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  An empirical analysis of stubborn bargaining

Send, J., & Serena, M. (2021). An empirical analysis of stubborn bargaining. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, No. 2021-05. doi:10.2139/ssrn.3787029.

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https://ssrn.com/abstract=3787029 (Preprint)
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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2022.102516 (Publisher version)
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Also published in Journal of Economic Psychology, Volume 90
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 Creators:
Send, Jonas1, Author           
Serena, Marco1, Author           
Affiliations:
1Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society, ou_830552              

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Free keywords: bargaining, stubbornness
 Abstract: In alternating-offer bargaining, a seller is "stubborn" if she demands the same asking price more than once. We provide empirical evidence on stubbornness and inform the theoretical literature by analyzing millions of eBay bargaining threads taken from Backus et al. (2020). Focusing on the best predictors of first-period stubbornness, we find that stubbornness is sticky, exploitative, and vengeful; a seller who was stubborn in the past is more likely to be stubborn in the future, and a seller is more likely stubborn if the buyer has been particularly lenient or tough in her counteroffer.

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Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2021-02-16
 Publication Status: Published online
 Pages: 33
 Publishing info: -
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: -
 Identifiers: DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3787029
 Degree: -

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Title: Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
Source Genre: Series
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Pages: - Volume / Issue: No. 2021-05 Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: - Identifier: -