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From jihad to resistance: the evolution of Hamas's discourse in the framework of mobilization

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Islamist versus nationalist and religious v. secular paradigms have dominated academic debates about Islamic movements for decades. The debate is largely centered on whether a group's words and actions can be better explained vis-à-vis its essentialist religious ideology or national socio-political context.¹ Scholarship regarding Hamas's discourse often tends to favor one or the other of these two approaches. The first essentialist approach cites Hamas discourse to cast the movement as a predominantly religious actor, intrinsically rooted in rigid Islamic traditions; in this view, Hamas seeks to alter its surrounding social-political environment to conform to its religious perspective.² From this essentialist perspective, Hamas aims to appropriate nationalist and secular terms, such as *muqawama* (resistance), and combine them with religious terms such as jihad.³

Conversely, while the nationalist approach does not ignore religion, it concludes that Hamas's political thought and practice is better explained by the complexities of Palestinian national existence, dominated by the desire to end the Israeli occupation and establish an independent Palestinian state.⁴ From this perspective, Hamas's words and actions are less concerned with unseen ideas pertaining to religion and metaphysics and more representative of the movement's pragmatic approach to politics, predominantly influenced by cost-benefit analyses and the exigencies of survival.⁵

Nonetheless, the article argues that, while Hamas's early texts between 1987 and 1993 show a clear focus on the Islamist v. secular-nationalist binary, the discursive dynamics of the movement's later texts follow a different logic decoupled from such rigid dichotomies. To explore these dynamics, this article employs discourse and frame analysis to examine the framing processes which are grounded within Hamas's evolving discourses. 'Framing' is based on the assumption that discourse is not just 'talk', the euphemistic substitution of terms, or frequency with which certain words are employed, but how language and symbols are constructed around keywords – known as master frames in framing theory terminology – to shape ideas and influence actions. A 'master frame' refers to a central term around which an entire discourse is articulated to justify words and actions. Its ultimate objective is to generate popular mobilization and propagate a cohesive worldview.⁶

Drawing on Hamas texts and interviews with its members in the Gaza Strip during 2012–13, the article investigates the master frames that have dominated Hamas's discursive dynamics since its inception. Moreover, it explores how and why earlier master frames were transformed and substituted for another. First, following the eruption of the First Intifada (1987–1993), Hamas's discourse was largely contingent on the movement's particular interpretation of Islam and centered around religious terminology such as the concept of jihad. Second, during the Oslo Accords years from 1993 to 2000, the religious conditionality of Hamas's discourses was progressively de-framed. Finally, since 2000, Hamas's discourse has been reframed around the

concept of *muqawama*, which increasingly materialized to frame military actions throughout the course of the Second Intifada (2000 to c.2005) as well as civil actions as in the Hamas electoral program for the legislative elections. Further, it was only after Hamas ascended to office in 2006 and then failed to keep its electoral promises, that the concept of *muqawama* was transformed to a more holistic concept applicable to changing circumstances. In other words, the notion of *muqawama* was transformed into a floating signifier: an unfixed and indefinable concept able to explain inaction as well as contradictory positions. Since then, the floating signifier of *muqawama* has dominated the movement's discourse.

Through application of framing theory, the article thus argues that the evolution of Hamas discourse over a thirty-year period, transforming from one based on religious terminology – such as *jihad* – to notions of *muqawama* have occurred in response to the movement's mobilization and the rearticulation of its changing worldview. These changes largely stem from the relative inclusivity and the flexibility of conceptions of *jihad* and *muqawama* respectively. *Jihad* is controversial, territorially loose and religiously exclusive and, as such, it only resonates with some Muslims. Conversely, *muqawama* is inclusive, universal, territorially bounded and considered legitimate in terms of international law in the fight against colonialism and occupation. Adopting the discourse of *muqawama*, thus, allowed Hamas to become more inclusive of different religious and political orientations within the Palestinian political arena – thereby providing greater scope for popular mobilization – and facilitated the movement's efforts to propagate a more inclusive worldview. This does not mean, however, that religion has disappeared from Hamas discourses – far from it; religious terminology remains prevalent. Thus, Hamas is not becoming more secular-nationalist or less Islamic. Religion continues to frame Hamas as a Muslim movement, however, whereas *muqawama* serves to frame its actions and reach out beyond its core religious and national constituencies.

Research design: data and method

Hamas was founded on 14 December 1987 as the political and militant branch of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood to fight the Israeli occupation.⁷ The acronym Ha.M.A.S., which means 'zeal' in Arabic, derives its roots from both religion (Islam) and *muqawama* (resistance) as evident in its official name **H**arakat al-**M**uqaawama al-**'I**slamiyya⁸ (the Islamic Resistance Movement). Founding member, 'Abd al-Fattah Dukhan, informed me that, when the name was coined on 10 December 1987, the integration of the term *muqawama* was inspired by 'the Islamic Resistance in the south of Lebanon which achieved success militarily against the Israeli occupation.'⁹ However, the concept of *muqawama* as a militant framework was initially marginalized from Hamas's discursive formation. It neither appeared in Hamas's first leaflet nor its founding Charter of 1988. Rather, the term *jihad* was employed instead to explain Hamas's words and deeds.¹⁰ It was not until the start of the Second Intifada in 2000 that the framework of *muqawama* emerged and gradually came to constitute the master frame for the organization. This raises the questions: how and why did Hamas establish its discourse? How has it evolved? And why was it re-framed around the master frame of *muqawama* at the expense of the religious master frame of *jihad*?

To answer these questions, the paper draws on a broad dataset that includes, first, the early official documents of Hamas, namely its 1988 founding Charter and 1993 Introductory Memorandum. A comparison of the two documents shows how the discourse was initially established and framed around religion in the movement's charter and then how the conditionality of religion was de-framed in the Introductory Memorandum. Second, 194 transcripts of interviews, speeches, press releases, media statements by Hamas political leaders (comprising more than 1000 pages in Arabic) extensively covering the period between 2000 and 2007 were subjected to rigorous analysis. These documents are referred to as '2000-7 Texts' in citations and quotes. The genesis and progressive reframing of Hamas's discourse around *muqawama*

can be best examined within this time-period, a period that includes Hamas's transition to office. The effects that this transition had on Hamas's discursive formation remain unexamined. Finally, the dataset also includes personal interviews with a number of Hamas founders and activists in the Gaza Strip during 2012 and 2013, as well information sourced from the broader canon of Hamas texts. As such, it is argued that the data sampled are representative of the broader canon of Hamas political discourse, provide a comprehensive understanding of the evolution of Hamas's master frames, and help explain Hamas's current discursive framing.

Hamas's primary texts were subjected to discourse analysis (DA) and frame analysis (FA). While both methods are considered different from one other, they are mutually supportive in examining Hamas's primary texts with reference to the socio-political context. DA is geared towards understanding how Hamas's discourse was established and the manner in which it evolved. FA, in turn, prioritizes the examination of why the social group articulates its discourse around a master frame in order to mobilize both people and resources, as well as propagate its worldview.¹¹ Both approaches are qualitative and constructionist in the sense that meanings and master frames neither assume consistency nor are they only defined through quantification.¹² To this end, while the duration and frequency of the use of the terms *jihad* and *muqawama* (along with their sub-frames) matter, their conceptual employment vis-à-vis framing words and actions are accorded more importance.

Master frames and mobilization

Mobilization is the key focal point of framing theory, by which it attempts to explain how and why a master frame is established, the manner in which it evolves, and what causes its transformation. Context, culture, and inter-group competition are all factors that may influence how and why discourses might be altered in order to meet a group's mobilization needs. As such, the transformation of Hamas's master frame from *jihad* to *muqawama* was predicated on the movement's need to mobilize more resources and reach out to a wider constituency. Accordingly, a master frame is temporal in nature and subject to change should it fail to meet the mobilization demands of the movement in question.

Moreover, master frames serve as dominant 'algorithms',¹³ which are 'culturally resonant to their historical milieu.'¹⁴ A master frame not only addresses the group's core constituents, but it must also resonate with what the broader public holds to be true. As such, it must be able to plausibly connect a large range of issues and resonate with a wide variety of social groups.¹⁵ Robert Benford and David Snow developed a typology of frames grouped as 'exclusive, inelastic and restricted' and 'inclusive, elastic and elaborated'.¹⁶ Accordingly, a frame becomes a master frame due to its inclusivity. Rita Noonan advanced the debate by discovering that opposition movements do not necessarily use opposing frames to gain popular support, but instead appropriate pre-existing hegemonic cultural frames. For example, the elaborated frame 'return to democracy', in contrast to restricted frames such as leftist 'working class', was better able to integrate the left-wing feminist movement in Chile in the 1980s.¹⁷

Drawing on the findings of Noonan, Benford and Snow, there is a fundamental gap vis-à-vis the inclusivity of the frames *muqawama* and religion and their wider resonance among Palestinian society. In subtly substituting one for the other, Hamas aimed to widen its popular discourse in order to mobilize more support. In its early years, religious discourse constituted Hamas's oppositional master frame in order to differentiate the movement from its Palestinian secular and nationalist competitors. However, Hamas did not manage to persuade most Palestinians of its religious agenda.¹⁸ Faced with this reality, Hamas started to employ the term *muqawama* in order to conceptualize its political actions and wider discourse. Over time, *muqawama* eventually became Hamas's master frame because it was more inclusive, flexible and malleable than the exclusive religious master frame of *jihad*.

While the work of Noonan, Benford and Snow has helped conceptualize how the master frame was created and why it transformed from jihad to muqawama, the transformation of muqawama into a floating signifier when Hamas assumed office in 2006 poses another theoretical challenge. To this end, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's theory of discourse posits that the transformation of a 'central signifier' (or master frame) into a 'floating signifier' takes place during times of 'crisis' when stated goals or promises are non-attainable.¹⁹ Given Hamas's inability to deliver on its electoral promises, previously framed as part of its 'program of muqawama', the notion of muqawama was thus transformed into floating signifier. Put differently, Hamas aimed to transform muqawama by eliminating its stable sense, previously linked to specific promises such as improving security and the economy, in order to avoid semantic inconsistencies.

In brief, the dynamics of Hamas's discourse are dependent on the milieu in which the movement is situated, challenging socio-political realities such as the blockade of Gaza, and the often-contradictory demands of resistance and governance. As such, Hamas's master frames are anything but static or reified entities; rather, they are continuously reconstituted, contested, replaced and transformed. In contrast to the essentialist approaches to Hamas's words and actions – that is, asserting that the movement is driven by religious dogma – it is thus evident that Hamas's early religious discourses were not immutable and unchanging, but subject to de-framing and replacement.

Framing and de-framing religion, 1987–2000

Mahmud al-Zahar, a Hamas leader in Gaza, defines Hamas as a movement inspired by religion, an ever-present concept defining the movement's view of the relationship between 'God and men'. Al-Zahar adds, 'Hamas is basically a vision of faith', with faith underpinning all of its activities.²⁰ Similarly, Hamas's head of the Department of Popular Action, Ashraf Zayid, considers religion 'the primary factor' underscoring Hamas's mobilization strategies.²¹ Many local activists interviewed by the author in the Gaza Strip similarly emphasized that religion is of central significance to Hamas. One local activist, for instance, stressed that his 'affiliation to Hamas is based on religious reasons.'²² What implications do such assertions have for the central premise of this article, that is, that Hamas's words and actions are no longer conditioned by religion? This question is addressed by examining the extent to which Hamas's religious identity defines its political goals, strategies, mobilization policies and worldview. To do so, the contours of Hamas's religious framing will be outlined by retracing the narrative from its root and then elaborating how it was subsequently de-framed.

Conventional wisdom shows Hamas's Islamism as either Islamization of secular-nationalist terms, as articulated by the essentialist approach, or lacking 'extensive philosophizing'.²³ However, Dukhan, who participated in the writing of the Charter, emphasizes that the genesis of Hamas's early political thought, as dictated in the 1988 founding Charter, was virtually derived from Egyptian Muslim scholar, Sayyid Qutb.²⁴ One leader of Hamas's internal program of education and training adds that Hamas's teachings of political thought in the 1980s and early 1990s were largely based on Qutb's works.²⁵

Qutb's approach is teleological and claims 'universalism'²⁶ – that is, the objective is to change the individual, society and the state to conform to a certain religious perspective.²⁷ To explain this approach, Qutb postulates the concept of 'submission to God' in the framework of 'belief' and 'faith'. The test of this relationship between faith and men is through '*al-ba'ith*' (catalyst) that God causes such as the occupation of Palestine²⁸ or 'malady' in both Muslim and non-Muslim societies.²⁹ Thus, any problem faced by society is a catalyst for people to react and abide by 'the true Islam'.³⁰ This is applicable to any political context, whether authoritarian (Egypt) or colonial (Palestine). What matters instead is the submission of all to God.

Qutb called submission to God *dar al-Islam* (home of Islam) as opposed to *dar al-jahiliyya* (home of ignorance).³¹ Within this ontological framework, earthly losses can result in gains in the afterlife. For instance, the torture and killing of many Islamists, including Qutb himself, in Egyptian prisons in the 1950s and 1960s, are considered a positive achievement as they did not compromise their ideological and political positions in the face of a non-religious regime. Accordingly, political issues are also part of faith which, in turn, cannot be divided. Qutb states that abandonment of part of faith means the abandonment of the faith as a whole.³² Within this framework, Hamas coined its religious approach in the Charter:

[Hamas] draws its guidelines from Islam; derives from it its thinking, interpretations and views about universe, life and humanity; refers back to it for its conduct; and is inspired by it in whatever steps it takes.³³

Within these universal guidelines regarding 'life' and 'humanity', Hamas framed and sacralized its words and actions by reference to its interpretations of the Islamic canon (Quran and Hadith). This context-free approach explains that the Israeli occupation and the expulsion of Palestinians from their homeland in 1948 was not only the result of the 'Zionist invasion', but also these were 'catalysts' stemming from 'the absence of Islam'. Consequently, a 'state of falsehood' replaced a 'state of truth'.³⁴ Al-Zahar, a strong defender of Hamas's founding Charter, elaborates that Hamas is part of a 'divine approach that is universal in which Palestine is nothing, a drop [in an ocean], it is the [universal] Islam'.³⁵

Similar to Qutb's ontological distinction, the Charter differentiates between 'Islamic or *jahili* art'.³⁶ In order to reconstruct *dar al-Islam* and renounce *dar al-jahiliyya*, the Charter aimed to reconstruct the individual, the family, society and leadership so that they all abide authentic Islamic values.³⁷ To translate this vision, the Qutbian Charter proposes that 'jihad is the path' to gradually prepare and create a society of '*mujahidun*' (persons of jihad), qualified to achieve the final goal of the 'liberation of Palestine' and the 'establishment of Islamic state'.³⁸ Jihad is mentioned in the Charter thirty-six times, providing a holistic frame for Hamas's program of action and its worldview:

Jihad is not only carrying arms... The good word, article, beneficial book, support and aid are jihad. [...] [Therefore] Writers and the educated, media people, preachers in mosques, educators and other sectors of the Arab/Muslim world: they are all called upon to play their roles, to fulfill their duties [of jihad].³⁹

This intersubjective approach to jihad made it the master frame around which Hamas's political discourse was articulated in the late 1980s and early 1990s. To sum up, submission to God, in contrast to the absence of Islam, and jihad form the underpinnings of Hamas's early discourse. They are milestones forming the contours to which Qutb, the Charter and al-Zahar all refer. Here, the essentialist or ideological interpretation of Hamas's words and deeds holds true, as Hamas's early religious approach aimed to change reality in accordance with its own vision. Yet, this vision clashed jarringly with reality, notably in 1993, when the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), led by Yasser Arafat, decided to engage in the peace with Israel in spite of Hamas and other opposition. Hamas failed to mobilize Palestinians around its religious approach in order to stop the Palestinian participation in the Madrid peace conference in 1991 or the subsequent Oslo peace agreement between the PLO and Israel.⁴⁰ As a result, Hamas needed to alter its discourse and adapt to the new political realities. In this context, Hamas issued its 1993 Introductory Memorandum with the aim of redefining the movement.⁴¹ Based on interviews with Hamas founders and activists, the Introductory Memorandum marked a turning point vis-à-vis the Charter's religious vision. To explicate this, the following sections highlight six major frames within the Charter and illustrate how they were perceived and de-framed in the Introductory Memorandum and later texts.

To begin, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was framed in the 1988 Charter as a 'religious cause' between 'Muslims' and 'Jews' engaged in until the 'day of judgement'.⁴² The Introductory Memorandum refutes this explanation and states that it is instead a conflict between 'Zionists' on the one side and 'Muslims and Arabs' on the other.⁴³ The term Zionists implies a political movement and colonial project that by no means includes all Jewish people in terms of religion or identification.⁴⁴ The term 'Arabs', moreover, can include Muslims, Christians and Jews. In short, the term 'Jews' in the Charter was replaced by 'Zionists' in the Introductory Memorandum. Similarly, the terms 'Zionists' or 'Israelis' eclipsed the term 'Jews' in the 2000–7 texts. The term 'Jews' was used eighty-six times within these texts, with clear differentiations between the Jewish people and specific Jews comprising settlers and occupiers in Palestine.⁴⁵ Meanwhile, the terms 'Israelis' and 'Zionists' were used 3,053 times to frame political opposition. In a similar vein, Hamas's spiritual leader, Ahmed Yassin, explained: 'I do not fight Jews because they are Jews... if my own brother takes my home by force, I will fight him.'⁴⁶ Hamas's media spokesperson, Salah al-Bardawil, concurs that the Palestinian cause is a 'political problem' in opposition to 'Zionism'.⁴⁷

Refuting religious agency and instead defining the key drivers of the conflict as colonialism, displacement and dispossession aimed to redefine Hamas's worldview and counteract the negative impacts created by the generalized use of the term 'Jews' in the Charter.⁴⁸ Hamas has been accused by the Western media as anti-Semitic, with 'genocidal' intentions⁴⁹ and 'calls for the elimination of Jews'.⁵⁰ Despite development in Hamas's discourse noted above, the movement's retention of its founding Charter until 2017 gave credibility to such views. To counteract such views, Hamas's 2017 Document of General Principles and Policies – widely regarded as its new charter – dedicated an entire article to elaborating this point; that is, the 'conflict is with the Zionist project not with the Jews because of their religion'.⁵¹ In doing so, Hamas aimed to actively mitigate any potential negative repercussions vis-à-vis the use of the term 'Jews'. In brief, an ostensible conflict with 'Jews', as a people, is politically loaded, especially in the West. This is a result of a long history of anti-Semitic attitudes in Europe, which culminated in the Holocaust. By emphasizing opposition with Zionism, a political settler-colonial movement, rather than Judaism, a religion and ethnic identity marker, Hamas strategically attempted to reframe its discourse to focus on its struggle against settler-colonialism and occupation, as well as the Palestinian people's right to self-determination, sanctioned by international law, instead of much more problematic conceptions of an ethno-religious conflict, moreover, with potential existential connotations stemming from historical events. This updated worldview is also more inclusive and extended the movement's capacity for the mobilization of resources, both material and human.

Second, the founding Charter's mobilizing capacity was limited to practicing 'Muslims'.⁵² Later development in Hamas's words and deeds, however, highlight a distinction between internal and external forms of mobilization. Internally, membership inside Hamas is still limited to Palestinian Muslims. Religion – although not the only factor – is a basic condition of membership. Each candidate swears *bay'a* (pledge or oath) based on Islamic religion to become a member – a Muslim Brother.⁵³ Therefore, not every Palestinian can join, which essentially makes Hamas a 'movement of Muslims'. In contrast, *externally*, Hamas has politically allied itself with non-Muslims. During local council elections for Bethlehem in 2005, for example, Hamas allied itself with the local Christian leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – a left-wing faction.⁵⁴ Similarly, during legislative elections in Gaza in 2006, Hussam al-Tawil, a Christian candidate, was elected on the Hamas ticket. In doing so, Hamas aimed to emphasize itself as an inclusive movement for all Palestinians. Hamas's evolving 'inclusivity' will be further discussed below within the framework of the movement's *muqawama* discourse.

Third, the Charter's framing separated Hamas from Palestinian nationalist-secular actors grouped under the umbrella of the PLO. Any cooperation or coordination was conditioned on their abidance with Islam, since 'secular ideology' is opposed to 'religious ideology'.⁵⁵ Conversely, in the Introductory Memorandum cooperation was conditioned on the 'non-recognition' of the state of Israel and rejection of the Oslo peace accord of 1993. In the early 2000s, conditional

non-recognition was dropped when 'democratic elections' became the criteria deciding interactions and ongoing intra-Palestinian power struggles, including the potential for Hamas's integration into the PLO.⁵⁶ Hamas saw that its mobilization potential had increased, so electoral success became its prime target.

Fourth, British Mandate Palestine is framed in the Charter as 'Islamic waqf' or endowment. Thus, Hamas transfers the ownership and territorial sovereignty of the lands constituting Mandate Palestine to God, therefore, making such sovereignty perpetual and irrevocable.⁵⁷ From this perspective, 'giving up any part of the land of Palestine is tantamount to giving up part of the Faith'.⁵⁸ Qutb's approach to faith as uncompromising⁵⁹ was politically applied to counter the PLO's then tendency to accept the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 242 calling for a two-state solution based on pre-1967 borders, which would give Israel 78 per cent and the Palestinians 22 per cent of the Mandate Palestine.⁶⁰ Unable to change the PLO's position towards Israel or stop the peace process, Hamas proposed two stages of liberation without recognition of the state of Israel. Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela referred to Hamas's approach as 'short-term and long-term objectives'. The short-term objective aims to establish a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank, while the long-term objective still strives to liberate Mandate Palestine in its entirety.⁶¹ This position is a constant in Hamas's discourse and is reiterated in the 2017 Document of General Principles and Policies.⁶² Contrary to essentialist approaches which link this point to Hamas's religious orientation – that is, it represents Hamas's refusal to abandon the liberation of historic Palestine⁶³ – Hamas's phasic approach broke with the idea that the religious frame 'waqf' was totally uncompromising. In fact, the term waqf disappeared in the 2017 Document of General Principles and Policies but the principal political objective focused on the 'liberation' of Mandate Palestine did not.

Fifth, Hamas's eventual goal outlined in the Charter is the establishment of an 'Islamic state'.⁶⁴ However, after its electoral victory in 2006, Hamas did not implement the Charter as policy, but instead agreed to work within the Palestinian political system based on secular Basic Law.⁶⁵ One consequence of this 'secular' development was the decision by some members of Hamas to break away and form Jaljalat.⁶⁶ Jaljalat leaders frame Hamas leaders as 'non-Muslims' as shari'a law must be obeyed and cannot be considered a question of political convenience and be compromised by 'earthly concepts' such as democracy.⁶⁷ Strongly criticizing Jaljalat as 'deviant thinking', al-Bardawil views democracy and religion as compatible.⁶⁸ Conversely, my interviews with Jaljalat leaders emphatically revealed that they believe that it is Hamas that has deviated from the founding Charter; that is, the Charter calls for the application of shari'a, yet Hamas has failed to do so since taking power in 2006–07. Jaljalat leaders continued to draw on the same ideas as the Qutbian Charter – for instance, 'submission to God' and 'faith' – as uncompromising framework for political advancement. As a result of Hamas's notional deviation from its founding Charter, they decided to leave Hamas and join the Salafi-jihadist group, al-Qaeda, in 2008.⁶⁹ Jaljalat later pledged its loyalty to the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in 2013.

Disputes about the Qutbian Charter started among Hamas leaders in 1992 when Israel deported 415 leaders of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Marj al-Zuhur in southern Lebanon. Then Head of the Hamas Political Bureau, Mousa Abu-Marzouq, raised the need for the 'annulment of the Charter'.⁷⁰ While the anti-Charter camp failed to have it annulled, Hamas leaders agreed to issue the Introductory Memorandum. While the Introductory Memorandum aimed to redefine Hamas, it was not introduced as an alternative charter like the 2017 Document of General Principles and Policies.

Finally, in the Charter Hamas initially identified itself with other 'Islamic movements' worldwide.⁷¹ Thus, the call to action to defend Palestine was predominantly motivated in terms of religious doctrines. However, Ahmed Yousef, a member of Hamas's Political Bureau, de-frames universalism and emphasizes territorialism when he says 'We are not al-Qaida [or] ISIS [but] people defending our country, our people and looking for our own state'.⁷² By highlighting the defense of Palestine, Yousef differentiates Hamas from groups that conduct transnational armed

jihad. The last section elaborates on the relationship between jihad and the worldview Hamas currently seeks to propagate.

To sum up, the six sub-frames functioned and aimed to alter reality to conform with the frame-system of jihad. Their de-framing, in turn, disconnected jihad from its more modern features, its loci and relationships. As a result, the discursive totality turned upside down from the objective religiosity of the Qutbian Charter to subjective adaptation to sociopolitical realities by changing and transforming as necessary. Furthermore, the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000 led to Hamas's gradual adoption of the latent term *muqawama* to frame its militancy. Eventually, *muqawama* would evolve into the master frame around which Hamas reframed its discourse.

Re-framing discourse around *muqawama* after 2000

The failure of final status of Oslo peace talks between Israel and the PLO at Camp David in July 2000, and the subsequent outbreak of the Second Intifada on 28 September 2000, opened a plethora of discursive opportunities for Hamas's radical stand on armed violence. From a Palestinian standpoint, the Oslo peace process was supposed to culminate in an independent Palestinian state in 1999. However, this process divided Palestinians into non-contiguous cantons and only led to more confiscation of Palestinian land and further entrenchment of settler-colonialism, notably allowing the number of Israeli settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territories to rise to about 72 per cent, from 115,700 in 1993 to 199,700 in 2000.⁷³ In this context, a PSR Poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research shows that 52 per cent of the Palestinians supported 'armed attacks' against the Israeli army.⁷⁴ This support continued throughout the course of the Intifada and, at one point, 92 per cent of respondents were of the belief that peaceful negotiations would neither bring about an Israeli withdrawal nor the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.⁷⁵

Israel's unilateral withdrawal of settlements from Gaza for 'security' reasons⁷⁶ in September 2005 favored Hamas's approach vis-à-vis Fatah's – the leader of the PLO – approach of negotiations. The withdrawal was perceived by 84 per cent of one poll as 'victory' for armed resistance; 40 per cent attributed the 'victory' to Hamas, 21 per cent to the Palestinian Authority (PA) and only 11 per cent to Fatah.⁷⁷ Capitalizing on its burgeoning popular legitimacy, Hamas extended the conceptual boundaries of *muqawama* to include non-militant activities. Campaigns for the local and the legislative elections between 2004 and 2006⁷⁸ and subsequent Hamas governance⁷⁹ were framed as *muqawama*. In doing so, Hamas advocated indigenous reform of the democratic system detached from Oslo structures.

Rashmi Singh instead concludes that Hamas has not compromised its original religious outlook and, moreover, has managed to appropriate Palestinian national secular discourse and define it as part of Islamic parlance.⁸⁰ Active and passive forms of *muqawama* such as *sumud* (steadfastness) and *sabr* (patience) are defined within the concepts of jihad and '*mujahidun*'.⁸¹ Hamas introduced the concept of '*istishhady*' (active martyr who seeks to sacrifice himself) instead of '*shahid*' (passive martyr).⁸² Singh's argument holds true if examining Hamas from the late 1980s to the early 1990s. During this period, Hamas demanded that Palestinians conform to its religious outlook, claiming that secular nationalist frames – such as 'armed struggle' – had failed to realize Palestinian national aspirations.⁸³

Since 2000, however, the empirical evidence shows a different logic of the framing process. First, Hamas's framing is not necessarily binary in nature. Second, it shows an incremental decline of religious frames in favor of concepts of *muqawama*. In interviews with Hamas's spiritual leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, he not only associated the term *jihad*, when used, with the term *muqawama*: as in 'jihad and *muqawama*', but also employed more frequently the term *muqawama* when referring to Hamas's military actions. Yassin, furthermore, expanded the use of non-religious terminology by using expressions such as '*amaliyyat fida'iyya*' (heroic operations)⁸⁴ to describe Hamas's attacks against Israel. The term *fida'iyya* arose to describe secular-nationalist

militants from the late 1960s to 1971.⁸⁵ In fact, Hamas advanced the term ‘*amaliyyat istishhadiyya*’ (active martyr operations) in the early 1990s as part of its religious framing and its attempts to replace secular-nationalist terms. Hamas’s use of nationalist expressions like this runs counter to Singh’s argument. Nonetheless, Hamas continues to employ the term ‘*istish’hadi*’, but it is not the only term used to frame its actions.

In eighty-nine of the 2000–7 texts dated between 2001 and 2005, the use of the term *muqawama* outnumbered jihad by a ratio of ten to one (1388 against 141 times). Roughly similar ratios can be found in eighty-four of the 2000–7 texts while Hamas was in office in 2006. In 2007, the ratio was twenty-four to one (190 against eight). One notable difference is that while Hamas was in office in 2006 and 2007, the term *muqawama* appeared less frequently than during the Intifada from 2000 to 2005. This de-escalation of rhetoric took place against the backdrop of a truce with Israel, which started in 2005 until the early months of 2006 when Hamas’s major focus was the 2006 legislative elections and the formation of a national unity government.

These results undercut Khaled Hroub’s contemporaneous claims that there had been a paradigmatic shift in Hamas’s political discourse, which had resulted in a decline in ‘the weight accorded to [armed] resistance.’⁸⁶ Hroub’s analysis was based on the number of times the word ‘resistance’ appeared in Hamas’s ‘three new documents’, specifically its 2005 electoral platform, its draft program for a coalition government, and its 2006 cabinet platform. It does not, however, represent the wider scope of Hamas’s political discourse either before or after 2006. These three documents only represent Hamas’s Change and Reform party – it represented the movement in elections and, subsequently, formed government. Conversely, some branches of Hamas, such as the military wing – the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades – are not beholden to the Gazan government. Instead, it is controlled by the Political Bureau, Hamas’s highest executive body. Therefore, this article examines a much wider scope of 2000–7 texts, largely articulated by members of the Political Bureau. In this regard, Hamas official spokesperson, Sami Abu Zuhri informed me that ‘the electoral program deals with details and tools for application for the next four years [of the elected government] but does not represent Hamas in its entirety.’⁸⁷

Nathan Brown also notes that Hamas’s program of governance ‘says little of struggle and resistance’ in comparison, for instance, to ‘corruption’ and ‘rule of law.’⁸⁸ Four years later, Brown approached Hamas as a movement and a government, refuting previous claims and concluding that Hamas’s project of *muqawama* had not been marginalized either in word or in deed.⁸⁹ In doing so, Brown tacitly differentiates between Hamas as an organization, led by the Political Bureau, and Hamas as a government.

For instance, in the five speeches made by Hamas’s then head of the Political Bureau, Khaled Meshal, and his deputy, Ismail Haniyeh, during the war between Hamas and Israel in 2014, there was no mention of the word jihad at all, but there are copious mentions of the term *muqawama*. This does not, however, mean the complete demise of Hamas’s utilization of the term jihad. Given the international audience for this war, Hamas chose to avoid the use of jihad as controversial term, often laden with negative connotations in the West, in particular, due to its association with groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS. Thereby, Hamas comparatively presents itself as a more moderate actor in front of international audiences.

The evolution of Hamas’s discourse and its reframing around the concept of *muqawama* has been consistent and this became official in 2017, in contrast to the prevalence of jihad in its 1988 founding Charter. In Hamas’s new charter, A Document of General Principles and Policies of 2017, jihad was only mentioned once, and twice as ‘mujahidin’ in reference to the Prophet Muhammad’s companions without any functional framing role for either regarding opposition or cooperation. Meanwhile, *muqawama* was mentioned fifteen times and was emphasized as a holistic framework for framing and symbolic purposes.⁹⁰ The validity of a *muqawama* is not only dependent on quantifiable measures, but also on the conceptual employment *muqawama* plays in framing meanings and actions through the 2017 Document of General Principles and Policies’ forty-two articles.

Accordingly, muqawama evolved to become Hamas's master frame to frame both militant as much as political actions. Following Israel's unilateral withdrawal of settlements and its armed forces from Gaza in 2005 – an unprecedented event in the Palestinian struggle against the Israeli occupation – Hamas leaders framed the withdrawal as a result of muqawama. Khaled Meshal emphasized: 'the ability of muqawama to drive out the enemy and liberate the homelands'; 'an achievement by muqawama that cannot be reduced to Israel's choice [of withdrawal]'; and 'the withdrawal from Gaza came under pressure of muqawama'.⁹¹ Along the same lines, the then deputy head of the Political Bureau, Abu Marzuq, said, 'Muqawama is still the choice of the Palestinian people to complete the victory and liberation'.⁹² Ra'fat Nasif concurs: 'What was achieved in Gaza would not have happened without muqawama'.⁹³ Muhammed Nazzal adds, '[Israel] would not have had to think about the logic of withdrawal from Gaza, except that muqawama battled and wounded [it] strenuously'.⁹⁴

These quotations tacitly imply a military connotation for muqawama. However, Hamas extended the conceptualization of muqawama to cover its potential integration into the Palestinian political system and its electoral campaigns to include socio-economic and political objectives. According to Abu Marzuq:

To create an environment of muqawama requires solving problems in this environment. These problems are related to more than 42 per cent of the unemployed in Gaza. More than 70 per cent of the population is below the poverty level, and more than 36 per cent of families in absolute poverty.⁹⁵

The 'environment of muqawama' implies an improvement of economic standards to reinforce the Palestinians' struggle vis-à-vis the Israeli occupation. Terms like democracy, elections, reform, state building, partnership, fighting corruption, ending black-market arms, and achieving security were underpinned by references to muqawama, demonstrating pragmatic adaptability in employing multi-variant types of muqawama, including non-violent forms, per practical exigencies. This 'line of muqawama' was outlined in Hamas's electoral program for the 2006 legislative election.⁹⁶ Hamas aimed to cover a large range of problems and linked them to each other⁹⁷ by deploying the frame muqawama 'as the program that unites us all [Palestinians] and covers all issues'.⁹⁸

This program was introduced to counter Fatah's Oslo-based project, which had failed to result in an Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Palestinian Territories through peaceful negotiations. As previously observed, between 2004 and 2005 in Gaza, the symbolism of muqawama was starkly present in Hamas's campaigns. Muqawama was introduced as the appointed strategy to liberate Palestine. The backdrops to Hamas's major rallies consisted of huge posters carrying images of Hamas 'martyrs' such as Sheikh Yassin and 'Abd al-'Aziz Rantisi. Hamas's leaders were projected and observed as 'martyr projects' and 'projects of muqawama' who were not corrupt and did not seek personal gain. In contrast, Fatah leaders were portrayed as candidates who sought political positions for personal gain and financial interests.

In a society where people honor sacrifice vis-à-vis Israeli occupation, Hamas won over an important segment of the electorate.⁹⁹ Following the Israeli assassination of Sheikh Yassin and Rantisi, a PSR Poll found that support for Hamas jumped 4 per cent overall to 24 per cent in June 2004. In Gaza, Hamas polled 29 per cent to Fatah's 27 per cent.¹⁰⁰ Maintaining the line of Hamas's politics of signification, the movement's electoral victories were referred to as the 'victory of muqawama'.¹⁰¹ The Hamas government formed in March 2006 was also framed as a 'government of muqawama'.¹⁰²

Floating muqawama, 2006–present

However, the victory of Hamas's program of muqawama would be short-lived. After ascending to office in 2006, Hamas was confronted by Israel, the US and the Fatah-led PA,¹⁰³ which imposed bureaucratic, severe economic and political constraints on its government. The aim of these

constraints was to impede the new government's ability to implement its political program, to demobilize Hamas's popular support and to pave the way for its overthrow.¹⁰⁴ This subjected Palestinians, many of whom were Hamas voters, to a complex set of power relations, creating what Laclau and Mouffe referred to as a 'crisis' for the master frame of muqawama insofar as it was unable to deliver on Hamas's electoral promises. Against this backdrop, Hamas extended the boundaries of muqawama, utilizing pre-existing terms as signifiers to confront these economic and political constraints. Put differently, Hamas framed political constraints placed on its government as a form of muqawama. Abu Marzuq, for instance, tied the concept of sumud, or steadfastness, with the idea of muqawama as follows:

Our choice is the sumud in the face of all these constraints within the framework of the program of muqawama as a comprehensive concept, which believes that the restoration of what was destroyed by the occupation is assigned to a program of muqawama and sumud until the recovery of Palestinian rights.¹⁰⁵

The proffered signifier sumud exhorted Palestinians to both tolerate and confront the severe economic measures imposed on them, with Hamas aiming to externalize responsibility for the incongruence between its promises to the electorate and subsequent outcomes. The use of sumud is one example of Hamas extending the notion of muqawama beyond both armed and civil actions, thereby transforming resistance into a floating signifier. Put differently, muqawama is dematerialized to explain Hamas's inability to take actions and meet its promises. In doing so, Hamas sustained the hegemonic character of the master frame of muqawama and prevented a break in the discourse, thus avoiding discursive inconsistency.

Head of the Palestinian parliament and Hamas leader, 'Aziz Dweik, framed Palestinians, suffering from the constraints, as 'people of muqawama', 'people of sumud' and 'people of sabr (patience)'.¹⁰⁶ 'The tunnel economy',¹⁰⁷ which Hamas constructed under the border between Gaza and Egypt to mitigate economic pressures, was in turn framed as the 'economy of muqawama'.¹⁰⁸ Thus, in this case, muqawama constitutes the provision of services and resources, on the one hand, and a symbolic meaning representing Palestinians, on the other.

The transformation of muqawama into a floating master frame was also employed to mitigate the fall-out vis-à-vis severe conditions in the Gaza Strip, for instance, Hamas's multiple wars with Israel and governmental authoritarianism after its military take-over of Gaza in June 2007. Despite the loss of life and material damage resulting from Israel's 50-day war on Gaza in 2014, Haniyeh framed the cease-fire between Hamas and Israel as a 'victory of muqawama'. He described all Palestinians in Gaza as muqawama: 'the militants in the tunnels are muqawama, and the people staying in their homes are muqawama... [and] *muqawimun* [persons of muqawama]'.¹⁰⁹ Muqawimun is used by Haniyeh to denote all Palestinians in contrast to 'mujahidun' as emphasized in work of Singh. Meanwhile, Haniyeh donned a Palestinian keffiyeh and waved the Palestinian flag, despite the fact that participants in the rally mainly comprised Hamas supporters. By introducing national symbols and associating these with the concept of muqawama, Haniyeh attempted to transcend the Palestinian national divides and present resistance, and therefore Hamas, as a representation of the Palestinian people.

The use of the intersubjective concept of muqawama was employed to foster a unified collective identity, a totality that Hamas identified as a society of muqawimun rather than a society of mujahidun stipulated in the founding Charter. Hamas employed the floating signifier muqawimun in an attempt to create a homogeneous totality promoting Palestinian collective identity, yet derived from heterogeneous terms and divergent Palestinian contexts. Thus, the deaths of thousands of Gazans in wars were given meaning through muqawama, sumud and sabr, therefore making such deaths more comprehensible and harder to protest.

Furthermore, Hamas's repression of opponents in Gaza are also framed within the concept of muqawama. Despite Hamas's excessive use of force, which claimed the lives of dozens of

civilians during its military take-over of Gaza,¹¹⁰ and the subsequent deployment of force and censorship against its opponents,¹¹¹ Haniyeh framed these actions as proactive and necessary to 'protect the program of muqawama'.¹¹² Then speaker of the Hamas government, Ghazi Hamad, justified these actions, in a personal interview, as 'proactive measures' to counter a coup planned against the Hamas government by the Fatah-led PA.¹¹³ Thus, Hamas's exercise of power is justified as a form of resistance against the PA, because the PA maintains security coordination with Israel. Hamas proposes 'muqawama as the opposite program for security coordination' to justify its repression of political opponents, even those who are not necessarily engaged in security coordination with Israel. In doing so, Hamas is attempting to utilize the resonance Gazans feel for the notion of muqawama to rally support for its actions. Indeed, Tareq Baconi notes that while there have been critiques against Hamas rule in Gaza, and its authoritarianism in particular there is solidarity around the idea of resistance.¹¹⁴

To sum up, Hamas's muqawama cannot be reduced to 'the doctrine of constant combat', 'persistent warfare'¹¹⁵ or 'religious doctrine'.¹¹⁶ Muqawama not only provides legitimacy for the fight against Israeli occupation, but it also employed it to include non-violent activities as well as justify authoritarian practices that favor loyalists and repress opponents.

This section contextualized and explained 'how' muqawama replaced jihad as the master frame underpinning Hamas's political discourse. The following section addresses 'why' this discursive transformation occurred.

Mobilizing power of muqawama v. exclusive jihad

The previous analysis raises a key question: if jihad and muqawama are not limited to military actions and both are intended to encompass militant and civil activities, then why did Hamas specifically switch its master frame from jihad to muqawama? Before addressing this question, it is important to explore the term jihad further and how it fits in Hamas's religious-political ideology. First, it is imperative to note that why, when and how to carry out jihad differs from one Muslim scholar to another (i.e. among the *ulama*), let alone how the concept is interpreted and applied by different Islamic actors. Initially an outgrowth of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, however, has its own interpretation vis-à-vis the concept of jihad and how it should be employed within the context of the Palestine-Israel conflict.

According to some Islamic scholars, jihad can function as the master frame of military actions in a manner similar to how certain texts translate the term as 'holy war'.¹¹⁷ The Salafist scholar, Said al-Qahtani, for instance, defines jihad as 'the effort of Muslims to fight infidels, warriors, apostates and the like; to uphold the word of God' and to spread the message of Islam.¹¹⁸ From this perspective, jihad is more than self-defense against oppressors, but a universal concept regarding proselytization. In contrast, Hamas's jihad is neither limited to military action nor is it considered offensive in nature. Influential Muslim theologian, Yusuf Qaradawi, a prominent figure within the Muslim Brotherhood, specifically distinguishes the word *qital* (fight) from jihad in the Quran. Qaradawi states that jihad does not necessarily indicate fighting, citing the chronological revelation of the Quran.¹¹⁹ Jihad is repeatedly mentioned in the '*makkiyya* [adjective of Mecca] suras' in the Quran which were revealed between 610 and 622 AD. These revelations occurred before the forced migration (*hijra*) of the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina where he lived until his death in 632. Islamic precepts during this period (610–622) prohibited fighting. The first verses related to fighting and violence were revealed in '*madaniyya* [adjective of Medina] suras': 'They [the believers] yuqatilun [fight] in the cause of Allah, so they kill and are killed'.¹²⁰

Qaradawi's contentions hold true; indeed, jihad is mentioned forty-one times in the Quran, but it is not specifically used in reference to military actions. For instance, in the verse 'the ones who... *jahadu*... with their wealth and their lives',¹²¹ the verb '*jahadu*' refers to passive

personal sacrifice that does not relate to employing violence, but to economic sacrifice linked to Islamic precepts of *ihsan* (charity), *zakat* (alms-giving) and *sadaqa* (donations).

Nonetheless, Qaradawi argues there are two types of jihad: 'civil' and 'military'. The civil type refers to a spiritual struggle comprising a wealth of relevant fields, including socio-economic, scientific, educational, medical and environmental areas. The military struggle is limited to enemies who attack Muslims by force, meaning that military jihad is limited to 'self-defense'.¹²² Qaradawi's interpretation of self-defense jihad concurs with Rashid Ghannouchi, leader of the Ennahda Party in Tunisia – a Muslim Brotherhood movement – who highlights that other kinds of military action have no legitimacy. Militant jihad is only legitimate when directed against the occupiers of Muslim land.¹²³ Hamas's concept of jihad in its founding Charter fall within the framework set by al-Qaradawi and Ghanouchi.¹²⁴ Accordingly, it is possible to claim that mujahidun are not necessary muqatilun (fighters) – as suggested by Singh – but rather the equivalents to muqawimun in Haniyeh's 2014 definition, thereby incorporating both militants and civilians. If this is the case, it further reiterates the same question: why did Hamas substitute the term mujahidun (or jihad) for muqawimun (or muqawama) when neither necessarily signifies military action and both can function as floating signifiers framing an unlimited range of actions and subjects? Building on the hypotheses of framing theory, muqawama in comparison to jihad functions as a resonant master frame which is flexible, territorially bounded, and has an inclusive worldview.

Jihad is a controversial and inflexible concept that brings disagreements and an exclusive worldview. Despite Hamas's 'moderate' theological approach confining armed jihad to self-defense and the movement's insistence that its military jihad is limited to Mandate Palestine, it is largely understood, mainly in the West, as 'holy war' against an 'open enemy'.¹²⁵ This understanding is not limited to 'al-Qaeda and ISIS', on the one hand, and 'Islamophobes', on the other,¹²⁶ but it also includes contexts where people suffered from violence in the name of jihad. After the September 11 attacks, for example, it is difficult for the term jihad to be understood worldwide as a universal way 'to improve yourself and to improve all humanity'.¹²⁷ Mobilizing an inclusive worldview demands that the social group should not endeavor to change discursive hegemonic realities but rather adapt and change its framing processes and master frame to align with reality.¹²⁸ Accordingly, one can understand why Hamas chose to substitute jihad for muqawama instead of trying to convince the world of 'true jihad' within the context of 'true Islam', just as the leftist movement in Chile during the 1980s did not seek to convince the public of 'class struggle' but rather employed the master frame 'democracy' to mobilize the public.¹²⁹ Thus, the effectiveness of the master frame depends on the extent to which the values and ideas associated with the movement's frames resonate with the intended targets of mobilization.¹³⁰

Muqawama, by comparison, is sufficiently broad in its interpretive scope, inclusiveness, and cultural resonance. Thus, it serves both Hamas's internal mobilization needs vis-à-vis Palestinians and the propagation of a more inclusive worldview for external consumption. Internally, muqawama aims to create moral and political domination and to bring about social change in Palestine in favor of Hamas. The idea of resistance resonates among the Palestinian population and incorporates current social struggles extending beyond ideological and religious affiliations. As a non-religious and inclusive concept, muqawama invites, using Antonio Gramsci's terms, 'spontaneous consent' – that is, Hamas moved away from the religious vision of the Charter's 'political ideas' and promoted 'general views' and 'common sense' as sources of public consent in an arena where Palestinian groups, from different political ideologies, contest hegemonic ideas.¹³¹

Externally, the term muqawama ascribes legitimacy to Hamas's actions, including military activities. The concept of armed muqawama is endowed with political and legal weight. The right to armed muqawama is implicitly defined within notions of national self-determination with a defined territory, in this case the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Hamas asserts, moreover, that 'muqawama is protected by the Geneva convention',¹³² thereby highlighting a legal basis for its struggle against Israeli occupation. To this end, Hamas aims to expand its

geopolitical discourse to include Arabs and Muslims and 'the freemen in Latin America, Africa and Europe'¹³³ by linking the Palestinian cause to anti-colonialism and universal ideas of self-determination as enshrined in the UN Charter. In this regard, Hamas adopts an open, tolerant and inclusive worldview in contrast to the closed, religiously exclusive, prism of jihad.

In doing so, Hamas draws a clear distinction between its muqawama and the armed jihad of other Islamic groups, whether the goals of these groups are territorial like Palestinian Islamic Jihad or extra-territorial like al-Qaeda and ISIS. In this context, one can understand why Hamas's top leaders during July-August 2014 war (Operation Protective Edge), Meshal and Haniyeh, avoided the use of the term jihad. Hamas justifies its use of violence thus: 'Our muqawama is only on the land of Palestine and our policy is not to fight cross-border.'¹³⁴ Such a statement would have very different mobilization effects and propagate a wildly divergent worldview, if the term muqawama was replaced by jihad, even though Hamas's military jihad carried the same geographical context and has never been used outside Mandate Palestine.¹³⁵

While muqawama is a legitimately recognized secular term however, it does not violate Hamas's moral and religious underpinnings. In fact, it helps Hamas free its discursive framing and broaden the scope of its discourse to appeal to a wider audience. It should therefore come as no surprise that officially Hamas no longer defines itself as a 'jihadist movement',¹³⁶ as stated in the 1988 Charter and the 1993 Introductory Memorandum, but a 'muqawama movement',¹³⁷ as stipulated in the 2017 Document of General Principles and Policies.

Conclusion

This article has investigated how and why the master frames of Hamas's political discourse were changed from religious terms, such as jihad, in favor of muqawama, arguing that this was driven by Hamas's increased mobilization needs and its evolving worldview. As such, muqawama evolved into a holistic framework for Hamas's words and action. While religion still has strong presence in Hamas discourse, it no longer functions as it once did, that is, as the master frame justifying the movement's words and actions. In Weberian terms, Hamas's discourse has become 'disenchanted'¹³⁸ – that is, while calls to action still require values and ideals to be realised, religion has lost its central role in explaining or justifying Hamas's actions.

Hamas's previous religious framing produced rigid mythologies without flexible boundaries to rationalize its production. Now, Hamas discourses of muqawama produce myths using full pragmatic awareness, relating them to civic life, and taking into account intersubjective and changing realities. The term muqawama was first introduced in 1987, reintroduced in 2000 to frame Hamas's militancy and then evolved to frame Hamas civic actions as well. Muqawama now forms the cornerstone of Hamas's political discourse to new strategic collective actions. In 2018, Hamas proposed the term 'popular muqawama' to frame its attempts to end the siege on Gaza through mass popular protests dubbed the 'Great March of Return'. In this case, Hamas adapted the mobilizing resonance of muqawama to frame such forms of civic non-militant action.

Taking mobilization as an analytical concept, therefore, the logical relations of Hamas's discourse become contingent transformations. In brief, the discourses of the master frame of muqawama are not fixed but subject to transformation and potential replacement. Put differently, it is possible to claim that Hamas's discourse has matured with relation to its mobilization strategies and the evolution of its worldview, but it remains far from stable: the discourse and its master frames are subject to change, reproduction and displacement. De-framing and reframing, therefore, are continuous processes aimed at mobilizing support for Hamas. For now, muqawama possesses a history that provides Hamas's discursive formation with meaning and value, which resonates with the wider Palestinian population and provides the movement legitimacy.

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Appendix of 2000-7 Texts: Hamas Leaders' Interviews and Speeches

The data in this Appendix is downloaded from the Palestinian Information Center (PIC), Hamas's major and biggest electronic webpage (<https://www.palinfo.com/site/pic/>). It is organized chronologically from the most recent. I translated the title of each discourse provided by the PIC for two reasons. First, titles can connect the reader with the information provided in this article. Second, readers who cannot read Arabic can search certain data through the translated title. However, sometimes I did not provide a title when it was just a repetition of the information provided, such as 'An exclusive interview with Hamas Head of Political Bureau Khaled Meshal by the Palestinian Information Center'.

Between 2006 and 2007

Name	Interviewer, Speech or Press Conference, and the title or the subject provided by the PIC – when available	Place and Date
Al-Takroui, Nawwaf	PIC interview: 'On the new Palestinian developments and the situation of the Palestinian [refugees] in Syria.'	Damascus, 26 August 2007
Al-Ashqar, Osama	PIC interview: 'On the situation of the Palestinian culture and the role of the intellectual.'	Damascus, 18 August 2007
Al-Mzeini, Osama	PIC interview: 'We warn Abbas of the US money and call upon the return to the embrace of the people.'	Gaza, 11 August 2007
Al-Bardawil, Salah	PIC interview: 'Abbas empowers himself by the American-Zionist Agenda.'	Gaza, 5 August 2007
Mousa, Yahya	PIC interview: 'We are moving forward and are optimistic about the future ... and [political] bets [that Hamas make concessions] will fail.'	Gaza, 31 July 2007
Hamami, Ibrahim	PIC interview.	London, 20 July 2007
Al-Aga, Muhammed	PIC interview: 'The government's keenness on dialogue is confronted by Abbas's [the Palestinian president] rejectionism, he does not give importance for the suffering of the people.'	Gaza, 14 July 2007
Naser, Muhammed	PIC interview: 'We are partners in the Palestinian legitimacy which is not restricted to one party [i.e., Fatah].'	Tehran, 14 July 2007
Nazzal, Muhammed	PIC interview.	Damascus, 8 July 2007
Abu Marzuq, Mousa	PIC interview: 'The security palace [of the PA] was a palace from papers... There is no way in front of Abbas but dialogue.'	Damascus, 2 July 2007
Siyam, Said	PIC interview.	Gaza, 30 June 2007
Haniyeh, Ismail	PIC interview.	Gaza, 17 June 2007
AL-Zahar, Mahmud	PIC interview: 'Security has returned to Gaza and the information and dangerous documents [The documents that Hamas confiscated after the military take-over of Gaza in July 2007] have not yet been published.'	Gaza, 24 June 2007
Khater, Sami	PIC interview: 'We are pushed to <i>al-hasem</i> [i.e., the military take-over of Gaza] after Gaza has become an intolerable living hell.'	Damascus, 24 June 2007
Murra, Rafat	PIC interview: 'The crisis in Nahr al-Bared [a Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon] on the verge of serious complications if it continues.'	Tripoli, 17 June 2007
Bahar, Ahmed	PIC interview: 'The Arab states should boycott the occupation state [i.e., Israel] as a support for Jerusalem and Palestine.'	Gaza, 9 June 2007
Al-Rasheq, Ezat	PIC interview: "'Naksa" [Israel's defeat of Arab countries in 1967] was similar to "Nakba" and factors of victory has become more entrenched.'	Damascus, 10 June 2007
Al-Halaiqa, Samira	PIC interview: 'The success of the [Israeli] occupation in controlling is backing down years ago.'	Hebron, 4 June 2007
Hamdan, Osama	PIC interview.	Beirut, 26 May 2007
Abu Marzuq, Mousa	PIC interview: ' <i>Muqawama</i> is the first crane and the base in order to dismantle the Zionist project.'	Damascus, 20 May 2007
Abu Marzuq, Mousa	PIC interview: 'Mecca agreement [that led to a national unity government in March 2007] is a national achievement and an important turning point in the contemporary Palestinian history.'	Damascus, 17 February 2007
Siyam, Said	PIC interview.	Gaza, 31 December 2006
Abu Marzuq, Mosa	PIC interview: 'The call for early elections is an invitation to falsify the will of the Palestinian people.'	Damascus, 14 September 2006
Haniyeh, Ismail	PIC interview, 'On the achievements of Haniyeh's external trip'	Gaza, 09 September 2006

Siyam, Said	PIC interview.	Gaza, 23 October 2006
Siyam, Said	PIC interview: 'We will not be abided by [former agreements between PLO and Israel] except with what will serve the interests of the Palestinian people.'	Tehran, 13 October 2006
Hamdan, Osama	PIC interview.	Lebanon, 4 October 2006
Nazzal, Muhammed	Interview by the Kuwaiti <i>al-Qabas</i> Newspaper.	25 September 2006
Abu Marzuq, Mosa	PIC interview.	Damascus, 14 September 2006
Al-Khudari, Jamal Naji	Newsletter.	4 September 2006
Abu-Zuhri, Sami	A communique in a press conference.	Gaza, 2 September 2006
Dweik, Aziz	A letter: 'From his Zionist cell to the sons of his indefatigable people'	30 August 2006
Haniyeh, Ismail	Friday's ceremony at Sheikh Radwan area [in northern Gaza].	22 July 2006
Bahar, Ahmed	PIC interview: 'The kidnapping of Dr. Dweik, the ministers, and MPs is a Zionist terrorist crime that aimed at humiliating the Palestinian people and punishing them for their democratic choice.'	Gaza, 19 August 2006
Khreisha, Hasan	PIC interview: 'The abduction of ministers and deputies is piracy and political blackmail.'	Tulkarem, 17 August 2006
Meshal, Khaled	Press conference: 'On the latest developments in the Palestinian arena.'	12 July 2006
Al-Mzeini, Osama	PIC interview.	Gaza, 8 July 2006
Haniyeh, Ismail	Speech in the Palestinian Center for Human Rights: 'The government and the Human Rights agenda.'	Gaza, 21 June 2006
Said, Khaled	PIC interview: 'Everyone should confront [the ones] who would undermine the security of the homeland.'	Jenin, 17 June 2006
Siyam, Said	PIC interview: 'The real threat to internal security is the [Israeli] occupation and its agents, collaborators and some others who have private agendas.'	Gaza, 5 June 2006
Haniyeh, Ismail	PIC interview.	Gaza, 4 June 2006
Nazza, Muhammed	Speech: 'At the Lebanese Islamic Jamma Festival for the support of the Palestinian people.'	05 June 2006
Hanieh, Islami	Quotes from Haniyeh's Friday Khutba at al-Emari Mosque [in Gaza City].	Gaza, 2 June 2006
Rizqa Yousef	Speech at the Palestinian Legislative Council.	Gaza, 31 May 2006
Kabha, Wasfi	Speech.	28 May 2006
Aziz, Dweik	Speech at the Palestinian National Dialogue Conference.	27 May 2006
Edwan, Atef	PIC interview: 'Our goal is to alleviate the suffering of refugees and the protection of the right of return.'	Damascus, 25 May 2006
Abu Marzuq, Mousa	Interview by al-Jamal Website: 'The American administration is not fate.'	25 May 2006
Haniyeh, Ismail	Speech at the Palestinian National Dialogue Conference.	Gaza, 25 May 2006
Siyam, Said	PIC interview.	Damascus, 24 May 2006
Turkman, Fakhri	PIC interview: 'Our people will not kneel and will not go hungry.'	Jenin, 21 May 2006
Siyam, Said	A decree on the start of the work of the executive committees.	Gaza, 18 May 2006
Saleh, Miriam	PIC interview: 'The financial crisis experienced by the Palestinian people is the product of an unjust decision ... This crisis began to disintegrate.'	Nablus, 17 May 2006
Haniyeh, Ismail	Speech at the commemoration of al-Nakba Day at Rafah City.	Gaza, 17 May 2006
Meshal, Khlaed	Speech at the meeting with scholars and merchants in Damascus.	Damascus, 16 May 2006
Haniyeh, Ismail	Speech at the conference on the right of return	Gaza, 13 May 2006
Haniyeh, Islami	Telephone intervention at the conference of Muslim jurists in Doha.	11 May 2006
Meshal, Khaled	A telephone conversation with the fleeing Palestinian Arab families from Iraq to the Syrian territory.	9 May 2006
AL-Zahar, Mahmud	Press Conference about his trip in Arab countries.	Gaza, 8 May 2006
Abu Marzuq, Mousa	Speech at the 17 th Arab National Congress in Casablanca.	6 May 2006
Al-Madhoun, Muhammed	PIC interview.	Gaza, 2 May 2006
Meshal, Khaled	Speech at a seminar: 'The Islamic unity to bridge the gap between the sects.'	Damascus, 3 May 2006
Abu Marzuq, Mousa	Interview by al-Sabil: 'If the situation of the government contradicts <i>muqawama</i> then <i>muqawama</i> will be the choice.'	1 May 2006
Dweik, Aziz	Speech at solidarity festival with prisoners at al-Jalazon refugees camp [in Ramallah/ The west Bank].	Ramallah, 28 April 2006

Meshal, Khaled	'Speech at the commemoration of the martyrdom of the two leaders: Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and Dr. Abdel Aziz Rantisi.'	23 April 2006
Al-Zahar, Mahmud	Press conference.	Damascus, 20 April 2006
Abu Marzuq, Mousa	Speech.	18 April 2006
Haniyeh, Ismail	Press conference.	Gaza, 9 April 2006
Al-Zahar, Mahmud	Interview by Alarabiya Satellite TV.	8 April 2006
Abu Marzuq, Mousa	PIC interview: 'Where is the PLO? [It is] kidnapped and killed.'	Damascus, 4 April 2006
Dweik, Aziz	Press conference.	2 April 2006
Meshal, Khaled	Speech at the 4 th Arab conference to support muqawama.	Beirut, 30 March 2006
Haniyeh, Ismail	Speech at the Palestinian Legislative Council.	28 March 2006
Haniyeh, Ismail	Speech: at the Palestinian Legislative Council.	27 March 2006
Meshal, Khaled	Speech at the solidarity festival for the support of Hamas movement.	Sanaa, 23 March 2006
Meshal, Khaled	Press conference.	Manama, 23 March 2006
Al-Tal, Muhammed	PIC interview.	Jerusalem, 21 March 2006
Meshal, Khaled	Interview by al-Bahrain satellite TV.	Manama, 21 March 2006
Meshal, Khaled	Interview by the Lebanese TV News.	Beirut, 19 March 2006
Haniyeh, Ismail	Press conference.	Gaza 18 March 2006
Meshal, Khaled	Speech at the Arab Cultural Centre.	Damascus, 18 March 2006
Al-Zbun, Anwar	PIC interview: 'Hamas is able to form a government [alone] but prefers the participation of every party.'	14 March 2006
Haniyeh, Ismail	Interview by Aljazeera satellite TV.	13 March 2006
Haniyeh, Ismail	PIC interview: 'The political program of the government stems from Hamas's electoral program.'	Gaza, 14 March 2006
Haniyeh, Ismail	Interview by Alarabiya satellite TV.	11 March 2006
Meshal, Khaled	Interview by Alarabiya satellite TV.	6 March 2006
Abu Obeida	PIC interview.	6 March 2006
Meshal, Khaled	Press conference.	Moscow, 2 March 2006
Abu Marzuq, Mousa	PIC interview.	2 March 2006
Abu Teir, Muhammed	PIC interview.	Ramallah, 2 March 2006
Dweik, Aziz	Interview by Aljazeera satellite TV.	25 February 2006
Abu-Zuhri, Sami	PIC interview.	Gaza, 25 February 2006
Meshal, Khaled	PIC interview.	Tehran, 23 February 2006
Al-Masri, Mushir	PIC interview.	Gaza, 22 February 2006
Dweik, Aziz	PIC interview.	Ramallah, 21 February 2006
Dweik, Aziz	Interview by Alarabiya Satellite TV.	20 February 2006
Meshal, Khaled	Interview by al-Ahram al-Arabi: 'After the formation of the government next step is to activate the PLO.'	18 February 2006
Siyam, Said	PIC interview.	16 February 2006
Meshal, Khaled	PIC interview: 'Hamas is open for dialogue with everyone, but the only obstacle is the Israeli occupation.'	Moscow, 14 February 2006
Meshal, Khaled	Speech at a podium in Doha.	Doha, 13 February 2006
Meshal, Khaled	Speech at the headquarters of the Egyptian Journalists Syndicate.	Cairo, 9 February 2006
Farhat, Marian	PIC interview.	Gaza, 2 February 2006
Al-Zahar, Mahmud	PIC interview.	Gaza, 15 January 2006
Nazzal, Muhammed	Speech at the 10 th anniversary of the commemoration of the Martyr Engineer Yahya Ayyash.	Beirut, 6 January 2006
Meshal, Khaled	Speech at Hamas's 18 th anniversary.	Damascus, 2 January 2006

Between 2000 and 2005

Meshal, Khaled	Interview by al-Manar Satellite TV.	25 December 2005
Meshal, Khaled	Interview by the radio station Sawt al-Aqsa in Gaza.	24 December 2005
Siyam, Said	Interview by al-Sabil.	19 December 2005
Asfour, Adnan	PIC Interview.	Nablus, 3 December 2005
Issa, Abdel Nasser	PIC Interview.	Nablus, 13 December 2005
Nasif, Raafat	PIC Interview: 'On the current Palestinian scene.'	Nablus, 22 October 2005
Tawil, Jamal	PIC Interview: 'Extension of [Israel's] administrative detention or deportation from home.'	Ramallah, 18 October 2005
Khaled, Meshal	Speech broadcast by radio station Sawt al-Aqsa in Gaza on the occasion of the Month of Ramadan.	14 October 2005
Osama, Hamdan	PIC Interview: 'We agreed to protect the right of return and to ensure stability and peace in Lebanon.'	Beirut, 10 October 2005
Mansour, Yasser	PIC Interview.	Nablus, 5 October 2005
Nazzal, Mohammed	Speech at Hamas's festival for the commemoration of the fifth anniversary of al-Aqsa Intifada.	2 October 2005
Abu Marzuq, Moussa	Lecture at the Arab Cultural Centre – Damascus: 'What is next after the [Israeli] withdrawal from Gaza.'	17 September 2005
Hamdan, Osama	Speech by Mr. Osama Hamdan on the commemoration of the Isra and Mi'raj [Prophet Muhammad's Night Journey] as well as the burning down of al-Aqsa Mosque.	Beirut, 27 August 2005
Abu Marzuq, Moussa	PIC Interview after the meeting with the PA Prime Minister.	Damascus, 22 August 2005
Meshal, Khaled	Speech and a press conference: 'On the start of the [Israeli] withdrawal from Gaza.'	20 August 2005
Meshal, Khaled	Interview by al-Sabil Newspaper: 'Our people made the victory in Gaza and Hamas's weapons will only be directed to the chests of the occupiers.'	Beirut, 20 August 2005
Khater, Sami	Interview by Falastin al-Muslemah journal: 'We are committed to muqawama...'	11 August 2005
Haniyeh, Ismail	A written letter: 'Questions before the Zionist withdrawal [from Gaza]? Muqawama and sumud are behind the "Israeli" withdrawal and the withdrawal must be comprehensive.'	Gaza, 3 August 2005
Asfour, Adnan	A written letter from prison: 'Is Hamas seeking to claim power through a military coup?'	1 August 2005
Al-Zahar, Mahmud	Press conference: 'What happened in Rafah is a real falsification of the will of the Palestinian public.'	Gaza, 20 May 2005
The Family of Abdel-Aziz Rantisi	PIC interview: 'Am Mohammed opens a book of beautiful memories of the family of the lion of Palestine, Rantissi.'	17 April 2005
Khatib, Kamal	PIC interview: 'Sunday will be the day of support for al-Aqsa mosque...'	6 April 2005
Meshal, Khaled	Speech at the founding conference for the international campaign to resist.	Doha, 19 March 2005
Mohammed Ghazal	PIC interview: 'We cannot judge on the results of Sharm el-Sheikh summit before meeting with Abu Mazen [Mahmud Abbas].'	Nablus, 12 January 2005
Nazzal, Muhammed	'Speech at the festival for the commemoration of the Martyrdom of the engineer Yahya Aiash.'	7 January 2005
Nazzal, Muhammed	'Speech at the popular conference for resisting Zionist normalization at the [Arab] Gulf.'	Doha, 27 December 2004
Yousef, Hassan	PIC interview: 'The priority is to resist the occupation and we should not get caught up in decorative things.'	23 November 2004
Meshal, Khaled	A press statement by Khaled Meshal, head of Hamas's political bureau on the death of Abu Ammar [Yasser Arafat] and the entitlements of the current situation.	Ramallah, 22 November 2004
Meshal, Khaled	'Press conference on the death of Abu Ammar [Yasser Arafat] and the requirements of the current situation.'	20 November 2004
Siyam, Said	Speech: 'Withdraw [your] pretexts... against <i>muqawama</i> .'	11 October 2004
Abu Marzuq, Mousa	PIC interview: 'Our Weapons are for defending ourselves, our land and our holy places.'	9 October 2004
Al-Zahar, Mahoud	PIC interview: 'The achievements of the blessed Al-Aqsa [the Second] Intifada are historic achievements.'	3 October 2004
Abu Marzuq	'Speech at the commemoration of the martyr Izz ad-Din Sheikh Khalil.'	Damascus, 1 October 2004

Ismail Haniyeh	Interview by Quds Press: '[Israel's policy of] assassinations must strengthen dialogue to reach a united Palestinian front: we will not stand with Arafat against Dahlan or vice versa...'	21 August 2004
Nazzal, Muhammed	PIC interview.	16 August 2004
Al-Zahar, Mahmud	PIC interview.	12 August 2004
Meshal, Khaled	Interview by Islam Online: 'Reform must be financially, militarily and politically inclusive and the monopoly over the Palestinian decision must be stopped.'	Beirut, 1 August 2004
Meshal, Khaled	Interview by <i>al-Hayat</i> newspaper: 'Personal interests are behind the reform movement and we must not overlap with the project of excluding Arafat.'	Beirut, 28 July 2004
Haniyeh, Ismail	Speech: 'Reform in the context of injuries.'	19 July 2004
Haniyeh, Ismail	Speech: 'The national Syndrome.'	17 July 2004
Al-Zahar, Mahmud	PIC interview: 'Elections are the determining factor on the management of the Gaza Strip after the Zionist withdrawal.'	Gaza, 15 June 2004
Haniyeh, Ismail	PIC Interview: 'The withdrawal plan [from Gaza] is a big trick but Hamas is too big to be marginalised.'	10 June 2004
Nazzal, Muhammed	Speech at the Third Conference of Jerusalem Foundation	Beirut, 6 May 2004
Haniyeh, Ismail	PIC Interview: 'Hamas has so many leaders and our operations are defined in the context of liberalisation but are not subject to reaction or revenge.'	Gaza, 20 April 2004
Meshal, Khaled	PIC Interview.	10 April 2004
Nazzal, Muhammed	PIC Interview: 'There is no absence of the leader inside Hamas movement.'	27 March 2004
Meshal, Khaled	Interview by Quds Press: ' <i>Muqawama</i> made the protection of settlements such as Netzarim more costly than Dimona reactor [officially, The Negev Nuclear Research Center].'	19 February 2004
Siyam, Said	PIC interview: 'Liberating the prisoners is a priority in our program.'	Gaza, 12 February 2004
Hamdan, Osama	PIC Interview.	27 January 2004
Yassin, Ahmed	PIC interview: 'Sheikh Ahmed Yassin puts the points on the letters.'	Gaza, 16 January 2004
Mohammed	PIC interview: 'Nazzal comments on the truce, the position from the PLO, and the Iraqi <i>muqawama</i> .'	5 January 2004
Nazzal	PIC interview: 'Hamas will not recognize the Zionist entity and the <i>muqawama</i> is using appropriate tactics for each stage...'	Gaza, 23 December 2003
Haniyeh, Ismail	PIC interview: 'In the last interview before his arrest.'	Nablus, 21 December 2003
Asfour, Adnan	'Speech at the festival of Hamas 16 th anniversary.'	Beirut, 21 December 2003
Meshal, Khaled	'Speech in the popular march of Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp in Lebanon in 16 th anniversary of Hamas.'	Beirut, 15 December 2003
Nazzal, Mohammed	Interview by <i>al-Hayat</i> newspaper, episode 7.	10 December 2003
Meshal, Khaled	Interview by <i>al-Hayat</i> newspaper, episode 6.	9 December 2003
Meshal, Khaled	Interview by <i>al-Hayat</i> newspaper, episode 5.	8 December 2003
Meshal, Khaled	Interview by <i>al-Hayat</i> newspaper, episode 4.	7 December 2003
Meshal, Khaled	Interview by <i>al-Hayat</i> newspaper, episode 3.	6 December 2003
Meshal, Khaled	Interview by <i>al-Hayat</i> newspaper, episode 2.	5 December 2003
Meshal, Khaled	Interview by <i>al-Hayat</i> newspaper, episode 1.	4 December 2003
Haniyeh, Ismail	Interview by <i>al-Haqaeq al-landaniyyah</i> : 'Hamas would consider a truce when the Zionist aggression fully stops...'	27 November 2003
Rantisi, Abdel-Aziz	Interview by <i>al-Sabil</i> newspaper: 'We are ready to avoid [targeting Israeli] "civilians" if the enemy stops targeting Palestinian civilians.'	23 November 2003
Meshal, Khaled	Interview by <i>al-Rayah al-Qatariyyah</i> Newspaper.	16 November 2003
Yassin, Ahmed	PIC Interview: 'On the 4 th anniversary of [the Second] Intifada.'	Gaza, 26 September 2003
Al-Zahar, Mahmud	PIC Interview: 'After surviving an assassination attempt.'	Gaza, 11 September 2003
Haniyeh, Ismail	PIC Interview: 'After surviving a Zionist assassination attempt.'	8 September 2003
Yassin, Ahmed	Interview by the Saudi <i>al-Watan</i> Newspaper: 'We will implement the law ourselves if the Authority [the PA] does not act against [Palestinian] collaborators [with Israel]'	Gaza, 6 September 2003
Meshal, Khaled	Interview by Al Jazeera satellite TV: 'Khaled Meshal talks about Hamas's relations with the PA.'	30 August 2003
al-Zahar, Mahmud	Interview by <i>al-Bayan</i> : 'The Zionist entity considered the truce as a surrender ... our options are open to respond to its aggressions.'	Gaza, 30 August 2003

Yassin, Ahmed	Interview by the Jordanian <i>al-Sabil</i> : 'The martyrdom of Abu Shanab is a big gain for Hamas...'	Gaza, 28 August 2003
Asfour, Adnan	Speech at Jerusalem Festival: 'The longing of the prisoners and the ascendance of the martyrs.'	10 August 2003
Hamdan, Osama	PIC interview: 'Illegal [black market] weapons are the ones used to confront the <i>muqawama</i> , and dialogue is still there.'	14 June 2003
Nassif, Raafat	PIC interview.	Tulkarem, 8 June 2003
Yassin, Ahmed	PIC interview: 'The Zionist enemy suffered heavy losses, to which they are not accustomed, from our heroes in the battle of Shijaiyyah. The weapons of the <i>muqawama</i> are the legitimate weapons which counter the occupation...'	Gaza, 10 May 2003
Asfour, Adnan	PIC interview: 'After a year of the [Israeli] invasion of Nablus.'	Nablus, 2 April 2003
Rantisi, Abdel-Aziz	PIC interview: 'On Iraq and the latest developments in the Palestinian arena.'	Gaza, 30 March 2003
Meshal, Khaled	Interview by al-Manar Satellite TV for the program 'What Else?'	16 March 2003
Nazzal, Mohammed	Interview by the Jordanian <i>al-Majd</i> newspaper.	4 March 2003
Rantisi, Abdel-Aziz	PIC interview: 'Enemy election results reflected the psychological reality of Zionism which is in love with killing and [therefore] promotes jihad option.'	Gaza, 9 January 2003
Yassin, Ahmed	PIC interview on Hamas's 15 th anniversary: 'Hamas's constants are fixed but its tactics change according to events and developments. They [Hamas's constants] are the security valve of our unity.'	Gaza, 15 December 2002
Al-Zahar, Mahmud	PIC interview: 'Cairo dialogue serves all parties, and <i>istishadiyya</i> operations will not stop.'	Gaza, 3 December 2002
Abu Marzuq, Mousa	Interview by al-Quds Press: 'No secretive agenda behind the Cairo talks and there are no impacts from the US campaign against Hamas's financial resources.'	19 November 2002
Haniyeh, Ismail	PIC interview: 'They tried to link us to the case of Abu-Lihya to discredit Hamas and to stop the [Second] Intifada and the <i>muqawama</i> .'	Gaza, 20 October 2002
Nazzal, Muhammed	Interview by Quds Press: 'Connecting Hamas to the case of Abu-Lihya is not justifiable.'	16 October 2002
Rantisi, Abdel-Aziz	PIC interview: 'Hamas paid for its achievements with the blood of its finest leaders and youth.'	Gaza, 5 October 2002
Ghousha, Ibrahim	Interview by the Lebanese <i>al-Mustaqbal</i> newspaper: 'We are committed to launching <i>istishadiyya</i> operations and harmony with Fatah helped expand the confrontations [with Israel].'	14 March 2002
Al-Zahar, Mahmud	PIC interview: 'Hamas initiates the events and takes its decision independently. Hamas is at the height of its strength and <i>muqawama</i> is not subject to bargaining.'	Gaza, 22 December 2001