



This book chapter was originally published by De Gruyter as:
Pahl, K. M. (2021). **Proclamations of neutrality: Disinterest and deliberation in Gilbert Stuart's "Portrait of George Washington"**. In P. Ekardt, F. Fehrenbach, & C. Zumbusch (Eds.), *Politische Emotionen in den Künsten* (pp. 95–109). De Gruyter.
<https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110725384-006>

Nutzungsbedingungen:

Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die Nutzungsbedingungen an.

Terms of use:

This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, nontransferable, individual and limited right to using this document. This document is solely intended for your personal, non-commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain all copyright information and other information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the document in public. By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated conditions of use.

Provided by:

Max Planck Institute for Human Development
Library and Research Information
library@mpib-berlin.mpg.de

**POLITISCHE EMOTIONEN
IN DEN KÜNSTEN**

**HERAUSGEGEBEN VON PHILIPP EKARDT,
FRANK FEHRENBACH UND
CORNELIA ZUMBUSCH**

DE GRUYTER

PROCLAMATIONS OF NEUTRALITY

Disinterest and Deliberation in Gilbert Stuart's »Portrait of George Washington«

KERSTIN MARIA PAHL

Disinterested or Uninterested: The Morals of Political Neutrality

In 1796, American-born and British-educated portraitist Gilbert Stuart painted a portrait of the first president of the United States of America, George Washington [plate VII].¹ Having been copied and engraved numerous times and now known as *Lansdowne Portrait*, the painting is arguably the most iconic portrait from the early American Republic. Clad entirely in black and standing in the center of the picture, Washington appears as though he has just risen from the chair behind him. His mouth seems to be clenched, but his determined face, his outstretched hand, and his firm posture indicate that he is about to speak. Contemporary sources suggest that this portrait shows Washington in the Congress Hall in Philadelphia in 1795, about to address the Fourth Congress (March 1795 to March 1797) on a matter that had divided Americans during the last two years: the nation's political neutrality during the French Revolutionary Wars in 1793, which resulted in the Neutrality Act of 1794 – which is still on the books today – and the so-called *Jay Treaty* of 1795, which facilitated trade with Great Britain. In his address to Congress, Washington defended the US's neutral politics, stating that »our country which was lately the scene of disorder and insurrection, now enjoys the blessings of quiet and order.«² His emphasis on the nation's prosperous tranquility responded to opposition to political neutrality, which figured into a larger dispute in American politics. The anti-neutrality group had also opposed the ratification of the constitution (1787–

1788) with the argument that a strong federal government would turn the US into a monarchy. Thus, with the decision for neutrality, the question of America's stance on monarchy flared up again.³

Exhibiting a unique blend of British portraiture adapted to an American purpose, the *Lansdowne Portrait* is often considered a hallmark of both the emergence of an American art tradition and the employment of portraiture in the process of nation-building.⁴ Indeed, the visual rhetoric and practices of eighteenth-century portraiture in the Anglophone world played a crucial role in social and political formation. While by far not its only purpose, portraiture – by describing, reflecting, and prescribing desirable social and moral ethics and forming canons of both values and their agents – expressed, shaped, and enforced larger frameworks that ordered and governed society, among them emotional frameworks.⁵ Because of the elite function of official portraiture, its emotional dimension can best be described with William Reddy's concept of »emotional regimes« that is, the »set of normative emotions and the official rituals, practices, and emotives that express and inculcate them; a necessary underpinning of any stable political regime.«⁶ The *Lansdowne Portrait* makes discernable an emotional regime of disinterestedness, determination, and emotional moderation. Washington embodies the *tranquilitas animae* [tranquility of the soul], which great men were required to display to signal their calmness, determination, and nonpartisanship.⁷

In the following, however, I would like to argue that both political and emotional tranquility are nuanced differently and that national leaders have had to mind these nuances in order to strike the right tone. In the late eighteenth century, there was a fine and contested line between disinterestedness and indifference: while the former attested to a person's ability to forge social bonds, the latter implied short-sighted carelessness.⁸

In the American debate on neutrality of the 1790s, one point of contention was whether the politics of neutrality meant that the government was *disinterested* and chose what was best for the country or, in contrast, *uninterested* in the United States's role in the world. Neutrality, therefore, was not neutral but was itself a form of partisanship.⁹

To understand the ambiguity of tranquility, it is helpful to attend to the way in which the interrelation between emotions and politics figured into art. On the one hand, emotions are operative *within* politics: they express, reflect, or influence political life.¹⁰ On the other hand, political emotions were, as will be shown, also understood as functioning in *analogy* to politics. Personal or intimate entities, such as the human body or family, were thought to be comparable to the country, and emotions were cast as similar to politics in that both were thought of as organizing principles of a larger entity.¹¹ As Alexis de Tocqueville wrote in his *Democracy in America* (1832/1840, first translated into English in 1835):

»In the United States the interests of the country are everywhere kept in view [...], and every citizen is as warmly attached to them as if they were his own. [...] The feeling he entertains towards the State is analogous to that which unites him to his family, and it is by a kind of egotism that he interests himself in the welfare of his country.«¹²

For Tocqueville, emotions played a role in politics and mirrored politics at once, a position that James Madison, co-author of the Federalist Papers, also embraced: »The best provision for a stable and free Govt. is not a balance in the powers of the Govt. [. . .], but an equilibrium in the interests & passions of the Society itself [. . .].«¹³

This double understanding of political emotions is particularly fruitful for political portraiture, because the body of the sitter is, inevitably, a political body.¹⁴ It acts as an agent and representative of the state, which is to say: it is a part of the entity, while also embodying or symbolizing it.¹⁵ As instrumental parts both of portraiture and the ethics it subscribes to, bodies in paintings have long been understood as a system of signs comprised of readable codes adhering to a defined grammar. While this perspective was often limited to analyses of iconography, recent scholarship has developed methodologies to explore and understand artworks as visual repositories and catalysts of emotions – rather than mere depictions – and as media that communicate ideas, ideologies, and notions that cannot necessarily be communicated verbally.¹⁶ A close look at neutrality in the light of political emotions reveals quite a bit about the general discursive principles that define the feeling and expression of other political emotions that might be contained in the *Lansdowne Portrait*. Roland Barthes has defined »the Neutral as that which *déjoue* [outplays] the paradigm [. . .]. The paradigm [. . .] is the opposition of two virtual terms from which, in speaking, I actualize one to produce meaning.« Listing different forms of neutrality, among them political neutrality, he states that his search for »the category of the Neutral insofar as it crosses language, discourse, gesture, action, the body, et cetera.« was ultimately aimed at »ethics, that is, the discourse of the ›good choice‹ [. . .], or of the ›nonchoice‹, or of the ›lateral choice‹.«¹⁷ In this vein, political and emotional neutrality challenges a paradigm, namely, the necessity to get involved or take sides and the need to choose or make a good choice more generally. This article will argue that the *Lansdowne Portrait* should be understood as the focal point of two antithetical interpretations of non-involvement. Because each form of tranquility, emotional and political, had different moral implications, it was paramount for the portrait to argue that its sitter embodied tranquility as a disinterested, but determined equilibrium.¹⁸

Composition of Composure: The Lansdowne Portrait

While it remains unresolved who commissioned the *Lansdowne Portrait* – named after its first owner, William Petty, first Marquess of Lansdowne – it is the first known full-length depiction of the President of the United States of America to show him in civilian rather than military dress.¹⁹ In his capacity as the chief executive of a newly founded nation, Washington stands amidst symbols of ancient Roman and American republicanism.²⁰ The columns in the background are in line with the body to signal constancy and steadfastness. The legs of the table and chair are decorated with fasces, symbols of Roman leadership, and on the back of the chair is a small, but clearly visible American flag. Together with the rainbow indicating tran-

quility after revolutionary storms, the chair compositionally and metaphorically backs Washington: whatever he is about to say, a peaceful America is behind him. Washington's posture, and especially the position of his feet, which are placed bluntly next to each other on the ground rather than in elegant contrapposto, is borrowed from antique sculptures of orators, but the overall composition follows the tradition of ruler portraits, famously employed by Hyacinthe Rigaud's portrait of Louis XIV and portraits of British monarchs from Charles I to George III [plate VIII].²¹

In Stuart's portrait, however, royal pose and royal body have become civilian pose and civilian body. This transformation birthed, as Eleanor DeLorme writes, a new type of painting in American art, »the state portrait.«²² Although the classic repertoire of portraiture, such as the columns and the bulky curtain, is still there, the sitter's body, paramount in ruler portraits, oscillates between being prominent and being inconsequential. Since Washington's frock, stockings, and buckled shoes are all black – in contrast with the elaborate ornamentation of the carpet and furniture's red and gold – the body's indistinct outline merges with the background. The background is carelessly painted, pointing at the fact that in a republican system, ceremonial decor is no longer important and that the ruler's body is no longer sacred and invested in regalia.²³ Accordingly, the sword in Washington's left hand hints both at his military career and at privileges of Old World aristocratic elites like the right to bear arms; but it is hardly visible against his frock, meaning that it has become insignificant in the face of the new order, exemplified by the books on the left side of the painting. The books on the floor are the *General Orders*, that is, the policy Washington wanted to see observed during the military campaigns of the 1770s, a book entitled *American Revolution* – probably David Ramsay's book of 1789 – and the *Constitution and Laws of the United States*. The books on the table, put at the very periphery of the painting, yet pointed out by Washington's outstretched hand, are the *Journal of Congress* – the Congress's minutes, begun in 1789 – and the *Federalist Papers*, a collection of essays promoting the ratification of the United States Constitution, which went into effect in 1789. Written between 1787 and 1788 by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, the *Federalist Papers* promoted national unity as a bulwark against disorder. The preference for ensuring a stable domestic situation over the pursuit of ideals overseas led to the government's decision not to intervene on behalf of the French, who had supported America during the War of Independence. The Proclamation of Neutrality was issued by Washington on April 22, 1793. Two cabinet members, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, who opposed neutrality and staunchly defended the French Revolution, and Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton, who embraced it, were particularly invested in the dispute. Jefferson resigned in 1793, and the division deepened with the *Treaty of Amity Commerce and Navigation, between His Britannick Majesty; and The United States of America*, called the Jay Treaty after the American plenipotentiary John Jay.²⁴ Ratified on June 24, 1795, the treaty is most likely the paper on the table, because on December 8 of the same year, Washington addressed the Fourth Congress, stating: »While many of the nations of Europe, with their American dependencies, have been involved in a contest unusually bloody, exhausting, and calamitous, [...] our favored country


[...] has enjoyed general tranquillity.²⁵ If the Jay Treaty, just signed or about to be signed, is indeed shown in the portrait, then its inclusion visually reinforces the result of the politics of neutrality, a contract establishing neutrality in law.²⁶

At the time of the Jay Treaty debate, a newspaper stated that Washington showed «a conduct delineating the strong features of a despot» and it was this reproach of despotism that the *Lansdowne Portrait* aimed to confute.²⁷ Washington exhibits a genteel, dispassionate, and unaffected posture, exemplifying – that is, literally and figuratively delineating – democratic, not despotic, leadership. With the rainbow in the background and the Jay Treaty on the left, the *Lansdowne Portrait* backed the Federalist argument that domestic unity and tranquility, largely based on political neutrality, had been and still was the best course of action.


Expressions of (Dis-)Passions: The Face of Duty and the Duty of the Face

In the portrait, Washington's mouth appears to be clenched, supposedly a hint at his false teeth [plate VIIa]. Yet this portrait face was, as Washington's grandson wrote, «the best likeness of the Chief in his latter days» – unlike the body, modeled on someone else's and too fleshy.²⁸

Probably painted after an unfinished bust portrait called the *Athenaeum Portrait* (1796), this face became the one by which Washington was to be known.²⁹ Although individualized, the face followed the portrait formula for boldness, which was frequently used for soldiers [fig. 1].³⁰



1 Charles LeBrun: *Boldness* (*la hardiesse*), 1660s, ink on paper, 19,6 x 25,4 cm, Paris, Louvre



2 Charles LeBrun: *Tranquility* (*la tranquillité*), 1660s, ink on paper, 20,2 × 25,7 cm, Paris, Louvre

Such distinct codes for communicating emotions in portraiture were taken from Charles Le Brun's *Les expressions des passions*, a typology of emotional expressions for use in the visual arts from 1667.³¹ According to Le Brun's theory, before emotions spread across the face, it finds itself in a state of »tranquillité« [tranquility] [fig. 2]; all other emotions were then described according to their divergence from this »sort of zero degree of expression.«³² Next on the intensity scale is »l'admiration« [wonder], which is only gradually more moved. Of wonder, Le Brun wrote: »This passion produces a suspension of movement only to give time to the soul to deliberate on what it should do, and to consider the object before it attentively, for if it be rare and extraordinary, out of this first simple movement will come Esteem.«³³

While tranquility serves as the springboard, wonder is a kind of distributing conduit, the state in which the soul decides on the emotional direction it will take. The other passion that diverges only slightly from »tranquillité« is »l'estime« [esteem], which means evaluation, not appreciation: having used the time granted by »wonder« to reflect, the soul has found the object worthy of attention.³⁴ However, while all other passions include value judgments, the three original ones – that is, tranquility, wonder, esteem – do not; rather, they only attest to an object's general noteworthiness.

Le Brun's concept was based on René Descartes's *The Passions of the Soul* (1649), many passages of which he copied, including the paragraph on »wonder.«³⁵ Descartes considered wonder (or »admiration«) as »the first of all the Passions«, a temporary state in which body, mind, and soul had not yet entirely processed the situation at hand.³⁶ »When the first encoun-

ter of any object surprizeth us, and we judge it to be new [...], we admire it, and are astonished at it. [...] this may fall out before we know at all whether this object be convenient or no [...].³⁷ Here, the lack of value judgment («convenient or no») is critical because the arousal and control of emotions were indicative of the moral configuration of the individual. Descartes believed those souls to be strongest who »can most easily conquer the Passions« by »firm, and determinate judgements concerning the knowledge of good and evil.« Virtue implied the ability to make good choices and govern one's emotions, and when one had lived so that »his Conscience cannot hit him in the teeth for failing to doe all things which he judged to be best [...] the most violent assaults of the Passions, shall never be strong enough to trouble the tranquility of his Soul.«³⁸ However, Descartes and Le Brun also hinted at the ambiguity of serene emotional states. Tranquility could be a sort of emotional zenith, in which one is filled with a range of other feelings, but is in control. However, along with wonder and esteem, tranquility could also function as a threshold for emotions that were yet to emerge. The former signaled determination, the latter indecision, two notions with very different moral values. Only if tranquility as deliberation ended in tranquility as a status did it properly function as a virtuous political emotion.

Washington championed this latter conception of tranquility as the end result of intentional action when talking about political neutrality and the Jay Treaty, stating that both contributed to »the extinguishment of all the causes of external discord, which have heretofore menaced our tranquillity.« Accordingly, »to the best judgment I was able to form of the public interest, after full and mature deliberation, I have added my sanction.«³⁹

Bodies and Politics: Emotion, Commotion, and the Government of the Passions

Political emotions operate within politics and are comparable to politics. Emotion itself is an inherently political term, originally meaning political commotion. First used in English in the mid-sixteenth century, it was understood as political agitation or civil unrest, synonymous with »troubles«, »great stirres« or »disorder«.⁴⁰ Since the physical movement converged with the feelings behind it, emotions indicated movement of body, blood, soul, face as well as the movement of people on the streets. Therefore, emotions, especially in the seventeenth century, provided a common denominator that could be used to cast the body itself as a political entity.⁴¹ On a societal level, emotions provided moral guidance. Virtue caused pleasure and joy and was thus rewarded by an agreeable emotional experience. On an individual level, bodies were believed capable of enacting the »government of the passions«, that is, the conscious and rightful navigation of affects and feelings.⁴² Edward Reynolds, in his *A Treatise of the Passions* of 1640, acquainted readers with the »Irregularitie, Subordination, Rebellion, Conspiracie, Discords« of the passions, implicitly treating body, mind, and soul as a political micro-entity with its own government and rules, including occasional uprising by its »sub-

jects«, namely, the passions. Like proper subjects, passions were complicated and needed regulation by reason, but they were necessary because without them, an individual would have »scarce any thing in him, which he may command and governe.«⁴³ No passions would also mean no vigor and no energy, as it was opposition that made one show one's actual strength: »We see not the violence of a River, till it meet with a Bridge; and the force of the Wind sheweth it selfe most, when it is most resisted: So the power of the *Will* is most seene, in repairing the breaches, and settling the mutinies, wherewith untamed *Affections* disquiet the peace of mans nature [...].«⁴⁴ Taming one's passions, however, was not the same as eliminating them, and stoicism, in particular, came under fire for not distinguishing between the two.⁴⁵ As the French treatise *The Use of Passions* by Jean-François Senault of 1649 (English 1649) noted: »Briefly, they [the Stoics] conclude, that to be a slave to Passion, is to live under tyranny, and that a man must renounce his liberty, if he obey such insolent Masters.« Senault found this unnatural: »To part the soul from the body, so to exempt it from these agitations, were to overthrow the Fabrick of man.« In both treatises, political analogies, such as »mutinies«, »tyranny«, »masters«, »agitations«, and »overthrow« were used to emphasize that emotions enabled people to show their strength and liberty by subjecting their emotions to the rule of the »Empire of Reason.«⁴⁶ Every individual was continuously replicating political battles in miniature, pitting mind (that is, reason) versus the body (that is, the senses) and negotiating with the soul (that is, the passions). Emotions kept mind, body, and soul resilient: »Vertue her self would become idle, had she no passions, either to subdue or regulate.«⁴⁷

This understanding of tranquility as the mastery of emotions informed the notion of the ideal political leader as someone (preferably a man) in control of their emotions. This also sheds light on political neutrality: capable leaders are neutral in the sense that they balance factions instead of avoiding engagement with them, because the ability to balance attests to one's strength and control.⁴⁸ Washington's own person, contemporary biographers said, embodied this form of tranquility: »His passions were naturally strong; with them was his first contest, and over them his first victory. Before he undertook to command others, he had thoroughly learned to command himself. [...] Neither passion, party spirit, pride, prejudice, ambition, nor interest, influenced his deliberations.«⁴⁹

Non-Neutral Neutrality: Interests and Disinterestedness

Hugo Grotius, one of the earliest proponents of international law, engaged with political neutrality in his treatise *On the Laws of War and Peace* (1625): »It might seem superfluous to speak of these, who have nothing to do with War, seeing it is manifest there is no right of War over them. [...] Necessity ought to be extreme, that it may give a right over what belongs to another man.«⁵⁰ Grotius's idea of political neutrality was equivalent to the emotional tranquility that Le Brun and Descartes talked about: it was the zero degree of any political action, which was preferably maintained as long as possible.



3 Matthew Darly (publisher): *For or Against Is Equally Alike*, 1780, etching on paper, 12,6 × 9 cm, London, British Museum

At the same time, however, political neutrality and emotional tranquility both had to be expressed in a way that signaled their origins in a conscious decision to be cautiously in charge without being interventionist. Alexander Hamilton wrote in *The Federalist*: «The rights of neutrality will only be respected, when they are defended by an adequate power. A nation, despicable by its weakness, forfeits even the privilege of being neutral.»⁵¹ It was this promise of power, being observant, impartial, and vigorous, but not idle and indifferent, that made neutrality effective.⁵² There is, Barthes said, «a vitality of the Neutral: the Neutral plays on the razor's edge: in the will-to-live but outside of the will-to-possess.»⁵³ Neutrality, in short, is not passive.

Political neutrality is, indeed, vital, because it is both an important status and an activating force. A contested concept in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century European international relations, it has no established iconography, unlike other expressions of politics, such as war,

peace, and the reason of state, truces, or leagues.⁵⁴ Ridiculed as a sign of conniving and cowardly opportunism, as the mark of those who favored pragmatism over principle, political neutrality was caricatured as a strategy of war-time profiteers, and prints satirized the neutral United Provinces trading with both the United Kingdom and their enemies, the Americans [fig. 3].⁵⁵ Since it accommodated monetary interests, neutrality undermined ideals of disinterested policy making, while the English term »interest«'s double meaning of both financial and non-financial concerns made disinterestedness in any case an ambiguous concept.⁵⁶

Likewise, and despite all claims to disinterested decision-making, the Jay Treaty was so unpopular that effigies of Jay were burned in several cities.⁵⁷ Thomas Jefferson came out of retirement, to form support for the anti-treaty league and the Republican Party he and James Madison had formed in 1792 to challenge Hamilton's Federalist Party and their ideas of centralized political power. In a letter to Madison from September 1795, he wrote that the treaty was »the boldest act they [Hamilton and Jay] ever ventured on to undermine the government [. . .]. A bolder party-stroke was never struck.« For Jefferson, the Jay Treaty had nothing to do with impartial governance or political neutrality but was a partisan decision in favor of the Constitution, the British, a centralized government with a strong executive, and an administration eerily reminiscent of a monarchy. Jefferson went on: »There appears a pause at present in the public sentiment, which may be followed by revulsion.«⁵⁸ Intriguingly, Jefferson's »pause« seems to be akin to the zero-degree tranquility described above that precedes outpourings of emotion. As soon as the public had finished deliberating, Jefferson suggested, judgment on the treaty would be scathing, so that the state of things following consideration would not be tranquil, but agitated. By pitting pre-judgment tranquility (diagnosed by himself) against Washington's post-judgment tranquility, Jefferson's argument challenged the claim that neutrality caused tranquility by identifying the bias in the narrative of disinterest set up by the administration.

Conclusion

During a presidential election, Tocqueville wrote, »[p]olitical parties in the United States are led to rally round an individual, in order to acquire a more tangible shape in the eyes of the crowd.« The US's chief executive represented the prevailing emotion that bound the people together, the »to a certain extent involuntary agreement, which results from similarity of feelings and resemblances of opinion.«⁵⁹ »[P]arties are strongly interested in gaining the election, not so much with a view to the triumph of their principles under the auspices of the President elect, as to show, by the majority which returned him, the strength of the supporters of those principles.«⁶⁰

A painting such as the *Lansdowne Portrait* was one way of communicating the claim that the President – here: Washington – represented majority of opinion and, as Dorinda Evans writes, »benevolent governance.«⁶¹ However, Washington's portrait was also a site of conten-

tion where different notions of non-involvement coalesced, even clashed, on a visual and socio-historic level.⁶² Its negotiation of disinterested and observant non-involvement and careless indifference thereby draws attention to the fact that differing stances on political neutrality were themselves partisan matters.

In order for this political dispute to emerge more clearly, it has been helpful to understand political emotions as both playing an active role in politics and as a heuristic model for understanding politics. When the body is cast as a political realm, emotions mirror the contending parties, making political neutrality and emotional tranquility structurally similar. In his farewell address to Congress, Washington included a long paragraph in which he described politics in the language of emotions, stating that nations should not be bound by »an habitual hatred, or an habitual fondness« in order to avoid becoming »a slave to its animosity or to its affection.«⁶³

Emotions are not only potent but also enlightening, because they contain or inform moral judgments on the situations in which they dominate. In the early years of the United States, emotional as well as political tranquility emerged as a litmus test for virtue and vice.⁶⁴ The *Lansdowne Portrait* attests to the political and emotional conflict between neutrality understood as the result of an impartial, yet authoritative decision or, rather, as a manifestation of the mindset of a president who just didn't care.

- 1 For the portrait cf. Dorinda Evans: *The Genius of Gilbert Stuart*, Princeton 1999, pp. 67–71 and Carrie Reborra Barratt and Ellen G. Miles: *Gilbert Stuart*, exhibition catalogue, The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New Haven 2004, pp. 166–175.
- 2 *Journal of the House of Representatives of the United States, Being the First Session of the Fourth Congress: Begun and Held at the City of Philadelphia, December 7, 1795*, Washington 1826 [1796], p. 367.
- 3 For political neutrality in the US of the 1780s cf. James A. Shaw: »The Great Desideratum in Government«. *James Madison, Benjamin Constant, and the Liberal-Republican Framework for Political Neutrality*, PhD thesis, University of Manchester 2015. Cf. Ralph Ketcham: *Presidents Above Party. The First American Presidency, 1789–1829*, Chapel Hill 1984, p. 102 f.
- 4 Barratt and Miles 2004, p. 168. Cf. Eleanor Pearson DeLorme: *Gilbert Stuart. Portrait of an Artist*, in: *Winterthur Portfolio* 14-4/1979, pp. 339–360, p. 348 ff.; Alison D. Howard and Donna R. Hoffman: *A Picture Is Worth a Thousand Words: Building American National Identity Through Art*, in: *Perspectives on Political Science* 42/2013, pp. 142–151; Wendy Wick and Lillian B. Miller: *George Washington. An American Icon. The Eighteenth-Century Graphic Portraits*, Charlottesville 1982, pp. 34–73.
- 5 Cf. in particular Marcia Pointon: *Hanging the Head. Portraiture and Social Formation in Eighteenth-Century England*, New Haven 1998, pp. 11–104; Udo J. Hebel and Christoph Wagner (ed.): *Pictorial Cultures and Political Iconographies. Approaches, Perspectives, Case Studies from Europe and America*, Berlin and New York 2011, esp. p. 7 f.; Volker Depkat: *The Grammar of Post-Revolutionary Visual Politics. Comparing Presidential Stances of George Washington and Friedrich Ebert*, in: Hebel und Wagner 2011, pp. 177–198, p. 177 ff.; »Emotion« will be the *terminus technicus* for this article.
- 6 William Reddy: *The Navigation of Feeling. A Framework for the History of Emotions*, Cambridge 2001, p. 129; cf. Nicole Eustace: *Passion is the Gale. Emotion, Power, and the Coming of the American Revolution*, Chapel Hill 2008, p. 11.
- 7 On the role of specific sentiments in American politics, expressing a common spirit, and creating a self-image cf. Andrew Burstein: *Sentimental Democracy. The Evolution of America's Romantic Self-Image*, New York 1999, esp. pp. 4–21; Sarah Knott: *Sensibility and the American Revolution*, Chapel Hill 2009, esp. pp. 1–22; Eustace 2008, esp. pp. 17–59 and pp. 385–438; cf. the chapter on »The Nonpartisan Ideal«, in: Ketcham 1984, p. 235.
- 8 Cf. Burstein 1999, esp. pp. xi–xxi, pp. 1–23 and pp. 167–207.
- 9 On the importance of disinterestedness cf. *The Federalist. A Collection of Essays, Written in Favour of the New Constitution*, no. 11, New York 1788, p. 9 f. and Gordon S. Wood: *Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution*, in: Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein and Edward C. Carter II (ed.): *Beyond Confederation. Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity*, Chapel Hill 1987, pp. 69–109, esp. pp. 75–85. On the difference between a neutral prince, »often apt to sacrifice the happiness of his subjects to personal ambition«, and a neutral state, which »exercised neutrality in the pursuit of the aggregate interest of the nation« cf. Shaw 2015, p. 99.
- 10 Cf. Ute Frevert: *Was haben Gefühle in der Geschichte zu suchen?*, in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 35-2/2009, pp. 183–208, esp. pp. 198–201; Johannes F. Lehmann: *Geschichte der Gefühle. Wissensgeschichte, Begriffsgeschichte, Diskursgeschichte*, in: Martin von Koppenfels and Cornelia Zumbusch (ed.): *Handbuch Literatur und Emotionen*, Berlin 2016, pp. 140–157, esp. 141–144.
- 11 Cf. Eustace 2008, p. 6 ff.
- 12 Alexis de Tocqueville: *Democracy in America*, London 1835, Vol. 1, p. 129.

13 Quoted after Colleen A. Sheehan: *The Politics of Public Opinion: James Madison's »Notes on Government«,* in: *The William and Mary Quarterly* 49-4/1992, pp. 609–627, p. 615; cf. Shaw 2015, p. 71 f.

14 Cf. Uwe Fleckner, Martin Warnke and Hendrik Ziegler: *Vorwort*, in: id. (ed.): *Handbuch der Politischen Ikonographie*, München 2011, 2 vols., vol 1, pp. 7–13, p. 9.

15 Cf. Volker Depkat: *Die Erfindung der amerikanischen Präsidentschaft im Zeichen des Geschichtsbruchs. George Washington und die Ausformung eines demokratischen Herrscherbildes*, in: *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 56-9/2008, pp. 728–742, p. 730; cf. Barratt and Miles 2004, p. 166 and Wick and Miller 1982, p. 5.

16 Anna Pawlak, Lars Zieke and Isabell Augart: *Vorwort*, in id. (ed.): *Ars – Visus – Affectus. Visuelle Kulturen des Affektiven in der Frühen Neuzeit*, Berlin 2016, pp. 7–17, p. 8 ff.; Ursula Franke: *Spielarten der Emotionen. Versuch einer Begriffsklärung im Blick auf Diskurse der Ästhetik*, in: Klaus Herding and Bernhard Stumpfhaus (ed.): *Pathos, Affekt, Gefühl. Die Emotionen in den Künsten*, Berlin 2004, pp. 165–188, p. 172 ff. Elke Anna Werner: *Visualität und Ambiguität der Emotionen. Perspektiven der kunst- und bildwissenschaftlichen Forschung*, in: Claudia Jarzebowski and Anne Kwaschik (ed.): *Performing Emotions. Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven auf das Verhältnis von Politik und Emotion in der Frühen Neuzeit und in der Moderne*, Göttingen 2013, pp. 147–166, p. 152 f.; for the emotions and the body cf. Pascal Eitler and Monique Scheer: *Emotionengeschichte als Körpergeschichte. Eine heuristische Perspektive auf religiöse Konversionen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 35-2/2009, pp. 282–313, esp. p. 283 f.

17 Roland Barthes: *The Neutral. Lecture Course at the Collège de France (1977–1978)*, New York 2005, p. 6 ff.

18 Cf. Franke 2004, pp. 165–188; Werner 2013, p. 149 and DeLorme 1979, p. 351.

19 Barratt and Miles 2004, pp. 166–169. Cf. Depkat 2011, p. 179 f. A half-length portrait by Edward Savage of 1793 shows him in a black-and-white frock.

20 Cf. Depkat 2008, p. 738 f.; Depkat 2011, p. 177.

21 Cf. Depkat 2011, p. 183 ff., and DeLorme 1979, p. 353 f.

22 Cf. DeLorme 1979, p. 353. Cf. Depkat 2008, p. 735 f., Barratt and Miles 2004, p. 170, Howard and Hoffman 2013, p. 146 and Evans 1999, p. 67. Cf. Depkat 2011, p. 185 ff., on the civilian formula, and Ulrich Pfisterer: *Zwei Körper des Königs*, in: Fleckner, Warnke and Ziegler 2011, pp. 559–566, esp. p. 564 f.

23 As his grandson wrote: »This pure yet dignified Republican, avoided show in every action of his long and meritorious life. True, tinsel and embroidery could have added nothing to [him].« George Washington Parke Custis: *Letter to Thomas Carberry, Esq., 7 April 1839*, in: John Austin Stevens, Martha Lamb and William Abbatt (ed.): *The Magazine of American History*, New York 1885, pp. 583–584, p. 584. On the clothes cf. Barratt and Miles 2004, p. 169.

24 Cf. Todd Estes: *Shaping the Politics of Public Opinion: Federalists and the Jay Treaty Debate*, in: *Journal of the Early Republic* 20-3/2000, pp. 393–422.

25 *Journal* 1826, p. 367. A newspaper article of May 1797 notes that »the figure is standing and addressing the Hall of Assembly. The point of time is that when he recommended inviolable union between America and Great Britain.« Quoted after Barratt and Miles 2004, p. 170 f.

26 Barratt and Miles describe it as »an example of the use of portraits to celebrate political alliances, especially at a time of international treaties«, Barratt and Miles 2004, p. 173.

- 27 Quoted after Estes 2000, p. 399.
- 28 Custis 1885, p. 583; cf. Barratt and Miles 2004, p. 168. For Stuart portrait faces cf. DeLorme 1979, p. 349.
- 29 Wick and Miller 1982, p. 53 and pp. 58–63. On the Athenaeum Portrait cf. Evans 1999, pp. 62–65 and Barratt and Miles 2004, pp. 147–153.
- 30 Cf. Depkat 2011, p. 186. On the face cf. Depkat 2008, p. 738 f. and Evans 1999, p. 65 f.
- 31 On Le Brun cf. Thomas Kirchner: *L'expression des passions. Ausdruck als Darstellungsproblem in der französischen Kunst und Kunsttheorie des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts*, Darmstadt 1991; Jennifer Montagu: *The Expression of the Passions. The Origin and Influence of Charles Le Brun's Conférence Sur L'expression Générale Et Particulière*, New Haven 1994; Anne Schmidt: *Showing Emotions, Reading Emotions*, in: Ute Frevert et al. (ed.): *Emotional Lexicons. Continuity and Change in the Vocabulary of Feeling 1700–2000*, Oxford 2014, pp. 62–90, p. 64 ff.; Werner 2013, p. 150 ff.; on a rare discussion of non-emotions cf. Line Cottegnies: *Codifying the Passions in the Classical Age – A Few Reflections on Charles Le Brun's Scheme and its Influence in France and in England*, in: *Études Épistémè* 1/2002, pp. 141–158, p. 144.
- 32 Cottegnies 2002, p. 144; cf. Montagu 1994, p. 18.
- 33 Montagu 1994, p. 132.
- 34 *Ibid.*, p. 132 f.
- 35 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 17; Cottegnies 2002, p. 142 f.
- 36 René Descartes: *Passions of the Soule in Three Books*, London 1650, p. 47; cf. Cottegnies 2002, p. 143
- 37 Descartes 1650, p. 47.
- 38 *Ibid.*, p. 41, p. 121.
- 39 Journal 1826, p. 367.
- 40 »emotion, n.«. OED Online. December 2018. Oxford University Press. <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/61249?rskey=Fd66Dt&result=1>. Last accessed: February 21, 2019.
- 41 Cf. Eitler und Scheer 2009, pp. 283–313.
- 42 Cf. Jean-François Senault: *The Use of the Passions*, London 1649, pp. 87–122: »The Third Treatise. The Government of the Passions«; William Ayloffe: *The Government of the Passions*, London 1700.
- 43 Edward Reynolds: *A Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soul of Man*, London 1650, p. 47 and p. 45: »So *Passion*, though of excellent service in Man, for the heating and enlivening of Vertue [...]; yet if once they [...] encroach upon Reasons right, there is nothing more tumultuous and tyrannicall.«
- 44 *Ibid.*, p. 48.
- 45 *Ibid.*, p. 47.
- 46 Senault 1649, p. 4 and pp. 5–6.
- 47 *Ibid.*, p. 7.

- 48 Cf. Shaw 2015, p. 52 and p. 113.
- 49 David Ramsay: *The Life of George Washington*, New York 1807, p. 328; cf. Wick and Miller 1982, p. ix f. and p. xiii; Wood 1987, p. 90 f. and Howard and Hoffman 2013, p. 146.
- 50 Hugo Grotius: *The Illustrious Hugo Grotius Of the Law of Warre and Peace*, London 1654, p. 645.
- 51 *The Federalist* 1788 (no. 11), p. 65; cf. Shaw 2015, p. 115: »For Madison, *inactivity* was the great friend of neutrality.«
- 52 Cf. Wood 1987, p. 85.
- 53 Barthes 2005, p. 73 and p. 13: »The desire for the Neutral continually stages a paradox: as an object, the Neutral means suspension of violence; as a desire, it means violence. [...] there is a passion of the Neutral [...]«
- 54 Cf. Roberto Merrill: *Introduction*, in: id. and Daniel Weinstock (ed.): *Political Neutrality. A Re-Evaluation*, London 2014, pp. 1–24, p. 1; Richard Arneson: *Neutrality and Political Liberalism*, in: Merrill and Weinstock 2014, pp. 25–43. Cesare Ripa: *Iconologia, or, Moral Emblems*, London 1709, p. 49, p. 54, p. 64, p. 73, and p. 75; cf. Fleckner, Warnke and Ziegler 2011, vol. 1, pp. 381–387 (»Friede«) and vol. 2, pp. 58–64 (»Krieg«) and pp. 381–387 (»Staatsräson«)
- 55 Cf. *The Federalist* 1788 (no. 11), p. 63.
- 56 Cf. Wood 1987, p. 83 f., p. 93 and p. 101: »No one, said the Antifederalists, however elevated or educated, was free of the lures and interests of the marketplace.«
- 57 For the mobilization of pro- and anti-Jay-Treaty groups cf. Estes 2000, p. 399 ff.
- 58 Thomas Jefferson Randolph (ed.): *Memoirs, Correspondence, and Private Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, London 1829, vol. 3, p. 322.
- 59 Tocqueville 1835, vol. 1, p. 197 und vol. 2, p. 382; cf. Depkat 2011, p. 178 and Estes 2000, p. 403: »Public sentiment was whatever either party said it was, and each party set out to measure or take the pulse of that opinion by mobilizing its own supporters [...]« Cf. Eustace 2008, p. 392 f., Wick and Miller 1982, p. xix, and Knott 2009, p. 243 f.
- 60 Tocqueville 1835, vol. 1, pp. 197–198; cf. Shaw 2015, p. 12 on James Madison's and Benjamin Constant's idea to institutionalize diversity to »neutralise the claims of competing interests.«
- 61 Evans 1999, p. 67; cf. Depkat 2008.
- 62 For a similar argument regarding the Jay Treaty debate cf. Estes 2000, p. 393: »[...] it contains a rich tapestry for historians interested in changes in political culture, [...] and the democratization of the public sphere in early America. A reexamination of the public debate on Jay's treaty is also an interesting and fruitful way to understand the efforts of Federalists to address and mobilize public support for it.« *The Lansdowne Portrait* can be understood as part of this »rich tapestry«.
- 63 Cf. Tocqueville 1835, vol. 2, p. 107.
- 64 Cf. on the Neutral as indifference and »The Neutral as Scandal« Barthes 2005, p. 70 ff.