

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Right-Wing Moderation, Left-Wing Inertia and Political Cartelisation in Post-Transition Chile

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Abstract

By examining the Manifiesto Project data for post-transition Chile, we show growing convergence in the electoral competition strategies between the centre-left and centre-right coalitions. While the former is characterised by inertia, the latter is marked by gradual yet relentless programmatic moderation. To interpret these results, we rely not only on theories of salience and party adaptation, but also on the cartel party thesis. This contribution reinforces the findings of increasing literature on post-transition Chile that reveals growing collusion between the mainstream left-wing and right-wing coalitions, which have increasing difficulties channelling demands emanating from below and therefore providing adequate political representation.

Keywords: Chile; manifiestos; political competition; right-wing moderation; cartelisation

Introduction

Michelle Bachelet's second administration (2014–18) differed from previous left-of-centre governments in post-transition Chile. The incorporation of the Partido Comunista (Communist Party, PC) into the governing coalition and the pursuit of an ambitious reform agenda generated significant internal struggles. While some political figures called for more gradual reform, others argued for rapid, broad transformations as demanded by social movements.¹

Not by chance, this tension within Bachelet's coalition surfaced over the extent to which the electoral manifesto for the 2013 presidential race should be (strictly) respected once a coalition is in government. After all, the manifesto can be seen as a sort of political mandate, whereby politicians create expectations about the actions

¹On the growing relevance of contentious politics and social movements in contemporary Chile, see Sofia Donoso and Marisa von Bülow (eds.), *Social Movements in Chile: Organization, Trajectories, and Political Consequences* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).

they will take if they win office.² At the two extremes of the dispute were the PC and the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Christian Democratic Party, PDC). On the one hand, the president of the PC argued that '[t]his is a [government] programme led by Bachelet and which all parties have committed to accomplish ... We cannot sell out the programme; that would be absurd. That would mean a breakup, it would mean that the president negates the popular and political will she declared before the country.'³ On the other hand, Senator Ignacio Walker from the PDC declared that '[t]he government programme is a navigation chart, not a straitjacket. There are some who think like that, and I think they do not understand the logic of politics ... The programme is not the Bible, nor the Koran, nor the Torah.'⁴

As this short illustration reveals, the programmes that political forces develop and follow as their pledges to the voting public, i.e. their manifestos, are key to understanding electoral competition and the formation of government alliances. Through manifestos, parties not only explain their policy proposals to the electorate, but also show voters which issues they consider most relevant. In this article, we study the evolution of electoral competition by analysing electoral manifestos using novel and recently released data on post-transition Chile.

Outside Latin America there is a vast amount of research examining electoral manifestos to analyse tendencies toward ideological convergence or divergence as well as the issues that become the focus of party competition. Most of this research has been conducted using data from the Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR) project, which provides quantitative measures of party positions. MARPOR has recently expanded geographic coverage to Latin America, and Chile is one of the first new countries included in the database. Chile was long characterised by a very stable political system and a high level of programmatic representation, making it one of the most suitable cases for studying party competition in Latin America.⁵ However, Chile's political system has been undergoing significant changes and shows many signs of deterioration, most notably at the level of party identification, programmatic structuring and voter participation.⁶ We

²Susan C. Stokes, *Mandates and Democracy: Neoliberalism by Surprise in Latin America* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 4–6.

³Luis Concha, 'Guillermo Teillier, presidente del Partido Comunista: "El programa no se puede transar, eso sería un quiebre"', *La Tercera*, 22 Dec. 2013.

⁴Francisco Torrealba, 'Ignacio Walker: "El gobierno debe hacerse la idea de que la DC va a introducir un matiz en las reformas"', *La Tercera*, 20 April 2014.

⁵Herbert Kitschelt, Kirk A. Hawkins, Juan Pablo Luna, Guillermo Rosas and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, *Latin American Party Systems* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Kenneth M. Roberts, *Changing Course in Latin America: Party Systems in the Neoliberal Era* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

⁶See, among many others, Juan Pablo Luna and Rodrigo Mardones, 'Chile: Are the Parties Over?', *Journal of Democracy*, 21: 3 (2010), pp. 107–21; David Altman and Juan Pablo Luna, 'Uprooted but Stable: Chilean Parties and the Concept of Party System Institutionalization', *Latin American Politics and Society*, 53: 2 (2011), pp. 1–28; Rossana Castiglioni and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, 'Introduction. Challenges to Political Representation in Contemporary Chile', *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, 8: 3 (2016), pp. 3–24; Juan Pablo Luna, 'Chile's Crisis of Representation', *Journal of Democracy*, 27: 3 (2016), pp. 129–38; Fernando Rosenblatt, *Party Vibrancy and Democracy in Latin America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018); Carlos Huneeus, 'La democracia semisoberana y la representación política tecnocrática', in Carlos Huneeus and Octavio Avendaño, *El sistema político de Chile* (Santiago: LOM, 2018), pp. 19–56.

contend that the study of party manifestos contributes to better understanding one important dimension of the evolution of the Chilean political system, namely the reduction of programmatic differences between the two main political coalitions at the moment of competing for votes. Unlike other studies based on opinion polls and parliamentary surveys,⁷ the analysis of Chilean party manifestos shows a counter-intuitive result: convergence in terms of electoral competition has not occurred on the right but on the left end of the political spectrum.⁸

Our main contribution in this article is to explain this puzzling empirical finding, linking it with theories of party adaptation in the context of electoral losses and the cartel party thesis, which points to growing collusion and decreasing policy differences between mainstream political parties.⁹ By doing this, we also contribute to existing scholarship on the increasing difficulties that mainstream political parties in contemporary Chile have in maintaining their linkages with society, as well as explain the difference between how parties compete and how parties govern while in office.¹⁰ Finally, we provide a guide to understanding and analysing the application of the MARPOR data to Latin American countries.

This article is structured in six parts. Part one provides the theoretical framework, based on salience, party adaptation and the cartel party thesis, from which we derive three hypotheses that we later test empirically. Part two presents an introduction to the MARPOR data and its application to Chile, where the manifestos are developed by political coalitions instead of political parties. Part three provides a detailed discussion of the evolution of the electoral programmes of the two dominant political coalitions in Chile since 1989, showing their growing ideological convergence in electoral competition. Part four examines the policy dimensions driving this convergence, while part five discusses the extent to which the Chilean political system is characterised by cartelisation and the gradual emergence of issue competition. Finally, in part six we discuss how the results of our analysis speak to existing literature on the evolution of the Chilean party system and provide

⁷Manuel Alcántara Sáez, 'La ideología de los partidos políticos chilenos, 1994–2002: Rasgos constantes y peculiaridades', *Revista de Ciencia Política*, 23: 2 (2003), pp. 68–87; Carlos Huneeus, *Chile, un país dividido: La actualidad del pasado* (Santiago: Catalonia, 2003); Eugenio Ortega Frei, 'Los partidos políticos chilenos: Cambio y estabilidad en el comportamiento electoral 1990–2000', *Revista de Ciencia Política*, 23: 2 (2003), pp. 109–47; Matías A. Bargsted and Nicolás M. Somma, 'Social Cleavages and Political Dealignment in Contemporary Chile, 1995–2009', *Party Politics*, 22: 1 (2016), pp. 105–24.

⁸The only other study based on Chilean election manifestos is Ricardo Gamboa, Miguel Ángel López and Jaime Baeza, 'La evolución programática de los partidos chilenos 1970–2009: De la polarización al consenso', *Revista de Ciencia Política*, 33: 2 (2013), pp. 443–67. This study finds different results. However, the authors used their own coding before the MARPOR data for Latin America became available and in consequence their results cannot be compared with the data generated for the rest of the world. When compared with the MARPOR data, their calculations underestimate the left position of the centre-left coalition and overestimate the right position of the centre-right coalition. Moreover, the authors do not disaggregate by dimensions of party competition, a key advantage of the MARPOR data that we exploit in this article.

⁹Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, 'Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party', *Party Politics*, 1: 1 (1995), pp. 5–31; 'The Cartel Party Thesis: A Restatement', *Perspectives on Politics*, 7: 4 (2009), pp. 753–66.

¹⁰Luna and Mardones, 'Chile: Are the Parties Over?'; Altman and Luna, 'Uprooted but Stable'; Castiglioni and Rovira Kaltwasser, 'Introduction. Challenges to Political Representation'; Luna, 'Chile's Crisis of Representation'; Rosenblatt, *Party Vibrancy*; Huneeus, 'La democracia semisoberana'.

an interpretation of how manifestos should be understood in the context of Latin American party systems.

Theoretical Framework

Scholars working with the MARPOR data rely on salience theory. This was developed to criticise the spatial theory of electoral competition, which argues that political parties are prone to converge toward the policy positions of the median voter.¹¹ Salience theory instead argues that the policy space is not fixed: it changes over time with the capacity of parties to process voter demands and their ability to make specific issues relevant through electoral propaganda.¹² This is particularly true given the existence of valence issues, which are goals shared by all voters, such as low inflation or high employment rates.¹³ Hence, instead of competing on all issues in the political space, parties normally prefer to give more salience to those on which they have more credibility. As Ian Budge *et al.* indicate, ‘... parties compete by accentuating issues on which they have an undoubted advantage, rather than by putting forward contrasting policies on the same issues’.¹⁴

Therefore, it should not surprise us if parties advance similar programmatic positions on valence issues, but end up presenting dissimilar ones on those issues that parties try to own. In fact, ‘issue ownership’, a key concept of salience theory, implies that parties are prone to develop an ideological portfolio that emphasises those issues that they aim to dominate. This explains how the growing programmatic convergence between mainstream parties in Western Europe has facilitated the rise of different types of ‘niche parties’, which opt to politicise sets of issues previously outside of party competition (ecology, immigration, regionalism, etc.) and present themselves as the only ones capable of handling them.¹⁵

Nevertheless, political parties are not free to adopt any topic since this would hurt their image and reputation. Parties have a history and profile that limit their space for giving more or less salience to different issues. Hence, parties normally highlight topics that they can credibly manage, while they keep silent on issues that are ‘owned’ by others. Seen in this light, Anthony Downs’ spatial theory of the median voter is not incompatible with salience theory: while the former

¹¹Donald E. Stokes, ‘Spatial Models of Party Competition’, *American Political Science Review*, 57: 2 (1963), pp. 368–77; Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper, 1957).

¹²James F. Adams, Samuel Merrill and Bernard Grofman, *A Unified Theory of Party Competition: A Cross-National Analysis Integrating Spatial and Behavioral Factors* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Martin Bækgaard and Carsten Jensen, ‘The Dynamics of Competitor Party Behaviour’, *Political Studies*, 60: 1 (2012), pp. 131–46; Norman Schofield and Itai Sened, ‘Modeling the Interaction of Parties, Activists and Voters: Why is the Political Center so Empty?’, *European Journal of Political Research*, 44: 3 (2005), pp. 355–90.

¹³Stokes, ‘Spatial Models’, p. 373.

¹⁴Ian Budge, David Robertson and Derek Hearl (eds.), *Ideology, Strategy and Party Change: Spatial Analyses of Post-War Election Programmes in 19 Democracies* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 39.

¹⁵Bonnie M. Meguid, ‘Competition between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success’, *American Political Science Review*, 99: 3 (2005), pp. 347–59; *Party Competition between Unequals: Strategies and Electoral Fortunes in Western Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

refers to how favourable or unfavourable parties feel about different topics (direction), the latter alludes to how strong these favourable or unfavourable feelings are (intensity).¹⁶ In other words, ‘... party competition is not a matter of *either* confrontation over different issue positions *or* selective emphasis of some issues over others; one type of competition does not preclude the other ... A party’s strategy is defined by both issue position and issue saliency.’¹⁷ This means that parties compete by emphasising those issues on which they have credibility and reputational advantage over their competitors and at the same time take position on those topics that are relevant to the voting public in order to maximise their voter share.

Theories of party adaptation help explain why existing political forces decide to modify their positions and give more or less salience to specific issues. These emphasise that past election results are crucial in the development of manifestos.¹⁸ The reason for this is that political parties are aware of their opponents’ strategies and after electoral defeats they reconsider the issues put forward in past manifestos.¹⁹ As Kenneth Janda *et al.* indicate, if ‘... a party campaigns on an election manifesto that is followed by an election defeat, [one can] expect the party to consider drastically altering its manifesto for the next election campaign’.²⁰ By contrast, when parties gain votes or maintain significant levels of support, they have little incentive to change their manifestos in future elections.

Yet, electoral defeats do not automatically transform into programmatic shifts. Because party leaders interpret electoral results in different ways and need to please different factions within their parties, it usually takes time before they decide to make changes.²¹ In fact, party adaptation should be seen as a process that follows a two-step pattern.²² An electoral defeat is normally followed by growing divergence from the winning party, since this strategy helps to energise the losing party’s base. However, if the incumbent party is capable of winning one or two more elections in a row, a more fundamental learning process will occur as the losing party will tend to shift its policy position toward the incumbent party. This two-step pattern can be identified in the moderation of the Democratic Party in the

¹⁶George Rabinowitz and Stuart Elaine Macdonald, ‘A Directional Theory of Issue Voting’, *American Political Science Review*, 83: 1 (1989), pp. 93–121.

¹⁷Sonia Alonso, *Challenging the State: Devolution and the Battle for Partisan Credibility. A Comparison of Belgium, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 19.

¹⁸James F. Adams, ‘Causes and Electoral Consequences of Party Policy Shifts in Multiparty Elections: Theoretical Results and Empirical Evidence’, *Annual Review of Political Science*, 15: 1 (2012), p. 407.

¹⁹Ian Budge, ‘A New Spatial Theory of Party Competition: Uncertainty, Ideology and Policy Equilibria Viewed Comparatively and Temporally’, *British Journal of Political Science*, 24: 4 (1994), pp. 443–67.

²⁰Kenneth Janda, Robert Harmel, Christine Edens and Patricia Goff, ‘Changes in Party Identity: Evidence from Party Manifestos’, *Party Politics*, 1: 2 (1995), pp. 175–6.

²¹James F. Adams and Zeynep Somer-Topcu, ‘Policy Adjustment by Parties in Response to Rival Parties’ Policy Shifts: Spatial Theory and the Dynamics of Party Competition in Twenty-Five Post-War Democracies’, *British Journal of Political Science*, 39: 4 (2009), pp. 825–46; Ian Budge, Lawrence Ezrow and Michael D. McDonald, ‘Ideology, Party Factionalism and Policy Change: An Integrated Dynamic Theory’, *British Journal of Political Science*, 40: 4 (2010), pp. 781–804; Zeynep Somer-Topcu, ‘Timely Decisions: The Effects of Past National Elections on Party Policy Change’, *The Journal of Politics*, 71: 1 (2009), pp. 238–48.

²²Bækgaard and Jensen, ‘The Dynamics of Competitor Party Behaviour’.

United States and the Labour Party in the United Kingdom following their serial defeats in the 1980s.²³

Another noteworthy aspect of the dynamics of political competition is the gradual transformation of mainstream political parties since the end of the Cold War, marked by the growing acceptance of *laissez-faire* economics and the increasing influence of international markets. This has undermined the perceived relevance of the right–left divide and fostered a process of depoliticisation by transferring control and competences to technocratic institutions at the national and international levels.²⁴ An important corollary of this gradual transformation is the emergence of the cartel party.²⁵ In contrast to the mass party, which is distinguished by the representation of well organised social groups with significant influence over the formulation of the party's political programme and candidate selection, the cartel party is characterised by its reliance on state funds that allow the party to professionalise and separate from its social basis and advance broad policy proposals that are defined by experts rather than party members.

The emergence of the cartel party implies a major transformation in the dynamics of party competition. In effect, '[w]ith the development of the cartel party, the goals of politics become self-referential, professional and technocratic, and what substantive interparty competition remains becomes focused on the efficient and effective management of the polity'.²⁶ Thus, the cartel party thesis postulates that mainstream parties tend to protect themselves from electoral risks by obtaining subsidies from the state and by reducing the policy space through an increase in the sphere of action of independent institutions at the national and global level.²⁷

The emergence of the cartel party also involves a change of the whole party system because mainstream parties have increasing liberty to adapt their policy profile to maximise votes, thereby facilitating their programmatic convergence.²⁸ In this context, to win elections parties need to give minimal signs of difference, making issue competition increasingly relevant for party competition. Instead of giving (too) much emphasis to positional competition on socio-economic topics, parties prefer to compete against each other by raising new issues that they can try to own.²⁹ In consonance with theories of party adaptation, the increasing relevance of issue competition should come from losing parties seeking programmatic adaptations to remain competitive.

Following this theoretical discussion, we may state three hypotheses to drive our empirical analysis of the evolution of electoral competition between Chile's two main political coalitions since 1989. First, political systems where one political

²³*Ibid.*, pp. 136–7.

²⁴See, among others, Peter Mair, 'Representative versus Responsible Government', MPIfG working paper no. 9/8, Sept. 2009; *Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy* (London: Verso, 2013).

²⁵Katz and Mair, 'Changing Models of Party Organization'; 'The Cartel Party Thesis'.

²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 755.

²⁷Mark Blyth and Richard Katz, 'From Catch-all Politics to Cartelisation: The Political Economy of the Cartel Party', *West European Politics*, 28: 1 (2005), pp. 33–60.

²⁸Richard Katz and Peter Mair, 'Cadre, Catch-all or Cartel? A Rejoinder', *Party Politics*, 2: 4 (1996), p. 525–34.

²⁹Christoffer Green-Pedersen, 'The Growing Importance of Issue Competition: The Changing Nature of Party Competition in Western Europe', *Political Studies*, 55: 3 (2007), pp. 601–28.

force tends to dominate electorally over a long stretch of time will show increasing convergence in terms of electoral competition. Second, the political force with more electoral victories will maintain its electoral strategy over time, while the political force with more consecutive electoral defeats will tend to converge toward the winning coalition's electoral programme to increase its voting prospects. Third, the political force with more electoral defeats will, at the same time, attempt to politicise new issues as a way to differentiate itself from the winning coalition.

The MARPOR Project and its Application to Chile

The MARPOR project represents a collaborative effort to provide a quantitative measure of party programmatic positions in as many democracies as possible. To this end, the project collects and codes election manifestos using a salience-based approach.³⁰ Manifesto coding involves two important steps: first, the text of each manifesto is broken up into coding units – called quasi-sentences – that include one and only one policy statement; second, these units are assigned to one of the 56 main codes or subsequent subcategory codes. The data is then aggregated for empirical use by providing the relative frequencies for each code – that is, what share of the manifesto each code represents. Thus, the data shows how much salience parties attribute to each of the policy areas. These policy areas cover the main lines of political competition in established Western democracies, such as welfare state restriction or expansion and statements concerning law and order, equality or the environment.³¹

In addition to the raw data on a party's position in each of the 56 policy areas, the data also includes an aggregated right–left ideological score for each manifesto based on a subset of antipodal statements. This right–left variable (RILE) comprises 13 rightist issues and 13 leftist issues that form the core of traditional right–left ideology – for example, economic redistribution vs. free market policies.³² These 26 categories are then compiled in an index that ranges from –100 (leftist) to +100 (rightist). While there are certainly critics of the index, the project-provided RILE remains one of the most well-known and often-used right–left ideological calculations.³³ In line with Riccardo Pelizzo's work, we consider the RILE index a useful tool for analysing how political actors try to signal to the electorate the direction in which they are moving. In other words, the RILE index reveals if, and how much, political forces adapt programmatically in order to remain competitive.³⁴

³⁰Ian Budge, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara and Eric Tanenbaum (eds.), *Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments, 1945–1998* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Budge et al. (eds.), *Ideology, Strategy and Party Change*.

³¹Budge et al. (eds.), *Mapping Policy Preferences*.

³²Michael Laver and Ian Budge (eds.), *Party Policy and Government Coalitions* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).

³³For critiques, see Kenneth Benoit and Michael Laver, 'Estimating Party Policy Positions: Comparing Expert Surveys and Hand-Coded Content Analysis', *Electoral Studies*, 26: 1 (2007), pp. 90–107; Kenneth Benoit, Michael Laver and Slava Mikhaylov, 'Treating Words as Data with Error: Uncertainty in Text Statements of Policy Positions', *American Journal of Political Science*, 53: 2 (2009), pp. 495–513. For a list of the policy issues included in the calculation of the index, see Laver and Budge (eds.), *Party Policy and Government Coalitions*.

³⁴Riccardo Pelizzo, 'Party Positions or Party Direction? An Analysis of Party Manifesto Data', *West European Politics*, 26: 2 (2003), pp. 67–89.

The MARPOR project initially covered a relatively small number of Western European democracies, but the data collection has expanded to over 50 countries and 1,000 parties spanning all of Europe and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The latest expansion of the project was to Latin America, where data from 1990 onward is being collected and coded. While the collection, coding and release of the data is ongoing, Chile was one of the first countries to be fully coded and have its data made publicly available.³⁵

Turning to the Chilean data explicitly, one key point is worth mentioning: in post-transition Chile, electoral manifestos are developed by coalitions and *not* by political parties.³⁶ Moreover, the MARPOR project codes the coalitions' manifestos for the first round of the presidential elections and not for the run-offs. Before elections are held, Chilean presidential candidates assemble broad-based alliances, which secure the possibility of passing legislation once a coalition is in government, making the Chilean political system an example of 'coalitional presidentialism'.³⁷ The manifesto therefore constitutes an explicit agreement between parties with diverging interests that enter together in an electoral contest for both parliament and the executive.³⁸ In this sense, electoral manifestos in Chile provide not only a signalling mechanism for potential voters, but also the glue that brings together different parties into an electoral and (if successful) government coalition. Commenting on the relevance of manifestos for Chilean parties, Leticia Ruiz Rodríguez notes: 'it seems true that in the Chilean case, [electoral] programmes, and more broadly the programmatic positions of party members, allow distinguishing between parties and serve in part to predict their behaviour'.³⁹

Coalitions formed in this way have proven to be very stable over time. This is partly related to the predominance of a democratic/authoritarian cleavage forged during the Pinochet dictatorship, generating an enduring split between supporters and opponents of Augusto Pinochet's regime and legacy. Not by chance, since the transition to democracy in 1989, the centre-left coalition Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (Coalition of Parties for Democracy) and the centre-right coalition Alianza (Alliance) have been able to control almost every seat in congress and every elected president has belonged to one of these two

³⁵Data available at <https://manifiesto-project.wzb.eu/>, last access 5 June 2019.

³⁶This is why the MARPOR project offers data at the coalition and not at the party level. Therefore, as we discuss in more detail, our unit of analysis is the political coalition. It is worth noting that Chile is not the only country in the world in which political coalitions rather than individual parties elaborate the electoral manifestos. An example is Italy since 1992, where parties usually 'form coalitions before the elections and present voters with common policy platforms with which they hope to gain an electoral mandate for a term in office', as quoted in Catherine Moury, 'Italian Coalitions and Electoral Promises: Assessing the Democratic Performance of the Prodi I and Berlusconi II Governments', *Modern Italy*, 16: 1 (2011), p. 39.

³⁷Timothy J. Power, 'Optimism, Pessimism, and Coalitional Presidentialism: Debating the Institutional Design of Brazilian Democracy', *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 29: 1 (2010), pp. 18–33; Paul Chaisty, Nic Cheeseman and Timothy J. Power, 'Rethinking the "Presidentialism Debate": Conceptualizing Coalitional Politics in Cross-Regional Perspective', *Democratization*, 21: 1 (2014), pp. 72–94.

³⁸See Gamboa *et al.*, 'La evolución programática de los partidos chilenos', p. 456. For a detailed discussion of the elaboration of manifestos in Chile, see Leticia Ruiz Rodríguez, 'Procesos de elaboración del programa en los partidos políticos de Chile', unpubl. paper, 2009, available at <http://eprints.ucm.es/9609/1/leticia.pdf>, last access 7 June 2019.

³⁹*Ibid.*, p. 9.

coalitions.⁴⁰ Therefore, given the predominance of these two political coalitions and the very fact that they – and not individual parties – develop the manifestos, we limit the focus of this article to the evolution of these coalitions. Because of recent signs of fatigue within the two coalitions, it seems all the more important to analyse how their manifestos have been changing, or not, since the recovery of democracy in 1989. We come back to this in the concluding remarks.

The Evolution of Political Competition in Post-Transition Chile

By looking at the data provided by MARPOR, we step directly into the verification of the three hypotheses presented in our theoretical framework. Table 1 presents an overview of the coalitions included in the analysis and their electoral results in presidential elections. It shows that the centre-left Concertación coalition collected a record of four consecutive victories in presidential elections between 1989 and 2009, meaning that the coalition was in office for about 20 years. Moreover, in the first two elections (1989 and 1993) the centre-right coalition Alianza suffered electoral defeat so profound that it was unable to force a ballotage. Instead of expanding its base of support, the centre-right coalition obtained fewer votes in 1993 than in 1989. This is related not only to the coalition's struggle to agree on a candidate but also to its continued strongly conservative profile.⁴¹

The key turning point was the 1999 presidential election between Ricardo Lagos and Joaquín Lavín, in which for the first time the Right obtained enough votes to force a run-off. Although Lavín belonged to the more conservative Unión Demócrata Independiente (Independent Democratic Union, UDI), he was one of the key figures in the gradual moderation of the Right and the development of a new electoral strategy marked by distancing from the traditional right-wing agenda.⁴² As Taylor Boas points out, this election marks '[the] Chilean right's first wholehearted embrace of the Concertación's model of campaigning'.⁴³ The Right's presidential candidates have since converged upon a

⁴⁰The Concertación coalition opposed Pinochet in the 1988 plebiscite and remained relatively stable in subsequent presidential elections. It includes the PDC, the Partido Socialista (Socialist Party, PS), the Partido por la Democracia (Party for Democracy, PPD) and the smaller Partido Radical (Radical Party, PR). For the 2013 election Concertación widened its alliance to include the PC, changing its name to Nueva Mayoría. The centre-right Alianza coalition is composed of the UDI and RN. The coalition has changed its name for every presidential election since 1989; here, we employ the most commonly used appellation.

⁴¹Oscar Godoy Arcaya, 'Las elecciones de 1993', *Estudios Públicos*, 54 (autumn 1994), pp. 301–37; Patricio Navía, 'La elección presidencial de 1993: Una elección sin incertidumbre', in Alejandro San Francisco and Ángel Soto (eds.), *Camino a La Moneda: Las elecciones presidenciales en la historia de Chile, 1920–2000* (Santiago: Centro de Estudios Bicentenario, 2005), pp. 435–61. Andrés Allamand, an RN politician who, since the end of the 1980s, has tried to build a modern Right, provides a detailed insider's account of the unsuccessful attempt to moderate the Right's agenda during the 1990s. See Andrés Allamand, *La travesía del desierto* (Santiago: Aguilar, 1999).

⁴²Arturo Fontaine Talavera, 'Chile's Elections: The New Face of the New Right', *Journal of Democracy*, 11: 2 (2000), pp. 70–7; Eugenio Tironi, *La irrupción de las masas y el malestar de las élites* (Santiago: Grijalbo, 1999), pp. 183–202.

⁴³Taylor Boas, 'Varieties of Electioneering: Success Contagion and Presidential Campaigns in Latin America', *World Politics*, 62: 4 (2010), p. 655.

Table 1. Overview of Coalitions Included in the Analysis

Year	Coalition	Presidential Candidate	% of Vote	RILE Position
1989	Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia	Patricio Aylwin	55.17	-17.07
	Democracia y Progreso (Alianza)	Hernán Büchi	29.40	+20.74
1993	Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia	Eduardo Frei	57.98	-13.13
	Unión por el Progreso de Chile (Alianza plus Unión de Centro Centro)	Arturo Alessandri	24.41	+24.84
1999	Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia	Ricardo Lagos	47.95	-15.46
	Alianza por Chile	Joaquín Lavín	47.51	-6.31
2005	Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia	Michelle Bachelet	45.69	-21.47
	Unión Demócrata Independiente	Joaquín Lavín	23.23	+13.51
	Renovación Nacional	Sebastián Piñera	25.41	-1.78
2009	Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia	Eduardo Frei	29.60	-20.46
	Coalición por el Cambio (Alianza)	Sebastián Piñera	44.00	-3.03
2013	Nueva Mayoría (Concertación plus the Communist Party)	Michelle Bachelet	46.70	-18.97
	Alianza por Chile	Evelyn Matthei	25.03	-28.01

Source: Authors' elaboration from MARPOR database, which is available at <https://manifeto-project.wzb.eu/>, last access 5 June 2019.

strategy initially employed by the Left and become much more competitive in the electoral arena.⁴⁴

One of the most discussed issues in the analysis of the Chilean party system since 1989 has been programmatic convergence.⁴⁵ This is perhaps understandable, given the elite agreement forged during the 1990s due to the Right's need to compete with the centre-left Concertación coalition when authoritarian reversal was no longer an option, and the Left's need to cooperate with the Right because of the institutional constraints inherited from the Pinochet dictatorship.⁴⁶ The manifesto

⁴⁴For a more detailed explanation of the evolution of the Right in post-transition Chile, see Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, 'La (sobre)adaptación programática de la derecha chilena y la irrupción de la derecha populista radical', *Colombia Internacional*, 99 (July–Sept. 2019), pp. 29–61.

⁴⁵See, for instance, Huneus, *Chile, un país dividido*; Ortega Frei, 'Los partidos políticos chilenos'; Gamboa *et al.*, 'La evolución programática de los partidos chilenos'; Bargsted and Somma, 'Social Cleavages and Political Dealignment'.

⁴⁶Peter M. Siavelis, 'Chile: The Right's Evolution from Democracy to Authoritarianism and Back Again', in Juan Pablo Luna and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (eds.), *The Resilience of the Latin American Right* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), pp. 242–66.




Figure 1. Right-Left (RILE) Position of Main Coalitions and Polarisation Index

Source: Authors' elaboration from MARPOR database, which is available at <https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/>, last access 5 June 2019.

data confirms that coalitions have also tended to converge at the level of electoral competition. Figure 1 shows the right-left position (RILE index) for the centre-left Concertación and the centre-right Alianza.⁴⁷ We also calculated a polarisation index as the programmatic distance between the two coalitions by simply subtracting both values.

Two features stand out in Figure 1. First, the polarisation index confirms the reduction in the level of polarisation between the two main political coalitions over time, with historical lows in 1999 and 2013. Second, the declining polarisation reflects a process of gradual convergence in competition strategies, as evidenced by the narrowing gap in the RILE index for both coalitions. In line with Martin Bækgaard and Carsten Jensen's argument, this convergence trajectory has not been linear, but rather has followed a two-step pattern: first distancing, then approaching.⁴⁸ The level of convergence is such that in the 2013 election both coalitions were programmatically equivalent.

Figure 1 also provides evidence that reveals the *direction* of convergence, thus supporting our second hypothesis. Much extant scholarship on programmatic evolution in Chile assumes the locus of programmatic convergence to be toward the right side of party competition.⁴⁹ The MARPOR data contradicts this, highlighting

⁴⁷The 2005 point takes the average positioning of the two right-wing candidates competing in the first-round presidential elections, Joaquín Lavín (UDI) and Sebastián Piñera (RN). The 2013 point for the Centre-Left represents the Nueva Mayoría coalition formed by Concertación and the PC.

⁴⁸Bækgaard and Jensen, 'The Dynamics of Competitor Party Behaviour', pp. 155–6.

⁴⁹Huneus, *Chile, un país dividido*; Gamboa *et al.*, 'La evolución programática de los partidos chilenos'.




Figure 2. Salience of 'Market Regulation' and 'Market Economy' in Coalitions' Political Programmes
 Source: Authors' elaboration from MARPOR database, which is available at <https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/>, last access 5 June 2019.

that the main cause of convergence has been the evolution of the rightist coalition toward the left. Most notably, in 2013 the RILE indicator shows that the centre-right Alianza lies further to the left than the centre-left Concertación. While perhaps counter-intuitive at first sight, in the vein of the 'signalling' interpretation of electoral manifestos,⁵⁰ we argue that the indicator reflects the special nature of political competition in 2013. On the one hand, the Nueva Mayoría (New Majority) – a coalition comprised of Concertación plus the PC – programme was fairly balanced between different policy areas, but placed more emphasis than the Centre-Right on maintaining the market economy and less on market regulation (see Figure 2). Most plausibly, the coalition did this strategically to ensure that an otherwise reformist programme did not scare off the business community. On the other hand, Alianza's 2013 'shift to the left' can be explained by the high concentration of mentions in the manifesto for expanding education (15.6 per cent against 6.9 per cent of the Nueva Mayoría manifesto). In fact, removing the education issue from the RILE indicator leaves both coalitions with the exact same score in 2013. We interpret this as Alianza's reaction to the growing significance of education issues for the population. Put in other words, the Centre-Right decided to give more salience to this issue whose perceived importance had grown for the voting public, particularly after the 2011 student protests and the right-wing Piñera administration's (2010–13) inability to control the education agenda throughout its mandate, a problem that contributed significantly to the erosion of Sebastián Piñera's approval ratings.

The data points to two interconnected processes supporting our expectations: inertia in the competition strategies of the Centre-Left and the gradual yet relentless moderation of the Centre-Right. We take each in turn. The consistency of the Concertación coalition's electoral competition strategy over time is quite remarkable. Following the theory of party adaptation, the most obvious explanation for this is the coalition's electoral success: given that Concertación won four consecutive presidential elections (1989, 1993, 1999 and 2005) with manifestos advocating very similar

⁵⁰Pelizzo, 'Party Positions or Party Direction?'

policy proposals, it has had little incentive to innovate.⁵¹ In effect, by disaggregating the dimensions of political competition, we show that this coalition has evolved little. Moreover, there is vast agreement among scholars that the parties that belong to Concertación experienced a learning process during the 1980s, which produced not only programmatic moderation but also growing convergence between them.⁵²

What is more interesting is that this stability provides a new perspective on the evolution of the Left in Chile. Concretely, it shifts the focus of attention from the question of whether there was a turn to the left, as in other Latin American countries, to that of explaining *why* and *how* a fairly left-wing political programme transforms into much more moderate policy-making processes once a coalition is in government. In fact, the Latin American left-turn literature argues that Chile represents a case of a 'moderate' Left.⁵³ The main characteristics of this moderate Left lie in its embrace of the market economy and a deep respect for the institutions of liberal democracy. Different from this, our analysis based on the MARPOR data confirms that, at the level of electoral competition, Concertación's position has remained surprisingly 'leftist' and stable over the last two decades, even when compared with other traditional left-wing parties in the Western world that have spearheaded a true turn toward more moderate positions. For example, considering the 1990–2014 period, Concertación's average RILE score (−17.9) is much more 'leftist' than the average RILE scores of the US Democratic Party (+1.5), the UK Labour Party (−7.2) and even the German Social Democrats (−13.0), while its standard deviation is about four times lower than that of these parties.⁵⁴ This highlights the distance between the policies announced during campaigning and their implementation once the president comes to power. In other words, one could argue that Concertación has advanced a left-wing programme as an electoral strategy, but in government ends up adopting a moderate policy-making strategy.⁵⁵ This question warrants further research and we return to it briefly in our concluding remarks.

⁵¹Carlos Huneeus and Octavio Avendaño, 'Los partidos políticos y su debilitamiento', in Huneeus and Avendaño, *El sistema político de Chile*, p. 173.

⁵²Manuel A. Garretón, 'El aprendizaje político en la redemocratización chilena', FLASCO working paper no. 24 of the 'Estudios Políticos' series, 1992; Kenneth M. Roberts, *Deepening Democracy? The Modern Left and Social Movements in Chile and Peru* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); Siavelis, 'Chile: The Right's Evolution'.

⁵³Evelyn Huber, Jennifer Pribble and John D. Stephens, 'The Chilean Left in Power: Achievements, Failures, and Omissions', in Kurt Weyland, Raúl Madrid and Wendy Hunter (eds.), *Leftist Governments in Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 77–97; Gustavo Flores-Macías, *After Neoliberalism? The Left and Economic Reforms in Latin America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Kenneth M. Roberts, 'Chile: The Left after Neoliberalism', in Steven Levitsky and Kenneth M. Roberts (eds.), *The Resurgence of the Latin American Left* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), pp. 325–347.

⁵⁴In the 1990–2014 period the standard deviation for Concertación's RILE score is 2.9, while it is 13.0, 11.3 and 12.2 for the UK Labour Party, the US Democratic Party and the German Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) respectively. During this period, Concertación's average RILE score is closer to that of parties with a more consistent leftist platform, such as the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, PSOE) and the Brazilian Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party, PT), with a RILE score of −19.0 and −18.9 respectively.

⁵⁵For studies of radical shifts between electoral and government programmes in Latin America, see Noam Lupu, *Party Brands in Crisis: Partisanship, Brand Dilution, and the Breakdown of Political Parties in Latin America* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016); and Stokes, *Mandates and Democracy*.

A second trend in the convergence trajectory is the moderation of the Right. As Figure 1 illustrates, while the Chilean right-wing coalition began with a typically rightist electoral platform in the 1990s, it moved on to a rather centrist one in the 2000s and then veered sharply to the left in 2013. By way of comparison, in the 1990s Alianza's average RILE score (+22.8) is similar to that of the US Republican Party (+27.3), whereas in the 2000s Alianza's score (-1.2) is closer to that of José María Aznar's Partido Popular (Popular Party, PP) in Spain (+3.3). As a result, taking into consideration the whole 1990–2014 period, Alianza's standard deviation is more than three times higher than that of the US Republican Party and the Spanish PP.⁵⁶ Several authors point to the existence of 'two rights' in Chile and their strategy of forming electoral and governing coalitions as an explanation for this moderation.⁵⁷ The two rights are the UDI on the extreme right, formed by former collaborators and defenders of Pinochet's regime legacy and business interests, and the centre-right Renovación Nacional (National Renewal, RN), formed from the vestiges of the old Partido Nacional (National Party, PN) and a new generation of liberal leaders who intend to represent a wider right-wing constituency.⁵⁸

Nevertheless, the mere existence of the two rights does not explain the gradual convergence toward centrist and even leftist positions. In line with the party adaptation theory reviewed earlier, we believe this is due to a learning process through which the Right adjusts its strategy of political competition over time due to substantial and continued electoral losses. Poor electoral results with a traditional right-wing programmatic platform in the 1990s opened up a process of electoral re-definition. While the first move – as the theory goes – was toward the right in an attempt to re-capture the rightist vote, the subsequent moves were intended to chase a more successful left-wing coalition, thereby gradually moderating the Right's initially conservative programme. This move toward the centre paid off with better electoral results at the end of the 1990s, encouraging the coalition to adopt a more moderate platform in the 2000s and leading to an almost outright abandonment of its traditional platform in the 2010s.⁵⁹ Not by chance, Andrés Allamand, one of the main advocates of moderation as key for the Right's electoral success, has recently argued that the Chilean 'Centre-Right needs to adopt a new approach: to assume for certain that inequality as a problem exists, that it does not resolve itself and that from now on it will be a political priority for the Centre-Right'.⁶⁰

⁵⁶The standard deviation of RILE scores is 17.7, 3.2 and 5.5 for the Chilean Alianza, the US Republican Party and the Spanish PP respectively.

⁵⁷Roberts, 'Chile: The Left after Neoliberalism'; Siavelis, 'Chile: The Right's Evolution'.

⁵⁸For a detailed analysis of the origins and evolutions of these two rights, see Marcelo Pollack, *The New Right in Chile, 1973–97* (London: Macmillan, 1999).

⁵⁹Juan Pablo Luna and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, 'Conclusion. Right (and Left) Politics in Contemporary Latin America', in Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser (eds.), *The Resilience of the Latin American Right*, p. 357.

⁶⁰Andrés Allamand, *La salida. Cómo derrotar a la Nueva Mayoría en 2017* (Santiago: Aguilar, 2016), p. 77.

The Dimensions of Electoral Convergence in Post-Transition Chile

The MARPOR database has the benefit of allowing a disaggregation of the dimensions of electoral competition along several issues. The database itself offers four indices that show the salience attributed to common political conflicts: economic planning, the defence of a market economy, welfare state expansion and international peace. Moreover, it allows researchers to construct their own indices and use the percentage of mentions contained in each question as a measure of the salience of that issue in the relevant political programme.⁶¹

To uncover the dimensions of electoral convergence in Chile and its evolution across time, we use three indices included in the MARPOR database: 'market regulation',⁶² 'defence of the free market' and 'welfare and social policy', which includes 'education'. These summarise the main axes of programmatic competition in Western democracies and allow for comparisons over time and across countries. We leave out the 'international peace' index, given the low salience it has in the Chilean coalitions' programmes. We also create two additional measures: a 'modernisation' index and a 'democratic/authoritarian' index. While the first intends to capture a dimension of electoral competition that is relevant outside developed democracies, the second intends to reflect the significance of this cleavage in electoral competition in Chile. Furthermore, to show the increase in issue competition in Chile, we analyse the salience of 'morality' and 'law and order' issues, which have increased in relevance to the population in recent years. This gives us eight issues that account for most of the coalitions' attention in their electoral programmes. As Table 2 shows, they cover between roughly 45 per cent and 70 per cent of the issues underpinning electoral competition in each election since 1989.

Market Regulation and Defence of the Free Market

Figure 2a shows the position of Concertación and Alianza on the issue of market regulation, i.e. topics related to increased consumer protection, economic competition and prevention of monopolies and other situations disrupting the functioning of markets.⁶³ The figure shows that market regulation has increased in prominence in both coalitions over time and the salience of the issue clearly increased from the 1990s to the 2000s. In the case of the left-wing Concertación, market regulation jumps from less than 6 per cent of mentions in the 1990s to almost 10 per cent in the 2000s, before falling again to 6 per cent in 2013. In the case of the right-wing Alianza, the importance of market regulation jumps dramatically from negligible in 1989 to almost 10 per cent in 2013. This implies that increased support for market regulation constitutes one of the issues that explain the moderation of the Chilean Right, especially in the last two elections. Just to illustrate this position, while the 2009 right-wing manifesto argued that 'we will continue to promote the organisation of consumers, so that they can defend their rights, and perfect the legislation so that

⁶¹Budge *et al.* (eds.), *Mapping Policy Preferences*.

⁶²The original 'planned economy' (PLANECON) index in the MARPOR database includes 'market regulation', 'support for economic planning' and 'price control'. We only use 'market regulation' as it captures the great majority of mentions of Chilean coalitions.

⁶³The 'market regulation' category in the MARPOR database is 'per403'.

Table 2. Salience of Studied Indexes and Issues (% Mentions in Manifesto)

		1989	1993	1999	2005	2009	2013
Market Regulation	Concertación	3.0	5.3	5.4	9.1	9.3	6.3
	Alianza	0.2	1.3	1.1	1.9	4.2	9.3
Market Economy	Concertación	4.0	3.8	1.3	1.7	1.0	1.0
	Alianza	8.9	15.4	3.2	2.1	1.9	0.0
Welfare	Concertación	12.4	13.9	18.6	20.3	20.0	17.7
	Alianza	7.7	7.8	16.8	15.4	10.3	17.2
Education	Concertación	6.0	8.2	7.6	5.2	6.3	6.9
	Alianza	5.9	4.5	6.9	7.9	7.0	15.6
Modernisation	Concertación	7.3	15.9	11.4	13.6	11.3	17.4
	Alianza	8.2	15.1	9.4	8.6	14.8	8.6
Democracy/ Authoritarianism	Concertación	14.7	6.2	14.0	8.0	8.5	8.4
	Alianza	10.0	7.1	9.0	6.9	6.7	5.2
Morality	Concertación	0.3	2.0	2.5	0.0	0.0	0.3
	Alianza	2.2	3.9	1.0	0.2	1.6	0.5
Law and Order	Concertación	0.9	3.1	4.2	3.8	3.1	2.8
	Alianza	1.8	4.2	4.7	4.8	4.9	12.9
Total	Concertación	48.5	58.2	65.0	61.7	59.6	61.0
	Alianza	44.8	59.3	52.1	47.5	51.3	68.6

Source: Authors' elaboration from MARPOR database, which is available at <https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/>, last access 5 June 2019.

they can access the Courts of Justice',⁶⁴ the 2013 right-wing manifesto maintained that 'it is essential to recognise that an adequate functioning of the market requires periodic reviews of the regulations and the existing institutions'.⁶⁵

Figure 2a shows that the 2005 election (the first Bachelet government programme) is an inflection point in terms of the salience of market regulation. The reduced presence of the issue in the second Bachelet government programme (2013 election) might be explained less as a reaction than as a change in the tone of the discourse of her campaign. As opposed to 2005, the discourse of the 2013 campaign included not just more market regulation but greater state intervention. The following statements from the respective years' coded manifestos support this interpretation. In 2005, the Bachelet campaign posed the issue of market regulation in the following terms: 'Globalisation creates more advantages and opportunities for bigger enterprises vis-à-vis small and medium enterprises. The hidden face of this process may be market concentration, which threatens fair competition and damages the interests of citizens and consumers. A modern economy combats and punishes anticompetitive practices.'⁶⁶ In 2013, both the rationale for the intervention of the state as well as its role had changed: 'The realisation of the main proposals contained in this programme requires more state and a better state. Chile needs a modern state that can lead development, that ensures fair competition and that can safeguard access, quality and satisfaction in the public services that it delivers to its citizens.'⁶⁷ This shows that while in 2005 the centre-left coalition believed that the main role of the state was to ensure adequate regulation and oversee the correct functioning of markets, in 2013 the coalition stressed the need for a more active state, highlighting the need for the state to lead the development model. With respect to the Right, the evolution of the salience of market regulation in the coalition's programme – especially during the 2013 election – may be interpreted as a right-wing coalition reacting to a successful left-wing coalition attempting to 'own' the discourse of taming unfettered market competition and protecting consumers from abuses, particularly following a series of notorious collusion scandals at the end of the decade.

Figure 2b shows the market economy index for both coalitions. This index includes positive mentions of the free market, free market capitalism as an economic model and related policies like privatisation, fiscal austerity, etc.⁶⁸ The figure shows a significant decrease in mentions of the market economy for both coalitions, especially Alianza. This data is particularly relevant for examining the change in the Right's electoral strategy, from a traditional right-wing platform during the 1990s and up to 15 per cent of the electoral programme devoted to defending the market economy in 1993, to little more than 3 per cent in 1999 and declining thereafter. Interestingly, Figure 2b mirrors Figure 2a and this is perhaps the best illustration of the change in Alianza's electoral strategy in order to match its more successful centre-left competitor.

⁶⁴Sebastián Piñera (Coalición por el Cambio), 'Programa de gobierno, 2010–2014', Sept. 2009, p. 31.

⁶⁵Evelyn Matthei (Alianza por Chile), 'Programa presidencial, 2014–2018', Sept. 2013, p. 102.

⁶⁶Michelle Bachelet (Concertación), 'Programa de gobierno, 2006–2010', Oct. 2005, p. 10.

⁶⁷Michelle Bachelet (Nueva Mayoría), 'Programa de gobierno, 2014–2018', Oct. 2013, p. 11.

⁶⁸Categories 'per401' and 'per414' in the MARPOR database.




Figure 3. Salience of Welfare and Education Issues in Coalitions' Programmes

Source: Authors' elaboration from MARPOR database, which is available at <https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/>, last access 5 June 2019.

Welfare and Social Policy

Figure 3 shows the position of the two coalitions on welfare issues.⁶⁹ This data reveals that welfare has constituted a significant and growing part of the Concertación electoral programmes since 1989. Conversely, the important part that welfare issues play for the Right's electoral profile today is noteworthy. Since the 1999 election, welfare issues have become a substantial topic in the Alianza programmes, in recent elections reaching the same level of significance as for its centre-left counterpart. Concretely, mentions of welfare increased by 10 per cent from 1989 to 2013 (7.7 per cent to 17.2 per cent). Moreover, if we consider the expansion of education as an additional dimension of social policy and welfare (Figure 3b),⁷⁰ an issue where salience increased from 5 per cent to 15 per cent for Alianza between 1989 and 2013, mentions of welfare and education alone account for one-third of the coalition's manifesto. We can state, therefore, that welfare and social policy – including education – are the main issues of convergence in electoral competition in Chile.

This finding reinforces previous research on the evolution of the Right in Chile and other Latin American countries. For example, Manuel Alcántara Sáez shows that in the early 2000s Chilean social policy (including housing, healthcare and social assistance) was the only item where nearly a majority of right-wing deputies justified high state intervention. In fact, support for state intervention among right-wing deputies on these issues was equivalent to that of the PDC, a major coalition partner in the centre-left Concertación.⁷¹ Other research on the evolution of party–voter linkages in Chile has underscored the emergence of a more progressive social policy profile in the UDI, intended to attract the vote of poor constituencies.⁷² This is coincident with research showing that Latin American right-wing

⁶⁹Categories 'per503' and 'per504' in the MARPOR database.

⁷⁰The category for 'education' in the MARPOR database is 'per506'.

⁷¹Alcántara Sáez, 'La ideología de los partidos políticos chilenos'.

⁷²Juan Pablo Luna, 'Segmented Party–Voter Linkages in Latin America: The Case of the UDI', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 42: 2 (2010), pp. 325–56.




Figure 4. Salience of Modernisation Issues in Coalitions' Programmes

Source: Authors' elaboration from MARPOR database, which is available at <https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/>, last access 5 June 2019.

parties governing after the 'turn to the left' have tended not to dismantle progressive social policies and, in some cases, have even expanded them.⁷³

Modernisation

We constructed a modernisation index (see Figure 4) by adding statements that deal with governmental and administrative efficiency,⁷⁴ as well as positive mentions of technology and infrastructure.⁷⁵ The data shows a high salience of modernisation issues for both coalitions, comprising between 8 per cent and roughly 18 per cent of their manifestos throughout the analysed period. The right-wing Alianza shows two peaks, in 1993 with Arturo Alessandri and again in 2009 with Piñera, when it reached close to 15 per cent. The latter is consistent with the technocratic tone of Piñera's 2009 campaign. For the left-wing Concertación, on the other hand, there is a gradual increase in the index, with peaks in the 1993 election with Eduardo Frei and again in the last election of 2013 with Bachelet. The salience of this issue in Bachelet's 2013 programme might be related to the need to show

⁷³Sara Niedzwiecki and Jennifer Pribble, 'Social Policies and Center-Right Governments in Argentina and Chile', *Latin American Politics and Society*, 59: 3 (2017), pp. 72–97.

⁷⁴Category 'per303' in the MARPOR database.

⁷⁵Category 'per411' in the MARPOR database.

administrative competence, given the coalition's history in government since 1989 and its expansion toward the left with the incorporation of the PC.

All in all, the data reveals that while highly salient in the electoral programmes, the theme of modernisation probably constitutes a valence issue. Given that Chile is a country that, despite its economic progress, still faces serious problems in areas such as infrastructure, productivity and innovation, it is not surprising that the two dominant coalitions agree on the necessity of fostering economic modernisation. In addition, the high salience of modernisation for both coalitions suggests that there might be competition over ownership. As Bonnie Meguid points out, when certain issues are desired by the whole population, mainstream parties need to not only take this issue into account but also try to own the issue in question to win credibility over rivals.⁷⁶

The Democratic/Authoritarian Cleavage

A significant amount of literature on the evolution of Chilean politics is devoted to discussions of the influence and change of cleavages after democratisation. One crucial controversy is whether the main cleavages that structured Chilean politics prior to the authoritarian breakdown of 1973, i.e. the class and religious cleavages, are still relevant for party competition or whether a new democratic/authoritarian cleavage forged during the dictatorship, dividing supporters from opponents of Pinochet and his legacy, is more salient.⁷⁷ Contemporary contributions to this debate argue that whatever their importance in the immediate post-authoritarian years, this may no longer be the case. For instance, Matías Bargsted and Nicolás Somma find that the significance of both cleavages has been gradually declining.⁷⁸ Similarly, Juan Pablo Luna and Rodrigo Mardones argue that the election in 2010 of Piñera, the first right-wing president after democratisation, marked the decline of the democratic/authoritarian cleavage and therefore opened a new era for party competition in the country.⁷⁹

⁷⁶Meguid, 'Competition between Unequals'.

⁷⁷This argument was introduced in Eugenio Tironi and Felipe Agüero, '¿Sobrevivirá el nuevo paisaje político chileno?', *Estudios Públicos*, 74 (autumn 1999), pp. 151–68, and discussed in Mariano Torcal and Scott Mainwaring, 'The Political Recrafting of Social Bases of Party Competition: Chile, 1973–95', *British Journal of Political Science*, 33: 1 (2003), pp. 55–84. For a response that argues this cleavage, if manifested, would be short-lived, see J. Samuel Valenzuela, 'Respuesta a Eugenio Tironi y Felipe Agüero: Reflexiones sobre el presente y futuro del paisaje político chileno a la luz de su pasado', *Estudios Públicos*, 75 (winter 1999), pp. 273–90; and J. Samuel Valenzuela and Timothy R. Scully, 'Electoral Choices and the Party System in Chile: Continuities and Changes at the Recovery of Democracy', *Comparative Politics*, 29: 4 (1997), pp. 511–27. During the early 2000s several scholars recognised that the democratic/authoritarian cleavage had survived longer than expected. See Ortega Frei, 'Los partidos políticos chilenos', p. 142; Claudio A. Bonilla, Ryan E. Carlin, Gregory J. Love and Ernesto Silva Méndez, 'Social or Political Cleavages? A Spatial Analysis of the Party System in Post-Authoritarian Chile', *Public Choice*, 146: 1 (2009), pp. 9–21. It is important to note that even authors who assign high relevance to this democratic/authoritarian cleavage warn that this should not be understood as a classical Rokkianian 'generative cleavage' with the capacity to create new parties and identities. See, for example, Ortega Frei, 'Los partidos políticos chilenos'; Torcal and Mainwaring, 'The Political Recrafting'.

⁷⁸Bargsted and Somma, 'Social Cleavages and Political Dealignment'.

⁷⁹Luna and Mardones, 'Chile: Are the Parties Over?'.




Figure 5. Salience of Democratic/Authoritarian Cleavage

Source: Authors' elaboration from MARPOR database, which is available at <https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/>, last access 5 June 2019.

Taking advantage of the MARPOR database, we have constructed a democratic/authoritarian index that captures the salience of this cleavage in political competition since 1989.⁸⁰ Figure 5 shows the democratic/authoritarian index and its evolution. The data confirms that the relevance of this political cleavage has decreased significantly: its salience fell to little more than half of what it was in 1989 (from 14.7 per cent to 8.4 per cent for the centre-left Concertación and from 10 per cent to 5.2 per cent for the right-wing Alianza). Nevertheless, this also shows that the democratic/authoritarian cleavage remains an important issue in electoral competition between the two coalitions. In fact, in the 2013 elections, mentions of issues related to this cleavage occupied more than 8 per cent of Nueva Mayoría's programme and more than 5 per cent of Alianza's.

Cartelisation and Issue Competition in Post-Transition Chile

As we have demonstrated, electoral competition in Chile has made the two main political coalitions converge over time in the typical areas where the Right and

⁸⁰The index was created by aggregating categories associated with either authoritarian or democratic values. For authoritarianism, it includes favourable mentions of the military and pre-democratic elites along with negative mentions of democracy. For democracy, it includes negative views about the military and pre-democratic elites and positive mentions of democracy, human rights and compensation to victims. The respective categories in the MARPOR database are 'per104', 'per202_2', 'per305_4' and 'per605_1' for authoritarianism, and 'per105', 'per202_1', 'per201_2', 'per305_5', 'per305_6' and 'per605_2' for democracy.

the Left tended to diverge in the past, notably in terms of welfare and market regulation. Moreover, while the democratic/authoritarian cleavage still weighs in the coalition's electoral strategies, it has declined significantly in importance. Therefore, seen in the light of the MARPOR data, it is not far-fetched to suggest that the Chilean party system is characterised by the electoral dominance of two political forces, which increasingly campaign by developing similar policy proposals in their manifestos. This portrayal of contemporary Chile is quite close to the cartel party thesis advanced by Richard Katz and Peter Mair, who draw attention to the replacement of the traditional mass party by a new type of political party which not only adopts patterns of interparty collusion rather than competition, but also privileges professional expertise and technocratic depoliticisation over political activism and strong roots in society.⁸¹

Although the cartel party thesis was originally developed to understand political transformations occurring in Western Europe, it can be adapted to analyse the reality of other countries.⁸² Katz and Mair relate the rise of the cartel party and the reduction of party competition directly to the increasing dependence of parties on public funding, a thesis that does not apply to post-transition Chile because party financing has been marked until recently by private donations rather than public money. However, recent corruption scandals have shown that the centre-left and centre-right coalitions obtained funds for campaigning from the business sector in exchange for political influence to achieve a similar result: ensuring that either of the coalitions will govern in a fashion favourable to the interests of the existing economic elites.⁸³ As Luna indicates, 'the upshot of these scandals has been to reinforce the perception that political and business elites are colluding to perpetrate "*abusos*" [exploitation] for the sake of "*lucro*" [profit]'.⁸⁴

Therefore, one could argue that the more political coalitions obtained funds from the same source (the business community in the case of Chile), the more they came to resemble one another and adopt similar policy approaches during campaigns. Seen in this light, the increasing convergence between the Centre-Left and Centre-Right in post-transition Chile revealed by the MARPOR data gives some validity to the cartel party thesis. Furthermore, cartelisation helps explain why Concertación's centre-left administrations have made little effort to undertake structural reforms to address the country's economic disparities. Despite the presence of many signs of discontent with the existing levels of inequality, the increasing politicisation of inequality by social movements,⁸⁵ and a fairly

⁸¹Katz and Mair, 'Changing Models of Party Organization'; 'The Cartel Party Thesis'. For a similar interpretation of the transformation of Chile's left-wing parties and its effects on welfare policies, see Jennifer Pribble, *Welfare and Party Politics in Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

⁸²See, for instance, Kenneth M. Roberts, 'Populism and Political Parties', in Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul A. Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo and Pierre Ostiguy (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 287–304.

⁸³Daniel Matamala, *Poderoso caballero: El peso del dinero en la política chilena* (Santiago: Editorial Universidad Diego Portales, 2015).

⁸⁴Luna, 'Chile's Crisis of Representation', p. 134.

⁸⁵Donoso and von Bülow (eds.), *Social Movements in Chile*; Kenneth M. Roberts, '(Re)Politicizing Inequalities: Movements, Parties, and Social Citizenship in Chile', *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, 8: 3 (2016), pp. 125–54.

leftist and stable political manifesto, the coalition systematically refrained from undertaking more radical reforms while in government. One problem, among others, is that a more leftist government would have threatened the interests of powerful elites, who would have not only stopped financing the Centre-Left's political campaigns but also hardened, limiting a more progressive government agenda.⁸⁶ To a certain extent, this is what happened to Bachelet in her second, more progressive administration (2014–18): the more she pushed for far-reaching reforms, in line with her reformist impetus but undesirable for the business community, the more the latter attacked her agenda.⁸⁷

Another way of looking at the cartelisation thesis is by examining the extent to which issue competition is taking root in Chilean party competition. After all, Katz and Mair maintain that once mainstream parties are 'largely indistinguishable from one another in terms of their main policy proposals', they will try to politicise other issues with the aim of signalling at least some sort of difference to the electorate.⁸⁸ Moreover, by examining whether issue competition is taking place in contemporary Chile, we can shed light on our third hypothesis, namely that it is the rightist Alianza, the coalition with more electoral defeats, which has mooted new issues for electoral competition. We examine this argument in two issues where the Right might have a competitive advantage: morality and law and order issues.

Morality Issues

A number of authors highlight the growing importance of post-materialist issues related to lifestyles, culture and the environment in electoral competition in the Western world.⁸⁹ They indicate that as countries increase their level of economic development and welfare, electoral competition will be progressively more concerned with post-materialist issues and less based on traditional cleavages.⁹⁰ In Chile, research has demonstrated the increasing salience to some segments of the population of issues such as divorce, abortion and same-sex marriage.⁹¹ At the same time, however, Chile is often portrayed as a conservative society in comparison with other Latin American countries, one where the Catholic Church still exerts significant moral as well as political influence.⁹²

⁸⁶Juan Pablo Luna and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, 'Introduction. The Right in Contemporary Latin America: A Framework for Analysis', in Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser (eds.), *The Resilience of the Latin American Right*, pp. 12–13.

⁸⁷Tasha Fairfield, 'Structural Power in Comparative Political Economy: Perspectives from Policy Formulation in Latin America', *Business and Politics*, 17: 3 (2015), pp. 411–41.

⁸⁸Katz and Mair, 'The Cartel Party Thesis', p. 760.

⁸⁹Ronald Inglehart, *Cultural Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Cas Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

⁹⁰Some authors argue that post-materialist values arrange under a new cleavage. See Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks and Carole J. Wilson, 'Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?', *Comparative Political Studies*, 35: 8 (2002), pp. 965–89.

⁹¹Merike Blofield, *The Politics of Moral Sin: Abortion and Divorce in Spain, Chile and Argentina* (New York and London: Routledge, 2006); Jordi Diez, *The Politics of Gay Marriage in Latin America: Argentina, Chile and Mexico* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

⁹²Blofield, *The Politics of Moral Sin*.




Figure 6. Salience of Morality Issues in Coalitions' Programmes

Source: Authors' elaboration from MARPOR database, which is available at <https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/>, last access 5 June 2019.

We have proxied post-materialist issues using the 'traditional morality positive' and 'traditional morality negative' variables contained in the MARPOR database.⁹³ These refer to opposite takes on prohibition, censorship, suppression of alternative behaviour (including divorce, abortion, etc.), maintenance and stability of traditional family values and support for religious institutions and their influence on public affairs.

Figure 6 shows the evolution of the salience of morality issues in the electoral strategies of Chile's two main coalitions. The data reveals that morality issues have remained residual in the manifestos of Chile's two main political coalitions, with an average salience of about 1.2 per cent in all elections between 1989 and 2013, and a peak of close to 4 per cent in the 1993 election. Although the data does show that, as expected, the Centre-Right has relied more on morality issues for electoral competition than the Centre-Left, it also demonstrates the declining salience of morality in party competition. In fact, in the 2013 presidential election, morality issues represented less than 1 per cent of the electoral programme of both coalitions. This means that Chile's two main electoral coalitions have not tried to politicise moral issues, although post-material values seem to be becoming increasingly relevant to certain segments of the population. The reason for this probably lies in the fact that the parties of the coalitions have different positions on moral issues, and in consequence, with the aim of avoiding internal conflicts, the parties

⁹³Categories 'per603' and 'per604' respectively in the MARPOR database.

that belong to each of these coalitions prefer to be silent on this topic in their presidential platforms.⁹⁴

Law and Order Issues

In the context of the turn to the left in Latin America, it has been argued that an increasing politicisation of crime and public security concerns is one of the strategies by which right-wing political parties try to buttress their electoral strength.⁹⁵ Although Chile is one of the countries in the region with the lowest indicators of crime and violence, the population has consistently ranked crime among their major concerns in public opinion polls. This, and the fact that the police force continues to be one of the most trusted institutions in the country, incentivises campaigning on law and order issues.⁹⁶

Our data in Figure 7 shows an increase in the salience of law and order issues, positive and negative,⁹⁷ with a rise of up to 4 per cent in the mid-1990s, decreasing slightly for the leftist coalition in the 2000s, but jumping to 12 per cent for Alianza in the 2013 election. Unlike every other dimension of party competition studied here, in the case of law and order it has been the rightist coalition that has consistently and increasingly devoted a larger part of its electoral manifesto to this issue. This indicates that while converging toward the more successful Concertación on almost all issues relevant for electoral competition in Chile, the one issue on which Alianza is consistently seeking an electoral advantage is law and order. This suggests that issue competition might be gradually on the rise in contemporary Chile, particularly because of the Right's interest in presenting itself as the defender of an 'iron-fist' approach toward crime. Take, for instance, the following sentence of Alianza's 2013 manifesto: 'We see how, day after day, people with long police records walk free and commit crimes. [...] these people cannot be free. This is why in our government, no delinquent or drug trafficker who is a repeat offender will have the right to early conditional release, but will have to serve his complete sentence in prison.'⁹⁸

Concluding Remarks

In this article we use, for the first time, data generated by the MARPOR project to assess how the electoral platforms of the two main Chilean political coalitions varied from the end of Pinochet's dictatorship in 1989 to the 2013 presidential election. We demonstrate that ideological convergence has been growing, to the

⁹⁴For example, in the Centre-Left's 2013 electoral manifesto there is only a single sentence that touches upon legalising abortion in certain circumstances (p. 169), something that indeed occurred during Bachelet's second administration and generated a heated debate within the coalition.

⁹⁵Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser, 'Conclusion. Right (and Left) Politics'.

⁹⁶Anthony Pereira and Mark Ungar, 'The Persistence of the "mano dura": Authoritarian Legacies and Policing in Brazil and the Southern Cone', in Katherine Hite and Paola Cesarini (eds.), *Authoritarian Legacies and Democracy in Latin America and Southern Europe* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004), pp. 263–304.

⁹⁷Categories 'per605_1' and 'per605_2' respectively in the MARPOR database.

⁹⁸Evelyn Matthei (Alianza por Chile), 'Programa presidencial, 2014–2018', Sept. 2013, p. 75.




Figure 7. Salience of Law and Order Issues in Coalitions' Programmes

Source: Authors' elaboration from MARPOR database, which is available at <https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/>, last access 5 June 2019.

point that in the 2013 presidential election the differences between the centre-left and centre-right coalitions were minor. However, contrary to most scholarly accounts pointing to the moderation of the Chilean Left, the MARPOR data shows that it has been the centre-right coalition engaging in a pronounced process of ideological moderation and not the Left, which has maintained a fairly stable left-wing platform even by international standards. Therefore, our first contribution lies in explaining this unexpected result: the severe electoral losses that the Right experienced during the 1990s paved the way for a steady moderation of the policy proposals defended by right-wing presidential candidates in their electoral manifestos. The result of this transformation is growing programmatic convergence between the two political coalitions, although one important difference exists: the growing emphasis on law and order by the Centre-Right.

A second contribution derived from this analysis is to reinforce the utility of analysing electoral manifestos for the study of political competition and its relevance for examining the state of Chilean democracy. One could argue that the moderation of the centre-right coalition is linked to its ability and/or need to take into account demands for more market regulation and welfare expansion. This is certainly true and provides grounds to think that political coalitions in post-transition Chile have been trying to adapt to remain competitive. From this perspective, the party system responds to the demands of the electorate and can therefore adequately represent citizens, as in the median voter theory. However, this contrasts with a vast amount of literature on Chilean politics

that draws attention to the unresponsiveness of mainstream political parties and their detachment from society.⁹⁹ This scholarship highlights that the two dominant political coalitions have become ossified and thus have increasing difficulties channelling demands emanating from below, seen in the increased preponderance of social movements and protests in recent years.¹⁰⁰ Seen in light of our analysis, we can argue that programmatic convergence is becoming a real challenge for Chilean democracy as voters have growing problems identifying the extent to which mainstream political forces meaningfully articulate different policy platforms during campaigns.

Although academics and policy-makers alike saw political polarisation as the main threat to the consolidation of democracy in the early 1990s, this does not seem to be the case today, when convergence, *not* polarisation, jeopardises Chilean democracy.¹⁰¹ Following the cartel party thesis, we may state that, once a political cartel is established, two main threats can affect the democratic system: defection and challenge from new entrants.¹⁰² While the former results from decreasing sympathy for and identification with mainstream political parties, the latter refers to the formation of new political forces that attack the established ones because of their unwillingness and failure to represent the electorate. As various scholars have shown, these two threats are becoming manifest in contemporary Chile: not only has the level of identification with established political parties plummeted, but new political actors have been gaining ground.¹⁰³

Finally, this article's third contribution is the opening up of a promising avenue of research for the role of manifestos in Latin America – a region that the MARPOR project is currently coding – allowing scholars to use this dataset in the near future. We discuss these contributions in more detail. As we indicated in our analysis of electoral manifestos in Chile, it is important to make a distinction between what parties and leaders say when competing with a certain programme to win office, and the programmatic ideas that they follow once in power. As Boas indicates, '[c]ampaigns often touch upon policy, but the process of policy-making in Latin America is very different from the way candidates choose their strategies'.¹⁰⁴ This seems to be particularly true for the case of Chile, where the centre-left coalition has advanced relatively leftist programmes according to the empirical material discussed in this article, but most presidents of this coalition have undertaken very moderate reforms. By the same token, one could maintain that the centre-right coalition has learned that neoliberal orthodoxy is a non-option in the electoral arena and it needs to find ways to demonstrate sensitivity to social concerns, independent of what it does once in government. In short, what political actors say on

⁹⁹Luna and Mardones, 'Chile: Are the Parties Over?'; Altman and Luna, 'Uprooted but Stable'; Castiglioni and Rovira Kaltwasser, 'Introduction. Challenges to Political Representation'; Luna, 'Chile's Crisis of Representation'; Rosenblatt, *Party Vibrancy*; Huneus, 'La democracia semisoberana'.

¹⁰⁰Donoso and von Bülow, *Social Movements in Chile*; Roberts, '(Re)Politicizing Inequalities'.

¹⁰¹Huneus, 'La democracia semisoberana', p. 50.

¹⁰²Katz and Mair, 'The Cartel Party Thesis', p. 759.

¹⁰³Luna and Mardones, 'Chile: Are the Parties Over?'; Altman and Luna, 'Uprooted but Stable'; Castiglioni and Rovira Kaltwasser, 'Introduction. Challenges to Political Representation'; Luna, 'Chile's Crisis of Representation'; Rosenblatt, *Party Vibrancy*; Huneus, 'La democracia semisoberana'.

¹⁰⁴Boas, 'Varieties of Electioneering', p. 645.

the campaign trail may be quite different from what they actually do when policies get created.

Because party manifestos should be seen as the signals that leaders and parties send to the electorate in order to win elections, it is worth analysing in detail the extent to which the actual policy responses of governments deviate from the programmatic propositions made during campaigning. As the dispute over the 2013 Chilean presidential election manifesto at the beginning of this article shows, Chilean party coalitions make use of election manifestos not only for signalling policy proposals to potential voters, but also for agreeing on a common government programme in the context of multiparty coalitions and setting legislative priorities for the administration. In other words, one relevant research question for future investigations is the distance between the actual policies advanced by presidents and those they advocated in their electoral manifestos. In fact, this could help to explain why political parties in Chile and other parts of Latin America are increasingly under stress. After all, if they develop a certain agenda during campaign season but do something different once in government, one should not be surprised when the electorate turns away from established parties.

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Spanish abstract

A través de un análisis de los datos del Proyecto Manifiesto sobre Chile en la post-transición, mostramos que hay una creciente convergencia en las estrategias electorales entre las coaliciones de centro-izquierda y de centro-derecha. Mientras que la primera se caracteriza por tener cierta inercia, la otra está marcada por una gradual, aunque persistente, moderación programática. Para interpretar estos resultados, nos apoyamos no sólo en teorías sobre la relevancia y adaptación partidarias, sino también en las tesis del partido-cartel. Nuestra contribución refuerza los hallazgos de una creciente literatura sobre la post-transición en Chile que revela una mayor colusión entre las coaliciones de izquierda y de derecha, las que han tenido cada vez más dificultades en canalizar las demandas emanadas desde abajo y por lo tanto en proveer una adecuada representación política.

Spanish keywords: Chile; manifestos; competencia política; moderación de derecha; cartelización

Portuguese abstract

Ao examinar os dados do Projeto Manifiesto no Chile pós-transicional, mostramos uma crescente convergência nas estratégias de competição eleitoral entre as alianças da centro-esquerda e da centro-direita. Enquanto a primeira se caracterizou pela inércia, a segunda foi marcada por uma gradual e ao mesmo tempo incansável moderação

programática. Para interpretar estes resultados, contamos não somente com teorias de saliência e adaptação partidária, mas também na tese de partido-cartel. Este artigo reforça as descobertas das emergentes publicações sobre o Chile pós-transicional que revela um gradativo embate entre as alianças tradicionais de esquerda e de direita, sendo que essas têm encontrado crescente dificuldade em canalizar as demandas oriundas de baixo, providenciando representação política adequada.

Portuguese keywords: Chile; manifestos; rivalidade política; moderação de direita; cartelização

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