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Einstein and Logical Empiricism

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Engler,  Fynn Ole
Department Structural Changes in Systems of Knowledge, Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, Max Planck Society;

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Citation

Engler, F. O. (2021). Einstein and Logical Empiricism. In T. Uebel, & C. Limbeck-Lilienau (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Logical Empiricism (pp. 90-98). London: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315650647-11.


Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-000A-5541-D
Abstract
The logical empiricists played key roles in the battle over the philosophical interpretation of the relativity theory. This chapter looks not only at Schlick’s defense of Einstein, but also at an input of Schlick’s that shaped Einstein’s view, namely his “point-coincidence argument.” Initially, the “hole argument” prevented a persuasive interpretation of general relativity, but it was soon replaced by the “point-coincidence argument,” which Einstein is likely to have adopted from Schlick at the end of 1915. Schlick had arrived at a uniform method of measurement based on spatiotemporal coincidences. The coincidence method made it possible to unambiguously assign a spatiotemporal schematized system of concepts, as represented by Einstein’s general theory of relativity, to physical events. A historical account of this episode is given here.