

Online Appendix

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Is the Euro up for Grabs? Evidence from a Survey Experiment.

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Appendix A Further information about the survey

The survey was fielded by SWG, a leading Italian polling company. Fieldwork was completed during an eight-day period from 17 October to 24 October 2019. Overall, 4,257 respondents completed the survey.

Quotas were used to generate a representative sample with regard to age, gender, and sector of the respondents. Moreover, survey weights were generated and applied to enhance the representativeness of the sample on additional dimensions (region, education, party choice).

The entire questionnaire was designed to be completed in approximately fifteen minutes. Overall, 12,540 people were invited to participate in the survey. Three respondents did not agree to participate after accepting our invitation; 224 respondents failed an attention check by the survey company; and 1,036 respondents were screened out because they fell into a quota that was already full.

Respondents were randomly allocated into six experimental groups. All respondents were exposed to the basic scenario (included in the main text) and, depending on their experimental group, a combination of the following frames:

1. National blame attribution (before the basic scenario):

The Italian government has decided to ignore the European fiscal rules and has allowed the public deficit to exceed the figure agreed with the European Commission. This has caused an increase in Italian public debt, already very high to begin with, and a downgrade of Italian bonds by rating agencies. As a consequence, now ...

2. Foreign blame attribution (before the basic scenario):

The Italian government wants to rekindle growth and reduce unemployment and decides to increase the public deficit. However, the European Union, led by Germany and other northern countries, prevents it from doing so and launches an excessive deficit procedure against Italy, which causes the downgrade of Italian bonds by rating agencies. As a consequence, now ...

3. Austerity mention (after the basic scenario):

... but only if the Italian government commits to implementing some policy changes. The measures that the Italian government needs to implement to receive the bailout package involve making it easier for companies to fire employees, cutting public expenditures (e.g., pension cuts, health care cuts, etc.), increasing taxes (both income taxes and value-added taxes), privatizing state assets, and introducing a haircut on savings in troubled banks.

Table A.1 Variable coding

| Variable | Survey question | Operationalization |
|-------------------------------|--|---|
| Benefited from euro | "Taking everything into account, would you say that you and your family have on balance benefited or not from Italy being a member of the European common currency, the euro?" | Continuous variable, 0–10; 0=Not benefited at all; 10=Benefited a lot |
| Exclusive national identity | Do you see yourself as: 1 Italian only; 2 Italian and European; 3 European and Italian; 4 European only; 5 None; 98 Refusal; 99 I don't know | Binary categorical variable; 1 coded as 1; 2 to 5 coded as 0; 98 and 99 coded as missing |
| Female | What is your gender? 1 Male; 2 Female; 3 Other; 98 Prefer not to say | Binary categorical variable 1 coded as 0; 2 coded as 1; 3 and 98 coded as missing |
| Age | What is your date of birth (dd/mm/yy)? | Three age groups generated (<30; >=30 & <60; >=60) |
| Education | What is your highest educational qualification? | Continuous variable based on a detailed list of Italian education levels according to the ISCED classification |
| Subjective income | Thinking of your household's total monthly or weekly income, is your household able to make ends meet, that is, pay your usual expenses easily or with difficulty? | Continuous variable, 0-10; 0=With great difficulty; 10=Very easily |
| Past vote | Which party did you vote for in the last European parliamentary election on 26 May 2019? | Categorical variable based on detailed list of Italian parties; Lega, PD and MS5 coded individually; all other parties as "Other party"; abstention, "I would prefer not to say" and "I don't remember" coded as "No party" |
| Export dependent (continuous) | To what extent does the enterprise/ organization for which you work depend on sales (exports) abroad? | Continuous variable, 1-5; 1=Very little or not at all; 5=Very much or entirely |
| Export dependent (dummy) | To what extent does the enterprise/ organization for which you work depend on sales (exports) abroad? | Binary categorical variable, 1=Very much or entirely; to a large extent (more than 50% of total sales); 0=all others |
| Economic left ideology | Factor of "economic left ideology" has the highest loadings for the items "The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels" and "It should be the government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one". | Predicted values of a rotated principal component factor score of eight items on attitudes towards economic and social value issues; three resulting factors |
| Economic knowledge | 1. What does the gross domestic product (GDP) measure? 2. What is an exchange rate? 3. Inflation is the term used to describe ... | The variable is coded as the sum of correct answers to three knowledge questions. Four response options were given for each question. |
| Assets (savings) | Do you or a member of your household own any of the following (please select all that apply)? [list of six types of assets given] Savings (in a bank account) | Binary variable; coded as 1 if a respondent has savings; 0 otherwise |
| Assets (stocks or bonds) | Do you or a member of your household own any of the following (please select all that apply)? [list of six types of assets given] Stocks or bonds | Binary variable; coded as 1 if a respondent has stocks or bonds; 0 otherwise |

Table A.1, continued

| | | |
|-----------------------------------|--|---|
| No assets | Do you or a member of your household own any of the following (please select all that apply)? [list of six types of assets given] My household does not own any of the above | Binary variable; coded as 1 if a respondent does not own any of the listed assets; 0 otherwise |
| Vulnerable labour market position | Do/did you have a work contract of ... [five response options given] | Binary variable; coded as 1 if a respondent has a work contract of limited duration, works part-time or via an agency, or has no work contract (and is employed); 0 otherwise |
| Unemployed | Which of these descriptions best describes your situation (in the last seven days)? [nine response options given] | Binary variable; coded as 1 if a respondent is a. unemployed and actively looking for a job; b. unemployed, wanting a job but not actively looking for a job; 0 otherwise |

Table A.2 Summary statistics

| | N | Mean | SD | Min. | Max. |
|-----------------------------------|-------|----------|------|------|-------|
| Benefited from euro | 4,257 | 4,257.01 | 3.78 | 3.08 | 0.00 |
| Exclusive national identity | 4,056 | 3,919.46 | 0.28 | 0.45 | 0.00 |
| Female | 4,243 | 4,241.95 | 0.52 | 0.50 | 0.00 |
| Age | | | | | |
| Age < 30 | 4,249 | 4,251.42 | 0.15 | 0.35 | 0.00 |
| Age ≥ 30 & < 60 | 4,249 | 4,251.42 | 0.51 | 0.50 | 0.00 |
| Age ≥ 60 | 4,249 | 4,251.42 | 0.34 | 0.47 | 0.00 |
| Education | 4,257 | 4,257.01 | 5.09 | 2.13 | 1.00 |
| Subjective income | 4,257 | 4,257.01 | 4.69 | 2.49 | 0.00 |
| Past vote | | | | | |
| Lega | 4,019 | 3,679.71 | 0.21 | 0.41 | 0.00 |
| M5S | 4,019 | 3,679.71 | 0.11 | 0.31 | 0.00 |
| PD | 4,019 | 3,679.71 | 0.14 | 0.35 | 0.00 |
| Other party | 4,019 | 3,679.71 | 0.16 | 0.37 | 0.00 |
| No party | 4,019 | 3,679.71 | 0.37 | 0.48 | 0.00 |
| Export dependent (continuous) | 3,859 | 3,894.85 | 1.57 | 1.11 | 1.00 |
| Export dependent (dummy) | 3,859 | 3,894.85 | 0.17 | 0.38 | 0.00 |
| Economic left ideology | 3,636 | 3,506.92 | 0.03 | 1.02 | -3.99 |
| Economic knowledge | 4,257 | 4,257.01 | 1.78 | 1.09 | 0.00 |
| Assets (savings) | 4,257 | 4,257.01 | 0.43 | 0.49 | 0.00 |
| Assets (stocks or bonds) | 4,257 | 4,257.01 | 0.12 | 0.32 | 0.00 |
| No assets | 4,257 | 4,257.01 | 0.15 | 0.36 | 0.00 |
| Vulnerable labour market position | 4,239 | 4,228.78 | 0.15 | 0.36 | 0.00 |
| Unemployed | 4,231 | 4,206.62 | 0.16 | 0.37 | 0.00 |

Appendix B Regression tables corresponding to figures in main text

Table B.1 Multinomial probit regression results underlying Figures 2 and 3

| | (1) | | (2) | |
|------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| | Referendum | | Referendum | |
| | Exit | Don't know | Exit | Don't know |
| austerity=1 | 0.850*** (5.84) | 0.504** (2.97) | 1.061*** (6.07) | 0.596** (3.25) |
| austerity=1 # govblame=1 | -0.283 (-1.40) | 0.0375 (0.16) | -0.364 (-1.55) | 0.00331 (0.01) |
| govblame=1 | 0.124 (0.87) | 0.221 (1.24) | 0.201 (1.23) | 0.253 (1.37) |
| austerity=1 # foreignblame=1 | -0.0863 (-0.43) | -0.122 (-0.51) | -0.111 (-0.47) | -0.143 (-0.58) |
| foreignblame=1 | -0.0182 (-0.13) | 0.264 (1.51) | 0.0242 (0.14) | 0.297 (1.65) |
| Benefited from euro | | | -0.286*** (-13.57) | -0.112*** (-5.98) |
| National identity=1 | | | 1.116*** (9.59) | 0.706*** (5.19) |
| Female | | | -0.194* (-2.04) | 0.127 (1.25) |
| >=30 & <60 years | | | 0.485*** (3.31) | 0.195 (1.24) |
| >=60 years | | | 0.217 (1.36) | 0.0840 (0.51) |
| Education | | | -0.0576** (-2.69) | -0.0457* (-2.12) |
| Subjective income | | | -0.0292 (-1.28) | -0.0237 (-1.01) |
| Constant | -0.553*** (-5.30) | -0.970*** (-7.68) | 0.246 (0.94) | -0.532 (-1.87) |
| Observations | 3,877 | | 3,877 | |
| F | 9.228 | | 18.17 | |

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B.2 Multinomial probit regression results underlying Figure 4 and Appendix Figures C.5 and C.6

| | (1) | | (2) | | (3) | |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | Referendum | | Referendum | | Referendum | |
| | Exit | Don't know | Exit | Don't know | Exit | Don't know |
| austerity=1 | 1.097*** (6.69) | 0.399* (2.24) | 0.992*** (9.08) | 0.688*** (6.35) | 0.816** (3.26) | 0.274 (1.11) |
| Benefited from euro | -0.236*** (-9.06) | -0.121*** (-4.67) | -0.271*** (-13.75) | -0.0933*** (-5.20) | -0.272*** (-13.77) | -0.0949*** (-5.30) |
| austerity=1 # Benefited from euro | -0.0619 (-1.64) | 0.0464 (1.37) | | | | |
| National identity=1 | 1.162*** (10.03) | 0.665*** (5.07) | 1.316*** (8.22) | 0.921*** (5.23) | 1.155*** (10.02) | 0.675*** (5.17) |
| <30 years | -0.444** (-3.21) | -0.110 (-0.77) | -0.450** (-3.22) | -0.122 (-0.84) | -0.442** (-3.17) | -0.111 (-0.77) |
| >=60 years | -0.270* (-2.48) | -0.157 (-1.42) | -0.263* (-2.44) | -0.157 (-1.42) | -0.265* (-2.44) | -0.156 (-1.40) |
| Education | -0.0478* (-2.26) | -0.0401 (-1.92) | -0.0479* (-2.25) | -0.0412* (-1.97) | -0.0561 (-1.78) | -0.0710* (-2.41) |
| Subjective income | -0.0101 (-0.46) | -0.0268 (-1.21) | -0.0128 (-0.59) | -0.0277 (-1.26) | -0.0116 (-0.53) | -0.0261 (-1.18) |
| austerity=1 # National identity=1 | | | -0.360 (-1.63) | -0.531* (-2.18) | | |
| austerity=1 # Education | | | | | 0.0197 (0.48) | 0.0584 (1.46) |
| Constant | 0.401* (2.14) | 0.0253 (0.12) | 0.473** (2.59) | -0.121 (-0.62) | 0.551* (2.43) | 0.0867 (0.39) |
| Observations | 4,056 | | 4,056 | | 4,056 | |
| F | 28.89 | | 29.22 | | 27.99 | |

t statistics in parentheses

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Appendix C Additional empirical results


Table C.1 Determinants of interest and identity; average marginal effects based on OLS (M1) and probit (M2) regressions

| | (1) | (2) |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| Female | -0.122 (-1.01) | 0.0617** (3.14) |
| >=30 & <60 years (Ref: <30 years) | -0.946*** (-5.06) | 0.0505 (1.43) |
| >=60 years (Ref: <30 years) | -1.025*** (-5.29) | -0.0332 (-0.92) |
| Education | 0.00785 (0.28) | -0.0283*** (-6.33) |
| Subjective income | 0.278*** (9.63) | -0.0234*** (-5.60) |
| M5S (Ref: Lega) | 0.831*** (5.46) | -0.219*** (-8.25) |
| PD (Ref: Lega) | 3.208*** (23.10) | -0.386*** (-16.81) |
| Other party (Ref: Lega) | 1.401*** (8.61) | -0.186*** (-6.51) |
| No party (Ref: Lega) | 1.058*** (6.06) | -0.222*** (-7.40) |
| Observations | 4,001 | 3,842 |

t statistics in parentheses


* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Figure C.1 Self-interest and identity by households' ability to make ends meet




Note: The horizontal and vertical lines denote sample average preferences and the size of the circles indicates the relative group size. To measure households' ability to make ends meet (subjective income), respondents were asked the following question: "Thinking of your household's total monthly or weekly income, is your household able to make ends meet, that is, pay your usual expenses easily or with difficulty?" The lower-income group includes the response categories 0 to 3 on a 0 to 10 scale (30 percent of respondents), middle income includes categories 4 to 6 (45 percent), and higher income includes categories 7 to 10 (25 percent). Using objective income groups or a continuous operationalization of income reveals a highly similar pattern. See Table C.1 below for corresponding regression results.

Figure C.2 Self-interest and identity by past vote in the 2019 European election




Note: The horizontal and vertical lines denote sample average preferences and the size of the circles indicates the relative group size. See Table C.1 below for corresponding regression results.

Figure C.3 Support for Italexit in a hypothetical referendum by experimental treatment




Note: Survey weights applied.

Figure C.4 Predicted voting probabilities in a hypothetical Italexit referendum by blame attribution treatments




Note: Predicted probabilities of voting in a hypothetical referendum based on multinomial probit models presented in Table B.1 in the appendix.

Figure C.5 Heterogeneous austerity treatment effects for educational attainment




Note: Predicted probabilities of voting in a hypothetical referendum based on multinomial probit models presented in Table B.2 in the appendix.

Figure C.6 Heterogeneous austerity treatment effects for national identity



Note: Predicted probabilities of voting in a hypothetical referendum based on multinomial probit models presented in Table B.2 in the appendix.

Figure C.7 Heterogeneous austerity treatment effects for economic knowledge



Note: Predicted probabilities of voting in a hypothetical referendum based on multinomial probit models presented in Table B.2 in the appendix, adding economic knowledge and its interaction with the austerity treatment.

Appendix D Robustness tests

Table D.1 Replicating Table 2 (Models 1 to 3) and Table 3 (Models 4 to 6) including the full sample and controlling for treatment

| | (1) | | | (2) | | | (3) | | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--------------------|
| | Remain | Exit | Don't know | Remain | Exit | Don't know | Remain | Exit | Don't know |
| Benefited from euro | 0.0539*** (19.69) | -0.0645*** (-23.73) | 0.0105*** (3.65) | | | | 0.0464*** (14.93) | -0.0528*** (-17.08) | 0.00641* (1.97) |
| National identity | | | | -0.351*** (-17.48) | 0.355*** (14.92) | -0.00366 (-0.16) | -0.243*** (-10.17) | 0.214*** (8.81) | 0.0290 (1.14) |
| Female | | | | | | | | | |
| Age >= 30 & < 60 Ref: Age < 30 | | | | | | | | | |
| Age >= 60 | | | | | | | | | |
| Education | | | | | | | | | |
| Subjective income | | | | | | | | | |
| M55 Ref: Lega | | | | | | | | | |
| PD | | | | | | | | | |
| Other party | | | | | | | | | |
| No party | | | | | | | | | |
| Observations | | 4,257 | | | 4,056 | | | 4,056 | |

Table D.1, continued

| | (4) | | | (5) | | | (6) | | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|
| | Remain | Exit | Don't know | Remain | Exit | Don't know | Remain | Exit | Don't know |
| Benefited from euro | 0.0444*** (13.98) | -0.0512*** (-16.21) | 0.00681* (2.09) | 0.0417*** (12.39) | -0.0463*** (-13.81) | 0.00461 (1.40) | | | |
| National identity | -0.228*** (-9.16) | 0.208*** (8.42) | 0.0194 (0.76) | -0.218*** (-8.87) | 0.175*** (7.21) | 0.0428 (1.70) | | | |
| Female | -0.0155 (-0.80) | -0.0573** (-3.13) | 0.0728*** (3.78) | 0.0194 (1.03) | -0.0596** (-3.21) | 0.0402* (2.20) | -0.00344 (-0.17) | -0.0218 (-1.09) | 0.0252 (1.35) |
| Age >= 30 & < 60 Ref: Age < 30 | -0.0718* (-2.46) | 0.0858** (3.07) | -0.0139 (-0.44) | -0.0771** (-2.58) | 0.0565 (1.94) | 0.0206 (0.73) | -0.123*** (-3.84) | 0.103*** (3.38) | 0.0194 (0.67) |
| Age >= 60 | -0.0141 (-0.45) | 0.0446 (1.49) | -0.0305 (-0.93) | -0.0499 (-1.57) | 0.0240 (0.77) | 0.0259 (0.85) | -0.0802* (-2.40) | 0.0603 (1.88) | 0.0199 (0.64) |
| Education | 0.0113** (2.64) | -0.00769 (-1.85) | -0.00361 (-0.88) | 0.00560 (1.31) | -0.00447 (-1.06) | -0.00113 (-0.29) | 0.0120** (2.68) | -0.00739 (-1.66) | -0.00460 (-1.15) |
| Subjective income | | | | 0.00757 (1.72) | -0.00731 (-1.73) | -0.000260 (-0.06) | 0.0250*** (5.90) | -0.0259*** (-6.23) | 0.000871 (0.22) |
| M55 Ref: Lega | | | | 0.0340 (1.25) | -0.0246 (-0.94) | -0.00943 (-0.44) | 0.107*** (4.12) | -0.116*** (-4.19) | 0.00877 (0.43) |
| PD | | | | 0.247*** (8.56) | -0.252*** (-9.07) | 0.00513 (0.21) | 0.474*** (19.92) | -0.470*** (-20.74) | -0.00398 (-0.21) |
| Other party | | | | 0.0723** (2.67) | -0.0787** (-2.95) | 0.00641 (0.28) | 0.174*** (6.41) | -0.195*** (-6.79) | 0.0210 (0.98) |
| No party | | | | 0.0430 (1.45) | -0.149*** (-5.28) | 0.106*** (3.74) | 0.106*** (3.64) | -0.242*** (-8.17) | 0.137*** (5.11) |
| Observations | | 4,036 | | | 3,842 | | | 4,001 | |

t statistics in parentheses

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table D.2 Replicating Tables 2 and 3 using multinomial logistic regression models

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|
| <i>Benefited from euro</i> | | | | | | |
| Remain | 0.0548*** (7.02) | | 0.0386*** (4.40) | 0.0371*** (4.19) | 0.0412*** (5.27) | |
| Exit | -0.0639*** (-9.09) | | -0.0447*** (-5.69) | -0.0459*** (-5.85) | -0.0389*** (-5.21) | |
| Don't know | 0.00909 (1.36) | | 0.00611 (0.78) | 0.00881 (1.13) | -0.00230 (-0.32) | |
| <i>National identity</i> | | | | | | |
| Remain | | -0.450*** (-8.36) | -0.352*** (-5.11) | -0.340*** (-4.65) | -0.299*** (-4.31) | |
| Exit | | 0.418*** (7.23) | 0.282*** (4.21) | 0.263*** (4.08) | 0.256*** (3.77) | |
| Don't know | | 0.0321 (0.64) | 0.0706 (1.16) | 0.0770 (1.20) | 0.0429 (0.79) | |
| <i>Female</i> | | | | | | |
| Remain | | | | 0.0189 (0.37) | 0.0476 (0.96) | 0.00543 (0.10) |
| Exit | | | | -0.110** (-2.66) | -0.0898* (-2.15) | -0.0459 (-0.95) |
| Don't know | | | | 0.0915* (2.02) | 0.0421 (0.94) | 0.0405 (0.91) |
| <i>>=30 & <60 years (Ref: <30 years)</i> | | | | | | |
| Remain | | | | -0.133 (-1.58) | -0.226** (-2.94) | -0.202** (-2.63) |
| Exit | | | | 0.115 (1.64) | 0.100 (1.48) | 0.0543 (0.73) |
| Don't know | | | | 0.0185 (0.28) | 0.126** (2.72) | 0.147*** (3.79) |
| <i>>=60 years (Ref: <30 years)</i> | | | | | | |
| Remain | | | | -0.0667 (-0.77) | -0.147 (-1.90) | -0.104 (-1.29) |
| Exit | | | | 0.0554 (0.78) | 0.0414 (0.62) | -0.0185 (-0.25) |
| Don't know | | | | 0.0113 (0.16) | 0.106* (2.10) | 0.122* (2.53) |
| <i>Education</i> | | | | | | |
| Remain | | | | 0.00637 (0.60) | 0.00349 (0.35) | 0.0113 (0.98) |
| Exit | | | | -0.00149 (-0.15) | -0.00130 (-0.13) | -0.0119 (-1.07) |
| Don't know | | | | -0.00489 (-0.55) | -0.00219 (-0.25) | 0.000598 (0.07) |
| <i>Subjective income</i> | | | | | | |
| Remain | | | | | 0.00884 (0.77) | 0.0305** (2.63) |
| Exit | | | | | -0.00575 (-0.57) | -0.0243* (-2.35) |
| Don't know | | | | | -0.00310 (-0.33) | -0.00620 (-0.70) |

Table D.2, continued

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|--------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|--------------------|----------------------|
| <i>M5S (Ref: Lega)</i> | | | | | | |
| Remain | | | | | 0.0433 (0.64) | 0.101 (1.49) |
| Exit | | | | | 0.0141 (0.23) | -0.0585 (-0.86) |
| Don't know | | | | | -0.0574 (-1.18) | -0.0425 (-0.92) |
| <i>PD (Ref: Lega)</i> | | | | | | |
| Remain | | | | | 0.207** (2.92) | 0.472*** (7.90) |
| Exit | | | | | -0.121 (-1.70) | -0.384*** (-6.58) |
| Don't know | | | | | -0.0864 (-1.68) | -0.0875* (-2.14) |
| <i>Other party (Ref: Lega)</i> | | | | | | |
| Remain | | | | | 0.0183 (0.28) | 0.173* (2.41) |
| Exit | | | | | 0.00167 (0.02) | -0.169* (-2.32) |
| Don't know | | | | | -0.0200 (-0.36) | -0.00439 (-0.08) |
| <i>No party (Ref: Lega)</i> | | | | | | |
| Remain | | | | | 0.155* (2.15) | 0.235** (3.07) |
| Exit | | | | | -0.157* (-2.53) | -0.265*** (-3.87) |
| Don't know | | | | | 0.00259 (0.04) | 0.0298 (0.50) |
| Observations | 687 | 651 | 651 | 648 | 624 | 652 |

t statistics in parentheses

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table D.3 Robustness models for Table 3; marginal effects after multinomial probit regressions; controlling for economic knowledge and economic left-right preferences

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|
| <i>Female</i> | | | | |
| Remain | -0.00833 (-0.16) | 0.0231 (0.46) | 0.0224 (0.39) | 0.0617 (1.18) |
| Exit | -0.0773 (-1.58) | -0.105* (-2.52) | -0.0735 (-1.39) | -0.111* (-2.53) |
| Don't know | 0.0856 (1.95) | 0.0816 (1.84) | 0.0511 (1.16) | 0.0492 (1.11) |
| <i>>=30 & <60 years (Ref: <30 years)</i> | | | | |
| Remain | -0.199* (-2.53) | -0.124 (-1.55) | -0.208* (-2.37) | -0.148 (-1.55) |
| Exit | 0.132 (1.92) | 0.0917 (1.35) | 0.130 (1.64) | 0.0989 (1.23) |
| Don't know | 0.0670 (1.08) | 0.0323 (0.52) | 0.0779 (1.33) | 0.0495 (0.73) |
| <i>>=60 years (Ref: <30 years)</i> | | | | |
| Remain | -0.0474 (-0.55) | -0.0626 (-0.74) | -0.0189 (-0.20) | -0.0320 (-0.32) |
| Exit | 0.00279 (0.04) | 0.0260 (0.37) | -0.0240 (-0.30) | 0.00714 (0.09) |
| Don't know | 0.0446 (0.65) | 0.0366 (0.55) | 0.0429 (0.67) | 0.0248 (0.36) |
| <i>Education</i> | | | | |
| Remain | 0.0257* (2.16) | 0.00476 (0.44) | 0.0310* (2.55) | 0.00796 (0.73) |
| Exit | -0.0253* (-2.25) | -0.00296 (-0.30) | -0.0295* (-2.52) | -0.00525 (-0.54) |
| Don't know | -0.000363 (-0.04) | -0.00180 (-0.19) | -0.00149 (-0.18) | -0.00271 (-0.30) |
| <i>Economic knowledge</i> | | | | |
| Remain | 0.0451 (1.70) | 0.0256 (1.01) | | |
| Exit | -0.0166 (-0.69) | -0.000792 (-0.04) | | |
| Don't know | -0.0285 (-1.33) | -0.0248 (-1.10) | | |
| <i>Benefited from euro</i> | | | | |
| Remain | | 0.0368*** (4.19) | | 0.0511*** (5.26) |
| Exit | | -0.0451*** (-6.08) | | -0.0471*** (-5.42) |
| Don't know | | 0.00830 (1.12) | | -0.00400 (-0.53) |

Table D.3, continued

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|-------------------------------|-----|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| <i>National identity</i> | | | | |
| Remain | | -0.338*** (-4.82) | | -0.264*** (-3.44) |
| Exit | | 0.270*** (4.30) | | 0.276*** (3.87) |
| Don't know | | 0.0672 (1.12) | | -0.0120 (-0.22) |
| <i>Economic left ideology</i> | | | | |
| Remain | | | -0.00105 (-0.04) | 0.00595 (0.23) |
| Exit | | | -0.0185 (-0.74) | -0.0338 (-1.58) |
| Don't know | | | 0.0196 (0.86) | 0.0278 (1.16) |
| Observations | 683 | 648 | 589 | 565 |

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D.4 Robustness models for Table 3; marginal effects after multinomial probit regressions; controlling for export exposure, assets, and labour market vulnerability

| <i>Export dependent (continuous measure)</i> | | | | | | | |
|--|---------------------|-------|------------|-----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|-------|
| M1 | Export dep. | N=631 | M2 | Benefited from euro | National identity | Export dep. | N=597 |
| Remain | -0.00171 (-0.07) | | Remain | 0.0409*** -4.61 | -0.350*** (-5.00) | -0.00725 (-0.31) | |
| Exit | 0.00669 -0.32 | | Exit | -0.0500*** (-6.69) | 0.287*** -4.43 | 0.0174 -0.98 | |
| Don't know | -0.00498 (-0.22) | | Don't know | 0.00917 -1.2 | 0.0633 -1.03 | -0.0102 (-0.44) | |
| <i>Export dependent (dummy)</i> | | | | | | | |
| M3 | Export dep. | N=631 | M4 | Benefited from euro | National identity | Export dep. | N=597 |
| Remain | -0.0116 (-0.16) | | Remain | 0.0409*** -4.63 | -0.352*** (-5.04) | -0.0381 (-0.59) | |
| Exit | 0.0247 -0.39 | | Exit | -0.0501*** (-6.73) | 0.289*** -4.48 | 0.0659 -1.3 | |
| Don't know | -0.013 (-0.22) | | Don't know | 0.00923 -1.2 | 0.0632 -1.03 | -0.0278 (-0.46) | |
| <i>Assets: savings</i> | | | | | | | |
| M5 | Assets | N=683 | M6 | Benefited from euro | National identity | Assets | N=648 |
| Remain | 0.159** -3.08 | | Remain | 0.0352*** -3.99 | -0.334*** (-4.81) | 0.0853 -1.68 | |
| Exit | -0.0985* (-2.01) | | Exit | -0.0446*** (-6.01) | 0.268*** -4.26 | -0.0371 (-0.86) | |
| Don't know | -0.0606 (-1.35) | | Don't know | 0.00943 -1.26 | 0.0661 -1.11 | -0.0481 (-1.08) | |
| <i>Assets: stocks or bonds</i> | | | | | | | |
| M7 | Assets | N=683 | M8 | Benefited from euro | National identity | Assets | N=648 |
| Remain | 0.113 -1.5 | | Remain | 0.0366*** -4.16 | -0.339*** (-4.89) | 0.0452 -0.68 | |
| Exit | -0.0094 (-0.13) | | Exit | -0.0455*** (-6.12) | 0.273*** -4.38 | 0.0548 -0.85 | |
| Don't know | -0.103 (-1.71) | | Don't know | 0.00887 -1.19 | 0.0653 -1.09 | -0.0999 (-1.65) | |
| <i>Assets: no assets</i> | | | | | | | |
| M9 | No assets | N=683 | M10 | Benefited from euro | National identity | No assets | N=648 |
| Remain | -0.244** (-3.16) | | Remain | 0.0360*** -4.18 | -0.318*** (-4.64) | -0.194** (-2.60) | |
| Exit | 0.107 -1.61 | | Exit | -0.0454*** (-6.13) | 0.268*** -4.27 | 0.0517 -0.9 | |
| Don't know | 0.137* -2.38 | | Don't know | 0.00936 -1.29 | 0.0502 -0.88 | 0.142* -2.35 | |

Table D.4, continued


| <i>Vulnerable labour market position</i> | | | | | | |
|--|--------------------|-------|------------|-----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|
| M11 | Vulnerable | N=680 | M12 | Benefited from euro | National identity | Vulnerable N=645 |
| Remain | -0.0994 (-1.18) | | Remain | 0.0372*** -4.21 | -0.331*** (-4.79) | -0.139 (-1.86) |
| Exit | 0.0475 -0.64 | | Exit | -0.0460*** (-6.15) | 0.262*** -4.25 | 0.0964 -1.69 |
| Don't know | 0.052 -0.8 | | Don't know | 0.0088 -1.16 | 0.0697 -1.14 | 0.043 -0.65 |
| <i>Unemployed</i> | | | | | | |
| M13 | Unemployed | N=675 | M14 | Benefited from euro | National identity | Unemployed N=644 |
| Remain | -0.0248 (-0.29) | | Remain | 0.0369*** -4.15 | -0.356*** (-5.24) | 0.0939 -1.23 |
| Exit | 0.0801 -1.11 | | Exit | -0.0441*** (-5.99) | 0.280*** -4.48 | -0.0125 (-0.21) |
| Don't know | -0.0553 (-0.90) | | Don't know | 0.00714 -0.93 | 0.0763 -1.27 | -0.0813 (-1.29) |

t statistics in parentheses

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001


Note: All models control for gender, age, and education.

Figure D.1 Replicating Table 3, Model 5 with full, simple, and no weights




Note: Probit coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals. Only control group included.

Figure D.2 Replicating Figure 2 with full, simple, and no weights



Note: Marginal effects and 95 percent confidence intervals.

Figure D.3 Replicating Figure 2 using multinomial logistic regression models



Note: Marginal effects and 95 percent confidence intervals.

Appendix E Results with partisan choice as DV


Table E.1 Multinomial probit regression results; framing effects on vote intentions

| | (1) | | | | (2) | | | |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | M5S | PD | Other | DK/ Abstain | M5S | PD | Other | DK/ Abstain |
| austerity=1 | 0.0472 (0.26) | 0.143 (0.97) | -0.0984 (-0.64) | 0.0593 (0.36) | 0.0901 (0.48) | 0.234 (1.35) | -0.0436 (-0.27) | 0.102 (0.60) |
| austerity = 1 # govblame = 1 | 0.0733 (0.29) | 0.135 (0.64) | 0.220 (1.00) | -0.0715 (-0.31) | 0.0146 (0.06) | 0.162 (0.67) | 0.202 (0.87) | -0.0945 (-0.39) |
| govblame = 1 | -0.180 (-1.04) | -0.0179 (-0.12) | -0.119 (-0.75) | 0.0202 (0.12) | -0.105 (-0.59) | 0.00774 (0.05) | -0.111 (-0.66) | 0.0699 (0.41) |
| austerity = 1 # foreignblame = 1 | -0.231 (-0.91) | -0.167 (-0.80) | -0.142 (-0.66) | -0.430 (-1.85) | -0.221 (-0.85) | -0.161 (-0.67) | -0.138 (-0.61) | -0.429 (-1.78) |
| foreignblame = 1 | 0.0679 (0.39) | 0.196 (1.36) | 0.167 (1.08) | 0.249 (1.52) | 0.0887 (0.49) | 0.220 (1.30) | 0.169 (1.02) | 0.267 (1.54) |
| Benefited from euro | | | | | 0.0735*** (3.98) | 0.281*** (14.90) | 0.117*** (6.53) | 0.119*** (6.48) |
| National identity= 1 | | | | | -0.795*** (-6.54) | -1.260*** (-9.23) | -0.748*** (-6.84) | -0.620*** (-5.36) |
| Female | | | | | -0.0848 (-0.84) | -0.0797 (-0.81) | -0.212* (-2.29) | 0.344*** (3.51) |
| >=30 & <60 years | | | | | -0.0727 (-0.41) | -0.116 (-0.68) | -0.375* (-2.33) | -0.323* (-2.02) |
| >=60 years | | | | | -0.364* (-1.96) | 0.275 (1.57) | -0.345* (-2.11) | -0.496** (-2.95) |
| Education | | | | | 0.00840 (0.36) | 0.107*** (4.91) | 0.0904*** (4.44) | 0.0618** (2.74) |
| Subjective income | | | | | -0.109*** (-4.69) | -0.0749*** (-3.38) | -0.0651** (-3.08) | -0.124*** (-5.61) |
| Constant | -0.389** (-3.09) | -0.542*** (-5.28) | 0.0381 (0.34) | 0.313** (2.67) | 0.303 (0.97) | -1.691*** (-6.12) | 0.157 (0.60) | 0.560* (2.12) |
| Observations | | 3,877 | | | | 3,877 | | |
| F | | 0.986 | | | | 13.66 | | |

t statistics in parentheses

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Figure E.1 Marginal effects of austerity and blame attribution on support for different party groups



Note: The marginal effects and 95 percent confidence intervals are calculated based on multinomial probit models presented in Table E.1 in the appendix.