Winner’s effort maximization in large contests

Barbieri, Stefano; Serena, Marco

doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102512

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Winner’s effort maximization in large contests

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Serena, Marco
Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society;

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引用

Barbieri, S., & Serena, M. (2021). Winner’s effort maximization in large contests. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 96:. doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102512.

引用: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-000A-E039-9

要旨

We investigate the temporal structure that maximizes the winner’s effort in large homogeneous contests. We find that the winner’s effort ranges from a lower bound of 0 to an upper bound of one third of the value of the prize, depending on the temporal structure; the upper (lower) bound is approached with an infinite number of players playing sequentially (simultaneously) in the first periods (period). Nevertheless, when the number of players is large but finite, we show that winner’s effort is maximized when all players play sequentially except in the very last period and that, within the family of such optimal temporal structures, more players play simultaneously in the very last period than sequentially in all other periods. Furthermore, out of all players, the percentage of those playing simultaneously in the very last period goes to 100% as the number of players grows larger and larger.