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Do what (you think) the rich will do: inequality, belief formation and group identity in public good games

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Martinangeli,  Andrea F. M.
Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society;

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Citation

Martinangeli, A. F. M. (2021). Do what (you think) the rich will do: inequality, belief formation and group identity in public good games. Journal of Economic Psychology, 83: 102364. doi:10.1016/j.joep.2021.102364.


Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0001-437E-7
Abstract
Beliefs about others’ cooperativeness are among the strongest determinants of cooperative behaviours. Beliefs about different others, however, are not necessarily uniform, nor necessarily related to past behaviours: Different expectations about different others might solely originate from differences in observed individual characteristics. Finally, not all such beliefs need drive conditional behaviour alike.

In a public good game with heterogeneous endowments, I find that rich subjects are expected to cooperate more by both rich and poor individuals, and that behaviours of both the rich and poor correlate only with beliefs about the rich. An intervention aimed at increasing perceived group cohesion has no impact on beliefs and mixed impacts on cooperation. I conclude with implications for information dissemination about uncooperative behaviour in the mass media and avenues for further research.