How Does Clientelism Foster Electoral Dominance? Evidence from Turkey

Arslantaş, Düzgün; Arslantaş, Şenol

doi:10.1177/2057891120920718

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How Does Clientelism Foster Electoral Dominance? Evidence from Turkey

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Arslantaş, Düzgün
International Max Planck Research School on the Social and Political Constitution of the Economy, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society;
University of Cologne, Germany;

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https://doi.org/10.1177/2057891120920718
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AJCP_7_2022_Arslantas.pdf
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Citation

Arslantaş, D., & Arslantaş, Ş. (2022). How Does Clientelism Foster Electoral Dominance? Evidence from Turkey. Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, 7(3), 559-575. doi:10.1177/2057891120920718.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0006-4B7F-9

Abstract

This article reveals how the AKP’s use of clientelism contributes to its electoral dominance. It does so by examining the features and actors as well as the structure of the clientelist network. The arguments are based on fieldwork in one of the poorest and most densely populated districts of Bağcılar, where in the 2015 legislative elections the AKP achieved more votes than in any other district in Istanbul.