public goods. In the Colombian case, it is important to notice that national and local elites were in general negligent and exclusionary. However, some subnational authorities were more negligent and exclusionary than others (Helg, 1987). In blacker regions, local elites encouraged tacit social boundaries between whiter power holders and blacker subalterns. The stimulation of racial boundaries reinforces inequalities and affects local performance. In this process, public goods provision such as education was an effective policy to maintain control of power and inequalities. Education was influenced by an implicit racial order that reinforced elites’ advantages over non-elite members. In this implicit order, blacker regions showed exclusion of the non-white component and lower state capacity to guide development.<sup>63</sup>

In regard to this, the literature and archival material show evidence of exclusion and lower elites’ interest in education in blacker regions. In this matter, Helg (1987) indicates that descendants of former slaves are the objects of exclusion and discrimination when enrolling in certain schools during the post-colonial period. In the same fashion, a report in 1922 describes that in “*schools out of the capital cities ...families of humble class, especially of black race, find difficulties to enroll their children*”<sup>64</sup>. Additionally, the report of the minister of education in 1914 says that the lack of interest by local authorities is an explanatory factor for the low performance of regions

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<sup>62</sup> In this regard, private markets do not provide sufficient quantities of goods to at least benefit their private interests (Pierson, 2004, p. 31).

<sup>63</sup> In this subject, Villegas (2008) and Palacios (2006) suggest a possible causal connection. Villegas concludes that in Colombia, racial difference is an epistemological support for controlling power and, finally, this issue “*transforms difference into inequalities*” (Villegas, 2008, p. 88). Palacios (2006) states that inequalities affect economic performance.

<sup>64</sup> Anales del Senado, sesiones ordinarias, Bogotá martes 12 de septiembre de 1922, p. 186 [own translation].

such as Chocó, the blackest region of Colombia. The report states that in this region “*municipal authorities care little about public instruction*”. The report adds that what municipal governments assign to education in the local budget is a miserable amount “...*only to fulfill legal obligations*” with national governments<sup>65</sup>. Also, a similar source describes how a municipality in a blacker region such as Bolívar receives low investment in education for its rural schools despite them producing substantial resources<sup>66</sup>. Similarly, the report in 1914 shows that Magdalena is a department where education “*has been more neglected*”<sup>67</sup> in part, the report says, by the role of local authorities in this outcome. Finally, in 1921 the report describes the situation in Magdalena as the result of the “*indolence*”<sup>68</sup> of municipal authorities to comply with their functions in education. Similar comments are common in these historical documents.

Considering that both Chocó and Magdalena were rich in natural resources (by this time, they were important producers of exportable goods such as gold, platinum and banana<sup>69</sup>) these facts suggest that municipal administrations did not show a high level of interest in public goods provision for the population. More fundamental for this research is that those regions also have in common what authors have classified as the hot-negroid periphery (Gutierrez, 1975). In other words, despite internal differences, they have a relative blacker composition of their populations compared to other Andean departments<sup>70</sup>.

Hence, a blacker racial composition deserves a more systematic analysis for explaining regional differences in the Colombian case. It seems that for institutionalized power-distribution reasons, blackness affects the political economic of public goods provision needed for development and, through this, the path of local performance.

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<sup>65</sup> Memoria del Ministro de Instrucción Pública al Congreso de 1914, p. 29-31 [own translation]. Documentos. Imprenta Nacional. Bogotá.

<sup>66</sup> Memoria que presenta el Director de Instrucción Pública al señor Gobernador del Departamento con motivo de la reunión de la Asamblea Departamental en el año 1914, p. 50. Tip. Mogollón.

<sup>67</sup> Memoria del Ministro de Instrucción Pública al Congreso de 1914, p. XLVI [own translation]. Imprenta Nacional. Bogotá.

<sup>68</sup> Memoria del Ministro de Instrucción Pública al Congreso de 1921, p. 74 [own translation]. Bogotá. Imprenta La Luz.

<sup>69</sup> In 1914, gold exports were worth 6.23 millions dollars (1971 dollars) (McGreevy, 1971, 210). McGreevy (1971, p. 207) also shows that banana production was 6 percent of the total exports of Colombia between 1920 and 1924. The majority of this production was concentrated in Chocó and Magdalena.

<sup>70</sup> Palacios (2006) describes that in tropical areas, such as in banana crop areas, workers were afro-Colombians.

### 3.2.2 Data

In order to estimate the effects of racial exclusion on local performance, I have constructed a cross-sectional data base from different sources for the period spanning the late 19<sup>th</sup> to mid-20<sup>th</sup> century with information at the municipal level.

Flórez, Medina & Urrea (2001) argue that the lack of information limits accuracy in the studies on racism in Latin American. This fact is relevant for Colombia and the analyzed historical context of this research. As in any historical approach, the collection of this information was challenging since in Colombia the quality of historical data at the municipal level is deficient for this historical period. In general, good historical data at the municipal level are the exception rather than the rule in the Colombian statistical repertory of late 19<sup>th</sup> and mid-20<sup>th</sup> century.

One of the reasons is that the preservation of historical data is a relative recent issue in this country. For instance, there was not a formal governmental institution in charge of collecting and preserving municipal statistics until the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century. For the period prior to 1951, censuses of the population are sources for obtaining information at the municipal level. These censuses were collected by the Comptroller General of the Republic (*Contraloría General de la República*). However, this material does not give a full break-down of municipalities.

In addition, political instabilities contributed to the vanishing of statistical historical material. For instance, during the uprising on 9 April 1948 (known as “*El Bogotazo*”), some public buildings and offices were burned down completely as retaliation for the assassination of the political leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. These revolts destroyed some historical archives of Colombian institutions and impeded the normal course of national and regional public offices.

Finally, data lacks uniformity during the analyzed period in both the types of records and standardization of analysis. Explicitly, the questionnaire designs of censuses and reports vary regarding the types of variables and/or regional specific. Indeed, once the reports have been located, it is difficult to find uniformity in the presentation of the data from one year to another.

It was puzzling work since in addition to the lack of uniformity in reporting, (some) municipalities show name changes, under-reporting, aggregations and/or desegregations<sup>71</sup>.

These complexities lead to some scholars arguing that quantitative work is almost impossible concerning variables related to education and local performance at the municipal level (Helg, 1987)<sup>72</sup>. However, I have constructed a historical data base on different sources. Acknowledging that restrictions in data still prevail, these sources bring information of the variables of interest for on average 700 municipalities during the analyzed period<sup>73</sup>.

Variables of local public goods provision therefore focus on public goods provision for development, e.g. education (following Mahoney, 2015, Wantchekon et al, 2015, Iyer, 2010, and Huillery, 2009). This work collects data on historical enrollment rates and numbers of schools per inhabitants broken down into urban, rural, public, private and primary and secondary levels. This information is from the reports of the minister of education to the national congress in 1890, 1894 and 1911. I use these variables because according to Helg (1987) and Law 39 of 1903, primary education was a local duty. Moreover, secondary education was also related to its application by subnational governments. Therefore, they are proxy indicators of the dynamics of local public goods provision. In addition, censuses of the population complement this material. For instance, this research also uses measurement of public goods provision such as literacy rates from the censuses in 1912 and 1938, and educational establishments according to the census of 1951.

Variables on economic local outcomes are from the First Industrial Census (FIC) of 1945 and the population census of 1938. This quantitative approach uses industrial per capita capital

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<sup>71</sup>In order to therefore transcript the data properly, it is essential to find data that is homogeneous and to process municipalities during the analyzed period. This refers especially to name changes from 1894 to 1950, aggregations, desegregations, etc. Moreover, the difference between no report and zero value in a category is sometimes imprecise.

<sup>72</sup> However, recent works describe an innovative use of quantitative information (Acemoglu, Garcia-Jimeno, Robinson, 2014, 2012, among others).

<sup>73</sup> For instance, the construction of some variables is supported by assumptions justified by an understanding of the analyzed context – as is usual in this type of analysis (National Research Council, 2004). Annex 3 provides information on the sources and methods for these variables.

calculated according to the FIC and the percentage of population in transformation industries according to the population census of 1938.

On the other hand, information on racial composition is from the population census of 1912. This census specifies four racial categories white, black, indigenous and mixed (mestizo)<sup>74</sup>. The characterization of these racial categories is according to perceptions of the interviewer (Palacios, 2006, and DANE).

Other variables are from Diego Monsalve (1927). This source depicts the municipal composition of coffee production via the number of coffee trees in 1925. This is a special period of coffee production for the country because during the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the coffee economy was consolidated as the major economic activity of the country (Ocampo, 2007, Palacios, 2006 and Bushnell, 1993).

Finally, other control variables such as geographical variables (temperature, rainy precipitation, and distance to Bogota, Buenaventura and Barranquilla) and gold production are from España & Sanchez (2012) and Sanchez & Nuñez (2000).

In general, despite these data still presenting restrictions, these sources contain valuable social and economic information at the municipal and department level to analyze the relationship between the informal institution of racial exclusion and indicators of socio-economic performance in the Colombian context of late 19<sup>th</sup> and mid-20<sup>th</sup> century.

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<sup>74</sup> There are only two censuses that show these four racial categories during 20<sup>th</sup> century in Colombia. Both censuses have limitations. In this research, I use the census of 1912 because in 1918 the census was raised during the time of the Spanish flu in Colombia that affected the Andean region in particular (see for instance Manrique, et al, 2009). Moreover, Wade (1989, 1993) and Gutierrez (1975) describe a process of a historical regional racial persistence in Colombia since colonization. Contemporary data also confirm this regional persistence. In particular, the data indicate that correlations between the regional black composition in 1912 and 2005 are high (0.9 including Chocó the blackest department and 0.67 excluding Chocó, see annex 1-1). The indigenous population shows similar patterns (correlation between 1912 and 2005 of 0.69 annex 1-2). Therefore, despite under-reporting of some municipalities, regional racial patterns in 1912 are consistent with historical regional racial patterns.

### 3.2.3 Empirical strategy: defining dependent and independent variables

The described circumstances suggest that blackness may have effects on local performance via dynamics of public goods provision which are specific to the dynamics of actors -such as national/subnational elites-. This relationship can be specified through an ordinary least square regression (OLS):

$$\text{Log } y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * PGP_i + \beta_2 * X'_i + \varepsilon_i \text{ (Equation 1)}$$

In equation 1, I initially operationalize the indicator of economic performance as  $y_i$ , where  $\text{Log } y_i$  is the logarithm of per capita industrial capital of municipality  $i$  according to the First Industrial Census of 1945.

This operationalization is based on the following explanations. First, industrialization was an important process of economic modernization in Colombia during the first half of 20<sup>th</sup> century (Palacios, 2006, España & Sanchez, 2012, 2010, Bushnell, 1993). Second, the nature of a quantitative approach seeks to identify individual parameters continuous or in scale (Katz, vom Hau & Mahoney, 2005). Third, literature usually uses GDP per capita as a proxy of economic performance (Katz, vom Hau & Mahoney, 2005, Bonet & Meisel, 2007, Acemoglu et al. 2002, 2001, among others); however, this variable does not exist in Colombia at the municipal level<sup>75</sup>. Fourth, using logarithms enables one to capture the relative growth of the variable. Fifth, in Colombia the correlation between industrial capital and GDP is high and relatively stable over time<sup>76</sup>. Finally, as my goal is to show differences in performance at the subnational level, I take the assumption that a municipality with higher per capita capital has proportionally higher per capita production with respect to a municipality with lower per capita capital<sup>77</sup>. Hence, I limit my analysis to specifying how the relative industrial performance of one municipality is relative to another municipality. That is to say,  $y_i$  measures relative differences in economic performance among municipalities<sup>78</sup>. Hence, by specifying  $y_i$  in this way, I am capturing key elements of the

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<sup>75</sup>Indeed, it does not exist currently.

<sup>76</sup> For contemporary times, the correlation is 0.89 for 1990-2000. See annex 2.

<sup>77</sup> This is a typical assumption from a Cobb-Douglas function of production. In my case, it is equivalent to industrial per capita capital.

<sup>78</sup> My goal is to show a plausible correlation between the persistent distribution of the blacker component of the population in Colombia and low local economic performance. Moreover, the literature mentions that “*high levels of inequality in incomes or in assets are causally related to lower rates of growth in mean incomes*” Ferranti, et al (2004, p. 27). Therefore, it is a potential proxy for economic performance.



historiography and capturing the conceptualization of moving from observations to indicators (Adcock & Collier, 2001).

Finally, I also use the percentage of population in transformation industries according to the population census of 1938 as a dependent variable in an additional exercise of robustness.

$PGP_i$  is public goods provision. This vector is the variable of interest to explain the relationship already established. Public goods provision is a set of different measurements that allows identifying local public investment. As already explained, literature in historical institutions regularly uses variables associated with public investment in education, health or infrastructure (Wantchekon et al, 2015, Iyer, 2010, Huillery, 2009). In the econometric exercise, I use as a measurement of public goods provision enrollment rates, the number of schools per 1000 inhabitants and the number of educational establishments<sup>79</sup>.

Finally,  $X'$  is a vector of geographical and social control variables to test the variable of interest with alternative explanations. These geographical and social controls help to determine if the effects of exclusion via public goods provision persist including controls such as coffee production, gold production, indigenous population, temperature, precipitation, distance to the capital, and distances to the major sea ports (among others).

Nonetheless, this specification may have problems of reverse causation. As the literature states, this problem may lead to a biased and/or inconsistent estimator of  $PGP_i$ . Biases and inconsistencies in the estimator indicate that the direction of the causal link is not clear (see Stock & Watson, 2010). For instance, it is not possible to establish if public goods provision affects industrial outcomes or vice versa. Therefore, the effects of public goods provision on the dependent variable need to be ‘distilled’.

To solve these problems, this research uses an Instrumental Variable technique (IV regression). The idea is to isolate the effects of the explanatory variable  $PGP_i$  on the dependent variable  $Log$

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<sup>79</sup> For robustness purposes, this research also conducts regressions using as proxy of public good provision literacy rates. Annex 3 describes variables, sources and methods.

$y_i$  instrumenting  $PGP_i$ . In order to instrument, it is necessary to use a variable related to the exogenous variable ( $PGP_i$ ) but unrelated to the endogenous variable ( $\log y_i$ )<sup>80</sup>. Then, for effects of this research, this instrumental variable is the percentage of a ‘blacker’ composition of the population  $BCP_i$ . Equation 2 shows this procedure that states in the first stage:

$$PGP_i = \varphi_0 + \varphi_1 * BCP_i + \varphi_2 * X' + e_i \quad (\text{Equation 2})$$

Now, equation 2 includes  $BCP_i$  which is the measurement of the informal institution of racial exclusion.  $BCP_i$  is the percentage of a ‘blacker’ population in early 20<sup>th</sup> century. This specification shows that the effects of racial exclusion on regional performance are indirect through public goods provision.

The percentage of blacker population is calculated by adding the black and mestizo population according to the population census of 1912<sup>81</sup>. This research uses this aggregation or additive procedure (Goertz, 2008) for four methodological reasons. First, as already mentioned, historiography and empirical data show a persistence of spatial regionalization of race. That is, Colombian regions maintain patterns of racial mix and compositions over time<sup>82</sup>. As a result, a blacker region would have blacker mestizos whilst a whiter region would have whiter mestizos. By adding blacks and mestizos we can then capture this pattern of difference in racial compositions and mixes through the variable blacker composition of the population. Second, after independence, the legal framework abolished racial categories from the official records; the only way to therefore identify blacker populations in similar sources is by using the slave populations from the 1843 or 1851 census. Using this variable could show us a relationship, but with biases in the estimations<sup>83</sup>. Third, the goal is to empirically demonstrate that the blacker regional makeup had influence on regional economic performance. This relationship has been overlooked in the Colombian economic history literature in more systematic strategies<sup>84</sup>. Finally, racial category in this census is according to self-perception. Therefore, to sum black and

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<sup>80</sup> With a valid instrument it is possible to estimate the effect of  $PGP_i$  over  $\log y_i$  eliminating the different sources of endogeneity in  $PGP_i$  (Stock & Watson, 2010).

<sup>81</sup> See annex 3 for variable definitions, sources and methods.

<sup>82</sup> See annex 1.

<sup>83</sup> A particularly historiographical bias.

<sup>84</sup> Recent works analyze the relationship among state capacity and local prosperity (Acemoglu, Garcia-Jimeno & Robinson, 2014). However, they do not focus on the issue of racial inequalities, local state capacity and local performance.

mestizos can capture processes of “whitening” described in the literature for this census (Palacios, 2006)<sup>85</sup>.

Nonetheless, an important caveat must be made. Contrary to works such as Mahoney (2015), this specification focuses on the indirect effects of the exclusion of the afro-descendant component of the population on socio-economic outcomes. The reasons are that although non-whites, indigenous and black populations are the subjects of historical racism and exclusion, the indigenous population deserves a separate analysis. In this regard, indigenous people depict two different processes. First, the indigenous population is subjugated by more direct processes of exclusion over this specific time (Hoffman & Centeno, 2003 and Centeno, 1997). This is especially evident for those territories where indigenous people were beyond elite control or in the so-called “*savage territories*”<sup>86</sup>. During the consolidation of the republic, republican elite members led a new process of colonizing these “*savage territories*” by processes of direct cultural and physical extermination established explicitly in the legal institutional framework<sup>87</sup>. Second, some regions are excluded from this policy because despite having a high indigenous population concentration, they were acculturated to the white elite traditions. For instance, Boyacá shows a high concentration of indigenous population. However, as part of the warm Andean center, Boyacá has a whiter mestizo population acculturated to the white-Spanish traditions and with relative better social arrangements (Gutierrez, 1975). Nonetheless, the latter does not imply a better social outcome. Therefore, the regressions will control separately by the percentage of indigenous population.

Hence, it is expected that  $\varphi_i$  will be negative. Therefore, municipalities with a blacker population experienced a lower accumulation of public goods for development. I use additional statistical tools to analyze these regional effects. First, I generate regional dummy variables. Second, the regression includes standard error cluster by regions. In this case, the error variance differs among regions but is the same for municipalities in a region. This procedure helps to capture estimations in regional effects. In this case, regional effects use two different measurements of

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<sup>85</sup> As the literature suggests whitening is the perception of one individual of considering himself/herself to be whiter than what he or she really is.

<sup>86</sup> These are parts of the departments of Casanare, Guajira, Arauca, Chocó, Amazonas, Putumayo and Caquetá, the majority of them located mainly in the south of the country.

<sup>87</sup> See for instance Harguindeguy (2010).

regions. The first measurement is the variable Regions shaped by the five political divisions of Colombia<sup>88</sup> and the second measurement is shaped by natural regions<sup>89</sup>.

In addition, this quantitative part performs tests to demonstrate whether the variable blacker composition of the population indirectly affects the final outcome. The first test is the exclusion restriction. This exclusion restriction must validate that  $BCP_i$  has no effect on  $\text{Log } y_i$ . In this case, the effects are indirect via  $PGP_i$  (Exogeneity condition). In addition, I estimate statistics from the first stage to see whether the instrument is relevant (relevance condition).

### 3.3 Qualitative approach: Process tracing

The regression analysis tries to identify the indirect relationship between the Afro-descendant component of the population and local performance. The analysis indicates that, during the consolidation of the republican period, regions with blacker composition of population did not foster public goods provision to favor economic performance. Hence, municipalities with lower public goods provision did not encourage the existence of structures to properly develop economic and social prosperity over time.

Nevertheless, regression analysis has limitations. Regression analysis is not appropriate for disentangling the causal mechanism through which the historical institution of racial exclusion has been transformed into low local public goods provision and low local economic outcome. Hedström & Ylikoski (2010, p.56) quote Boudon (1976) to illustrate this fact by stating “*that explanations are not achieved by simply estimating parameters of generic statistical models, but by developing generative models that explicate the mechanisms at work*”. That is, regression analysis fails to explain and estimate correctly temporal contexts and reproduction mechanisms (Lieberman, 1991). Moreover, qualitative analysis is a strategy to overcome restrictions in the quantitative estimations. For instance, the limitations of historical data are potential sources of biases in the causal path between racial exclusion and local outcomes. Trampusch & Palier

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<sup>88</sup> Caribbean, Andean, Pacific, Amazona and Orinoquia. The Pacific region does not however include municipalities from the Valle department.

<sup>89</sup> The same 5 regions. In this case, however, the Pacific region includes municipalities from the Valle department close to the Pacific coast.

(2016) and Mahoney (2004) argue that methodologies such as process tracing are useful in supplementing statistical findings and corroborate the causal link (Mahoney, 2004, p. 89). Indeed, Mahoney (2004) states that qualitative analysis leads to elaborate, modify and/or reject statistical findings.

Therefore, the qualitative approach tries to establish, define and clarify the causal mechanism linking the informal institution of racial exclusion with local socio-economic performance. In order to do this, I use process tracing methodology to trace actors, meaningful practices of actors, and the incidences of these actors and practices on public goods provision as part of the mechanism.

### **3.3.1 Why process tracing and why theory-building process tracing**

In this research, I state general propositions that systematically explain the link between a historical exclusionary institution and local socio-economic outcomes. These general propositions provide theoretical insights into actor behavior and reactions and how such regular behavior influences local socio-economic outcomes by establishing a mechanism.

I chose process tracing because firstly my research goal is related to “*within-case inferences regarding the presence of mechanisms in a particular case*” (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p.163). Process tracing is a proper methodology to establish the “*examination of intermediate steps in a process to make inferences about hypotheses on how that process took place and...how it generated the outcome of interest*” (Bennett & Checkel, 2015, p. 6). In process tracing methodology, historical explanations help to elucidate steps, channels, mechanisms and processes that convey the final outcomes (Bennett & Checkel, 2012).

Secondly, although I take a multimethod approach, my focus is on the theoretical mechanism. In this regard, I develop a theoretical mechanism that can explain the causal link between my

hypothesized cause and the outcome. In this mechanism, it is relevant to determine the role of actors and how their regular practices shape the outcome<sup>90</sup>.

From the different variants of process tracing, this research uses the inductive theory-building process tracing. According to the literature on this methodology, theory-building process tracing begins with the theoretical conceptualization of the cause and outcome followed by analysis of the empirical material to construct a hypothesis of the causal mechanism (Trampusch & Palier, 2016 and Beach & Pedersen, 2013). This inductive process follows theoretical insights as guides in the search of the mechanism (Trampusch & Palier, 2016 and Beach & Pedersen, 2013)<sup>91</sup>. Specifically, I generate a hypothesis of the causal mechanism at work by starting with historical records (Trampusch & Palier, 2016, p. 8). Initially I attempted to deduce a theoretical mechanism from the existing institutional approaches and then to test it. However, the empirical material readdressed my goals to new findings in need of further development. These findings were a better specification of the precise actors, how they react or behave in face of exclusion, how these processes involve institutional change and institutional reproduction, and how this behavior affects socio-economic outcomes.

Therefore, in this research, process tracing analysis consists in identifying “*meaningful*” and “*regular*” behavior of actors and the systematic incidences of these actions on local socio-economic outcomes. Pouliot (2015) argues that social practices are meaningful, organized and regular. Specifically, the author states that “*within a given context, practices exhibit regularities; otherwise there would be no structure to social interactions*” (Pouliot, 2015, p. 251). Then, inductively, I concentrate on identifying the systematic behavior of key actors.

Additionally, theory building process tracing is appropriate when an identified correlation between the hypothesized cause and outcome exists (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). The association between “non-whiteness” and poor performance is not new<sup>92</sup>. Moreover, the quantitative hypothesis states that a negative relationship exists between the afro-descendant component of

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<sup>90</sup> Hence, the analysis focuses on a “*causes of effects*” approach (Mahoney & Goertz, 2006). Specifically, I focus on identifying the mechanism that generates the outcome (Y) and “*not on the causal effects of an X upon values of Y*” (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p.3; Bennett & Checkel, 2012; George & Bennett, 2005; Gerring, 2007).

<sup>91</sup> That is, as the literature states, the search is inspired by theoretical insights and not compared with them.

<sup>92</sup> See for instance section 1.5, 1.4.3.3 and 1.4.2.

the population and local performance in Colombia. Regression analysis shows that municipalities with a blacker population composition did not show good public goods provision and performance. However, it is necessary to specify clearly how this cause produces the outcome. Following Beach & Pedersen (2013, p. 164) I therefore use theory building process tracing because “*there is a well-established empirical correlation between X and Y but we are in the dark regarding a potential mechanism between the two*”.

### **3.3.2 Sources**

For the empirical work, I use different historical sources. The sources are official documents from the different public archives of Colombia, historiographical literature and local newspapers.

Following Beach & Pedersen (2013), I use pattern, sequence, and trace evidences. In this regard, I use statistics from official sources (pattern evidence), documents and reports from different periods of time and origin (sequence evidence), meeting minutes, local newspapers and correspondence (trace evidence).

The field work was in Colombia between February and June of 2014. The archival material was collected in consideration of different producer entities, origins and periods of time to corroborate the representativeness of “*general trends*” for these observations. Particularly, the diverse information includes archives from different ministries, national government, subnational governments, individual citizens, etc. Moreover, the authenticity of the data is guaranteed by a triangulation of official information from the Nation General Archive of Colombia and libraries in Bogota Colombia.

### **3.3.3 Description of the data**

The first historical sources are subnational reports and correspondence among different actors of interest from the section annex files II (*Archivos Anexos II*) of the Ministry of Public Instruction and the Ministry of Education at the General Archive of the Nation in Bogotá. In particular, I revised the documental series correspondence, reports, schools, inspections, acts of visitations of this section between 1880 and 1927 and the similar archives of the Ministry of Education

between 1928 and 1957<sup>93</sup>. The archives contain reports of subnational governments and national authorities. They also have a varied correspondence between local authorities and national government, local population and local governments, and local population and national government. This correspondence shows demands, concerns, and opinions and other behavior that help to reconstruct regular practices of involved actors regarding exclusion and the political economy of the public provision of education.

The second source is also from the General Archive of the Nation and more focused on the case study. This source concerns the section annex files from the producer entity Ministry of Government Intendancies and 'Comisarias'. The documental series basically include correspondence, general reports of local authorities, and others. These files present detailed reports and correspondence for the Chocó case study. These historical archives bring together local and regional reports from the authorities, demands, concerns and opinions of local citizens and authorities in social, economic and political issues on topics different to the political economy of education. For instance, it provides local reports, correspondence and communications for social, economic and political issues of the case study.

The third source is the annals of the national congress from 1880 to 1950. These annals include both chambers the national Senate and the House of Representatives. The collection for this source is located at the General Archive of the Nation and the Library of the National Congress. This source offers information of the political economy at the national and subnational levels for the analyzed period. Specifically, this source enables tracing of contestations, demands and effective reforms or lack of reforms of the legal institutional framework regarding the concepts of interest. For instance, it is possible to trace the different parts of the formation of a new law against (or favoring) the exclusionary institutional framework or public goods provision. Explicitly, the annals describe the process of creation of laws regarding education, race, and regional development. The collection of this information focuses on the topics related to the Chocó case study.

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<sup>93</sup> From 1928, the minister changed the name from the Ministry of Public Instruction to the Ministry of Education.



Moreover, I examined different editions of the local Chocoano newspaper *ABC* between October 25 of 1931 and February 19 of 1935. This material is available on the web page of the local newspaper ‘*Chocó 7 días*<sup>94</sup>’. This source describes political, social and economic local issues of the Chocó case study.

I also revised the annual report of the minister of public instruction (1882-1927) and minister of education (1928-1957) to the national congress available at the National Library and the General Archive of the Nation. These reports have information of the political economy of public provision of education at the national and subnational levels. The reports facilitate the general view of education, general legal framework, subnational and local frameworks, challenges and opportunities. The reports also present the results of such policies since they offer qualitative and quantitative data.

Reports of the Chocó national authorities are at the Public Library Luis Angel Arango in Bogota. A source is the reports of the intendants, the highest authority in this region for 1908, 1919, 1940 and 1941. Another important source is the report of the apostolic prefect between 1919 and 1923. These sources reveal information related to local issues, statistics, concerns, local legal frameworks, contexts, pictures, etc. of the case study from different periods.

Secondary sources are historical and anthropological works for afro-descendant populations and the region of Chocó in Colombia. Also, I revised the legal framework from 1886 to the first half of 20<sup>th</sup> century. This includes the legal framework of education in the book *Colombian Education 1903-1958* of the National Education Ministry (*Educación colombiana: disposiciones orgánicas y reglamentarias de la educación nacional en las ramas de primaria, normalista superior y bachillerato y otros aspectos de interés general: 1903-1958*). Additionally, I reviewed the compendium *History of the Laws (Historia de las Leyes)* available at the library of *Universidad de los Andes* and the Library of the Colombian National Congress. This source offers the official framework for public goods provision, racial issues and related topics.

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<sup>94</sup> [http://www.choco7dias.com/ediciones\\_anteriores.html](http://www.choco7dias.com/ediciones_anteriores.html)

### 3.3.4 Why the late 19<sup>th</sup> and mid-20<sup>th</sup> centuries

Historiography shows that the late 19<sup>th</sup> and mid-20<sup>th</sup> centuries are a special period of analysis. Although this period includes diverse historical events, two important arguments determine its selection. First, this period is considered to be the consolidation of the republic. This consolidation was characterized by a tacit national racist ideology in which the informal institution of racial exclusion prospered. Second, it is a transitional period from a rural and backward economy to a relative modern economy based on two important processes with effects on local performance. These processes are the consolidation of the coffee economy and the rise of industrialization.

The first argument refers to the consolidation of the republic. Different authors explain that the consolidation of the republic was led by an exclusionary project against the bulk of non-white population. This project is the modernization project of the “mestizo nationhood” that consisted in the invisibility of the non-white component of the population in the Colombian national identity (Appelbaum, 2003, Larson, 2004, Lasso, 2003, Maya, 2009, Roldán, 2003, Wade, 1989, Arocha, 1998, among others).

The historiography illustrates that modernization projects were a characteristic of Latin American countries. In Colombia, this modernization project occurs in the Regeneration period. During Regeneration, the national white elite designs an institutional framework that supports a conservative, centralized and catholic state. Furthermore, this elite project uses the myth of a Spanish heritage as a unifying element<sup>95</sup>. According to this myth, Colombia had to reinforce its Spanish heritage as a means of modernization. National elites then institutionalized the belief that in order to be ‘modern’ Colombia had to homogenize its national identity with elements of Spanish traditions. In this regard, the national ideology behind the institutional framework promoted the social construction that Colombia had a unique language (Spanish), religion (catholic) and race (mestiza) (Arocha, 1998, Melo, 1989).

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<sup>95</sup> Appelbaum (2003), Larson (2004), Lasso (2003), Maya (2009), Roldán, (2003), Wade (1989), Arocha (1998), Melo (1989), among others.

In this puzzle, language and religion were relatively common elements in Colombian society. However, the literature shows that the issue of a ‘unique race’ needed a more complex discourse<sup>96</sup>. On the one hand, the mix of indigenous, whites and blacks had created a multiracial society. On the other hand, after the independence process, slavery and racial differentiation were illegal. In this context, the Colombian multiracial society had to be homogenized in an implicit manner. This implicit manner consisted of making racial diversity invisible (Lasso, 2003). In this implicit social order, white people had a better standing, controlling the political and economic power of modern Colombia<sup>97</sup>. In other words, in the Colombian context of the late 19<sup>th</sup> and mid-20<sup>th</sup> centuries, the institution of racial exclusion is in force and prospers, allocating resources unequally among different actors.

The second argument is related to the development of an export economy with the coffee economy and the rise of the industry of transformation. Coffee production integrates the country into international trade at a level that Colombia had not experienced before<sup>98</sup>. Different authors argue that coffee production generates benefits at different levels. For governments, coffee production provides fiscal resources to a weak economy. For society, coffee production generates employment, accumulation of capital and other benefits<sup>99</sup>.

On the other hand, industrialization appears as the representation of a relative modern economy. Specifically, the literature shows that industrialization was the result of more economic resources for agricultural exports, the credit bonanza of the second decade of 20<sup>th</sup> century, the international conjunctures of the 1929 crisis, and the effects of the Second World War<sup>100</sup>. These events foster the rise of the national industrial production of basic goods especially in the textile, foods and beverages industries (Ocampo, 2007).

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<sup>96</sup> See for instance Appelbaum (2003), Larson (2004), Lasso (2003), Maya (2009), Roldán, (2003), Wade (1989), Arocha (1998), Melo (1989), among others.

<sup>97</sup> See Villegas (2008), Palacios (2006). As time passed, this elite exclusionary project gradually mutated from a racial to a class issue as a consequence of the effects of the racial debate after the Second World War (Leal, 2010).

<sup>98</sup> Ocampo (2007), Montenegro (2002), Brew (2000), Meisel (1987, 1993, 1999, 2008), Jimenez & Sideri (1985), McGreevy (1971), Safford (1967), among others.

<sup>99</sup> Ocampo (2007), Montenegro (2002), Brew (2000), Meisel (1987, 1993, 1999, 2008), Jimenez & Sideri (1985), McGreevy (1971), Safford (1967), among others.

<sup>100</sup> Ocampo (2007), Palacios (2006), Bushnell (1993), McGreevy (1971), etc.

This temporal framework therefore allows analysis of the effects of the informal institution of racial exclusion on socio-economic outcomes in a country with a more modern productive structure; a country which changes from a backward economy during the post-independence period to a country with a productive structure based on the expansion of the agricultural frontier and modern industrialization.

### **3.4 Operationalization: theoretical concepts in the process tracing approach**

In this section, I define the qualitative aspect of the measurements of the theoretical concepts of cause, actors and outcomes involved in the causal relationship among racial exclusion and local performance. In order to do this, I follow the systematized concepts of the theoretical chapter.

#### **3.4.1 Operationalizing the cause: racial exclusion**

Pager & Shepherd (2008) argue that exclusion can be measured by different strategies. These strategies are perceptions, the identification of the behavior of dominant groups, statistical analysis, experimental approaches and legal records. However, these methods are not without limitations and difficulties (Pager & Shepherd, 2008 and Quillian, 2006). Following Pouliot (2015), Quillian (2006) Adcock & Collier, (2001), and San Roman (1996), the operationalization of racial exclusion in the process tracing approach is based on the identification of observable regular practices and counterfactual analysis that capture the attributes of the systematized concept of racial exclusion. That is, racial exclusion is an informal institution, dynamic, and with power distributional implications.

The attributes of racial exclusion represent a major challenge for its operationalization. Racial exclusion of the afro-descendant population has been a historical institution since colonial times in the Latin American context. However, during the colonial context, racial exclusion of the black component was explicit in the legal institutional framework of Spanish colonies via the cast system (Maya, 2009). After the independence process, the context became different. Now, racial exclusion is illegal under Colombian regulations. Nonetheless, the context of tacit ideology of differences favors the continuation of racial exclusion as an informal institution. As an informal institution, racial exclusion was in force in the form of unspoken or “*hidden*” regular

behavior (Carruthers, 2012, Streeck & Thelen, 2005, among others)<sup>101</sup>. As Quillian (2006, p. 302) would say, racial exclusion was hidden by its perpetrators.

Therefore, “*how can we measure discrimination when it is an often illegal and hidden practice?*” (Quillian, 2006,p.299). Moreover, how can we make this operationalization for a specific historical time period that involves limitations in the availability of information? The informal character and the historical framework of racial exclusion complicate its operationalization. These are precisely the challenge that the study of racial exclusion supposes in a qualitative approach.

A common approach to estimate racial exclusion involves statistical methods (Quillian, 2006). These methods lead to identifying the average difference between an excluded racial population and non-members of this group. According to this principle, a first intuitive step to identify the magnitude of racial exclusion of blackness is to identify the socio-economic profile of the total population by racial categories. If the socio-economic profile shows differences against afro-descendant racial groups, then the causal assumption could be made that a higher racial predominance of blackness indicates differential treatment that contributes to this unfavorable outcome (Quillian, 2006, as the empirical quantitative approach tries to demonstrate).

However, this first method of estimating has limitations in its “*content validation*”. This limitation means that what it identifies does not capture completely the content of the systematized concept established in the theoretical section (Adcock & Collier, 2001, p.538), i.e. that racial exclusion is an informal institution with three major attributes. These attributes are that racial exclusion means implicit (racialized) differential rights and obligations, has power distributional implications, and is dynamic. Therefore, following Pouliot (2015) and Quillian (2006), the operationalization of racial exclusion in the process tracing approach is based on the identification of the regular practices and counterfactual analysis that validate these attributes.

Following Pouliot (2015) and San Roman (1996), the indicator of racial exclusion is related to observable individual and institutional regular practices associated with tacit rights and

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<sup>101</sup> This institution was in force in the social structure in the form of implicit social conventions.

obligations that discriminate in a racialized population. Moreover, Quillian (2006) argues that “*to estimate the magnitude of discrimination in a particular context then involves answering a counterfactual question: What would the treatment of target group members have been if they had been dominant group members?*” (Quillian, 2006, p. 302). Therefore, regular practices are evaluated in light of this counterfactual question.

According to these insights, racial exclusion is then operationalized as:

- Individual and institutional tacit regular practices of actors that indicate rights and obligations, rules of behavior, social practices or constructions that discriminate based on racialized characteristics of blackness.

As the literature on race shows, the specific racialized characteristics are physical, cultural and regional characteristics associated with blackness<sup>102</sup>. The physical characteristics are the phenotypical identification of blackness<sup>103</sup>, i.e. skin color, hair, physical strength. Cultural characteristics are related to unspoken cultural meanings, constructions and associations with the black world. This refers explicitly to associating blackness with laziness, ugliness, backwardness, subordination, inability to prosper by their own means. Finally, regional affiliation is related to the regional race relations in Colombia (Appelbaum, 2003, Roldan, 2003, Wade, 1993, Gutierrez, 1975).

Racial exclusion therefore appears in the sources when dominant groups depict regular behavior of a type implying differential treatment to a region or community because of racialized characteristics associated with a specific region<sup>104</sup>.

Racial exclusion at the individual level is identified by individual racial discriminatory behavior. At the institutional level, racial exclusion is identified as discriminatory, unofficial public policies and exclusionary behavior by policy makers that propagate differential treatment

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<sup>102</sup> For explanations on racialized characteristics, see Ontario Human Rights Commission (2005) and National Research Council (2004).

<sup>103</sup> As it was already stated, this work is focused on blackness. The indigenous population suffers a more direct process of racial exclusion than the subtle process against the black population.

<sup>104</sup> As the literature suggests.

regarding rights and obligations of individuals, groups or regions due to their racialized characteristics (Baez, 2000).

Moreover, the measurement must identify whether these tacit individual and institutional regular practices would be different because of the black racialized characteristics of actors (Quillian, 2006).

The institution of racial exclusion is also measured by:

- Individual and institutional regular practices of actors that unevenly allocate power resources and that this uneven allocation is based on racialized characteristics.

This operationalization emphasizes the attribute that racial exclusion has distributional consequences. As the literature predicts, racial exclusion shapes unequal collective actors (e.g. Mahoney, 2015, 2010). In this regard, this operationalization clarifies that the racially excluded population has unspoken unfavorable rights and obligations while power holders obtain indirect privileged rights and obligations. This operationalization stresses the power relations behind social practices related to racial exclusion. Racial exclusion then appears when one region, community or individual are subject to regular practices that limit their access to power resources via unspoken daily informal practices and/or the indirect political economy of power holders.

Moreover, by using counterfactual analysis it was identified that unfavorable rights and obligations of an excluded population mean privileges for power holders. Racial exclusion then appears in the sources when policy makers or public policies indirectly favor a region, community or individual because of their racialized affiliation to whiteness<sup>105</sup>. The benefits of ‘whiter’ groups mean discriminatory treatment to non-members of this affiliation along with a resulting concentration of power.

Finally, the institution of racial exclusion is also identified as:

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<sup>105</sup> National Research Council (2004)

- Unspoken regular practices of differential treatment of a dominant group against “*inferior*” racialized groups. The determination of inferiority evolves over time and is determined by belonging to a caste, race or class related to connotations of blackness.

This measurement takes into account the contested character of racial exclusion as institution. Racial exclusion comprises evolving historical and contextual constructions over time. For instance, in the Colombian case, racial exclusion evolves from a caste system to racial categories, and finally to class system<sup>106</sup>.

### **3.4.2 Identifying the outcome or dependent variable: socio-economic outcomes**

The major attribute of socio-economic outcome is focused on public goods provision in process tracing analysis. Thereafter, this qualitative part of the research then refers to public goods provision through local socio-economic outcome ( $Y=1$ ).

The first argument for this specification concerns the institutional theoretical implications of public goods provision as outcome as already discussed in the theoretical section. Accordingly, the provision of public goods is highly influenced by the institutional frameworks that distribute power resources and impact actors’ regular behaviors<sup>107</sup>.

Second, the quantitative strategy states a statistical relationship between racial exclusion, public goods provision and local economic performance by using an instrumental variable technique. This technique shows the indirect effects of racial exclusion on local economic performance via public goods provision suggesting a differential public goods provision on the basis of race (Pager & Shepherd, 2008). This technique also shows that the effects of racial exclusion on public goods provision are direct. Hence, the qualitative part focuses on disentangling this direct relationship specifying the uncovered mechanism between racial exclusion and low public goods provision.

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<sup>106</sup> Analysis of this evolution is in Leal (2010).

<sup>107</sup> Mahoney (2010), Pierson (2004).



Third, using the terms of King, Keohane & Verba (1994), this relationship in the quantitative approach indicates that public goods provision has the character of an intervening variable. Hence, public goods provision is a “variable” that represents the causal mechanism between racial exclusion and economic performance. However, this research does not take such a mechanistic view. In contrast, this research follows the argument that an analysis of mechanisms is more than the identification of an intervening variable. Moreover, in a mechanistic approach public goods provision is not a variable but a concept (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). The use of a concept instead of a variable allows analyzing the dynamics of power, tensions and conflict behind the provision of public goods. Consequently, public goods provision is neither a mechanism nor a variable in qualitative analysis. In the qualitative approach, public goods provision represents the attributes of the systematized concept of socio-economic outcome as conceptualized in the theoretical section.

Fourth, data and time restrictions make it more feasible to demonstrate systematically the causal link of this direct relationship between the cause racial exclusion and the public goods provision outcome. Therefore, the analyzed cause (X) is racial exclusion and the outcome (Y) low public goods provision in the case study analysis.

The operationalization of the outcome will follow the attributes specified in the systematized concept explained in the theoretical section. An additional attribute is that the term socio-economic outcome is usually related to poor socio-economic performance. The adjective ‘poor’ denotes low, scanty or unprosperous. Miller (2007) suggests that the operationalization entails establishing values related to ‘poor’, i.e. this attribute for the systematized concept should be captured in magnitudes or as indicators for operationalization.

The data set available allows identification of different indicators and the establishment of scales for ‘poor’. Therefore, one strategy for identifying low public goods provision is to estimate indicators associated with public goods provision. An additional step is to compare the values of these estimations to the national average. A value scored as ‘poor’ will be values lower than the national average. Therefore, the first operationalization states as an outcome:

- Indicators associated with public goods provision with value lower than the national average.

On the other hand, the systematized conceptualization suggests that some public goods carry more political economic implications than others. For instance, authors consider that education is a good that is underproduced by markets and has relevant distributional implications. Public goods provision of education entails political decisions shaped by institutional frameworks. Moreover, Mahoney (2015, 2003) argues that variables related to education are one of the indicators identifying social outcomes. Consequently, public goods provision is identified by:

- Indicators of education such as literacy rates, numbers of schools and schooling attendance<sup>108</sup>.

The attributes also suggest that another way of identifying outcomes is by identifying reforms related to the political economy of public goods provision. Pierson (2004, p. 32) argues that laws, reforms, etc. are forms of public goods<sup>109</sup>. Therefore, in this qualitative part, the operationalization of the concept of local performance as outcome is also:

- The identification of reforms related to the political economy of public goods provision. It also includes the identification of the effective results of those reforms.

In this regard, regular behavior of actors could propagate reforms in the local political economy of public goods provision. These reforms have gradual effects on the distribution of resources, and eventually effects on local socio-economic variables. This means, the reforms may or may not improve the provision of public goods. For instance, institutional revisions could generate reforms such as a new law for the creation of a new school for an excluded population. The final implementation and delivery of the new school would be the result of this reform to the local political economy of education. This effective reform in the political economy is an outcome that improves local performance in the sense that more non-members of the elite would have access to this public good. This outcome would challenge the current unequal distribution of resources

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<sup>108</sup> Mahoney (2015) also mentions indicators such as infant mortality and life expectancy.

<sup>109</sup> Pierson (2004, p. 32) states “*laws themselves have the character of public goods for those who benefit from them*”.

by making education more available for the bulk of the population and not for a close circle of the local society. In contrast, regular practices of institutional reinforcement could facilitate a lack of reforms to increase the provision of public for the bulk of the population.

Finally, it is important to emphasize that there are also reforms or initiatives beyond the political economy of education which have outcomes affecting access to resources, and which are also interesting to process.

### **3.4.3 Identifying actors**

The section on systematized concepts shows that there are two potential types of actor. Broadly, these actors are rule makers and rule takers.

How can we operationalize or identify these actors? According to Wonka (2007) and Adcock & Collier (2001), the attributes defined in the systematized concept will shed light on such operationalization.

#### ***3.4.3.1 Power holders/rule makers: local white elites: identification and regular practices***

The first actor type concerns the rule makers. According to the systematized concept, this first actor type has low-level ‘affectation’ by the exclusionary institutions of racial exclusion; in other words, this actor has a better social standing as allocated by the institution of racial exclusion.

The institution of racial exclusion shapes “unevenly...collective actors” (Mahoney, 2015, Mahoney, 2010, p. 3) according to racialized characteristics of blackness, so in this particular case, the local white elite are the rule makers. Whiteness allows them to have an initial allocation of resources that favors them. Specifically, local elites have whiter skin and have initial higher level of economic and social control of resources than the bulk of the population.

The local white elite’s privileged position among excluded actors gives them an active role in the design of local public policies and relations with national designers<sup>110</sup>. The systematized concept

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<sup>110</sup> The levels of exclusion are minimal for them. This exclusion is limited to how the national institutional design of institutional regional racism can affect their interests, with usually minimal incidences.

states that regular practices of this actor consist of the reproduction of the national oppressive institutional framework in the local context. That is, this actor implements, rewrites, and reproduces the institution in a local context.

This actor is then identified by:

- Whiter actors with better social standing as allocated by the institution of racial exclusion.
- Whiter actors with the allocated role of implementing, rewriting and reproducing institutions.
- Applying Collier (1999), an actor could be a region, group or individual that representative of a collective.

However, as the major premise of this research stated, empirical work is necessary to identify the different actors and behavior involved in this mechanism.

#### ***3.4.3.2 Rule takers: afro-descendant population***

In contrast to rule makers, the systematized concept states that rule takers face exclusion because they share the exclusionary characteristics that the dominant national ideology defines as inappropriate or unwanted.

According to the systematized concept, this actor has a lower social standing as allocated by the institution of racial exclusion.

Resistance is the expected behavior from this actor. In this case, suppressed actors do not limit their demands for changes. They decide to adopt an agenda of revision<sup>111</sup>.

Therefore, according to the attributes from the systematized concept for rule takers, they are identified as:

- Afro-descendant members with lower social standing as allocated by the institution of racial exclusion.

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<sup>111</sup> As historical institutionalism would suggest.

- Afro-descendant members with the allocated role of taking, adapting, revising exclusionary institutions.
- Applying Collier (1999), the afro-descendant population could be a region, group or individual that is representative of a collective.

Again, only empirical material will show the truly specific composition of actors and regular practices that contribute to final outcomes.

### 3.5 Selecting the case

The case study analysis focuses on a within-case analysis to uncover the mechanism between the hypothesized cause and outcome. It is a “*mechanism-centered design*”, which implies a typical case selection strategy (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 2, Goertz, 2008). This means, the typical case will show how racial exclusion affects local public goods provision.

A typical case is helpful to trace the causal process of how X causes Y (Goertz, 2008, George & Bennett, 2005). In other words, a typical case is a case where the hypothesized cause (X), the outcome (Y) and scope conditions are present (X=1, Y=1) (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). An X=1 and Y=1 case is appropriate in process tracing for determining causal mechanisms, explaining the existence of an outcome and how the causal factor X is a potential explanation for this outcome (Goertz, 2008). I specifically focus on cases of: a high presence of the informal institution of racial exclusion (X=1) and low public goods provision (Y=1).

In addition, the strategy of selection requires a non-random procedure. Even though I have a large-N sample in the quantitative approach, the within-case analysis is at the departmental level. During the time being considered here, Colombia had 5 political-administrative divisions: national, departmental, intendantial, commissarial and municipal. In this research, the case study is selected from the 15 departments in existence in 1951<sup>112</sup>.

The reasons for this strategy are twofold. The first concerns the research goal. Collier & Mahoney (1996) argue that case selection depends to some extent on the research question. In this work, the research question is related to explaining *how the exclusionary institution of racial*

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<sup>112</sup> Memoria del ministro de educación nacional 1951 a p. 17. Ed. Iqueima

*exclusion affects low public goods provision and the specific role of actors and their role in this issue.* Hence, the selected case would be a typical case of an excluded region with low public goods provision. The second reason is that the availability of information focuses on the within-case analysis at departmental level<sup>113</sup>.

This research uses the region of Chocó as a case study. Following Gerring (2008, p. 648), Chocó has “*a set of descriptive characteristics*” that make this region representative of an excluded region with low public goods provision.

Explicitly, Chocó is a typical case for two main dimensions of this research. The first is that Chocó is a department in the hot-negroid periphery (see Gutierrez, 1975). As member of the hot-negroid periphery Chocó has a persistently high black population percentage over time. In other words, Chocó shows some of the indicators for operationalizing racial exclusion in this research. On the other hand, Chocó also belongs to the second dimension of this research. This refers to Chocó also showing indicators for operationalizing the outcome. For instance, Chocó demonstrates poor public goods provision.

### **3.5.1 A typical case of racial exclusion**

Regarding the first dimension, Chocó is historically the blackest region in Colombia (Leal, 2007, Jaramillo-Uribe, 1996). Its racial composition makes this region more susceptible to the effects of the informal institution of racial exclusion.

During colonization, this region depicted the preponderance of a slave population dedicated to mining activities (Gomez, 1980, p. 71). According to the colonial population census of 1778-80, 8.86 percent of the total slave population in Colombia was concentrated in Chocó. This percentage is exceeded only by the three regions of Cartagena, Antioquia and Popayan. In this regard, Cartagena was the entry port for slaves during the colonization, while Antioquia and Popayan were also mining regions like Chocó<sup>114</sup>.

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<sup>113</sup> Historical information in archives is available more at the departmental than at municipal level – for the level of detail that qualitative analysis demands.

<sup>114</sup> See McFarlane (1993, p. 355), Gomez (1980).

Nonetheless, in contrast to the other regions, Chocó was a majority black region. According to the same source, 39.3 percent of its population were black-slaves while for Antioquia, Cartagena and Popayan this percentage was only 19.3, 8.13 and 20.8 percent respectively<sup>115</sup>.

**Table 3-1 Ethnic composition of Chocó**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Whites</b>	<b>Indians</b>	<b>Mestizos<sup>116</sup></b>	<b>Blacks</b>
1778-80	2.3	36.9	21.6	39.3
1912	4.7	9.1	15.6	70.6
1918	11.2	7.1	20.4	61.3
2005	-	11.4	-	73.6

Source: Own construction based on McFarlane (1993, p. 356), Census 1912<sup>117</sup>, 1918 and 2005<sup>118</sup>

During the republic, three factors contribute to the persistence of the high of black population concentration in this region. These are the persistence of the patterns of settlements, the miscegenation processes and the migrations after the manumission of slaves in 1851 (Bushnell 1993, Wade, 1993 and West, 2000 [1957]).

For instance, the republican censuses show that Chocó has the highest afro-descendant population among the Colombian regions. According to the census of 1912, 70 percent of the Chocoana population is black (see table 3-1). Moreover, contemporary racial data confirm this persistence. In 2005, the census shows that the black population was 73.6 percent in Chocó<sup>119</sup>. No other region or department in Colombia shows such a high and persistent concentration of a black population.

Additionally, some intercensal information also corroborates the predominance of afro-descendant population in Chocó. Various historical reports from the intendants and the national government lay emphasis on the predominance of the black race in this region<sup>120</sup>. Illustrations 3-1 and 3-2 show images of ‘typical’ members of Chocoanas communities during the first half of

<sup>115</sup> Moreover these regions had 16.97, 11.7, and 15.15 percent of white population respectively while Chocó only had a concentration of 2.26 percent of the white population (McFarlane, 1993, p. 356).

<sup>116</sup> In 1778-80, this category is free of all colors. This category also includes free blacks.

<sup>117</sup> It includes Pueblorrico separated from Chocó in 1912 and excludes Negua affiliated to Quibdó.

<sup>118</sup> Racial categories are indigenous, rom, raizal, black/mulato/afro Colombian, none, no inform.

<sup>119</sup> This includes palenqueros an afro-descendant racial minority. See annex 1.1.

<sup>120</sup> See for instance, Informe del Intendente Nacional del Chocó 1908, Informe que el Prefecto Apostólico del Chocó rinde al ilustrísimo y reverendísimo Arzobispo de Colombia, como Presidente de la Junta Arquidiocesana de Misiones 1919-1923, and *Geografía Económica del Chocó* in Anales del Congreso, Bogotá 13 de noviembre de 1946.

the 20<sup>th</sup> century. It can be easily seen how the most evident composition of the population is of afro-descendant origin.

**Illustration 3-1 Chocoano children**



Source: Informe que el Prefecto Apostólico del Chocó rinde al ilustrísimo y reverendísimo Arzobispo de Colombia, como Presidente de la Junta Arquidiocesana de Misiones 1919-1923 [Report of apostolic prefect 1919-1923]

**Illustration 3-2 Chocoanos**



Source: Informe que el Prefecto Apostólico del Chocó rinde al ilustrísimo y reverendísimo Arzobispo de Colombia, como Presidente de la Junta Arquidiocesana de Misiones 1919-1923 [Report of apostolic prefect 1919-1923]

Nonetheless, the fact of being historically the blackest region in Colombia does not mean that this is a typical case of an excluded region. In order to be more precise and following George & Bennett (2005, p.24), preliminary knowledge of the case will make the selection case strategy



stronger. In this regard, Jaramillo-Urbe (1996) states that due to the predominance of black population in Chocó, the cultural preservation of African-black values is expected. In other words, racial harmony is expected (see Hernandez, 2010, Leal, 2007). However, this was not the case. The author says that, as in all Latin America, the minority of whites impose their values, institutions and socio-economic structures. Hence, the institution of racial exclusion is part of the Chocó daily life at two major levels; at the national and local levels.

At the national level, the context of inequalities and tacit ideologies of differences allowed a collective identification of Chocó with beliefs and stereotypes of being blacker, “*poor...rural, uncultured*”, and deviated “*from standard patterns of religious, family and sexual practice*” (Wade, 1989, p.4). For the national government, the black Chocó was considered incapable, “*a big boy*”, “*a bastard son*”, “*a sensual boy*” (Hernandez, 2010, p.24, ABC Newspaper January 3 of 1935, Villegas, 2005, p. 224 [own translations])<sup>121</sup>. Under these conditions, the institution of racial exclusion easily prospers through behavior such as invisibility, negation, subordination and omission of the national government toward this region (Maya, 2009, p. 222)<sup>122</sup>. This means, Chocó received differential treatment regarding implicit rights and obligations established by the national government because of its racialized characteristics.

At the local level, despite the high black component, Chocó was not in racial harmony (Hernandez, 2010, p.9). In this region, there were tacit enforced rights and obligations that maintained the informal institution of racial exclusion such as the tacit association between race and class, socio-physical “*whitening*” processes, racial conflicts, and the ‘unspoken’ defense of socio-racial hierarchies (Hernandez, 2010, Urrego, 2010, Wade, 1993, among others).

Therefore, based on the analysis of the empirical material and preliminary knowledge, Chocó is a case of a region where racial exclusion is an institution implicitly in force during the period of analysis. This issue will be developed in more detail in the empirical chapter.

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<sup>121</sup> ABC newspaper, January 3 of 1935, issue 2934 (in Chocó 7 días, 2014 issue 975, section: el Chocó de Ayer: [http://www.choco7dias.com/975/choco\\_ayer.html](http://www.choco7dias.com/975/choco_ayer.html))

<sup>122</sup> As a matter of fact, it is important to clarify the informal character of this exclusion. As the scope conditions specify, in contrast to the formal racism in ex-British colonies at this time, Chocó’s context is one where racial exclusion is an informal institution via the ‘unspoken’ establishment of rights and obligations enforced within this society.

### 3.5.2 A typical case of low public goods provision

The empirical data and literature also demonstrate that Chocó is a typical case of a region with low public goods provision ( $Y=1$ ). In 1980, Gomez (1980) states that Chocó, with only 300 km of roads within a territory covering more than 47,000 km<sup>2</sup>, is the department with the least kilometers of roads. The author refers to the period from late 1970 to early 1980. However, the historical low performance of Chocó is evident in many aspects of public goods provision. For instance, in 1908, the intendant of Chocó makes an analogy between the state of this region and a “*beautiful maiden*” with a mother that did not know how to take care of her<sup>123</sup>. Additionally, Valois (1945) mentions that Chocó is inhabited by the poorest Colombians, with a “*stationary life*” where only 3 out of 11 municipalities have electric power and none have water and sewer systems (Valois, 1945, p. 69). Therefore, low public goods provision is evident almost everywhere.

This fact is more evident for those public goods that support modern development such as public education (one of the major interests of this research). In Chocó, public goods provision of education is deficient in the various censuses and records for the period of analysis. For instance, according to the population census in 1912, the mean illiteracy rate was 94.4 percent, i.e. 10.5 points higher than the national average. The situation did not improve over time. In 1938, illiteracy is 80 percent in Chocó. Nonetheless, despite a decreasing in the rate, the national average was 58.4 percent, so Chocó therefore had a higher difference to the national average.

The archival material also mentions the backwardness of Chocó. For instance, in 1882 the superintendent of education claims that in “*coastal municipalities and especially municipalities in Chocó, the progress in public instruction has been slow and arduous*”<sup>124</sup>. Similarly, in 1888 the report of the minister of education accounts that there is no information on education for Chocó. They know only that there is one (1) primary school with 76 students in Quibdó for a population comprised of 15 districts and 46 small towns<sup>125</sup>. By 1911 the intendency has only 22

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<sup>123</sup> Informe del Intendente Nacional del Chocó 1908, p. 5 [own translation]. Edición Oficial, Imprenta Nacional. Bogotá.

<sup>124</sup> Memoria del Secretario de Instrucción Pública correspondiente al año de 1882, p. 83 [own translation]. Bogotá.


<sup>125</sup> Informe presentado al Congreso de la República en sus sesiones ordinarias por el Ministro de Instrucción Pública 1888, p. 129-130. Imprenta de La Luz. Bogotá.

educational establishments and 1189 students for a population of almost 70,000 inhabitants<sup>126</sup>. In 1912, the report from the Minister of Education states that education in this region is in “complete decay”<sup>127</sup>.

Figure 3-1 and 3-2 illustrate this fact better. The figures show the percentage of primary schools and students per inhabitants between 1882 and 1951. By this time, the provision of primary schools is a governmental responsibility. Therefore, these variables are highly related to the local public goods provision.

The figures compare Chocó with the total percentage for Colombia and other departments such as Antioquia, Cauca and Caldas. In general, Chocó has a persistent low performance especially for the rate of students per inhabitants. In particular, Chocó is below the national average rate of public schools per inhabitants. Furthermore, whiter departments such as Antioquia or Caldas show better performances than Chocó.

**Figure 3-1 Rate of schools per inhabitants 1882-1951, Choco, Antioquia, Cauca and Caldas**




Source: Own calculations based on DANE, MIP, and MEN.

<sup>126</sup> Censo General de la Republica de Colombia levantado el 5 de marzo de 1912, p. 287. Imprenta Nacional. Bogotá.

<sup>127</sup> Memoria del Ministro de Instrucción Pública al Congreso de 1912, p. 17 [own translation]. Imprenta Nacional. Bogotá.

The differences are more evident for students per inhabitants. Chocó was below the national rate of students per inhabitants. As in the case of schools per inhabitants, while Antioquia and Caldas show better performance in students per inhabitants, Chocó shows a significant gap to the national level.

**Figure 3-2 Rate of students per inhabitants 1882-1951, Choco, Antioquia, Cauca and Caldas.**



Source: Own calculations based on DANE, MIP, and MEN.

On the other hand, process tracing authors emphasize the relevance of testing alternative explanations for the selected topic (Checkel 2005, Bennett, 2008, Mahoney, 2012). In this regard, the most common explanations from Colombian literature about regional differences are coffee production, mining production and geography. Hence, it is important to select a case(s) with these additional characteristics.

Relatively speaking, the case study has such additional requirements. Chocó is one of the most important mining producers of Colombia. Indeed, Chocó experienced a mining boom during the analyzed period (Bonet, 2008, Gonzalez, 2012, Gonzalez, 1996, among others). Furthermore, although Chocó is not considered a coffee producer, the department had coffee production and potential to develop a coffee economy in some of its municipalities (see Monsalve, 1927 p. 589).

Geographical characteristics make up a central part of the analysis of alternative explanations since it is a common argument to justify differences in regional socio-economic outcomes in Colombia, especially for the case of Chocó (see for instance Bonet, 2008).

I therefore consider evidence for and against the various alternative explanations to assess alternative explanations (Checkel, 2005). This means, the research considers, as far as possible, evidence that does not fit with the principal research argument.

According to this principle, the department of Chocó presents all the requirements to be a typical case of a non-white region object of exclusion and low socio-economic performance.

### **3.5.3 The region of Chocó: general description**

Chocó is one of the most controversial regions in Colombia. This region is characterized by special geographical conditions, historical high levels of poverty, state neglect, and inequalities. These elements contrast with its historical high levels of material wealth and potential productive advantages (Bonet, 2008, Gonzalez, 1996, Cuesta, 1986, Valois, 1945).

Choco is a coastal region located in the northwest of Colombia (see illustration 3-3). The geophysical conditions represent an important characteristic that defines the region. According to Monsalve (1927), the physical extent of Chocó is 48,275 km<sup>2</sup>. However, this figure varies during the period analyzed. In 1934, the report from the intendant states that this territory has an extent of 46,725 km<sup>2</sup> and considered the fifth region according to extent in Colombia<sup>128</sup>. In 1944 the intendant of Chocó reports an extent of 47,000 km<sup>2</sup>. Currently, studies report that Chocó is the fourth department in terms of the extent of territory with 47,840 km<sup>2</sup> (Mosquera, 1992). These changes in extent are in part explained by processes of aggregation and disaggregation of the Chocoano territory. In this regard, during the analyzed period, some municipalities became part

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<sup>128</sup> Compared by department.

of neighboring areas. However, the variations could also be explained by problems in the establishment of the limits with neighboring departments such as Valle, Antioquia and Caldas<sup>129</sup>.

**Illustration 3-3 Location of Chocó in Colombia**



Source: Mosquera (1992)

Among its geographical characteristics, Chocó has a special dimension that no other region in Colombia possesses. This region is a unique territory in South America with coasts on the Caribbean Sea of 65 kilometers and the Pacific Ocean of 350 kilometers (Mosquera, 1992). This means, Chocó shares 27 percent of the Colombian pacific coast with a strategic proximity to the Panama Canal (intendant reports, 1940-1941). Moreover, Chocó is rich in hydro sources with the rivers Atrato (720 km), San Juan (380 km) and Baudó (205 km) and its “*multiple tributaries*” (Maldonado-Ocampo et al, 2006, Intendant report, 1908). Historically, the rivers are the major transport system in this region; especially during the time period for this research (Report of apostolic prefect 1919-1923).

<sup>129</sup> The archival material shows frequent complaints about border disagreements between Chocó and its neighboring departments (see for instance, Informe del Intendente Nacional del Chocó al Señor Ministro de Gobierno / Intendencia Nacional del Chocó, 1941, p. 5. Imprenta Oficial. Quibdó).

The geographical location also contributes to the levels of rainfall and temperature. Chocó has an average rainfall level of 7,000 mm<sup>2</sup> per year (Bonet, 2008). Regarding the climate and temperature, Chocó has a tropical humid climate with an average temperature of 28°C. However, this territory presents different climatic zones, soils and landscapes. According to the intendant in 1934, the average temperature was between 26 and 28 Celsius degrees in the low and coastal lands, and 15 Celsius degrees in the high lands<sup>130</sup>.

The literature argues that the predominant equatorial climate, hydro-resources and location influence economic activities. These geographical conditions affect soil conditions and productive potential. According to Bonet (2008), 68 percent of soils are considered of low productivity. However, Chocó is rich in natural resources such as gold, silver, copper, platinum, iron, carbon, alumina, radio, osmium, rhodium (Intendant report, 1908). Indeed, by the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, Chocó was the first world producer of platinum generating an economic boom during the period (Urrego, 2010, Bonet, 2008, Gonzalez, 1997 and 1996, Monsalve, 1927). Moreover, despite the low soil productivity, Chocó was a producer of wood, rubber, tagua, sugar, cacao, coffee, banana, coconut, corn, among other natural resources (Monsalve, 1927 and intendant report, 1908).

Regarding its history, Chocó was originally a region inhabited by various indigenous tribes such as the emberas, chocoes, catios, noanamaes, citaraes, cunas, cuevas, dabaiba, among others before of the arrival of the Europeans (Gomez, 1980). During colonization, Spaniards established the first South American settlement in the territory in 1510. Although the settlement failed to prosper, Chocó soon became the focus of colonizer exploitation in Colombia because of its rich production of gold (Gonzalez, 1996, Valois, 1945).

Historiography shows that gold exploitation was one of the major economic activities of Spanish America after the 16<sup>th</sup> century. However, the Spanish faced the same problem as the entire

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<sup>130</sup> Informe que el Intendente del choco rinde al señor Ministro de Gobierno, acerca de la administración de la Intendencia en el periodo 1933-1934. Informe anual que rinde el Director de Agricultura y Estadística de la Intendencia al señor Secretario de Hacienda. Quibdo junio 13 de 1934. In AGN: sección: Archivo Anexos, Entidad Productora: Ministerio de Gobierno sección Intendencias y Comisarías, Serie Documental: Intendencias Informes Generales, Caja: 001, Carpeta: 002, Folio: 37-40. Gómez (1980) mentions a warm climate dominates over an extent of 1904 km<sup>2</sup>, a cold climate over 1193 km<sup>2</sup> and wasteland over 166 km<sup>2</sup> (Gomez, 1980, p. 142).

colony regarding its exploitation. In general, the indigenous labor force was scarce and weak for such activity<sup>131</sup>. In order to increase economic exploitation, the Spanish imported black slaves from Africa to all of America. Massive importation occurs in 1580 when the Colombian city of Cartagena became the main slave port for Spanish America<sup>132</sup>.

Historiography also shows that the importation of slaves generated fundamental demographic changes in Chocó. Mining activities favored this process. Exploitation of gold was the historical economic activity of this region and African slaves were a more appropriate labor force for this activity than the native-indigenous population (Gonzalez, 1996, Gomez, 1980, among others). According to Gonzalez (1996), Cuesta (1986) and Gomez (1980), a concentration of an African slave population in Chocó was evident by 17<sup>th</sup> century. Indeed, as it has already been shown, the census of 1778/80 states that more than one third of the population were black slaves when the percentage in Colombia overall was barely 7 percent. This demographic pattern and the future mestizaje made Chocó historically the blackest region of Colombia (Leal, 2007, Jaramillo-Uribe, 1996, Bushnell 1993, Wade, 1993 and West, 2000 [1957]).

On the other hand, its physical and political divisions present variations throughout the analyzed period. In particular, Chocó had four different political and administrative regimes between 1886 and 1950. From 1886 to 1906, Chocó was briefly a province ruled by the department of Cauca. In 1906 is established as an intendency according to the Decree 1347 of 1906. An intendency was a political and administrative regime of “*exception*” (Valois, 1945, p. 45). In contrast to a department, the fact of being an intendency meant that Chocó directly depended on the national government for its administration. For instance, according to the Decree 1347 of 1906, the intendency is administrated by an intendant appointed by the national government. Later, it was administrated by the intendant and an administrative council both with similar functions to departmental governors and assemblies (Monsalve, 1927). In this regard, the most significant difference to a department is the non-existence of the democratic election of departmental assemblies.

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<sup>131</sup> See for instance, Gonzalez (1996), Bushnell (1993), Cuesta (1986), Gomez (1980), West (2000 [1957]), among others.

<sup>132</sup> Maya (2009) says that the number of African slaves that arrived in Cartagena between 1580 and 1640 was more than half million.



In 1908, Chocó is acknowledged as a department by Law 1 of 1908 and regulated by Decree 916 of 1908. The departmentalization lasts only one year. Law 65 of 1909 and Decree 340 of 1910 make Chocó an intendancy until Law 13 of 1947. The latter law establishes Chocó as one of the 15 departments of the time. The establishment as a department remains for the rest of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Chocó is now one of the 32 departments<sup>133</sup> with Quibdó its capital city.

In relation to the demographic composition, according to the census of 1912, Chocó was divided into the provinces of Atrato and San Juan. The province of Atrato comprised the municipalities of Bagadó, Litoral, Riosucio, Carmen, Negua, Acandí and the capital city of Quibdó. The province of San Juan comprised Itsmina (the province capital), Tadó, Baudó, Novita, Condoto and Pueblorrico. The number of provinces and the composition of each province also vary during the analyzed period. In 1919, the intendant reports that there are four provinces: Atrato, San Juan, Darien and Pacifico. Moreover, some municipalities were created, merged or segregated by the department.

However, the most common fact is to associate Chocó with the historical provinces of Atrato and San Juan. In addition, the census of 1951 reports 12 municipalities that correspond to 10 from 1912. These municipalities are Quibdó, Itsmina, Acandí, Bagadó, Baudó, Condoto, El Carmen, Novita, Nuquí, Riosucio, and Tadó. It excludes Pueblorrico, merged into the department of Caldas in 1912, and San Jose del Palmar established in 1938.

Annex 4 shows the evolution of the population for each municipality from 1905 to 1951. These data show two facts. The first is that Chocó has on average 1.26 percent of Colombian population. The second is that the majority of the population is concentrated in the municipalities of Quibdó, Baudó, Condoto, Itsmina, Novita and Tadó. For instance, these municipalities have an 80 percent share of the population in 1951 and 70 percent in 1912.

Finally, the productive structure of the population focuses on two activities: agriculture and mining. Data from the population censuses are variable regarding the composition of each category of economic activity during the analyzed period. However, broad patterns show that the

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<sup>133</sup> As it was established by the constitution of 1991.

economic structure in Chocó focuses on agricultural and mining activities. For instance, in 1912, 58.6 percent of the population are involved in agricultural activities while in 1918 this percentage is 34.1 percent followed by mining activities at 14.3 percent. In 1938, the primary sector involves 90.6 percent of the population<sup>134</sup>. However, 25.8 percent of this primary sector is involved in mining activities. By 1951, agriculture and mining extraction continue as the major economic activities for the population with 61.53 and 28.9 percent respectively<sup>135</sup>.

#### **3.5.4 Chocó, the special regime and the case selection strategy**

The case selection strategy requires an additional topic to be explained: the varying and special political and administrative regimes of Chocó during the majority of the period of analysis. This section explains that these special regimes are empirical manifestations of the hypothesized cause of the informal institution of racial exclusion more than an exceptional condition with potential effects on final outcomes.

In particular, as already explained, Chocó had four different political and administrative regimes between 1886 and 1950. Among these different regimes, the system of intendancy prevailed for the majority of the time. These different regimes could be considered as exceptional characteristics that affect final public goods provision, making the case selection questionable. The diverse special regimes would then be contributing to outcomes generating a systematic error in the causal inference (Collier & Mahoney, 1996).

George & Bennett (2005) claim that previous knowledge of a case makes case selection strategy stronger. Previous knowledge here shows that the central decision of maintaining Chocó with special regimens is an example of implicit racial exclusion against this region (Mosquera, 1992, Gomez, 1980, Valois, 1945). Chocó is a socio-cultural region member of the hot-negroid periphery (Jaramillo-Uribe, 1996, Gutierrez, 1975). The literature illustrates that in Colombia there was an implicit agreement in which regional members of this hot-negroid periphery were made invisible, negated, and stereotyped by the national government as unable to address their own governance (Hernandez, 2010, Maya, 2009, Villegas, 2008 and 2005, among others). The

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<sup>134</sup> According to the census, it is economic active population (EAP).

<sup>135</sup> See annex 5 for details.

national elites associated the socio-cultural compositions of regions such as Chocó with barriers to local and national prosperity; consequently, these regions needed the assistance and guidance of the national government (Hernandez, 2010, Villegas, 2008 and 2005). In this sense, special systems such as the intendency are manifestations of the informal institution of racial exclusion itself.

For instance, Mosquera (1992) argues that the different special regimes of Chocó are part of unspoken practices of racial discrimination against afro-descendants in Colombia. In the words of Mosquera (1992, p. 129) “*it seems that it is annoying to have a black department*”. The author adds that “*there is no violent repression against them (blacks)...but it a form of underhand discrimination is practiced*” such as that related to special administrative and political regimes (Mosquera, 1992, p. 129 [own translation] quoting the newspaper el Tiempo of 14 July of 1989).

In other words, there are not explicit laws that establish that this differential treatment is based on the racial composition of Chocó. However, the special regime implicitly manifests the impossibility of Chocó to rule its own administration for the reasons explained by authors such as Hernandez (2010), Maya, (2009), and Villegas (2008 and 2005), among others. Accordingly, the special regime more than an alternative explanation to outcomes and is a concrete manifestation of the hypothesized cause<sup>136</sup>.

However, an additional important caveat must be stated referring to the research question and related to identifying the hypothesis of the mechanism. The mechanistic approach also investigates the role of actors in local public goods provision. Therefore, the special regimes would indicate that the role of local actors is limited in the local political economy of public goods provision because of the centralized administrative system.

Effectively, the differential treatment means a limitation for the local political economy of public goods provision. This is a case of implicit racial exclusion which means exclusion and differential negative treatment. Nonetheless, despite this implicit segregation, local actors had some “open spaces” for the manipulation of these limitations during the analyzed period. The

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<sup>136</sup> This is also discussed in the empirical part.

“open spaces” were in the regulations and in the form of interpretations, reinterpretations and gradual changes<sup>137</sup>.

This means, firstly, the analysis of the evolution of regulations show that for some issues related to public goods provision, the regulations allow some autonomy to local actors. This autonomy was reduced because of the effects of the implicit exclusion; nonetheless, it existed. For example, according to the regulations of the intendancy, the intendant had the same attributions of departmental governors established in Law 149 of 1888<sup>138</sup>. Article 7 of Decree 1347 of 1906 – that regulates the intendancy – states 23 specific functions for the intendant. Among these 23 functions, 10 are explicitly related to local responsibilities in the provision of public goods. This decree states functions such as the intendant having to “*intervene in the direction of public instruction*”, “*create local schools*”, “*hire the construction of public roads... invest in public establishments*”, and “*appoint freely local mayors*”<sup>139</sup>. Decree 340 of 1910 also re-states that the functions of the intendant are the same functions as those of a governor.

A major critic to the intendancial system is the absence of departmental assemblies<sup>140</sup>. According to Law 102 of 1914, the functions of the assemblies are in charge of the national government in Chocó. However, Decree 340 of 1920 creates the administrative council. The administrative council had similar attributes to departmental assemblies (Monsalve, 1927, p. 588)<sup>141</sup>. This council was comprised of the intendant and local authorities<sup>142</sup>. Indeed, reports inform that Law 41 of 1923 delegates the function of organizing the intendancy to the national government. In turn, the national government delegates this function to the administrative council<sup>143</sup>. Likewise, laws such as Law 10 of 1930 and Decree 2089 of 1930 show opportunities for the local public goods provision by this administrative council. For instance, these regulations mention that, in contrast to other intendancies, Chocó has its own administrative council for preparing the local

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<sup>137</sup> As Streeck & Thelen (2005) and Mahoney & Thelen (2010) would suggest.

<sup>138</sup> Valois (1945, p. 48) regulation valid until 1913.

<sup>139</sup> Valois (1945, p. 48 [own translation]) presents the decree.

<sup>140</sup> This institution was responsible for many functions related to public goods provision in the departments.

<sup>141</sup> The report of the intendant in 1940 mentions that the administrative council exists since the decree 340 of February 13 of 1920 and all its initiatives were approved by the national government during that year. Informe del Intendente Nacional del choco al señor Ministro de Gobierno 1940, p. 71. Imprenta Oficial. Quibdó.

<sup>142</sup> ABC newspaper, January 17 of 1935, issue 2941 (in Chocó 7 días, 2014 issue 992, section: el Chocó de Ayer: [http://www.choco7dias.com/992/choco\\_ayer.html](http://www.choco7dias.com/992/choco_ayer.html) )

<sup>143</sup> Anales de la Cámara de Representantes, sesiones ordinarias, Bogotá jueves 1 de Agosto 1935 p. 72.

budget. Moreover, Articles 17 and 19 of Decree 2089 of 1930 allow flexibility in the management of the local budget for investment. Article 17 states that the administrative council can make changes in the budget when it is “*evident and undisputed*” that a voted amount is no longer necessary. Article 19 establishes “*supplementary and extraordinary*” appropriations to the budget when the need is imperative. The only conditions are that these movements must be justified, there must be a surplus in the collected revenues, and the changes must be presented to the national government for approbation. These conditions existed in the fiscal history of Chocó<sup>144</sup>. Finally, Decree 2110 of 1932 allocates similar ‘flexibilities’ in the local political economy of public goods provision authorizing budget ‘reallocations’.

The analysis of previous knowledge and historical material also illustrates these potential opportunities for local actors in the local political economy of public goods provision in Chocó. Helg (1987) argues that public goods provision such as education was reduced because it was under the responsibility of catholic orders in special territories such as Chocó. However, Chocó presents a different connotation relative to others intendancies and special territories. The report of the apostolic prefect shows that public instruction of the municipalities was a responsibility of the civil government and not of catholic orders in Chocó<sup>145</sup>. In other words, local civil authorities had opportunities in the local political economy. Indeed, Valois (1945, p. 61[own translation]) states that the blame for backwardness in Chocó is in part a responsibility of the “*Chocoano politicians and leaders that neither in the national congress nor in the intendential administration*” use the opportunities for favoring Chocó. This argument is also in the archival material. In a report to the minister of government in 1946 the author quotes the secretary of finance of Chocó who states that the local government should concentrate on the imperative problems of the intendancy in the elaboration of the budget. The report adds that the lack of public services such as water, sewerage, public lighting, etc. of prosperous cities such as Quibdó is a consequence of the poor local administration. According to the author, the municipal budget in Quibdó focuses on salaries and expenses of questionable “*moral justification*”<sup>146</sup>.

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<sup>144</sup>Informe del Intendente Nacional del Chocó al señor Ministro de Gobierno 1941, p. 97-99. Imprenta Oficial.

<sup>145</sup> Informe que el Prefecto Apostólico del Chocó rinde al ilustrísimo y reverendísimo Arzobispo de Colombia, como Presidente de la Junta Arquidiocesana de Misiones 1919-1923, p. 112. Imprenta Nacional 1924. Bogotá.

<sup>146</sup> Informe sobre la Intendencia del Chocó. Anales del Congreso, Cámara, Bogotá Noviembre 13 de 1946, p. 1495-1496 [own translation].

Second, institutions are gradually contested and revised (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, Streeck & Thelen, 2005). Local actors in Chocó could take a higher level of autonomy in locally providing public goods. This autonomy is available, as the authors would say, in interpretations, reinterpretations, revisions and gradual changes of the rules (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, Streeck & Thelen, 2005). In finding such opportunities, local actors have an important role in the local political economy of public goods provision, minimizing the implications of the informal institution of racial exclusion in the form of special regime.

The analysis of regulations reveals these opportunities for gradual change in autonomy. The regulations were open to amendments to increase relatively local autonomy over time. Gradual amendments in local autonomy were, for example, in laws such a Law 102 of 1914. This law establishes that the national government effectively exercises the function of the departmental assembly – which constitutes a clear restriction. However, it also affirms that the autonomy and independency of Chocó is guaranteed for “*the administration of its sectional interests*” (Article 2). Similarly, Law 62 of 1915 sustains that budget surpluses must be allocated to public works of the intendancy. The law also gives higher autonomy to the intendant. According to the law, the intendant is in charge of developing this regulation, organizing and achieving the local budget with, of course, consideration beforehand by the national government. According to Law 41 of 1923, the national government delegates the function of the assemblies to the local administrative council. Moreover, Decree 903 of 1939 authorizes administrative council of Chocó to establish regulations for the fiscal and administrative government of the municipalities. Finally, Law 2 of 1943 contributes to additional gradual changes against the implicit exclusion (article 18). This law provides an independent representative in the House of Representatives of the country<sup>147</sup>. This process of evolution in autonomy concludes with the establishment of Chocó as a department according to Law 13 of 1947.

In summary, Chocó is a typical case of the informal institution of racial exclusion and low public goods provision as discussed in section 3.5.1 and 3.5.2. This current section shows that the special regime is not an exceptional condition. The analysis of regulations and previous knowledge demonstrate that differential treatment existed. However, these limitations are related

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<sup>147</sup> The Chocoanos representatives were previously elected using just the electoral circumscription of Antioquia.

to the empirical manifestation of the informal institution of racial exclusion rather than exceptions to the Chocoano case. Moreover, the analysis of the regulations also shows that, in this implicit exclusion, local actors potentially had “open spaces” in the local political economy of public goods provision. These potential opportunities were related to the regulations and in the possible interpretations, reinterpretations and gradual changes of these regulations for Chocó. In Chocó, local actors were therefore also responsible for providing some public goods at the local level<sup>148</sup>.

These arguments add to the justification that Chocó is a typical case of the hypothesized cause and final outcome ideal for theory building process tracing. The following step is to study how racial exclusion works inside this typical case of Chocó, how this institution affects local actors, their behavior, and the incidences of these elements on local public goods provision.

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<sup>148</sup> As Cuesta (1986), Valois (1945) and others Chocoano authors suggest. For example, Jackson (2010) mentions that institutions could be understood in different ways and gaps or spaces between rules and actions allow interpretations of institutions. Chocoano actors had this potential of interpretation and reinterpretations to provide more public goods at the local level. However, the effective use of this potential looks limited for the purpose of public good provision. Possibly, that is why authors such as Cuesta (1986) and Valois (1945) see the backwardness in socio-economic performance of Chocó as also being the responsibility of the locals.

## Chapter 4 Quantitative analysis

In line with the first research goal, this chapter shows quantitatively that the institution of racial exclusion is an alternative explanation for differences in local socio-economic outcomes in the Colombian case. Results identify that a negatively and significant relationship exists between the measurement of the racially excluded ‘blacker’ composition of the population and local socio-economic outcomes. In other words, statistical analysis and different econometric specifications suggest that municipalities with a blacker composition of its population were subject to higher dynamics of elite racism and exclusion that led to an unequal provision of public goods needed for development. In contrast, whiter regions achieved better social relationships between local elites and the general population. Those regions provided more public goods and showed relatively better economic performance than blacker areas.

This chapter proceeds as follow. The first part gives descriptive statistics of the data base. The second part provides the empirical results of the regression analysis. Part three then overviews the robustness checks.

### 4.1 Data analysis and descriptive outcomes

The methodological strategy suggests a statistical relationship between racial exclusion, public goods provision of education and local economic performance. This section gives an analysis of the descriptive statistics for variables related to this causal link. Moreover, the section breaks down the analysis at both departmental and municipal levels and tries to identify potential structural patterns in the data.

This descriptive analysis indicates that economic performance and public goods provision differ among regions and that these differences potentially persisted over time. The analysis also illustrates that racial composition of the population is also related to these differences<sup>149</sup>. Specifically, those blacker regions show lower regional performance. The results of this

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<sup>149</sup> See annex 1. This annex suggests persistence in the regional black composition of the population over time. This persistence is argued also by authors such as Wade (1989, 1993), Gutierrez (1975), among others.




descriptive analysis are not completely conclusive but do provide evidence to suggest the close relationship among the variables.

### 4.1.1 Public goods provision for development

This sub-section analyzes the spatial distribution of public goods provision in Colombia. Specifically, it uses data on illiteracy rates, schools per 1000 inhabitants and educational establishments per 1000 inhabitants as a proxy for public goods provision.

Literacy rates in Colombia show two major trends during the analyzed period. The first pattern refers to an increase in the national average of literacy rate. The second pattern is a concentration of higher rates in departments of the central Andean region and lower rates in the Caribbean and pacific coastal regions (see illustration 4-1).

Illustration 4-1 Literacy rate 1912 and 1938 (quintile)




Source: Population censuses<sup>150</sup>

<sup>150</sup> The illustration shows quintile and excludes what Jaramillo-Uribe (1996) classifies as the Amazon region and eastern llanos basin region considered as far and remote.

Figure 4-1 shows illiteracy rates by departments reported by population censuses for 1912 and 1938<sup>151</sup>. First, the figure points out that the average illiteracy rates decrease from 1912 to 1938. This phenomenon is in line with structural processes of Colombian society such as higher levels of urbanization and changes in the productive structure<sup>152</sup>. Hence, while the national average illiteracy rate is 83.8 percent in 1912, it is 58.4 percent in 1938.

However, there are some patterns in this figure that deserve further attention and analysis. First, some departments maintain high levels of illiteracy in both years 1912 and 1938. This is the case, for instance, of Chocó, Sucre, Córdoba, Boyacá and Casanare. These departments maintained levels of illiteracy above the national average (NA). Second, departments in the Andean region such as Bogotá, Antioquia, Caldas and Quindío show illiteracy rates below the national average in both analyzed periods.

Figure 4-1 Illiteracy rate by department 1912 and 1938




Source: Population censuses

As the literature argues, high illiteracy rates are an indicator of an ineffective primary educational system to develop basic skills. These skills potentially increase intellectual development and, through this, economic development (UNESCO, 2009). Hence, even though lower illiteracy rates in 1938 suggest that Colombia increased investment in primary education, some regions were successful in developing and maintaining a relatively effective educational system, while others regions fail in this goal thereby increasing regional gaps.

<sup>151</sup> Departments are sociopolitical divisions relatively equivalent to states or provinces.

<sup>152</sup> Sanchez & España (2012b), Roldán (2003), Melo (1989), among others.

**Figure 4-2 Schools per inhabitants**



Source: Population censuses, ministry of public instruction reports

As with illiteracy rates, primary schools are unequally distributed among regions and these differences tend to persist over time<sup>153</sup>. Figure 4-2 illustrates a positive and persistent relationship between the number of schools per 1000 inhabitants in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and mid-20<sup>th</sup> centuries. Therefore, those departments with higher numbers of schools per inhabitants in circa 1890 tend to have higher numbers of schools in 1911 and 1938<sup>154</sup>. The figure also shows that the number of schools per inhabitants particularly increases from 1911 to 1938. This evidence is associated with the same factors that explain the decrease in the national average of illiteracy rate. Basically, the national economy grows, the departments increase their incomes, coffee production consolidates as the leading product of the Colombian economy, and the national government is committed to increasing primary education in part pushed by the international context (Ocampo, 2007, Melo, 1989 and Helg, 1987).

An important comment to make is that, according to the data, the average number of schools per inhabitants was still low<sup>155</sup>. Although the population and schools were increasing, the numbers of schools were still low relative to the population. In this regard, the major argument justifying low numbers of schools is linked to low local income (Palacio, 2006, Zuluaga et al 2004, Helg, 1987), especially for those regions that did not participate in the coffee economy. Hence,

<sup>153</sup> Correlations at department level are 0.15 for circa 1890-1911 and 0.40 for 1911-1938.

<sup>154</sup> In 1938, numbers of schools are the numbers of educational establishments according to the census of 1938. This figure excludes the department of Putumayo because data for 1911 are considerably high for this context in this region.

<sup>155</sup> It was 1.11 in 1938.

historiography states that since municipalities had low rates of revenue collection and income, public investment in education was consequently low.

Nonetheless, even though income restrictions are important, the role of local governments and race relations is also a critical issue in regional performance<sup>156</sup>. In the historical contexts of inequalities and control of power, low numbers of schools is also related to elite dynamics to guide development<sup>157</sup>. In this particular case, it concerns the dynamics of subnational elites. Primary education was an obligation of subnational governments<sup>158</sup>. Laws such as Law 39 of 1903, Law 8 of 1909 and Law 4 of 1913 explicitly state that subnational governments must support the construction and maintenance of municipal primary schools<sup>159</sup>. Therefore, in the Colombian context, the lower number of schools is a partial indicator of the extent local governments invested in the public provision of goods for development – such as schools for the population.

The literature also suggests that local governments were comprised of members of the local elite with a biased interest in public instruction. On this subject, Helg (1987, p. 62 and p.46 [own translation]) mentions that in addition to low municipal funding, investment in local education “*depend(s) on the interest of influential local members*” and, usually, these influential members did not “*make any effort to develop education*”. As in Helg (1987), Zuluaga et al (2004, p. 204) claim that education had to deal with the ineptitudes of local governments.

This lack of interest of local elites was reinforced by the racial characteristic of the local population through implicit social arrangements based on racial exclusion<sup>160</sup>. Historiography shows that it is not a minor fact that patterns of individual and institutional racism govern elite attitudes toward the provision of public goods to non-elites. For instance, Adriana Maya argues

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<sup>156</sup> For instance, Bushnell (1993, p. 166-7) states that in the Colombian context “*there was little interest in using revenues for programs of education and welfare aimed at the popular classes*”.

<sup>157</sup> Mahoney (2010), Pierson (2004), Ferranti et al (2004).

<sup>158</sup> Municipal and departmental see Helg (1987, p. 103).

<sup>159</sup> Law 8 of 1909, (Article 9). Law 4 of 1913 is a law of subnational regimes that orders subnational funding and responsibilities to local governments on public instruction (Article 39 for example). Law 39 of 1903 regulates education.

<sup>160</sup> As inferred by authors such as Villegas (2008), Múnera (2005), Roldán (2003), Arocha (1998), Helg (1987), Wade (1993), among others.

that legacies of exclusion and discrimination guided educational policies in the Colombian republican context<sup>161</sup>. Similarly, Roldán (2003, p. 62) explains that subnational elites developed government projects based on the support of the hierarchies of difference. In this context, ethnic and cultural differences were used for establishing implicit hierarchies and differences between elites and non-elite members. These dynamics generated an implicit double social agreement to justify exploitation, exclusion and discrimination by elite members (Roldán, 2003).

The empirical material sheds some light on this matter. The annual reports of ministers of education show potential results of these implicit agreements. For instance, in 1912, the annual education report states that the department of Bolívar has 2.77 students per 100 inhabitants. This department also has historically higher rates of afro-descendants in its population, and its capital Cartagena was the major slave port during colonization. On the other hand, the same report says that whiter departments such as Caldas have 7.59 students per 100 inhabitants. The minister sums up that such difference is in part explained by the local authority interest in education<sup>162</sup>.

It could be said that between Bolívar and Caldas, coffee production is an important difference explaining this circumstance. Caldas is one of the major coffee producers in Colombia. However, arguments from different disciplines question this explanation. For example, Fernandez (2014) finds that coffee performance was better in regions with more egalitarian institutional arrangements. In a different analytical perspective, Roldán (2003) also claims that municipalities that differed racially to the socially accepted in the hegemonic ideology, show patterns of socio-economic performance different to whiter regions<sup>163</sup>. Hence, there is a perception that a more fundamental cause than physical endowments explains not only low national investment in education, but also, in this particular analysis, regional gaps in educational performance.

For purposes of illustration, this exercise also compares numbers of schools in late 19<sup>th</sup> century and educational establishments in the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century. The data continue to show a persistent and positive relationship. Figure 4-3 illustrates that those departments with higher numbers of

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
<sup>161</sup> Maya (2009).

<sup>162</sup> Memoria del Ministro de Instrucción Pública al Congreso de 1912, p. 23. Imprenta Nacional. Bogotá.

<sup>163</sup> With regard to this reference, the author focuses her analysis on patterns of violence during the conflict known as “*La Violencia*” from 1946 to 1953.

schools in circa 1890 maintain higher levels of educational establishments in 1951<sup>164</sup>. However, the figure also shows that the number of educational establishments per inhabitants in 1951 is lower than in circa 1890. This fact could be explained by three factors. First, the data for 1951 are from the census of buildings and not reports of the minister of education (as is the case for circa 1890 and in 1911). This census reports numbers of educational establishments and does not specify the level of education of these institutions. Second, the population is higher in 1951. And finally, investment in education and public infrastructure such as public schools might have been affected by social convulsions during the so-called period of “*La Violencia*” (The violence) between 1947 and 1953<sup>165</sup>.

**Figure 4-3 Schools per inhabitants circa 1890 - 1951**



Source: Population censuses, reports ministry of public instruction


Enrollment rates also confirm spatial differences in public goods provision. Enrollment rates describe the capacity of the system to satisfy the educational demand (UNESCO, 2009). Figure 4-4 shows that public goods provision in circa 1890 has a positive correlation with the capacity of the educational system in 1911 to satisfy the demand<sup>166</sup>. Hence, as reported by the data, it can be concluded that enrollment rates in 1911 depended on the numbers of schools, which in turn, depended on the numbers of schools in previous periods.

<sup>164</sup> Indeed the correlation coefficient is 0.56.

<sup>165</sup> This figure is only for purposes of illustration. Data in 1951 should be interpreted with caution. In addition to the issues discussed in the text, this figure excludes Intendancies and Comisarias in 1951 because data were not available. Nonetheless, it is illustrative of persistence.

<sup>166</sup> As in figure 4-2 and 4-7, it excludes Putumayo for the same reasons.

Figure 4-4 Enrollment rates and schools



Source: Population censuses, reports ministry of public instruction

Concluding this section, figures 4-1, 4-2, 4-3 and 4-4 show a persistency in the educational system at the departmental level. The data show that departments with greater levels of literacy, numbers of schools and enrollment rates tend to maintain such a trend over time. Consequently, the spatial educational gaps increase among the Colombian regions. The next section describes the regional distribution of economic performance.

#### 4.1.2 Economic performance


As for the provision of public goods for development, there is also data that illustrates Colombia having spatial heterogeneities in levels of economic performance. Figure 4-5 outlines the high spatial concentration of variables associated with economic performance such as industrial performance<sup>167</sup>. The figures show that departments such as Antioquia, Bogota D.C, Valle, Atlántico and Cundinamarca have the highest concentration of industrial capital. For instance, these departments have 77 percent of participation on industrial fixed assets. In addition, they share 78 percent of the national industrial capital stock.

In contrast to this pattern, indicators for industrial development show that levels of fixed assets and capital stock are low for Chocó, Casanare, Caquetá or Sucre. These departments barely accumulate a 0.2 percent share in overall industrial capital.

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<sup>167</sup> Data are from 1945 FIC.

**Figure 4-5 Share of fixed assets and capital stock**



Source: FIC


The same patterns exist for the concentration of industrial establishments<sup>168</sup>. The results are consistent with the distribution of industrial capital. Figure 4-6 shows that more than 60 percent of the industrial establishments are in departments such as Antioquia, Bogotá, Valle and Atlántico. In contrast, Chocó, Casanare, Guajira and Cesar share the lowest participation with only a 0.5 percent share of industrial establishments.

This fact can be illustrated even more by analyzing the average number of establishments in each department. This reveals that the average number of industrial establishments in departments such as Antioquia is 10.3 while in Valle it is 19 establishments per municipality. On the other hand, in Chocó and Casanare these indicators are 0.46 and 0.31 industrial establishments per municipality respectively.

<sup>168</sup> This indicator represents the departmental share of overall industrial establishments.




**Figure 4-6 Share of industrial establishments**



Source: FIC

By comparing economic performance with educational indicators, the correlation confirms that inequalities in economic performance are in line with substantial spatial inequalities in the provision of public goods for development. Figure 4-7 presents the relationship between education and industrial establishments. The figure shows that this relation is positive, meaning that those departments with the highest levels of schools per inhabitants tend to show the highest levels of industrial establishments.

**Figure 4-7 Industrial establishments and schools**



Source: Population census, report ministry of public instruction, FIC

As this descriptive analysis and literature show<sup>169</sup>, it seems that more educated departments are also the departments with higher levels of economic performance. However, the conditions that propagate such patterns require deeper insights that can be achieved only by disentangling this relationship.

### 4.1.3 Racial composition

This section describes the potential relationship among spatial distribution of blackness, public goods provision and economic regional performance. It has already been stated that spatial inequalities in public goods provision are consistent with spatial inequalities in economic outcomes. This section shows that the regional distribution of race also presents similar tendencies.

Figure 4-8 Distribution of black population




Figure 4-8 shows the distribution of the black population by departments according to the 1912 census. The data confirm that the distribution of the afro-descendant population is heterogeneous among departments and highly concentrated. For instance, Chocó has the highest afro-descendant population. On the other hand, Bogotá D.C, Santander, Quindío have afro-descendant populations below the national average.


By comparing the spatial distribution of education and race, it is possible to observe that those departments with high levels of illiteracy have high levels of afro-descendant populations. This fact is especially so for departments such as Chocó, Sucre and Cordoba. Chocó shows illiteracy

<sup>169</sup> España & Sanchez (2012 and 2010).

rates of 94.4 and 80 percent in 1912 and 1938, and has the highest concentration of black population. In general, the blacker regions have low levels of educational establishments, enrollment rates, and educational attainments.

Moreover, the same applies also to racial composition and economic performance. Figure 4-9 portrays the distribution of industrial establishments and the percentage of black population in Colombia<sup>170</sup>. It can be observed that, in general, the majority of municipalities without industrial establishments also have high rates of black population. Moreover, those municipalities with a lower black percentage of population have higher numbers of industrial establishments<sup>171</sup>.

**Figure 4-9 Black population and industrial establishments**



Source: Population census, FIC

<sup>170</sup> This figure shows municipalities with numbers of industrial establishments lower than the national average.

<sup>171</sup> The overall sample also shows a similar pattern. That is, blacker municipalities have a lower concentration of establishments while ‘whiter’ municipalities have the highest number of establishments.

**Table 4-1 Descriptive statistics**

Variables	All municipalities			Blacker municipalities			Whiter municipalities		
	Obs	Mean	Sd	Obs	Mean	Sd	Obs	Mean	Sd
<i>Public Good provision</i>									
Illiteracy 1912	728	83.8	10.9	412	84.6	9.5	327	81.7	12.3
Illiteracy 1938	789	58.4	15.4	479	61.8	13.9	393	54.0	14.8
Enrollment primary public schools 1911 per 1000 hbt	772	37.8	28.9	456	33.3	23.2	368	42.8	30.2
Enrollment primary private schools 1911 per 1000 hbt	772	2.0	8.3	456	0.7	2.8	368	3.5	11.2
Enrollment secondary public schools 1911 per 1000 hbt	772	2.4	6.7	456	1.3	3.4	368	3.7	8.7
Enrollment secondary private schools 1911 per 1000 hbt	772	2.6	6.6	456	2.2	6.3	368	3.3	7.6
Primary public schools 1911 per 1000 hbt	772	0.59	0.41	456	0.57	0.35	368	0.62	0.36
Primary private schools 1911 per 1000 hbt	772	0.03	0.12	456	0.02	0.10	368	0.05	0.13
Secondary public schools 1911 per 1000 hbt	772	0.04	0.08	456	0.02	0.07	368	0.05	0.10
Secondary private schools 1911 per 1000 hbt	772	0.04	0.11	456	0.03	0.10	368	0.06	0.14
Enrollment urban primary public schools circa 1890 per 1000 hbt	761	20.2	18.5	448	17.4	16.4	362	23.3	20.4
Enrollment rural primary public schools circa 1890 per 1000 hbt	761	1.6	5.0	448	1.3	4.9	362	2.0	5.0
Enrollment total primary public schools circa 1890 per 1000 hbt	761	21.8	19.5	448	18.7	17.6	362	25.3	21.3
Primary public urban schools circa 1890 per 1000 hbt	761	0.32	0.27	448	0.29	0.28	362	0.35	0.27
Primary public rural schools circa 1890 per 1000 hbt	761	0.05	0.12	448	0.04	0.11	362	0.06	0.13
Primary public schools (total) circa 1890 per 1000 hbt	761	0.36	0.31	448	0.33	0.31	362	0.41	0.31
Educational establishments 1951 per 1000 hbt	813	0.09	0.10	500	0.07	0.08	414	0.10	0.11
Hospitals 1951 per 1000 hbt	813	0.036	0.05	500	0.036	0.05	414	0.038	0.04
Hospitals 1938 per 1000 hbt	789	0.066	0.09	479	0.062	0.09	393	0.074	0.09
<i>Economic variables</i>									
Percapita capital	813	69.0	145.6	500	39.2	113.4	414	93.6	167.6
Industrial workers	813	1.4	2.3	500	0.8	1.9	414	1.8	2.7
Industrial establishments (K>0)	813	9.6	54.4	500	6.1	29.4	414	13.3	69.7
Percapita capital	454	92.1	161.8	270	55.8	131.9	229	121.9	182.2
Industrial workers	454	1.8	2.5	270	1.2	2.1	229	2.4	2.9
Industrial establishments	454	17.2	71.9	270	11.2	39.3	229	24.0	92.4
<i>Control variables</i>									
Rainy precipitation (cm3)	730	1705.5	949.5	430	1787.5	1042.9	351	1599.2	793.8
Temperature (°C)	730	20.5	5.0	430.0	21.9	4.9	351.0	19.9	4.9
Distance Bogota (km)	772	285.9	186.6	456.0	301.5	187.8	368.0	275.4	189.5
Distance Buenaventura (km)	768	412.1	189.7	455.0	445.5	197.6	364.0	400.8	186.2
Distance Barranquilla (km)	772	604.8	256.3	456.0	533.4	243.7	368.0	633.2	258.0
Coffee production 1925 (mill)	772	0.43	0.93	456	0.42	0.96	368	0.52	1.04

Note:Blacker is the percentage of black and mestizo population according to the census of population of 1912. Blacker municipalities are municipalities with Blacker indicator higher than the national average. Whiter municipalities are municipalities with white category higher than the national average. Data on economic variables are from FIC 1945. Data on coffee are from Monsalve (1927) in millions of coffee trees. Data on geography are from Sánchez & Nuñez (2000). For more details, annex 3 describes the list of variables, sources and methods.

The analysis at the municipal level also identifies differences for all the variables of interest. Table 4-1 lists descriptive statistics at the municipal level. The table breaks down the data by all municipalities, blacker municipalities ( $BCP_i$ ) and ‘whiter’ municipalities. Blacker municipalities

are municipalities with the ‘blacker’ variable higher than the national average<sup>172</sup>. Similarly, ‘whiter’ municipalities are municipalities with a white racial category higher than the national average.

The first part of the table reports indicators for the provision of public goods<sup>173</sup>. The table shows that the basic difference is that blacker municipalities present lower indicators associated with the effectiveness of the educational system and public goods provision. For instance, blacker municipalities show relative higher rates of illiteracy than the national average. Similarly, blacker municipalities have lower mean enrollment rates and numbers of schools per 1000 inhabitants. Additionally, for blacker towns in 1911, the mean of enrollment rate is 4.5 points lower than the national average<sup>174</sup>. Similarly, in circa 1890 the mean enrollment rate is 2.8 points lower than the national average<sup>175</sup>. The table also illustrates that ‘whiter’ municipalities present better indicators of public goods provision than the national average.

The differences in education statistics also apply to economic variables. In this case, the data show that for variables such as per capita industrial capital, numbers of workers, and industrial establishments, blacker municipalities have a lower mean than national averages and whiter municipalities. In the case of per capita capital, blacker municipalities have 29.8 and 54.3 points lower than the national average and the whiter municipalities respectively. The pattern is greater when analyzing only municipalities with industrial capital. In this case, the difference is 36.3 and 66.1 respectively. This fact emphasizes the lower levels of economic performance of municipalities with populations with a blacker composition.

Finally, several control variables are included in the analysis. These variables are important because they represent the major alternative explanations in the literature for local differences in socio-economic outcomes in Colombia. Specifically, they refer to the geographical hypothesis and production of exportable goods such as coffee and gold. In the case of geographical characteristics such as temperature and precipitation, municipalities with a blacker population

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<sup>172</sup> The variable ‘blacker’ as it was specified in the methodological chapter (*BCP<sub>i</sub>*).

<sup>173</sup> In particular, and in line with UNESCO (2009), it shows indicators for outcomes and capacities of the state to satisfy educational demand as numbers of students per inhabitants.

<sup>174</sup> For primary public schools.

<sup>175</sup> For urban primary public schools.

have higher levels than the national and whiter municipalities' averages. These characteristics are in line with the spatial distribution of the race in Colombia explained by different authors and that claim that black population is historically settled in the hot, low and rainy-periphery (Villegas, 2008, Palacios, 2006, Bushnell, 1993, Gutierrez, 1975, among others). On the other hand, a relevant issue proposes the fact that coffee production is significantly lower in blacker municipalities. This would be an interesting issue to disentangle in more systematic ways.

In conclusion, this descriptive analysis sheds light on the hypothetical relation in this study. Basically, there is a negative relation between blacker population and local performance. These facts are consistent with anthropological and sociological studies on racial structure in Colombia that suggest a prevalent cultural and economic discrimination against the afro-descendant component of the population in the postcolonial context. For instance, Wade (1993, p. 11) says that afro-descendants are discriminated and excluded from the benefits of development and education. According to the author, the economic role of blacks is historically related to low positions in the socio-economic structure.

Villegas (2008) and Arocha (1998) mention that relations of power are behind this exclusion. In general, elites control the benefits of investments in areas rich in natural resources (such as Chocó). These structures of power are reinforced by the permissive role of national and local authorities in face of the abuses of elites<sup>176</sup>. Consequently, the initiatives for fostering state capacity for development, by both oppressed people and power holders, are almost non-existent in blacker racial contexts (Arocha, 1998).

Descriptive statistics and studies on racism therefore suggest that systematic factors give a greater explanation than the lack of resources or geographical conditions for the low local socio-economic outcomes in blacker communities. Moreover, such a systematic explanation is related to structures of power control, hierarchies and exclusion.

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<sup>176</sup> Villegas (2008, p. 86) describes processes of expropriation, forced displacements and violence against black communities in which the state plays a permissive role.

However, despite this section showing evidence of a relation between racial composition, public goods provision and economic performance, such evidence is merely descriptive and not conclusive<sup>177</sup>. The following section therefore develops a more systematic strategy.

## 4.2 Regression analysis: results

The first hypothesis and the methodological strategy state that racial exclusion ( $BCP_i$ ) has indirect effects on local economic outcome ( $Log y_i$ ) via the direct effects of public goods provision ( $PGP_i$ ) (see equation 1 and 2).

$$Log y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * PGP_i + \beta_2 * X'_i + \varepsilon_i \text{ (Equation 1 second stage)}$$

$$PGP_i = \varphi_0 + \varphi_1 * BCP_i + \varphi_2 * X' + e_i \text{ (Equation 2 first stage)}$$

The estimates confirm this hypothesis. In this regard, the results identify a positive and significant relationship between different measurements of public goods provision and economic outcomes. Moreover the instrument is valid and highly correlated with the endogenous variable  $PGP_i$  for different specifications of public goods provision. Therefore, these results indicate that those municipalities with a blacker composition within its population show a lower provision of public goods for development and, consequently, a lower level of economic performance.

Table 4-2 shows the results using overall primary enrollment rates for late 19<sup>th</sup> century based on the reports of minister of education for circa 1890<sup>178</sup>. The first stage shows that the instrument is significant and negative. In addition, control variables do not affect the coefficient and significance of  $BCP_i$ . Hence, when controlling against the geographical characteristics of the municipalities, a statistically significant relationship exists between populations with a blacker composition, public goods provision and local economic performance. Municipalities with a blacker component within a population present lower primary school enrollment rates and

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<sup>177</sup> For instance, alternative explanations are not systematically included in this descriptive analysis (i.e., coffee production, climate, etc.).

<sup>178</sup> Circa 1890, Cundinamarca does not appear in the report of 1894. I found a separate report for Cundinamarca in 1890 and assumed this information as a proxy for the data circa 1890.

experience a lower accumulation of public goods for development, while other factors remain constant<sup>179</sup>.

**Table 4-2 Econometric results: dependent variable, log per capita industrial capital**

VARIABLES	OLS	First Stage	Second Stage
Public primary enrollment rate circa 1890 per 1000 hbt	0.0263** [4.362]		0.0982*** [3.215]
Percentage Indians 1912	-3.930* [-2.948]	-18.49* (-1.651)	-3.429*** [-2.657]
Coffee production 1925	1.002*** [15.86]	-2.286* (-1.652)	1.151*** [15.11]
Dummy Gold production 19th century	0.489 [1.817]	0.000235 (0.000167)	0.507** [2.020]
Dummy Paisa	0.551** [5.610]	4.454*** (4.624)	0.264*** [3.827]
Temperature	-0.870* [-2.454]	-2.207 (-1.193)	-0.724** [-2.344]
Temperature [2]	0.0191* [2.551]	0.0440 (0.936)	0.0165*** [2.617]
Distance Bogota	-0.00309 [-1.539]	-0.00111 (-0.208)	-0.00308 [-1.541]
Distance Barranquilla	-0.00194* [-2.510]	0.00136 (0.273)	-0.00225*** [-5.423]
Blacker Composition BCPi		-17.22* (-1.785)	
Constant	7.870* [2.641]	60.26*** (3.890)	4.472 [1.549]
Observations		697	697
R-squared		0.057	0.008

Robust t-statistics in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

See annex 3 for details on definitions, sources and methods.

Table 4-3 shows the results using urban primary enrollment rates circa 1890. Again, the results indicate a statistically significant negative relationship between blackness, enrollment rates (public goods provision) and local economic outcomes.

<sup>179</sup> This specification uses error clusters by regions.



**Table 4-3 Econometric results: dependent variable log per capita industrial capital**

VARIABLES	OLS	First Stage	Second Stage
Public urban primary enrollment rate circa 1890 per 1000 hbt	0.0234* [2.853]		0.101*** [3.270]
Percentage Indians 1912	-3.944* [-2.924]	-18.47 (-1.622)	-3.383** [-2.349]
Coffee production 1925	0.996*** [14.83]	-2.286* (-1.688)	1.156*** [15.34]
Dummy Gold production 19th century	0.483 [1.801]	0.231 (0.191)	0.484* [1.911]
Dummy Paisa	0.540** [4.949]	5.410*** (4.474)	0.156* [1.714]
Temperature	-0.878* [-2.452]	-2.103 (-1.022)	-0.728** [-2.156]
Temperature [2]	0.0192* [2.529]	0.0434 (0.851)	0.0165** [2.363]
Distance Bogota	-0.00311 [-1.548]	-0.000451 (-0.0943)	-0.00314 [-1.533]
Distance Barranquilla	-0.00193* [-2.446]	0.00142 (0.270)	-0.00226*** [-5.065]
Blacker Composition BCPi		-16.78* (-1.691)	
Constant	8.098* [2.718]	56.09*** (3.024)	4.737 [1.497]
Observations	697	697	697
R-squared	0.085	0.057	0.002

Robust t-statistics in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

See annex 3 for details on definitions, sources and methods.

Regarding the control variables, there are three important issues to analyze. First, estimations in tables 4-2 and 4-3 include the indigenous population<sup>180</sup>. The results demonstrate that the indigenous component negatively affects local outcomes. The variable is negative and significant. Hence, these results suggest that the exclusion of indigenous population contributes directly to low local outcomes<sup>181</sup>. This result is consistent with the literature and clarifies why the black population cannot be analyzed at the same level (Hoffman & Centeno, 2003 and

<sup>180</sup> These data are according to the census of 1912.

<sup>181</sup> Harguindeguy (2010) argues that the law was a powerful tool in this process. In this matter, an explicit legal framework subjects “savage” indigenous people to exploitation, exclusion and discrimination.

McGreevy, 1971). Hoffman & Centeno (2003, p. 364) argue that indigenous people “*suffer under more formal segregation than blacks*”. Explicitly, the historiography and empirical material show that in the republican context, there were direct official policies such as abolition of *resguardos* and processes of “*civilization*”. These processes facilitated on the one hand, indigenous’ domination, exploitation and extermination. On the other hand, they benefited landowning elites, clerics and caciques (McGreevy, 1971, p. 77 and 83)<sup>182</sup>. For instance, as presented in the literature, the new colonization of “*savage tribes*” was an explicit public policy<sup>183</sup> of the new republic and had two strategic goals<sup>184</sup>. First, it enabled access to territories rich in natural resources to be exploited by the new white creole colonizers. Second, it facilitated a cheap (almost slave) labor force that was easy to control. This process was not exclusive in Colombia. It was also part of the national elite project of the new whiter Latin-American elites from Argentina to Mexico (Harguindeguy, 2010). In the Colombian case, there was a large set of national laws on “*civilization*” of “*savage indigenous*”<sup>185</sup>. The official education reports consistently reveal the evolution of these direct processes of civilization against indigenous tribes. Common concepts are apparent in such reports: reducing the savage population, violence, forced labor, cultural suppression, among others forms of direct exclusion. Another characteristic in common is that these forms of exclusion are justified legally in the national institutional framework as explicit state policy. For instance, in 1922 the report of the minister of education states that among its policies was the reduction of the indigenous component in cultural life. The report states that with the implementation of public policies, over time indigenous dialects will disappear<sup>186</sup>. In 1890, the education report points out indigenous people as a “*reluctant race for intellectual and moral progress*”<sup>187</sup>, so the inspector of education does not expect the enrollment of this population in schools. In general, this public policy resulted in land grabbing by local elites, new forms of slavery for “*savages*”, and low performance of regions with high

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<sup>182</sup> This relates in Colombia mainly to the south part of the country.

<sup>183</sup> Colonization of indigenous territories was a major issue for the national political economy from the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries.

<sup>184</sup> For instance see Harguindeguy (2010), McGreevy (1971).

<sup>185</sup> For instance, Law 89 of 1890, Law 28 of 1909 (against “*savage irruptions*”), Law 14 of 1912, Law 64 of 1914, among other regulations.

<sup>186</sup> Memoria del Ministro de Instrucción Pública al Congreso de 1922, p. 12. Casa Editorial de la Cruzada.

<sup>187</sup> Informe que el Ministro de Instrucción Pública presenta al Congreso de Colombia en sus sesiones ordinarias de 1890, p. 142 [own translation]. Imprenta de la Luz. Bogotá.

percentages of indigenous populations (Harguindeguy, 2010, Hoffman & Centeno, 2003, McGreevy, 1971, among others).

The second issue is coffee production. Coffee production shows a positive statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable. This exercise therefore confirms, like the literature establishes, that coffee production was also important for local performance. Finally, other control variables show the expected relationship. For instance, precipitation, distance to Bogotá (the capital city), distance to the sea port of Barranquilla and temperatures show a statistically significant (except Bogota) and negative relationship with the outcome in the majority of the specifications. According to the econometric exercise, geographical variables were therefore also important for lower local performance.

In addition to enrollment, this research also uses more specific variables for measuring public goods provision. I include numbers of schools per 1000 inhabitants according to the reports of ministries of education in 1911. I also consider the number of educational establishments, as a measurement of public infrastructure, according to the population census of 1951. In all cases and with different strategies, I found a significant and negative relationship between populations with a blacker composition and economic performance via public goods provision.

Table 4-4 shows the results for numbers of schools per 1000 inhabitants in 1911 as a proxy of  $PGP_i$ . According to this table, the number of schools per 1000 inhabitants presents a significant and positive relationship with the measurement of local economic outcomes. Moreover, the instrument is valid and highly correlated with the endogenous variable. This means that those municipalities that provide more schools for their population have a lower afro-black composition within their population. Again, the expected relationship can be detected. As in enrollment rates, control variables show the expected effects. In this sense, coffee production shows a positive and significant relationship with municipal performance. On the other hand, indigenous population, rainy precipitation, distances and temperature are negatively related to the outcome<sup>188</sup>.

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<sup>188</sup> This exercise uses cluster by regions.

Table 4-4 Econometric results: dependent variable, log per capita industrial capital

VARIABLES	OLS	First Stage	Second Stage
Number of public primary schools 1911 per 1000 hbt	-1.637** [-3.371]		5.767** [2.330]
Percentage Indians 1912	-4.294* [-3.009]	-0.152 (-0.837)	-4.319*** [-4.153]
Coffee production 1925	0.793*** [10.09]	-0.0752*** (-7.409)	1.331*** [7.079]
Dummy Gold production 19th century	0.924 [2.343]	0.0117 (0.217)	0.828* [1.668]
Dummy Paisa	1.197** [4.665]	0.118 (1.021)	0.337 [1.075]
Rainy precipitation	-0.677* [-2.751]	-0.0293 (-1.471)	-0.408* [-1.910]
Temperature	-0.671* [-2.617]	0.0415 (1.115)	-1.010*** [-4.228]
Temperature [2]	0.0145* [2.927]	-0.00100 (-1.012)	0.0231*** [4.448]
Distance Bogota	-0.00256 [-1.116]	0.000258** (2.516)	-0.00458*** [-4.365]
Distance Barranquilla	-0.00135 [-1.734]	-9.82e-05 (-0.899)	-0.000970 [-1.333]
Blacker Composition BCPi		-0.235** (-2.250)	
Constant	8.043** [3.725]	0.404* (1.690)	6.486*** [5.440]
Observations	697	697	697
R-squared	0.099	0.068	

Robust t-statistics in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

See annex 3 for details on definitions, sources and methods.

Another variable that sheds light on the negative correlation between populations with a blacker composition and local economic outcomes is secondary education. This variable deserves special analysis because it illustrates the reproduction of the socio-racial hierarchies to control power.

During the analyzed period, secondary and professional education were a privilege for members of the elites (especially during the early part of the analyzed period, Helg, 1987). Only members of the national or subnational elites had access to these types of academic training. Zuluaga et al

(2004) say that elites in Colombia had two class-based purposes for education at both national and subnational levels. First, offering higher academic training for new elite members (who will rule the country in the future). Second, providing basic education for the rest of the population.

Similar to the case of local differences in primary education, the literature argues that regional gaps in secondary education are explained by differences in local income. As some municipalities are poorer than others the logical outcome is low public goods provision. However, the archival material and the literature also suggest that implicit social arrangements based on racial exclusion are behind such results<sup>189</sup>. For instance, sources show that whiter local elites found it more effective to send their offspring to whiter cities in order to receive secondary education. They also found it more effective to subsidize private secondary schools instead of making the effort to create local public secondary establishments in blacker regions. Furthermore, subnational public resources were used to finance the secondary education of members of subnational elites. Some students with low socio-economic backgrounds were accepted with a subnational scholarship in secondary schools, but such cases were exceptional (Helg, 1987). The existence of secondary schools is therefore associated with the efforts by local elites to provide secondary education to the rest of the population and not only to focus their efforts on educating members of elites.

The quantitative analysis of public goods provision in secondary education will confirm the inequalities in the access to education, especially for the blacker regions. Table 4-5 shows the results. Panel A shows results using error cluster by region, and panel B uses cluster by natural regions<sup>190</sup>. Table 4-5 demonstrates that those municipalities with populations with a blacker composition have fewer public secondary schools. The instrument shows that there exists a negatively and significant relationship between a blacker composition and the number of secondary schools. Moreover, controlling against geographical and socio-economic variables, the instrument is marginally affected, showing consistency in the causal link. Similar to the results for schools in primary education, there are local differences in secondary education which are

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<sup>189</sup> For instance, authors such as Maya (2009), Villegas (2008), Roldán (2003), Helg (1987), among others.

<sup>190</sup> Regional effects use two different measurements of regions. The first measurement is the variable “regions”. The second measurement is comprised of “natural regions”. These terms are explained in the methodological part and annex 3.

also related to racial make-up. Indeed, the archival material shows that secondary schools were concentrated within the major cities of the country. These cities are whiter in general (such as Bogotá or Medellín). In contrast, those regions with populations with blacker compositions have low numbers of secondary schools (or they simply do not have schools at this level during much of this period).

**Table 4-5 Econometric results: dependent variable, log per capita industrial capital**

VARIABLES	Panel A			Panel B		
	OLS	First Stage	Second Stage	OLS	First Stage	Second Stage
Number of public secondary schools 1911 per 1000 hbt	11.95** [5.517]		32.26** [2.066]	11.95*** [8.849]		32.26* [1.935]
Coffee production 1925	0.798*** [14.03]	0.00501** (2.570)	0.687*** [5.979]	0.798*** [22.72]	0.00501*** (2.584)	0.687*** [6.098]
Percentage Indians 1912	-4.801** [-5.595]	-0.0767*** (-3.212)	-3.810*** [-2.771]	-4.801** [-4.800]	-0.0767*** (-3.274)	-3.810** [-2.438]
Dummy Gold production 19th century	0.165 [0.448]	0.0447*** (8.936)	-0.747 [-0.772]	0.165 [0.418]	0.0447*** (7.198)	-0.747 [-0.770]
Dummy Paisa	-0.469** [-4.008]	-0.00284 (-0.303)	-0.412*** [-2.911]	-0.469 [-1.848]	-0.00284 (-0.276)	-0.412 [-1.640]
Rainy precipitation	-0.626* [-2.503]	-0.00523** (-2.309)	-0.494 [-1.633]	-0.626 [-1.753]	-0.00523** (-2.194)	-0.494 [-1.366]
Temperature	-0.897** [-5.732]	-0.00765*** (-3.475)	-0.755*** [-4.713]	-0.897*** [-18.80]	-0.00765*** (-4.344)	-0.755*** [-5.461]
Temperature [2]	0.0181*** [7.103]	0.000149*** (2.908)	0.0156*** [6.415]	0.0181*** [11.53]	0.000149*** (3.508)	0.0156*** [7.280]
Distance Bogota	0.000182 [0.0943]	-1.62e-05 (-0.982)	0.000488 [0.313]	0.000182 [0.0693]	-1.62e-05 (-0.904)	0.000488 [0.239]
Distance Buenaventura	-0.0107*** [-6.450]	-4.86e-06 (-0.127)	-0.0107*** [-7.566]	-0.0107*** [-3.698]	-4.86e-06 (-0.124)	-0.0107*** [-4.482]
Distance Barranquilla	-0.00700*** [-7.254]	-2.80e-05 (-1.119)	-0.00663*** [-6.681]	-0.00700** [-5.442]	-2.80e-05 (-1.065)	-0.00663*** [-5.334]
Blacker Composition BCPi		-0.0419* (-1.926)			-0.0419* (-1.915)	
Constant	17.10*** [6.420]	0.169*** (3.004)	14.39*** [4.155]	17.10*** [5.979]	0.169*** (3.328)	14.39*** [3.559]
Observations	693	693	693	693	693	693
R-squared	0.137	0.061	0.052	0.137	0.061	0.052

Robust t-statistics in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

See annex 3 for details on definitions, sources and methods.

In line with the political economy of differences and inequalities, an important element in this context is the ambivalence between the public and private provision of some public goods for development such as secondary and professional education. Helg (1987) says that education was considered a private issue for early-republican elites<sup>191</sup>. According to the author, early republican

<sup>191</sup> As it was established in the Concordat or convention with the Holy See of 1887, education is a moral issue in charge of the 'private' Catholic Church (Helg, 1987, p. 28).

authorities consider that the role of government in education is to assist the private sector and not to displace it. This issue is evident in the archival material. For instance, the report of the minister of education in 1894 states that “*secondary education should be left to the private sector and not affect the national public budget*”, moreover, the report says that secondary education “*must satisfy...political and religious*” interests of “*the true (policy of) regeneration of the public instruction*”<sup>192</sup>.

**Table 4-6 Econometric results: dependent variable, log per capita industrial capital**

<b>VARIABLES</b>	<b>OLS</b>	<b>First Stage</b>	<b>Second Stage</b>
Public and private secondary schools 1911 per 1000 hbt	10.21** [4.724]		18.12** [2.485]
Percentage Indians 1912	-4.137** [-4.916]	-0.172*** (-4.840)	-3.171** [-2.249]
Coffee production 1925	0.724*** [9.055]	0.0128*** (4.129)	0.617*** [4.835]
Dummy Gold production 19th century	-0.0200 [-0.0502]	0.0703*** (6.517)	-0.579 [-0.720]
Dummy paisa	-0.396** [-3.579]	-0.0105 (-0.823)	-0.313** [-2.129]
Rainy precipitation	-0.532 [-2.123]	-0.0146*** (-4.808)	-0.399 [-1.279]
Temperature	-0.865** [-4.371]	-0.0125** (-2.194)	-0.776*** [-4.417]
Temperature [2]	0.0176** [5.020]	0.000241** (2.059)	0.0160*** [5.255]
Distance Bogota	-0.000542 [-0.302]	5.13e-05*** (2.123)	-0.000964 [-0.606]
Distance Buenaventura	-0.00985*** [-6.032]	-9.37e-05*** (-2.584)	-0.00913*** [-5.347]
Distance Barranquilla	-0.00695*** [-6.854]	-4.38e-05 (-1.300)	-0.00674*** [-6.969]
Blacker Composition BCPi		-0.0745** (-2.542)	
Constant	16.17** [5.106]	0.311*** (2.691)	14.21*** [4.261]
Observations	693	693	693
R-squared	0.157	0.078	0.128

Robust t-statistics in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

See annex 3 for details on definitions, sources and methods.

This political economy of education limited the access to education for social mobilization affecting blacker regions to a higher level. That is, it limited secondary and professional education for the bulk of the afro-descendant population. Ferranti et al (2004, p. 28) state that in

<sup>192</sup> Informe que el Ministro de Instrucción Pública presenta al Congreso de Colombia en sus sesiones ordinarias de 1894, p. XXXVIII [own translation].

societies with a high concentration of power, power holders can choose strategies that benefit themselves rather than the rest of the population<sup>193</sup>. This insight is appropriate in describing the provision of secondary education in Colombia.

In this context, the analysis of the public and private provision of education is also important and worthwhile for two historiographical reasons. First, the majority of private schools were subsidized by local, departmental and national governments through what the governments call “*subvenciones*” or public funding for primary or secondary private schools. Second, as mentioned, the existence of private primary and secondary schools is also associated with the interests of and efforts by local elites in providing public goods for the local population. In other words, to some extent, both public and private schools indicate the interests of authorities in education<sup>194</sup>. In this regard, the educational report of 1911 contains the number of public and private schools at secondary level. This research measures the efforts by a municipality towards secondary education by adding together the number of public and private schools. Table 4-6 shows the results. Estimations use error cluster by region.

Results show a negative and significant relation between blackness and the numbers of secondary public and private schools. It seems that those regions with populations with a blacker composition were unable to provide both private and public education for its population. Therefore, this evidence partially confirms that blacker regions stimulated neither public nor private education in the way whiter regions did. Moreover, the differences in levels of education also indicate that secondary education was not a relevant issue for local authorities in this socio-cultural context of inequalities. Considering that this type of education has greater effects on local performance via the positive externalities of a more specialized education, local elites in blacker regions failed in developing a better system for the provision of public goods for local performance.

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<sup>193</sup> The authors specify that in “*unequal societies in which political power is intertwined with wealth may be less likely to choose policies that reduce those inefficiencies than to allocate scarce resources to alternative uses*” (Ferranti et al, 2004, p. 28). Something similar is in Mahoney (2010) and Pierson (2004).

<sup>194</sup> In particular, many of these schools provided scholarships for poor people, and with this, improved the social mobility of non-members of the elite (see for instance Helg, 1987, Zuluaga et al, 2004).



On the other hand, according to data of the population census of 1951, similar exercises were made but using infrastructure in education<sup>195</sup>. By using this specification, the estimation confirms that the exclusion of the blacker component of the population only has effect on per capita industrial through its effect on public goods provision. Table 4-7 confirms that public goods provision has a significant and positive relationship with economic performance. The instrument depicts the expected sign and is highly correlated with the endogenous variable.

**Table 4-7 Econometric results: dependent variable log per capita industrial capital**

<b>VARIABLES</b>	<b>OLS</b>	<b>First Stage</b>	<b>Second Stage</b>
Educational establishments 1951 per 1000 hbt	12.36*** [10.34]		19.21** [2.223]
Percentage Indians 1912	-4.669** [-5.674]	-0.105*** (-2.829)	-4.273*** [-3.473]
Coffee production 1925	0.815*** [17.38]	0.00314 (0.611)	0.788*** [13.14]
Dummy Gold production 19th century	0.508 [1.310]	0.0153 (0.954)	0.401 [0.855]
Dummy paisa	-0.509* [-2.894]	0.000470 (0.0208)	-0.513** [-2.503]
Rainy precipitation	-0.603* [-2.408]	-0.00601 (-0.921)	-0.548** [-1.995]
Temperature	-0.646*** [-7.641]	-0.0282*** (-2.607)	-0.461* [-1.773]
Temperature [2]	0.0121*** [8.940]	0.000648** (2.375)	0.00796 [1.279]
Distance Bogota	0.000153 [0.0801]	-1.41e-05 (-0.371)	0.000236 [0.147]
Distance Buenaventura	-0.00926** [-4.753]	-0.000126* (-1.752)	-0.00842*** [-3.739]
Distance Barranquilla	-0.00646** [-4.824]	-7.77e-05* (-1.795)	-0.00604*** [-4.073]
Blacker Composition BCPi		-0.0703*** (-3.845)	
Constant	13.15** [5.003]	0.508*** (4.859)	10.08** [2.104]
Observations	693	693	693
R-squared	0.165	0.056	0.147

Robust t-statistics in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

See annex 3 for details on definitions, sources and methods.

<sup>195</sup> As already mentioned, data in 1951 should be interpreted with caution. For instance, this census does not break down the level of education of these educational establishments. In addition, data were not available for intendancies and Comisarias. Nonetheless, this exercise is illustrative in showing the hypothesized relationship.

Finally, in an extended exercise, I confirm the results using literacy rates as the independent variable. In the Colombian case, it is not difficult to consider that literacy rate is a good proxy for public goods provision for the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. During this time, the education system was marginal and depended on governmental investment, especially local investment (Helg, 1987). This is the case not only for public education, but also for private education<sup>196</sup>. For instance, schools, teachers and teaching materials were provided through national, regional or local public investment. Low literacy rates therefore reflect more the extent that education was available to the population<sup>197</sup>. Moreover, as UNESCO (2009) argues, this variable can be considered as an indicator of the effectiveness of local authorities in developing systems of primary education.

**Table 4-8 Econometric results: dependent variable, log per capita industrial capital**

<b>VARIABLES</b>	<b>OLS</b>	<b>First Stage</b>	<b>Second Stage</b>
Literacy Rate	6.843*** [5.554]		11.21** [2.384]
Coffee production 1925	0.142 [1.558]	-0.00974*** (-2.815)	0.182* [1.816]
Dummy Gold production 19th century	-0.0225 [-0.0735]	0.0190 (1.628)	-0.0971 [-0.307]
Dummy paisa	-1.625*** [-4.217]	0.172*** (13.71)	-2.349*** [-2.776]
Rainy precipitation	-0.122 [-0.969]	-0.00200 (-0.413)	-0.0990 [-0.772]
Temperature	-0.580*** [-2.869]	0.0144* (1.864)	-0.637*** [-3.018]
Temperature (2)	0.0162*** [3.202]	-0.000377* (-1.953)	0.0178*** [3.337]
Distance Bogota	0.000742 [0.935]	6.60e-05** (2.174)	0.000366 [0.413]
Distance Buenaventura	-0.00375*** [-3.058]	1.30e-07 (0.00276)	-0.00362*** [-2.930]
Distance Barranquilla	-0.000863 [-0.888]	-8.97e-05** (-2.413)	-0.000535 [-0.519]
Blacker Composition BCPi		-0.106*** (-5.565)	
Constant	7.443*** [3.270]	0.0985 (1.127)	7.169*** [3.120]
Observations	429	429	429
R-squared	0.146	0.530	0.120

t-statistics in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

It does not include indian population. Capital higher than zero (K>0).

See annex 3 for details on definitions, sources and methods.

<sup>196</sup> Private education was (heavily) subsidized by public funding.

<sup>197</sup> Historical evidence shows several examples.

Table 4-8 shows the results using a sample for municipalities with per capita industrial capital higher than 0 ( $y_i$ ) and literacy rates in 1912<sup>198</sup>. This data base has 429 municipalities. The first stage shows that the instrument is significant and negative. In addition, control variables do not affect the coefficient and significance of  $BCP_i$ . Hence, even controlling against geographical characteristics of the municipalities, there is a statistically significant relationship between populations with a blacker composition, public goods provision and regional economic performance. Municipalities with a blacker component of the population therefore present lower literacy rates and experience a lower accumulation of public goods for development, while other factors remain constant.

**Table 4-9 Econometric results: dependent variable, log per capita industrial capital**

<b>VARIABLES</b>	<b>OLS</b>	<b>First Stage</b>	<b>Second Stage</b>
Literacy Rate	9.622*** [6.111]		12.09** [2.274]
Percentage Indians 1912	-4.556** [-5.059]	-0.162*** (-3.520)	-4.335*** [-4.263]
Coffee production 1925	0.929*** [17.88]	-0.00809** (-2.304)	0.947*** [17.65]
Dummy Gold production 19th century	0.476 [1.114]	0.0218* (1.910)	0.421 [0.912]
Dummy paisa	-2.163*** [-6.740]	0.175*** (4.804)	-2.594*** [-2.966]
Rainy precipitation	-0.618* [-2.459]	-0.00486* (-1.727)	-0.598** [-2.506]
Temperature	-1.033*** [-6.319]	0.00332 (0.698)	-1.046*** [-7.029]
Temperature (2)	0.0215*** [7.748]	-0.000119 (-1.120)	0.0220*** [7.821]
Distance Bogota	-0.00109 [-0.585]	0.000109*** (3.749)	-0.00136 [-0.780]
Distance Buenaventura	-0.0109*** [-6.854]	1.88e-05 (0.307)	-0.0110*** [-8.269]
Distance Barranquilla	-0.00718*** [-8.061]	-1.31e-05 (-0.393)	-0.00721*** [-9.671]
Blacker Composition BCPi		-0.110*** (-2.964)	
Constant	17.94*** [7.756]	0.159* (1.728)	17.78*** [8.989]
Observations	690	690	690
R-squared	0.122	0.551	0.121

Robust t-statistics in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

See annex 3 for details on definitions, sources and methods.

<sup>198</sup> This exercise does not use cluster by regions. Despite the strategy using literacy rate and per capita industrial capital is in España & Sanchez (2012 and 2010), the causal argument is entirely different.

Table 4-9 shows the results using the overall sample. Again, the results indicate a statistically significant negative relationship among blackness, literacy rate (public goods provision) and local economic performance<sup>199</sup>.

**Table 4-10 Econometric results: dependent variable, log per capita industrial capital**

<b>VARIABLES</b>	<b>OLS</b>	<b>First Stage</b>	<b>Second Stage</b>
Literacy Rate	8.589** [5.170]		16.32*** [3.572]
Percentage Indians 1912	-4.726** [-5.139]	-0.159*** (-3.554)	-4.044*** [-4.566]
Dummy Coffee production 1925	-0.795** [-5.031]	-0.00772 (-0.806)	-0.796*** [-5.502]
Dummy Gold production 19th century	0.517 [1.189]	0.0229* (1.950)	0.342 [0.735]
Dummy paisa	-1.207** [-3.762]	0.173*** (4.339)	-2.529*** [-3.218]
Rainy precipitation	-0.727* [-2.824]	-0.00456 (-1.624)	-0.669*** [-2.879]
Temperature	-0.332** [-4.112]	0.00367 (0.988)	-0.350*** [-4.731]
Temperature [2]	0.00521* [2.589]	-0.000126 (-1.342)	0.00612*** [2.975]
Distance Bogota	-0.00134 [-0.653]	0.000111*** (3.938)	-0.00223 [-1.251]
Distance Buenaventura	-0.0113*** [-7.085]	2.66e-05 (0.434)	-0.0116*** [-9.289]
Distance Barranquilla	-0.00654*** [-7.684]	-4.36e-06 (-0.135)	-0.00665*** [-10.63]
Blacker Composition BCPi		-0.110*** (-2.801)	
Constant	11.70*** [7.766]	0.146* (1.926)	11.04*** [10.15]
Observations	690	690	690
R-squared	0.102	0.546	0.092

Robust t-statistics in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

See annex 3 for details on definitions, sources and methods.

<sup>199</sup> This exercise uses cluster errors by regions. As specified, regional effects use two different measurements of regions. The first measurement is the variable regions comprised of the 5 political divisions of Colombia: Caribbean, Andean, Pacific, Amazona and Orinoquia. The Pacific Region does not however include the municipalities from the Valle department. The second measurement is comprised of the natural regions: the same 5 regions but in this case the Pacific region includes municipalities close to the Pacific coast.

Table 4-10 shows the results but using the variable dummy of coffee production. In this regard, the variables of interest are significant and have the expected sign. Nonetheless, the variable dummy of coffee production shows a negative relationship with the outcome. This result is counterintuitive but it could suggest that coffee production is insufficient to provide better economic performance. Accordingly, other structural factors therefore exist. For instance, as already mentioned, Roldán (2003) argues that in Colombian regions differential patterns of production, property rights and settlement related to ethnic differences are present. Whiter regions share better dynamics of performance, while the regions the author calls “peripheral” are affected by exclusionary implicit social agreements. Fernandez (2014) also claims that not all regions with geographical characteristics for coffee production were able to develop benefits associated with the coffee economy. Indeed, archival material shows that, for instance, some municipalities in Chocó present favorable conditions for the production of coffee, however, they fail in developing this type of agricultural production to the same scale that whiter municipalities achieve with the same geographical conditions (in Caldas or Antioquia)<sup>200</sup>.

On the other hand, geographical explanations corroborate the expected relationship. Precipitation, distances and temperature show a statistically significant and negative relationship with the outcome in the majority of the specifications. According to the econometric exercise, geographical variables were also important for lower regional development.

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<sup>200</sup> See for instance, Estudio sobre las posibilidades agrícolas y el porvenir del Chocó. In AGN sección: Archivo Anexos, Entidad Productora: Ministerio de Gobierno sección Intendencias y Comisarías, Serie Documental: Intendencias Informes Generales, Caja: 001, Carpeta: 002, Folio: 123-130.

**Table 4-11 Econometric results: dependent variable, percentage of population in transformation industries**

<b>VARIABLES</b>	<b>OLS</b>	<b>First Stage</b>	<b>Second Stage</b>
Literacy rate 1938	0.0590* [2.770]		0.129** [2.547]
Percentage Indians 1912	-0.0253* [-3.133]	-0.327*** (-7.692)	-0.00870 [-0.659]
Coffee production 1925	-0.000883** [-3.988]	0.00195 (0.330)	-0.00113*** [-2.769]
Dummy Gold production 19th century	0.00610 [1.377]	0.0178** (2.270)	0.00480 [1.529]
Dummy paisa	0.00120 [0.0960]	0.135*** (6.191)	-0.00829 [-0.527]
Rainy precipitation	-0.00501** [-4.067]	-0.0334*** (-6.101)	-0.00238 [-0.941]
Temperature	-0.0139** [-5.822]	-0.0267*** (-2.783)	-0.0122*** [-5.261]
Temperature [2]	0.000292** [3.781]	0.000525** (2.077)	0.000261*** [3.921]
Distance Bogota	9.16e-05*** [11.87]	0.000177*** (2.854)	7.89e-05*** [15.69]
Distance Buenaventura	0.000158** [5.207]	-0.000369*** (-3.650)	0.000183*** [9.251]
Distance Barranquilla	0.000185*** [6.603]	-8.95e-05 (-1.330)	0.000189*** [8.145]
Blacker Composition BCPi		-0.137*** (-3.488)	
Constant	-0.00371 [-0.548]	0.977*** (9.238)	-0.0644*** [-3.212]
Observations		684	684
R-squared		0.468	0.396

Robust t-statistics in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Cluster by natural regions. See annex 3 for details on definitions, sources and methods.

Finally, an additional exercise of confirmation is represented in table 4-11. Table 4-11 shows results using the percentage of the population in transformation industries as the dependent variable, and the literacy rate as the independent variable. These data are from the population census of 1938. The results show that a blacker composition in a population has negative effects

on local performance via proxies of public goods provision. The instrument is significant and negatively correlated with the endogenous variable.

### 4.3 Robustness

The previous section shows different estimations that identify the negative indirect effect of racial exclusion on local economic outcomes via public goods provision. The estimations also use different proxies for public goods provision. These different proxies identify the hypothesized relationship. However, these results are based, among other things, on the assumption that the instrument does not have a direct effect on economic performance. This research uses different tests that demonstrate the validity of this assumption.

First, the estimations control against different variables that, according to historiography and theory, would correlate with the instrument and the final outcome. Coffee production and geographical variables are the most relevant alternative explanations for differences in local outcomes. However, the results show that, including these control variables in different estimations, these variables have marginal effects on the significance and sign of the instrument and the dependent variable.

Second, the validity of the instrument was tested using the exclusion restriction. The exclusion restriction must validate that blackness ( $BCP_i$ ) is not directly related to  $\text{Log } y_i$ , but by the indirect effects on  $PGP_i$  (exogeneity condition). Obviously, since other authors and evidence demonstrate the persistence of a regional racial composition within the population, it is easy to conclude that  $BCP_{it}$  is correlated to  $BCP_{it+1}$ . A blacker composition may therefore directly affect current performance. However, all the exclusion restriction tests conducted in this research show that there is not a direct relationship between  $BCP_i$  and  $\text{Log } y_i$ . In addition, a blacker composition affects local performance but, as already stated, these effects are indirect through the institutional settings that entail the implicit racial order. These institutional settings deal with specific implicit dynamics of public goods provisions and actor behavior. This will be a central issue in the qualitative analysis.

Lastly, F statistic is used to examine whether the instrument is relevant (relevance condition). As the literature states, relevance means that the instrument has explanatory power, meaning the instrument is not weak. In this regard, the first stage regression statistics show that the F statistics are significant for the different specifications. The results then demonstrate that the instrument has explanatory power on the equation of the instrumented variable. Therefore, the different tests confirm that the measurement of exclusion of the blacker composition of the population has no effect on per capita industrial capital different to its effect on public goods provision.



# Chapter 5 Process tracing analysis

The second research aim relates to the specification of a hypothesis of a causal mechanism. The specification of this hypothesis requires a qualitative analysis. This chapter presents this qualitative analysis. This analysis identifies the presence of the various systematized concepts, parts of the mechanism, and the specific behavior that contribute to the causal relationship between the informal institution of racial exclusion and local public goods provision.

The chapter begins with the empirical manifestations of the institution of racial exclusion in the case study. Following this, the chapter presents the empirical manifestations that permit a hypothesis of the mechanism. This mechanism identifies the specific actors and behavior that the informal institution of racial exclusion covers, and the causal link between these constructions and the final provision of public goods outcome. Finally, the chapter describes empirical observations of the scope conditions that facilitate interaction between the cause, the mechanism and the final outcome.

## 5.1 The mechanism of reaction

Based on empirical analysis, this research arrives at the hypothesis that there is a mechanism of reaction between the informal institution of racial exclusion and local socio-economic outcomes, namely, public goods provision. The term mechanism of reaction is derived from the literature on race that shows that actors react to exclusionary institutions with different types of behavior<sup>201</sup>. And as all action has consequences, social reactions have consequences on socio-economic outcomes.

The hypothesis for the mechanism of reaction arrived at states that the informal institution of racial exclusion shapes three specific actors: non-aggrieved, mid-aggrieved and aggrieved actors. These actors react to the exclusionary institutions of racial exclusion with five different types of

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<sup>201</sup> For instance, Hoffmann (2006), Pyke (2010), Shasha (2009), Bivens (2005), among others.

behavior: adoption, adaptation, no-cooperation, revision, and contestation of the informal institution of racial exclusion<sup>202</sup>.

Specific behavior such as adoption, adaptation and no-cooperation are forms of reproduction of the informal institution of racial exclusion. When actors take positions on the local political economy of public goods provision, these forms of reproduction propagate ineffective initiatives for the provision of public goods for the bulk of afro-descendants.

In contrast, behavior such as revisions and contestations are forms of alterations to the informal institution of racial exclusion. When actors take positions on the local political economy of public goods provision, alterations to the informal institution of racial exclusion tend to propagate effective initiatives for public good production for the excluded population.

Hence, the final link indicates that, on the one hand, behavior such as adoption, adaptation and no-cooperation propagate ineffective initiatives for the local provision of public goods for the bulk of afro-descendants. Conversely, revisions propagate effective initiatives for public good production of excluded population. Lastly, contestations have minor repercussions in promoting effective initiatives for the provision of public goods for the excluded population.

## **5.2 Evidence for the cause: racial exclusion**

Analysis of the historical material focuses on the Chocó case study, the region representative of blackness in Colombia (Leal, 2007, p. 76)<sup>203</sup>.

The systematized concept of the cause states that racial exclusion is an informal institution. This dynamic institution establishes unspoken differential treatment, rights, obligations and/or rules implicitly enforced in a society. The concept also states that racial exclusion is related to the unequal allocation of power resources against populations with racialized characteristics of the

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<sup>202</sup> The theoretical chapter discussed that this research uses insights from racial and institutional literature to identify the hypothesis of the mechanism. In particular, sections 2.3.4 and 2.3.5 show that these insights are theoretical guides to analyzing the empirical material and to developing the hypothesis.

<sup>203</sup> The author states “*the quintessentially black department in Colombia*” (Leal, 2007, p. 76).

black world. Finally, racial exclusion is dynamic because actors socially contest the institutional allocation of resources (see chapter 2).

Accordingly, the operationalization of racial exclusion is measured by identifying regular practices of actors. Such regular actor behavior indicates tacit social practices of discrimination based on racialized characteristics of the afro-descendant component of the Colombian population, with power distributional implications (see chapter 3).

In the archival material, observations show that racial exclusion is frequently evident in the behavior of key actors of the political economy. These actors are white rule makers, policy makers, and members of national and local elites. In other words, they are power holders. Basically, these power holders exclude populations through regular behavior related to forming public policies that promote tacit differential treatment to a region, community or individual because of its/their afro-descendant racialized characteristics.

For instance, indirect racist practices exist that are historically discriminative against Chocó. Five observations help to develop this insight. The major observation is the differential national treatment that Chocó receives via the ‘special’ political and administrative regime that this region faces during the period of analysis. This ‘special’ regime applies to Chocó an implicit unequal treatment, a disparate impact of policies, and tacit rules that allocate power resources implicitly based on Chocó’s racialized characteristics. This means Chocó is a case where the informal institution of racial exclusion is in force<sup>204</sup>.

As already explained, empirical material and background knowledge show that the ‘special’ regime is a case of racial exclusion in force. This part of the analysis, however, develops additional insights that reinforce this conclusion.

To summarize, between 1886 and 1950, Chocó had four different political and administrative regimes. In 1886, the conservative political constitution establishes Chocó as part of the Cauca department. As part of Cauca, this region is governed by the caucana white elite of the city of

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<sup>204</sup> As the background concepts and systematized concept suggest.

Popayán. In 1906 Chocó is separated from Cauca and established as an intendancy. An intendancy was different to a department. It was, as already mentioned, a political and administrative regime of exception (Valois, 1945, p. 45). The intendancial regimen of exception means that, contrary to a department, Chocó is administrated directly by the national government. In turn, the national government appoints an intendant that rules this region according to the norms specified in Decree 1347 of 1906. In 1908 Chocó is elevated to a department. However, this change is valid only until Law 65 of 1909 that reestablishes Chocó as an intendancy. The intendancy remains until 1947 when Chocó is then re-established as department and remains so until current times.

Consequently, Chocó was an intendancy during the majority of the analyzed period. Politicians refer to the special intendancial system as “*anomalous*” territorial division that facilitates inequalities among Colombian regions. In the words of a Chocoano congressman in 1935, Chocó, as member of this category, is “*ignored, abandoned*” and suffers the “*tragedy*” of “*not deserving the attention of our statesmen*”<sup>205</sup>.

For instance, in a debate in the Colombian National Congress in 1938, congressmen claim that Chocó suffers abandonment, negligence, and the deprivation of its national autonomy<sup>206</sup>. The authors criticize the intendancial system and mention that this has poor results in Chocó laying stress on the “*aberrations*” of the direct administration<sup>207</sup>. Among the “*aberrations*” are more bureaucratic processes to public purchasing, contracting, delay for budget preparation, approval, and performance, among other examples. The congressmen also mention that the lack of autonomy is a systematic policy by the national government and point out a specific example. The example refers to the creation and elimination of the Intendancial Procurement (“*proveeduría intendencial*”). The Intendancial Procurement was a public corporation created to manage local public purchasing and contracting. This creation improves bureaucratic congestion

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<sup>205</sup> Report of Sergio Abadía Arango (Chocoano congressman), Roberto Londoño and Domingo Irurita to the National Congress in 1935. Anales de la cámara de representantes Bogotá Martes 22 de octubre de 1935 p. 1009 [own translation].

<sup>206</sup> Anales del Senado febrero 7 of 1938 No 116, p. 1480-1481.

<sup>207</sup> Ibid, p. 1481 [own translation].

in the intendancies. However, the central government eliminates it with the argument, according to the congressmen, that “*this minor autonomy is very dangerous*”<sup>208</sup>.

Similarly, neglect and lack of autonomy are important issues in the various discussions on the law to create the department of Chocó between 1946 and 1947. In the discussions, it is frequently argued that Chocó deserves treatment as equal to any other “*civilized region of Colombia*” which reveals the reality that this region is being treated differently<sup>209</sup>. In a particular discussion at the National Congress, the author mentions that Chocó experiences the “*intendantial tragedy*” of a pejorative condition of considering itself more than a municipality; however, Chocó is less than a department (the report says)<sup>210</sup>.

The special regime illustrates that Chocó receives special treatment and that there is an allocation of resources of rights and obligations which are attributes of the systematized concept of the institution of racial exclusion. Nevertheless, this observation does not show that this special regime is related to tacit racialized characteristics. Beach & Pedersen (2013) suggest that observations need to be evaluated in light of background knowledge to assess its content. Hence, the material needs to be contrasted with the background knowledge in the literature to determine whether this ‘special’ regime is an example of the institution of racial exclusion.

The literature argues that afro-descendant population suffers implicit racism (e.g. Maya, 2009, 2001, Cuesta, 1986). As territory member of the hot-negroid periphery with a population with a high afro-descendant composition, Chocó is managed with the regular behavior of, as Maya (2009) would say, invisibilization, negation, and neglect by the national government. As a black region, Chocó is an “*irresponsible child*” that needs to be raised and guided by the national government (Hernandez, 2010, Villegas, 2008, 2005, Mosquera, 1992, p. 100 [own translation], Gomez, 1980). In this regard, the regular behavior of national elites shows that Chocó does not deserve autonomy. In other words, Chocó as a blacker and backward region is incapable of self-governance and requires direct supervision of the paternal whiter national government. Chocó

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<sup>208</sup> Ibid [own translation].

<sup>209</sup> Anales del Congreso, Cámara, Bogotá martes 3 de septiembre de 1946 [own translation].

<sup>210</sup> Anales del Congreso, Senado, Bogotá sábado 19 de octubre de 1946, p. 1161 [own translation].

then receives a differential pattern of treatment by the national power holders<sup>211</sup>. That is, Chocó receives an allocation of resources based on an ‘unspoken’ racial order.

An additional attribute needs further discussion regarding the special regime observation. Racial exclusion is a dynamic institution contested over time. In this matter, systematic exclusion by the special regime was contested. The constant struggle of this region for departmentalization process is evidence of this contestation. There is a bulk of information in the empirical material that shows that departmentalization was persistently demanded by the Chocoana population. For instance, between 1946 and 1947, the reports of the National Congress state that this initiative had been under discussion by the congress from a long time ago. The reports emphasize that each year chocoanos were claiming this measure for the region<sup>212</sup>.

A second observation of the informal institution of racial exclusion also appears in local newspapers. For instance, a local newspaper in Chocó in 1935 mentions the design of a new public policy in the Colombia National Congress for Chocó. The project is addressed by three national congressmen proposing a new law to “*promote and reorganize*” the intendancy<sup>213</sup>. The project includes greater financial resources for public infrastructure such as roads, an aerodrome, waterworks, etc. Nevertheless, a curious part is that the project also includes the hiring of 20 Spanish families to develop fishing industries in Chocó.

The design of this policy is an example of the informal institution of racial exclusion in force. It is racial exclusion because the project reflects a regular practice of whiter policy makers promoting unspoken differential treatment against “*inferior*” racialized Chocoanos. Among the three policy makers are Luis Ignacio Andrade and Fabio Gartner, congressmen from the whiter departments of Caldas and Huila. They are white male members of the dominant political elite promoting and supporting implicit cultural and biological “*whitening*” of blacker regions as a measurement of progress. Legal projects to introduce Europeans were popular during the first

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<sup>211</sup> As it was already mentioned, Chocó suffers a “patriarchal” and colonial system of subordination to the national government as the intendancial system (Valois, 1945, p.59-60).

<sup>212</sup> Anales del Congreso, Senado, lunes 12 de agosto de 1946, Anales del Congreso, Senado, 19 de octubre de 1946 and Anales del Congreso, Senado, 22 de enero de 1947.

<sup>213</sup> ABC newspaper, January 5 of 1935, issue 2935 (in Chocó 7 días, 2014 issue 976, section: el Chocó de Ayer: [http://www.choco7dias.com/976/choco\\_ayer.html](http://www.choco7dias.com/976/choco_ayer.html) [own translation]).

half of 20<sup>th</sup> century in Latin America. The idea consists in promoting immigration policies that ‘save’ the country with “*white blood*” (Pisano, 2012, p. 50). Consequently, the introduction of 20 Spanish families is a measure that implicitly suggests ‘cleansing’ of the unwanted racial components of Chocoano society.

The behavior of policy makers tacitly entails that Chocó requires a differential policy design (racial exclusion) that can facilitate the introduction of this Spaniard white component to this society. Accordingly, this fact demonstrates that there are unspoken practices of an uneven allocation of resources. For white elites, the local black population in Chocó is unable to prosper without the white element and therefore the progress of a backward blacker region relies on facilitating the introduction of this white Spaniard component.

Lastly, this policy also entails preferential treatment to the white Spaniard families in the form of benefits and access to resources to settle in Chocó. According to the systematized concept, this is also a form of racial exclusion. In particular, there is preferential treatment of these Spanish families because of their inherent racialized characteristics. Again, all this is embedded in implicit behavior. That is, there are no explicit segregation laws; there are no direct apartheid laws. However, there is an unspoken message of white superiority vs non-white inferiority<sup>214</sup>.

A third observation is in the constant grievances from citizens concerning the regular behavior of differential support to peripheral parts of Colombia such as Chocó. In a letter to the national government in 1933, some citizens from the Chocoana Pacific region demand more investment in infrastructure. The authors complain about the fact that the local population live in poverty and precarious conditions. Moreover, they state that the regular behavior of national authorities is “*dedicated exclusively to*” the Andean region (a whiter region)<sup>215</sup>. The authors also claim that there is no interest from the national authorities in this part of the country. They therefore demand a remedy, an act that can be interpreted as contestation to such regional exclusion. This evidence shows that the institution of racial exclusion is visible in institutional regular practices

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<sup>214</sup> Indeed, racism was considered “*antinational*” (Pisano, 2010, p. 55).

<sup>215</sup> Letter to the ministry of government. November 30 1933. Document of the General National Archive in Colombia (AGN), folio. 56-57. AGN: sección: Archivo Anexos, Entidad Productora: Ministerio de Gobierno sección Intendencias y Comisarías, Serie Documental: Informes generales, Caja: 001, Carpeta: 001, Folio: 56-57 [own translation].

by national actors who unevenly allocate resources based on regional racialized characteristics. Moreover, it also shows contestations to the exclusionary institution. Background knowledge also allows evaluating this observation. The literature shows that in Colombia an implicit racial order existed and, as Appelbaum (1999) says, the implicit regional racial order benefited some places and regions. In this regard, Chocó a blacker region, suffered the regular behavior of neglect and omission while national energies of the policy makers focused on the Andean whiter region, as the authors of the letter argue.

The fourth observation shows that racial exclusion was not only an issue of regional affiliation. Racial exclusion by socio-physical characteristics is also perceptible inside the black world. The case of Manuel Saturio Valencia (1867-1907) is an example of the informal institution of racial exclusion in force inside the black world of Chocó.

Secondary sources show that Manuel Saturio Valencia was a poor black Chocoano who lived during the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. This black mulato moved upward in the social structure. As one of a few exceptional poor black chocoanos, Valencia received primary, secondary and professional education through intervention by religious communities, and/or wealthier members that sponsored causes such as his (Wade, 1993). He studied law and became a judge in Chocó, moving upwards socially. This social mobility via education gave him social contact to the dominant classist and exclusionary white world of Chocó (Leal, 2007, Wade, 1993, Martinez de Varela, 1983, Gomez, 1980).

However, as the literature mentions, the narrow circle of white dominant elite blocked the social advancement of actors who, like him, try to challenge unspoken racial hierarchies<sup>216</sup>. In this particular case, Valencia violates the tacit racial hierarchies, the tacit rights and obligations, the appropriate social practices that his afro-descendant condition allocates to him in an unspoken socio-racial hierarchy.

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<sup>216</sup> For instance, Leal (2007), Wade (1993).



Leal (2007) specifies that one of his “*mistakes*” was an affair with a blond woman member of a white and powerful Chocoana family<sup>217</sup>. The affair was a challenge to unspoken racial hierarchies<sup>218</sup>. Therefore, according to historiography, the downfall of Manuel Saturio Valencia has three phases. The first was the destruction of his professional career. Second, Manuel Saturio Valencia was accused of attempting to burn down the capital city of Quibdó. Finally, he was condemned to death by a controversial incrimination based on weak evidence<sup>219</sup>. In addition to the weak evidence against him, the judges were related to the family of the white woman involved in the affair (Leal, 2007 and Wade, 1993).

The literature also shows that Saturio contests the unspoken racial exclusion by trying to establish a social movement against white oppression, but he fails in his attempt (Gomez, 1980, p. 117).

Last, but not least, the final observation concerns a visit by the president of Colombia to Chocó in 1934. This shows the prevalence of racial exclusion inside Chocó. During the visit, the mayor of the capital Quibdó enacts a decree banning the sick, disabled and mendicant from the streets of the city. This measure was highly criticized by the local population. In other words, such regular behavior of exclusion was contested. As an answer to the critics, in an article in a local Chocó newspaper, the author states that “*what does it (the decree) have to condemn? Isn't it an aesthetic responsibility of bringing together sick people in one place?*”<sup>220</sup> First, considering that Chocó is the blackest department of Colombia, it is obvious that the majority of such people were of afro-descendant origin. Second, for the article's author, the major argument justifying the decree is related to an “*aesthetic responsibility*” to the local authority that ultimately segregates, discriminates, and excludes those who do not have “aesthetic” standards. In other words, it implicitly discriminates against the bulk of afro-descendant population. The measure therefore shows implicit regular behavior concerning differential allocation of rights and obligations to this population based on racialized characteristics.

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<sup>217</sup> Leal (2007) claims that the true crime of Valencia was to challenge unspoken racial rules of relationships by getting a blond girl of the Chocoana white elite pregnant.

<sup>218</sup> And since racial barriers are stronger than social barriers, the powerful structures of racial exclusion move to destroy him (Leal, 2007, p. 83).

<sup>219</sup> Leal (2007) and Wade (1993) agree that the evidence against him was questionable.

<sup>220</sup> ABC newspaper, December 5 of 1934, issue 2920 (in Chocó 7 días, 2014 issue 946, section: el Chocó de Ayer: [http://www.choco7dias.com/946/choco\\_ayer.html](http://www.choco7dias.com/946/choco_ayer.html)) [own translation].

In conclusion, the discussed observations are examples of the informal institution of racial exclusion in force in the case study. There are not explicit rules that state that afro-descendants require differential treatment. However, the evidence shows that there is tacit enforcement of rights and obligations, rules and social practices. These tacit rules and obligations allocate resources unevenly among white and afro-descendant actors. The observations also show that the institution of racial exclusion is contested in a society that discriminates against individuals based on racialized characteristics related to afro-descendant component.

### **5.2.1 Direct forms of racial exclusion, indigenous population**

This sub-section offers a discussion to highlight the indirect character of racial exclusion for afro-descendant populations. The discussion illustrates this issue by explaining the direct character of racial exclusion of the indigenous population during the analyzed period.

Although direct forms of exclusion and indigenous population are not the focus of this research, this section discusses evidence of these for three reasons. First, this discussion highlights the indirect character of exclusion of afro-descendants in the Colombian context. Second, the direct form of exclusion of indigenous people is present in the literature (Mahoney, 2015). Third, the indigenous component is present in the quantitative approach.

The previous section demonstrated evidence of racial exclusion as a dominant institution in the Colombian context. However, such racial exclusion takes an indirect and subtle approach to afro-descendant population. This racial exclusion is in the form of unspoken rules, rights and social practices, etc. and not in formal laws.

In the case of indigenous population, this exclusion took a direct form during the period analyzed. In contrast to afro-descendants, the indigenous population suffers the direct effects of the “*civilization projects*”. Extensive literature and historical material show that such civilization projects condemned this population via direct regular practices of violence, expropriation and extinction. As already mentioned in the quantitative part, this policy had two general goals – not

only in Colombia, but also in Latin America. First, it gave for white new ‘colonizers’ access to land. Second, it fostered an easy way to control labor force<sup>221</sup>.

In the Colombian case, there is a large set of formal laws on “civilization” and “colonization” of “*savage-indigenous*” people and/or “*savage territories*”. For instance, Laws 89 of 1890, 28 of 1909, 14 of 1912 or 64 of 1914. In contrast to the afro-descendant exclusion, these laws are explicitly intended to physically and culturally reduce savage-indigenous population. Indeed, it succeeds (Hoffman & Centeno, 2003 and Harguindeguy, 2010).

Moreover, official education reports persistently depict the evolution of these direct public policies. For instance, in addition to the facts described in the quantitative part, in 1912 the report of education states that, in trying to “*civilize*” savages, it is true that local authorities initially “*need to use violence against indigenous people in order to encourage them (the indigenous people) to allow their children go to school*”. The report also states that “*indigenous persons are forced to work...in the construction of schools and houses*” for catholic communities. Besides, it also mentions that indigenous people are forced to work on lands that have belonged to “*these religious communities since time immemorial*”. By “*immemorial*”, this source possibly refers to colonial times in which colonizers performed the regular practice of land grabbing from the native-indigenous population. Finally, the source states that these measures are “*for their own (indigenous persons) benefit and that of their descendants*”<sup>222</sup>.

However, in contrast with the arguments of this report, the literature extensively shows that this systematic public policy results in land grabbing by elites and new forms of slavery of “*savages*”. Furthermore, the quantitative results show that this direct exclusion negatively affects the socio-economic performance of regions with a high percentage of indigenous population.

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<sup>221</sup> Hoffman & Centeno (2003), McGreevy (1971), and Harguindeguy (2010).

<sup>222</sup> Report minister of education 1912. Memoria del Ministro de Instrucción Pública al Congreso de 1912. Bogotá, Imprenta Nacional 1912, p. 114 [own translation].

### 5.3 The mechanism: actors and regular behavior

A mechanism as a system is comprised of actors who act. These actions are regular practices embedded in a context that contributes triggering of final outcomes<sup>223</sup>.

According to the hypothesis of the mechanism of reaction, the institution of racial exclusion affects local public goods provision via the regular practices of specific actors that this institution includes. In particular, the institution of racial exclusion comprises three unequal actors. These are non-aggrieved, mid-aggrieved and aggrieved actors. In turn, these actors react to the institution of racial exclusion with five different regular types of behavior according to the level of grievance that each actor faces related to the exclusionary institution. The types of behavior are adoption, adaptation, revision, no-cooperation and contestation of the exclusionary institution<sup>224</sup>. Regular practices, on many occasions, influence initiatives concerning the local political economy in providing public goods. Consequently, local dynamics of public goods accumulation is affected.

This section presents evidence of the existence of each identified actor, their regular behavior and the causal link between the cause, actors, behavior and the outcome.

#### 5.3.1 Non-aggrieved actors

Non-aggrieved actors are entities or individuals that face no adverse effect from the exclusionary institution. Mainly, this actor lacks the characteristics associated with the exclusionary institution. Moreover, non-aggrieved actors receive an advantageous allocation of resources from the exclusionary institution that in turn then receives reinforcement.

Consequently, the regular behavior of this actor is adoption of the exclusionary institution. Combining theoretical insights from institutional and racial literature, adoption means to behave in a way that takes, maintains and follows the rights, obligations, rules, social practices

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<sup>223</sup> Beach & Pedersen (2013, p. 39) refer to “*entities engaged in activities*”. As it was discussed, see also Pouliot (2015), Hedström & Ylikoski (2010), Falletti & Lynch (2009).

<sup>224</sup> As the theoretical chapter shows, theoretical insights guide the empirical analysis of the archival material to develop a hypothesis for the mechanism. In this regard, the identification of actors and behavior arose from the theoretical insights in the literature on institutionalism and race.

associated with the exclusionary institution<sup>225</sup>. In other words, adoption is the enforcement of the informal exclusionary institution. In turn, adoption of the exclusionary institution has effects on public good provision when non-aggrieved actors have critical roles in initiatives in the local political economy of public good provision. Accordingly, they will carry out initiatives that are ineffective in the provision of public goods favoring the bulk of excluded population<sup>226</sup>.

### **5.3.1.1 Non-aggrieved actors: white elites in Chocó and low public goods provision**

Non-aggrieved actors are the first evident manifestation of actors in the empirical material. The trace that allows this conclusion is the behavior of members of the local white elite in this case study<sup>227</sup>. These members of the white elite share several attributes. They lack the characteristics related to the informal institution of racial exclusion and show an advantageous initial allocation of resources. These attributes categorize this actor as non-aggrieved by the informal institution of racial exclusion. Specifically, they are whiter skin and with initial higher economic and social control of resources than the bulk of the afro-descendant population.

White local elite regularly behaves in a way which adopts the exclusionary informal institution of racial exclusion. Adoption allows them to maintain the socio-economic hierarchies proper to the white world. When this actor takes a strategic position in the local political economy, the empirical material shows that adoption is manifested in specific behavior such as negligence, selective investment, omission and/or corruption in initiatives for public goods provision that benefits the majority afro-descendant population.

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<sup>225</sup> For instance DiCaprio (2012), Amsden & DiCaprio (2012), Streeck & Thelen (2005), Gaventa (1982), Pager & Shepard (2008), De la Cadena (2000), Sue (2013), Tilly (1998), among others. For example, adoption would be similar to emulation or exploitation in Tilly (1998). However, it is not. According to Tilly (1998), terms like emulation are part of the mechanism itself. In this research, adoption is not a mechanism. First, adoption is general behavior that is part of a mechanism. Second, this mechanism intends to explain not only processes of reproduction, but also simultaneous changes and different actors involved.

<sup>226</sup> In contrast to DiCaprio (2012), the mechanism aims to show the complete causal link between an exclusionary institution, different actors, different behavior and the final outcome. This part of the mechanism shows the causal link for one of these actors, in this case, non-aggrieved actor.

<sup>227</sup> In Chocó, this actor is particularly important in controlling the major local issues during late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. By this time, the control of political and economic relevant issues is managed by white elite members. As Wade (1993) argues they “*were the political and economic elite and they maintained a very exclusive social circle*” (Wade, 1993, p.108). The literature says that black individuals appear rarely in this sphere of Chocoano power positions before 1920.

The archives systematically show that such behavior represent patterns of practices by Chocoano white elites. National reports regularly reveal claims that the official information from Chocó is deficient or inexistent. Moreover, local authorities are involved more in chains of corruption and negligence than in providing public goods for development. The official correspondence shows local authorities are permissive in paying the salaries of teachers and public employees. It also shows public contract claims that have legal and fiscal deficiencies.

For instance, the annual report of education in 1890 mentions that after three attempts to designate an inspector of education in Chocó, 13 month on there was no notification on whether this inspector had assumed his functions<sup>228</sup>. The same source reveals that Chocó was abandoned regarding education and that the regional authorities did not have information on the numbers of schools, salaries, or conditions of the teachers of Chocó because its authorities had not informed it<sup>229</sup>. Similarly, in 1892, the reports claim that the provinces of Chocó do not present reports on education; moreover, these provinces depict low progress in the schools<sup>230</sup>.

In line with these observations, the archival material from Chocó is abundant with similar patterns of negligence, omission, carelessness, etc. These regular patterns of behavior potentially demonstrate that local white elites follow the regular behavior of adoption, contributing to low performance in public goods provision in the region.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to evaluate whether these observations are effectively forms of adoption of the exclusionary institution, whether this behavior emerges from non-aggrieved actors, and how such behavior relates to final outcomes. This means explicitly, as the methodological literature recommends, first, the origin of the source needs to be evaluated in order to assess the validity of the information (see Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Second, it is imperative to show that such behavior comes from local white elite members and are forms of adoption of the exclusionary institution. Third, the evidence needs to be contrasted with

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<sup>228</sup> Informe que el Ministro de Instrucción Pública presenta al Congreso de Colombia en sus sesiones ordinarias de 1890, p. 126. Imprenta La Luz. Bogotá.

<sup>229</sup> Informe que el Ministro de Instrucción Pública presenta al Congreso de Colombia en sus sesiones ordinarias de 1890, p. 138. Imprenta La Luz. Bogotá.

<sup>230</sup> Informe que el Ministro de Instrucción Pública presenta al Congreso de Colombia en sus sesiones ordinarias de 1892, p. XCI and 105. Papelería y Tipografía de Samper Matiz. Bogotá. .

alternative explanations. Fourth, those observations need to demonstrate the causal link with the institution of racial exclusion and the final outcome of low performance in public goods provision.

Regarding evaluation of the sources, the authors of the observations for 1890 and 1892 are the departmental inspectors of Cauca. Up to 1906, Chocó was a province of this department. Therefore, the inspector's insights could be a way of blaming Chocó for the lack of results from his regional office. However, the evidence also appears in reports from the national minister of education. For example, in 1914, Chocó is not part of Cauca. Since 1906, Chocó is an 'intendancy' independent of Cauca<sup>231</sup>. Cauca does not have responsibility for the educational office in this territory. Nonetheless, negligence is a regular type of behavior by local authorities in blacker regions. The report in 1914 states that it is a "pity" to say that local authorities do not take care of public instruction. The report adds that "*municipal councils and mayors...believe that they have no obligation with schools... teachers are then completely isolated without protection and support of the municipal authorities*". The report supplements that one of the examples of this regular behavior is the local public budget in education. The author states that the local budget in education in Chocó is a miserable amount<sup>232</sup>.

To demonstrate that such regular practices are by white local elites, background knowledge in the literature is useful. The literature extensively shows that, during the analyzed period, white local elites control the local political economy of Chocó (Urrego, 2010, Rausch, 1999, Wade, 1993). Moreover, the literature also suggests that racist institutional arrangements guide the social relations among elites and the bulk of non-white population (Maya, 2009, Roldán, 2003). In Chocó, white local elite members are important in the control of the major local governmental positions during late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. As Wade (1993) argues, white elites "*were the political and economic elite and they maintained a very exclusive social circle*" (Wade, 1993, p.108). The authors of such negligent behaviors were therefore mainly white members of the local elite. Consequently, they lack the characteristics related to the informal institution of racial exclusion and possess an advantageous position of power. Accordingly, adoption is a regular

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<sup>231</sup> That is to say, it is a 'relatively' autonomous political division.

<sup>232</sup> Memoria del Ministro de Instrucción Pública al Congreso de 1914, p. 29-30. Documentos. Imprenta Nacional. Bogotá [own translation].

type of behavior by members of the white elite. Adoption appears in the form of specific behavior such as negligence in initiatives for public goods provision that benefit the afro-descendant majority population, as described in the examples.

Related to the alternative explanations, there are three major alternative explanations that potentially explain the low performance in Chocó. The first is geographical location. Chocó is geographically isolated which could explain a lack of communication of reports and the final low performance in public goods provision. However, against the isolation's argument is an abundance of correspondence in the archival material on various issues of Chocó for this period which suggests that geographical isolation was not a barrier for properly communicating the education reports to regional or national authorities. Moreover, the same report in 1892 states that the province of Barbacoa on the Pacific coast maintains contact with regional authorities despite also being isolated from the department capital. According to the report, despite this province being in the littoral and that those provinces in the littoral being far from the capital Popayán, Barbacoa has a "diligent" prefecture. Additionally, this prefecture believes in the relevance of public instruction conserving "*active official correspondence*"<sup>233</sup> with the regional government. These observations unambiguously support the fact regular practices of omission, negligence and lack of interest were patterns of behavior by the local white Chocoano policy makers more than geographical isolation.

A second alternative explanation is poverty. Colombia in general certainly shows poverty in the period analyzed. Poverty is therefore an important element. However, lack of resources do not explain completely the low final performance by Chocó. For example, the report in 1914 shows that the visitor of the minister of public instruction concludes that the needs of Chocó in education are four fold: the cooperation of parents, cooperation of local authorities, lack of teachers and physical installations. Among these issues, the official says that local councils and mayors do not show any interest in education. For instance, their attitudes against teachers are dishonest. They delay the payment of teachers' salaries until the debt expires and is

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<sup>233</sup> Informe que el Ministro de Instrucción Pública presenta al Congreso de Colombia en sus sesiones ordinarias de 1892, p. 105. Papelería y Tipografía de Samper Matiz. Bogotá [own translation].



automatically classified as being of no preferential duty<sup>234</sup>. In addition, as the report in 1914 shows, the official mentions that local authorities allocate trifling amounts to education<sup>235</sup>.

The archival material frequently contradicts the poverty argument. In 1913 when public revenues are rising in Chocó, local authorities fail to support the creation of a new secondary school by arguing the lack of a location. Specifically, national Law 44 of 1913 allocates more than 30,000 Colombian pesos (cops) for various investments in Chocó. One was the foundation of two pedagogical institutions in Quibdó and Itsmina<sup>236</sup> (In 1914 the budget for education in Chocó is 20,000 cops)<sup>237</sup>. However, the schools were not constructed. It is true that not all 30,000 cops were allocated to the creation of the two schools. Nonetheless, according to the national education report of 1914, the initiative was unsuccessful because local authorities in Chocó did not provide the locations in the municipalities. White local elites (non-aggrieved actors) therefore demonstrated ineffective behavior for the creation of two new schools with effects on local socio-economic indicators. Explicitly, these elites did not make sufficient effort, demonstrating a lack of interest in the construction of the schools.

Moreover, Chocó is historically a source of wealth. An example is the existence in this region of foreign mining companies such as the Chocó Pacific Company (CPC). This company shares the attributes of a non-aggrieved actor. This company is a foreign multinational not affected by the allocation of informal racial exclusion. According to Castillo & Varela (2013), the rise in platinum prices made Chocó a good opportunity for business for foreign investors. Indeed, Chocó was the first world producer of platinum in early 20<sup>th</sup> century and presents significant economic growth during this time (Urrego, 2010, Bonet, 2008). Nonetheless, depredator behavior by white local elites such as the Chocó Pacific Company hoard the benefits of mining activity. In this matter, property titles of land were easily appropriated by local white elite members (Castillo & Varela, 2013). The benefits of the mining production in Chocó were

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<sup>234</sup> Memoria del Ministro de Instrucción Pública al Congreso de 1914, p. 29-31. Documentos. Imprenta Nacional. Bogotá.

<sup>235</sup> Memoria del Ministro de Instrucción Pública al Congreso de 1914, p. 29-31. Documentos. Imprenta Nacional. Bogotá.

<sup>236</sup> These pedagogical institutions make reference to secondary institution and have the purpose of increasing the supply of teachers for the region, a way to improve local socio-economic performance.

<sup>237</sup> Memoria del Ministro de Instrucción Pública al Congreso de 1914, p. XXV. Linotipo de la Imprenta Nacional. Bogotá.

therefore unequally distributed among non-aggrieved actors at the expense of the rest of the population.

For instance, in the discussion about the legal project at the National Congress to transform Chocó into a department, the author states that the Choco Pacific Company “*has not reattributed to Chocó ... a minimal part of the enormous benefits that this company has obtained...Neither has this company compensated for the damage produced in the rivers*”<sup>238</sup>. Of course, not only the regular behavior of white non-aggrieved elites are involved in this issue. As we will later see, some mid-aggrieved actors have a relevant role in this outcome through their regular practices.

**Table 5-1 Mining production and the budget of Chocó 1922-1941**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Production'</b>	<b>Value in cops</b>	<b>Choco budget</b>
1922	62,568.85	156,422.00 *	
1923	111,898.02	279,744.80 *	
1924	117,233.77	293,084.17 *	
1925	74,732.29	186,830.56 *	
1926	80,972.87	202,431.99 *	
1927	91,017.04	227,542.39 *	
1928	120,524.46	301,310.89 *	902,311.04
1929	96,534.23	241,335.36 *	1,054,696.63
1930	94,435.65	236,088.92 *	699,200.63
1931	94,435.65	236,088.92 *	498,723.89
1932	219,370.30	680,016.00	468,432.49
1933	265,398.32	1,181,439.00	465,073.37
1934	549,240.00	3,249,888.00	368,142.08
1935	.	.	399,617.98 ``
1936	.	.	429,965.51 ``
1937	.	.	508,014.48 ``
1938	.	.	531,088.34 ``
1939	1,668,000.00	1,635,679.00 **	544,244.84 ``
1940	996,485.00	1,556,774.04 **	625,763.45 ``
1941	1,164,000.00	1,728,859.00 **	637,120.99 ``

\*Own calculations based on the total value between 1922 and 1931 data from AGN: sección: Archivo Anexos, Entidad Productora: Ministerio de Gobierno sección Intendencias y Comisaría, Serie Documental: Intendencias Informes Generales, Caja: 001, Carpeta: 002, Folio: 64-68 and 143 \*\* Platinum Valois (1945). \*\*\* Valois (1945).  
 'value in ctsts. `` Own revenues (Valois, 1945).

<sup>238</sup> Anales del Congreso, Cámara, Bogotá 13 de noviembre de 1946, p. 1499 [own translation].

Table 5-1 shows mining production in Chocó from 1922 to 1941. The table demonstrates that this production was high compared to the local budget of the local government. According to the report of the intendant of Chocó in 1934, production was 8.83 times the budget of Chocó in 1934.

Lastly, the intendantial system is another popular alternative explanation for low public goods provision in Chocó. This explanation refers to the lack of autonomy of the ‘special’ intendantial regime. Indeed, Helg (1987) specifies that the lack of autonomy means that intendantcies were discriminated by the national government and received poor public instruction. Education was limited to the services offered by missions of catholic orders.

Catholic orders were effectively part of the public instruction of Chocó for isolated areas dominated by indigenous tribes. Furthermore, the special regime was a form of exclusion that limited the autonomy of Chocó. However, the report of the apostolic prefect in 1918-1923 states that public instruction is also the responsibility of local civil governments, especially in urban areas<sup>239</sup>. It is true that the systematic exclusion of Chocó via the special regime generated lack of autonomy for this region. However, as already discussed, there were opportunities for local actors in the local political economy of providing public goods. For example, according to the regulations, the intendant had the same attributes as departmental governors for certain public goods such as education (these attributes were established in Law 149 of 1888). Furthermore, Decree 1347 of 1906 states the functions of the intendant to be the intervention in public education, creation of schools and responsibilities related to construction of roads and establishments. The regulations therefore do establish that public goods provision was also a local responsibility of local authorities in Chocó. The problem is therefore more related to these positions of power being dominated by exclusionary local white elite members with adoption as a regular pattern of behavior in the informal institution of racial exclusion.

The analysis therefore shows that the problem of Chocó is related more to the distribution of resources rather than a lack of resources. This distribution of resources is rooted in social

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<sup>239</sup> Informe que el Prefecto Apostólico del Chocó rinde al ilustrísimo y reverendísimo Arzobispo de Colombia, como Presidente de la Junta Arquideosesana de Misiones 1919-1923, p. 112. Imprenta Nacional 1924. Bogotá.

arrangements that promote unequal treatment towards particular choconos. In summary, these observations, complemented with background knowledge, show that non-aggrieved actors are white local elites, possess advantageous positions, control the local political economy of public goods provision, and behave with patterns of omission, neglect, etc., for the local political economy in providing public goods. Non-aggrieved actors potentially reproduce exclusionary institutions by adopting them at a local context. By adopting, they reproduce deleterious regular practices for local performance such as omission, negligence and exclusion affecting the local outcome. Finally, the analysis of observations also shows that alternative explanations are not sufficient to explain low local performance.

However, these observations do not clearly show whether such regular behavior by white elites are effectively adoptions of the exclusionary institution of racial exclusion. These observations also do not provide consistent evidence that demonstrate the precise causal link with the institution of racial exclusion and the final outcome of low public good performance, i.e., the fourth point for discussion. This explanation requires a more exhaustive analysis.

The causal link is explained through observations that illustrate the central specific actors in the case study. The selection of each observation has three criteria. First, secondary sources show that these actors are important in the local political economy of the case study. Second, the archive material and literature shed light on their regular presence and regular behavior in the case of Chocó. Third, the analysis of the material enables it to be concluded that each observation shows specific characteristics. Consequently, these observations can be classified as members of specific categories of actors. They are classified specifically as non-aggrieved, mid-aggrieved and aggrieved actors.

This process allows identifying the causal link. The subsequent sections therefore process specific observations that better illustrate the link among the institution in force, the actors involved, their regular behavior, reproduction, change and the subsequent final outcomes. The following section begins by explaining the observation for non-aggrieved actor.

### ***5.3.1.2 The intendant Dionisio Echeverry Ferrer and the statue of César Conto: the institution of racial exclusion, non-aggrieved actors, adoption and public goods provision***

The first observation is Dionisio Echeverry Ferrer (1901-1981). This actor is an example of a non-aggrieved actor. This individual actor is important to explain because his case is associated with how the informal institution of racial exclusion contributes to low public goods provision. Dionisio Echeverry Ferrer shows the following attributes: 1. He experiences no adverse effects from the informal institution of racial exclusion. 2. He receives an advantageous allocation of resources from the informal institution of racial exclusion. 3. He adopts the exclusionary institution of racial exclusion. 4. He holds positions of power for the local political economy of public goods provision. In positions of power, he adopts the institution of racial exclusion behaving with negligence or making selective investment in the provision of public goods. Such adoption behavior results in ineffective initiatives for the provision of public goods that favor the bulk of excluded population for the period being analyzed.

There are manifestations that demonstrate the presence of these attributes. First of all, Dionisio Echeverry Ferrer does not have the racialized characteristics of the afro-descendant population. Consequently, he has no level of affectation from the informal institution of racial exclusion. He is a 'white' elite member of European origin. According to Gallo (2011) the first Ferrer in Chocó was Carlos Ferrer. Carlos Ferrer arrives in Chocó in 18<sup>th</sup> century from Cataluña Spain. Once in Chocó, Carlos Ferrer establishes businesses and a prosperous lineage in the Chocoana capital of Quibdó. Henceforth, the Ferrer family have patterns of marriages to Italians, Spaniards and white Colombians. The Echeverry Ferrer's family descends from this white lineage<sup>240</sup>.

His socio-racial background gives him access to political, economic and social power. He belongs to the white local elite. The Echeverry Ferrer family was involved in positions of economic, political and social power in the region of Chocó (Gallo, 2011). The Ferrer's were politicians, writers, journalists, soldiers, etc., positions performed typically by white elite members in the Colombian late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century society. Accordingly, Dionisio

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<sup>240</sup> For more details, see Gallo (2011).

Echeverry Ferrer receives an advantageous allocation of resources. All in all, he is not affected by the informal institution of racial exclusion.

Dionisio Echeverry Ferrer follows the informal institution of racial exclusion. There is evidence that Dionisio Echeverry Ferrer is racist. For instance, Rausch (1999, p. 118) contends that as intendant, Dionisio Echeverry Ferrer makes regular efforts to halt the advances of afro-descendant people and to exclude them. Dionisio Echeverry Ferrer therefore adopts the informal institution carrying out specific unspoken regular practices of differential treatment against afro-descendant racialized groups<sup>241</sup>.

There are symptoms that allow the conclusion to be made that when white elite members hold positions of power in the local political economy of public goods provision, they adopt the informal institution in the form of negligence, omission, corruption, selective investment, and other negative types of behavior. Dionisio Echeverry Ferrer held several positions of power in the local political economy of Chocó. For instance, he was intendant of Chocó between 1938 and 1942. In his reports as intendant of Chocó, he describes the fiscal situation of Chocó as precarious to attend the most basic of needs<sup>242</sup>. Nonetheless, his behavior is negligent and selectively prioritizes investment against the afro-descendant population. The case of the bust of Cesar Conto is an example of this conclusion.

In his report for 1941, the budget shows an amount of 3000 Colombian pesos for a bust in the central square of Quibdó<sup>243</sup>. Why is this decision an argument for an informal institution of racial exclusion being in force? And why does such behavior affect local public goods provision? The short answer is that Dionisio Echeverry Ferrer makes an unspoken differential act that discriminates against the afro-descendant population by facilitating the bust for the central square of Quibdó. The racial exclusion is twofold. Dionisio Echeverry Ferrer implicitly promotes

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<sup>241</sup> Local white elites behave in a way that tacitly allocates privileged rights and social standings to the white population while discriminating against the afro-descendant racialized chocoanos.

<sup>242</sup> Informe del Intendente Nacional del Chocó al Señor Ministro de Gobierno / Intendencia Nacional del Chocó, 1941, p. 7. Imprenta Oficial, Quibdó. This fact is a common pattern in these types of reports

<sup>243</sup> Informe del Intendente Nacional del Chocó al Señor Ministro de Gobierno / Intendencia Nacional del Chocó, 1941, p. 266. Imprenta Oficial, Quibdó. The report shows that the total amount for the bust is 5000 Colombian pesos. This amount is part of the extraordinary income (pages 74-75). However, in the report of 1941, 3000 cop appears as the amount appropriated for this concept during 1940.

whiteness as a positive value and shows negligence and selective investment of public funding against the afro-descendants majority.

The bust is of César Conto (1836-1891). César Conto was a Chocoano writer, politician and member of an old slave-trading family<sup>244</sup>. The most relevant factor of the bust is that César Conto was a white member of the Chocoana elite; illustration 5-1 shows the white phenotypical characteristics of Cesar Conto. In a majority afro-descendant society, Echeverry Ferrer facilitates public investment in honoring a white elite member - with public funds classified by him as precarious - instead of honoring the many prominent afro-descendant citizens. The specific behavior of honoring this white citizen is a tacit discrimination against the majority afro-descendant component by promoting whiteness as the ideal, a regular practice by the Chocoana white elite (Leal, 2007). In this regard, Echeverry Ferrer takes, maintains and follows the unspoken promotion of whiteness as a positive value. At the same time, he sends the message of blackness as being an ‘unwanted condition’. This behavior is a form of implicit racial exclusion against the afro-descendant component, i.e. while the white component is exalted; afro-descendant contributions are “invisiblized” by the white elites<sup>245</sup>.

The bust of César Conto shows another specific issue by illustrating how the specific behavior of non-aggrieved actors can propagate low public goods provision. Specifically, Dionisio Echeverry Ferrer behaves negligently by facilitating the use of scarce public funding for the bust of César Conto. In turn, the negligent behavior affects the provision of public goods that benefit the majority of afro-descendant population. In other words, this behavior is the institution of racial exclusion in force generating the final outcome. Analysis of the local budget also allows such a conclusion.

The analysis of the budget of the intendancy shows that the amount allocated to the bust corresponds to 5.7 percent of the total expenses in schools construction during 1940<sup>246</sup>. This percentage is significant for the following reasons. According to the report, the bust also

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<sup>244</sup> Leal (2007, p. 90). Indeed a distant relative of Echeverry Ferrer (see Gallo, 2011).

<sup>245</sup> As Freedman (1984) would indicate (Freedman, 1984 quoted in Pisano, 2012 p. 76).

<sup>246</sup> Informe del Intendente Nacional del Chocó al Señor Ministro de Gobierno / Intendencia Nacional del Chocó, 1941, p. 266 lines 137<sup>a</sup>A-137K of total expenses’ column of the budget of public works in 1940. Imprenta Oficial, Quibdó.

corresponds to 62.2 percent of the investment in primary school construction for six poor towns of Chocó in 1940<sup>247</sup>. The investment in the bust could have therefore improved the conditions of public primary education for at least 4 poor towns in Chocó. This amount is relevant when compared with the poor conditions in primary education in Chocó at the time.

Moreover, the report also shows that from when Dionisio Echeverry Ferrer governed the intendancy, investment in new primary schools was marginal. Primary schools are important in public policy for the majoritarian illiterate afro-descendant population. However, the bulk of total expenses in schools construction was concentrated on two major projects: the renovation of the Carrasquilla secondary school in Quibdó, and the continuation of an agricultural boarding school<sup>248</sup>. Furthermore, the report shows that between 1939 and 1940 there were only 8 new primary schools in the intendancy<sup>249</sup>. This amount is significantly low. For instance, the report of the secretary of education mentions that it is necessary to double the number of primary schools because the current offer (166 schools) is marginal compared to the number of inhabitants of the intendancy and the demands for primary education from the population<sup>250</sup>.

Nonetheless, scarce resources represent a possible alternative explanation for this low investment in public goods provision for the majority afro-descendant population. As Echeverry Ferrer mentions in his reports, the resources of Chocó are precarious. Moreover, the special regime constitutes another alternative explanation for the poor performance in education. There are also observations that contradict the argument of Dionisio Echeverry Ferrer being an actor against the progress of Chocó. Indeed, Cuesta (1986) describes Dionisio Echeverry Ferrer as a progressive leader. His major two projects in education could corroborate this observation.

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<sup>247</sup> These towns are Pizarro, Novita, El Roble, Riosucio, Lloró and Mecana. Informe del Intendente Nacional del Chocó al Señor Ministro de Gobierno / Intendencia Nacional del Chocó, 1941, p. 266. Imprenta Oficial, Quibdó.

<sup>248</sup> Nonetheless, despite significant changes in the Chocoana society, the Carrasquilla School was still associated with offspring of the local rich-mid class families. According to Pisano (2010 p.67) before 1930, the offspring of the local white and mulato elites were concentrated within this school. This adoption generates a disadvantageous allocation of public resources for this region.

<sup>249</sup> Primary schools rise from 155 to 163 schools. Informe del Intendente Nacional del Chocó al Señor Ministro de Gobierno / Intendencia Nacional del Chocó, 1941, p. 25. Imprenta Oficial, Quibdó.

<sup>250</sup> Informe del Intendente Nacional del Chocó al Señor Ministro de Gobierno / Intendencia Nacional del Chocó, 1941, p. 225-226. Imprenta Oficial, Quibdó.



However, the same reports by Dionisio Echeverry Ferrer show that the intendancy has resources. The report shows budgetary surpluses of 106,721.53 Colombian pesos in 1939 and 37,311.97 Colombian pesos in 1940<sup>251</sup>. These surpluses correspond to 166.8 percent of the total expenses in schools construction for the intendancy in 1939, and 75.9 percent in 1940<sup>252</sup>. Nevertheless, despite these surpluses, the frequent demands for primary schools and complaints about the calamitous state of the existing schools, there is no evidence of significant political initiatives dedicating additional resources to the construction of new primary schools for small and poor Chocoano towns. That is, there are no initiatives to generate reforms to improve the political economy of public goods provision that benefits the bulk of afro-descendant population.

The special regime is also not a satisfactory argument in this specific observation. While it is true that the centralized system limited administration of Chocó, previous sections of this study show that the regulations gave some autonomy to local actors. Dionisio Echeverry Ferrer had the alternative of using such opportunities to give priority to the real needs of Chocó. For example, he could have used the option of budget ‘reallocations’ permitted by regulations such as Decree 2110 of 1932<sup>253</sup>. Moreover, it could also be argued that the bust of César Conto was an initiative fostered by the central authorities<sup>254</sup>. However, regulations gave local authorities the option of suggesting the priorities for the intendancy<sup>255</sup>. This means, Dionisio Echeverry Ferrer had the opportunity of influencing the appropriation of funds for the bust of César Conto. In this regard, there are neither traces of contestation against the investment of the bust in his reports, nor suggestions for the reallocation of this amount for public goods that truly benefit the majoritarian afro-descendants.

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<sup>251</sup> Informe del Intendente Nacional del Chocó al Señor Ministro de Gobierno / Intendencia Nacional del Chocó, 1941, p. 10. Imprenta Oficial, Quibdó.

<sup>252</sup> Informe del Intendente Nacional del Chocó al Señor Ministro de Gobierno / Intendencia Nacional del Chocó, 1941, p. 82-83. Imprenta Oficial, Quibdó.

<sup>253</sup> He needed only to demonstrate that the voted investment was not necessary and report the justification to the national government.

<sup>254</sup> Indeed, the amount is part of extraordinary income.

<sup>255</sup> For instance, Law 2 of 1943, Law 10 of 1930, Law 62 of 1915.

Finally, the progressive description of Cuesta (1986) contradicts analysis such as Rausch (2003, 1999) and Martinez (1987)<sup>256</sup>. These authors describe Dionisio Echeverry Ferrer as nepotistic and corrupt.

**Illustration 5-1 César Conto**



Source: Aguilera (1997)<sup>257</sup>

In the discussed observations, Echeverry Ferrer shows regular selective behavior against the interests of the bulk afro-descendant people. As a member of the elite, he does not make sufficient effort to provide public goods for non-white members. Investment in primary schools is a fundamental policy for the majority illiterate Chocoano population. However, as the material shows, he allocates trifling budget to the construction of primary schools. Such negligence and lack of interest, etc. are forms of adoption of the informal institution of racial exclusion. Such adoption behavior results in ineffective initiatives for access to public schools for the non-elite which affect the final outcome of a low provision of public goods.

Finally an important comment to make concerns the fact that occupying the highest social standing at a local level does not mean that non-aggrieved white elites do not face exclusion.

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<sup>256</sup> Quoted in Rausch (1999).

<sup>257</sup> Taken from Virtual library Luis Angel Arango (BVLAA) of Aguilera (1997) in <http://www.banrepcultural.org/blaavirtual/revistas/credencial/octubre1997/9401.htm>

Since they are part of an excluded region, they have to deal with certain consequences. Nonetheless, the levels of exclusion are minimal or non-existent for them. Such exclusion is limited to how the national design of institutional regional racism might affect their interests, generally at minimum incidence.

### **5.3.2 Regular practices of mid-aggrieved actors: black elites**

Mid-aggrieved actors are entities or individuals who are subject to mid-level effects from the exclusionary institution. Mid-aggrieved actors are affected by the exclusionary institution because they present some characteristics related to the exclusionary institution. However, they are affected at a lower level than typically aggrieved actors since they have access to resources, or their characteristics can be ‘disguised’. Such conditions permit this actor to minimize the distributional effects of the exclusionary institution.

There are two types of mid-aggrieved actors according to reactions in the face of the exclusionary institution. The first mid-aggrieved actors incline to regular practices of what could be classified as adaptation to the exclusionary institution. These are adapted mid-aggrieved actors. Adaptation means to adjust and follow the exclusionary institution. That is, adaptation is a form of reproduction of the informal exclusionary institution. Similar to adoption by non-aggrieved actors, adaptation means to adhere to the exclusionary institution. However, since mid-aggrieved actors are affected by the exclusionary institution, they have to adjust to the ambivalence that the exclusionary institution has for them: the conflict of being affected and at the same time adhering to the institution<sup>258</sup>. When mid-aggrieved actors hold positions key for the local political economy of public goods provision, adaptation becomes manifested in specific behavior such as negligence, omission or lack of initiatives for the provision of public goods that could favor the bulk of excluded population.

The second type of mid-aggrieved actor inclines to regular practices of revising the exclusionary institution; they are revisionist mid-aggrieved actors. Revisions are reexaminations, reviews, or

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<sup>258</sup> In this regard, adaptation is similar to the behavior described in various literature such as Pyke (2010), Pierson (2004), Robinson (2012) or Tilly (1998) (see section 2.3.5).

modifications to the exclusionary institution<sup>259</sup>. When revisionist mid-aggrieved actors hold key positions for the local political economy of public goods provision, revisions are manifested in the form of promoting reforms to exclusionary policies. Such reforms propagate effective initiatives for a more egalitarian provision of public goods that favor the bulk of the excluded population.

### ***5.3.2.1 Adapted mid-aggrieved actors in Chocó: black-mulato elites and regular practices***

Instances of adapted mid aggrieved actors are available in the empirical material. The behavior of local black/mulato elite members permit such a conclusion.

A first instance is that mulato/black elites face negative effects from the exclusionary institution, but their access to resources minimizes an unequal distributional allocation of the informal institution of racial exclusion. Black/mulato elite members are black or light-skinned mulato. Therefore, they have the ‘unwanted’ racialized characteristics of the afro-descendant world. Based on these racialized characteristics, they suffer discrimination in some instances. Nevertheless, adapted mid-aggrieved actors have accumulated physical and human capital. The empirical material and historiography show that a section of black/mulato elite members share a common pattern of having access to wealth in mining activities during late 19<sup>th</sup> and the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. The historiography also shows that some of them, and especially their offspring, gradually gain further access to resources in the form of education or social standing via marriage with whiter members of the society. The access to education, social standing and wealth allow them the potential to gradually move up in the social hierarchy via cultural or physical whitening (see for instance Castillo & Varela, 2013, Wade, 1993). Other sections of black/mulato elite members stem from access to human capital. These are black men with a poor socio-economic background. However, they receive education via the support of a sponsor well situated in the social standing<sup>260</sup>. These new educated blacks become new members of nascent black/mulato elite. They also gradually move up in the social hierarchy via cultural or physical whitening.

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<sup>259</sup> The term revision is acquired from literature such as Streeck (2010), Mahoney & Thelen (2010), Streeck & Thelen (2005), and similar.

<sup>260</sup> This was the case of Manuel Saturio Valencia described in Leal (2007) or Wade (1993). .

Adapted mid-aggrieved actors internalize the exclusionary institution and regularly behave in ways to adapt to the informal institution of racial exclusion. Symptoms of adaptation of the institution of racial exclusion are evident. For example, adaptation is present in the form of regular practices of differentiation from similar afro-descendants<sup>261</sup>. It does not mean conflict with their similar afro-descendants, but they establish differences between themselves and those similar to them. Consequently, this means establishing similarities to whites.

Particular traces of adaptation are evident in the form of municipal secessions. Secessions from the blacker Chocó to whiter regions are common in the material. For instance, in 1912 the Chocoana municipality of Pueblorrico asks for secession from the intendancy of Chocó. This municipality claims to be part of the department of Caldas. The prerogative is accepted in 1912 and Pueblorrico began to be part of Caldas. A second secession proposal is in 1913. In this case, San Pablo claims that the Chocoana province of San Juan should be part of the department of Valle and not part of Chocó. The prerogative is rejected<sup>262</sup>. An additional secession is appealed by the municipalities of Pueblorrico (again) and Salgar. They ask for the secession of the municipality of El Carmen from Chocó and the annexation of this municipality to the department of Antioquia. The secession is rejected because of it not being requested by the affected population<sup>263</sup>.

In the case of the annexation of Pueblorrico to the department of Caldas, the proponents argue that the reason for secession is being nearer to Manizales (the capital of Caldas) than to Quibdó the capital of Chocó<sup>264</sup>. This fact is true. However, it is also true that Caldas is one of the whitest departments in Colombia and demands exist for secessions of blacker regions to whiter regions but not the other way round. Appelbaum (2006) argues that whiter departments in Colombia developed a myth of progress and development. Along the same line, the author argues that the excluded population also “*associated whiteness with progress*” (Appelbaum, 2006, p.14).

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<sup>261</sup> Pyke (2010) argues that internalized excluded actors easily identified themselves with the national exclusionary ideology and distance from their similar. Their regular behavior consists in establishing clear boundaries between them and the rest of poor black people and to adapt exclusionary behavior against this population. Such regular practices help them to achieve conditional acceptability from dominant white elites and, in a future, to share this power (Wade, 1993). As already mentioned, similar concepts are in Pierson (2004) and Robinson (2012).

<sup>262</sup> Anales del Senado, Bogotá febrero 3 de 1914, p. 1242.

<sup>263</sup> Anales del Senado, Bogotá febrero 2 de 1914, p. 1238.

<sup>264</sup> Anales del Senado, Bogotá Octubre 19 de 1912, p. 595-596.

Therefore, it is no coincidence that the process of secession from a blacker to a whiter region is a form of differentiation from the similar.

In these observations, the proponents are well positioned actors of the excluded regions. For instance, in the case of Pueblorrico the material shows that among the proponents was the local priest and local authorities. Such people, in contrast to the rest of the population, had access to information. Nonetheless, the attitudes of adaptation by differentiation are linked to the circumstance of internalizing the belief that whiter regions facilitate progress whilst black regions are synonyms of backwardness. Nonetheless, the case of Pueblorrico is dubious since the priest and the local authority were probably white.

Further regular practices of adaptation can be found in the material in the form of differentiation. In this case, such regular practices refer to the behavior of the new emergent black/ light mulato elite. The literature shows that new black elites emerge as result of higher (gradual) access to education and wealth for some specific afro-descendant sectors (Castillo & Varela, 2013, Leal, 2007, Wade, 1993, among others). This new black elite is shaped by (mulatos) black men born between 1900 and 1920. They have implications for the development of Chocó during the first half of 20<sup>th</sup> century. The majority of such men studied in whiter cities in Antioquia or Bogotá (Rausch, 2003, Wade, 1993). Therefore, they have access to information in the form of education. By revising the patterns of marriage for these black elite members, it is easy to identify that the majority of them were married to whiter women (Palacios, 2014, Rausch, 2003, Wade, 1993). Systematic or not, this behavior represents a process of cultural and physical whitening through marriage<sup>265</sup>. For instance, one of the most assiduous defenders of black Chocoanos was Diego Luis Cordoba. He was a politician who worked for black Chocoanos as a member of the Colombian congress. Nonetheless, Diego Luis Cordoba was accused of “betrayal” because he married a white woman from Antioquia (Wade, 1993, p. 311). As with this example, the literature shows further potential for “whitening”<sup>266</sup>. For instance, mulato Chocoano politicians such as Adan Arriaga and Ramon Lozano Garces also married whiter women (Palacios, 2014, Wade, 1993).

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<sup>265</sup> In this regard, Wade (1993, p. 121) states that “*a motive of blanqueamiento (whitening) is hard to discount*”.

<sup>266</sup> Moreover, Leal (2007) mentions that afro-descendant population reproduces racism when they have important positions.

However, these observations are not robust when for example one considers that the accusations of Diego Luis Cordoba of being a ‘traitor’ might have stemmed from enemies or envy (see Wade, 1993). Therefore, in his specific case, the fact described is not more than a controversial observation. Nevertheless, there are manifestations in the material that allow concluding that adaptation is a regular practice of some members of the black/mulato elite.

This analysis leads to the third attribute identified for adapted mid-aggrieved actors. Adapted mid-aggrieved actors, when holding positions of power in the political economy of public goods provision, adapt the exclusionary institution with the specific behavior of omission, neglect, and/or lack of interest for the provision of public goods that benefit the bulk of their similar afro-descendant population. Such behavior of adaptation results in ineffective initiatives for the provision of public goods that favor the bulk of excluded population. Consequently, these behaviors of adaptation contribute to low public goods provision. The following section explains this causal link in detail.

### ***5.3.2.2 The case of Adan Arriaga: the institution of racial exclusion, adaptation and public goods provision***

Secondary sources and the archival material show that Adan Arriaga is a typical adapted mid-aggrieved actor. Adan Arriaga (1907-1994) is a Chocoano, lawyer, and politician of Chocó. As an adapted mid aggrieved actor, he has the attributes of this category. In others words, first, Adan Arriaga faces mid-level effects from the informal institution of racial exclusion; he is a black mulato and affected by the unequal allocation of the informal institution of racial exclusion. However, he has access to resources with which he can minimize the effects of the informal unequal allocation of resources. Second, he adopts the informal institution of racial exclusion; he depicts exclusionary behaviors against afro-descendant population, and does this despite being a member of this population. Third, he holds a key position for the local political economy of public goods provision. He was an intendant, congressman, and minister of government among others positions of power. Once in such positions, he performs adaptation in the form of omission, negligence, lack of interest and/or systematic investment against the public goods provision for the bulk of the afro-descendant population. These behaviors of adaptation result in ineffective initiatives for the provision of public goods to favor the bulk of the excluded population.

The first attribute is evident in the material. The material shows that Adan Arriaga is a Chocoano from a black and modest origin. Consequently, he suffers from the unequal allocation of resources by the informal institution of racial exclusion. In the weekly newspaper *Sabado* in 1944, he is described as a Chocoano, from a black, indigenous and mulato humble background (Palacios, 2014). Because of his racial condition, he faces exclusion. For instance, the same article mentions that in a party in Quibdó a white girl indicated her intention to abandon the party “*if this black is going to dance here*” referring to Arriaga (Palacios, 2014 [own translation]). Many years later, Arriaga moved up in the social standings via education. That is, he had access to resources. His mobility was extremely successful. He achieved an important position of power not only in Chocoano politics, but also at the national level. Moreover, he married the same white girl that discriminated against him at the party a few years before (Palacios, 2014). In this matter, education allows him access to resources and to minimize the unequal allocation of resources that the informal institution of racial exclusion assigns to him.

It would be expected that since he is of afro-descendant origin, he treats this population in an equal way. Nevertheless, the archival material and historiography show that Adan Arriaga adapts the informal institution of racial exclusion thereby implicitly reproducing it. That is, he shows the second attribute of an adapted mid-aggrieved actor. The archives provide good descriptions of his regular practices of adaptation. In his reports as intendant of Chocó he systematically incites cultural and biological “*whitening*” and promotes white immigration to Chocó as a measurement of progress<sup>267</sup>. In these reports, he refers to immigration as “*redemptive immigration*”<sup>268</sup>. In the same source, he offers or describes a specific area of Chocó as areas “*more appropriate for white race*” in an effort to demonstrate that white people can live in Chocó without major problems. Similarly, in a report to the Colombian president, he focuses on Chocó’s needs for higher investment in roads because this measure would increase immigration and prosperity. Specifically, he states “*imagine this land (Chocó) in the hands of a stronger*

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<sup>267</sup> He frequently states that Chocó needs immigration. By immigration, he refers to Antioqueño immigrants (whiter), among other things because the Antioqueño race is the best for the mining economic traditions of Chocó. See for instance: Memorandum sobre el Chocó, Bogotá agosto 10 de 1934 in AGN: sección: Archivo Anexos, Entidad Productora: Ministerio de Gobierno sección Intendencias y Comisarías, Serie Documental: Intendencias Informes Generales, Caja: 001, Carpeta: 002, Folio: 98-105.

<sup>268</sup> Memorial a Senadores Andrade y Gartner diciembre 27 de 1934 hoja No 3 in AGN: sección: Archivo Anexos, Entidad Productora: Ministerio de Gobierno sección Intendencias y Comisarías, Serie Documental: Intendencias Informes Generales, Caja: 001, Carpeta: 002, Folio: 140-144 [own translation].



*race*” referring to the whiter race of Antioqueños despite himself being a black mulato Chocoano. Moreover, he disdainfully refers to black poor people in a zone of Chocó as “*poor blacks immersed in water all day*”<sup>269</sup>. In his appreciations, as authority of Chocó he promotes racist projects for the immigration of whiter people to Chocó which is contradictory with his afro-descendant origin, but not with adaptation to the exclusionary institution. Therefore, he is affected by his afro-descendant condition, but at the same time he follows the exclusionary institution by applying unequal treatment that discriminates against the afro-descendant population.

Contemporary observations also present manifestations of the adapted behavior of Adan Arriaga. Rausch (2003, 1999) and Wade (1993) mention that the perception of Arriaga is that he was a mulato leader used by the elite as a counterweight to real black progressive leaders such as Diego Luis Cordoba. According to Rausch (2003, p. 75), “Arriagistas” tried to halt the advances of afro-descendants led by Cordoba.

The third symptom that Adan Arriaga is representative of mid-aggrieved actors is that once in a position of power he adapts in the form of omission, negligence, and a lack of interest in the public goods provision for the bulk of the afro-descendant population. During his political life, Arriaga was an intendant of Chocó, governor, congressman, and minister of labor, among other important positions. He had knowledge of the region, its problems and obstacles.

During his rule as intendant<sup>270</sup>, there is a case that shows his negligence to the poor population and favoring of the local white elite. A letter of 6 October 1934 mentions that a Chocoano citizen complains that despite accomplishing all the requirements, the local government does not acknowledge his rights over a gold mine<sup>271</sup>. He argues that the reason why local authorities do not want to assign his rights is that the official of the secretary of finance of Chocó is a lawyer of the Chocó Pacifico Company (CPC), a mining transnational associated with the local white elite

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<sup>269</sup>Memorándum sobre el Chocó, Bogotá agosto 10 de 1934 in AGN: sección: Archivo Anexos, Entidad Productora: Ministerio de Gobierno sección Intendencias y Comisarías, Serie Documental: Intendencias Informes Generales, Caja: 001, Carpeta: 002, Folio: 98-105 [own translation].

<sup>270</sup> January 1934-november 1934 (Gómez, 1980).

<sup>271</sup> Carta al Ministro de Gobierno octubre 6 of 1934 in AGN: sección: Archivo Anexos, Entidad Productora: Ministerio de Gobierno sección Intendencias y Comisarías, Serie Documental: Correspondencias comunicaciones, Caja: 004, Carpeta: 003, Folio: 101 [own translation].

and with interests in his gold mine. Consequently, the local authority blocked his intentions to pay the necessary fees to obtain the right over the mine. Effectively, the document confirms that the official is a lawyer of the CPC. Nonetheless, the letter states that this is not a reason to refuse the claim, rather the citizen did not pay the rights to the mining title. The citizen, however, argues that the local authority did not accept his payment<sup>272</sup>.

This observation shows only that during his rule, the local population makes complaints about unequal treatment. However, it does not reveal if this unequal treatment is related to racialized characteristics. Moreover, counterarguments to regular behavior of adaptation are also available in the archives. For instance, the director of education in 1934 mentions that Adan Arriaga was an important actor supporting the creation of a popular secondary school for girls in Chocó<sup>273</sup>. This measure democratized education for popular classes. To evaluate whether Adan Arriaga demonstrates adaptation to the informal institution of racial exclusion, it is important to trace Adan Arriaga's political life.

Important evidence appears in a detailed analysis of his public goods investment plan while intendant of Chocó in 1934. The analysis shows that he did not promote measures that truly increased the wellbeing of the majority afro-descendant population. That is, there are relatively few initiatives to generate reforms to improve the political economy for public goods provision to benefit the bulk of the afro-descendant population. Instead, the analysis shows adaptation to the informal institution of racial exclusion, with an unequal distribution of resources among the majority afro-descendant racialized group.

For instance, during his rule in 1934, the numbers of primary schools decreased from 104 (with 133 teachers) to 90 (with 117 teachers)<sup>274</sup>. Public primary schools are a public good for the majority afro-descendant poor population (see illustration 5-2). In Arriaga's reports, he states

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<sup>272</sup> Indeed, the letter shows that the secretary of finance of Chocó is Dionisio Echeverry Ferrer.

<sup>273</sup> Intendencia Nacional del Chocó Dirección de Educación Pública, Quibdó 12 de junio de 1934 in AGN: sección: Archivo Anexos, Entidad Productora: Ministerio de Gobierno sección Intendencias y Comisarías, Serie Documental: Intendencias Informes Generales, Caja: 001, Carpeta: 002, Folio: 7-20.

<sup>274</sup> Reporte al Ministro de Gobierno, Quibdó 21 de junio de 1934 in AGN: sección: Archivo Anexos, Entidad Productora: Ministerio de Gobierno sección Intendencias y Comisarías, Serie Documental: Intendencias Informes Generales, Caja: 001, Carpeta: 002, Folio: 65.

that the majority afro-descendant population remains illiterate. The measure of cutting schools therefore affects this population.

Arriaga argues that this reduction is consequence of a forced reduction in the local budget. Indeed, he explains that the local budget was reduced from 390,622.70 Colombian pesos in 1933 to 368,152.08 in 1934 which means an effective reduction of 6.1 percent<sup>275</sup>. Moreover, he claims that national aid to Chocó also decreased as a consequence of an international crisis. Public investment in the intendancy is therefore low.

Nonetheless, analysis of the empirical material shows also that Adan Arriaga demonstrates regular behavior of selective investment that implicitly undermines the afro-descendant population. Explicitly, he decreases the numbers of schools instead of cutting others aspects of the local budget such as public investment in the intendancial palace<sup>276</sup> or the creation of new bureaucratic positions<sup>277</sup>. For instance, in his reports, he outlines improvements to intendancial revenue. Specifically, he states that there is a surplus of 26,203.64 Colombian pesos<sup>278</sup>. Indeed, the intendant later reports that the intendancy shows a favorable fiscal position because of the rise of the gold price and the intendancial surplus<sup>279</sup>.

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<sup>275</sup> Reporte al Ministro de Gobierno, Quibdó 21 de junio de 1934 in AGN: sección: Archivo Anexos, Entidad Productora: Ministerio de Gobierno sección Intendencias y Comisarías, Serie Documental: Intendencias Informes Generales, Caja: 001, Carpeta: 002, Folio: 64-78.

<sup>276</sup> City hall. Reporte al Ministro de Gobierno, Quibdó 21 de junio de 1934 in AGN: sección: Archivo Anexos, Entidad Productora: Ministerio de Gobierno sección Intendencias y Comisarías, Serie Documental: Intendencias Informes Generales, Caja: 001, Carpeta: 002, Folio: 70.

<sup>277</sup> Intendencia del Chocó Bogotá 12 de junio de 1934 in AGN: sección: Archivo Anexos, Entidad Productora: Ministerio de Gobierno sección Intendencias y Comisarías, Serie Documental: Intendencias Informes Generales, Caja: 001, Carpeta: 002, Folio: 94-96.

<sup>278</sup> Intendencia del Chocó Bogotá 12 de junio de 1934 in Reporte al Ministro de Gobierno, Quibdó 21 de junio de 1934 in AGN: sección: Archivo Anexos, Entidad Productora: Ministerio de Gobierno sección Intendencias y Comisarías, Serie Documental: Intendencias Informes Generales, Caja: 001, Carpeta: 002, Folio: 67.

<sup>279</sup> Intendencia del choco, Bogotá julio 12 de 1934 in Intendencia del Chocó Bogotá 12 de junio de 1934 in AGN: sección: Archivo Anexos, Entidad Productora: Ministerio de Gobierno sección Intendencias y Comisarías, Serie Documental: Intendencias Informes Generales, Caja: 001, Carpeta: 002, Folio: 96.

**Illustration 5-2 'Typical' students of primary schools in Chocó**



Source: Informe que el Prefecto Apostólico del Chocó rinde al ilustrísimo y reverendísimo Arzobispo de Colombia, como Presidente de la Junta Arquidiocesana de Misiones 1919-1923 [Report of apostolic prefect 1919-1923]

In a different source, the local officer of education specifies that Chocó needs 47 primary schools and the total value of this investment is 28,200 Colombian pesos<sup>280</sup>. Nonetheless, a decrease in primary schools during 1934 shows that it was not a public investment priority for the intendancy. Instead, the archives show Adan Arriaga defending the creation of new positions such as the 'supervisor' for new public works in the south of the department<sup>281</sup> and additional collectors of revenues<sup>282</sup>. Certainly, these new positions were maybe necessary. However, the

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<sup>280</sup> Intendencia Nacional del Chocó Dirección de Educación Pública Quibdó 23 de octubre 1934 in AGN: sección: Archivo Anexos, Entidad Productora: Ministerio de Gobierno sección Intendencias y Comisarías, Serie Documental: Intendencias Informes Generales, Caja: 001, Carpeta: 002, Folio: 131. And Quibdó octubre 1 de 1934 in AGN: sección: Archivo Anexos, Entidad Productora: Ministerio de Gobierno sección Intendencias y Comisarías, Serie Documental: Intendencias Informes Generales, Caja: 001, Carpeta: 002, Folio: 132-133.

<sup>281</sup> This new position represented a monthly salary of 70 Colombian pesos. Intendencia del choco, Bogotá julio 12 de 1934 in Intendencia del choco Bogotá 12 de junio de 1934 in AGN: sección: Archivo Anexos, Entidad Productora: Ministerio de Gobierno sección Intendencias y Comisarías, Serie Documental: Intendencias Informes Generales, Caja: 001, Carpeta: 002, Folio: 96.

<sup>282</sup> There is no specification of how many new collectors, but this new position represented a monthly salary of 30 Colombian pesos per collector. Intendencia del choco, Bogotá julio 12 de 1934 in Intendencia del choco in AGN:

literature and archival material mention that some of these strategies were in line with traditions of clientelism and bureaucracy of Chocoano governments (Wade, 1993, Cuesta, 1986, Gomez, 1980, Valois, 1945). For instance, Wade (1993, p. 118) quotes a Chocoano lawyer who states that the governing class of Chocó is inept and constantly concerned with “*who can take the biggest portion of the bureaucratic pie*”. In 1946 a report to the National Congress mentions that the fiscal organization should be structured against the “*tradition*”. The report says that in Chocó, “half” of the budget is dedicated to “*excessive bureaucracy*”. The report specifies that in the case of Quibdó, the budget and expenses dissolve “*into salaries and expenses of dubious moral justification*”<sup>283</sup>.

The surplus of 26,203.64 Colombian pesos could have mitigated the effects of the decreasing in total budget and national aid. This amount could also have stimulated more public goods such as primary schools required by the majority illiterate afro-descendant population<sup>284</sup>. Incidentally, based on the already quoted report from the officer of education<sup>285</sup>, the intendancy could have provided 43.67 new primary schools with the increase in own revenues. However, there is no evidence that show initiatives by Adan Arriaga to use this surplus in increasing primary education for poor Chocoano towns. Consequently, his regular behavior implicitly affects public goods provision for the majority afro-descendant population. In other words, Adan Arriaga adapts the informal institution of racial exclusion by omission, negligence or neglect of any systematic investment to benefit the majority afro-descendant population. Consequently, with such regular behavior, he allocates a low-level of resources to the excluded population.

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sección: Archivo Anexos, Entidad Productora: Ministerio de Gobierno sección Intendencias y Comisarías, Serie Documental: Intendencias Informes Generales, Caja: 001, Carpeta: 002, Folio: 94-95.

<sup>283</sup> Informe sobre la Intendencia del Chocó. Anales del Congreso, Cámara, Bogotá Noviembre 13 de 1946, p. 1495-1496 [own translation].

<sup>284</sup> Sources and data show that the majority Chocoanos are illiterate blacks. For instance, memorándum sobre el Chocó, Bogotá agosto 10 de 1934 in AGN: sección: Archivo Anexos, Entidad Productora: Ministerio de Gobierno sección Intendencias y Comisarías, Serie Documental: Intendencias Informes Generales, Caja: 001, Carpeta: 002, Folio: 98-105. p. 2.

<sup>285</sup> Intendencia Nacional del Chocó Dirección de Educación Pública Quibdó 23 de octubre 1934 in AGN: sección: Archivo Anexos, Entidad Productora: Ministerio de Gobierno sección Intendencias y Comisarías, Serie Documental: Intendencias Informes Generales, Caja: 001, Carpeta: 002, Folio: 131. And Quibdó octubre 1 de 1934 in AGN: sección: Archivo Anexos, Entidad Productora: Ministerio de Gobierno sección Intendencias y Comisarías, Serie Documental: Intendencias Informes Generales, Caja: 001, Carpeta: 002, Folio: 131-133.

Historiography also sheds light on symptoms of the adaptation of Adan Arriaga. Rauch (2003, 1999) and Wade (1993) describe Adan Arriaga as an ally of the local white Chocoana elite to antagonize the advancement of the afro-descendant population. Similarly, Palacios (2014) describes how this important politician from Chocó demonstrated good oratory skills and eloquence in his political campaigns. He (Adan Arriaga) extensively described the major problems of Chocó in his political discourse to obtain votes. Nevertheless, the author says, “*Why has Dr Arriaga, who deeply knows these problems, not tried to solve them?*”<sup>286</sup>

An answer to this question can be found in an institutional analysis of his ruling. When actors such as Adan Arriaga hold positions of power over the political economy for public goods provision, they adapt to the institution of racial exclusion with specific behavior such as: being negligent; developing policies that foster implicit exclusionary programs; or selectively investing in public goods that do not benefit the majority afro-descendants (such as immigration policies and allocating budget surpluses to new bureaucratic positions). These observations show that the regular practices of Arriaga are a manifestation of an adapted mid-aggrieved actor. He did not make sufficient effort in providing local public goods to benefit the bulk of the afro-descendant population. In turn, he reproduces the informal institution of racial exclusion, contributing to the low outcomes in this region. Such adaptation behavior resulted in ineffective initiatives for the provision of public goods to favor the bulk of the excluded population such as primary schools for poor afro-descendants.

### **5.3.2.3 Mid-aggrieved revisionist actors**

Evidences of revisionist mid-aggrieved actors are also apparent in the behavior of members of the black/ light mulato elite. Similar to adapted actors, revisionist mid-aggrieved actors are of afro-descendant origin. They have a black-mulato heritage that affects them through an unequal allocation of resources. However, either their afro-descendant heritage is minimal or they have access to resources. These conditions minimize the effects of the informal unequal allocation of resources. There is evidence that these actors revise the informal institution of racial exclusion. Moreover, when they hold key positions in the local political economy for public goods

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<sup>286</sup> The author refers to the year of 1939 and to Certegui, i.e. a local municipality in Choco. The author also refers to the lack of initiatives for the national holiday of independence as evidence of this politician’s low interest in the region. (Palacios, 2014, p. unknown [own translation]).

provision, such revision is manifested as the promotion of reforms to exclusionary policies. These reforms propagate effective initiatives for a more egalitarian provision of public goods that favor the bulk of excluded population. That is, they propagate effective initiatives for the provision of public goods.

#### ***5.3.2.4 Vicente Barrios Ferrer, the institution of racial exclusion, revisions and public goods provision***

The symptoms of revisionist mid-aggrieved actors are evident in persons such as Vicente Barrios Ferrer. Vicente Barrios Ferrer was a Chocoano born in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century (1908) with an afro-descendant heritage and representative of a revisionist mid-aggrieved actor (see illustration 5-3). Pisano (2012, p. 156) describes Vicente Barrios Ferrer as phenotypically light. However, Wade (1993) also describes Vicente Barrios Ferrer as a son of a white father and black mother which makes him an afro-descendant (Wade, 1993, p. 117). He grew up in an environment that excluded afro-descendants because of social constructions associated with the black world of Chocó. Nonetheless, the level at which he was affected is lower than for a typical afro-descendant because he had access to information and had lower afro-descendant characteristics<sup>287</sup>. Consequently, his access to information mitigates the unequal allocation of resources by the informal institution of racial exclusion.

There is evidence that permit the conclusion that when Vicente Barrios Ferrer holds positions key for the local political economy of public goods provision, he makes revisions to the informal exclusionary institution through reforms to implicit exclusionary policies. These reforms produce effective initiatives for a more egalitarian provision of public goods for the majority afro-descendant population.

Specifically, Vicente Barrios Ferrer leads revisions to the informal institution of racial exclusion in the form of reforms that eliminate implicit boundaries for afro-descendant population. A manifestation of these revisions is in the creation of the public secondary schools for girls of Quibdó in 1934 when he is secretary of education in Chocó.

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<sup>287</sup> On one hand, he was an afro-descendant of lighter skin color. On the other hand, he was educated and achieved high positions within the Chocó social hierarchy.

**Illustration 5-3 Vicente Barrios Ferrer**



Source: Palacios (2012)

Historically, Chocó is educationally backward. Backwardness in education is especially notable in education that facilitates social mobility such as secondary education. In 1934, there are only two secondary schools in Chocó. This limits access to secondary education to a low number of individuals. These individuals are members of the white or emergent mulato elite. The white and mulato Chocoana elite fulfill requirements that implicitly exclude the afro-descendant component of the population, requirements such as the high cost of education and other socially implicit boundaries<sup>288</sup>.

In 1934 Vicente Barrios Ferrer was the director of the office of education in Chocó. In his reports, he states that the unique school of girls in Quibdó is exclusionary. This school is the “Presentation” school ruled by a catholic order of the Reverend Mothers of the Presentation. The school was elitist and historically financed with public local and national funding. In 1919, the report of the intendant states that the intendency finances this private school because it provides the education for “*our daughters*”<sup>289</sup>. Moreover, Article 4 of national Law 62 of 1915 establishes the allocation of public funding to finance the completion of the construction of this school. Additionally, Law 119 of 1928 institutes national aid of 10 Colombian pesos per student in the

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<sup>288</sup> By this time, secondary education is for well positioned members of society (see for instance Pisano, 2012, 2010, Wade, 1993).

<sup>289</sup> Memoria del Intendente Nacional del Chocó al señor Ministro de Gobierno 1919, p. 45 [own translation]. Imprenta Oficial. Quibdó.



school. This means public funds finance the education of the white-mulato elite of the Chocoano society while the bulk of the afro-descendant population remain in illiteracy.

Vicente Barrios Ferrer states that the nuns of the Presentation refuse to enroll “*girls from popular classes*”. He then presents “*to the administrative council a project to create an intendential secondary school for girls*”<sup>290</sup>. The enrollment of an average Chocoana in the Presentation school is effectively a real challenge. It requires overcoming implicit boundaries and rights and obligations that discriminate against the afro-descendant population. According to Pisano (2012 and 2010), students had to be daughters of married parents and pay a monthly fee of 80 Colombian pesos. These conditions eliminated all the poor afro-descendant population that lived mainly in open relationships and under poor economic conditions<sup>291</sup>. Incidentally, the report of the intendant shows that the monthly salary of a public teacher is 30 Colombian pesos<sup>292</sup>. Consequently, a monthly fee of 80 Colombian pesos was virtually impossible for a poor Chocoano. Illustration 5-4 shows students of the Presentation school. This image illustrates the prevalent whiter phenotypical characteristics of students from this school.

The initiative to create a new school is itself a revision of the informal institution of racial exclusion in the form of reforms that eliminate implicit exclusionary policies<sup>293</sup>. Furthermore, additional reforms were behind this initiative. In the reports, Vicente Barrios Ferrer says that to create a new public secondary school he approves a stop on public funding that financed the private Presentation school. Stopping public funding allows resources for the new public school. This fact constitutes a reform to the implicit exclusionary policies against the afro-descendant population. As Vicente Barrios Ferrer states, by stopping resources for the Presentation school,

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<sup>290</sup> Intendencia Nacional del Chocó Dirección de Instrucción Pública, Quibdó 12 de junio de 1934 in AGN: sección: Archivo Anexos, Entidad Productora: Ministerio de Gobierno sección Intendencias y Comisarías, Serie Documental: Intendencias Informes Generales, Caja: 001, Carpeta: 002, Folio: 17 [own translation].

<sup>291</sup> Gutierrez (1975) shows patterns of family life in Colombia. The author demonstrates that the rates of cohabitation are significantly high for regions such as Chocó.

<sup>292</sup> The salary of a public teacher was between 30 or 42 Colombian pesos per month. Intendencia Nacional del Chocó Dirección de Instrucción Pública, Quibdó 12 de junio de 1934 in AGN: sección: Archivo Anexos, Entidad Productora: Ministerio de Gobierno sección Intendencias y Comisarías, Serie Documental: Intendencias Informes Generales, Caja: 001, Carpeta: 002, Folio: 8.

<sup>293</sup> That is, implicit boundaries, rights and obligations that discriminate against the afro-descendant population, i.e. implicit racial exclusion.

students from popular classes get access to education and “*now what was impossible has become a reality*” for poor Chocoanas<sup>294</sup>.

**Illustration 5-4 School of the Presentation of the Reverend Mothers of the Presentation Quibdó infant section**



Source: Informe que el Prefecto Apostólico del Chocó rinde al ilustrísimo y reverendísimo Arzobispo de Colombia, como Presidente de la Junta Arquidiocesana de Misiones 1919-1923 [Report of apostolic prefect 1919-1923]

The new public school is finally opened in 1934. This means that this revision of an implicit exclusionary policy propagates an effective initiative to improve public goods provision that benefits the bulk of afro-descendant population. This fact also illustrates that such behavior by a revisionist mid-aggrieved actor consequently contributes to increasing the final outcome of public goods provision. For example, the national report of education in 1938 shows that Chocó went from having zero secondary public schools for students from popular classes<sup>295</sup> in 1934 to one new school with 94 students in 1937<sup>296</sup>. Therefore, the behavior of Vicente Barrios Ferrer allows more afro-descendants to access public goods such as education.

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<sup>294</sup> Access to the new school is for “*all students from popular classes with primary education and good behavior*” Intendencia Nacional del Chocó Dirección de Instrucción Pública, Quibdó 12 de junio de 1934 in AGN: sección: Archivo Anexos, Entidad Productora: Ministerio de Gobierno sección Intendencias y Comisarias, Serie Documental: Intendencias Informes Generales, Caja: 001, Carpeta: 002, Folio: 17 [own translation].

<sup>295</sup> Exceptions were a few students with scholarships in La Presentacion.

<sup>296</sup> Memoria 1938 section statistics after p. 99. Educación Nacional Informe al Congreso 1938. Editorial ABC. Bogota.

Nonetheless, as Vicente Barrios Ferrer is the author of some of the analyzed sources, it is important to evaluate these observations. Following Beach & Pedersen (2013), the analysis of background knowledge reveals evidence that confirm the hypothesis of a revisionist mid-aggrieved actor. Secondary sources such as Wade (1993) and Caicedo (1992) present descriptions of Vicente Barrios Ferrer. Caicedo and Wade show that Vicente Barrios Ferrer was a Chocoano with afro heritage. The authors also show that Vicente Barrios Ferrer accesses resources via education studying at the Colegio Carrasquilla of Quibdó and later in Medellín. Finally, Vicente Barrios Ferrer holds key positions in the political economy for public goods provision. These observations corroborate Vicente Barrios Ferrer having the attributes of being an actor moderately affected by the unequal allocation of the informal institution of racial exclusion. However, he has access to resources with which he can minimize the unequal allocation of resources. Secondary sources also contain evidence that permits the conclusion that once in positions of power in the local political economy for public goods provision, this revisionist mid-aggrieved actor carries out revisions to the exclusionary institution. In this regard, Caicedo (1992) states that the elite of Chocó celebrated the appointment of Barrios Ferrer as director of education of Chocó because they (the elite) thought that Vicente Barrios Ferrer would continue educational discrimination against blacks and poor people. However, the author claims that this was not the case. Along the same line, Wade (1993) explains that in 1933, Vicente Barrios Ferrer combined the wealthy Modelo School and the poor Annex School as a measure to remove social barriers. The author says that “*this was the first effective blow against the aristocracy*” or the white/mulato elite of Chocó (Wade, 1993 p. 117 quoting Caicedo, 1977)<sup>297</sup>. Vicente Barrios Ferrer therefore promotes reforms to the exclusionary setting.

In summary, these observations arrive at the conclusion that a revisionist-mid aggrieved actor such as Vicente Barrios Ferrer contributes to public goods provision by revising the informal institution of racial exclusion. Vicente Barrios Ferrer was of afro-descendant origin and affected by the unequal allocation of the informal institution of racial exclusion. However, he has access to resources that minimize the effects of an informal and unequal allocation of resources and

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<sup>297</sup> Besides, Caicedo (1992, p. 32 [own translation]) states that in his discourse before enacting this norm in front of the population Vicente Barrios Ferrer says “*since education is supported by the government for the benefit of the community and equality, on Monday, half of each course of the Modelo School will pass to the annex school and vice versa.*”

contests the informal institution of racial exclusion. Finally, in positions of power in the local political economy for public goods provision, he carries out revisions by reforming implicit exclusionary policies. These reforms produce effective initiatives for a more egalitarian provision of public schools that favor the majority afro-descendant population.

### **5.3.3 Regular practices of aggrieved actors: the bulk of afro-descendant population**

Aggrieved actors are highly affected by the informal institution of racial exclusion. This actor has racialized characteristics associated with the informal institution. Moreover, in contrast to mid-aggrieved actors, they have relatively little access to resources to minimize the exclusionary allocation of resources. Similarly, in contrast to mid-aggrieved actors, they rarely have access to positions of power in the local political economy for public goods provision. Such conditions of a low allocation of resources limit their opportunities for revisions that truly contribute to both revision of the informal institution of racial exclusion and the final outcome of public goods provision.

There are manifestations in the material that the regular behavior of aggrieved actors are generally of two types. First, some aggrieved actors behave in ways to reinforce the exclusionary institution. These are related to ‘non-cooperative’ behavior that in turn reproduce the informal institution of racial exclusion. Non-cooperative behavior promotes self-suppression in the form of self-racism, egoism, rivalries, antagonism, and/or lack of cooperation with their similar afro-descendants. Nonetheless, contrary to adaptation, aggrieved actors receive no benefit in promoting such behavior. Such non-cooperative behavior and the resulting institutional reproduction block collaborative initiatives that allow eliminating exclusionary policies for public goods provision. Subsequently, the survival of exclusionary policies fosters low public goods provision for the afro-descendant population. Second, limited access to resources does not mean the absence of demands for change. There are also manifestations of regular behavior contesting the informal institution of racial exclusion. Such contestations are in the form of protests, demands and/or complaints against exclusionary policies. However, there are signs that

such contestations have minor effects in promoting reforms to the exclusionary institution and the final outcome<sup>298</sup>.

### **5.3.3.1 Aggrieved actors: non-cooperative behavior among Chocoanos**

In the empirical material, there is no evidence of individual aggrieved actors. Typical and common afro-descendants are ‘obscured’ in the sources as if they “*do not have voice*” (Pisano, 2012, p. 24 [own translation]). The literature contends that this fact is normal in a context that makes invisible those who are not members of what the national ideology considers as ‘ideal’.

However, as the methodological section suggests, using Collier (1999, p. 15), aggrieved actors emerge as collectivities in the empirical material. That is, aggrieved actors appear as regions, provinces, groups, towns, etc.

The analysis of the empirical material permits the conclusion that aggrieved actors share the following attributes. First, they are actors highly affected by the informal institution of racial exclusion. These communities, towns or cities also share the attribute of relatively scarce or no allocation of resources. That is, they do not have access to resources to minimize the unequal allocation of resources by the informal institution of racial exclusion<sup>299</sup>.

A second attribute is that aggrieved actors carry out their regular practices in a local context of a homogeneous excluded population. This attribute and the low access to resources differentiate aggrieved actors from mid-aggrieved actors.

Third, there is evidence that some aggrieved actors share regular behavior attributes that promote self-suppression. In other words, they carry out non-cooperative behavior that reproduces the

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<sup>298</sup> Non-cooperation and contestation behavior have been identified and classified using the literature on institutionalism and race as a theoretical guide, for instance Pyke (2010), Smith (2010), Shasha (2009), Leal (2007), Hoffman, 2006, Bivens (2005), Tilly (1998), Gaventa (1998), Wade (1993), Luke (1974), among others (see the theoretical chapter section 2.3.5).

<sup>299</sup> In other words, they are the bulk of the afro-descendant poor population.

informal institution of racial exclusion. Non-cooperative behavior is behavior in the form of rivalries, stereotypes, egoism and/or lack of cooperation with similar afro-descendants<sup>300</sup>.

Fourth, an additional attribute is that when such actors and behavior are related to positions in the local political economy for public goods provision, such non-cooperative behavior block collaborative initiatives that allow the elimination of exclusionary policies against afro-descendant population which generate low public goods provision. Symptoms of the various attributes are evident in the antagonism between two Chocó regions: the historical provinces of Atrato and San Juan<sup>301</sup>.

In this discussion, Chocó as a whole is a collective actor shaped by these two provinces. In turn, Atrato and San Juan perform as sub-actor members of the Chocó collectivity. As members of Chocó, Atrato and San Juan receive unequal treatment that discriminates against them in the form of neglect, negligence and lack of interest by the national elites. As already discussed, Chocó is an excluded region because of its racialized characteristics<sup>302</sup>. This exclusion is tacitly enforced by the national institutional design of implicit racism. Consequently, the provinces of Atrato and San Juan are actors that share the attributes of being affected by the informal institution of racial exclusion through a scarce allocation of resources and low opportunities to break away from this condition.

These aggrieved actors are a homogeneous and majority excluded population. The two provinces have a similar afro-descendant composition. According to a population census, 72 percent of the population in Atrato and 69 percent in San Juan are afro-descendants<sup>303</sup>. The rest of the population is mainly blacker mestizos. They are also mainly poor. The white component is a small minority while the excluded population is majority. Atrato and San Juan, as collective actors, therefore lack two attributes key for mid-aggrieved actors. Mid-aggrieved actors have relatively significant access to resources and are closely related to the social circle of power of

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<sup>300</sup> As already mentioned, much of this behavior is present in different types of literature such as institutionalism and racial relations.

<sup>301</sup> The capital of Chocó Quibdó is in Atrato. San Juan is the most important mining area in the region.

<sup>302</sup> For instance, as already explained Chocó, as a blacker and backward region, is from the national government's viewpoint, incapable of self-governance and requires direct supervision of the paternal whiter national government.

<sup>303</sup> Population census 1912, p. 292.

the white elite. In this case, Atrato and San Juan are mainly black, poor and relatively disconnected from the national white elite power.

Nonetheless, despite these socio-racial homogeneous characteristics, the empirical material frequently describes behavior that reproduces the informal institution of racial exclusion among similar aggrieved actors. However, in contrast to mid-aggrieved actors, this reproduction is in the form of non-cooperative behavior such as rivalries, antagonism, egoism, and/or lack of cooperation among similar aggrieved actors<sup>304</sup>. Therefore, while mid-aggrieved actors try to adjust and follow the informal institution as a possible condition of acceptability to the white world<sup>305</sup>, aggrieved actors face an ‘irrational’ behavior of non-cooperation in the form of antagonism, rivalries, etc. with their similar aggrieved.

For instance, in 1906, a report makes a request to the national government for a new secondary school for girls in Quibdó, de capital of Atrato. The major argument of the request however refers to rivalries between the communities of Atrato and San Juan. The author states that the province of Atrato requires this secondary school because “*this region is superior to Itsmina*”<sup>306</sup>. Itsmina is the capital of the province of San Juan, the antagonist province.

Two different sources mention the same rivalry and antagonism thirty years later. In 1934, a report on education remarks that this rivalry affects cooperation among Chocoanos. The report states that the Chocoano population must “*forget resentments*” against members of the intendancy “*with unfounded hatred*” making a call to “*inter-provincial solidarity*”<sup>307</sup>.

Similarly, in 1934 the report from the prefecture of the province of San Juan exemplifies tensions between the two provinces of Chocó. In this report, the author states that there is an “*irritating*” allocation of funding to San Juan. The author adds that this province is under conditions of

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<sup>304</sup> It is different to adaptation.

<sup>305</sup> As interpreted by authors such as Robinson (2012), Pierson (2004), and Wade (1993).

<sup>306</sup> In AGN: Ministerio de Instrucción Pública expediente No 1427 abril 20 de 1906. El Prefecto de la Provincia de Atrato, transcribe algunos párrafos del informe emitido por el al señor gobernador del departamento, sobre la marcha de la administración pública en esa provincia, Folio: 9-12 [own translation].

<sup>307</sup> Intendencia Nacional del Chocó Dirección de Educación Pública, Quibdó 12 de junio de 1934 in AGN: sección: Archivo Anexos, Entidad Productora: Ministerio de Gobierno sección Intendencias y Comisarias, Serie Documental: Intendencias Informes Generales, Caja: 001, Carpeta: 002, Folio: 19 [own translation].

“inferiority” compared with Atrato and this fact is one of “*the causes of discontent of the inhabitants of San Juan, related to the actions of Atrato*” and the cause “*of the struggle and antagonism, of which there are constant demonstrations*”<sup>308</sup>. Such regular patterns of behavior also appear in newspapers<sup>309</sup>.

A final observation indicates that such behavior blocks initiatives for public goods provision. According to an ex-intendant of Chocó, M. Vargas, rivalries were normal behavior among chocoanos when he was intendant (1924-1926). He states that the antagonism made the administration difficult because “*any measure that benefits one province was seen with jealousy by the other province*”<sup>310</sup> referring to the antagonism between Atrato and San Juan. Hence, the historical antagonism and lack of solidarity among Chocoanos, instead of propagating the organization of common interests, propagates difficulties for proper administration.

Likewise, the report describes a specific case where this antagonism among Chocoanos contributes to blocking effective reforms to exclusionary policies with effects on local public goods provision. The author refers to a project to construct a public road between the two antagonist provinces. The new road would potentially improve economic activities and communication between Atrato and San Juan. Nonetheless, it was not possible.

There are two causes for the failure and both are related. The first was the decrease in funding by the national government. The second, according to the source, disputes among Chocoanos that obstruct such resources. Specifically, the author states that the initiative for this public good was blocked for “*what is truly inexplicable, the opposition and complaints from...Chocoanos*”. The Chocoanos, states the author, generated a bad atmosphere in the process<sup>311</sup>.

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<sup>308</sup> Itsmina Agosto 15 de 1934 by Antonio Asprilla in AGN: sección: Archivo Anexos, Entidad Productora: Ministerio de Gobierno sección Intendencias y Comisarias, Serie Documental: Intendencias Informes Generales, Caja: 001, Carpeta: 002, Folio: 111-112 [own translation].

<sup>309</sup> See for instance various editions of the local newspaper ABC.

<sup>310</sup> Septiembre 29 de 1933 carta de M. Vargas Vásquez in AGN: Archivo Anexo, Entidad Productora: Ministerio de Gobierno sección Intendencias y Comisarias, Serie Documental: Intendencias Informes Generales, Caja: 001, Carpeta: 001, Folio: 32-34 [own translation].

<sup>311</sup> Septiembre 29 de 1933 carta de M. Vargas Vásquez in AGN: Archivo Anexo, Entidad Productora: Ministerio de Gobierno sección Intendencias y Comisarias, Serie Documental: Intendencias Informes Generales, Caja: 001, Carpeta: 001, Folio: 32-34 [own translation].



These different observations show that aggrieved actors share behavior that promote their own suppression. In other words, since they are homogeneous afro-descendants, they behave non-cooperatively reproducing the informal institution of racial exclusion in the form of behavior such as rivalries and antagonisms among their similar afro-descendants. Moreover, non-cooperative behavior among aggrieved actors block collaborative initiatives that allow generating public goods provision in favor of such afro-descendant communities.

Important caveats in this issue are that such regular non-cooperative behavior takes place among relatively equally excluded actors and not between actors with different levels of exclusion. Moreover, such non-cooperative behavior is closely related to racial order. Lastly, in contrast to adaptation, non-cooperative behavior does not have the connotations of difference from their similar afro-descendants. For example, non-cooperative behavior is not from an actor, town or province with a better standing (whiter or wealthier) against an actor, town or province with lower standing (blacker and poorer). Non-cooperative behavior also does not aim to establish similarities with the white world. Non-cooperative behavior takes place among relatively equally excluded actors with relatively low access to resources that reproduce their own suppression.

Nonetheless, Palacios (2006, p. 2) argues that rivalries “*between towns, regions and (political) parties*” were characteristic elements of the Colombian context. That is, rivalries and antagonism could be part of the context and not of the mechanism. However, there are symptoms to classify specific behavior such as rivalry in the regular behavior of actors highly aggrieved by an exclusionary institution and not as part of contextual conditions.

First, the report of the ex-intendant M. Vargas claims that antagonism “*dominates public life in Chocó*” and this antagonism (regionalism) has a “*more intense character than in any other areas of Colombia*”<sup>312</sup>. Rivalries and antagonisms were more profound in an afro-descendant region such as Chocó because the informal institution of racial exclusion means tensions among excluded actors. That is, the unequal allocation of resources fosters low resources being disputed

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<sup>312</sup> Septiembre 29 de 1933 carta de M. Vargas Vásquez in AGN: Archivo Anexo, Entidad Productora: Ministerio de Gobierno sección Intendencias y Comisarias, Serie Documental: Intendencias Informes Generales, Caja: 001, Carpeta: 001, Folio: 32-34 [own translation].

and defended among similar aggrieved actors in a contentious manner<sup>313</sup>. Between similar aggrieved towns and provinces are permanent disputes on defending positions, privileges, advantages, resources, regionalism, etc.

For instance, the material provides regular expressions of rivalries such as the capital of an intendancy having to be a certain city because it is “*most important*” than others, or a school being allocated in a particular province because of its “*superiority*”, etc<sup>314</sup>. Egoism, rivalries and regionalism are also evident in intendancial reports. On the one hand, a report in 1908 refers to egoistic individuals that do not take a path of reconciliation<sup>315</sup>. In the reports for 1940 and 1941, the intendant also refers to such symptoms of rivalries among Chocoanos in the form of political struggles and regionalism. Similarly, examples of a lack of solidarity exist in the empirical material as non-cooperative behavior by aggrieved actors. In 1934, a report from the secretary of education states that education should be focused on developing cooperation among Chocoanos because the opposite values prevail<sup>316</sup>. This observation points out the existence of a lack of cooperation inside this black region. Consequently, non-cooperative behavior in the form of tensions, antagonism, rivalry, etc. are frequent types of behavior in Chocó.

The background knowledge in the literature also presents manifestations of non-cooperative behavior related to the racial order in Chocó. Claudia Leal mentions that afro-descendants were considered by themselves as pusillanimous with inferiority complexes that divided instead of eliminating hatred against them. Indeed, quoting Caicedo (1992), Leal (2007) mentions that these divisions and lack of solidarity among afro-descendants prosper paradoxically beyond the end of the domination of the white elite in Chocó after 1960<sup>317</sup>.

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<sup>313</sup> See for instance Bivens (2005).

<sup>314</sup> In AGN: Ministerio de Instrucción Pública expediente No 1427 abril 20 de 1906. El Prefecto de la Provincia de Atrato, transcribe algunos párrafos del informe emitido por el al señor gobernador del departamento, sobre la marcha de la administración pública en esa provincia, Folio: 9-12 [own translation].

<sup>315</sup> Informe del Intendente Nacional del Chocó 1918, p. 46-47. Edición Oficial, Imprenta Nacional. Bogotá.

<sup>316</sup> Intendencia Nacional del Chocó Dirección de Educación Pública, Quibdó 12 de junio de 1934 in AGN: sección: Archivo Anexos, Entidad Productora: Ministerio de Gobierno sección Intendencias y Comisarias, Serie Documental: Intendencias Informes Generales, Caja: 001, Carpeta: 002, Folio: 19.

<sup>317</sup> Contemporary anthropological and sociological studies also shed light on this patterned behavior of aggrieved actors. For example, Peter Wade (1993, p.325) states that in Colombia inside the black population, solidarity is a “*hard goal*”. Egotism, envy and lack of solidarity represent common behavior by the black population in a context of inequality such as in Chocó. Such behavior propagates divisions that will affect processes of resistance to

Finally, the reason for such behavior is the implicit racial order that dominates social, political and economic Chocoano life. This implicit racial order is evident, for instance, in a 1946 report to the National Congress stating that in Chocó there is a profound racial problem that blocks the progress of the intendancy<sup>318</sup>. The profound racial problem is a manifestation of the informal institution of racial exclusion being more in force in Chocó than in any other Colombian region. This institution was in force in a tacit association between race and class, in socio-physical “whitening” processes, and also in racial conflicts between similar aggrieved actors (as those described in Hernandez, 2010, Urrego, 2010, Leal, 2007, Wade, 1993, Report to the National Congress, 1946). Consequently, this research classifies the regular practices of antagonism and rivalries, etc. as forms of non-cooperative behavior that reproduces the informal institution of racial exclusion and is not a contextual condition as the analysis of Palacios would indicate.

### ***5.3.3.2 Aggrieved actors contestations: complaints, demands, protests and denouncements***

Other regular behavior of aggrieved actors refers to contestations to the informal institution of racial exclusion. Fully aggrieved actors contest the informal institution of racial exclusion. These contestations are in the form of demands, protests and/or complaints against the unequal allocation of resources they face. However, the relative low access to resources mitigates opportunities to promote initiatives that achieve reforms to exclusionary policies that affect public goods provision for the afro-descendant population.

The official correspondence from national authorities, local authorities and citizens reveal examples of these demands, protests and complaints. In most cases, contestations take the form of demands for more public schools, teachers, scholarships, roads or social services that benefit the afro-descendant population.

For instance, it is usual in the material to observe grievances from citizens. These grievances are related to discrimination against Chocó in the form of a lack of national support for this region. Similarly, there are also manifestations of regular behavior in contesting the informal institution

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promote revisions and improvements in socio-economic conditions. Peter Wade describes this situation for the temporal dimension of 1980.

<sup>318</sup> Informe sobre la Intendencia del Chocó. Anales del Senado, Cámara, Bogotá Noviembre 13 de 1946, p. 1495.

of racial exclusion in the form of protests, demands and complaints against exclusionary policies or actors.

There are four examples of contestation to discuss. The first is a letter to the national government. In this letter, several citizens from the Pacific-Chocoana region request more investment in infrastructure for the region and complain about the fact that the local people live in poverty and precarious conditions. Nonetheless, national energies, they say, are “*dedicated exclusively to*” the Andean region (a whiter region). Moreover, the authors also claim that there is no interest by national authorities in this part of the country. Therefore, they call for attention to remedy this fact<sup>319</sup>.

Second, in 1934 peasants argue that Chocó doesn’t progress for “*obvious reasons*”. These reasons concern the existence of wealthy landholders engaged in reproducing “*abominable and ruinous*” practices affecting “*the labor and farming class*”<sup>320</sup>. They argue that Chocó does not progress because of the “*gamonales and caciques*” or wealthy people, usually whiter landholders, who establish feudal relations and grab land. All these actions, the authors say, affect their agricultural activities and quality of life.

Third, many of these complaints are related to multinational mining companies such as the Chocó Pacific Company. In the annals of the Colombian senate in 1922, the Chocoano towns of San Pablo, Condotó and Tadó “*complain about irregularities and usurpations*” by the foreign companies in areas near to the rivers San Juan and Condoto. The authors express that they “*do not know how to sign (their names)*” indicating their illiteracy, likelihood of being of afro descent and low access to information. However, they contest the state about “*irregularities and usurpations*”. They demand a law to protect their rights “*because local authorities do not enforce their rights*”<sup>321</sup>.

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<sup>319</sup> Letter to the ministry of government. November 30 1933. In AGN: sección: Archivo Anexos, Entidad Productora: Ministerio de Gobierno sección Intendencias y Comisarías, Serie Documental: Informes generales, Caja: 001, Carpeta: 001, Folio: 56-57 [own translation].

<sup>320</sup> Correspondence to Secretary of Intendencias y Comisarias julio 8 de 1934 in AGN: sección: Archivo Anexos, Entidad Productora: Ministerio de Gobierno sección Intendencias y Comisarías, Serie Documental: Correspondencias comunicaciones, Caja: 004, Carpeta: 003, Folio:13 [own translation].

<sup>321</sup> Anales del Senado, secciones extraordinarias, Bogotá noviembre 27 No 90 de 1922 [own translation].

Finally, regular contestations appear in the reports of the Chocó intendant for 1908, 1919, 1934, 1940 and 1941. For example, in 1934, the report states that during the period there are no “*violent clashes*” related to the intensive exploitation of the multinational Choco Pacific Company. However, the community of “*La Vuelta*” has complaints because of the damage caused by this company in the navigation of the rivers.

Nevertheless, these contestations rarely materialize in effective reforms for local socio-economic outcomes. There are signs that such contestations have minor repercussions in promoting reforms to the exclusionary institution and the final outcome. The observational reforms are achieved when actors with higher access to resources can channel such claims (for instance, mid-aggrieved actors).

This means, in contrast to the revisionist mid-aggrieved actors, some aggrieved actors force contestations. However, these initiatives are generally blocked because these actors do not have access to resources that minimize the effects of the exclusionary institution and do not hold positions of power. In the majority of cases, it is not possible to determine whether their claims were solved. For instance, it is not possible to process the complaint on “*gamonales and caciques*” concerning land grabbing in 1934.

Other examples show that demands are usually denied or blocked almost immediately. Part of the reason concerns actors’ low access to resources and positions of power. In the case already described on the demand for a new law against “*irregularities and usurpations*” (in San Pablo, Condoto y Tadó in 1922), the National Congress responds by stating laws already exist to protect their rights. Therefore, the senate suggests “*say to the claimants that the senate does not consider a new law necessary ...they should make their claims to the judiciary*”<sup>322</sup>. With such an answer, no observable modification in local outcomes related to access to public goods was achieved. The major reason why such claims failed was because they were usually redirected to the local authorities and the dynamics at the local level depended on actors such as non-aggrieved white elites or adapted mid-aggrieved black elites who tended to reproduce the oppression. Cuesta (1986) also presents examples of a low capacity by aggrieved actors to achieve real reforms to

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<sup>322</sup> Anales del Senado, secciones extraordinarias, Bogotá noviembre 27 No 90 de 1922 [own translation].

exclusionary policies. The author states that the afro-descendant population did not have any status. They are marginalized from holding positions in the intendential government.

What is important in these examples is that despite an unequal distribution of resources by the institutional framework, aggrieved actors also try to contest such institutional allocation of resources. Moreover, although these contestations have limited effects, they set a clear precedent for future revisions. In the long run, some of the demands are met when they are undertaken by revisionist mid-aggrieved actors. For instance, after many requests to national governments, Chocó gained its first public school for secondary education for men in 1904. During this time, claims were also made for a public school for women. The school was finally achieved thirty years later in 1934 by mid-aggrieved actor such as Vicente Barrios Ferrer<sup>323</sup>.

#### **5.4 Scope conditions**

Section 2.4 discussed that a mechanism of reaction to exclusionary institutions fails to prosper without a context to facilitate it. The Colombian case of late 19<sup>th</sup> and mid-20<sup>th</sup> centuries is a context of structural political and economic inequalities, and a tacit ideology of differences. Following authors such as Falleti & Lynch (2009), without such contextual conditions, the effects of racial exclusion on local outcomes and actor behavior could be different.

In this context, the informal institution of racial exclusion facilitates the control of power resources (Hoffman & Centeno, 2003). In other words, in this context race becomes socially significant in dividing people into different racial categories. Such classification facilitates the allocation of rights and obligations to each specific group in which a dominant power group receives benefits (National Research Council, 2004, Loury, 2003).

Therefore, informal hierarchical race relations are an informal institution that acts as a causal factor with potential effects on public goods provision. In turn, the context of political and economic inequalities and a tacit ideology of difference is the setting that triggers the mechanism between cause and outcome. This fact entails, as Falleti & Lynch (2009) would suggest, that

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<sup>323</sup> As described in the previous section. The literature also shows signs of contestations. For example, Wade (1993, p. 37) states that some of the excluded population implicitly or explicitly rejected the allocated status of inferiority.

either in more egalitarian political and economic contexts or/and in contexts of explicit ideology of differences, the way in which the informal institution of racial exclusion affects local socio-economic outcomes could be different.

The following section presents an analysis of the empirical material regarding the contextual conditions.

#### **5.4.1 Political inequalities**

In Colombia in the time being analyzed, the republican political context is characterized by historical political exclusion, division, polarization, and official repression (Palacios, 2006, Arocha, 1998, Appelbaum, 2004, Bushnell, 1993, among many others). In other words, it is a context of political inequalities. As in many Latin American countries, political inequality is one of the restrictions in a system that facilitates that an institution of racial exclusion that affects local outcomes via the mechanism of reaction. Historiography and the empirical archive material shed light on different episodes that corroborate this context and its persistence over time.

For instance, in 1919 a report by a congressman mentions that Colombian has been a typical exponent of political agitations and instabilities “*with 64 armed revolts and 11 constitutions during the last century*”<sup>324</sup>. The author refers to the conflict-ridden 19<sup>th</sup> century. During this time, the liberal and conservative parties are the focus of Colombian political turmoil.

Authors state that such struggles are partially explained by the fact that the control of political power by a political party entailed the exclusion of the opposition from different levels of power. For example, political hegemony by the liberal party means the exclusion of the conservatives in various forms and vice versa. Moreover, such forms do not include only exclusion from positions of power, but also persecution, repression and violence<sup>325</sup>. That means there was a persistent context of inequality in access to political power over time.

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<sup>324</sup> Anales del Senado, sesiones ordinarias, Bogotá Jueves 20 de noviembre 1919 No 95, p. 379 [own translation].

<sup>325</sup> For instance, the liberal period of “*the radical Olympus*” between 1863 and 1886 excluded conservatives from political power and promoted the persecution of the Catholic Church by expropriation of properties. Along the same line, during the conservative period of the Regeneration (after 1886), liberals were excluded and persecuted (see for instances Palacios, 2006, Bushnell, 1993).

The temporal framework of this research begins in the so-called regeneration period of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. During this period the political power concentrates on the radical faction of the conservative party. As historiography shows, this regime promotes radical Catholicism and centralism. A general rule of power holders is that they apply explicit official repression to keep the political opposition out of power (Palacios, 2006, Bushnell, 1993, among others). The empirical material supports these insights. In the annual report of the minister of education in 1890, a complaint appears about a school in the city of Barranquilla. The complaint states that the school is educating “*enemies*” of the current government and the Catholic Church. Therefore, the report adds, the creation of a new secondary school in this city is necessary because the youth in the current school are “*a threat to society*”<sup>326</sup>.

The literature shows that political exclusion during the Regeneration leads to the civil war known as the Thousand Days' War from 1899 to 1902. This war was the epicenter of political conflicts between radical conservatives and liberals. The liberal party basically demanded political participation in Colombian society by starting a civil conflict that ended in the liberal defeat.

After war, the country enters a period of reconciliation between its two political factions. This reconciliation is explained, first, by the post-conflict reconciliation policies of the government after the Thousand Days' War. Second, the country experiences the economic bonanza of the 1920's that relieves intra-party confrontation (Ocampo, 2007, Bushnell, 1993, McGreevy, 1971, among others). Nonetheless, it does not mean the end of political inequality. In contrast, political exclusion takes more subtle means. For instance, it takes the form of electoral fraud (Bushnell, 1993).

During the end of the analyzed period, several events disrupt the political context. From 1929 to 1950, the relatively peaceful political context is affected by international events. Second, the appearance of challengers to the structural political inequalities brings back more direct political confrontations that end with the period known as the “*violence*” (“*La Violencia*”) between 1947

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<sup>326</sup> Informe que el Ministro de Instrucción Pública presenta al Congreso de Colombia en sus sesiones ordinarias de 1890, p. 86. Imprenta de la Luz. Bogota [own translation].



and 1953. Indeed, in this confrontation, bipartisan violence rooted in structural political inequalities results in more than 200,000 victims (Roldan, 2003).

Taking all the above into account, political inequalities define the context in which the institution of racial exclusion, the mechanism, and the outcomes interact. In summary, political elites are polarized and divided in two political parties. Struggles for the control of political power are evident and persistent. In this context, the informal institution of racial exclusion is an important element generating disadvantages for specific people and places (Roldan, 2003, Appelbaum, 1999).

#### **5.4.2 Economic inequalities**

Colombia has a “*corrosive concentration of wealth*” (Palacios, 2006, p. xi). This circumstance is a constant especially during the studied period. The literature and the empirical material show that the late 19<sup>th</sup> and mid-20<sup>th</sup> centuries are characterized by highly concentrated factors of production such as land and capital. Moreover, the peasant and labor class are subject to unequal labor relations.

In this context, economic inequalities are strongly correlated with political inequalities. McGreevy (1971) explains that unequal access to political power affected the distribution of income. While a small part of population represented by elites mostly controls national income, the bulk of the population live under conditions of subsistence (Palacios, 2006, McGreevy, 1971).

An important issue to emphasize is that, in general, Colombia was a poor, rural and backward country in the Latin American context. And to make things worse, international events affected national political and economic relations<sup>327</sup>.

Nonetheless, despite international events and their effects on national life, a small elite exercises major control over economic resources at different levels. At the national level, a white elite

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<sup>327</sup> For instance, during late 19th century, the Colombian economy was affected by a foreign trade crisis (Bushnell, 1993).

controls the resources of agrarian cyclical booms and commercial activities. At the subnational level, local “*gamonales*” or landlords control access to land and economic resources<sup>328</sup>.

For example, authors state that the expansion of the agricultural frontier in face of a growing international demand for coffee helps to concentrate land and wealth by national and local landowners in certain areas during the second decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Palacios, 2006). By this time, coffee production becomes the major economic activity of the country (Ocampo, 2007). The literature argues that this expansion of the coffee economy brings increased democratic land tenure into the western region (McGreevy, 1971). However, the majority of the peasant class continues to be landless, poor and almost under the former colonial labor conditions (Palacios, 2006).

From 1929 to 1945, changes by the new liberal and progressive government propagate the illusion of change in wealth inequalities (Palacios, 2006, Bushnell, 1993). Historiography shows that more cordial contestations by the national government to the popular and rural classes support this illusion. Nevertheless, such historiography also shows that this is not entirely the case. For instance, the national government introduces a more direct form of taxation which could be interpreted as a way of alleviating economic inequalities. However, the international context is at the root of such changes and not improvements in income inequalities<sup>329</sup>. The crisis in 1929 and the Second World War decrease government revenues from a strategy of gaining taxes from international trade (Junguito & Rincon, 2004). Therefore, in addition to austerity being the general economic rule of the national government (Palacios, 2006); the government needs to reformulate its tax system design. On the other hand, this period experiences increasing social unrest by the rural and labor classes which foster conditions for change such as the agrarian reform in 1936. However, despite such reforms being conducted by the liberal government, they do not affect the properties or interests of large landowners (Bushnell, 1993). Therefore, they do not lessen the unequal distribution of wealth.

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<sup>328</sup> See, for instance, authors such as Palacios (2006), Helg (1987), Múnica (2005), Roldan (2003), McGreevy (1971), etc.

<sup>329</sup> See Junguito & Rincon (2004).

### 5.4.3 Tacit ideology of differences

As the theoretical section states, the republican Colombian context is a context of tacit ideologies of difference. In such a context, flexible and ambiguous dogmas and/or ideologies prevail on the inferiority of particular groups or individuals because of specific social characteristics<sup>330</sup>. These characteristics can be of different types<sup>331</sup>. In the Colombian case, these tacit ideologies are associated with non-white racialized characteristics of a profoundly class-biased society.

Following the literature on race relations, an attribute of racial exclusion is that it is related to “(B)ehaviors and practices, and as such it differs from a definition that also includes prejudiced attitudes and stereotypical beliefs” (National Research Council, 2004, p. 43). In this particular case, the informal institution of racial exclusion is related to behavior and practices against the afro-descendant population embedded in a context of prejudices, stereotypes and beliefs against social groups different to the dominant white elite. In other words, it is a context of tacit ideologies of difference.

This contextual framework takes on a special character during the consolidation of the republic in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. During this time, the national elite establishes the ideological project of “Regeneration”. In turn, the Regeneration applies a flexible and exclusionary project of the mestizo nationhood (Lasso, 2003, among others). According to this project, Colombia is a mestizo nation because it is the outcome of miscegenation between three races: white, black and the native population. However, ambiguity remains because regeneration appeals to a Spanish heritage of a white race, language and religion to shape the Colombian nation (Arocha, 1998, Melo, 1989).

As result, the non-white component acquires negative social constructions (Maya, 2009, Appelbaum, 2006, 1999, Lasso, 2003, Wade, 1993, Gomez, 1980, among others). The black component was tacitly associated with the negative stereotypes of being unable, anarchic, quarrelsome, and lazy; and the indigenous component was socially related to stereotypes of

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<sup>330</sup> Lasso (2003), National Research Council, 2004, among others.

<sup>331</sup> It could be race, gender, nationality, religion, etc.

selfishness, fanaticism, disrespectfulness, savageness, cruelty, etc.<sup>332</sup>. Under these contextual conditions, national elites promote the values of the white-Spanish world as the ideal for modern Colombian society.

The evidence reveals this context of tacit racist ideology of difference in the form of systematic and persistent thoughts, beliefs, opinions, prejudices and/or attitudes against the non-white component of the population. For instance, in the annual report of Public Education in 1884, a minister expresses the opinion that the director of the National School of Music shows satisfactory achievements. In the opinion of the minister, the reason for this personal acknowledgment is related to “*the proper assiduity*” that characterized his (white) race<sup>333</sup>. The director of this school was Jorge Price, son of an English white man.

Other evidence is in the annual report of education of 1890. In this source, the inspector of education of the department of Tolima associates the lack of development with the stereotype of the weakness of certain races. The inspector states that the slow development of the Latin American nations is “*the natural development of the nations of Latin race*”<sup>334</sup>, especially, the author says, when this “*Latin race*” is mixed with the native (indigenous) American race.

In 1892, the minister claims the idea that one of the reasons why primary education is not uniform in all regions is because of the predominance of “*certain races*”<sup>335</sup>. Obviously, the white race is not an issue in these circumstances. In particular, the minister mentions that the “*vocation of a privileged race*” is an advantage for the whiter department of Antioquia<sup>336</sup>. He also refers to the Antioqueña region as “*vigorous people*”<sup>337</sup> favored by its “*ethnographic unity*” as a

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<sup>332</sup> Hernández (2010, p.24), Villegas (2005, p. 224), Geografía Económica del Choco, 1943 quoted in Anales del Congreso, Senado, Bogotá 13 de noviembre de 1946, p.1499-1503.

<sup>333</sup> Memoria del Secretario de Instrucción Pública correspondiente al año de 1884, p. 9 [own translation]. Impreso a cargo de Nemesio Torres. Bogotá.

<sup>334</sup> Informe que el Ministro de Instrucción Pública presenta al Congreso de Colombia en sus sesiones ordinarias de 1890 Tomo Segundo, p. 174 [own translation]. Imprenta de la Luz. Bogotá.

<sup>335</sup> Informe que el Ministro de Instrucción Pública presenta al Congreso de Colombia en sus sesiones ordinarias de 1892, p. LXXVI [own translation]. Papelería y Tipografía de Samper Matiz. Bogotá.

<sup>336</sup> Informe que el Ministro de Instrucción Pública presenta al Congreso de Colombia en sus sesiones ordinarias de 1892, p. XXXV [own translation]. Papelería y Tipografía de Samper Matiz. Bogotá.

<sup>337</sup> Informe que el Ministro de Instrucción Pública presenta al Congreso de Colombia en sus sesiones ordinarias de 1892, p. LI [own translation]. Papelería y Tipografía de Samper Matiz. Bogotá.

circumstance for better educational attainments<sup>338</sup>. The same evidence appears in whiter departments such as Santander. The inspector of education argues that the children there are more intelligent because of their (immigration) origin<sup>339</sup>.

These observations concern not only the political economy of education. The elites promote these differences in diverse fields of the national debate. Observations illustrating such contextual ideology are evident in the discussion by the National Congress about immigration laws. In 1919 in a debate over a new immigration law, a senator stated that immigration needs to ensure the composition of a “*physically and morally healthy race*”<sup>340</sup>. On October 21 the discussion affirms that the Colombian population has weak elements (ethnic); therefore, the state needs to improve the quality of citizens<sup>341</sup>. The source also mentions that there is a biological degeneration which is the single origin of all “*social, political and economic setbacks that characterize our history*”<sup>342</sup>. Later, in 1920, the discussion says that the state should favor “*the conservation of the race*”<sup>343</sup>.

There is also more specific evidence in the Chocó case study. In this regard, official sources promote beliefs and stereotypes related to the racial composition of this region. For instance, *The Economic Geography of Chocó* is a book published in 1943 by the National Controller of the Republic (a national institution)<sup>344</sup>. The book classifies the racial composition of Chocó as white, mulata, black and indigenous. This classification does not directly promote ideologies of difference but does so by associating each racial category with particular “*virtues and vices*”. According to the source, the black and mulato Chocoano races are socially related to disorder, inferiority complexes and being quarrelsome, lazy, and anarchic. On the other hand, the Chocoano indigenous population is socially related to cruelty and selfishness and other negative

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<sup>338</sup> Informe que el Ministro de Instrucción Pública presenta al Congreso de Colombia en sus sesiones ordinarias de 1892, p. LXXVI [own translation]. Papelería y Tipografía de Samper Matiz. Bogotá.

<sup>339</sup> Informes de los Inspectores Generales de Instrucción Pública de los Departamentos dados al Ministro del Ramo en 1892, p. 324. Papelería y Tipografía de Samper Matiz. Bogotá.

<sup>340</sup> Anales del Senado, sesiones ordinarias, Bogotá miércoles 24 de septiembre de 1919, p. 181-182 [own translation].

<sup>341</sup> Anales del Senado, sesiones ordinarias, Bogotá jueves 20 de noviembre de 1919, p. 378-380.

<sup>342</sup> Anales del Senado, sesiones ordinarias, Bogotá jueves 20 de noviembre de 1919, p. 378-380 [own translation].

<sup>343</sup> Anales de la Cámara de Representantes, Bogotá jueves 11 de noviembre de 1920 [own translation].

<sup>344</sup> Geografía Económica del Chocó, 1943 quoted in Anales del Congreso, Senado, Bogotá 13 de noviembre de 1946, p. 1499-1503 [own translation]. This source included collaboration by Chocoano authors.

connotations. Indeed, there is a national general perception that one of the major problems of Chocó is its race. In 1934 a national politician expresses the opinion that nobody defends the blackest region of Colombia “*because in Chocó there is no race, but useless men*” referring to Chocó’s undefended richness in natural resources<sup>345</sup>. Similarly, in 1946 a report at the National Congress refers to Chocó’s “*lazy race*” as a cause for its backwardness<sup>346</sup>.

These social constructions concerning Chocó are in line with a context of an ideology of difference. The social beliefs and constructions about Chocó are flexible and ambiguous ideologies of inferiority (in terms of Lasso, 2003). As already mentioned, the national ideology sees the Chocoana population as “*a big boy*”, “*a bastard son*”, “*an irresponsible child*”, “*a sensual boy*” that needs to be assisted (Hernandez, 2010, p.24, Villegas, 2005, p. 224, Mosquera, 1992, p. 100 [own translation])<sup>347</sup>. Specifically, the circumstance of being part of a non-white region associated Chocó with the tacit stereotype of being beyond the national ideal because of Chocó’s racial composition.

This context has been extensively studied in the traditional Colombian literature. Authors classify the period of the republican consolidation as a period of “invisibilization” of the non-white component in Latin-American society. Various authors illustrate how the national elite project of the mestizo nationhood promotes tacit exclusion and invisibility of the non-white component of the population<sup>348</sup>. These studies also stress how, by using implicit racism, national elites maintain control of national power. It is obvious that only white people had access to mechanisms of social mobilization such as education and political power. In contrast, the black and indigenous component had limited access to such mechanisms.

Furthermore, the tacit ideology of difference also takes the form of class difference. Class difference takes on an important character after the Second World War, and is strongly related to racialized characteristics (Leal, 2010). In this regard, the exclusionary republican project also

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<sup>345</sup> ABC newspaper, December 15 of 1934, issue 2923 (in Chocó 7 días, 2014 issue 955, section: el Chocó de Ayer: [http://www.choco7dias.com/955/choco\\_ayer.html](http://www.choco7dias.com/955/choco_ayer.html) [own translation].

<sup>346</sup> Anales del Congreso, Cámara, 13 de noviembre de 1946 p. 1495 [own translation].

<sup>347</sup> Also ABC newspaper, January 3 of 1935, issue 2934 (in Chocó 7 días, 2014 issue 975, section: el Chocó de Ayer: [http://www.choco7dias.com/975/choco\\_ayer.html](http://www.choco7dias.com/975/choco_ayer.html)

<sup>348</sup> Larson (2004), Appelbaum (1999), Arocha (1998), Wade (1993), Múnera (2005), Melo (1989), among others.

appeals to Spanish heritage and scientific concepts to support beliefs and prejudices of the existence of social differences within the Colombian population (Leal, 2010). The dominant idea of the elites consists in an implicit ideology that social groups have different social standings that must be maintained (Leal, 2010, p. 398).

The analysis of the political economy of education is more than illustrative in this issue. For instance, in 1890 the annual report of education states that one of the fundamentals for the heroes of independence was to offer education for all social classes. However, the report adds that education is necessary in order that everybody will “*know their duty*”<sup>349</sup>. The concept of duties was the unspoken belief that every member of the society belongs to a specific social hierarchy and this member must know his place (Wade, 1993, p. 107)<sup>350</sup>.

Almost all revised reports make reference to these differences. In 1896, for instance, while the under-secretary of public instruction in 1896 argues that Colombia needs to increase secondary education, he also suggests that the sentence “*no omnes doctores*” should be written on the schools’ walls. This reveals a tacit belief that higher education should be reserved for certain members of society (elites)<sup>351</sup>. This fact was especially true for professions related to public affairs. The national elites believed it was necessary to strictly control graduation from secondary school and filter enrollment to university because it was a “*passport*” to politics<sup>352</sup>, particularly at the subnational level<sup>353</sup>.

Social differences persist at the time. By the 1920’s, Colombian cities began to ‘modernize’ as result of social transformations. Palacios (2006) describes a society with increasing demands for cars, electricity, and running water among other urban characteristics that indicate a tendency toward a process of urbanization that was consolidated during the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. However, the society was highly stratified showing three major social classes: upper class,

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<sup>349</sup> Informe que el Ministro de Instrucción Pública presenta al Congreso de Colombia en sus sesiones ordinarias de 1890, p. VII-VIII [own translation]. Imprenta la Luz. Bogotá.

<sup>350</sup> In this respect, social hierarchy is related to skin color.

<sup>351</sup> Informe que el Ministro de Instrucción Pública presenta al Congreso de Colombia en sus sesiones ordinarias de 1896, p. LXIX [own translation].

<sup>352</sup> Informe que el Ministro de Instrucción Pública presenta al Congreso de Colombia en sus sesiones ordinarias de 1896, p. 32 [own translation].

<sup>353</sup> Ortiz (2012) presents a detailed analysis on social classification and educational evaluation.

middle class and lower class (Palacios, 2006), with prejudices from the elite being related to this stratification. For instance, in 1922, the report of the director of one of the most prestigious universities of the country mentions that they must avoid certain young people continuing in professional education. Moreover, according to the author of the report, Colombian needs an “*intellectual aristocracy*”<sup>354</sup>.

After the 1930’s, international events and internal political change accelerate the process of urbanization, industrialization and democratization<sup>355</sup>. These processes finally transform the country into a more modern society. However, at the same time elites maintain a social discourse of a class society. In this regard, Leal (2010) offers insights into the general dynamics of social inequalities. According to the author, the social constructions around race are controversial following the Second World War; however, social differences persisted in the form of class stratifications. In any event, the basic issue is that the privileged social position of a small elite group and the disadvantages of non-members were demonstrated using various strategies such as traditions, consumption, and education among others (Leal, 2010, Palacios, 2006, Wade, 1993)<sup>356</sup>.

In conclusion, these tacit stereotypes, ideas and beliefs of social difference are systematic and persistent in the social construction of the Colombian nation. This context promotes whiteness as synonymous with progress, and blackness as synonymous of backwardness<sup>357</sup> delineating the relationship of the causal link. That is, this national racist ideology shapes the context in which the informal institution of racial exclusion prospers as an alternative cause to affect socio-economic outcomes.

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<sup>354</sup> Memoria del Ministro de Instrucción Pública al Congreso de 1922 tomo II anexos, p. 93-95 [own translation]. Casa Editorial de la Cruzada.

<sup>355</sup> The liberal party takes political control and favors access to rights such as democratization of the suffrage and rights for the labor class (see for instance Palacios, 2006, Bushnell, 1993).

<sup>356</sup> A clear example of inequalities is in Palacios (2006). The author describes a case of inequality in the access to justice in a case of murder by a local member of elite who receives only 10 months in prison (Palacios, 2006, p. 105).

<sup>357</sup> For instance, Maya (2009), Appelbaum (2003, 1999), Wade (1993).



# Chapter 6 The mechanism: theoretical implications

The objective of process tracing analysis was to identify empirical manifestations of the theoretical mechanism between the informal institution of racial exclusion and the outcome of local public goods provision. This mechanism addresses the following questions: how does the exclusionary institution of racial exclusion affect local socio-economic outcomes such as local public goods provision? Which specific actors shape this institution? How do actors behave within this mechanism? How does such specific behavior contribute to final outcomes? How do these processes involve institutional change and institutional reproduction?

This chapter is a general overview of the hypothesis of the mechanism. First, the chapter describes the general causal link of the model. Next, it presents the specific causal link for each actor in the mechanism. Finally, the chapter discusses the limitation of the hypothesis arrived at and potential further case studies in the application of the mechanism.

## 6.1 General overview of the mechanism of reaction

In Chapter 5, the case study analysis arrives at a hypothesis that there is a mechanism of ‘reaction’ between the cause of the informal institution of racial exclusion and the outcome of local public goods provision. The term ‘reaction’<sup>358</sup> stresses that actors ‘react’ to exclusionary institutions with different behavior. In turn, such social reactions or behavior have consequences on socio-economic outcomes.

Figure 6-1 provides a general overview of the hypothesis of the mechanism of reaction. According to this hypothesis, the general pattern consists of the informal institution of racial exclusion being made up three specific actors. These actors are non-aggrieved, mid-aggrieved and aggrieved actors. Boxes A and B show this process. These actors react to the exclusionary

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<sup>358</sup> The literature on race was the basis for arriving at this term. For instance, Hoffman (2006, p. 108) mentions individual strategies as to escape, revert or ignore racism.


institutions with five different types of behavior depending on the level that each actor is affected when confronted with the exclusionary institution. Such regular behavior refers to adoption, adaptation, revision, contestation and non-cooperative behavior<sup>359</sup>. Box C depicts such behavior. This regular behavior represent forms of revision or enforcement of the informal institution of racial exclusion. Boxes D and E show that the revisions or reinforcements affect the provision of public goods when such actors and specific behavior are related to initiatives for the local political economy of the provision public goods. The final link then indicates that these initiatives affect public goods provision or the final outcome.

The following sections illustrate the analysis of this mapping of the mechanism specifying the causal link between the informal institution of racial exclusion and the final outcome of local public goods provision for each actor. The analysis of the causal link for each actor is in line with figure 6-1. Henceforth, each actor is disaggregated to see more clearly the causal link.

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<sup>359</sup> This research follows an inductive strategy to develop the hypothesis of the mechanism. However, as the theoretical chapter discusses, the identification of actors and behavior was guided by a combination of theoretical insights from the literature on race and institutions.

Figure 6-1 Mechanism of reaction




## 6.2 Non-aggrieved actors and local public goods provision

The first actor is the non-aggrieved actor. Non-aggrieved actors are not affected by the exclusionary institution because they do not belong to the social group with the social characteristics related to the exclusionary institution (Box A and Box B in figure 6-2). They have resources and receive an advantageous allocation of resources with the implementation of the exclusionary institution.

Consequently, non-aggrieved actors adopt the exclusionary institution (Box C). That is, non-aggrieved actors behave by taking and reproducing the exclusionary institution.

When these actors hold positions of power in the local political economy of public good production, adoption of the exclusionary institution is manifested in a form of behavior that propagates ineffective initiatives for the provision of public goods that favor the bulk of excluded population (Box D and E). These ineffective initiatives are related to omission, negligence, and/or corruption against the provision of public goods that would favor the excluded population. Accordingly, such behavior affect the final outcome of low public goods provision (Y).

**Figure 6-2 Map of the mechanism for non-aggrieved actors**



An important comment to make here is the need to establish the conditions that facilitate non-aggrieved actors in the regular behavior of adoption of the exclusionary institution. Although the process tracing analysis in chapter 5 does not lay emphasis on the identification of these conditions, general examination suggests that these conditions are related to the interests of

non-aggrieved actors in maintaining the socio-economic hierarchies<sup>360</sup>. Non-aggrieved actors are the equivalent to the national power holders, but in a local context. Therefore, the conditions that impact their regular behavior are simply related to maintaining control of power by reproducing unequal socio-economic standings<sup>361</sup>. After all, non-aggrieved actors face no level of being affected by the exclusionary institution; hence, the regular behavior of adoption of the exclusionary institution at the local level follows.

### **6.3 Mid-aggrieved actors and local public goods provision**

Mid-aggrieved actors face a mid-level of being affected by the exclusionary institution. Mid-aggrieved actors are affected by the exclusionary institution because they present some characteristics related to the exclusionary institution. However, they depict lower levels of being affected than a typical aggrieved actor since they have access to resources or lower characteristics related to the exclusionary institution. These conditions minimize the distributional effects of the exclusionary institution (Box A and B in figure 6-3 and 6-4).

Mid-aggrieved actors are of two types: adapted and revisionist mid-aggrieved actors. Figure 6-3 shows the adapted mid-aggrieved actor. Adapted mid-aggrieved actors incline towards regular practices of adaptation of the exclusionary institution (Box C). Adaptation is to adjust and follow the exclusionary institution. That is, adaptation is a form of reproduction of the informal exclusionary institution<sup>362</sup>. When adapted mid-aggrieved actors are placed in key position for the local political economy of public goods provision, adaptation is manifested in specific behavior that propagate ineffective initiatives for the provision of public goods that would favor the bulk of excluded population (Box D and E). These ineffective initiatives are related to negligence, exclusionary policies, inefficient bureaucracy or selective investment in public goods that do not benefit the majority excluded population.

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<sup>360</sup> As suggested in the literature, for instance Tilly (1998).

<sup>361</sup> It does not matter whether these regular practices of adoption result in change or reproduction of the exclusionary institution. Section 5.3.1 also mentions that adoption combines theoretical insights present in, for instance, DiCaprio (2012), Sue (2013), Amsden & DiCaprio (2012), among others

<sup>362</sup> This behavior is similar to adoption of non-aggrieved actors in that adaptation is to adhere to the exclusionary institution. However, adaptation is different to adoption in that mid-aggrieved actors are affected by the exclusionary institution. Therefore, they have to 'adjust' to the ambivalences that the exclusionary institution entails. As already mentioned, adaptation follows theoretical insights described in various literature such as Robinson (2012), Pyke (2010), Pierson (2004), Leal (2007), or Tilly (1998).

**Figure 6-3 Map of the mechanism for adapted mid-aggrieved actors**





Figure 6-4 illustrates the second mid-aggrieved actor. Second mid-aggrieved actors incline towards regular practices of revision of the exclusionary institution (Box C). Revisions are the reexamination, review or modification of the exclusionary institution<sup>363</sup>. When revisionist mid-aggrieved actors hold key positions in the local political economy of public goods provision, revisions are manifested in behavior that propagates effective initiatives for the provision of public goods to favor the bulk of excluded population (Box D and E). These effective initiatives are related to the elimination of exclusionary policies and a more equitable provision of public goods for the general population.

**Figure 6-4 Map of the mechanism for revisionist mid-aggrieved actors**



General inferences from the case study and literature lead to the conclusion that mid-aggrieved actors face two conditions to react with adaptation or revision<sup>364</sup>. The first condition is access to resources. Access to resources allows mid-aggrieved actors to be affected by the exclusionary institution at a lower level. Access to resources also allows a

<sup>363</sup> See for instance, Streeck & Thelen (2005).

<sup>364</sup> For instance, see Pyke (2010), Bivens (2005) or Tilly (1998).

better position in the socio-racial standing. This type of aggrieved actor can then question, contest, reformulate or revise the exclusionary institutional framework.

However, not all mid-aggrieved actors choose to revise the institutional framework. Some mid-aggrieved actors behave regularly with adaptation to the institutional framework because their conduct is influenced by another condition: the internalization of the institutional ideology.

Internalized mid-aggrieved actors easily identify themselves with the national exclusionary ideology and distance themselves through their regular behavior patterns from those similar to them<sup>365</sup>. Such regular behavior consists of establishing clear boundaries between them and the rest of the excluded people and to adapt exclusionary behavior against the rest of the excluded population<sup>366</sup>. Such regular practices help them to achieve the conditional acceptability from dominant white elites and to share white power in future (Wade, 1993).

In contrast, mid-aggrieved actors that do not internalize the exclusionary institution favor processes of revisions to the exclusionary institution. Bivens (2005) argues that disadvantages were dismantled when excluded people do not internalize the exclusion. This non-internalization of the exclusionary institution explains the reaction of revisionist mid-aggrieved actors discussed in the empirical chapter.

#### **6.4 Aggrieved actors and local public goods provision**

Aggrieved actors are highly affected by the exclusionary institution. This actor shows the social characteristics associated with the exclusionary institution. Moreover, they have relatively scarce or no access to resources to minimize the exclusionary allocation of resources (Boxes A and B in figures 6-5 and 6-6). These conditions differentiate this actor from non- and mid-aggrieved actors. In general, they are actors homogeneously and highly affected by the exclusionary institution.


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<sup>365</sup> See for instance Pyke (2010), Leal (2007), Bivens (2005), among others.

<sup>366</sup> Literature on internalized racism discusses these processes of 'distance' to the similar.

Aggrieved actors behave in two ways<sup>367</sup>. Figure 6-5 illustrates that aggrieved actors can show non-cooperative behavior that reproduces the exclusionary institution. Non-cooperative behavior consists of behavior that promotes the self-suppression in the form of rivalries, antagonism, egoism, and/or lack of cooperation among their excluded population (Box C). In turn, when such actors and behavior are related to positions of power in the local political economy of public goods provision, non-cooperation blocks initiatives that allow eliminating of exclusionary policies for public goods provision (Box D and Box E). Consequently, the survival of exclusionary policies fosters low public goods provision for the afro-descendant population.

**Figure 6-5 Map of the mechanism for non-cooperative aggrieved actors**




On the other hand, regular behavior of contestation to the informal institution of racial exclusion also exist. Figure 6-6 describes aggrieved actors who contest. These contestations are in the form of protests, demands and/or complaints against exclusionary policies or actors (Box C). However, these contestations have no repercussions in promoting reforms to the exclusionary institution and the final outcome. The reason is that, in this case, access to resources is so low that actors do not hold positions of power in the local political economy of public goods provisions (Box D). Such a condition limits their opportunities for revisions that truly contribute to both the revision of the informal institution of racial exclusion (Box E) and the final outcome of public goods provision.

<sup>367</sup> Such behavior are prompted in the literature such as Pyke (2010), Smith (2010), Shasha (2009), Hoffman (2006), Bivens (2005), Wade (1993), Gaventa (1982), Luke (1974), among others.



**Figure 6-6 Map of the mechanism for aggrieved actors that contest**



In turn, general inferences from the case study and literature lead to the conclusion that aggrieved-actor behavior is influenced by similar conditions to those for mid-aggrieved actors, i.e. access to resources and internalization.

Excluded actors have low access to resources. This condition impacts their regular practices of non-cooperation because of tensions and disputes over scarce resources (Bivens, 2005). Moreover, low access to resources also conditions them to processes of internalized oppression, reproducing conflicts between the excluded population (Bivens, 2005, Tilly, 1998, Gaventa, 1982).

However, some aggrieved actors incline towards contestation of the exclusionary institution. As already mentioned, non-internalization favors actions against oppression (Bivens, 2005). Hence, contestations may be feasible when aggrieved actors do not internalize oppression. Nevertheless, in this context fully aggrieved actors lack sufficient access to resources to materialize such contestations in observable reforms of outcomes. Reforms are achieved when actors with better access to resources can address these contestations. This means explicitly that observable reforms are viable when revisionist mid-aggrieved actors address these contestations.

### **6.5 Limitations of the mechanism**

This section discusses the limitations of the hypothesis of the mechanism. The hypothesized mechanism of reaction shows that actors react to exclusionary institutions and, in turn, these reactions have consequences on local socio-economic outcomes such as public goods provision. In particular, the mechanism shows that in the Colombian case, the informal institution of racial exclusion shapes three different actors. Moreover, these different actors

react to exclusionary institutions with five types of behavior. Such behavior affects local socio-economic outcomes via access and initiatives by each actor in the local political economy of public goods provision.

The hypothesis is relevant for similar analyses that aim to explain the causal relationship between exclusionary institutions and local socio-economic outcomes. The literature shows a consistent negative relationship among exclusionary institutions and low socio-economic outcomes. However, the theoretical mechanism between the cause and outcome is still subject to theoretical and methodological debate. In this regard, the findings of this work contribute to the debate.

However, the hypothesis presents some limitations that need to be discussed. A first limitation is that a better explanation is required concerning which conditions impact the regular behavior of each actor. The previous section broadly indicates some of these conditions. For example, for mid-aggrieved and aggrieved actors, the conditions concerned access to information/resources and internalizations. However, only a more precise analysis of cases will shed light on this. This means it is necessary to empirically trace more precisely the conditions under which actors decide to take one regular type of behavior rather than another. Therefore, further studies need to detect the pattern of conditions previous to each regular behavior in the mechanism of reaction.

A second limitation is that this work is an inductive effort based on a single case study. This fact presents two additional restrictions for the hypothesis. The first restriction is theoretical. This means that this work uses the theoretical framework of historical institutional analysis. According to the literature on this theoretical approach, contextual and time framing conditions are relevant in shaping socio-economic outcomes (e.g. Steinmo, 2008). Therefore, it is imperative to take care in establishing conclusions because each historical context can interfere in the cause racial exclusion, the mechanism of reaction and the outcome. Moreover, concerning socio-economic outcomes, this research limits the analysis to the outcome of public goods provision. Further analysis is necessary to disentangle the mechanism between an institution and other more complex outcomes such as economic growth or development. Consequently, the hypothesis of the mechanism of reaction is limited to equivalent “analytical contexts” as those described in the current work. Accordingly, the second restriction is methodological. Namely, the interaction among outcomes, mechanism and

cause could be specific to the Colombian Chocoano case. Only further empirical work can therefore evaluate the hypothesis. Authors in process tracing analysis suggest that the evaluation of the hypothesis in similar typical cases is the next step after theory building process tracing analysis (e.g. Beach & Pedersen, 2013). For example, empirical work in further similar case studies can detect the presence of the mechanism of reaction in what Falletti & Lynch (2009, p. 1154) call “analytically equivalent contexts”.

A third limitation is the incidence of alternative explanations in the final outcome. In the Colombian Chocoano case, economic causes such as geography are an important alternative explanation. Hence, it is necessary to emphasize that this analysis does not pretend to displace alternative explanations. In contrast, the present analysis aims to study the informal institution of racial exclusion as an additional alternative explanation since this research recognizes that there is no social outcome that is the result of a unique cause.

In summary, these limitations are points of departure for further investigations in this field. Such additional analysis will detect and confirm the presence of the hypothesis of the mechanism and the interaction among this mechanism, cause and outcome. The following section sheds light on potential future case studies which are “analytically equivalent” for further analysis.

## **6.6 Potential case studies for testing the hypothesis of the mechanism: the informal institution of racial exclusion and local socio-economic outcomes in La Sierra Peru and Costa Chica Mexico**

### **6.6.1 The informal institution of racial exclusion in the Peruvian Andean region: the case of la Sierra Peru**

#### ***6.6.1.1 Racial relations in Peru: presence of the scope conditions***

This research identifies two scope conditions that allow interaction among the informal institution of racial exclusion, the mechanism of reaction and local socio-economic outcomes. These scope conditions are structural historical inequalities and tacit ideologies of difference. As a Latin American country, Peru is part of a context of structural inequalities and tacit ideologies of difference. This means, on the one hand there is a context of categorical

differences that have persisted over time (Tilly, 1998). On the other hand, in Peru beliefs and thoughts prevail of certain racialized groups or people being considered inferior<sup>368</sup>.

The context of structural inequalities is a context of historical economic and political inequalities. In Peru, economic inequalities are present in, for instance, historical high levels of wealth concentration. In this respect, Williamson (2009) argues that indexes of inequalities for Latin American countries such as Peru show a historical tendency to increase. The author states that during the last two centuries, the Peruvian Gini index moved from 42.2 in 1876 to 52 in 2002. Similarly, Hoffman & Centeno (2003) claim that despite Peru not having the highest levels of Gini index in the region, it depicts a Gini index (46.2) higher than regions such as East Asia and Pacific (38.1), South Asia (31.9) and industrial countries (33.8). In other words, there is a significant concentration of wealth in Peru. This concentration can be classified as economic inequality, one of the attributes of the scope conditions in this analysis.

Political inequalities are also part of the Peruvian context. Peru presents clientelism, weakness of left parties, low state capacity, concentration of political power and political repression (Huber, 2009). For example, Ferranti et al. (2004, p. 114) illustrate that in 1920, Peru still lacked secrecy in elections. This strategy allowed the political elite to maintain control over elections and political power. Likewise, the authors also state that a literacy requirement was in force for elections until the late mid-20<sup>th</sup> century. The literacy requirement acted as a restriction for the majority facilitating the concentration of political power in a small elite group. For example, in 1925 the Peruvian literacy rate was 38 percent, indicating that only a reduced portion of the population had access to political rights (Ferranti et al., 2004).

A general analysis also allows classifying the Peruvian context as a context of tacit ideologies of difference. In Peru, tacit prejudices, moral evaluations, and beliefs predominate in considering certain racial groups as inferior. As in all Latin America, such inferiority is associated with the non-white component of the population, particularly the indigenous population.

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<sup>368</sup> For more detail on racism as ideology see Pager & Shepard (2008), Quillian (2006), and the National Council (2004).

Like the Colombian case, these ideologies of difference have a Spanish colonial background. Peru is a former Spanish colony. In Spanish ex-colonies, the formal ideology of white racial superiority was in force during the colonial time. After independence, racial hierarchies officially disappeared as part of the creole emancipation project (Lasso, 2003). The indigenous people became Peruanos citizens and slavery began a path toward gradual abolition via the “free womb” law (*libertad de vientres*) or by declaring slave trading illegal (Larson, 2004).

However, as Lasso (2003) argues, there was flexibility in the coexistence of racial democracy and racist ideologies in the new Latin American republics. The literature states that the Peruvian post-independence period was characterized by the need for social order and the definition of a collective national identity. Such a construction was controlled by the Peruvian intellectual elite (Mendez, 2011, Larson, 2004, De la Cadena, 2000, 2001, Orlove, 1993, among others). The national elite established the basis for national identity on ideologies that promoted the “*mestizo nationhood*”. The “*mestizo nationhood*” simultaneously stimulated racial democracy, inequalities and the erasing of the ‘unprogressive’ non-white component (Lasso, 2003, Appelbaum, 2003, among others).

However, De la Cadena (2001, p. 3) argues that in Peru, the project of “*mestizaje*” was not an official national ideology as in other Latin American countries. Nevertheless, the author also argues that the national ideology supported the ideology of “*silent racism*”. Basically, silent racism also consists in a national ideology that implicitly promotes beliefs, prejudices and stereotypes of indigenous and afro-descendant inferiority. This ideology stimulates whiteness as the ideal and indianess and blackness as inferior states (De la Cadena, 2000). This ideology also used the scientific racialized discourse of the 19<sup>th</sup> century to control what it classified as ‘inferior’ (Wilson, 2000).

Regionalization of race is an additional attribute of the Peruvian case that links with this research. In Peru, the republican national ideology links socio-economic order, race, origin and geography (Larson, 2004, De la Cadena 2000, Orlove, 1993). As in Colombia, Peru then experiences a process of regionalization of race or as geo-racial fissuring according to Larson (2004). In such regionalization, Peru was classified into three geo-cultural regions. These are the coastal lowlands, the Andean highlands or the Sierra, and the Amazon or jungle (Orlave, 1993).

Orlove (1993) explains that these regional borders were related more to dominant ideological constructions than to geophysical reasons. For Orlove (1993), the coastal lowlands, where the capital Lima is located, were collectively identified as whiter, Spanish, modern and with making progress. The coast is the locality for European descendants (De la Cadena, 2000). In contrast, the highlands or la Sierra was collectively identified with the original indigenous population, sadness, mountains, obstacles, backwardness and poverty. Moreover, the Amazon region was associated with being primitive, aboriginal, savage, far, remote, and with a scarce indigenous population that required a process of “civilization”<sup>369</sup>.

Three facts can be detected in this regionalization. First, although the Peruvian coastal lowlands is “*relatively poor in natural resources*” (Falen, 1985, p. 16), this region is collectively associated with whiteness and progress in a clear contrast to the Colombian coastal regions more culturally associated with non-whiteness and backwardness. Second, the region of la Sierra in the central Andes is related to indianess and backwardness. It is also contrasts with the relatively equivalent Colombian warm Andean central region, collectively identified as whiter and progressive<sup>370</sup>. Third, despite afro-descendants being an excluded population in the Peruvian national ideology, the tacit regional-racial order is concentrated on the indigenous population. In Peru, the afro-Peruvian population also suffers the effects of the new national order. They are non-white. However, there are two potential explanations of why the regional distribution and exclusion focused on indianess/whiteness. First, in contrast to the indigenous population of the Sierra, afro-Peruvians are foreigners in the national imaginary and lack a geo-cultural place of national origin (De la Cadena, 2000, p.21). Moreover, they are a relative small percentage of the population compared to the afro-descendant Colombian population (in particular, afro-descendants in the Pacific and Caribbean populations in Colombia)<sup>371</sup>.

The social constructions of indianess/highlands and whiteness/coast allow establishing differences between dominated and dominants which are elements of tacit ideologies of difference (Pager & Shephard, 2008, Quillian, 2006, National Research Council, 2004). As Appelbaum (1999) states for the Colombian case, regionalization favors certain places and

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<sup>369</sup> See also Larson (2004), De la Cadena (2001, 2000).

<sup>370</sup> See also Appelbaum (1999), Wade (1993), Gutierrez (1975). In this regard, it is also important to note that the population in La Sierra Peruana is located in higher areas on average than in Colombia (see for instance Plaza, 1989).

<sup>371</sup> Helg (2004, p. 2) states that Colombia has the third largest afro-descendant population in America after United States and Brazil.

people. In this regard, Peruvian highland and indigenous territory was affected by such regionalization with the coastal Limeños being favored (De la Cadena, 2000). Orlove (1993) contends that the republican imaginary of associating indianess with the highland region of la Sierra had economic and political reasons. The Peruvian construction of linking race, racial stereotypes and geography provides “*a basis for conceptualizing the nation as an entity in need of centralized leadership*” (Orlave, 1993, p. 324). Of course, the leadership entails the whiter limeña leadership. In this sense, “*the Indians became the people of the highlands*” (Orlove, 1993, p. 325) and the term “*serranos*” (people from la Sierra) took on a contemptuous connotation (Mendez, 2011). The indigenous population was associated with the poor performance of the new republic; therefore, the national ideology promotes ‘domestication’ of the indigenous Andean world (Larson, 2004)<sup>372</sup>.

The key issue with Peru is that, similar to Colombia, the context of tacit ideologies of difference and structural inequalities do not favor the majority non-white population. This disadvantage is independent of whether the non-white component is black or indigenous and/or the geographical location of the non-white groups. Moreover, this context delineates the backdrop in which future informal institutions affect local socio-economic outcomes. Such contextual conditions could then facilitate, alter and determine how the informal institution of racial exclusion affects local socio-economic outcomes via the mechanism of reaction.

#### **6.6.1.2 La Sierra Peru: the “Indian stain”**

The first potential case is the highland region of la Sierra in Peru. La Sierra is a geo-cultural region located in the Andean central region of Peru. This territory corresponds to 26.1 percent of the country and, as part of the Andean system, la Sierra is a highland territory with massifs, rivers and climatic and ecological heterogeneities (Falen, 1985 and Caballero, 1981). Larson (2004, p. 158) mentions that this territory is known as “*the Indian stain*” which refers to the high concentration of indigenous population.

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<sup>372</sup> De la Cadena (2001, p. 7) argues that the “culturalist definition of race” favors discrimination in Peru. Lima, the coastal capital, represents the European culture despite the existence of the indigenous population there. In contrast, Cuzco represents the cultural heritage of the Incas. The coastal city of Lima, as the whiter Andean cities in Colombia, was therefore the epicenter of the promotion of this tacit national ideology of difference.

The Sierra is a territory historically rich in natural resources. During the colonial time, this region was a source of free labor and mining resources for the Spanish. The indigenous people of la Sierra were basically forced to work under the colonial institution of mita in mining and agriculture activities for the benefit of the crown (Bowser, 1974). Currently, this region has significant mining production of cooper, gold, silver, iron and zinc among other minerals (Falen, 1985).

Illustration 6-1 Natural regions of Peru



Source: Caballero (1981)

However, la Sierra is a Peruvian region with historically low socio-economic outcomes. De la Cadena (2000) mentions that the Peruvian economic bonanza during the early 20<sup>th</sup> century did not favor la Sierra. The author explains that this region remains rural and backward with low urban infrastructure and servile relations<sup>373</sup>. Contemporary data also illustrate the unequal distribution of wealth in Peru. According to the IPE (2015)<sup>374</sup>, the departments located in la Sierra generally present the lowest indexes of regional competitiveness

<sup>373</sup> In contrast, the coastal Limeña region, which takes advantage of the bonanza, prospers with national issues being concentrated in Lima (De la Cadena, 2000).

<sup>374</sup> Instituto Peruano de Economía.



measured by various indicators such as access to infrastructure, health, education, employment and law. For example, this report shows that the highest illiteracy rates in Peru are in the Serrano departments of Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Cajamarca, Apurimac and Huánuco. The report also states that three out of the last five positions in GDP per capita are departments of la Sierra<sup>375</sup>. Similarly, negative socio-economic outcomes are apparent for access to electricity, water, education, among others<sup>376</sup>.

There are many alternative explanations for the regional disadvantages of the Sierra. One of the most evident is geography. According to Caballero (1981), the climate and high altitude impose restrictions to local development. Similarly, Werbrouck (2004) says that the physical environment of la Sierra is a restriction to transport systems and access to land, resources and opportunities.

However, although these arguments are valid, there are more fundamental reasons to explain such local backwardness. Caballero (1981) argues that geographical conditions are not decisive in explaining the whole picture of la Sierra. The author states that factors related to economic and political interests such as colonial interests, the postcolonial concentration of land, and “*gamonalismo*”<sup>377</sup> have transformed the advantages of the Sierra into disadvantages for the local population. Similarly, Falen (1985) argues that the centralization of national issues in the coastal region of Peru is an explanation of the disadvantages of la Sierra.

In this regard, as in many countries of Latin America, racial relations in Peru are an important alternative explanation. De la Cadena (2000, p. 20) states that the unequal regional performance of Peru “*had racial causes*”. Incidentally, the literature in Peru is extensive in showing significant correlations between racial composition and socio-economic outcomes (see for instance Santos, 2014 for a brief summary). Torero et al. (2002) reports that the indigenous population has lower levels of education, more children and higher levels of poverty. Erikson (2012) argues that indigenous children suffer higher levels of undernutrition, extreme poverty, and do not have access to health and bilingual education (Spanish/vernacular languages). Likewise, INEI (2008) shows that educational opportunities

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<sup>375</sup> The departments of Puno, Huánuco and Apurimac. The other two are departments in the forests and remote Amazon (IPE, 2015).

<sup>376</sup> The report also shows that the departments in the coastal region present better socio-economic outcomes.

<sup>377</sup> According to Larson (2004, p. 164) “*gamonalismo*” refers to “*parameters of local power, based on monopolistic forms of wealth*”.

are related to ethnicity. The lower levels of education are in the population with vernacular languages as their mother tongue. Many of this population are in the region of la Sierra. For example, in the department of Apurimac in la Sierra, 71.5 percent of the population speaks Quechua that was learnt in childhood<sup>378</sup>. In this department, only 7.2 percent of the population who learnt vernacular languages as a mother tongue achieve superior education. In contrast, in Apurimac, 45.6 percent of the population that learnt Spanish as a mother tongue achieve superior education (INEI, 2008).

The issue is that parallel to the backwardness of la Sierra, this territory is the location in Peru for a majority non-white population. Or in the words of Larson (2004), this region is “the Indian stain”. In la Sierra there is a historical racial nucleation of the indigenous population which has a similar pattern to the racial nucleation of the afro-descendant population in Chocó. The discussion also shows a correlation between racial composition and local socio-economic outcomes in Peru. However, it does not indicate the presence of racial exclusion as an informal institution. In order to explore such a possibility, the next section illustrates the presence of racial exclusion as an informal institution.

### ***6.6.1.3 The presence of the informal institution of racial exclusion***

As the theoretical chapter discusses, the systematized concept of the informal institution of racial exclusion has three attributes in this research. First, racial exclusion entails unspoken rights and obligations implicitly enforced in a society that discriminates against a racialized population. Second, racial exclusion has distributional effects. Third, racial exclusion as an institution is dynamic.

Regarding the first attribute, it is feasible that racial exclusion is present in unspoken discriminatory practices enforced in the Peruvian society. The literature shows that racial exclusion is hidden, subtle, implicit, but present in Peru. Despite there being no formal racial rules, studies such as Drzewieniecki (2004) finds that half of the analyzed population admits to practicing racial discrimination. Moreover, Erikson (2012) claims that the population that speaks Quechua as a mother language sees their opportunities for studying limited because of the reduced number of native language schools. The lack of such schools is a form of implicit

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<sup>378</sup> This is an indicator that is highly predominant among the indigenous population.

exclusion of the indigenous population from access to education. Indeed, as De la Cadena (2000) demonstrates, racist behaviors are so internalized that the society does not perceive it as racial exclusion. Non-white people, in this case indigenous population, are invisibilized by national policy makers. They “*disappeared from public discourse*” (Velazquez & Iturralde, 2012, Maya, 2009, Larson, 2004, De la Cadena, 2001 and Jacobsen quoted in Larson, 2004 p. 154). Moreover, the political economy focused on these unspoken practices. The literature describes debates to stimulate foreign immigration to “improve” the racial stock during postcolonial times (e.g. Larson, 2004, p.197), or education as a race-homogenization tool (De la Cadena, 2000). However, although these examples illustrate different forms in which racial exclusion is present, this racial exclusion is informal and indirect in contrast to the formal character that the institution of racial exclusion had during colonization<sup>379</sup>.

The second attribute of the systematized concept refers to distributional effects. In Peru, and particularly in La Sierra, racial exclusion distributes power resources in the form of implicit privileges in accessing resources. For instance, Caballero (1981) states that in the Sierra, a “gamonal” order prevailed in post-colonial times and in the 1960s. This gamonal order is closely related to an ethnic-cultural order in which ‘whiter’ (mestizos) “*feudal*” lords or power holders have the privileges of controlling resources such as indigenous labor, political power, trade, and land (Caballero, 1981). That is, the informal institution of racial exclusion allocates a privileged position to whiter landlords. In contrast, the informal racial order allocates low or no access to resources to the non-white indigenous population. In general, this population is under the control of the whiter elite members. Indigenous people and darker mestizos (pejoratively called cholos) then take low socio-economic positions in which they suffer labor exploitation or are forced into domestic servitude in both rural and urban areas (Mendez, 2011).

The third attribute is related to the dynamic character of racial exclusion. The literature offers observations that associate racial exclusion with a dynamic institution in Peru. First, racial exclusion is contested. De la Cadena (2001) sheds light on processes of de-Indianization as a particular way through which the serrana society of Cuzco contested racism. This de-

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<sup>379</sup> Historiography shows that, during the colonial period, racial exclusion was a formal institution via the caste system. Despite some researchers emphasizing flexibility of the caste system in Spanish Latin America (Contreras & Zuloaga, 2014, Sue 2013, Velasquez & Iturralde, 2012), the system consisted of classification and explicit exclusion of individuals according to their racial makeup. That is, the caste system entails specific behavior with implications in access to resources such as land or political power.

Indianization consists in accepting with honor the indigenous heritages, but at the same time attempting to differentiate from the indigenous stereotype. De la Cadena (2001) also mentions that de-Indianization consists of indigenous population realizing the need to be educated in order to fight against indigenous exclusion. The author quotes the opinion of an indigenous leader who expresses the vital need for education because literacy makes them less Indian. However, to be less Indian means to learn how to read and write because it prevents indigenous people being “*easy preys of the hacendados (landlords) and their lawyers*” (De la Cadena, 2001, p. 9). That is, the informal institution of racial exclusion is contested by the indigenous population seeking of opportunities such as education.

This general description therefore shows that the informal institution of racial exclusion is apparent in the Peruvian context and has similar attributes as those in the Colombian case. The next section briefly discusses possible traces of the various elements of the hypothesized mechanism.

#### ***6.6.1.4 Presence of the mechanism in the ‘Peruvian stain’***

Particular contextual conditions may suppose challenges for evaluating the presence of the mechanism of reaction in cases such as Peru. This country has a racial order with special connotations which may interfere in the hypothesized causal link (see De la Cadena, 2000, Drzewieniecki, 2004 or Caballero, 1981). However, the literature shows evidence that allows identification of the potential presence of the mechanism of reaction in the Peruvian case.

The previous sections demonstrate that there are many similarities of the territory of La Sierra with the studied region of Chocó in terms of the presence of similar scope conditions, the cause and the outcome.

A broad discussion also allows potential identification of certain actors and regular behavior as elements of the mechanism of reaction, e.g. the first actor can clearly be identified as the non-aggrieved actor or elite. Non-aggrieved actors face no level of being affected by the exclusionary institution and obtain an advantageous allocation of resources. The Peruvian and serrana elite are not affected by the informal institution of racial exclusion. The literature also shows that they control access to power resources (e.g. De la Cadena, 2000, Caballero, 1981). Specifically, the Peruvian members of the elite are usually ‘whiter’ members of the national

and local society. They were described as power holders or policy makers that design and adopt national or supranational institutions.

The second type of actor is a mestizo class generally known as “cholo” (Wilson, 2000). This mestizo or cholo class can be related to mid-aggrieved actors. Mid-aggrieved actors face low levels of being affected by the exclusionary institution and have a better allocation of resources compared to aggrieved actors. Some Peruvian mestizos face a lower level of exclusion because they are educated or have access to economic resources. Indeed, even darker mestizos are considered “*people of worth*” in the Peruvian implicit racial order (De la Cadena, 2001, p.7). Regarding behavior, they can adapt to the informal institution of racial exclusion. Wilson (2000) and Caballero (1981) state that mestizos show tensions between their indigenous origin and the white world (Wilson, 2000). Moreover, Caballero (1981) emphasizes that in the serrano case, the landlord elite were not pure white people, but mestizos that reproduced the old oppressions towards the indigenous population.

This type of mid-aggrieved actor may also show regular behavior that revises the informal institution of racial exclusion. This was the case for many mestizo leaders involved in revolts in La Sierra. In these revolts, the indigenous population protested against oppression and exclusion (see Caballero, 1981). Larson (2004, p. 158) refers to the case of Juan Bustamante, a mestizo from Puno a department in La Sierra, who “*launched the first Indian-rights movement in the Andes*”.

Finally, aggrieved actors are easily identified as a collective actor. Aggrieved actors face high levels of being affected by the informal institution. Therefore, they contest or demonstrate non-cooperative behavior. For instance, as Caballero (1981) shows, this type of aggrieved actor is apparent in the numerous indigenous movements in the Sierra such as the Austuparia in 1885 or Rumí Maqui in 1915 in which oppressed indigenous people contest racial injustice.

However, while the literature permits this general and imprecise identification of certain actors and behavior present in the mechanism of reaction, only future empirical and detailed analyses of the case will allow better and precise conclusions. In other words, a more detailed analysis could identify the presence of the mechanism and the specific causal link among cause, mechanism and final outcome.

## **6.6.2 The informal institution of racial exclusion in Costa Chica Mexico and afro Mexicans**

### **6.6.2.1 Scope conditions**

The literature shows that Mexico, like Colombia and Peru, is a country that faces historical processes of colonialism, mestizaje, slavery, formal racial ideologies, caste systems, emancipation, modernization projects of “racial democracy”, etc. These elements define the context for the republican and modern period. A general analysis of Mexico shows that this country shares as scope conditions historical structural inequalities and tacit ideologies of difference.

A context of structural inequalities can be identified by establishing political and economic inequalities. Indeed, Mexico is a country with “extreme” levels of inequalities over the time (Ferranti et al, 2004, p. 119).

A broad analysis of contextual conditions shows that historical economic inequalities are present. Dobado & Garcia (2010) illustrate that Mexico had been extremely unequal since colonization. This context of inequalities persisted over time. For instance, De Ita (2006) states that in 1910, 95 percent of rural families in Mexico had no access to land. For the author, this factor contributes to making Mexico the Latin American country with the highest level of land and wealth concentration of the time. The Mexican revolution lessened the high concentration but contemporary studies also show the persistence of economic inequalities. Esquivel (2015, p. 7) shows how economic growth is concentrated and that currently “*Mexico is within the 25% of countries with the highest levels of inequality in the world*”. Moreover, the author adds that economic elites reproduce these inequalities by controlling the state and obtaining privileges in taxes and regulations.

Analysis of the contextual conditions also shows that the political context is delineated by historical political disparities. The literature shows that, in a post-colonial context, Mexico presents bipartisan disputes for political control and a high concentration of power. Moreover, the modern political context was characterized by authoritarianism, a dominant party hegemony (PRI party), monopolies of political institutions and power, weakness by the opposition, electoral fraud, coercion, a ‘fake’ left party participation, and other elements of

political concentration (Huber, Nielsen & Stephens, 2006, Crespo, 2004, Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni & Weingast, 2003). Such attributes, roughly, classify Mexico as a country with a context of structural political inequalities.

Furthermore, in Mexico, it is easy to identify a national ideology that promotes social difference. Sue (2013, p. 1) exemplifies this fact by stating that in Mexico elites “*create a belief system (or ideologies) to justify, legitimize, and support their rule*”. This ideological system also prevails over time. During the colonial period, the explicit ideology of difference established strict racial classifications. Jung (2009) shows that Spanish authorities were extremely strict against racial mixing, establishing specific names and percentages for different racial categories<sup>380</sup>.

The postcolonial context cannot support explicit ideologies of difference after emancipation from Spain. Indeed, the racial category of Indian disappeared (Jung, 2009). However, the national ideology of difference is strategically designed to overcome attempts at equality such as independence, Mexican nationalism and the Mexican revolution (Sue, 2013, Villareal, 2010).

Like in Colombia and Peru, the national ideology of difference in Mexico has as its core the invisibilization of the non-white component. National beliefs are associated with whiteness with progress and modernity, while indian-ness, blackness and hybridity are associated with backwardness (Sue, 2013, p. 13). Using racist biological theories, racial diversity was then seen as a problem for the modernization of the new nation (Velasquez & Iturralde, 2012, Stabb, 1959, Knight, 1990)<sup>381</sup>. Modernization of the country therefore meant non-whites facing problems from policies such as *mestizaje* or cultural “whitening” (Sue, 2013, Jung, 2009). This ideology was especially relevant during the government of Porfirio Diaz in late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries (Knight, 1990).

In 1910, the Mexican Revolution challenged ideologies of difference. After the revolution, Mexican national identity uses Indian Mexican heritage as its symbol (Jung, 2009). Jung (2009) states that indigenous people are “re-imagined as *campesinos* (peasants)” and became

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<sup>380</sup>For instance, the author shows the following classifications: pure Indio, mulato (1/2 African and 1/2 European), coyote (3/4 Indian and 1/4 European), morisco (3/4 European and 1/4 African), lobo, “tente en el aire (hold-yourself-in-mid-air)”, “no te entiendo (I-don't-understand-you)”, among others (Jung, 2009, p. 7).

<sup>381</sup> For example, it is used Spenserian/Darwinist theories.

an important element in the political discourse (Jung, 2009, p.2). However, as already mentioned, the literature shows that national ideology of difference overcomes egalitarian structural changes such as the Mexican Revolution. First, in the post-revolution period, an ambivalence of racial democracy/exclusion persisted. Second, differences relate to social differences. Specifically, and similar to Colombia, the post-revolution period is characterized by a close relation between non-whiteness and low social classification. In this sense, class-racial identity determines access to political, economic and social life, generating an implicit socio racial order (Sue, 2013, Jung, 2009, Knight, 1990).

Likewise, national ideology supports a strong invisibilization of the black component in Mexico. Post-revolutionary Mexico uses the negation of racism and blackness as a pillar for its national ideology (Sue, 2013, Villareal, 2010, Hoffmann, 2006, among others). Racism and blackness are basically considered as not being part of the national character because Mexico is a country of mestizos (Sue, 2013, Vaughn, 2013). This represents a new form of an ideology that promotes difference by negating, invisibilizing and ignoring the exclusion of the black component. The racial discourse then takes the connotation of the indigenous vs. non-indigenous world while afro-Mexicans are truly invisibilized (Vaughn, 2013, Villareal, 2010).

In other words, in Mexico, there is a general negation of multiracial diversity but particularly of the afro-Mexican identity. In this regard, Vaughn (2013, p. 229) claims that since the national ideology had its roots in the pre-Hispanic indigenous foundations, afro-Mexicans remain at the margins of Mexican national identity. The author claims that blacks are not black but another form of mestizaje or the result of the physical environment, e.g. from the sun, climate, etc. (Vaughn, 2013, Sue, 2013). Indeed, the author claims that the “cult” to mestizaje in Mexico is a form of demonstrating an aversion to racial purity in the society (Vaughn, 2013, p. 228). It does not mean the invisibilization of blackness protects afro-Mexicans from exclusionary ideologies. As Vaughn (2013) states, there is an anti-black and pro-white discourse in the Mexican national identity in which the black component suffers a high level of exclusion. Afro-Mexicans are associated with ineptitude, laziness, rebelliousness, and unable to become good citizens by being industrious (Velasquez & Iturralde, 2012).

In general, it appears that, despite local specificities, the Mexican context shares general attributes with Colombia and Peru. Each country faces a Spanish colonial heritage, a



profound context of historical economic and political inequalities and the promotion of tacit ideologies of difference focused on negative beliefs and prejudices against the non-white component. These elements can facilitate interaction among exclusionary informal institutions as the cause, the mechanism of reaction, actors, regular behavior and low local socio-economic outcomes.

#### **6.6.2.2 *Costa Chica brief description and low socio-economic outcome***

As the previous section mentions, afro-Mexicans face special conditions in the Mexican context. The setting of structural inequalities and tacit ideologies of difference frame the exclusion of this population. Indeed, CONAPRED<sup>382</sup> (2011) argues that the exclusion of afro-Mexicans is particularly intensive in Mexico so that it is difficult to be precise about the socio-economic conditions of this population because of a lack of data in the official sources.

Moreover, studies state that Mexicans are unfamiliar with their African heritage despite Mexico having different regions with phenotypic characteristics of the afro-descendant world (such as Michoacán, Querétaro, Guanajuato, among others, Velasquez & Iturralde, 2012)<sup>383</sup>. The afro-Mexican heritage has its origin in colonization. According to Rosas (2007), Mexico comes second for the number of imported slaves into a country during the late 16<sup>th</sup> and early 17<sup>th</sup> centuries. However, the author argues that whitening processes, the independence war and the revolution lead to a significant decrease of the black population.

Nonetheless, despite the lack of information, mestizaje and invisibility, Mexico has some regions where the negative correlation between afro-descendant component and poor local socio-economic performance is evident. Among these regions, Costa Chica stands out. Costa Chica is located between the states of Guerrero and Oaxaca in the south Pacific part of the country and with a relatively high concentration of afro-descendant population, a population mix that is not normally associated with Mexico (Vaughn, 2013, Velasquez & Iturralde, 2012).

Costa Chica also has poor socio-economic outcomes. Its majority afro-Mexican population, similar to the cases of Chocó in Colombia and the indigenous people of La Sierra in Peru, live in poor socio-economic conditions. In this region, the most important economic activities

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<sup>382</sup> Consejo Nacional para prevenir la Discriminación (CONAPRED).

<sup>383</sup> See also Vaughn (2013).

are agriculture and fishing (see for instance Velasquez & Iturralde, 2012). However, these economic activities are precarious. For instance, Rosas (2007) mentions that the afro-Mexican population suffers extreme poverty and a lack of services and infrastructure. Like in Rosas (2007), Velasquez & Iturralde (2012) also show that this population faces historical social and economic inequalities, and a lack of public services such as health and education<sup>384</sup>.

As in Colombia and Peru, poor local socio-economic outcomes are closely related to the racial order in Mexico. For instance, Villarreal (2010) illustrates that in Mexico a profound racial stratification exists with effects on socio-economic outcomes. According to the author, there is a strong correlation between educational attainment, occupational status, poverty and darker skin color. Similarly, according to CONAPRED (2011), 74 percent of the afro-Mexican population does not have access to health services and 96.5 percent of them do not receive social security benefits such as vacations.

Accepting that race and blackness are not the only explanation for poor socio-economic performance, it is nevertheless evident that racial exclusion lies behind these outcomes. That is, racial exclusion is a potential alternative explanation. Moreover, the literature confirms this pattern. For instance, Jung (2009, p. 11) states that in Oaxaca, where Costa Chica is located, elites have *“been indoctrinated from their earliest youth to see indigenous people as both alien and inferior”*. Similarly, Sue (2013) argues that afro-Mexicans suffer a process of marginalization and negation as part of the national identity. Like these authors, CONAPRED (2011, p. 12) states that afro-Mexicans are not part of the Mexican social fabric. Indeed, in Mexico people, do not acknowledge the existence of black people; they prefer to think about the existence of *“morenos”* as a way to soften blackness (Vaughn, 2013).

These reasons suggest that for its majority black population and low socio-economic outcomes, the region of Costa Chica in Mexico could be a potential future case for researching the presence of the mechanism of reaction. Costa Chica presents the potential of a geographical concentration of a non-white population and poor local socio-economic outcomes. The following sections present a brief discussion of potential traces of the informal institution of racial exclusion and different elements of the mechanism.

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<sup>384</sup> Indeed, the authors mention that low access to land in the Pacific coastal areas of Mexico helped massively in the movement for independence.

### **6.6.2.3 The presence of the informal institution of racial exclusion**

In line with the theoretical attributes of racial exclusion used in this research, the informal institution of racial exclusion is in force in Mexico. Mexican society presents regular practices and behavior that discriminate against racialized groups. Moreover, in this country this institution has distributional effects and is dynamic.

As in many Latin American countries, Mexico had formal institutions that allocated resources among racialized actors during the colonial period. For instance, there were explicit rules such as a system of law called “*Derecho Indiano*” (Indian law), special tribunals, racial divisions, etc. (Jung, 2009, Knight, 1990).

However, historiography shows that a post emancipation movement based on racial democracy consents to the institution of racial exclusion in an informal way. That is, in Mexico there are no explicit rules such as the “*Derecho Indiano*”, but the non-white population is ruled by unspoken rights and obligations that consider non-whites as inferior. For example, Velasquez & Iturralde (2012) argue that there are no formal rules to establish differential treatment to afro-Mexican communities. However, discriminatory treatment is visible in the implicit and limited access to rights and obligations for these groups who are phenotypically different. These rights and obligations include access to justice, law, equality, etc. Jung (2009) claims that the non-white population is considered as “*ignorant, isolated, or traditional*” and in that sense their participations in politics is limited (Jung, 2009, p. 11). The lack of participation by them is implicit discriminatory practice. Such practices are implicit because the barriers to prevent participation are indirect, such as education or social status. Similarly, Hoffmann (2006) mentions that Afro-Mexicans or “*morenos*” face anodyne and elaborated exclusionary behavior from their non-black neighbors. Hence, there are no explicit rules that prevent non-white participation, but there are indirect rules and practices. In other words, there are behavioral practices based on racialized characteristics that indirectly exclude the non-white population in Mexico.

Moreover, in Mexico, the informal institution of racial exclusion has distributional effects. The allocation of socio-racial status is a fact that shows the distributional effects of the informal institution of racial exclusion. According to Villareal (2010), the racial phenotype is an important element in defining social mobility in the country. In Mexico, “...*physical*

*appearance handicaps seriously*” the upward mobility “*in the middle and upper classes*” (Colby & Van den Berghe, 1961 and Nutini, 1997 quoted in Villareal, 2010, p. 656). The informal institution of racial exclusion in Mexico then entails regular practices and behavior that allocate power resources to racialized groups in the form of socio-racial status.

Likewise, policy makers are actors fundamental in developing such exclusionary behavior. For instance, the government of Porfirio Diaz promoted whiteness as the ideal status of Mexican society via indirect immigration policies (Knight, 1990). Moreover, after the revolution, the Mexican elite established educational and social policies to consolidate exclusionary access to resources (Velasquez & Iturralde, 2012). Villareal (2010, p. 655) argues that the policy design of the post-revolution period attempted to eliminate the “*inherently backward and inferior*” indigenous culture. However, such policies by national elites such as the *mestizaje* generated the exclusion of non-white groups such as afro-Mexicans from the construction of 20<sup>th</sup> century Mexico (Velasquez & Iturralde, 2012).

Lastly, racial exclusion is also dynamic in Mexico. The institution undergoes change, is subjected to contestation or is reinforced over time. For instance, the informal institution of racial exclusion was not the same before and/or after the revolution of 1910. In both periods, it is informal and has distributional effects. However, the post-revolutionary context incorporates institutional contestations related to previous exclusions. For example, the post-revolutionary context integrates the “symbol” of indigenous heritage into the national identity (Jung, 2009). Therefore, the non-white indigenous people have a relatively ‘positive’ national connotation in post-revolutionary Mexico.

In summary, in Mexico the informal institution of racial exclusion is present in the common unspoken regular behavior of actors. These practices reproduce patterns of allocation of power based on racialized characteristics. In turn, racial exclusion interacts within this context. That is, in the Mexican case racial exclusion is an informal institution, has distributional effects and is dynamic.

#### 6.6.2.4 Presence of the mechanism

The first actor potentially part of the mechanism of reaction is the whiter elite. The members of the whiter elite are potentially equivalent to non-aggrieved actors. Sue (2013, p. 6) describes the socio-racial order in Mexico as a “pigmentocracy” dominated by individuals with European phenotype while indigenous and African descendants are at the bottom of the structure.

Whiter elites design the institutional framework in order to control power. Vaughn (2013, p. 233) shows that in Mexico this sector of the population maintains control of political and economic power for generations. In other words, they design, promote and adopt behavioral practices that indirectly exclude populations based on racialized characteristics. Such behavior by whiter elite members is a form in which the informal institution of racial exclusion is in force and reproduced.

On the other hand, mid-aggrieved actors are potentially those individuals with an afro or indigenous dominant phenotype. Although they have non-white characteristics, they have access to resources that are in some way “whitening” the racial impurity. Villarreal (2010) argues that in Mexico, whiter categories were accessible via education and wealth. Moreover, the author shows that wealthier or educated mestizos show behavior similar to adaptation to the dominant white world. There are preferences for whiter skin tone and they try to “portray themselves as white” (Villarreal, 2010, p. 655). Indeed, Sue (2013) claims that violence is not a necessary condition to support racism in Mexico. In the Mexican case, as in many cases, the oppressed are fundamental to reproducing racial exclusion. In this regard, mid-aggrieved actors reproduce the informal institution of racial exclusion or, as the author states, they adapt the exclusionary ideology<sup>385</sup>. Vaughn also states how the non-white population prefers whiter standards than darker. The author indicates that non-whites consider white as beauty and constantly seek the whitening process as in assuring their offspring of the whiter condition. Similarly, Vaughn’s (2013, p. 232-233) illustration of non-white community attempts at differentiation from those similar to themselves is an example of adaptation of aggrieved actors. For instance, the author states that “*no community in the Costa Chica wanted to be recognized as being the most black town in all Mexico...people in those communities tended to distance themselves from blackness by assigning the height of blackness to the past*”.

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<sup>385</sup> Note that Sue (2013) refers to the term ideology and not to racial exclusion as an institution.

Moreover, the author shows how afro-descendants try to “whiten” via a whiter partner because they consider that “white is simply prettier than black” (Vaughn, 2013, p. 234).

Nevertheless, there are also traces that suggest that aggrieved actors can also show social contestations or revisions to exclusionary institutions. Jung (2009) says that racialized groups rebel against exclusion and demand better redistribution, autonomy, political opportunities, etc. For instance, the author describes that in Oaxaca “Indians began to cite the constitution in disputes” (Guardino, 232 quoted in Jung, 2009, p. 12). Similarly, Vaughn (2013) and Hoffmann (2006) argue that oppressed groups such as afro-descendants have emerged in Mexico in order to defend their rights. According to the authors, they are oppressed people and fight for social mobility, recognition and collective rights. This fact could be considered as revision or contestation of the informal institution of racial exclusion by aggrieved or mid-aggrieved actors. A further and detailed analysis of this issue will shed light in this regard. In any event, contestations by aggrieved actors seem to be present.

Jung (2009, p. 17) also states however that non-whites resist cultural resurrection projects. For instance, the author mentions that they oppose inclusive policies such as indigenous-language instruction. Similarly, Hoffmann (2006) mentions that afro-communities are frequently involved in local disputes and rivalries which result in ways analogous to those disputes described in Wade (1993) for the case of Chocó. In other words, such disputes could be considered as forms of non-cooperative behavior by aggrieved actors.

In summary, these insights broadly indicate that Mexico is potentially a case study to test the mechanism of reaction hypothesis. The brief discussion shows that under the contextual conditions, a similar cause and outcome are potentially present. Under such conditions, it is of interest to evaluate the potential of racial exclusion as an informal institution. In particular, it would be interesting to analyze the dynamics and power distributional implications of this concept in the Mexican case. Moreover, it would also be interesting to analyze how the informal institution affects local socio-economic outcomes via the regular behavior of actors, i.e. to identify the presence of the hypothesized mechanism of reaction.

### 6.6.3 Further challenges for testing the theory

The previous section shows how La Sierra in Peru and Costa Chica in Mexico are potential case studies to test the mechanism of reaction hypothesis. The literature shows that there are similar scope conditions to the Colombian case. Moreover, there is a likely correlation between racial exclusion and poor socio-economic outcomes. The literature also suggests that racial exclusion presents the attributes of an informal institution. Finally, the analysis also suggests that some traces of the mechanism are potentially present. However, as I already stated, this is a general overview and not a conclusive analysis.

In this regard, it is imperative to demonstrate the specific causal link among the informal institution of racial exclusion, the mechanism of reaction and low local socio-economic outcomes in each potential case. Moreover, there are particularities in each case that could differ from the Colombian case and make hypothesis testing a challenge. Velasquez & Hoffmann (2007) say that in studies on race relations, specific contexts limit the potential for comparisons. For example, there are specificities such as indigenous nationalism or the role of mestizos in Peru. According to De la Cadena (2001) the mestizaje project was not a popular policy in Peru as in other Latin American countries. Indeed, the author argues that in La Sierra, mestizos had an ambiguous status. This ambiguity consisted in whiter elites discriminating against them based on darker skin and the indigenous population also discriminating against them because of their ‘white stain’. This “*anti-mestizo feeling*” needs to be analyzed in more detail to detect how it affects the mechanism of reaction hypothesis in the Peruvian case. For instance, do such particularities affect actors and behavior? Do they facilitate the rise of additional actors or behavior? Do they affect the causal link between cause, mechanism and outcome?

The case of Mexico also has particular characteristics. For instance, it is important to analyze the role of nationalism in Mexico. Moreover, it is imperative to analyze in detail the structural change of the Mexican Revolution and its effects on the contextual conditions. Another important issue is the higher rate of mestizaje in the black population. Such mestizaje contrasts with other Latin American countries (Hoffmann, 2006). Therefore, it is necessary to answer questions such as how do these characteristics specifically reshape racial exclusion as an institution? Which specific actors and regular behavior shape racial exclusion following structural changes in Mexico? How could the final outcome be affected?

Moreover, in countries such as Peru, there is a more phenotypical cultural aspect of race than in Colombia. This fact entails racial discrimination being overcome with resources (wealth or human capital). In this regard, De la Cadena (2000) argues that in Peru, there is “*an imprecise notion of race in which the “spirit” prevailed over...the physical aspects of race*” (De la Cadena, 2000, p. 8). That is, an individual can “whiten” via wealth or human capital (De la Cadena, 2001). Similarly, authors such as Drzewieniecki (2004) and Caballero (1981) mention the flexibility of racial hierarchies via the *mestizaje*. For Drzewieniecki (2004) and Caballero (1981), access to wealth could eliminate racial barriers for the “whitening” of the excluded population, something possible, but more difficult in the Colombian context. In Colombia, wealth and human capital are important but not sufficient conditions for cultural and physical whitening (see for instance Wade, 1993).

Finally, it is also important to emphasize the relevance of alternative explanations. The final outcome also concerns the interrelation of alternative factors. In the case of Peru, geographical explanations are relevant. The altitudes of the highlands make local economic activities difficult (Werbrouck, 2004, Caballero, 1981). In the case of Mexico, it would be interesting to research the relation between geophysical environment and local socio-economic outcomes. It would be also important to analyze the geographical location of the afro-Mexican population.

Nonetheless and despite these differences, authors such as Velasquez & Hoffman (2007) state that racial studies in Latin America will benefit from a closer dialogue between the studies of different contexts such as those in Central America and South America. The authors argue that despite the particularities in each country, the different analyses could enrich knowledge on racial relations by establishing individual or shared dynamics (Velasquez & Hoffmann, 2007, p. 7).

Therefore, evaluation of the mechanism of reaction hypothesis could follow this suggestion. Further analysis of Peru and Mexico could show the presence of the mechanism of reaction in cases different to Colombia. These analyses could also complement theoretical insights determined in the Colombian case, widening and enriching this theoretical tool to explain how racial exclusion and socio-economic outcomes are causally linked.



# Chapter 7 Conclusions and final discussions

## 7.1 Summary

This research analyzed the effects of an exclusionary informal institution on local socio-economic outcomes. Specifically, this research used the Colombian case of racial relations, the geographical distribution of race and differences in local performance to analyze the effects of the informal institution of racial exclusion on local socio-economic outcomes.

The analysis involved two different research questions. The first is the causal effect racial exclusion bears on local socio-economic outcomes in the Colombian postcolonial context of the late 19<sup>th</sup> and mid-20<sup>th</sup> centuries. The second is how the informal institution of racial exclusion affects the final outcomes. This second research question specifically addresses the questions of how the informal institution of racial exclusion affects local socio-economic outcomes such as public goods provision, which specific actors shape this institution, how these actors behave, how such regular behavior contributes to outcomes, and how such processes involve institutional change and institutional reproduction.

To answer these questions, this research follows theoretical insights of historical institutionalism. Historical institutionalism is useful for this research because it allows the study of racial exclusion incorporating important elements of racial dynamics and institutions such as power resources, actors, regular practices of these actors, simultaneous processes of institutional revisions and reproductions, tensions and conflicts (see discussion in chapter 2). These elements are fundamental to understanding the specific processes among the cause of the historical institution of racial exclusion, its effects on the final outcomes, and the “black box” between them.

Historical institutionalism is therefore a theoretical guide to developing a hypothesis of the mechanism between racial exclusion and socio-economic outcomes. This mechanism emphasizes identification of the causal link specifying the specific actors, behavior, power relations, reproductions and revisions that contribute to shaping the final outcomes.

The research questions and the theoretical approach have repercussions on the research's methodological strategy. To answer the two general research questions, I use a multimethod strategy. This multimethod strategy consists of quantitative and qualitative analysis.

The identification of the average causal effect requires a quantitative strategy. Racial exclusion was primarily operationalized as a vector variable in the initial strategy. It was calculated as the percentage of blacker population in Colombian municipalities ( $BCPi$ ). This operationalization had the advantage of allowing identification of systematic correlations between cause and outcome<sup>386</sup> supporting the hypothesis of a negative relation between the proxy variables of racial exclusion and the final outcome of local socio-economic performance.

Furthermore, this strategy has the advantage of using a large-N database with information at the municipal level for the Colombian case. This large-N database serves as input for the instrumental variable technique (IV regression). The IV technique is a methodological strategy to calculate the average effect of racial exclusion on local socio-economic outcomes, i.e. to answer the first general research question.

The IV regression methodology states that racial exclusion ( $BCPi$ ) has indirect effects on local economic outcomes ( $Log y_i$ ) via the direct effects of public goods provision ( $PGPi$ ). This empirical strategy is justified from insights that argue that the provision of public goods is highly related to institutional dynamics. In turn, these institutional dynamics involve actors, power, and political economic decisions (Mahoney, 2010, Pierson, 2004). In particular, public goods, social and political power are interrelated to consolidate benefits or political advantages (Mahoney, 2010, p. 16, Pierson, 2004, p. 32 and 37). Therefore, public goods provision is directly affected by racial exclusion<sup>387</sup>. Additionally, public goods provision affects local economic performance because public goods provision potentially increases intellectual and physical development necessary for economic progress (UNESCO, 2009).

However, three elements made the use of a multimethod strategy vital. First, the way in which racial exclusion is theoretically conceptualized means its operationalization as a vector variable is limited. The limitation relies on an operationalization as vector variable not being

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<sup>386</sup> Fearon & Laitin (2008), Pager & Shepherd (2008), Quillian (2006).

<sup>387</sup> The theoretical and methodological parts discuss this issue.

able to capture theoretical attributes of the concept of racial exclusion such as power distributional implications or a dynamic character (relevant attributes in this work). This limitation is common in quantitative works that use racial variables as an institutional explanation<sup>388</sup>. The lack of a theoretical concept is one of the major criticisms of studies on the effects of institutions. Indeed, authors such as Evans (2006) state that institutions are usually limited to proxies and lack accuracy in analysis. This research therefore analyzed the effects of an institutional cause focusing on an empirical strategy that allows improved theoretical conceptualization and operationalization of the cause.

Second, Pager & Shepherd (2008) and the National Research Council (2004) argue that quantitative models should be used with caution “*in making causal interpretations*” related to studies on racial exclusion (Pager & Shepard, 2008, p. 184). The findings usually rely on assumptions that result in problems for interpretations (National Research Council, 2004). This issue is more relevant working in historical periods where data collection is one of the major challenges<sup>389</sup>. Qualitative analysis is then a useful strategy to complement these studies (Trampusch & Palier, 2016, Mahoney, 2004). In this regard, Mahoney (2004 and 2000) suggests that qualitative analyses such as process tracing are ideal to verify causal paths and discard spurious connections. Using this principle, a qualitative methodology was vital in this research to study the causal link.

Moreover, the second general research question involves the construction of a hypothesis of the mechanism between the cause and outcome. In this research, the notion of a mechanism differs from the view of intervening variables (following Beach & Pedersen, 2013). In other words, it was necessary to apply a mechanistic strategy to specify how the exclusionary institution of racial exclusion affects local socio-economic outcomes. This mechanistic strategy brings precise accounts of the processes, actors and behavior involved in the causal path (Mahoney, 2000, p. 418). Hence, the identification of the mechanism entailed a qualitative approximation to the explanation.

Finally, a multimethod approach improves understanding of simultaneous processes of institutional reproduction and change. This focus is suitable for studies on institutions such as the informal institution of racial exclusion.

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<sup>388</sup> See discussion on racial studies.

<sup>389</sup> As was the case of this research.

The qualitative approach uses process tracing analysis, a methodology appropriate to identifying the mechanism between the hypothesized cause and outcome (Trampusch & Palier, 2016, Beach & Pedersen, 2013, Bennett & Checkel, 2015, Mahoney, 2012, among others). Among the different variants of process tracing, this research uses theory building process tracing. As Beach & Pedersen (2013) state, theory building process tracing is appropriate when an identified correlation between the hypothesized cause and outcome exists, but the mechanism is not clear. Using archival material and secondary sources, the theory building process tracing then arrived at a hypothesis of the mechanism.

Theory building process tracing requires a typical case selection strategy (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, Goertz, 2008). This means the case study in this work was a typical case of the informal institution of racial exclusion cause (X) and the low local socio-economic outcomes (Y). An important caveat in this regard is that in the qualitative approach, local socio-economic outcomes refer to public goods provision. As discussed, this outcome and its direct relationship with the cause present institutional theoretical implications relevant to tracing. Therefore, process tracing analysis focused on the link between racial exclusion and public goods provision.

The case study was the region of Chocó in Colombia. Chocó is a region with a high percentage of black population and where the informal institution of racial exclusion is in force (X). Moreover, Chocó also shows poor performance in local outcomes (Y), particularly, public goods provision.

In line with the research questions and empirical strategies, the findings of this research are also broken down into two major results.

The first result concerns the quantitative analysis which found that the informal institution of racial exclusion is an alternative explanation for low local socio-economic outcomes in the Colombian case. Descriptive statistics and regression analyses showed that there is a negatively and statistically significant relationship between the measurement of the racial exclusion of the 'blacker' composition of the population and local socio-economic outcomes during the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. In other words, statistical analysis and various econometric specifications identified the hypothesis that municipalities with a blacker

composition of its population had a lower provision of public goods and lower economic performance.

The IV regressions used different measurements of public goods provision ( $PGP_i$ ) and economic outcomes ( $\text{Log } y_i$ ). The different measurements of public goods provision ( $PGP_i$ ) are enrollment rates, numbers of schools per 1000 inhabitants disaggregated into primary, secondary, public, private schools, the number of educational establishments per 1000 inhabitants, and literacy rates. These data are from reports of the minister of public instruction and population censuses. The measurements for economic performance ( $\text{Log } y_i$ ) are per capita industrial capital and the percentage of population in transformation industries according to the FIC of 1945 and the population census of 1938.

The different econometric exercises showed that the instrument  $BCP_i$  is valid and highly correlated with the endogenous variable  $PGP_i$  for the different specifications of public goods provision. That is, the first stages showed that the instrument of blacker composition of the population ( $BCP_i$ ) is significant and negative. Therefore, these outcomes indicate that those municipalities with a blacker composition of its population presented a lower provision of public goods for development and, consequently, a lower level of economic performance measured by industrial variables ( $\text{Log } y_i$ ).

The econometric exercises also depict that control variables do not affect the coefficient and significance of the instrument  $BCP_i$ . This fact means that even after controlling for alternative explanatory variables such as geography, production of goods, etc. the statistically significant relationship among the blacker composition of the population, public goods provision and local economic performance persists. In the case of geographical variables<sup>390</sup>, there was the expected negative relationship with the dependent variable (in the majority of the specifications).

Furthermore, the IV regressions also indicate that the indigenous component negatively affects local industrial performance ( $\text{Log } y_i$ ). The coefficient of indigenous population is negative and significant. This result is important because it suggests that exclusion of the indigenous population contributed directly to low local outcomes. As the discussion shows,

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<sup>390</sup> Temperature, precipitation, distances, etc.

the direct effects on the indigenous population are totally consistent with the official regulatory framework of the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. This regulatory framework directly excluded the indigenous population. In contrast, the afro-descendant component suffered a more ‘subtle’ exclusion because there were no explicit exclusionary rules against them<sup>391</sup>.

Another relevant result is the effect of coffee production. Coffee production is the most documented alternative explanation in the Colombian literature for local differences in socio-economic performance. The IV regressions indicated that coffee production was relevant for local socio-economic performance as the literature argues. The coefficient of the coffee production variable is positive and statistically significant.

An additional topic deserves more discussion. This topic is related to secondary education and racial make-up. The regressions identified a negative direct relationship between racial exclusion and secondary public goods provision. This result shows that Colombia is a society with historical inequalities in the access to education, in particular for the type of education that would increase social mobility for afro-descendants. The negative and significant relationship unambiguously demonstrates that those municipalities with a blacker composition of its population had less public secondary schools. This outcome is relevant because secondary education has stronger implications for social mobility. The lower number of secondary schools in blacker municipalities therefore reduced opportunities for prosperity in these areas. Like the results for schools in primary education, in secondary education local differences exist and are also related to racial make-up. Moreover, the econometric regressions also show a negative and significant relation between the afro-descendant composition of the population and numbers of public and private secondary schools. This finding is relevant because private secondary schools were also consequence of local public investment. Many private schools were financed by public funds. Hence, it seems that those regions with a blacker composition of its population were unable to provide both ‘private’ and public education for its populations. In other words, blacker regions failed on stimulating education for the majority.

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<sup>391</sup> The research showed different examples of rules of direct exclusion against indigenous people. Moreover, there is an analysis of the literature that discusses this issue.

Finally, other exercises also identified the negative relationship between the afro-descendant component and local socio-economic performance. For instance, additional specifications use literacy rates as the independent variable and percentage of population on transformation industries as the proxy of economic performance (according to the population census of 1938). These extended exercises also showed that municipalities with a blacker component of the population display lower literacy rates and experience a lower accumulation of public goods for industrial performance.

Concluding the first part of the results, the various quantitative strategies support the hypothesis that racial exclusion is an alternative explanation for differences in local socio-economic performance in Colombian municipalities. Moreover, racial exclusion has a direct negative relationship with public goods provision. Lastly, the econometric exercises show that the effects of racial exclusion on economic performance are negative and indirect via the dynamics of public goods provision.


The second part of the results concerns identifying the mechanism between racial exclusion and local socio-economic performance. In particular, socio-economic outcome is operationalized through public goods provision. Following the theory building process tracing analysis, the research here proposes a hypothesis of the mechanism of reaction.

This mechanism of reaction hypothesis states that the informal institution of racial exclusion shapes three specific actors. These actors are non-aggrieved, mid-aggrieved and aggrieved actors. These actors react to the exclusionary institution with five types of behavior: adoption, adaptation, non-cooperation, revision and contestation of the informal institution of racial exclusion<sup>392</sup>. Such regular practices are forms of modifying or enforcing the informal institution of racial exclusion. In turn, these modifications or reinforcements affect the local provision of public goods when these actors and specific behavior are related to initiatives for the local political economy of public goods provision. Hence, the final link indicates that behavior such as adoption, adaptation and non-cooperation facilitate low public goods provision. In contrast, behavior such as revision and contestation tend to facilitate effective initiatives for improved public goods provision. Figure 7.1 portrays a summary.

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<sup>392</sup> The discussion shows that the literature on institutionalism and racial relations provide theoretical insights that guided the identification of these actors and behavior in the empirical sources.

Figure 7-1 Mechanism of reaction



The causal link for each specific actor is then presented to better explain the hypothesis of the mechanism. The first actor concerns non-aggrieved actors (see item I in each panel of figure 7.1). Non-aggrieved actors face no level of being affected by the exclusionary institution because they do not show the socio-racial characteristics related to the exclusionary institution. Moreover, the implementation of the exclusionary institution accommodates them in an advantageous position in controlling the access to resources. These elements favor the specific behavior of adoption of the exclusionary institution. The causal link is that such actors are frequently in positions of power in the local political economy of public goods provision. Therefore, adoption of the exclusionary institution is manifested in the form of behavior that propagates ineffective initiatives for the provision of public goods to favor the bulk of excluded population through omission, negligence, and/or corruption. Consequently, such adoption of the exclusionary institution affects the final outcome of low public goods provision (Y).

The analysis of sources showed that this was the case for the whiter Chocoana elites in Colombia. The whiter elite basically controlled access to power resources in Chocoana society. In order to maintain such a position of power, they reproduced the informal institution of racial exclusion, ‘adopting’ the national institutional exclusionary framework. The Chocoana whiter elite then adopted white values as a society ideal while excluding the bulk of afro-descendant population. In turn, when they take responsibility for Chocó’s local political economy, their regular behavior of adoption result in being ineffective for the



provision of public goods to favor the majority poor afro-descended Chocoanos. For instance, in the observations analyzed, instead of using scarce resources to construct more public primary schools, non-aggrieved actors misused them favoring public investments irrelevant to the welfare of the afro-descendant majority.

Component II of figure 7.1 shows the causal link for mid-aggrieved actors. Mid-aggrieved actors have a mid-level of being affected by the exclusionary institution. They present some socio-cultural characteristics related to the exclusionary institution. However, despite these characteristics, the level of being affected differs from a typical aggrieved actor because mid-aggrieved actors have access to resources or have relatively lower characteristics associated with the exclusionary institution. These elements minimize the effects of the exclusionary institution.

As the analysis showed, mid-aggrieved actors show two regular types of behavior: adaptation and revision. Adaptation is visible in regular practices that reproduce the exclusionary institution. Moreover, when adapted mid-aggrieved actors hold positions in the local political economy of public goods provision, adaptation is observable in practices that propagate ineffective initiatives for the provision of public goods for the bulk of excluded population, initiatives associated with negligence, exclusionary policies, inefficient bureaucracy, etc.

This pattern was the case of the new mulato Chocoana elite. The new mulato Chocoana elite members are the result of gradual opportunities for a limited sector of afro-descendants for the accumulation of capital<sup>393</sup>. The new mulata Chocoana elite were members of the Chocoana society with afro-descendant heritage. Consequently, they encountered the effects of the exclusionary institution. However, as mentioned, they had access to resources from the accumulation of physical capital (mainly from mining activities) or human capital<sup>394</sup>. These elements eased the improvement of their social standing. Once at a better social standing, secondary and primary sources showed that they adapted to reproducing the exclusionary institution. For instance, they show a preference for marriage to whiter partners or they support exclusionary projects. Moreover, when adapted mid-aggrieved actors were in positions relevant for the local political economy of public goods provision, adaptation had the connotation of exclusionary social practices. The archives material reveal efforts in

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<sup>393</sup> Castillo & Varela (2013), Leal (2007), Wade (1993), etc.

<sup>394</sup> As the historiography shows.

fostering implicit whitening immigration campaigns and the allocation of scarce public resources in profligate public investment against the benefit of the afro-descendant majority.

Other types of mid-aggrieved actors incline towards regular practices of revision of the exclusionary institution. In turn, the revisions propagate effective initiatives for the provision of public goods that favor the bulk of excluded population. This was the case of some members of the new mulato Chocoana elite. Similar to adapted mid-aggrieved actors, this selected group shares certain attributes with the afro-descendant heritage. They improved their social standing also through accumulating money or human capital. Moreover, many of them joined Chocó's local public administration. Nevertheless, in contrast to adapted mid-aggrieved actors, this category of mid-aggrieved actor revised exclusionary policies such as implicit educational segregation. Such revisions were relevant in propagating improved provision of public goods such as a greater offering of schools for the poor majority afro-descendant Chocoanos.

Component III of figure 7.1 shows aggrieved actors. Aggrieved actors are highly affected by the exclusionary institution. These actors have the socio-racial characteristics associated with the exclusionary institution. Moreover, they have relatively low access to physical or human resources. Consequently, the level of affectation is high. The analysis of the sources show that aggrieved actors have two regular types of behavior: non-cooperative action and contesting the exclusionary institution.

Behavior such as non-cooperation reproduce the exclusionary institution. In this regard, non-aggrieved actors promote their own suppressions with behavior such as rivalry, antagonism, egoism, and/or lack of cooperation with the similarly aggrieved population. In turn, such behavior of reproduction blocks initiatives that allow an improved provision of public goods. This was exactly the situation for many Chocoanos who, for instance, blocked initiatives for the provision of public goods in national and local spaces through rivalry among themselves.

On the other hand, aggrieved actors also contest the exclusionary institution. These contestations are in the form of protests, demands and/or complaints against exclusionary policies or actors. However, such contestations have low repercussions on public goods provision because access to resources to influence the local political economy of public goods is highly limited. As the analysis shows, aggrieved actors were the Chocoana people or

communities. These Chocoanos, as a collective, have high afro-descendant characteristics and relatively poor access to resources. The sources showed observations of protests against exclusionary conditions. These contestations were barely transformed into an improved provision of public goods. Nonetheless, they set precedents for future revisions.

The analysis also presented the mechanism of reaction hypothesis as being potentially applicable in analytically equivalent contexts<sup>395</sup>. For instance, Spanish Latin American countries present similar cause, outcome and contextual conditions to those described in the Colombian case. Therefore, the mechanism of reaction could be useful to explain how racial exclusion affects local socio-economic outcomes in these contexts.

For example, this research gave a general description of two potential case studies: the case of La Sierra in Peru and Costa Chica in Mexico. Both regions show a strong presence of the informal institution of racial exclusion. That is, in each case, racial exclusion exhibits the attributes of the systematized concept of this research. Moreover, as in Chocó, these regions have low socio-economic outcomes. This general description also showed that these regions may have the various actors identified and behavior elements of the mechanism of reaction hypothesis. However, as the analysis remarked, such identification is the outcome of a general description only and more empirical work is necessary to test the proposed hypothesis of the mechanism of reaction.

Finally, it is important to mention the limitations of the analysis. Regarding the quantitative analysis, this research examines an alternative explanation for differences in local socio-economic outcomes for the Colombian case. This means, first, that such an alternative explanation in no way pretends to displace existing explanations for differences in local performance in Colombia. Rather, this analysis aims to complement such a debate. Second, although relevant new data were collected, the data still have limitations for the analysis. The quantitative results are illustrative and consistent with the hypothesis that racial exclusion has negative effects on local socio-economic outcomes. Moreover, this work used different techniques and proxy variables to corroborate this insight. However, as the National Research Council (2004, p. 155) states “*situations in which the researcher will possess the data and detailed knowledge needed to support specification of an appropriate model are relatively*

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<sup>395</sup> As Falleti & Lynch (2009) would indicate.

*scarce*”, particularly, in racial studies. As in any historical approach, this fact is more noteworthy when dealing with an institutional cause and a historical time period that make quantitative analysis a challenging task. In this regard, the construction of variables and conclusions are supported by assumptions. Consequently, although the evidence is consistent, it is imperative to remark that “*plausible explanations cannot be excluded*” and further work in the archive is necessary to reduce limitations in the analysis (National Research Council, 2004, p. 129).

On the other hand, the qualitative analysis presents two major limitations. The first concerns this research not making any conclusive analysis regarding the conditions under which actors choose to behave regularly in one way rather than another. This fact still remains opaque in the analysis. A second caveat is that the mechanism hypothesis needs evaluation. In order to evaluate the hypothesis, it is necessary to do further empirical work in similar contextual cases.

## **7.2 Implications**

This research has three major implications. First, the results supplement the analysis of the effects of exclusionary informal institutions on local socio-economic outcomes. Second, the research suggests a complementary perspective to study racial issues. Third, the findings present and develop an alternative explanation for differences in local performance in the Colombian case.

### **7.2.1 Implications for the literature on institutional effects on socio-economic outcomes**

This research supplements the analysis of the effects of exclusionary institutions on local socio-economic outcomes in three major subjects. First, specification of the mechanism hypothesis complements the study of the effects of exclusionary informal institutions by showing the precise causal link between the institutional cause and the outcome. Second, the emphasis on actors and behavior illustrates how variously aggrieved actors contribute to different final outcomes. Finally, the work offers a more symmetric strategy to study the effects of institutions.

This research studies the effects of a historical informal exclusionary institution on local socio-economic outcomes. Using a historical institutional framework, the research sees the study of actors and their behavior as vital in the analysis of such effects. The analysis also follows the theoretical precept of simultaneous processes of institutional change and reproduction. Moreover, this research uses an institutional perspective on the cause racial exclusion.

These insights are in no way new for the literature on institutionalism. Many historical institutionalist works emphasize that to study the effects of institutions it is necessary to study the actors, the distributional effects, reproductions, changes, the contexts and the dynamic character of institutions. For instance, some of the work argues that in order to analyze the effects of institutions on socio-economic outcomes, researchers must define the actors that the institution shapes and how these actors and institutions are transformed by the context and power relations (e.g. Mahoney, 2010, Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, Pierson, 2004, Streeck & Thelen, 2005).

Developing on these insights, this research supplements the analysis of the effects of informal exclusionary institutions on local socio-economic outcomes by offering a more precise specification of the theoretical mechanism.

A first major implication of this research therefore refers to the proposed hypothesis for the mechanism. Specification of the mechanism hypothesis complements the study of the effects of exclusionary informal institutions by showing the precise causal link. Accordingly, the causal link specifies the precise actors and specific behavior through which an exclusionary informal institution affects local public goods provision. For instance, it clarifies who the actors are, how actors behave exactly, how this behavior simultaneously involves institutional reproduction and change, and how such regular practices truly contribute to specific local socio-economic outcomes. Such precision clarifies current gaps in the literature on these types of processes. Consequently, studies on the effects of informal exclusionary institutions on socio-economic outcomes could be complemented by applying the hypothesis arrived at for the mechanism of reaction. Such studies would benefit by addressing analysis to identifying the precise elements within the causal link.

Second, the focus on actors leads to identifying exclusionary informal institutions comprising different aggrieved actors who react to the exclusionary institution with different behavior. These actors are non-aggrieved, mid-aggrieved and aggrieved actors.

This emphasis on different actors and behavior reveal that these three specific aggrieved actors tend to reproduce and change the exclusionary institution with consequences on the final outcome of local public goods provision. The fact that institutions are reproduced or change is a standard finding in the literature. Similarly, a popular finding is that reproduction and powerful actors contribute to low socio-economic outcomes. However, a more appealing finding is showing precisely that aggrieved actors (i.e. namely mid-aggrieved and aggrieved actors) may cause fundamental institutional adjustments which influence the outcome of public goods provision. This research therefore brings balance to the disproportionate attention to the role of privileged actors and institutional reproduction in shaping local socio-economic outcomes. This perspective supplements the theoretical insights for studying the effects of institutions such as those in Amsden, DiCaprio & Robinson (2012), Mahoney (2010) or Tilly (1998).

Finally, there are minor implications related to the identification of the mechanism hypothesis. For example, this research suggests that studies on institutional effects need to offer a more symmetric strategy to study these effects. These studies should focus on both the causal effects and theoretical mechanism to understand the phenomenon. In this regard, this research contrasts with work from the new institutional economic approach (Acemoglu, Garcia-Jimeno, Robinson, 2014, 2012, among others) which are devoted to the average effects of institutions overlooking relevant attributes of the institutional explanation and the theoretical mechanism<sup>396</sup>.

Furthermore, this research offers an explanation for differences at subnational levels. This last issue differs from works in the historical institutionalist tradition centered on comparative historical analysis at the country level (Mahoney, 2015, 2010, 2003, and Lange, Mahoney & vom Hau, 2006).

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<sup>396</sup> Or as Mahoney (2004, p. 89) would say, it is necessary to develop “*a theoretically-informed discussion of the generative processes that produce the association*”.

### 7.2.2 Complementary perspective to analyze racial issues

Literature on race shows that race matters in explaining socio-economic outcomes (Gafar, 1998). The negative association between “non-whiteness” and low socio-economic outcomes is more than an established and evident issue in much racial relation work<sup>397</sup>. Moreover, such literature offers theoretical insights on behavioral strategies in the face of exclusion<sup>398</sup>. As a supplement on literature on race, this research first emphasizes conceptualizing racial exclusion as an institution. Second, it specifies how the effects of race are translated into low local socio-economic outcomes.

Regarding the emphasis on racial exclusion as an institution, the discussion shows that the literature on race defines four general attributes for the concept of racial exclusion<sup>399</sup>. Racial exclusion entails: differential treatment to a dominated group or individual based on racialized characteristics; negative consequences for the excluded individuals or groups and benefits for dominant individuals or groups; discrimination is associated with behavior; and, finally, racial exclusion can be at individual or at institutional level.

On the other hand, the literature on institutional economics refers to racial issues as institutions operationalized as proxy variables almost always with coordinating effects (Mahoney, 2010, Evans, 2006). Authors such as Evans (2006) point out the theoretical deficiencies of this conceptualization.

In contrast, this research conceptualizes racial exclusion as an institution complementing the attributes of the literature on race. As an institution, informal racial exclusion has theoretical attributes. These attributes are that the informal institution of racial exclusion concerns unspoken rights and obligations enforced in a society that discriminate a racialized population. Moreover, racial exclusion is dynamic. That is, racial exclusion is contested over time. Lastly, racial exclusion has effects on power distribution related to racialized characteristics (these theoretical attributes follow Mahoney, 2015, Carruthers, 2012, Reskin, 2012, Mahoney, 2010, Streeck, 2010, Pager & Shepard, 2008, Quillian, 2006, Streeck & Thelen, 2005, National Research Council, 2004, Pierson, 2004, Knight, 1992, among others).

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<sup>397</sup> For instance, Wilson (2010), Hoffman & Centeno (2003), Jencks & Phillips (1998), Gafar (1998) Hogan (2001), Flórez, Medina & Urrea (2001), Patterson (2001), etc.

<sup>398</sup> See Sue (2013), Sawyer (2006), Hoffmann (2006), Bivens (2005), among others.

<sup>399</sup> For instance, Pager & Shepard (2008), Quillian (2006), National Research Council (2004), etc.

As the literature on historical institutionalism suggests (e.g. Mahoney, 2015), this institutional approach to racial exclusion is different to institutional conceptualizations that consider racial exclusion as merely a coordinating mechanism that regulates behavior or cultural social practices appropriate to rational choice and cultural approaches.

This research therefore suggests that racial studies should integrate the attributes of racial exclusion as an institution with the background attributes present in the literature on race. This integration would provide better theoretical conceptualization in the terms of Evans (2006) and Adcock & Collier (2001). That is, in addition to the well-known attributes of racial exclusion from the literature on race, racial studies should include the analytical attributes of unspoken differential treatment, rights, obligations and/or rules implicitly enforced in a society with distributional effects and a dynamic character. This conceptualization enables analysis to focus on the dynamics inside the mechanism that contributes to the final outcome.

This research's specification of how the effects of race are translated into low local socio-economic outcomes (i.e. its second emphasis) refers precisely to the above mechanism. The literature on race is prolific in showing negative correlations between racial exclusion and socio-economic variables<sup>400</sup>. This literature is also rich in showing mechanisms and behavior through which racial exclusion is faced, reproduced or changed as social understandings (Sue, 2013, Sawyer, 2006, Hoffmann, 2006, Bivens, 2005, among others). In contrast, this research shows that, in addition to the specification of correlations, associations, mechanism of reproduction or change, etc., it is necessary to precisely demonstrate the causal link that shows how the effects of race are translated into local socio-economic outcomes. This means to precisely demonstrate the theoretical mechanism that helps to understand better these well-established correlations from the literature on race<sup>401</sup>. The results show that the mechanism of reaction explains how this institution of racial exclusion shapes specific actors and their specific regular behavior with effects on local socio-economic outcomes. That is, this hypothesis of the mechanism supplements the study of racial relations by articulating insights from the literature on race and institutionalism, helping to elucidate theoretical issues that remain unclear around established correlations.

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<sup>400</sup> As shown in the introduction.

<sup>401</sup> to better understand the association (Mahoney, 2004).



### **7.2.3 Alternative historical institutional explanation in the Colombian literature**

This research constitutes an alternative historical explanation for the Colombian literature on race relations and local performance. This fact entails two sub-general implications. First, this work uses historical institutionalism to analyze racial relations and differences on local socio-economic performance in the Colombian case. Second, this research focuses on detecting both the average effect of racial exclusion and the theoretical mechanism.

The use of historical institutionalism overcomes overlooked analysis of current institutional approaches to the Colombian case such as those in Acemoglu, Garcia-Jimeno & Robinson (2014, 2012), Bonet & Meisel (2007), and Garcia-Jimeno (2005), among others. A major implication of applying this theoretical strategy is that the study of actors, behavior and power relations is relevant to analyzing the effects of racial exclusion as an institution and its effects on local performance in Colombia.

On the other hand, this research focuses on detecting both the average effect and the causal mechanism in the Colombian case. In this regard, the quantitative analysis first identifies the average effect of racial exclusion on local socio-economic outcomes in an important period of Colombian history. Many works state the inverse relation between racial exclusion and outcomes for the Colombian case. For instance, the literature on race relations in Colombia contends that racial composition is related to socio-economic outcomes (Urrego, 2010, Maya, 2009, Appelbaum, 2006, Arriaga, 2006, Roldán, 2003, Flórez, Medina & Urrea, 2001, Wade, 1993, among others). In general, these works argue that whiter regions are perceived as more prosperous and developed.

However, the literature on quantitative analysis remains descriptive. Some of this work is limited to descriptive analyses or single case studies. Moreover, a well-developed historiographical, sociological and anthropological literature just does not have the purpose of explaining the average effect of race on differences on socio-economic performance. One of the major reasons for this limitation is the available information. As in any historical approach, data collection poses one of the major challenges for researchers. Indeed, data on racial classification after the colonial period are scarce. This argument is frequent in explaining the lack of conclusions at the national and subnational level (Flórez, Medina & Urrea, 2001, Helg, 1987).

This research collected historical data to support different strategies for quantitative analysis. The major difference to previous work is that this research uses a new Large-N historical database and systematically calculates the average effects of racial exclusion using both descriptive statistics and regression analyses. Although data limitations and assumptions are still issues that constrain the scope of the analysis, this database contains variables of interest from different sources between the late 19<sup>th</sup> and mid-20<sup>th</sup> centuries at the municipal level. In other words, it contains new information on educational enrollment rates, number of public and private schools, numbers of primary and secondary schools between circa 1890 and 1950, etc. The construction of the data base is a contribution related to works on similar topics such as those in Acemoglu, Garcia-Jimeno & Robinson (2012), Flórez, Medina & Urrea (2001) or Helg (1987), among others.

This fact means that this research is also of interest to the Colombian literature on economic and non-economic explanations for differences on local socio-economic performance. The Colombian literature proposes economic hypotheses such as geography and the export economy (coffee and gold production) as major explanations for differences on local performance. In contrast, this research analyzes the alternative explanation of the informal institution of racial exclusion.

Lastly, this research stresses the search for a theoretical mechanism. This theoretical mechanism is a system according to the terms of Beach & Pedersen (2013) and not just an intervening variable as much work in non-economic explanations specify. That is, the mechanism is a detailed account of the causal link involving actors and behavior (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, Mahoney, 2004). The hypothesis of the mechanism contributes to a description of the specific process through which racial exclusion generates differences in local socio-economic performance in Colombia. This focus contrasts with institutional explanations for the Colombian case concentrating on quantitative strategies (Acemoglu, Garcia-Jimeno & Robinson, 2014, 2012, Bonet & Meisel, 2007, and Garcia-Jimeno, 2005). The hypothesis for the mechanism of reaction arrived at explains the (until now) opaque process through which the informal institution of racial exclusion generates differences in local socio-economic performance in Colombia.


In summary, this research complements understanding of the effects of historical institutions on socio-economic outcomes by analyzing the informal institution of racial exclusion. The

analysis of racial exclusion allowed studying the effects of an alternative explanation for differences in local performance in Colombia, and developing a hypothesis of the theoretical mechanism. The hypothesis of the mechanism proposes implications for academic areas such as the analysis of the effects of institutions on socio-economic outcomes, racial relations, and the Colombian literature on differences in local performance. Unquestionably, further work is vital to explore additional issues that require developing such as testing of the mechanism hypothesis, further archival work on data at the municipal level, and a systematic explanation of how actors in the mechanism opt for a type of regular behavior rather than another. However, the attained findings and implications shed light on issues that are almost always opaque in works with research purposes similar to those developed in this research.

# Annexes


## Annex 1. Regional persistence of race

Annex 1.1 Regional persistence of blackness 1912-2005. (Departmental mean for 1912)




Source: population censuses

Annex 1.2 Regional persistence of the indigenous population 1912-2005. (Departmental mean for 1912)



Source: population censuses

## Annex 2 Per capita GDP and industrial assets



Source: DANE, Banrep, population censuses

<sup>402</sup> Includes Chocó. Identification is by self-recognition (Palacios, 2006, p. 3). For more details see Annex Final graphs.

<sup>403</sup> It does not include Chocó. Identification by Self-recognition

### Annex 3 Data description

Variables	Name	Calculation	Source
illiteracy	Illiteracy Rate 1912	Percentage of people who can't read related to the total population in 1912 or 1-literacy rate (1-t_Leen_1912). Data from 1912 census have 41 observations of population calculated according to censuses of 1918, 1928, 1938, 1951, 1964, 1973. Moreover, 51 observations of 'literacy' are calculated based on the departmental average of literacy (see excel file 'Cal 1912 1938'). These municipalities present information in the FIC. However, they do not present information in the population census of 1912 for the variables of interest. This process excluded municipalities that belong to departments that do not report the major information in census of 1912; therefore, it is not possible to estimate the departmental averages. Finally, the former department of Magdalena does not report data (different to population by municipality). This information appears as zero value in the data base. However, the different results of exercises are not significantly affected by this since these observations are excluded in calculations using the condition $t\_Leen\_1912 > 0$ .	Population Census 1912. By: Colombia. Ministerio de Gobierno. Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1912.
illiteracy_1938	Illiteracy Rate 1938	Percentage of people that can't read related to the total population in 1938. The variable 'people that can't read' is the result of the aggregation of the categories male and female. Therefore, it is assumed zero for missing values to limit the number of municipalities without information when adding the different categories for a particular municipality. Data on population have 24 observations with imputations based on censuses of 1951 and	Population Census 1938. By: Colombia. Contraloría General de la República. Dirección Nacional de Estadística. Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1940-1942.

		1964 (see excel file 'Cal 1912 1938'). However, these observations are excluded in calculations using the condition Literacy_1938>0 because these observations coincide with imputed data in population.	
t_Leen_1912	Literacy rate 1912	Percentage of people that can read related to the total population. Population is from census 1912. It used a similar process as in the variable illiteracy.	Population Census 1912. By: Colombia. Ministerio de Gobierno. Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1912.
Literacy_1938	Literacy rate 1938	Percentage of people that can read related to the total population in different categories (male and female). Population is from census 1938. It used a similar process as in the variable illiteracy_1938.	Population Census 1938. By: Colombia. Contraloría General de la República. Dirección Nacional de Estadística. Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1940-1942.
P_ind_percentage_1938	Percentage of population in transformation industries	This variable is the population in transformation industries related to the total population in each municipality according to the census of 1938. It assumes missing values as zero. However, these observations are excluded from calculations using the condition Literacy_1938>0. This condition includes only municipalities with reported data for the population in transformation industries in the census of 1938.	Population Census 1938. By: Colombia. Contraloría General de la República. Dirección Nacional de Estadística. Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1940-1942.

<p>t_escuelas_urb_ofi_1894_1hbt t_escuelas_rur_ofi_1894_1htb t_escuelas_tot_ofi_1894_1htb</p>	<p>Schools per 1000 inhabitants circa 1890, urban, rural and total.</p>	<p>Numbers of schools in circa 1890 per 1000 inhabitants. Numbers of schools is disaggregated by urban, rural and total (urban plus rural). For instance, t_escuelas_urb_ofi_1894_1hbt is the total of urban schools in a municipality i per 1000 inhabitants. The value in urban, rural and total schools is the aggregation of the records reported in each municipality in different categories (female urban/rural schools, male urban/rural schools, etc.). Therefore, the calculation of the number of schools assumes that: 1. Schools are urban when inspectors of public instruction do not specify between urban and rural. 2. It is assumed that symbol (-) equates zero in the reports. 3. In calculating the aggregations, missing values equate to zero. The reason is that these data on schools are not recorded equally by the different officials in charge. For instance, the records do not present uniformity. Some reports present complete information (schools and students disaggregated by female/male/mixed schools/urban/rural). In contrast, other municipalities report limited information (less categories or disaggregation). This assumption allows limiting the number of municipalities without information when adding the different categories for a particular municipality. On the other hand, the population is estimated based on data from population censuses of 1912 and 1938.</p>	<p>Data are collected from different issues of Official Diary (Diario Oficial) 1893-4 except for Cundinamarca. Data for Cundinamarca are from „Tercer Informe general de Instrucción Pública del Departamento de Cundinamarca 1890". Bogotá, Imprenta de Antonio M. Silvestre. See file Annex of data base.</p>
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<p>t_matri_urb_ofi_1894_1hbt t_matri_rur_ofi_1894_1hbt t_matri_tot_ofi_1894_1hbt</p>	<p>Enrollment rates per 1000 inhabitants circa 1890, urban, rural and total.</p>	<p>This variable is the number of students in circa 1890 per 1000 inhabitants disaggregated by urban, rural and total. For instance, t_matri_urb_ofi_1894_1hbt is the total of urban students in a municipality i per 1000 inhabitants. The total of students includes the aggregation of the records reported in each municipality for different categories (female/male/mixed students). Therefore, it uses a similar process as in the previous variable of schools circa 1890.</p>	<p>Data are collected from different issues of Official Diary (Diario Oficial) 1893-4 except for Cundinamarca. Data for Cundinamarca are from „Tercer Informe general de Instrucción Pública del Departamento de Cundinamarca 1890". Bogotá, M. Silvestre Imprenta de Antonio. See Annex of data base.</p>
<p>t_esc_tot_ofi__prim_1911_1hbt t_escuelas_prim_ofi_1911_1hbt t_escuelas_sec_ofi_1911_1hbt t_escuelas_prim_priv_1911_1hbt t_escuelas_sec_priv_1911_1hbt</p>	<p>Schools per 1000 inhabitants 1911</p>	<p>This variable is the numbers of schools in 1911 per 1000 inhabitants. This variable is disaggregated by public-primary (tot_ofi_prim), urban public-primary (prim_ofi), public-secondary (sec_ofi), private-primary (prim_priv), private-secondary (sec_priv). For instance, t_esc_tot_ofi__prim_1911_1hbt is the total (urban plus rural) public primary schools in a municipality i per 1000 inhabitants. The total of schools includes the aggregation of the records reported in each municipality in different categories (urban female/male, rural female/ male, etc.). Population is according to census of 1912. It is assumed: 1. The symbol (...) is zero in the report of the ministry. 2. In the aggregation process to construct the variable, it is assumed that missing values in schools equate to zero. This assumption limits the number of municipalities</p>	<p>Report to the National Congress of Minister of Public Instruction 1911. Ministerio De Instrucción Pública. Bogotá 1911. Imprenta Nacional, p. 66-155. And census 1912.</p>



		without information when adding the different categories for a particular municipality. Moreover, based on previous knowledge, it is reasonable to assume that these municipalities do not have schools during this time.	
t_esc_sec_O_y_P_1911_1hbt	Secondary public and private schools per 1000 inhabitants	Number of secondary public and private schools per 1000 inhabitants. It uses a similar process as in the previous variables t_esc_tot_ofi_prim_1911_1hbt.	
t_alumnos_tot_ofi_prim_1911hbt t_alumnos_prim_priv_1911_1hbt t_alumnos_sec_ofi_1911_1hbt t_alumnos_sec_priv_1911_1hbt	Enrollment rate 1911 per 1000 inhabitants	Enrolled students in 1911 per 1000 inhabitants. This variable is disaggregated by public primary (ofi_prim), private primary (prim_priv), public secondary (sec_ofi), private secondary (sec_priv). For instance, t_alumnos_tot_ofi_prim_1911 is the total of students in public primary schools in a municipality i per 1000 inhabitants. The total students include the records reported in each municipality in different categories (urban female/male, rural female/ male, etc.). The population is from the 1912census. Moreover, it uses a similar process as in schools 1911.	Report to the National Congress of Minister of Public Instruction 1911. Ministerio De Instrucción Pública. Bogotá 1911 Imprenta Nacional, p. 66-155. And census 1912.

school_1hbt_1951	Educational establishments per 1000 inhabitants 1951	<p>Numbers of educational establishments according to the population census of 1951. Population is from census of 1951. The number of educational establishments is the aggregation of reported establishments in the categories 'urban' and 'rural' areas (“cabeceras, cacerios and others”). Information on the population was not available for some so called national territories. Information on buildings was not available for all the so called national territories. The construction of the variable assumed that: 1. The symbol (-) in the census equates to zero. 2. It is assumed zero for municipalities that report a population in the population census but do not report in the building census. According to the data reported in the census and previous knowledge, this value was potentially close to zero. 3. In calculating the aggregation in the number of educational establishments, it is assumed that missing values equate zero. With this assumption, it is possible to limit the number of municipalities without information when adding the different categories for a particular municipality.</p>	Census of Buildings and Population 1951. By: Colombia. Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística. Bogotá: DANE, 1954.
hops_1hbt_1951	Hospitals 1951 per 1000 hbt	<p>Number of hospitals per the population according to the 1951 census. Number of hospitals is the aggregation of reported hospitals in the categories 'urban' and 'rural' areas as in schools. Therefore, it uses a similar process as in the previous variable school_1hbt_1951.</p>	Census of Buildings and Population 1951. By: Colombia. Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística. Bogotá: DANE, 1954.

school_1hbt_1938	Schools per 1000 inhabitants in 1938	Numbers of schools per 1000 inhabitants. Population is from the census of 1938. The number of schools is the aggregation of reported schools in the categories 'extern' and 'intern' areas in each municipality i. Therefore, 1. It assumes symbol (-) as zero value. 2. It uses a similar process as in the previous variable school_1hbt_1951 for calculating the aggregation of numbers of schools for a municipality i. It also uses a similar process for population as in illiteracy_1938 to exclude imputed data on population.	
hops_1hbt_1938	Hospitals 1938 per 1000 hbt	Number of hospitals per 1000 inhabitants in 1938. It uses a similar process as in the previous variable school_1hbt_1938.	Population Census 1938. By: Colombia. Contraloría General de la República. Dirección Nacional de Estadística. Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1940-1942.
AF	Industrial fixed assets	Total fixed assets according to FIC 1945 in a municipality i. It is the aggregation of fixed assets in the different sectors reported in the FIC. The construction of the aggregation of the value of fixed assets assumes that missing values equate to zero. The reasons are: 1. By assuming zero in missing values, it is possible to limit the number of municipalities without information when adding the different categories for a particular municipality in STATA. 2. The so called national territories only report data for Choco, Meta and Caquetá in the FIC. The rest is assumed as zero because according to the FIC the industries in the so called national territories are of "scarce	First Industrial Census. By: Colombia. Contraloría General de la República. Bogotá : La Contraloría , 1948

		importance" suggesting that they are considerably low (FIC, p. 2236).	
Kpesos	Capital stock	Total capital in pesos according to FIC 1945 in a municipality i. It is the aggregation of capital in pesos in the different sectors reported in the FIC. It uses a similar process as in the previous variable AF.	First Industrial Census. By: Colombia. Contraloría General de la República. Bogotá : La Contraloría , 1948
K_per1_2	Percapita capital	Fixed assets plus capital in pesos according to FIC 1945 in a municipality I (+0.0001). Population is estimated based on data of the population censuses of 1938 and 1951.	First Industrial Census. By: Colombia. Contraloría General de la República. Bogotá : La Contraloría , 1948
lK_per1_2	Log Percapita capital	Natural logarithm of K_per1_2	First Industrial Census. By: Colombia. Contraloría General de la República. Bogotá : La Contraloría , 1948
ocupados_t_pob	Industrial workers	Total industrial workers according to FIC 1945 in a municipality i. It is the aggregation of industrial workers in different sectors reported in the FIC. Population is estimated based on data of population censuses 1938 and 1951. It uses a similar aggregation process as in the previous variable AF.	First Industrial Census. By: Colombia. Contraloría General de la República. Bogotá : La Contraloría , 1948

ind_total	Industrial establishments	Total industrial establishments according to FIC 1945 in a municipality i. Population is estimated based on data of the population censuses 1938 and 1951. It uses a similar aggregation process as in the previous variable AF.	First Industrial Census. By: Colombia. Contraloría General de la República. Bogotá : La Contraloría , 1948
negros_1912	Percentage of Black population	Is the percentage of black population according to the aggregation of the total of racial categories (black, white, indigenous and "mixed") reported in census 1912. The census presents under-reporting and the same symbol (...) for no reports and zero. Therefore: 1. Municipalities were imputed using the average of racial categories of the department when they present the symbol (...) in all racial categories (as in literacy rates). 2. It is assumed that the symbol (...) is zero when municipalities report some racial categories, but they present the symbol (...) in one of these categories. 3. The former department of Magdalena does not report data. This information appears as zero value in the data base. However, the results are not significantly affected since negros_1912 is a rate. Therefore 0/0 equates to missing value excluding these observations. 4. Despite these issues, regional racial patterns in 1912 are consistent with historical regional racial patterns documented in the literature (see annex 1-1 and 1-2). 4. It is assumed that the calculated percentages correspond to the values of each racial category in each municipality.	Population Census 1912. By: Colombia. Ministerio de Gobierno. Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1912.
indios_1912	Percentage of indigenous population	Percentage of indigenous population according to the aggregation of the total of racial categories (black, white, indigenous and "mixed") reported in census 1912. It uses a similar process as in the	

		variable negros_1912.	
afrodecen_1912	Percentage blacker population.	The number of black and mestizo population according to the total racial categories reported in census 1912 (black, white, indigenous and "mixed"). It uses a similar process as in the variable negros_1912.	Population Census 1912. By: Colombia. Ministerio de Gobierno. Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1912.
precipitaciommil	Rainy precipitation	In cm3 from Sánchez & Nuñez (2000)	Sánchez & Nuñez (2000)
temperatura	Temperature (°C)	From Sánchez & Nuñez (2000)	Sánchez & Nuñez (2000)
Dist_Bog	Distance Bogota (km)	From Sánchez & Nuñez (2000)	Sánchez & Nuñez (2000)
Dis_Buen	Distance Buenaventura (km)	From Sánchez & Nuñez (2000)	Sánchez & Nuñez (2000)
Dis_Bquilla	Distance Barranquilla (km)	From Sánchez & Nuñez (2000)	Sánchez & Nuñez (2000)
cafe_1925mill	Coffee production 1925	Number of coffee trees 1925 at the municipal level (millions) according to Monsalve (1927). Monsalve (1927) reports this information for producer municipalities of coffee by departments. The author specifies the number of municipalities not producers by departments. Therefore, they are as zero value. The rest of the municipalities are considered as municipalities that do not belong to the Colombian coffee tradition. Therefore, they are assumed as zero.	Diego Monsalve (1927). Colombia cafetera: Información histórica, política, civil, administrativa, geográfica, demográfica, etnográfica, fiscal económica, bancaria, postal, telegráfica, educacionista, sanitaria, departamental, minera, agrícola, industrial, comercial, ferroviaria, diplomática y general.

			Producción. Artes gráficas, s.a., sucesores de Henrich y c.a, 1927
Dummy paisa (D_Antioquia)	Dummy Antioqueña region	Dummy variable with 1 in departments of the 'paisa' tradition (Antioquia, Caldas, Risaralda, and Quindío) and zero (0) otherwise.	
dummy_oro	Dummy Gold production 19th century	From España & Sanchez (2012)	España & Sanchez (2012)
Region	Regions	Dummy by region. Regions are Caribbean, Andean, Pacific, Amazonas and Orinoquia. Pacific Region does not include municipalities from the Valle department.	
Natural_Region	Natural region	Dummy by region. Regions are Caribbean, Andean, Pacific, Amazonas and Orinoquia. However, in this case, the Pacific region includes some municipalities from the Valle municipalities close to the Pacific coast.	
For more details see Excel and STATA Dofile files.			

## Annex 4 Population of Chocó 1905-1951 by municipalities

Municipalities	Years							Ext Km2**
	1905	1908*	1912	1918	1928	1938	1951	
Quibdó	14,218	14,000	15,756	24,722	21,916	30,122	35,364	17,640
Acandí				1,985	1,404	3,261	3,315	3,016
Bagadó	1,234	4,000	2,632	2,791	2,574	4,008	3,490	648
Baudo	5,974	6,500	6,961			13,254	14,539	3,600
Carmen	2,132	4,000	2,315	2,789	3,459	4,901	5,803	1,232
Condoto	3,197	3,500	3,556	4,853	8,335	8,956	9,049	565
Cuellar	2,245							
Itsmina			11,093	11,222	15,134	19,899	20,528	7,820
Juradó				1,628	1,261	1,109		2,278
Lloró	1,989	3,500						
Murindó	2,424							
Negua		3,500	1,925					
Novita	9,806	6,500	6,078	4,700	5,852	6,503	7,433	1,994
Nuquí				2,037	2,271	2,941	5,555	1,804
Pizarro				6,413	6,178			
Pueblorrico			2,119					
Riosucio			938	1,718	2,658	3,503	3,674	2,176
Rosario	925							
San Jose del Palmar							1,497	
San Nicolas de Timatute		2,500						
San Pablo	3,114	11,000						
Sipi	1,661	3,000		1,457	1,768	2,091		2,800
Tadó	5,236	8,000	4,754	6,591	7,831	10,668	9,691	1,152
<b>Indigenous Tribes</b>								
Indigenous		14,000	10,000	18,480	4,758			
Tribe Noamanes		2,000						
Tribe Tules		15,000						
<b>Total Chocó</b>	<b>54,155</b>	<b>86,000</b>	<b>68,127</b>	<b>91,386</b>	<b>85,399</b>	<b>111,216</b>	<b>119,938</b>	<b>46,725</b>
<b>Total Colombia</b>	<b>4,355,477</b>		<b>5,072,604</b>	<b>5,855,077</b>	<b>7,851,110</b>	<b>8,701,816</b>	<b>11,548,172</b>	<b>1,141,748</b>

Source: Population censuses 1905, 1912, 1918, 1928, 1938, 1951. \*Intendant report 1908. \*\*According to intendant report 1934.



## Annex 5 Population and economic sectors Chocó 1912-1951

Year		Population in agriculture	Total EAP*	Total population
1912		26,459	45,092	68,127
percentage		58.68		

Year		Population in agriculture	Population in mining	Total (w/o indigenous tribes)	Total population
1918		24,842	10,436	72,906	91,386
percentage		34.07	14.31		

Year	Primary sector**	Population in agriculture	Population in mining	Total EAP	Total population
1938	56,469	40,087	16,068	62,314	111,216
percentage	90.62	64.33	25.79		

Year		Population in agriculture	Population in mining	Total EAP	Total population
1951		27,741	13,065	45,087	119,938
percentage		61.53	28.98		

Source: Population censuses, 1912,1918,1938,1951.

EAP=economic active population

\*assumed

\*\*total primary sectors

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## Historical Archives and newspapers

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