

The neurobiology of punishment

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Abstract | Animals, in particular humans, frequently punish other individuals who behave negatively or uncooperatively towards them. In animals, this usually serves to protect the personal interests of the individual concerned, and its kin. However, humans also punish altruistically, in which the act of punishing is personally costly. The propensity to do so has been proposed to reflect the cultural acquisition of norms of behaviour, which incorporates the desire to uphold equity and fairness, and promotes cooperation. Here, we review the proximate neurobiological basis of punishment, considering the motivational processes that underlie punishing actions.

Kin selection

Evolutionary models which predict that animals should be motivated to protect their relatives, to ultimately preserve their genetic inheritance.

Direct reciprocity

So called 'tit-for-tat reciprocity', in which a beneficial act to another individual is likely to be reciprocated by that individual.

Indirect reciprocity

Sometimes referred to as reputation formation, this involves acquiring a reputation as being beneficial towards others, and therefore being treated favourably by them.

Altruistic punishment

Punishing that involves a selfless personal cost to the punisher, which is never likely to be recovered.

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Animals, including humans, shape their behaviour on the basis of experience. In social animals, the action of one individual can influence the state of another, and ecological evidence indicates that many species will engage in punishing behaviour to protect the interests of themselves and their kin¹. In humans, however, punishment also appears to adopt an important role in promoting and preserving cooperation. From an evolutionary perspective, theoretical models have suggested that whereas cooperation in small groups ought to be sustainable by kin selection, direct reciprocity and indirect reciprocity, cooperation in large groups requires the cultural acquisition of cooperative norms of behaviour²⁻⁷. These norms include the motivation to altruistically punish according to common standards of fairness, and raises the question as to what, in the brain, underlies the proclivity to do so.

Drawing on a current behavioural and neurobiological understanding of motivation, we consider the neurobiological processes that underlie the motivation to punish others, addressing in particular how such behaviours may be acquired. First, we review the basic structure of motivational systems and consider principal types of action, namely innate actions (Pavlovian responses), stimulus-response actions (habits) and goal-orientated actions, and discuss how these actions are learned through experience and, importantly, through observation. This provides an appropriate basis for considering both the types of action that underlie punishing actions, and for illustrating how behaviour is adapted following receipt of punishment. We then discuss evidence concerning whether, and how, punishment mediates and promotes cooperation in social interactions by considering ecological observations in animals and by drawing on game theoretic experiments in humans. Finally, we describe recent human functional MRI (fMRI) studies involving fairness judgements and punishment in economic games. Together with insights


into the basic structure of motivational systems, we put forward a neurobiological model of punishment that incorporates impulsive, goal-directed and ultimately altruistic actions.

Motivation, learning and action

Our current understanding of human motivation draws strongly on an extensive animal and human literature in experimental psychology⁸⁻¹¹. Motivation is characterized by action, either to increase the probability of an outcome (appetitive motivation), or to reduce it (aversive motivation). Thus, a reward can be operationally defined as an event that an animal will expend energy to bring about, whereas a punishment is an event that an animal will expend energy to reduce or avoid. Note that in this way (and typical in the experimental psychology literature), the term punishment is taken to apply to any aversive event, regardless of its aetiology. However, in social contexts (in social psychology and behavioural economics), a punishment is often assumed to refer more specifically to an aversive event administered by another individual. These semantic distinctions aside, any complete motivational account of punishment needs to consider both the propensity to administer, and the impact of receiving, a punishment.

Motivational value. The value of a reward or an aversive event can be considered in terms of an ordinal scale of preference, in which given a choice, higher-valued (or less aversive) outcomes will be selected over lower-valued ones. This concept of value is useful, as it outlines a unitary currency against which events of different modalities can be judged¹². Furthermore, value seems to be underpinned by basic underlying appetitive and aversive systems¹³ (BOX 1). The concept of value naturally extends to incorporate otherwise neutral states or cues

Box 1 | A common aversive motivational system



Several key experiments provide evidence that there is an underlying common motivational pathway that mediates aversive learning.

Standard aversive conditioning. A cue (for example, a tone) conditioned to predict a shock subsequently elicits an anticipatory fear response when presented alone, reflecting a learned prediction of the shock (a).

Blocking. A novel cue (the light) fails to effectively acquire an aversive conditioned response to an outcome that is already well predicted by an existing cue (the buzzer), because there is no 'aversiveness' left to predict (b)^{159,160}.

Transreinforcer blocking. A cue that already predicts an aversive outcome can block the acquisition of a conditioned response to a novel cue that is paired with an aversive outcome in a different modality (c). For example, if a buzzer that has been pretrained with a shock is then presented along with a light and paired with a loud aversive noise, the buzzer blocks further conditioning to the aversive noise¹⁶¹. Even though noise and pain differ greatly in their sensory properties, they seem to access a common aversive system, indicating that punishments of any modality might be treated in a similar way.

Transreinforcer blocking can also be accomplished by using a conditioned inhibitor (d). In conditioned inhibition, a cue that predicts that an otherwise expected reward will be omitted acquires appetitive inhibitory properties¹⁶². Accordingly, a cue that signals the omission of a reward can block a primary aversive punisher¹³. For example, if a buzzer that has been paired with omission of expected food is subsequently presented in conjunction with a novel cue (the light), and paired with a shock, the animal develops no aversive response to the light. This illustrates that the buzzer, as a conditioned inhibitor for food, successfully blocked the prediction of the shock, indicating that they are served by a common underlying aversive representation.

that predict 'primary' rewards or aversive events. This 'state–outcome' associability is embodied within Pavlovian learning, in which a reliable, predictive pairing of a neutral stimulus or context (the conditioned stimulus) with a reward or aversive event (the unconditioned stimulus) enables an appropriate anticipatory response (the conditioned response) to be elicited when the predictive stimulus or context is encountered in the future^{14,15}. For example, being bitten by a particular dog is likely to induce increased heart rate, sweating and fleeing when that dog is encountered subsequently.

The ability to predict reward (or aversive events) embodies self-evident motivational benefits as it allows an animal to deal with future interests. This predictive ability also yields a new set of possible events, namely

those associated with omission of an expected outcome. Accordingly, the omission of an expected aversive event can be rewarding (an aversive inhibitor), and the omission of reward can be aversive (an appetitive inhibitor). Importantly, this seems to be mediated by the same mechanisms as primary rewards and aversive events, respectively (BOX 1). This relationship underpins a basic architecture of motivational systems in which reward and aversive mechanisms oppose each other^{13,16}. This 'Konorskian' model consists of underlying, mutually inhibitory appetitive and aversive systems, the operation of which gives rise to four basic categories of motivation — prediction of reward (hope), prediction of aversive events (fear), omission of reward (frustration) and omission of aversive events (relief)¹⁰ (FIG. 1).

Pavlovian learning
Learning that a previously neutral environmental cue predicts a motivational salient outcome.

Instrumental learning
Learning that a particular action predicts a motivational salient outcome.

In the brain, the representation of appetitive and aversive value has been studied in both animals and humans, using experiments that dissociate value from basic sensory representations (for example, by altering motivational state, affective context, expected value, relative value, or counterfactual value^{17–27}). From these studies, the most prominent region to emerge in the encoding of appetitive value is the orbitofrontal cortex, particularly its medial aspect, which functionally exploits reciprocal connections, especially to the amygdala and ventral striatum (nucleus accumbens). The representation of aversive value, although less well studied, has highlighted two regions in particular: the lateral orbitofrontal cortex and the anterior insula cortex^{19,28–35}, which are also interconnected with the amygdala and ventral striatum^{36,37}.

The ability to learn values leads to the question of how individuals exert control over their environment to bring about appetitive, and reduce aversive, events. Several distinct action mechanisms can be dissociated both behaviourally and neurobiologically, characterized by the way in which an action is learned and evoked (FIG. 2).

Pavlovian actions. The simplest actions are the responses directly associated with Pavlovian conditioned or unconditioned stimuli, generally regarded as ‘hard-wired’. Accordingly, prediction of aversive events often produces defensive or aggressive responses that are likely to have evolved to protect the immediate welfare of the animal. Indeed, aggressive responses are often seen towards inanimate aversive cues in animal experiments, and consistent with an opponent model, these responses can even be elicited by appetitive inhibitors³⁸. Pavlovian responses are often context-dependent: for example, in male rats, the prediction of a painful shock can produce freezing in a solitary animal, and aggression in the presence of another male³⁹.

From a neurobiological perspective, Pavlovian actions are mediated by a network of predominantly subcortical regions that coordinate the acquisition of predictive value with the execution of responses. The best understood region is the amygdala, which learns to mediate conditioned responses through connections with other brain regions such as the periaqueductal grey, hypothalamus, parabrachial nuclei, caudal pontine nuclei of the reticular formation, and ventral tegmental area⁴⁰.

Structures such as the periaqueductal grey and anterior hypothalamus mediate primitive defensive, retaliatory and offensive responses, and encode essential motor patterning mechanisms for fighting⁴¹.

Instrumental actions. However, Pavlovian actions provide only a restricted set of options for action, and more flexible control is mediated by instrumental learning, whereby an individual learns to associate a particular action with its outcome⁴². Consequently, actions that lead to a reward are executed more frequently in the future, whereas those that lead to aversive events are executed less often. For example, discovering that pressing a lever results in food delivery will cause an animal to press that lever more often, whereas if such an action is followed by an electric shock, the animal will press the lever less often. Clearly, the latter result is often the desired endpoint when punishment is administered by another individual, and response suppression is proportional to the magnitude, certainty and imminence of an anticipated punishment^{43–53}. This effect is to some extent Pavlovian: cues that were previously paired with punishment suppress instrumental responding in the absence of any instrumental contingency (conditioned suppression⁵⁴), but adding such a contingency substantially enhances suppression^{55,56}.

Instrumental learning allows learning of arbitrary and potentially highly adaptive responses beyond the restrictive set that are available to Pavlovian mechanisms, and there are two distinct types of instrumental action: habits, and goal-orientated actions. Habits appear to learn the simple value of actions, by essentially collapsing the value of future outcomes into a single action-value for each choice available to the animal. Thus, although the (value of the) outcome may be directly used to reinforce or inhibit the action, the resulting habit does not encode any specific representation of that outcome (FIG. 2). In the brain, this habit-based learning system is thought to involve a dopamine dependent error-based learning mechanism, and anatomically it crucially involves the dorsolateral striatum and ventral prefrontal cortex^{57–62}.

Habit-based learning may be a highly effective and computationally simple way to learn and act following extensive exposure to an environment with predictable outcomes. However, it might be a less effective way to make choices given limited experience, or if the outcomes depend on more complex aspects of the action and the environment. By contrast, goal-orientated actions incorporate an internal representation of the outcome, which can be used more directly to guide actions. Experimentally, one of the hallmarks of goal-orientated action is sensitivity to outcome devaluation: if an animal learns to press a lever for food when hungry, and is subsequently fed to satiety, it presses the lever less frequently when exposed to the lever again, indicating that it appropriately represents the reduced value of the action. However, there is good behavioural evidence of a transfer of action control from goal-orientated to habit based systems over time, and on extensive training this sensitivity to outcome devaluation is reduced^{63–65}.

		Outcome	
		Excitatory	Inhibitory
Valence	Aversive	Aversive excitor (fear)	Aversive inhibitor (relief)
	Appetitive	Appetitive excitor (hope)	Appetitive inhibitor (frustration)

Figure 1 | Appetitive and aversive excitators and inhibitors. Motivational stimuli can be excitatory or inhibitory, depending on whether they predict the occurrence or the absence, respectively, of an affective outcome or of another predictor. They can also be classified by valence, as stimuli that are associated with either appetitive or aversive outcomes or predictors. When combined, these two classifications illustrate the four basic motivational states of fear, relief, hope and frustration.




Figure 2 | Different mechanisms of learning and action. **a** | Pavlovian learning results in Pavlovian responses: repeated predictive pairing of an arbitrary state or cue with a motivationally salient outcome (a reward or aversive event) causes a conditioned and typically innate response to be emitted when the state is encountered in the future, appropriately anticipating the outcome. **b** | Instrumental habit learning causes habit formation: if an action is executed while the animal is in a certain state, and the action leads to a reward, the action is reinforced such that encountering the state in the future makes executing that action more likely. If the value of the outcome was aversive, then the action is inhibited in the future. **c** | Instrumental goal-orientated learning results in goal-directed actions: if an action from a certain state leads to a reward, then an explicit representation of the sequence is remembered, which is available to guide actions when the state is encountered in future. **d** | Learning following observation can also result in habits and goal-direction actions: Observing actions and outcomes in others may lead to reinforcement of either state-action pairs, or possibly state-action-outcome sequences, which might reinforce future actions in the observer.

In addition to simple outcome representations, goal-orientated action selection may accommodate substantial complexity, involving representation of potentially intricate sequences of actions, including those whose outcomes are governed by higher-order structures and rules. Although many animals may possess a surprisingly sophisticated ability to model the structure of their environment to guide goal-orientated behaviour^{66,67}, this capacity is clearly remarkably developed in humans. From a neurobiological perspective, experiments in rats have shown that goal-orientated actions are known to crucially involve the dorsomedial striatum and medial prefrontal cortex, which appear to learn actions through a dopamine-independent mechanism. In humans (and to a lesser extent in monkeys), there is evidence of a considerable capacity to form cognitive models of the world, involving recruitment of extensive regions of the prefrontal cortex^{68–72}.

Given this diversity of action mechanisms, how does the brain decide which mechanism to use in different circumstances? Competition between different mechanisms can be illustrated by designing experiments so that the output of different processes are in opposition^{73,74}. Remarkably, apparently self-punitive behaviour can inadvertently result from instrumentally punishing an animal for emitting Pavlovian responses to that punishment^{75–78}. For example, squirrel monkeys have been observed to increase pulling on a restraining leash that has been experimentally (instrumentally) arranged to

deliver painful electric shocks, with the unfortunate result that they end up getting more shocks than to the optimal response (to stay still), had they been able to learn it⁷⁸. Similarly, if Siamese fighting fish are instrumentally punished for their characteristic (Pavlovian) aggressive fighting display, the display is reinforced rather than inhibited⁷⁷. This illustrates that as the Pavlovian response to being punished may be (reciprocal) aggression, the institution of punishment can counter-intuitively reinforce the behaviour it was intended to reduce. Accordingly, the artefacts of (Pavlovian-instrumental) competition may have important consequences for the institution and efficacy of punishment in social circumstances, and are related to a long debate about the optimum methods of punishment in modern-day institutions such as schools⁷⁹.

Pavlovian-instrumental interactions clearly cooperate in guiding avoidance learning, which in social contexts may be a key mechanism underlying ostracism — possibly one of the most effective means of punishment in many animals, including humans^{80,81}. In ostracism, interactions with other individuals are reduced, which subsequently reduces the opportunity for the ostracized individual to reap the benefits of cooperation. Avoidance appears to involve the rather complex coordination of several processes: Pavlovian learning of predictors of aversive outcomes, Pavlovian and instrumental escape from these predictors, establishment of aversive inhibitory value of the avoided (safety) state, and instrumental reinforcement of the avoided action^{11,82–87}. The latter instrumental component may possibly be under either, or both, habitual and goal-orientated control⁸⁸. The neurobiological substrates reflect the operation of these multiple mechanisms, and crucially include the amygdala, orbitofrontal and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, and striatum^{89–92}. Furthermore, the instrumental reinforcement of the avoidance action by the aversive inhibitor (safety state) may be dopamine-dependent⁹³.

Learning from observation and teaching. There is another important mechanism by which the value of actions can be learned, and which turns out to have special importance when considering social actions such as punishment. Clearly, one advantage of social living is that it allows an individual to learn about events that they never themselves experience, simply by observing others. Information gained from observation has considerable value, whether it reflects the fortunes or misfortunes of others, as it can be used to improve one's own individual future behaviour.

An important mechanism of human learning, particularly during development^{94,95}, observational learning is also observed in a number of other species, for example in behaviours such as determining what foods to eat and in learning to hunt^{96–99}. In laboratory studies, a rat will cautiously approach a metal prod that it has previously seen administer a shock to another rat¹⁰⁰, and primates will acquire a fearful response to an animal (for example a snake) that they previously observed to evoke a fearful response in a conspecific¹⁰¹.

Credit assignment problem
This refers to the problem of attributing value to intermediate states and actions in sequential learning.

However, less is known about the mechanisms that underlie observational learning compared with individual learning; in particular, what precisely is being learned. This, in part, reflects difficulties performing these experiments in animals, and much of what is known comes from experimental observations in monkeys and in developing and adult humans. There is good evidence that both actions and action-goals can be learned through observation, and various models have addressed how this relates to associative and goal-orientated aspects of state–action–goal associations^{102–104}. There is evidence for quite sophisticated goal-oriented imitation in human infants; for example, after observing an adult use a novel action to perform a task, infants only imitated the action when they judged it to be a rational means to achieve the goal¹⁰⁵. If the goal of the action is not well understood, it appears that learning is based on reinforcing representations of the infant's own actions in an associative manner based on observed stimulus–response couplings¹⁰³. This type of learning has been shown to influence behaviour even when in opposition to the observer's own action goals¹⁰⁶.

It is less clear, however, how the value of goals is learned through observation of other individuals' choices (FIG. 2). The distinction between action learning and value learning in observational contexts is important, and resembles that between motor control and instrumental learning in individual contexts. Motor control has been extensively studied with respect to imitation and skill acquisition, particularly since the discovery of mirror neurons (see below); however, value learning is less well understood. For instance, the value of many actions may be far from obvious, and for sequential actions this gives rise to the credit assignment problem¹⁰⁷. In theory, one way of solving this problem is to observe the affective reaction of the executor following action execution, and use this as a surrogate value. However, this may be either poorly observed, or extinguished. This problem is no less troublesome in the aversive domain, illustrated by an 'inverse' avoidance problem: if an observer witnesses that others frequently avoid an action or state (for instance, if they were previously punished for it), long after observable conditioned responses have extinguished¹⁰⁸, how does he/she infer that it is aversive? In principle, it ought to be possible to either directly acquire habits (for example, through imitation), or to more explicitly model (infer) the value of goals (FIG. 2). The relative lack of evidence that addresses this appeals to the need to design the sort of experiments that have dissociated the different types of instrumental learning in individual trial-and-error contexts (such as outcome devaluation).

From a neurobiological perspective, there has been intense interest in the information accrued from observation since the discovery in monkeys that some neurons (mirror neurons) selectively fire during both observation and execution of similar actions^{109,110}. These neurons are located in the inferior frontal cortex and the anterior region of the inferior parietal lobule, areas that have a crucial role in sensorimotor control. The different properties of various subtypes of mirror neurons suggest that they have a sophisticated role in action observation.

Some clearly mirror the action being observed very precisely, while others reflect primarily the goal of the action. Interestingly, recent evidence indicates that a proportion of neurons in the monkey inferior parietal lobule code specifically for the intentions of the individual being observed (such as eating or placing an object)¹¹¹, and a similar property has been observed in the human right posterior inferior frontal gyrus¹¹². So, it seems plausible that learning about the motivational value of actions may access this system, which subsequently allows individuals to improve their own decisions. However, how this might be coordinated with the brain regions involved in individual motivational control is not yet understood.

One especially useful method that might help an individual to learn complex, sequential tasks is for another individual (an expert) to provide supplementary outcomes for various sub-components of the task. This comes into play during helping and teaching behaviours, which in addition to being ubiquitous in humans (where it is greatly facilitated by language), can also be observed in other species^{113,114}. Meerkats, for example, teach pups how to handle potentially dangerous prey such as scorpions, using live but disarmed (by removing the sting) scorpions¹¹⁵. Thus, pups learn how to avoid outcomes (potentially fatal stings) that they never actually experience.

An important feature of learning through observation and teaching is that it represents cultural learning, allowing knowledge about observed (or possibly inferred) goals to be passed between individuals, perhaps even generations, over time^{94,99}. Actions learned in this way may have the capacity to become behavioural norms, and can be adhered to in a way that incorporates some independence from actual outcomes. This may be especially important for punishment, as we discuss below, as in theory it allows the propensity to punish to be culturally acquired, and the outcome of punishment to be learned without personal transgression.

Punishment and cooperation

Motivation in social environments. One of the principal inadequacies in our current understanding of the motivational basis for punishment derives from the fact that, despite an extensive animal literature on learning about basic outcomes such as food and pain, there is much less comparable work for learning about outcomes that arise from interactions with other individuals. Clearly, learning to select optimal actions becomes increasingly difficult when the consequences of the actions of others need to be taken into account. Beyond simple retaliation or avoidance, accurately predicting the manner in which punishment might arise across the breadth of social circumstances, based on our understanding of the basic structure of motivational systems, begins to become more speculative¹¹⁶.

One approach is to formalize models of individual action selection and learning, import them into multiagent contexts, and simulate the behaviours that emerge. Currently the most successful models come from the field of reinforcement learning^{117,118}, in which two broad classes of algorithm exist: those which learn an explicit model of the environment and search through it to deter-

Box 2 | Economic games

Behavioural economics and social psychology have for some time embraced the complexity that arises when single agent decision makers are embedded in multiagent contexts. Evolutionary game theory draws on hypothetical and experimental paradigms that exploit the dynamic, goal-orientated nature of social interactions. These games characteristically allow an individual to choose between purely selfish and cooperative actions.

For example, the Prisoner's Dilemma illustrates the classic tension between cooperation and competition. In its original form, two prisoners on trial must independently decide whether to stay silent about their crime, or betray the other to the prosecution. Although mutual silence results in the best cooperative outcome, the selfish choice is to betray the other¹⁶³. Modern versions of the Prisoner's Dilemma and other games, typically involving financial payoffs, allow games to be played repeatedly to study how cooperation develops or declines over time, and can be studied in brain imaging environments¹⁶⁴. They have illustrated how decision-making in social environments is underpinned by the same neurobiological substrates, and involves learning in a similar manner as non-social tasks^{12,165–170}.

Evolutionary models aim to explain why individuals should behave in a certain way in these games, and in the simplest case consider discrete behavioural subtypes (for example, cooperators, punishers and free-riders) interacting in simple games such as the public goods game. By specifying the costs of various actions (as well as other parameters such as immigration and emigration rates, mutation rates and so on), one can determine the overall fitness of an individual's behaviour, which determines the number of offspring it will have, each of which inherit the behavioural genotype with a certain probability. This allows the proportions of different behavioural phenotypes to be modelled or simulated over many generations, as a population grows or diminishes, to determine which are evolutionarily stable.

mine the best actions (model-based actions), and those that estimate the individual value of the actions based on eventual summed outcomes, and select according to these values (model-free actions). This distinction bears a well-supported (both behaviourally and neurobiologically) correspondence to goal-orientated, and Pavlovian and habit-like action selection, respectively^{57,119–124}. In theory, individual agents can learn actions in social contexts by these simple reinforcement methods, or better still, learn the value of joint actions (that is, take the actions of others into account when learning the value of their own actions). Interestingly, simulated agents such as these will often learn and maintain stable cooperative behaviour^{125–127}.

However, such solipsistic methods ignore the intentionality of other agents: since the value of an action is contingent upon the action of another individual, it is governed in part by unobservable information determined by the decision policies of other agents. This may require more sophisticated goal-directed learning⁷¹, which involves generating a model (an estimate) of other agent decision policies to guide better actions, and updating that model according to experience. In principle, this allows an agent to learn how its actions influence the actions of others. A central computational component of policy estimation may be the representation of the affective state of others, as this is a strong determinant of their response to your action. Accordingly, goal-directed instrumental decision-making towards selfish motivational goals may proceed in a way that requires modelling the behaviour and intentionally influencing the affective state of others (that is, selfish prosocial behaviour). In theory, more complex behaviours such as reputation formation can be tractably predicted, in which your model incorporates other agent's representations of your policy. However, the computational basis of these more complex goal-directed systems is currently poorly understood. So too is our understanding of how individuals learn values from observation (which can be approached from an inverse reinforcement learning

perspective^{128,129}). However, important insight into more goal-directed punishment can be gained from predicting, and observing experimentally, how individuals behave in simple economic games (BOX 2).

The free-rider problem. How punishment might operate in social and reciprocal interactions is illustrated by the free-rider problem. Consider a game in which individual players invest a certain amount of their own money into a central pot (FIG. 3), which is then multiplied by a fixed amount, and the total amount subsequently divided equally amongst all players, which they add to the money they didn't invest initially. This type of game, termed a public goods game, is similar to many real-life situations, such as a business in which the earnings of each employee depend of the overall turnover of the business. The contribution of each employee increases the public good and is beneficial for everyone. More specifically, the overall benefit of the group is bigger than the individual cost of contributing, but this in turn is higher than the direct benefit for the individual. Thus, each individual has also a strong temptation not to contribute initially, that is, to free-ride (defect) on the contributions of the rest of the group because each individual also profits from the common good, even if he/she does not contribute. If everyone defects, however, cooperation breaks down and the common good is no longer realized. This problem is referred to as the first-order free-rider problem.

Punishment provides a possible solution: if contributing employees start punishing free-riders by fining them (but at personal cost), the level of cooperation increases again because free-riders want to avoid the cost of being punished¹³⁰. If the punisher knows that he/she will interact with the free-rider again, he/she will subsequently benefit from the increased cooperation, and punishment in this case can be viewed as a (long-term) selfish form of reciprocity. However, if the punisher knows that they will not interact with the free-rider again, he/she pays the cost of punishing while others benefit from the free-rider's switch to cooperation, and thus punishing

Ultimate basis

The ultimate basis of an observed behaviour refers to the overall reason for the existence of the behaviour, typically approached in terms of its evolutionary basis.

Proximate basis

The proximate basis of an observed behaviour refers to its immediate cause, such as the underlying neurobiological process.

becomes altruistic. In reality, as we discuss below, humans punish both selfishly and altruistically^{131,132}.

But a new problem arises: why should individuals endure the costs of punishing free-riders instead of simply cooperating and avoiding the costs of being punished by others? This is the second-order free-rider problem. One solution is to introduce higher levels of punishment, and punish those who do not punish. Another solution, that human societies maintain punishment by group selection and transmission of conformity, has also been suggested^{3,133,134}. Accordingly, groups with altruistic punishers are able to enforce cooperation norms. With an increasing number of punishers, the number of defectors

in these societies is minimized, as is the cost of punishment. In terms of the ultimate basis of human reciprocity and cooperation (BOX 3), group selection should favour cooperative groups, allowing punishment and cooperation to evolve. This casts the spotlight on experimental studies that probe the existence and nature of punishment in both animals and humans.

Experimental studies

Punishment in animals. Animals not infrequently behave negatively to one another. In many cases, this behaviour is driven by an immediate selfish benefit to the animal (or its kin) — for example, assertion of dominance, the establishment of mating bonds, theft, parental–offspring conflicts and retaliation¹. In some situations, food-sharing is increased by harassment, although whether this represents cooperation is unclear¹³⁵. For example, the sharing rate in chimpanzees and squirrel monkeys increases with increasing acts of harassment¹³⁶. However, punishment is observed in some situations where it seems more likely to preserve or promote cooperation. For example, chimpanzees attack allies that do not support them in third party conflicts¹³⁷, and queen naked mole rats will attack workers that they judge to be lazy¹³⁸. Cases such as these highlight behaviour that influences future, non-immediate actions of others, rather than conferring immediate self-benefit. These dispositions might represent the evolutionary precursor of more complex and ultimately altruistic punitive behaviours widely seen in humans¹³⁶.

Punishment in humans. In addition to more simple (defensive and retaliative) forms of punishments, humans also clearly use punishment to motivate others to cooperate¹³⁹. One of the classic experimental studies looked at cooperation in a public goods game¹³¹. It was shown that sanctioning by means of financial penalties increased cooperation in subsequent rounds of the game, and in comparison with games in which there was no opportunity for punishment.

The existence of altruistic punishment as a proximate intentional motivation in humans is evident by demonstrations that people are willing to incur a personal cost solely to punish others whom they consider to have behaved unfairly. The simplest illustration occurs in the Ultimatum game, where a player decides whether to accept a proposed split, offered by another player, of a central pot of money. Typically, unequal (< 20%) splits are rejected, which leave both proposer and responder empty handed. This institution of costly, altruistic punishment for unfair behaviour seems to be ubiquitous across widely different societies and cultures^{140,141}.

Altruistic punishment robustly promotes cooperation^{2,132,142}. For example, individuals allowed to choose between playing public goods games in institutions (societies) that did or did not offer the opportunity to punish and reward others initially tended towards those institutions where they could not be punished¹⁴³. The payoffs in these groups declined as they became dominated by free-riders, and most individuals switched to play in sanctioning games where the overall level of cooperation progressively increased. Subsequent




Figure 3 | Punishment in a public goods game. Public goods games provide an experimental illustration of the utility of punishment in social economic interactions. In this example, each player receives an initial endowment of £10 (a), and contributes a certain proportion towards the public good (b), temporarily leaving each with £5. However, the red player — a free-rider — contributes nothing, and so remains with £10. The collective contribution is multiplied by a certain amount (4 times in this example), which reflects the overall economic benefit of cooperation (c). This amount is then equally divided amongst all players, including the free-rider, who as a result ends up with the most money: £27.5 as opposed to £22.5 (d). However, if another player (in blue) is allowed to fine the free-rider (£10 at a personal cost of £2 in this example), this removes the incentive to free-ride in the red player (e). Even though this seems irrational in the short term, the blue player may benefit from future interactions in which the red player cooperates. Thus, in the long run, short-term punishment results in long-term gain, and accordingly reflects a selfish form of reciprocity with repeated interactions. If the blue player does not interact again, however, then punishment becomes altruistic.

Box 3 | Evolutionary models of cooperation and altruism

Evolutionary models suggest that kin selection, direct reciprocity and indirect reciprocity can account for many cooperative situations, including those involving punishment, in non-human and human populations. However, it is unclear whether these mechanisms are sufficient to sustain cooperation when large numbers of individuals interact strategically, because they rely strongly on the assumption that individuals interact repeatedly^{3,133}. This problem is especially stark in humans who, unlike most species, cooperate in large groups and with genetically unrelated strangers with whom they are unlikely to interact again. This renders the expected benefits of forming a good reputation minimal, and such societies are vulnerable to the intrusion of free-riders. Although further experimental evidence is required in non-human species, there is a growing consensus that a different and unique form of cooperation has evolved in human societies, in which social norms are learned, co-operators are altruistically rewarded, and free-riders are altruistically punished.

This aspect of human altruism, referred to as 'strong reciprocity'^{134,171}, has been characterized as follows: "where members of a group benefit from mutual adherence to a social norm, strong reciprocators obey the norm and punish its violators, even though as a result they receive lower payoffs than other group members, such as selfish agents who violate the norm and do not punish, and pure co-operators who adhere to the norm but free-ride by never punishing"³. In contrast to models of direct or indirect reciprocity, strong reciprocity models state that individuals are motivated to reward co-operators and to punish defectors even if they cannot expect any long-term self-benefit — so-called 'true' altruism¹³².

studies have indicated that cooperation may be even more robust if altruistic punishment is combined with altruistic reward, in which the cooperativeness of others is rewarded (at a personal cost)¹⁴⁴.

The proposed importance of cultural norms in driving behaviour predicts that individuals ought to be motivated to reward and punish those who adhere to or transgress norms towards others, even when they themselves are not involved¹⁴⁵. These situations are captured by third-party punishment games, in which an observer witnesses the interactions of two other players. For example, a third-party punishment game was implemented in the context of a simultaneous Prisoner's Dilemma task¹⁴⁶: an individual observed the behaviour of two players during the game, and was subsequently given the option to punish at personal cost. Players who cooperated were almost never punished, whereas almost 50% of individuals punished players who defected when their partner cooperated. When both players defected, the punishment rate decreased to 21%. This asymmetry appears to reflect the norm of conditional cooperation, which prescribes that cooperation is assumed if the other player cooperates, whereas defection is considered a more legitimate (less unfair) response in the face of defection by others. Accordingly, unilateral defection is punished more strongly than mutual defection⁶. Once a group establishes a strong reciprocating culture, interaction with other forms of (selfish) reciprocity may mean that the costs of altruistically punishing become relatively small^{3,147}. In effect, the threat of punishment may become effective in maintaining cooperation.

Neuroimaging studies in humans. Recently, fMRI has been used to probe the neurobiological correlates of human cooperative behaviour in game theoretic experiments. In particular, several studies have addressed the neurobiological correlates of fairness and punishment, establishing findings which begin to shed light onto the underlying basis of punishing actions. A study of the response to fair and unfair offers in an Ultimatum game found that activity in the anterior insula correlated with the receipt of an unfair offer, and was greater

when playing a human as opposed to a computerized opponent, and greater still with increasingly unfair offers¹⁴⁸. Impressively, this activity predicted individuals' subsequent decisions to reject the offer, effectively (altruistically) punishing their opponent. This study also identified activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) in relation to fair offers, but not correlated with the degree of unfairness, indicating that it might adopt a more modulatory role. This proposition was supported by another experiment, which disrupted DLPFC activity with transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) during the Ultimatum game¹⁴⁹. It was found that TMS applied to the right, but not left, DLPFC reduced the decisions of individuals to reject unfair offers. This behaviour was specific to human opponents, insensitive to the magnitude of the offer, and independent of subjective verbal ratings of unfairness.

These findings lead to the question of how the representation of the aversive motivational value of unfairness is linked to behavioural decisions to punish. Ultimately, the individual must choose between two outcomes: the financial value of accepting the offer, and the retributive value of punishing the opponent. We designed a task aimed at identifying the brain areas associated with retributive value by looking at the response to cues which predicted that opponents would receive painful electric shocks¹⁵⁰. We compared brain activity elicited when the cues signalled that a fair or unfair opponent would receive either a high or low intensity shock, where the degree of fairness was associated with previous play in a sequential Prisoner's Dilemma game. The medial orbitofrontal cortex and nucleus accumbens were activated when cues indicated an imminent high intensity shock to unfair players, and this activity correlated with individuals' subjective feelings of anger and retribution. These findings, which were accompanied by compensatory decreases in empathic neural responses, highlight the flexible representation of retributive goals in the orbitofrontal cortex, similar to that seen for primary rewards.

While passive tasks such as this are adequate for identifying brain areas associated with retributive motivational states, they offer little insight into the question of control: that is, which brain areas are involved in learning

and executing actions to bring about punishment? One study gave individuals the opportunity to punish unfair opponents, at personal cost, in an anonymous trust game¹⁵¹. Using positron emission tomography (PET), it was found that activity in the dorsal striatum was associated with altruistic punishment acts, with greater activation associated with more severe punishments (which were tied to greater personal losses).

A neurobiological model

Taken together with an understanding of basic motivation and action selection, these findings allow one to sketch the beginnings of a neurobiological model of punishment (FIG. 4). In the simplest case, if an aversive outcome appears to be directly and predictively associated with another individual, it would seem likely to invoke a Pavlovian mechanism, centred on the




Figure 4 | Putative neurobiological substrates of punishment. Impulsive, predominantly Pavlovian punishment may centre on an amygdala-based circuit (depicted in yellow), in which there is associative learning between other individuals (which act as cues) and aversive outcomes. Aversive outcomes may input directly to the amygdala (for example, from brainstem nuclei associated with primitive aversive representations, such as pain²⁹), or through more complex aversive representations in the anterior insula (AI) and lateral orbitofrontal cortex (LOFC). This pathway might also be important for avoidance and ostracism. Instrumental punishment may involve striatal-mediated reinforcement of actions that lead to appetitive retributive goals. This appetitive representation (depicted in blue) may involve the medial orbitofrontal cortex (MOFC), and might result from forward-planning of future interactions in broader areas of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) involved in theory of mind, agency, hidden state-estimation and working memory. Goal-directed actions may reinforce action through the dorsomedial striatum (DMS, green). Habit-based actions might reinforce action through dorsolateral striatum (DLS, red), possibly utilizing a dopamine-dependent circuit via the substantia nigra and ventral tegmental area. PAG, periaqueductal grey. Anatomical image adapted, with permission, from REF. 172 © (1996) Appleton & Lange.

Conditioned reinforcement
The process by which a Pavlovian-acquired value can reinforce instrumental action.

amygdala, that may present a relatively pre-potent or impulsive route to punishment. This pathway may direct retaliative responses towards that individual, mediated in part via aggression-related areas such as the periaqueductal grey. Furthermore, this amygdala-dependent pathway might have a central role in guiding escape and avoidance from future interactions with that individual, contributing to subsequent ostracism.

The amygdala may exploit functional connectivity with the lateral orbitofrontal cortex and anterior insula, which might be necessary for more sophisticated, context-dependent aversive representations; for example, those relating to fairness. In principle, one can import fairness-related outcomes onto the Konorskian model (FIG. 1) to specify the full range of excitatory–inhibitory fairness-related outcomes (and predictors) (FIG. 5). This would predict that the anterior insula is similarly involved in representing retributive inhibitors — that is, outcomes and predictive cues associated with the frustration of seeing a free-rider unpunished. However, at this time we know relatively little about how the brain represents observed norms of cooperative behaviour in a way that allows judgement of the fairness of others’ behaviour^{6,152}.

Beyond these simple aversive responses, instrumental control may be dependent on an appropriate representation of the appetitive retributive value of outcomes associated with successful punishment in the medial orbitofrontal cortex. This appetitive value could reinforce punishing actions (or avoidance actions) through reciprocal connections with the dorsal striatum, in a similar manner to primary rewards. Furthermore, reinforcement may arise from complex models of future reciprocal interactions involving more widespread areas or the prefrontal cortex: this might include theory of mind areas (the anterior paracingulate cortex, the superior temporal sulci and the temporal poles) that are likely to be involved in representing the policies of others^{153–155}, anterior cingulate cortical subregions that are involved in representing agency¹⁵⁶, and more anterior prefrontal cortical areas that are involved in model-building and resolution of partial observability⁷¹. Ultimately, in repetitively predictable situations, such actions may become habitual responses to unfairness.

Altruistic action. The retributive value of punishment may arise from potentially sophisticated forward modelling of future interactions. However, this leads to the question of how altruistic goals are acquired — if they, by definition, ultimately result in personal cost. There are several possibilities. First, they might reflect a misassumption that future interactions are not improbable (not unreasonable in the smaller societies in human evolutionary history). Second, they could reflect the anticipated prospect that kin, possibly in subsequent generations, will interact with the individual being punished. Third, if punishment from selfish reciprocal (goal-orientated) action reliably results in eventual long-term payoffs, more proximal states following punishment may be reinforced both through habit-based learning, and through sequential Pavlovian learning¹⁵⁷. The latter process allows the state immediately following punishment to acquire an




Figure 5 | Fairness related outcome representations. This figure extends the Dickenson and Dearing’s ‘Konorskian’ motivational model¹³ to incorporate social reinforcement made with respect to judgements of fairness. When affective outcomes are observed in conspecifics who are fair (or who are kin), the motivational value is congruent with the observer. If the individual is judged to be unfair, then the pattern of value is reversed. This illustrates the full spectrum of prosocial motives according to predicted or omitted outcomes, or their predictors.

appetitive value, which might then independently reinforce other actions (through conditioned reinforcement). Both these forms of control will be insensitive to the possibility that in some situations the outcome is altruistic. Fourth, it is possible that learning mechanisms that are invoked when one individual observes other individuals punishing in situations which may not necessarily be altruistic, might generalize across situations in which it is. Given that many selfish reciprocal punishing actions may stem from a long-term view of future interactions, the eventual benefits of an action are likely to be frequently obscure to a naïve observer. In other words, the appetitive value of retributive states and actions might be purely imitated or inferred through observation, since the observer does not have access to the eventual goals in the mind of the individual being observed. Thus, the motivation to punish unfair individuals may be acquired across states in a way that assumes eventual outcomes. Fifth, and in a similar manner, the value of punishment might be taught by experts to non-experts (for example, from parents to offspring, or from dominant to subordinate individuals). In this case, the appetitive value of punishment may be intricately tied in with cultural concepts of morality and justice.

Thus, the very nature of action systems, both those involved in individual and observational learning, may have an inherent tendency to generalize non-altruistic to altruistic actions. This suggests that there is no reason

to assume that altruistic punishment should necessarily be hard-wired as an inherited intrinsic motivational goal (that is, as an unconditioned appetitive stimulus) in the same manner as primary rewards. However, neither does it exclude the possibility. Future research might help to resolve both the role of learning and early development in the acquisition of altruistic behaviour.

Clearly, there are many potentially complex ways in which punishing behaviour, including altruistic punishment, might be acquired, and the nature of this acquisition governs the types of action by which it is mediated. Although this says nothing about why such behaviour should have evolved (that is, the ultimate basis of different forms of punishment), it illustrates (proximately) how they might be based on the operation and, importantly, the interaction of different learning systems. Furthermore, this complexity illustrates the difficulty that evolutionary models face. Since the underlying learning and decision making processes are not solely concerned with punishment behaviour, such models need to take into account the other behaviours that these systems subservise, many of which are not related to reciprocity and cooperation. This difficulty may be similarly evident in other apparently irrational punishment-related behaviour, such as self-punitive actions and reciprocal aggression. Thus, future models may need to take a more generic approach to understanding the interaction between evolution and learning¹⁵⁸.

Conclusions

Punishment, in its various forms, is likely to have played a key role in shaping the dynamics of social interaction in many species — humans in particular. Although many aspects of our neurobiological model are speculative, punishment is likely to involve the integration of a number of distinct representation, learning and action systems. Whatever the neural mechanism, the affirmation that punishment, including altruistic punishment, substantially promotes cooperation in human societies seems firm. Vital to furthering our knowledge will be an understanding of the behavioural and neurobiological basis of cultural and observational learning, sequential learning and model-based learning and planning in the context of other agents. This could be crucial to gaining neurobiological insight into how apparently altruistic behaviours are acquired, as well as shedding light onto more complex social aspects of punishment, such as arbitration, policing and the role of hierarchies.

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Acknowledgements

B.S. and R.D. are supported by a Wellcome Trust Programme Grant to R.D. T.S. was supported by the Medical Research Council. The authors thank N. Daw, P. Dayan and the anonymous reviewers for comments on the manuscript.

Competing interests statement

The authors declare no competing financial interests.

FURTHER INFORMATION

Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging:
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At a glance summary

- Punishment is common across species, where it often serves to protect the personal interests of the animal concerned. In humans, it seems to promote and preserve cooperative behaviour, according to culturally acquired (moral) norms of behaviour. This extends to the existence of altruistic punishment, in which the act of punishing is personally costly to the punisher, but protects the cooperative interests of the group.
- An account of the proximate basis of punishment focuses attention on the behavioural and neurobiological basis of motivation, and an understanding how basic learning and action selection systems deal with outcomes that involve other individuals.
- Appetitive and aversive systems motivate actions through Pavlovian, habit-based and goal-directed actions, which are acquired in specific ways. Particularly important for social and altruistic actions may be learning through observation, in which naïve observers learn actions from others. This reflects the cultural acquisition of behaviour, and may be an underlying component of social norm development.
- In social decision-making situations, individuals often benefit from cooperation. However, many cooperative situations give rise to the temptation to free-ride on the cooperative behaviour of others. This can be deterred by punishing non-cooperative free-riding behaviour. This pays off in the long run if the punisher interacts with the reformed free-rider again, but is costly if they do not.
- Altruistic punishment appears to be common across diverse human cultures. It extends to third-party situations, in which passive observers punish those that they witness acting unfairly. It may be especially powerful in promoting cooperation when combined with other forms of punishment that arise from direct and indirect modes of reciprocity.
- In the brain, recent functional MRI studies have highlighted key areas involved in the recognition and representation of unfairness (anterior insula), in the establishment of retributive goals

(orbitofrontal cortex), and in the execution of punishing actions (striatum).

- We outline a neurobiological model of punishment, in which an amygdala-centred pathway mediates impulsive, retaliative punishment, and a striatal system mediates instrumental punishment. This latter system may mediate goal-directed punishing actions that involve forward planning (that is, reciprocity-based punishment), as well as more habit-like punishing actions as experience becomes more extensive.
- Consideration of the learning systems that underlie punishment predict that selfish reciprocity is likely to generalize to altruistic (strong) reciprocity. Accordingly, it may not be necessary to assume that altruistic retributive goals are inherited unconditioned appetitive stimuli.
- Future research needs to focus on exploring more precisely the type actions that underlie altruistic punishment (at a proximate level), and understanding how learning and evolution interact in shaping cooperative behaviour (at an ultimate level).

Toc Blurb

Humans punish selfishly but also altruistically. Seymour, Singer and Dolan propose a neurobiological model of punishment, based on our understanding of motivational systems, observational studies that show how punishment mediates cooperation, and brain imaging data from humans playing economic games.