Monetary and social incentives in multi-tasking: The ranking substitution effect

Stefan, Matthias; Huber, Jürgen; Kirchler, Michael; Sutter, Matthias; Walzl, Markus

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Monetary and social incentives in multi-tasking: The ranking substitution effect

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Sutter, Matthias
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

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2020_10online.pdf
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引用

Stefan, M., Huber, J., Kirchler, M., Sutter, M., & Walzl, M. (2020). Monetary and social incentives in multi-tasking: The ranking substitution effect.

引用: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0006-66F3-5

要旨

Rankings are prevalent information and incentive tools in labor markets with strong competition for talent. In a dynamic model of multi-tasking and an accompanying experiment with financial professionals, we identify hidden ranking costs when performance in one task is incentivized and ranked while another prosocial task is not: (i) a ranking influences behavior if individuals lag behind: they spend more total effort and substitute effort in the prosocial task with effort in the ranked task; (ii) those ahead in the ranking spend less total effort and lower relative effort in the ranked task. Implications for incentive schemes are discussed.