the general trends of privatisation. Chapters 2 to 6 identify some empirical conditions such as demography, public finance, civil service, the case of the industrial port of Wenzhou (the site of a pilot project for the reform of private investment rules), and foreign direct investment, respectively, to illustrate the unique conditions of Chinese political economy and the strategy of privatisation adopted by the Chinese government. Chapter 7 describes the culmination of the tipping point, according to the author, when the 1997 Asian financial crisis met the endogenous policy pressure toward privatisation.

According to the author, this book does not intend to be framed under any *a priori* theoretical discipline. Instead, it is written from the Chinese perspective, covering the political economy from both pre-reform as well as the reform periods. As the author pointed out at the very beginning, the central argument of the book 'is that privatization of the post-Mao economy is largely due to the state's increasing inability to reply on the public sector to address two critical concerns for regime survival: employment and revenue'. Policies of privatisation naturally followed the specific requirements of Chinese political economy. In terms of the process of privatisation, based on the 1995 guidelines, there were four rounds of revisions made by the State Council from 1997 to 2007, resulting in allowing a broader inflow of foreign capital in various service sectors, such as banking, wholesale and professional services. Also, after those revisions, certain sectors of wholly foreign-owned enterprises were eventually allowed to enter the Chinese economy.

To back up the argument for increasing central government revenues, the author describes the system for tax separation (*fenshuizhi*), which was introduced after 1994. This allowed the local official to better position them for 'performance evaluation and in the generation and control of discretionary resources'. Yet, the consequence of *fenshuizhi* unavoidably pushed local officials to use any means to help generate revenues, leading to the later policy of rule bending across almost all Chinese economic sectors.

Amongst others, the author uses the Wenzhou pilot project to illustrate how rule bending has become part of the Wenzhou entrepreneurial spirit. The notorious business practices and (over) competition from Wenzhou entrepreneurs, especially in areas such as shadow banking as well as property speculations, were widely reported and criticised. The author examines the outcomes of rule bending, which led to many famous business people from Wenzhou (including eight prominent entrepreneurs) ending up in jail. Policy bending and irregularities create a tempting environment for business entrepreneurs to engage in economic crime as well as preventing other local enterprises from expanding.

As a result of privatisation, the author concluded that 'Between the 1985 and 1995 industrial censuses, for example, the total number of foreign-invested industrial enterprises increased by eighty-six times'. Between 1985 and 1998 the total number of foreign-invested industrial enterprises increased from 516 to 26,448. In terms of geographical area, for example in Guangdong province, 36.5 per cent of private-foreign JV (joint-venture) was in the Pearl River Delta. Yet, it is in this area that the author could have developed further the relations between the Pearl River Delta and the distribution of those private investments.

As a book on the political economy of China, the statistical evidence is impressive, but, for wider audiences, there is room for further developing the examination of when privatisations occur, geographical locations and specific areas of privatisations. This book is particularly useful for academics and others who wish to understand China's unique political economy.

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Humans of the world unite

Jenny Andersson

The Emergence of Globalism Visions of World Order in Britain and the United States, 1939–1950, by Or Rosenboim. Princeton University Press. 338 pp. £31.95.

The global is a utopian dream, a space projected as much from the failures of nation-state-based politics in the twentieth century,

as from true visions of how the world might be better organised and governed. Or Rosenboim's *The Emergence of Globalism* is a panoramic account of visions of world order in the second half of the twentieth century, beginning with the outbreak of the Second World War and ending with the Korean crisis which began in 1950. This period, Rosenboim suggests, is marked by a great plurality of dreams of how the world could be united, and how the aggressive politics of nation-states could be replaced by new forms of world cooperation and federation. Most of these visions turn out to be flawed, inherently limited by forms of nationalist or Anglocentric bias, by legacies of past imperial dreams, or by the rivalry between great intellectuals with differing notions of what a united world would be—which racial, political or geographical hierarchy it would reflect, and whose intelligence and civilisation it should promote. *The Emergence of Globalism* is arguably the first study that examines the richness of these 1940s arguments for readers in political and intellectual history. In so doing the text also makes a significant contribution to studies of globalism.

In recent years, intellectual historians and students of international relations theory have become increasingly interested in the history of that particular space situated beyond the national level and encompassing (at least in principle) the totality of humanity. In the history of science, historians have long since shown how natural scientists, armed with predictions of weather and climate, turned the world into a natural object, planet Earth. Historians of international relations and political history have been slower in bringing out the also fascinating history of how this planet was constituted not just as a natural ecosystem, but as an interconnected social and political system and product of world politics. Globality studies—which became a fad in the history profession following its turn away from methodological nationalism and its simultaneous rejection of sociological theories of globalisation—are the study of specific visions of the world and the kinds of chaos and order that at different points in time were understood to be governing this world.

Of course, human beings have always lived in the world, but ideas of how this world should be governed, what should be the right relationship between nation-states and between peoples are highly historically specific. Globality refers to the process by which, many historians argue, the world was perceived not as a combination of various different entities, but by key processes of interdependence and integration. Some historians have seen that process as beginning in new communication technologies which enabled new forms of connectivity, while others have seen globality as a theoretical and intellectual shift from nation and empire to the level of the world. According to Rosenboim, the central importance of the global was that it substituted ideas of empire in debates about geography, international relations, and liberal politics from the 1940s on. At the same time, visions of world order in the 1940s were still necessarily limited, reflecting debates in which race was still a pertinent category, and in which nations were understood as having a solid heartland and an expansive frontier. The global, Rosenboim suggests, was a space for the projection of ideas of sovereignty, freedom and decision on behalf of those many liberals who by 1939 were convinced that empires were defeated and that nation-states had failed to procure stable forms of peace. Most of these intellectuals were American and British thinkers schooled in history and theories of empire. Their visions of the world had a bias, and as such, visions of world order often 'collapsed into a defence of Western moral and political values'.

It is here that Rosenboim's hugely ambitious book, which includes debates from the Austrian neoliberal, Friedrich von Hayek, to the American historian and literary critic, Lewis Mumford, is somewhat at odds with the more critical literature on intellectual world history and globality. Most such studies have aimed to open up a largely western-centric narrative of the world, look for new materials in Arabic or Chinese literatures, or for forms of reception and interpretation in the former colonies. Rosenboim's book is unapologetically western, and that is fine, but it would have been interesting to see her engage more clearly with the scholarship that has proposed that such visions of world order carried racist, eugenicist and Victorian ideas of order into the emergent project of

cosmopolitan world governance after 1945 (see *Victorian Visions of World Order*, edited by Duncan Bell, 2007). Rosenboim also makes a problematic compartmentalisation of her study by ending it in 1950 on the grounds that discourses on world order and world federation petered out after 1950, only to return, but in a much different form, in visions of global integration after 1989. The latter is a very questionable conclusion—the 1960s and 1970s were decades in which there was a massive eruption of forms of world organisation (many of them with origins in immediate post-war forms of world federalism). Many of these, such as the World Order Model Project by Harold Lasswell, or by the Quakers, were, in contrast to many of Rosenboim's examples, attempts to break radically with earlier visions of world unity as a continuation of imperial or national community. They tried to conceive of other forms of unity, and also advocated bypassing politics altogether by creating planetary social movements and citizens' groups.

In 1964, the world peace movement, which was split between the communist and the liberal world, attempted to create a genuine form of world organisation under the name of Mankind 2000, and in the same years, the World Council of Churches similarly tried to envision forms of world unity by rejecting the nation as the basis of citizenship. By the early 1970s, radical visions of globality were also not merely western and liberal, as in Rosenboim's examples, but also inspired by the return of Marxism, for instance in the dependency theory that spurred Third Worldist arguments of a New International Economic Order.

The relatively narrow chronological section charted by Rosenboim is marked by a particular version of world order thinking linked to federalism. Federalism, in turn, was a liberal project, directly linked to key debates in liberal political theory during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and federalism envisioned 'the global' first and foremost as a system of interconnected and sovereign states. Rosenboim carefully lays out the semantics of this argument and shows that within this field there was ample divergence—from racial visions to emergent cosmopolitanism—and also unexpected forms of circulation. For instance, in the idea of the frontier or the heartland from Germany to the US, she is less interested in the way that federalism was itself just one of many different projections of the kind of unity and organisation that a united world would be, than how federalism also encompassed key choices in political history that then came to have a real significance on the future of the world. She is closest to this discussion in the chapter on European federalism, and of the way in which in the history of the European project, federalism became a response to debates about the polarity of world order and the growing influence, particularly that of China.

Visions of European federation thus opposed a federal Franco-German Europe to the USA and to China, while simultaneously creating what scholars have recently referred to as 'Eurafrique'—projections of a formerly colonial African continent, still tied economically to the future of Europe (see Peo Hansen and Stefan Jansson, *Eurafrica. The Untold History of European Integration and Colonization*, 2014). Rosenboim adds here to a budding but not at all exhaustive literature on the constitution of the Third World (a concept which emerged in the early 1950s) in relation to new forms of western and northern unity that reiterated essentially imperial arguments of the economic role of the former colonies.

While naturally not all of these things would have fitted in one book, and because there are earlier studies of the longer genealogy of ideas of world governance, Rosenboim makes little attempt to connect her visions of world order with the longer legacy of visions of empire, on the one hand, or more radical visions of world order as globality, on the other. What she describes as globalist ideology thus in the end appears as a relatively continuous strand of Anglo-Saxon political thought. Indeed, the core concepts that Rosenboim traces in visions of world order—for instance sovereignty and freedom—are concepts key to the history of liberalism. Other concepts, such as justice, welfare, or human need, that carried a second wave of globalist arguments from the mid 1960s on, carry less weight in her analysis.

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