Online Appendix

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Appendix A Information about the data

Information about the investment database

Fiscal data on district-level budgets is derived from official reporting by districts to the statistical authorities in their states. The statistical offices assembled the data series used for our analysis at our request. The lowest level at which data was available was Germany's 294 *Landkreise* and 194 *Kreisfreie Städte*. As shown in Table A.1, some statistical offices were able to deliver data from 1991 to 2018; others were only able to deliver data starting in the mid-1990s. Moreover, gaps in the data series may derive from incomplete reporting by districts to statistical offices or states' failures to maintain or provide comprehensive data for their districts.

State	Data coverage	Note
Baden-Württemberg	1991–2018	
Bavaria	1991–2018	
Brandenburg	1993–2006 2012–2018	Data for 2007–2011 could not be delivered due to changes in the accounting system.
Hesse	1991–2018	
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	1996–2018	
Lower Saxony	1991–2018	
North Rhine-Westphalia	1991–2018	
Rhineland-Palatinate	1991–2018	
Saarland	1992–2006 2012–2018	Data for 2007–2011 could not be delivered due to changes in the accounting system.
Saxony	1992–2018	
Saxony-Anhalt	1995–2018	
Schleswig-Holstein	1992–2018	
Thuringia	1995–2018	

Table A.1 Coverage of our data for municipal-level investment by state

We made two adjustments to the fiscal data: First, since many states changed the prescribed accounting systems from cameralism to double-entry bookkeeping (usually in the late 2000s), we had to deal with different ways in which districts report their budgets. While these changes led to gaps in our data, we worked with the statistical agencies and carefully merged the different categories to create continuous time series for the most important variables. Secondly, we had to account for district reforms, which usually involved mergers between previously separated districts. These district reforms were especially prominent in Eastern Germany in the late 1990s and mid-2000s after reunification. To maintain continuity in our units of observation, we took the most recent list of districts from 2018 and applied this list to all previous years for which we collected data.

Our data only contains information on the districts' core budgets. We could not account for public investments by publicly owned entities with independent legal status that report separate budgets.

Information about the political database

The election data was coded based on the *Kommunales Wahllexikon*, a local election encyclopedia issued annually by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. Table 1 includes a detailed list of all the states and number of districts included in the study. In general, the name, the year of election, the party affiliation, the term of office, and the number of needed ballots were coded. Regarding the party affiliation, voter associations that compete in state-level and local elections are subsumed under "regional voter associations."

The number of elections under consideration in the study is affected by changes in the procedural rules for the election of local administrators. Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Lower Saxony, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Schleswig-Holstein switched during or shortly before the period from indirect elections (local district council elects head of administration) to direct elections. Therefore, the election year is not uniform but may vary within these states. In Baden-Württemberg and Brandenburg, the local administrator is not elected directly. Hence, only information about name, party affiliation, and election year is available for districts in these two states. Generally, years for which no investment data is available were excluded from coding (see Table 1).

A special case is district reforms that affect the population eligible to vote. Major district reforms took place in Saxony-Anhalt 2007, Saxony 2008, and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 2011. There are three possible scenarios: dissolution into several other districts, inclusion in one other district, and merging into a new one. First, districts that were dissolved and divided into more than one other district are not coded. However, the districts that absorbed small parts of dissolved districts are included. Second, wherever one district became entirely part of an existing district, both the included and the existing district are not coded. Finally, wherever two districts were merged into a completely new one, only the new district is coded from the year of its formation onwards. The two original districts that were merged are not coded.

Ν	Number of districts	Data coverage	Note
873	44	1999–2018	
1,914	99	1999–2018	
249	18	1999–2006 2013–2018	Elections not coded from 2007 to 2012 as no investment data available
519	26	1999–2018	
81	8	1999–2009 2011–2018	District reform in 2011
887	45	1999–2018	
1,034	53	1999–2018	
697	36	1999–2018	
83	6	1999–2006 2013–2018	Elections not coded from 2007 to 2012 as no investment data available
170	13	1999–2018	
216	14	1999–2018	
298	15	1999–2018	
459	23	1999–2018	
	873 1,914 249 519 81 887 1,034 697 83 170 216 298	873 44 1,914 99 249 18 519 26 81 8 887 45 1,034 53 697 36 83 6 170 13 216 14 298 15	873 44 1999-2018 1,914 99 1999-2018 249 18 1999-2006 213-2018 2013-2018 519 26 1999-2009 81 8 1999-2009 2011-2018 2011-2018 887 45 1999-2018 1,034 53 1999-2018 697 36 1999-2018 83 6 1999-2018 170 13 1999-2018 216 14 1999-2018 298 15 1999-2018

Table A.2 Coverage of our data for local executive elections by state

	List of Los	/ variablec	used in the	rogroccion	analycic
Table A.3					allaivsis

	Variable	Coding	Source				
	Dependent variable						
1	Investment (pc)	Sum of all investment purposes in EUR, divided by population	State statistical agencies				
		Independent variables					
1	lag(Investment (pc))	Lagged version of Investment (pc)	State statistical agencies				
2	Business tax revenue (pc)	Revenues from the local business tax in EUR, divided by population	State statistical agencies				
3	Liquidity loans (pc)	Liquidity loans in EUR, divided by population	State statistical agencies				
4	Administrative capacity (per 1,000 capita)	Number of technical personnel employed in local administration, divided by population times 1,000	State statistical agencies				
5	Party: Left (ref.: Right)	0 = district administrator belonging to a right-wing party 1 = district administrator belonging to a left-wing party	Kommunales Wahllexikon				
6	Party: Regional voter association (ref.: Right)	 0 = district administrator belonging to a right-wing party 1 = district administrator belonging to a regional voter association 	Kommunales Wahllexikon				
		Control variables					
1	Investment subsidies (pc)	Federal and state investment subsidies in EUR, divided by population	Local statistical agencies				
2	Social security exp. (pc)	Social security expenditures in EUR, divided by population	Local statistical agencies				
3	Unemployment (change)	Annual change in the unemployment rate as share of the labor force	Federal Statistical Office				
4	GDP (pc)	Gross domestic product in Thousand EUR, divided by population	Federal Statistical Office				
5	Net migration (per 1,000 capita)	Out-migration subtracted from in-migration, divided by population times 1,000	INKAR online				

Statistic	Ν	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Investment (pc)	7,784	321.998	153.187	0.000	2,243.076
Business tax rev. (pc)	7,784	315.951	224.790	-64.243	2,985.287
Liquidity loans (pc)	7,373	404.307	875.424	0.000	8,363.025
Admin. capacity (per 1,000 capita)	7,352	1.308	0.498	0.000	5.083
Party: Left (ref.: right)	7,544	0.327	0.469	0.000	1.000
Party: Regional voter assoc. (ref.: right)	7,544	0.140	0.347	0.000	1.000
Investment subsidies (pc)	7,784	123.304	76.199	-5.511	754.429
Social security exp. (pc)	7,762	368.154	259.171	0.003	1,799.417
GDP (pc)	7,763	29.290	13.630	8.442	182.128
Unemployment (change)	7,749	-0.066	3.022	-16.687	14.506
Net migration (per 1,000 capita)	7,369	2.718	6.285	-40.600	59.300

Table A.4 Summary statistics

Appendix B Additional results







Figure B.2 Investment by state







Figure B.3 Interaction effect of liquidity loans and left party








Figure B.5 Instantaneous interaction effects for regional voter association

Appendix C Robustness tests

	Dependent variable: Investment (per capita)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
lag(Investment (per capita))	0.732***	0.722***	0.715***	
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	
Business tax revenue (per capita)	0.113***	0.119***	0.091***	
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)	
Liquidity loans (per capita)	-0.009***	-0.008***	-0.008***	
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	
Admin. capacity (per 1,000 capita)	-5.453**	-3.479	–3.879	
	(1.951)	(2.207)	(2.203)	
Party: Left (ref.: right)		-12.230*** (2.370)	-26.031*** (3.920)	
Party: Regional voter assoc. (ref.: right)		2.753 (3.148)	-22.834*** (6.201)	
Investment subsidies (per capita)	0.290***	0.304***	0.310***	
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	
Social security expenditure (per capita)	-0.059***	-0.053***	-0.055***	
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	
GDP (per capita)	-0.192	-0.253	-0.182	
	(0.126)	(0.135)	(0.136)	
Unemployment (change)	0.799*	0.766*	0.740*	
	(0.346)	(0.370)	(0.369)	
Net migration (per 1,000 capita)	0.947***	0.820***	0.804***	
	(0.163)	(0.183)	(0.183)	
Business tax revenue x left			0.042*** (0.009)	
Business tax revenue x regional voter a	ssoc.		0.088***	
			(0.019)	
Constant	50.172***	51.797***	61.058***	
	(4.210)	(4.618)	(4.914)	
Observations	7,263	6,394	6,394	
R ²	0.719	0.707	0.709	
Adjusted R ²	0.719	0.707	0.708	
Residual Std. Error	80.675 (df = 7253)	82.866 (df = 6382)	82.669 (df = 6380)	
F Statistic	2,065.226***	1,402.793***	1,195.171***	
	(df = 9; 7253)	(df = 11; 6382)	(df = 13; 6380)	

Table C.1 Replicating Table 1 with pooled OLS models (i.e., no fixed-effects)

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

	Dependent variable: Investment (per capita)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
lag(Investment (per capita))	0.392***	0.354***	0.353***	
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	
Business tax revenue (per capita)	0.140***	0.143***	0.115***	
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.011)	
Liquidity loans (per capita)	-0.012***	-0.014***	-0.014***	
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	
Admin. capacity (per 1,000 capita)	19.711***	21.530***	21.003***	
	(3.178)	(3.644)	(3.643)	
Party: Left (ref.: right)		-6.541 (3.501)	-21.828*** (5.017)	
Party: Regional voter assoc. (ref.: right)		-2.647 (4.440)	-13.266 (7.539)	
Investment subsidies (per capita)	0.711***	0.747***	0.754***	
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.024)	
Social security expenditure (per capita)	0.020**	0.022**	0.021**	
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	
GDP (per capita)	-0.108	0.379	0.397	
	(0.213)	(0.248)	(0.247)	
Unemployment (change)	0.573	0.606	0.594	
	(0.305)	(0.326)	(0.325)	
Net migration (per 1,000 capita)	0.512**	0.402*	0.395*	
	(0.177)	(0.200)	(0.199)	
Business tax revenue x left			0.045*** (0.011)	
Business tax rev. x regional voter assoc.			0.037 (0.022)	
Constant	–11.050	–22.257	–15.452	
	(18.528)	(19.474)	(19.514)	
Observations	7,263	6,394	6,394	
R ²	0.794	0.789	0.789	
Adjusted R ²	0.782	0.775	0.776	
Residual Std. Error	71.030 (df = 6871)	72.614 (df = 6000)	72.514 (df = 5998)	
F Statistic	67.680***	57.016***	56.930***	
	(df = 391; 6871)	(df = 393; 6000)	(df = 395; 5998)	

Table C.2 Replicating Table 1 with models that only include unit-fixed effects

Note: All models include unit-fixed effects, which are omitted from the table; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

	Dependent variable: Investment (per capita)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
lag(Investment (per capita)	0.221***	0.224***	0.224***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Business tax revenue (per capita)	0.169***	0.171***	0.123***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Liquidity loans (per capita)	0.023***	0.023***	0.022***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Admin. capacity (per 1,000 capita)	10.663***	7.743*	7.784**
	(2.942)	(3.023)	(3.002)
Party: Left (ref.: right)		-6.651** (2.250)	–35.778*** (3.513)
Party: Regional voter assoc (ref.:right)		1.042 (3.063)	-7.075 (4.924)
Investment subsidies (per capita)	0.818***	0.814***	0.816***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Social security expenditure (per capita)	-0.005	-0.007	-0.016***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
GDP (per capita)	0.655***	0.856***	0.893***
	(0.084)	(0.092)	(0.092)
Unemployment (change)	-0.775**	-0.839**	-1.035***
	(0.269)	(0.273)	(0.275)
Business tax revenue x left			0.081*** (0.005)
Business tax revenue x regional voter assoc.			0.023* (0.011)
Observations	397	397	397

Table C.3 Replicating Table 1 with GMM models (Arellano-Bond estimator)

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Appendix D Sensitivity analyses

	Dependent variable: Investment (per capita)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
lag(Investment (per capita))	0.344*** (0.011)	0.310*** (0.012)	0.310*** (0.012)	
Business tax revenue (per capita)	0.164*** (0.010)	0.165*** (0.010)	0.144*** (0.013)	
Liquidity loans (per capita)	-0.007** (0.002)	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.009*** (0.002)	
Admin. capacity (per 1,000 capita)	14.882*** (3.541)	20.829*** (4.040)	20.940*** (4.041)	
Party: Left (ref.: right)		-5.222 (3.920)	-18.230** (5.766)	
Party: Regional voter assoc. (ref.: right)		1.539 (4.922)	–3.468 (8.517)	
Investment subsidies (per capita)	0.755*** (0.028)	0.800*** (0.030)	0.804*** (0.030)	
Social security expenditure (per capita)	0.001 (0.009)	0.002 (0.009)	0.001 (0.009)	
GDP (per capita)	0.331 (0.275)	0.337 (0.312)	0.276 (0.313)	
Unemployment (change)	0.675 (0.504)	0.629 (0.517)	0.625 (0.517)	
Net migration (per 1,000 capita)	0.069 (0.259)	-0.084 (0.301)	-0.087 (0.301)	
Business tax rev. x left			0.034** (0.011)	
Business tax rev. x regional voter assoc.			0.016 (0.024)	
Constant	42.542*	19.635	27.384	
	(20.638)	(21.645)	(21.783)	
Observations	6,180	5,469	5,469	
R ²	0.808	0.803	0.803	
Adjusted R ²	0.796	0.790	0.790	
Residual Std. Error	70.936 (df = 5829)	72.469 (df = 5120)	72.417 (df = 5118)	
F Statistic	70.013*** (df = 350; 5829)	59.987*** (df = 348; 5120)	59.759*** (df = 350; 5118)	

Table D.1 Replicating Table 1 for Western Germany only

Note: All models include district- and year-fixed effects, which are omitted from the table; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

	Dependent variable: Investment (per capita)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
lag(Investment (per capita))	0.300*** (0.024)	0.299*** (0.027)	0.294*** (0.027)	
Business tax revenue (per capita)	0.115*** (0.031)	0.143*** (0.034)	0.089* (0.045)	
Liquidity loans (per capita)	-0.024**	-0.025**	-0.024**	
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	
Admin. capacity (per 1,000 capita)	3.924 (7.334)	-0.142 (8.370)	1.552 (8.380)	
Party: Left (ref.: right)		-13.984* (6.018)	-29.481** (10.434)	
Party: Regional voter assoc. (ref.: right)		-4.353 (8.163)	-43.273** (15.965)	
Investment subsidies (per capita)	0.661*** (0.032)	0.696*** (0.036)	0.715*** (0.037)	
Social security expenditure (per capita)	0.034** (0.012)	0.029* (0.014)	0.030* (0.014)	
GDP (per capita)	0.306 (1.331)	-1.709 (1.564)	-2.252 (1.572)	
Unemployment (change)	0.284 (0.658)	0.010 (0.781)	0.031 (0.779)	
Net migration (per 1,000 capita)	-1.246*** (0.355)	-1.388*** (0.414)	-1.458*** (0.417)	
Business tax rev. x left			0.080 (0.045)	
Business tax rev. x regional voter assoc.			0.206** (0.074)	
Constant	42.876 (32.936)	66.558 (38.275)	78.650* (38.512)	
Observations	1,083	925	925	
R ²	0.829	0.823	0.825	
Adjusted R ²	0.813	0.804	0.805	
Residual Std. Error	51.596 (df = 992)	52.726 (df = 833)	52.519 (df = 831	
F Statistic	53.411*** (df = 90; 992)	42.594*** (df = 91; 833)	42.099*** (df = 93; 831)	

Table D.2 Replicating Table 1 for Eastern Germany only

Note: All models include district- and year-fixed effects, which are omitted from the table; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

	Dependent variable: Investment (per capita)				
	(1) Without Bavaria	(2) Without Bavaria	(3) Without Bavaria and Baden-Württem- berg	(4) Without Bavaria and Baden-Württem- berg	
lag(Investment (per capita))	0.287***	0.287***	0.318***	0.332***	
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	
Business tax revenue (per capita)	0.196***	0.172***	0.188***	0.144***	
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.013)	
Liquidity debt (per capita)	-0.004*	-0.004*	-0.004*	-0.007**	
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	
Admin. capacity (per 1,000 capita	a) 25.191***	24.739***	22.231***	20.995***	
	(4.412)	(4.414)	(4.309)	(4.565)	
Party: Left (ref.: right)	-10.874**	-22.641***	-8.590*	-24.333***	
	(3.811)	(5.475)	(3.676)	(5.915)	
Party: Regional voter assoc.	-2.599	-10.851	-0.293	-10.968	
(ref.: right)	(5.086)	(8.461)	(5.153)	(9.864)	
Investment subsidies (per capita)	0.639***	0.643***	0.618***	0.756***	
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.031)	
Social security expenditure (per capita)	0.026**	0.025**	0.035***	0.008	
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	
GDP (per capita)	0.413	0.251	0.581	0.456	
	(0.401)	(0.405)	(0.388)	(0.347)	
Unemployment (change)	0.413	0.414	0.502	0.597	
	(0.397)	(0.397)	(0.377)	(0.507)	
Net migration (per 1,000 capita)	-0.421	-0.406	-0.358	0.179	
	(0.270)	(0.270)	(0.263)	(0.318)	
Business tax rev. x left		0.036** (0.012)		0.055*** (0.011)	
Business tax rev. x reg. voter asso	с.	0.029 (0.026)		0.066* (0.031)	
Constant	14.997	25.882	1.281	4.965	
	(21.798)	(22.084)	(20.827)	(21.927)	
Observations	4,573	4,573	4,089	4,173	
R ²	0.742	0.743	0.723	0.809	
Adjusted R ²	0.723	0.724	0.703	0.796	
Residual Std. Error	67.585 (df = 4257)	67.530 (df = 4255)	63.915 (df = 3817)	69.390 (df = 3912)	
F Statistic	38.908***	38.754***	36.775***	63.762***	
	(df = 315; 4257)	(df = 317; 4255)	(df = 271; 3817)	(df = 260; 3912)	

Table D.3	Replicating model 2 and 3 from Table 1 without Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg

Note: All models include district- and year-fixed effects, which are omitted from the table; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

	Dependent variable: Investment (per capita)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Business tax revenue (per capita)	0.162*** (0.001)	0.165*** (0.010)	0.141*** (0.012)
Liquidity loans (per capita)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.009*** (0.002)	-0.009*** (0.002)
Admin. capacity (per 1,000 capita)	15.442*** (3.346)	19.455*** (3.815)	19.460*** (3.814)
Party: Left (ref.: right)		-6.742 (3.528)	-19.010*** (5.080)
Party: Regional voter assoc. (ref.: right)		-0.646 (4.494)	–9.912 (7.650)
Business tax rev. x left			0.036*** (0.001)
Business tax rev. x regional voter assoc.			0.032 (0.023)

Table D.4 Re-estimating coefficients of interest from Table 1 with a Jackknife approach

Note: The table shows results from a Jackknife resampling approach. All models from Table 1 were reestimated 13 times, each time dropping all observations from one state from the analysis. The average of the coefficients and standard errors across these 13 models was then calculated. The results for all variables of interest are shown above. All models include control variables and district- and year-fixed effects, which are omitted from the table; p<0.05; *p<0.01; **p<0.001.