Political representation in Europe: Understanding the party composition of EU institutions

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Summary

What explains the party composition of EU institutions? In European democracies, parties are key actors that transmit the political preferences of the electorate into political decisions. Parties are also influential in delegating decision makers to institutions of the European Union (EU). However, the strength of parties changes substantially through differences in the design of democratic institutions. As a consequence, electoral results are translated differently into political representation in European countries and to institutions of the EU.

In this work, I explain representation in the EU by focussing on the party composition of EU institutions since 1958. I show how the democratic institutions involved influence the party make up of the EU. In my study, I highlight the different mechanisms of delegation among member states. I discuss the consequences of institutional design for the strength of parties in parliaments and governments as well as in the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament. I draw on theories of government formation to explain the party make up of the Council. In addition, I explain the selection process to the College of Commissioners over time. By discussing work on the second-order effect in EP elections, I show how the party composition of the Council and the EP are interrelated. My results are based on a new database of electoral results and governmental compositions in Europe.

Zusammenfassung

In dieser Arbeit untersuche ich die parteipolitische Zusammensetzung der Europäischen Union (EU) seit 1958. Parteien sind zentrale Akteure in den politischen Systemen der Mitgliedsstaaten, welche die Entscheidungsprozesse in den Ländern und in den Institutionen der EU bestimmen. Parteien sind des Weiteren entscheidend an der politischen Willensbildung in den demokratischen Prozessen europäischer Länder und der EU beteiligt. Sie stellen Kandidaten für Wahlen und dominieren die Willensbildung in den Parlamenten. Dabei wird die Stärke der Parteien in besonderem Maße durch politische Institutionen beeinflusst.

Durch meine Arbeit erkläre ich Repräsentation in der EU, indem ich die Delegationskette von Wahlen über die Regierungsbildung in den Mitgliedstaaten zur parteipolitischen Zusammensetzung von Rat und Kommission nachzeichne. Des Weiteren diskutiere ich den Zusammenhang des Wahlverhaltens in nationalen Wahlen und den Wahlen zum Europäischen Parlament. Dabei lege ich besonderes Augenmerk auf den Einfluss verschiedener Institutionen in der Delegationskette. Mit meiner Arbeit leiste ich einen entscheidenden Beitrag, den Prozess der demokratischen Willensbildung in der EU besser zu verstehen.

1 Introduction

Modern democracy enables representation through elections. In a democracy, citizens enjoy political liberties and select their representatives in free and contested elections. Political representation via elections may be enabled by two mechanisms, mandate and accountability (Manin et al. 1999). A mandate view suggests that citizens select their delegates according to political promises. Politicians offer different political positions in electoral campaigns and citizens choose freely among them. As a consequence, politicians enact their political promises after elections via their electoral mandate. An accountability perspective focuses on retrospective control. Citizens may either support (re-elect) or oppose previous political decisions through elections. Hence, elections provide a mechanism to hold political actors accountable. Politicians are encouraged to enact political legislation in line with citizens' interest in order to get re-elected. Both approaches, mandate and accountability, suggest that governments act in the interest of the people. This minimalist conception of democracies informs us how democracy enables representation. It links the interests of citizens with political elites through elections. Elections enable citizens to voice their political preferences and delegate them to the legislative process. Free and open elections allow citizens to choose among different political representatives, hence between different political programmes. They may either delegate their political views (mandate) or punish policies that were not in line with their interest (accountability).

However, the chain of delegation in democratic political systems incurs some more steps of delegation. Political representatives select actors to propose legislation. A majority of the representatives enacts collectively binding decisions. This democratic process of delegation can be accomplished through very different political institutions. Electoral systems may encourage representation by local candidates or empower parties via national list requirements. Coalition building dynamics may privilege some legislative actors and disadvantage others. All these steps of delegation are influenced by underlying political institutions. These institutions may strengthen or reduce the chances of expressing political preferences for a mandate or to hold politicians accountable for previous decisions. Hence, to understand representation, we have to understand how political institutions alter the selection of political representatives.

The democratic chain of delegation has been better understood by scholars of comparative politics over the last decades. We now have a rich set of studies about the influences of electoral systems on party systems and vice versa. We have also made progress in understanding the dynamics of cabinet building and termination. In addition, we better comprehend inter-institutional decision-making dynamics such as bicameralism or judicial review. These findings allow us to understand how our political institutions alter representation and how democratically elected

agents act under different institutional rules. However, most of these studies focus on nation states.

In Europe, we have seen the emergence of a new and powerful political entity, the European Union (EU). What started as a cooperation of nation states has evolved into a complex political system. The various political institutions are still dominated by EU member states. However, their political composition comes about by very different forms of democratic delegation compared to the nation states. On the one hand, delegation to the Council and the Commission incurs one more step of delegation from national governments. On the other hand, democratic representatives in the EP are elected directly by EU citizens since 1979. As a consequence, we would expect these institutions to differ in their political composition.

What is a proper unit of analysis in order to understand the political composition of EU institutions? Manow et al. (2008, 20–25) suggest to focus on parties in order to understand political dynamics and representation in the EU. They base their argument on three observations. First, there have always been some general arguments that parties, especially their ideological orientations, have influenced key decisions of European integration. The six founding states were mostly governed by conservative parties. As a consequence, the practical concepts of European integration were very different from social-democratic (socialist) concepts of integration at the time. The same dynamics took place in the mid 1980s when a majority of conservative parties deepened European integration through the Single European Act. This major treaty was based on an significant amount of liberal economic ideas as supported by parties of the moderate right. Once a majority of moderate left parties was controlling European governments in the late 1990s, EU member states made more effort to enact social policies at the European level. Second, Manow et al. simply emphasise the fact that parties are major political units in democratic politics. The relevance of parties has been highlighted widely, theoretically and empirically. Parties structure political competition because they allow citizens to choose between different policy platforms. They enable and train for political careers by providing a platform for ambitious politicians. Especially in Europe, parties dominate decision making in parliaments and governments. It is very unlikely that these political entities loose all their relevance once decision making takes place at the European level. Third and finally, a lot of recent empirical investigation has revealed that parties do in fact influence political dynamics in the EU. Parties control the selection process to EU institutions at the national level, they structure competition within the EP and have some patterns of coalition building in the Council. I review this literature extensively in the next chapter. However, detailed studies based on very different research designs show that parties structure attitudes on European integration and influence decision making in the legislative process of the EU.

Given that parties are an important political entity in the EU, we also need a comprehensive

understanding how these actors come into place. The first parts of my introduction have highlighted the fact that democracy enables representation through elections but that the underlying political institutions of democratic systems may differ significantly and thereby have an effect on the composition of legislatures and governments. As a consequence, democratic institutions in EU member states should also alter representation to the political institutions of the EU differently. This dissertation will help to better understand representation in the EU by investigating the party composition of EU institutions. Most of the empirical contribution lies in specifying the mechanisms of delegation for the Council and the College of Commissioners. In order to explain the party structure of the EP, I draw on a rich set of empirical studies provided by other scholars. Through my work, I give a detailed empirical investigation of the party fabric of the EU from the creation of the European Economic Community to the Eastern enlargement of the EU (1958 to 2004).

My dissertation is divided into four substantive chapters. Chapter 2 gives a general introduction to the literature I base my study upon. That chapter also provides some first descriptive information on electoral systems and party systems among EU member states as well as information on the different processes of cabinet formation in the Union. In order to summarise the relevant work for my dissertation, I first introduce the literature on empirical democratic theory that examines representation via quantitative analyses. Second, I present more traditional approaches on studying the EU in order to put my work into the context of EU studies. A third part introduces the recent work on the role of parties in the EU. I conclude by summarizing our current understanding of the party fabric of the three EU institutions: the Council, the EP and the Commission. This summary highlights the fact that especially the party composition of the Council and the Commission has received little scholarly attention.

Chapter 3 discusses the empirical basis of studying political representation and the party structure of European countries as well as EU institutions. It was one of the more surprising aspects of this study to find out that it is rather difficult to collect and combine comprehensive data on electoral results, government compositions and political positions of parties. In order to overcome these shortcomings, I propose a new approach towards data collection in political science. In addition, I present various measures of the political positions of parties as well as indicators for democratic institutions. I conclude by presenting empirical information on the party composition of national parliaments, the Council, the EP and the Commission from 1958 to 2004.

In chapter 4, I provide a more detailed and fine-grained analysis of the party composition of the Council. To explain the party make up of the Council, I draw on theoretical and empirical work in coalition formation. My statistical analysis investigates which national parliamentary parties have higher chances of becoming part of the national government, thereby automatically being represented in the Council. I base my analysis on party characteristics such as size, polit-

ical position and previous governmental experience. Through my results, I am able to explain the selection mechanisms that underlie representation in the Council.

Chapter 5 provides another detailed empirical investigation of delegation to an EU institution. In that chapter, I investigate the appointment to the College of Commissioners. I ask to what extend this process is similar to the appointment of national ministers or bureaucrats. Hence, my study tries to investigate how 'political' the appointment is and if there are changes over time. As in the chapter on the Council, I base my investigation on a quantitative analysis. This time, however, I focus on individuals (Commissioners) and not on parties per se. I ask to what extent Commissioners had been loyal party politicians prior to their appointment to the Commission.

I conclude in the last chapter by summarizing my major empirical findings. This last chapter provides the essence of my study: How can we understand the EU's party structure and how are the party composition of the Council, the EP and the Commission are interrelated? In addition, I discuss further avenues of research for studying representation in the EU.

2 Representation in the European Union

How has the political system of the EU evolved and how can we study representation to EU institutions? What is the structure of political conflict in the EU and its member states and how are these lines of conflict aggregated in the EU's political institutions? These are broad questions of empirical democratic theory and existing research in comparative politics has clarified some underlying mechanisms. However, studies of the EU have only recently seen major contributions from comparative politics and the Union was traditionally studied rather differently by focusing on explaining EU integration via grand theories. This chapter summarises the evolution of empirical democratic theory and discusses the major findings about the effects of democratic institutions on translating political interests. I draw on this work throughout this dissertation to understand the party make up of the EU.

Scholars have approached the EU differently before, as I mentioned. For long periods of time the debate between intergovernmentalists and neofunctionalists dominated research on European integration. This theoretical focus on grand theories has shifted to more mid-range theories in the last two decades. Work in the latter tradition has had a much stronger focus on causal mechanisms and investigated a broader range of substantial research questions. Studies have focussed on decision making, political attitudes, or policy dynamics and drew their inspiration from rational choice theories and sociological concepts. This chapter also shortly introduces the historical development of our field. Nevertheless, I quickly turn to the role of parties in the EU. My discussion shows that parties matter in the EU but that we lack a coherent understanding how these actors come into place. To overcome these shortcomings, we can draw on empirical democratic theory to better understand the effects of political institutions on representation in the EU.

The following sections discuss the work on empirical democratic theory and European integration. I proceed in four steps: First, I discuss the relevance of political institutions and present different theoretical approaches that investigate their dynamics. Second, I present the literature from comparative politics that focuses on empirical studies of representation. This part includes a summary of major work on electoral systems, party systems and government formation. In that section, I also present an empirical summary of the structure of electoral systems, party systems and government formation in EU member states. Third, I summarise the literature on the EU to which this study intents to speak. In order to present my understanding of research on the EU, I provide a short historical summary of the various theoretical approaches towards the Union. Fourth, I explore the more recent literature on party politics in the EU. These discussions of modern studies of comparative politics and studies of the EU provide an important background to understand my subsequent empirical work on the party composition of the Council and the

College of Commissioners. My conclusion highlights the fact that we are in need of a better understanding of the party fabric of the EU. Therefore, I propose to draw on empirical democratic theory in order to enrich our understanding of the EU.

2.1 Studying political institutions

Understanding political institutions is one of the major tasks of political scientists. Especially the last three decades of research in political science have been accompanied by an ever closer look on mechanisms that explain political decision making under different institutional rules. This recent focus on political institutions has been labelled as a new institutionalism. Hall and Taylor (1996) have prominently divided the new institutionalism into three types (rational, historical and sociological). Here I focus on rational choice concepts of institutions that provide insights into the effects of political institutions. Historical and sociological institutionalism apply a wider concept of institutions and are less relevant for my work. Substantially, rational choice institutionalists raise the same questions as discussed under the old institutionalism with its focus on formal (legal) institutions. The major innovation incorporated by rational choice institutionalists was a new reliance on theoretical tools from economics. By including theories of decision making as developed in game theoretical models of strategic interactions, the effects of institutional rules are theoretically explored. Applying modern statistical tools help in testing these theory driven hypotheses empirically.

New insights into the dynamics of political institutions as developed by these studies are important for many subfields of political science. Comparative politics has developed as a sub-discipline of political science that focuses on explaining the effects of political cleavages and institutional rules (e.g. electoral systems, bicameralism) on party systems and patterns of government formation. Here, research questions focus on explaining the effects of certain political institutions on decision-making dynamics. Lijphart (1999) provides the broadest and most accessible summary of research as conducted from the seventies to the nineties of the last century. A good example of the changes to political science that came through the new institutionalism as applied to the study of electoral systems is provided in Cox (1997). Whereas Lijphart relies on theories and empirical research designs from the first wave of modern studies on political institutions, Cox marked the departure in a new era of research by combining strict microfoundations (game theoretical models) with advanced statistical techniques. The latter approach is now the mainstream type of analysis: a combination of sophisticated microfoundations with a rigorous empirical research design.

The study of political institutions has also helped to better understand issues of normative democratic theory and representation. Do political institutions structure democratic politics? Are the effects of democratic institutions desirable? Riker (1988) started a debate from a rather

sceptical perspective. He drew on social choice theory to demonstrate the consequences of political institutions such as majority decisions and agenda control. Riker found them to be prone to manipulation because of political disequilibrium. Mackie (2004) has challenged this pessimistic account of democracy on normative and empirical grounds. McGann (2006) provides another study that combines normative political philosophy, social choice and empirical studies of political institutions to put doubt on Riker's pessimistic view of democracy. According to him, meeting the ideal of political equality requires proportional representation at the electoral level and simple majority rule at the decision stage. McGann also discusses the consequences of these institutions for minority protection. Work that combines political philosophy and the study of political institutions is important, as it connects research traditions that often exchange too few of their major findings.

The new-institutionalism has also made inroads to the study of the EU (see Aspinwall and Schneider 2000). Studying the EU has seen a major shift of attention from grand theories of EU integration towards revealing causal mechanisms underlying institutional dynamics. First, this has been accomplished by developing formal models of inter-institutional decision dynamics among EU institutions, such as the Council, the EP and the Commission (cf. Crombez 1996; Steunenberg 1994; Tsebelis 1995; Tsebelis and Garrett 2001). Subsequently, many empirical studies have tested these theoretical propositions (e.g. Franchino 2007; König et al. 2007; Mattila 2004; Tsebelis et al. 2001). As a result, studies of the EU have departed from approaching the EU as an international institution based on intergovernmental bargains towards analysing the EU as a political system with major transnational issues of contestation (Hooghe and Marks 1999). Recently, studies of the political institutions of the EU have seen a major shift of attention towards the role of parties. Scholars of the EU have become aware of the role that parties play in aggregating interests as well as in the decision-making processes of the EU. This work combines models and insights from comparative politics and applies them to the political system of the EU.

Understanding the party composition of EU institutions is important in two respects. On the one hand, we need to understand the chain of delegation through political institutions to understand the potential of representative democracy. On the other hand, all students that explain decision making of political institutions should also have a coherent understanding how these actors come into place.

2.2 Comparative politics and the study of representation

This dissertation explains the party composition of EU institutions to understand questions of democratic representation. Studying the effects of political institutions and their consequences for representation has been a major subfield of comparative politics. Powell Jr. (2004) divides

the empirical literature on democratic theory into two lines. One line of work closely follows the research agenda set by the behavioural revolution. It studies representation by comparing the policy positions of voters and politicians based on survey data. Powell Jr. labels the approach *substantive representation*.

The alternative approach is more relevant for my study. Based on Rae (1967), it studies the effects of political institutions on representation by focussing on the interplay between electoral systems, party systems and government formation. Powell Jr. refers to this as *procedural representation* to distinguish it from the previously discussed approach. The major research question in this paradigm asks how certain institutional features modify vote aggregation in modern democracies. An accessible summary of the first wave of this research is provided by Lijphart (1999). Recently, this literature has been significantly enhanced by including game-theoretical models and advanced statistical techniques.

In the next section, I discuss studies of procedural representation in greater detail and summarise the findings of these studies in the context of the EU. To prepare my empirical investigation on the party composition of EU institutions, I especially focus on studies about electoral systems, party systems and government formation. I provide empirical indicators for all EU member states that highlight differences among them. These indicators provide a broad overview on the structure of democratic competition in Western Europe. Later, the analytical parts of my dissertation make use of these studies to understand the EU's party composition in more detail. After presenting the major insights of these procedural studies of representation, I shortly discuss studies of substantive representation, especially work that has focussed on the EU.

2.2.1 Procedural representation

Studies of procedural representation investigate political institutions and their effects on the aggregation of political preferences. Many of these studies have provided important insights into the consequences of institutions on representation and delegation. Two books can be singled out to highlight the questions raised and the roads of research taken by scholars working in this tradition. Powell Jr. (2000) provides a comprehensive summary of the state of the art and draws on his former studies (e.g. Huber and Powell Jr. 1994; Powell Jr. 1984; Powell Jr. and Whitten 1993). In the book, Powell Jr. compares the positions of voters and the institutions that are supposed to represent voters' interests by using aggregated data. He compares the median position of voters, parties and institutions to explain how political institutions alter preference aggregations. The same approach is taken by McDonald and Budge (2005) to 'confer the median mandate'.

To understand delegation in democratic systems both books use data on electoral outcomes

and parties in government. The researchers link this information with data on the political positions of parties. With these data, Powell Jr. and McDonald and Budge track how electoral outcomes are translated into governmental responsibility. Most of the time, both books compare median positions of the electorate, parliament and government to understand how different institutional rules alter preference aggregation.

Powell Jr. bases his study on questions of normative political theory. What are the different concepts of democracy and which ideals do they pursue? He distinguishes between *proportional* and *majoritarian* visions of democracy. Proportional concepts of democracy put a strong emphasise on a direct transformation of electoral outcomes into equal representation in the legislature. Hence, these democracies apply permissive electoral systems to increase representation. To the contrary, majoritarian concepts of democracy emphasise accountability aspects of democracy. Here, democracy is not so much about ensuring a close correspondence of electoral outcomes to legislative composition but rather a matter of giving constituents the chance to vote a government in or out. Powell Jr. specifies the ideals of both concepts and investigates empirically how these ideals are fulfilled in Western democracies.

McDonald and Budge put less emphasis of normative questions. They base their empirical investigation on data of the manifesto project. These data allow one to compare the political positions of parliamentary parties for the whole post-war period, whereas Powell Jr. makes only use of data for the last two decades. In addition, McDonald and Budge also investigate patterns of policy making by focussing on spending patterns in different democratic regimes.

Obviously, the books previously discussed are only two paradigmatic examples of a broad research tradition. Especially their strong reliance on aggregate data to explain representation singles them out as important work for my study. Beyond these books, there are many studies that focus on parts of the democratic chain of delegation to clarify the impact of political institutions on preference aggregation. I discuss some of the more important studies when focussing on the respective institutions in the following paragraphs.

Electoral system   Once a political system is democratic and allows its citizens a free and fair competition for political offices, electoral systems are the first direct link between the political preferences of citizens as expressed via votes and political representatives. However, electoral systems vary widely and can alter the translation of votes into seats significantly. In addition, differences in electoral rules establish various incentive structures for the interaction between citizens and politicians. Consequently, political scientists have made enormous efforts to investigate the consequences of electoral systems systematically.

Rae (1967) is the most important of the earlier studies on the effects of electoral institutions on vote aggregation. Rae demonstrates that district magnitude, i.e. the number of candidates

allowed to take office in a constitutional district, provides a major explanatory factor for the number of parties in a given electoral system. This insight moved beyond the traditional dichotomies of plurality based electoral rules and two-party systems versus proportional based electoral institutions and multi-party systems. Rae's study systematically incorporated a large number of electoral outcomes into a quantitative empirical analysis. By focussing on district magnitude, it provided a more fine grained measure for the causes of party system heterogeneity. Knowledge about electoral systems is important in order to better understand the structure of party systems and electoral competition among parties. Consequently, all of the quantitative studies that have investigated how electoral systems alter vote-seat translation have followed Rae's approach.

Of similar importance as Rae's book has been the study by Cox (1997). He shifts attention to the logic of strategic interaction that takes place at the district level. Most famous is the $M + 1$ rule that Cox emphasises to explain the number of effective candidates in an electoral district. This extends Duverger's hypothesis (Riker 1982) by shifting the focus from the country level to the district level and by extending the logic of the arguments to electoral districts that provide more than one electoral mandate. In order to explain the latter, Cox draws on a study by Reed (1990) that applied Duverger's law to the Japanese electoral system with multi-member districts. Cox provides a game-theoretical model to explain the micro-logic behind Duverger's law at the district level. According to him, it is the candidate's incentive not to waste votes that encourages electoral coordination. Consequently, parties 'optimise' the number of candidates according to the district magnitude. Cox's study shifted attention to the district level and included game theoretical models to explain voter dynamics under different electoral systems. This approach was innovative, as it provided a much better micro-logic for candidate and voting behaviour under different electoral rules.

More recent studies combine measures on (ethnic) heterogeneity and electoral systems to sharpen our understanding of the effects of electoral systems (Clark and Golder 2006; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994). These studies try to disentangle the effects of electoral systems and cleavages on the heterogeneity of the party systems. I discuss cleavage based arguments for party system fragmentation in the next section. Given the current focus on electoral systems, all empirical studies on the interaction of cleavages and electoral systems show that electoral systems do have an independent effect on the effective number of legislative parties.

Students of electoral systems have developed different indicators to determine the characteristics of electoral systems. Among these indicators are district magnitude, number of districts, upper tiers, the electoral formula and malapportionment (differences in the ratio of electorate and MPs among districts). Golder (2005) provides a data set with information on many of these electoral system parameters for all post-war democratic elections. The least squares index first

Table 1: Disproportionality electoral systems (EU15 1958–2004)

Country	Value	Country	Value	Country	Value
Austria	1.3	Germany	2.2	Netherlands	1.2
Belgium	3.2	Greece	7.1	Portugal	5.6
Denmark	1.2	Ireland	4.0	Spain	7.2
Finland	3.4	Italy	3.6	Sweden	1.4
France	13.9	Luxembourg	3.2	United Kingdom	14.6

discussed by Gallagher (1991) is very prominent to map the disproportionality caused by an imperfect vote-seat translation via electoral systems. With the help of this indicator we can better understand the biases produced under different electoral rules.

Table 1 provides an overview of the disproportionality of electoral systems in the EU15. The values show the mean of the Gallagher index for all parliamentary elections during EU membership (1958–2004). With these results, we can easily infer the level of disproportionality caused by the electoral system in a member state. Translating votes into seats is one of the first steps in the democratic chain of delegation. In this dissertation, I will not systematically discuss the effects of electoral systems on representation. However, let me spend some time explaining the different levels of disproportionality in EU member states' parliaments.

If the least squares index has the value of 1.0, it indicates perfect proportionality. As can be seen in table 1, some member states' electoral systems lead to high degrees of proportionality. High proportionality may be achieved either by a very high district magnitude (Netherlands) or by a multi-tier system (Austria, Denmark, Sweden). In the latter systems, an upper tier with a higher number of seats is used to correct for disproportionality caused by small district magnitudes.

A second group of EU members shows moderate levels of disproportionality. Here, the difference in vote-seat translation is caused by a significant electoral threshold (Germany) or a small district magnitude with no upper tier (Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg). In addition, a restrictive electoral formula, such as D'Hondt in Finland and Italy, may result in a significant deviation from proportional representation.

Greece, Spain and Portugal show relatively high levels of disproportionality (values at about 7). In Spain, this is caused by a small district magnitude and a significant malapportionment (a varying number of voters) among electoral districts (Hopkin 2008, 378–379). Greece applies an electoral system of 'reinforced' proportional representation where seat allocation in upper tiers advantages larger parties (Mackie and Rose 1991, 187). In Portugal, the relatively high disproportionality is caused by the combination of a small district magnitude and the usage of a rather disproportional electoral formula (D'Hondt).

Finally, two countries show very high levels of disproportionality: United Kingdom and France. The high disproportionality is caused by the use of plurality/majority electoral systems. In the United Kingdom, a candidate has to gain a plurality of the votes in order to win the mandate in a single member district. France applies single member districts as well. However, the country uses a two-ballot majority-plurality system (Elgie 2008, 122): a candidate needs to win the majority of the votes in the first or a plurality of the votes in a second round. Both systems encourage high levels of electoral coordination and significantly reduce the prospects of smaller parties. This can easily be seen by the high levels of the least squares index in these systems.

The results in table 1 and my previous discussion highlight the fact that electoral systems have an important impact on political representation. Election results can alter the translation of votes into seats significantly. Powell Jr. (2000) reminds us that this effect may be intentional as it distinguishes 'two great visions of democracy': majoritarian and proportional influence. Accordingly, compositions of EU member states' parliaments reflect electoral outcomes differently. On the one hand we find highly proportional representation systems such as Denmark and the Netherlands. On the other hand we have majoritarian systems that alter electoral outcomes significantly as in the UK and France. All other member states are in between these two extremes. In this dissertation, I often compare the composition of governments and EU institutions to the party composition of member states' parliaments. We should be aware that national parliamentary elections are already a first step in the chain of delegation to EU institutions.

To sum up, electoral systems helps us to understand a crucial institutional influence on party system fragmentation. Political scientists have shown that smaller district magnitudes reduce party system fragmentation in assemblies. Consequently, electoral systems provide an important filter among the democratic institutions that translate votes into seats. These results do also apply to EU member states and representation through elections show different degrees of proportionality. Let me now discuss other causes of party system fragmentation.

Party systems The strong emphasis of the electoral system on the number of parties has been challenged by emphasizing the endogeneity problem that accompanies the argument. It may well be that "It's parties that choose electoral systems (or, Duverger's laws upside down)" as Colomer (2005) entitled his article. An extensive literature on the causes of electoral system change has tried to overcome the endogeneity problem (e.g. Boix 1999). Nevertheless, scholars agree that the electoral system tends to increase or suppress the number of legislative parties. However, parties may choose those electoral rules that fit the interest of the majority of parties in a given party system the most. In order to understand the structure of party systems, we have to study both, the effects of electoral systems as well as the number of conflict lines in a country.

To understand the dividing lines in a party system scholars have focussed on cleavages that separate societies. Lipset and Rokkan (1967, 47) defined the concept of cleavages in order to explain the genesis of European party systems. The authors derive the structure of European party systems from highlighting substantial societal cleavages during the process of state formation. According to Lipset and Rokkan four cleavages build the major lines of conflict along which European party systems formed: centre/periphery, state/church, owner/worker, urban/rural. In modern social science we would refer to the establishment of these party systems as a path dependent process that led to a lock in of an earlier structure. However, Lipset and Rokkan (50) wrote about a 'freezing' of party systems when they referred to the same dynamics.

Caramani (2004) provides an important empirical study of the genesis of the European party systems. For the study, Caramani (2000) collected district level data about electoral outcomes in West European democracies since the mid of the 19th century. Caramani supports many of the empirical propositions as outlined by Lipset and Rokkan. He shows how heterogeneous regional party systems became more homogeneous during the process of state formation. At the beginning of democratisation and after the extension of suffrage, parties provided candidates in only some of the electoral districts. These candidates were concentrated on strongholds of the party. Over time, European party systems became nationalised with parties running candidates in all districts. In addition, voting behaviour became more homogeneous. However, due to different national cleavages and the differences among the electoral systems, the European countries have formed rather different party systems.

Ever since Sartori (1976) provided his famous typology, party systems have been compared by the number of parties and the ideological dispersion of parties in a country. Sartori based his typology on the number of parties and the levels of ideological spread in order to develop certain groups of party systems. More recent approaches rely on quantitative indicators and compare national party systems by degrees of fragmentation. These indicators combine the strength of parties in parliament with quantitative measures of their position in a political space.

How do party systems differ among EU member states? Previously, I have given some information on the electoral systems of the EU15 member states. The following paragraphs present a similar summary of the party systems of these countries. In order to present some information on the fragmentation of these party systems, I make use of the effective number of parties (Laakso and Taagepera 1979) and a polarization index (Dalton 2008). The first measure indicates the degree of fractionalization, the latter the amount of ideological spread. I discuss the mathematical characteristics of these indicators in chapter 3.3.4.

In table 2 I provide mean values for the effective number of elected parties (*enep*), the effective number of parliamentary parties (*enpp*), the number of parties in parliament (*npp*) as well as a polarization measure for West European countries during EU membership. Although, these

Table 2: Party system indices (EU15 1958–2004)

	enep	enpp	npp	pol
Austria	3.6	3.4	4.5	0.37
Belgium	6.8	5.9	9.9	0.28
Denmark	5.3	5.0	9.0	0.44
Finland	5.8	5.0	9.2	0.35
France	5.5	3.6	7.1	0.44
Germany	3.5	3.2	5.1	0.31
Greece	2.8	2.3	5.2	0.39
Ireland	3.2	2.8	6.2	0.30
Italy	4.9	4.4	12.3	0.40
Luxembourg	4.0	3.5	5.4	0.30
Netherlands	5.1	4.8	10.3	0.36
Portugal	3.3	2.7	6.0	0.28
Spain	3.5	2.7	12.0	0.40
Sweden	4.3	4.0	7.7	0.43
United Kingdom	3.2	2.2	8.8	0.44

values give us no information about the substantive cleavages in these countries, they allow us to better understand party system fragmentation in EU member states.

First, I use these figures to explain the effective number of parties indicator in more detail. The UK has two major parties (Labour and Conservatives) that share on average three quarters of the national vote, a medium sized party (Liberals) with about fifteen percent vote share and a number of minor parties with a very small number of votes. There are on average nine parties in parliament (*npp*). However, the effective number of elected parties is slightly higher than three indicating that there are only three significant parties (*enep*). The same number could be realised with two major and two minor parties. The British electoral system translates votes into seats very disproportionally as previously discussed. Hence, the effective number of parties is significantly lower in parliament due to the use of a majoritarian electoral system (*enpp*). The effects of electoral systems on altering vote-seat translation are also easy to realise for other member states by comparing the effective number of elected parties (*enep*) to the effective number of parliamentary parties (*enpp*). The difference between these two values corresponds to the levels of disproportionality as previously presented.

If the effective number of parliamentary parties in a country is between two and three, this indicates that there are two major parties that dominate the legislature (France, Greece, Spain, UK). In all of these countries, two-party dominance goes hand in hand with a significant seat bonus of the larger parties. In most EU member states, the effective number of parties in par-

liament is about four. This value indicates that the party systems consists of a couple of major parties as well as some minor parties. Finally, some of the member states have a comparatively high number of effective parties. This is either caused by a highly proportional electoral system (e.g. Denmark and Sweden) or by party systems that consist of a high number of cleavages. An example for the latter case is Belgium, a country with many linguistic, religious and cultural cleavages.

Finally, the polarization index gives an indicator for the ideological spread of parties (*pol*). The values I provide are based on a party's left/right position and its strength in parliament. Low values indicate an ideological coherence of parties whereas higher values up to 1.0 indicate that there are parties at the extremes of the left/right spectrum. What we can observe among EU member states is that we have either very few parties at ideological different positions or many minor parties over the whole spectrum of possible positions.

Knowledge about the structure of party systems and its interrelatedness with electoral systems is important to better understand representation via democratic institutions. Each is an important explanatory factor to understand the number and heterogeneity of parties represented in parliament. In addition, the effective number of parties also indicates which types of governments form. The higher the number parties in parliament, the more likely is cabinet formation by coalition government.

Government formation   Recent contributions to the study of government formation will be thoroughly presented in one of the later chapters that explains the party composition of the Council (see chapter 4). Here, I shortly summarise the major findings provided by students of coalition dynamics. Let me recall first that only parliamentary systems with a high number of parties are likely to face situations of coalition government. The traditional Westminster model with an electoral system that provides a high premium of additional seats for the winner of the elections only rarely creates situations that require government making by the means of coalition building. Government coalitions are more likely to occur in electoral systems that do not manufacture one party majorities in parliament. More permissive electoral systems do not give the plurality winner of the votes the chance to be the majority party in parliament. Previously, we discussed the impact of district magnitude on the number of parties in parliament. Consequently, the more proportional an electoral system, the higher the tendency towards multiple parties in parliament, hence government coalitions.

What parties are likely to form governments and which patterns of coalition building exist in democracies? The systematic study of coalition formation started in the late sixties when the first models of coalition building were developed. An accessible summary of this literature is provided by Lijphart (1999, 91–96). The first work on government formation distinguishes

between two motivations that help to explain which parties are likely to form a government: office-seeking and policy-seeking. Office-seeking motivations focus on the share of cabinet positions that every party wants to control in government. In this perspective, each party wants to maximise its share of governmental positions. Consequently, parties have an incentive to look for as few coalition partners as possible: Only coalitions with the minimal number of required parties or the minimal number of seats necessary to gain a majority of seats in parliament should form. These types of governments are called minimal winning coalitions, as opposed to minority governments and surplus majority coalitions. Alternatively, policy-seeking approaches include the political positions of parties. Parties that are ideologically close are more likely to form governments in these approaches. It is assumed that only these minimal winning coalitions form that are ideologically connected. In this respect, connectedness implies that only parties next to one another in political space form coalitions. I discuss the models of government formation drawing on policy and office motivations more thoroughly in the chapter on the party composition of the Council. However, distinguishing between policy- and office-seeking is crucial to understand contemporary theories of coalition building.

Müller and Strøm (2000) provide an overview on coalition governments in Western Europe at the country level. To make these studies comparable, they rely on a coherent framework of analysis as developed in the first chapter of the book. The country chapters provide very detailed accounts on the various forms of coalition formation that take place in each country. Furthermore, each chapter provides detailed data on all post-war coalitions in the country studied. Today, Müller and Strøm is still the most thorough set of comparative case studies on coalition building accompanied by systematic data on different aspects of cabinet formation.

Quantitative empirical analyses of government formation have explored the probabilities of parties to form coalitions more generally. I shortly summarise the major findings that come out of this work. Paul Warwick has systematically studied the patterns of government formation and published his results in various papers (e.g. Warwick 2006, 2001). All of his studies are based on a data set with detailed information about all Western post-war governments. Warwick (1996) calculates the probability of a party to be a government member. The study shows that factors such as ideology, size and former government participation influence a party's likelihood to become a coalition partner. According to Warwick's results, big moderate parties have a higher probability to form the government. In addition, his studies show the strong dominance of the formateur party, meaning the party that is given the task to build a viable government coalition. As a result, the formateur party is very often itself a member of the actual government that forms.

More recent, but highly influential, has been a study by Martin and Stevenson (2001). Whereas Warwick focuses on parties as the unit of analysis, Martin and Stevenson try to discriminate

among the power of various theoretical approaches to explain government formation by relying on advanced statistical techniques. I discuss the results of their analysis later in this dissertation. It is important, however, to note that their results support many of Warwick's findings. The study also demonstrates the influential role of the formateur party. In addition, the empirical study shows that a strong focus on either policy-seeking or office-seeking motivations, is not helpful to understand real world coalition formation dynamics. Martin and Stevenson urge to better integrate and unify the two models of government formation.

Almost all theoretical approaches predict that coalitions are composed of only as many parties as needed to gain majority control in the legislatures (minimal winning coalition). Empirically, we observe two instances contradicting these predictions: Minority governments and oversized coalitions. Minority governments do not control a legislative majority and oversized (surplus majority) coalitions contain more coalition partners than necessary for a legislative majority. Minority governments frequently occur in the Scandinavian countries, whereas oversized coalition governments often form in Belgium.

Let me summarise the empirical patterns of government formation in Western Europe that have been highlighted through various studies. According to Gallagher et al. (2006, 401) only around fifteen percent of governments in Europe are single party majority governments. Consequently, coalition government is the dominant cabinet form in Europe. About a third of the governments in Europe are minimal winning coalitions. The rest is evenly split among minority governments (single party and coalitions) and surplus majority (oversized) coalitions. The results are illustrated in the following table.

Table 3 presents some descriptive information on governments in the EU15 by providing the number of governments (*ng*) and elections (*ne*) during their respective EU membership as well as averages for the effective number of governing parties (*enp*), the number of parties (*np*) and the seat share of coalition parties in parliament (*sh*). We find that most of these governments control a majority of the seat share (*sh*) in parliament. However, some of these governments control on average almost two-third of the seats in parliaments. Two patterns account for this fact: On the one hand we find member states such as Austria and Luxembourg that are regularly governed by grand coalitions. Here, two of the major parties form the coalition. On the other hand, we have member states such as Belgium that are regularly run by oversized coalitions. These coalitions contain more parties than necessary in order to control a majority in parliament. Finally, we see that governments in Denmark and Sweden are often minority governments without a legislative majority. At least the left-wing cabinets in Sweden have all been single party governments by the Swedish Social Democrats. In contrast, most of the Danish cabinets have been minority coalitions with more than one party in government.

Another difference is that the number of governments (*ng*) relative to the number of elections

Table 3: Government characteristics (EU15 1958–2004)

	ng	ne	enp	np	sh
Austria	5	4	1.9	2.0	0.62
Belgium	31	16	3.2	3.9	0.63
Denmark	15	12	1.6	2.2	0.38
Finland	5	4	2.7	3.6	0.60
France	35	13	1.9	2.7	0.62
Germany	17	13	1.7	2.6	0.57
Greece	11	9	1.1	1.2	0.58
Ireland	14	11	1.3	1.7	0.52
Italy	45	13	1.7	3.2	0.51
Luxembourg	13	10	1.9	2.0	0.68
Netherlands	17	15	2.6	3.2	0.62
Portugal	6	6	1.0	1.2	0.51
Spain	6	6	1.0	1.0	0.50
Sweden	4	4	1.0	1.0	0.43
United Kingdom	11	11	1.0	1.0	0.55

(*ne*) varies significantly between member states. We have some member states' governments that last for the whole legislative term and most countries show only little deviation from this pattern. These cases also include some instances of parliamentary elections that were called for early after a coalition broke down. Nevertheless, three countries (Belgium, France and Italy) show a different ratio of the numbers of governments compared to the number of elections and indicate a significant number of short-lived cabinets.

To summarise the various work on procedural models of representation it is important to acknowledge the major progress that political scientists have made towards a better understanding of political institutions such as electoral systems, party systems and coalition building. I draw on many of these results later in this dissertation to explain the party composition of the Council and the College of Commissioners. In fact, this dissertation can be seen as a study of procedural representation in the EU. Before I start my empirical analysis, I first summarise an alternative approach towards the empirical study of representation and discuss the application of this school of thought to the EU.

2.2.2 Substantive representation

Studies of substantive representation tackle the empirical issue of comparing the positions of voters and political elites differently. Instead of focussing on political institutions, scholars who

work in this tradition compare the linkage between political positions of citizens and those of elites. To determine these positions, studies of substantive representation rely heavily on mass and elite survey data. These studies have a long tradition in comparative politics as I outline in the next section.

Understanding issue congruence   What is the programmatic linkage of citizens to their representatives? Do voters and their representatives have similar preferences on political issues? To what extent does the congruence of citizen and elite positions vary? Such questions motivate empirical studies of substantive representation. They investigate empirically the differences between voters and elite positions through survey data. Some of this work also investigates the direction of these linkages. Are politicians trying to represent citizens' political positions or do they structure the political views of their supporters?

Miller and Stokes (1963) provide the first empirical study to investigate the similarity of positions taken by voters and their representatives. They compare the political attitudes of constituents (voters) and representatives (Congressman) in the United States. According to Miller and Stokes, two mechanisms may guarantee the political control of representatives by their constituents. First, representatives and constituents are like-minded, hence the former are acting in the interest of the latter by following their personal convictions. Second, representatives seek re-election, and to gain the votes of their constituents, they closely follow their perceptions of district attitudes. Based on these assumptions, Miller and Stokes compare empirically the political views of constituents and representatives as well as representatives' perceptions of constituents attitudes. The authors show a correlation between these measures.

Holmberg (1989) presents an empirical study of representation for Sweden in the 1960s and 1980s following the congruence approach. However, besides comparing the political views of parliamentarians and the electorate for the two periods through survey data, he also adds other empirical information about substantive representation. Holmberg, compares the social and occupational composition of the Swedish Parliament (Riksdag) and eligible voters. Although Holmberg is critical of the broader merits of the 'mirroring aspect of social representations', he argues that it is 'not without intrinsic value' (3).

Studies of substantive representation are widespread within political science and have a long tradition. Most of these studies are country based because cross-national comparisons require a significant amount of data management. One European project has provided systematic data and empirical analysis on social representation in European legislatures (Best and Cotta 2000; Cotta and Best 2007). However, there are few systematic cross-national studies of substantive representation. Fortunately, there is an extensive study of substantive representation in the EU to which I turn now.

EU studies of substantive representation I have previously presented some descriptive empirical evidence about procedural representation in the EU. So far, however, understanding representation in the EU has been dominated by scholars focussing on substantive representation. This approach is most prominently presented in Schmitt and Thomassen (1999). The book contains a set of articles that study representation in the EU by using individual level data and taking on a research perspective as developed in the study of political behaviour. The study is innovative as it combines information from the European Election Study, a survey of candidates and MEPs in EP elections, with a survey of parliamentarians in eleven EU member states.

Two of the articles in the book directly compare attitudes of EU citizens, national MPs and MEPs. Thomassen and Schmitt (1999) evaluate the congruence of political positions between voters in EP elections and MEPs. Their results show that constituents and parliamentarians show a high correspondence on the general left/right dimension but less so on European topics. In fact, the difference on European issues is rather strong. Whereas voters took moderate positions on issues such as a common currency and the removal of borders, most MEPs were highly supportive of these political programmes. The same findings apply to national MPs with positions on European integration similar to MEPs but far off from voters' positions.

In the title of his article, Holmberg (1999) refers to MPs and MEPs attitudes as 'wishful thinking'. He compares the positions of parliamentarians to their perception of voters' attitudes. The survey data show that parliamentarians are well aware of their pro-integration positions and know that these positions are EU friendlier than the positions of their voters. However, once we compare the positions of voters with the perception of these positions by MEPs, we find that most parliamentarians strongly overestimated their voters support for European integration. In fact, about three quarters of parliamentarians overestimated their constituents' support for European solutions on currency, employment and border issues. This distance is even stronger for MEPs than for MPs.

The book by Schmitt and Thomassen provided the first systematic cross-national comparison of voter and elite attitudes in the EU. Hence, it gave valuable information on representation in Europe. However, the results raise critical questions on the quality of representation in the EU. MPs and MEPs take similar positions to their constituents on a left/right dimension and evaluate the attitudes of their voters correctly. In contrast, on positions on European issues both MEPs and MPs are much more supportive than their voters. Even worse, both groups of parliamentarians also have wrong perceptions of their voters' position on these issues. Consequently, representation on European issues is rather difficult to accomplish because the political elite does neither share nor anticipate the attitudes of their voters.

Similar empirical evidence was recently provided by Mattila and Raunio (2006) for the 2004 EP elections. Instead of comparing the positions of voters and representatives directly, the au-

thors evaluate voters' self placements and party placements in the EU integration/independence and left/right dimension. They compare the difference between a voter's position and his/her perception of the position of the party for which he/she voted. Results reflect the previous findings of the Schmitt and Thomassen volume. Parties show better correspondence in the left/right dimension than in the EU dimension. In addition, parties tend to be more supportive of European integration than their voters.

Studies of substantive representation have broadened our knowledge of citizen-politician linkages in the EU. Survey data are an indispensable source of information on voters' positions and the Eurobarometer provides systematic information over the last four decades. Unfortunately, survey data on the political elite (e.g. parliamentarians) is more rare and less systematic. However, issues of substantive representation are investigated systematically and there are encouraging efforts to improve survey data for these types of studies. Yet, Powell Jr. (2004, 291–2) correctly criticises that studies of substantive representation "have seldom worried about election rules and collective preference aggregation." Hence, we also need a coherent understanding of procedural representation and need to investigate how political institutions alter preference aggregation in the EU. But how has the EU been studied so far?

2.3 Understanding the European Union

Within the last two decades studies of the EU have almost developed into an independent subfield of political science at least in Europe. Scholarly work on the EU has gained an enormous amount of attention with work of political scientists trained in very different traditional fields of the discipline. The significant number of journals, book series and master programmes that focus on the EU highlight the contemporary interest in exploring Europe's political structure scientifically. Naturally, interest in studying the EU has grown with the increased political relevance of European integration. The following paragraphs present my summary of scholarly work on the EU and the progress that has been achieved. Since I later study the party fabric of EU institutions in greater detail, my summary is biased in favour of work on Europe's political institutions from a comparative politics perspective. I start by paying tribute to grand theories of integration.

2.3.1 From grand theories to mid-range puzzle solving

Traditionally, European integration has been approached by scholars with a background in the discipline of international relations. For several decades, two different approaches, neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism, dominated the understanding of the integration process. These

two theories shaped the academic debate and inspired numerous empirical studies until new theoretical concepts were developed in the 1990s.

The neofunctional theory of European integration was developed by Ernst Haas in the 1950s and 1960s. He hypothesised that an international elite of non-state actors would drive European integration rather than nation states. Functional requirements and benefits of regional integration would ask for a deepening of cooperation among European states. This process of constant integration would be lead by supranational institutions that constantly widened their responsibilities through a self-enforcing need of further integration (Haas 1958, 1961).

However, the crisis of integration in the 1960s led international relations scholars of the 'realist school' to specify an alternative theory of European integration. Hoffmann (1966) developed the intergovernmental theory of integration and argued that nation states are in firm control of the integration process. In this perspective cooperation among member states was only a minor change in the structure of inter-state bargaining and reflected the interests of the countries involved. European integration would not challenge the sovereignty of member states and not alter the logic of international politics.

Understanding the process of European integration by relying on grand-theories has a strong tradition among scholars of the EU. Drawing on intergovernmentalist and neofunctional perspective has helped us to better understand the major decision-making processes that surrounded Europe's integration. However, Hix (2005, 15) nicely refers to these theories as "the two great monoliths at the gate of the study of European integration since the 1970s" and indicates a change of their relevance for contemporary studies. The last two decades have been accompanied by major shifts in approaching European integration scientifically.

Within the last decades, we saw the arrival of several new theoretical perspectives on European integration. First, intergovernmentalism saw a major reformulation that cumulated in an influential book by Andrew Moravcsik (1998). In the book, Moravcsik disentangles the interests of member states in order to 'taking preferences seriously' (Moravcsik 1997). In this perspective member states' interests were not only shaped by brute geopolitical positions and static economic interest. Government positions were explained by relying on national interest coalitions that were aggregated. These were mostly determined by crucial economic actors and formed member states' positions at intergovernmental conferences. A second major group of research assembled under the banner of studying multilevel governance. These scholars eschewed grand theories and stylised integration models but saw a 'sui-generis' political system with complex and unprecedented forms of interaction they intended to investigate in detail (Jachtenfuchs 2001).

At the same time, scholars with a background in comparative politics arrived at the scene and applied the rational choice toolbox to the institutions of the Union. Through this work, the

political process of the Union was modelled using spatial games. These models allowed for hypothesizing about the power of the major actors in the Union under different decision rules. Rigorous empirical testing of these models was subsequently added.

The merit of each of these approaches led to a lot of debate (e.g. Aspinwall and Schneider 2000; Moravcsik 1999; Pollack 2005). Given the differences in research interest and assumptions about the major actors in place, little convergence among these theories has been accomplished. However, by providing stylised differences of perspectives, different research communities were able to distil their work and put it up against the legacy of other approaches. Recently, Hooghe and Marks (2009) have even tried to reintegrate grand theory questions into current research perspectives on the EU. Now, I focus on institutional approaches towards studying the EU. These studies share the same focus as my study. They try to understand how institutions alter political interest and influence decision making.

2.3.2 Institutional approaches

Institutional approaches have now accomplished an almost dominant theoretical toolkit for political scientists. Often scholars follow an categorization first proposed by Hall and Taylor (1996) and distinguish between sociological, historical and rational choice approaches. All three approaches have also been influential in studying the EU. Pierson (1996) was the first who proposed to incorporate concepts of historical institutionalism to the study of European integration and Christiansen et al. (1999) provides an introduction to sociological/constructivist approaches. However, this dissertation may be especially relevant for work in the rational choice tradition that investigates the effects of institutional rules. Consequently, my subsequent paragraphs focus on this approach and the literature that works in this line of EU research.

Rational choice institutionalism has its focus on formal institutions and their implications for the strategic behaviour of actors. In order to understand decision making, these authors ask how institutional settings constrain actors' options. To develop their arguments and specify the mechanisms of strategic behaviour, rational choice scholars use formal tools as developed in game theory. Empirical implications of these models are tested with quantitative statistical techniques.

Rational-choice institutionalists have come up with a set of models to specify the exact mechanisms of decision making in the EU. By drawing on game theoretical models developed to study legislative procedures in the US congress and rational-choice theories of comparative politics, these scholars have provided microfoundations to understand the strategic interaction that explains decision making in the EU. Most of the theories in this tradition are developed as formal (mathematical) models of inter-institutional decision making. In addition, scholars have pro-

duced a number of (quantitative) empirical studies of legislative procedures to test the predictive power of these models.

We saw a major turning point when the first models of EU decision making in the rational-choice tradition were published ten to fifteen years ago. Steunenberg (1994) and Crombez (1996) provided the first formal models of legislative decision making in the EU based on spatial theory. Both authors specify equilibria for the different legislative procedures of the EU. Through these models, Crombez and Steunenberg can state precisely the power differentials between the Council, the Commission and the EP under a certain legislative procedure. According to their models, the Commission had an especially strong agenda-setting power under the institutional rules of the EU whereas the power of the EP was rather limited at the time. Of similar importance, but more controversial, has been the Tsebelis (1994) claim of the conditional agenda-setting power of the EP. The publication of the article was shortly followed by a discussion about its theoretical merits (Moser 1996; Tsebelis 1996). This debate, however, led to first systematic attempts to test the proposed models empirically by relying on systematic data collection of legislative procedures and statistical analysis (e.g. Kreppel 2002; Tsebelis et al. 2001).

The last decade of research on decision making in the EU has generated a significant body of work that further elaborated rational choice theories of EU politics. Most of the quantitative empirical work is still focussing on decision making in the European Parliament (e.g. Hausemer 2006; Hoyland 2006). However, some scholars have recently shifted attention to the Council (e.g. Hagemann 2007). So far, there are very few quantitative empirical studies on the Commission. It was also through formal models of EU decision making and their empirical testing that scholars started to play more attention to the role of parties in the EU.

2.4 Parties and European integration

Studies of the EU have seen a major shift towards the role of parties over the last years. Research has shown that parties play an important role in structuring attitudes towards European integration and EU decision making. This research departs from the traditional perspective that puts the interests of nation states against the interests of the EP and the Commission. Manow et al. (2008) argue that parties are important actors in EU member states and that they have significantly influenced the dynamic of European integration. There is also an increasing number of empirical studies that highlight the importance of political parties. Often, these studies start with models of institutional decision making and use parties as the unit of analysis. I discuss the contemporary result of this research in greater detail in the next section. First, I summarise how the role of parties has been studied. Second, I systematically review the existing literature on the party composition of the Council, the EP and the Commission.

2.4.1 The role of parties in European integration

Recent scholarly work on the role of parties focuses on two questions. First, researchers have investigated the conflict dimensions of European integration. Starting in the 1980s, the EU has become more and more politicised. On the one hand, citizens gained more options to influence political decisions via direct elections to the EP and referenda in some member states. On the other hand, member states' decisions for further political integration, especially through the Single Market, had important political consequences. As a result, European integration has become a polity-creating process (Hooghe and Marks 1999). Second, researchers have focused on conflict dimensions in EU decision-making processes. These questions follow naturally from the politicisation of European integration. Once the various decisions of deepening European integration are more contested, it should also reveal more conflict in the everyday decision-making processes of the Union.

Europe's political space   Scholars at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC) have systematically investigated the structure of conflict over European integration. This work has been influential since it combined theoretical questions about the structure of political conflict in Europe with systematic data gathering. Through various party expert surveys conducted at UNC, we have now a systematic understanding about the structure of the European political space (e.g. Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Ray 1999).

Foremost, research on Europe's political space has investigated how attitudes towards European integration are related to more traditional conflict dimensions in the national party systems in Europe. This work asks if party positions on European integration are systematically related with the classical political alignments such as the left/right dimension. Left/right captures attitudes toward the regulation of the economy as well as the welfare state and has been the major line of conflict in post-war Western democracies. On this dimension, left parties have been in favour of a regulated market economy and higher spending on welfare policies. Contrary, right-wing parties have advocated more liberal economic policies and less redistributive welfare state policies.

Does the traditional left/right dimension capture attitudes toward European integration as well? If we take a look at the whole spectrum of European parties, we find that there is a u-shaped relation. Extreme parties, both left and right, are strongly in opposition towards European integration. Right extreme parties assemble nationalist, authoritarian and populist protest parties. Opposition against European integration is one of their key issues of political mobilisation. Left extreme parties oppose European integration as a process of liberalization. For these parties, the process of unification favours capitalists stronger than national regulation. Contrary to the fierce opposition through extreme parties, almost all moderate parties strongly support Eu-

ropean integration. The European integration process has been driven by these moderate parties. However, Hooghe et al. (2002) show that there is some interesting variation among moderate parties. Disentangling support for European integration into different policy areas shows that moderate right parties favour EU integration as a project that establishes a more liberal market economy. Contrary, left parties which support European integration hope to establish some form of regulated capitalism at the European level. The rather different stances of left and right parties on European economic integration are highlighted through different policy questions in the UNC expert surveys. These indicators demonstrate that social democratic parties largely favour European employment policies whereas centre/right parties are more favourable towards the internal market.

The structure of support among parties is different in the new member states from Central- and Eastern Europe (Marks et al. 2006). This is mostly related to a second dimension of party competition in European countries, namely authoritarian/libertarian (Kitschelt 1994) or Green, Alternative, Liberal (GAL) / Traditional, Authoritarian, National (TAN) (Hooghe et al. 2002, 976). In West European countries, parties on the left tend to be libertarian and right parties authoritarian. The relation of left/right and libertarian/authoritarian is linear in Central East European countries as well. However, the direction of this relation is opposite in these countries. Parties on the right tend to be more libertarian/GAL whereas left parties are mostly authoritarian/TAN. This is also connected to support for European integration. In Central/Eastern Europe, right parties support European integration and parties on the left are opponents of the integration process. Whereas the connection between left/right and EU support is u-shaped in Western Europe, it is linear in Central/Eastern Europe.

The last decade of research on the EU has provided systematic evidence about the structure of conflict over European integration. The politicisation of the EU started in the eighties with the Single European Act (Hooghe and Marks 1999). Its far reaching consequences for European economies highlighted the political aspects of European decision making for the member states. In addition, institutional reforms of the EU as well as more political participation of EU citizens through direct EP elections and national referenda have started a 'struggle' over European integration. Are these lines of conflict represented in decision-making processes of the EU? The next section explores recent research on the EU's legislative politics to answer this question.

Parties and decision making in the EU   Recent studies have systematically investigated the conflict dimensions in decision making of the EU. Often, these empirical studies are based on formal models of EU decision dynamics as previously discussed. The subsequent paragraphs summarise these studies and focus on the role of parties in EU decision making. It is important

to realise that there has been a turn of attention towards the role of parties in recent studies. My discussion highlights this fact.

The most important decisions take place in the Council. Decisions are made in the European Council that assembles the members' head of states and in the Council of Ministers. The former is the highest political body but has no formal executive or legislative powers in the EU systems. The latter is composed of the member states' ministers where principal legislative activities take place. It is divided into different Council formations that focus on certain policy fields. Decision making in the Council of Ministers is almost always consensual as Hayes-Renshaw et al. (2006) demonstrate. The authors analyse all roll-call votes for the period from 1994 to 2004. The study shows that member states only rarely vote against propositions at the ministerial level. These findings are in line with previous qualitative evidence that revealed strong consensual tendencies in the Council of Ministers.

Do parties influence decision making in the Council of Ministers? Analysis of voting behaviour in the Council has been significantly improved since voting records of the Council of Ministers have been made publicly available. Though most of the decisions in the Council are consensual, recent empirical analysis have revealed some lines of conflict. Mattila (2004) provides an empirical study of voting behaviour in the Council of Ministers. His analysis is based on the same data source as previously discussed but limited to the period between 1995 to 2000. Mattila's study shows that ideological positions of parties do in fact explain voting records in the Councils. He explains voting behaviour on the basis of both a left/right and an integration/independence dimension. A recent study by Aspinwall (2007) supports Mattila's findings. Aspinwall studies voting behaviour in the Council of Ministers as well as at the 1997 Amsterdam intergovernmental conference. The analysis demonstrates that voting behaviour that favours integration legislation can be explained by drawing on the left/right positions of national governments. However, Mattila's study is rather controversial. Other authors explain voting behaviour in the Council by emphasizing political economy variables and highlight the importance of a north/south divide in the Council of Ministers (Mattila and Lane 2001; Thomson et al. 2004; Zimmer et al. 2005). In this perspective, conflict between net contributors and net recipients shapes fundamental conflict dimensions.

Whereas data on voting behaviour of the Council were difficult to access for a long time, studies of voting patterns in the EP have a long tradition and have generated systematic evidence on the decision dynamics within the parliament. The role of the EP in the decision making of the EU was negligible for the first periods of European integration. However, it gained some relevance shortly after direct EP elections in 1979. First this was only through more extensive usage of the Parliament's consultation rights. Nevertheless, only the introduction of the cooperation procedure in the Single European Act (1987) and the codecision procedure in the Masstricht Treaty

(1993) substantially enhanced the EP's powers. Nowadays, the EP has substantial influence on decision making through the codecision II procedure as established in the Amsterdam Treaty.

Especially Simon Hix, Abdul Noury and Gérard Roland have systematically studied voting behaviour in the EP since 1979 (Hix et al. 2005, 2006, 2007; Noury 2002). By analysing EP roll-call votes, the authors demonstrate how cohesive voting blocks in the EP have formed. Results show that voting behaviour is similar to decision dynamics in national parliaments (cf. Kreppel and Tsebelis 1999). Most of the voting takes place along the classical left/right dimension. In addition, there is a less significant conflict dimension with regard to attitudes toward European integration. Some of the rather small party groups in the EP are strongly against European integration and vote systematically against the major integration friendly party groups. However, whereas the pro/anti integration dimension has gradually evolved since the 1990s, the left/right dimension has been present in MEPs' voting behaviour since 1979.

Other research on the EP has focussed on the EP's legislative influence. A lot of this research follows Tsebelis' famous claim about 'conditional agenda-setting power' of the parliament (Tsebelis 1994). Research efforts have tried to demonstrate the scope of EP influence under the cooperation and the codecision procedure. Results show that the EP has been more successful in amending legislation under the codecision procedure. Tsebelis et al. (2001) highlights the important role of Commission support for successful EP amendments.

Direct party influence on EU decision making is strongest in the EP as many studies demonstrate. It is the EP where ideological differences have a direct influence on decision making. Neither in the Council nor in the Commission are party dynamics as easily demonstrated as in the Parliament. The Commission, to which I turn now, is probably the institution that is most immune toward direct party control.

The Commission proposes policy ideas, initiates, prepares and implements legislation. It is the executive branch of the EU similar to national ministries. The Commission's core executive (the College of Commissioners) is composed of high profile representatives from the member states and the bureaucracy (the directorate-generals) responsible for the administrative work.

Studies of the Commission focus either on the College of Commissioners or on the administrative arm. Only a few studies have been able to systematically investigate the factors that determine Commission decisions. Data on the decision dynamics within the Commission are hard to gather, so that qualitative studies dominate investigations of the Commission (Wonka 2008). Most of the quantitative studies rely on surveys among Commission officials in order to determine factors that influence decision making in the Commission.

In an explorative study of decision dynamics within the College of Commissioners Egeberg (2006) highlights the role of sectoral portfolio interests and finds almost no influence of partisan interest. Thomson (2008) confirms these findings with an empirical study of EU legislation.

However, Thomson also finds strong evidence for the influence of national interests in decisions of the College of Commissioners. Both of the studies mentioned analyse only a short time period so that it is difficult to generalise from these findings. As previously mentioned, systematic studies about decision making within the Commission have only started recently.

In the previous sections, I have summarised the role of parties in European decision making. My discussion of the role of parties in the EU shows that parties structure the political space in the EU and provide different policy options to citizens. In addition, parties play an active role in EU decision making. The role of parties in EU politics has significantly increased over the last three decades and especially the EP works more and more like a 'normal' parliament. However, we are still in need of a systematic understanding of the party composition of EU institutions. In order to improve our understanding about the role of parties in the EU, this dissertation provides a systematic evaluation of the EU's party fabric.

2.4.2 Europe's party political composition

To understand the party compositions of EU institutions, it is necessary to look at each of the three institutions separately. The party political composition of the three institutions has received varying amounts of attention by scholars of the EU. The second-order election hypothesis put forward by Reif and Schmitt (1980) has helped to focus attention on the interrelatedness of the party composition of national governments and the results of elections to the EP. Contrary to the high interest on the second-order EP elections, studying the selection criteria for Commissioners has only started recently. Out of this research, there is now a growing body of evidence about the mechanisms behind the appointment of Commissioners. Finally, a coherent understanding of the party composition of the Council is almost completely absent. This is even more surprising as there exists a well developed literature on government formation in Europe that could be drawn upon in order to understand the Council's party composition.

In the next sections, I summarise the research on the party composition of the three EU institutions. First, I discuss the empirical literature on the elections to the EP in greater detail. Second, I give a short summary on current research about the party composition of the Council and the College of Commissioners. However, I discuss these two institutions of the EU more thoroughly in two separate chapters of this dissertation. Finally, I critically assess the lack of research on the party composition of the Council. Let me start by reviewing the work on the role of parties in the EP, hence the second-order election literature.

European Parliament   Elections to the EP have been held since 1979. Therefore, to understand the party composition of the EP we have to study EP elections systematically. Shortly after the first election to the EP took place, Reif and Schmitt (1980) compared this election to

sub-national elections and referred to EP and sub-national elections as 'second-order elections'. This hypothesis has been highly influential and has shaped the research agenda for studies on the outcomes of EP elections ever since.

According to Reif and Schmitt (1980, 9) elections to the EP show certain characteristics that are similar to sub-national elections such as lower turnout, higher success for small and new political parties, more invalidated ballots and losses for governmental parties. Similar patterns had been revealed before in studies of German states elections ('Landtage') and midterm elections to the US Congress. All these elections show systematic differences compared to 'first-order' national elections, hence elections to national parliaments. These patterns have prevailed in all of the later EP elections and numerous studies confirmed the findings (e.g. Marsh 1998). Further refinements have shown that this second-order dynamic is especially strong at the midterm of two national parliamentary elections. The further the distance to the last and next national election, the higher the second-order effects.

Methodologically, these studies investigate second-order dynamics by comparing vote shares of parties between first- (national) and second-order (EP or sub-national) elections. Time differences to national elections are mostly included as second-order polynomials to capture the non-linearity of the of the temporal dimension. Governing parties have a 'honeymoon' period shortly after national elections, were second-order dynamics are less severe. The loss of votes of a governing party in second-order elections are most severe in the middle of the electoral cycle.

Recently, empirical research has tried to reveal some more evidence about the systematic differences of national and EP elections. Ferrara and Weishaupt (2004) have put forward the hypothesis that party unity does also explain a significant part of EP election gains or losses. Parties that provide clear signals on their positions towards European integration are significantly more successful than parties split on the EU issue. The authors support their claim by including party positions derived from expert surveys into their analysis. Hix and Marsh (2007) also include party positions systematically to explain gains and losses in EP elections. Their analysis shows that an inclusion of party positions does not alter the major findings of the second-order literature that is losses for large and governing parties. However, the study also demonstrates that extreme parties on the EU dimension are highly successful in EP elections compared to their national performance (503). Especially eurosceptic parties have shown good electoral performance in EP elections. In contrast to the importance of the EU dimension, Hix and Marsh suggest that left/right positions do not matter in terms of relative electoral performance.

The work on the characteristics of elections to the EP has reached an advanced stage. We understand the systematic patterns that distinguish EP elections from national elections. In addition, we are able to systematically predict vote shifts between elections. It can be said that studies of EP elections have been a successful cumulative research endeavour.

Despite my praise for the systematic advances in studies of EP elections, some reservations are nevertheless in order. Although we have a good understanding of the systematic differences of national and EP elections at the aggregate level, there is still a lack of knowledge when it comes to explaining this voting behaviour at the micro-level. Rohrschneider and Clark (2008) convincingly argue that we do not have any systematic studies of the motivations behind vote shifts in EP elections. Rohrschneider and Clark summarise some of the arguments that try to explain these different voting patterns. They emphasise that it may well be that voters perceive party performance differently between the national and the European level. However, systematic studies linking micro-data with macro phenomena of second-order dynamics have yet to be provided. Consequently, studies of second-order dynamics have to move beyond the analysis of aggregated data and combine the knowledge of the second-order literature with the widely available EP elections studies based on voter surveys.

How are second-order characteristics and the party composition of the EP related? What are the consequences of the second-order election effect for the party composition of the Council? Dynamics that are in place at EP elections have direct consequences for the party composition of the EP vis-à-vis the other EU institutions. Some authors have claimed that second-order dynamics lead to a logic of divided government in the EU (e.g. Hix 2005, 206), a claim that I will investigate in greater detail later in this dissertation. Nevertheless, some characteristics do directly translate into systematic differences in the party political composition of EU institutions such as the effect on small parties. Small parties are more successful in EP elections than in national elections. As a result, these parties show stronger presence in the EP than in national legislatures. In the Council, however, small parties are less likely to be represented, due to the logic of government formation in member states. The consequences of these patterns are straight forward: Small parties are underrepresented in the Council and the Commission but overrepresented in the EP. Following to the same logic, bigger parties are dominating the Council and the Commission but show a weaker performance in EP elections. Later, I explore these dynamics in greater detail but turn now to the Commission.

College of Commissioners   Studies on the composition of the European Commission have focussed on two levels. A wide literature that is based on studies of public administration has focussed on the bureaucratic arm of the Commission. This work asks about the internal dynamics within the bureaucracy of the Commission and about the loyalties of Commission staff. A second, very recent, literature has focussed on the College of Commissioners, the heads of the Commission's directorates-general appointed by member states.

The extensive literature on the Commission's administration is best summarised by Hooghe (2001). The book shows that loyalties among the Commission's bureaucracy is shaped the most

through their previous national experiences. My work is more interested in the party composition of the College of Commissioners. Consequently, I focus on research that studies Commissioners' appointment patterns. Hooghe's book discusses the relevance of party affiliations for the administrative part of the Commission. I refer interested readers to her work.

The appointment patterns to the College of Commissioners have been first studied by Mac-Mullen (1997). He gathered biographical information of all Commissioners appointed up to the Santer Commission. In his study, MacMullen focuses on characteristics of the Commissioners and discusses changes over time. The article shows that Commissioners have held more high profile positions in recent decades. MacMullen gives also extensive information on the changes of the age structure and the percentage of women among Commissioners.

MacMullen's major contribution was the provision of the first systematic comparison of the career background of Commissioners when appointed to the Commission. Recently, researchers have tried to combine empirical studies of the appointment process with more general questions about political careers. Wonka (2007) studies the appointment process and raises questions about these appointments with a principal-agent perspective. He asks about the mechanism that may best guarantee an interest representation of member states in the Commission.

In this dissertation, I also provide a detailed investigation of the appointment process to the College of Commissioners. Contrary to previous studies, I apply multivariate statistical models to determine the mechanisms behind Commissioners' appointments. Furthermore, I incorporate indicators developed in comparative politics to further investigate the changing patterns of appointments. My results demonstrate that Commissioners' recruitment has become similar to patterns of ministerial appointment in member states. Nowadays, Commissioners are high profile politicians with strong ties to the domestic parties in government. The later chapter on the patterns of appointment to the College of Commissioners sheds more light on delegation to the European Commission and underlying mechanisms of delegation (see chapter 5).

European Council and the Council of the European Union   We still lack a systematic study of the party composition of the Council. Franchino (2007) relies on a data set that includes detailed information on the party composition of the Council but does not explain how these actors come into place. Philip Manow and I have previously discussed how the logic of government formation in EU member states translates into the party composition of the Council (Manow and Döring 2008). We are combining studies of government formation and the work on the political space of the EU, and thereby provide a first attempt to explain the party composition of the Council.

In Manow and Döring we put forward the argument that the party structure of the Council is systematically biased in favour of pro-European parties. We highlight the fact that a bias

towards more moderate left/right parties in the process of government formation and the u-shaped relation of the left/right and the integration/independence dimension should result in a higher likelihood of pro-European parties to be represented in the Council. We support our argument by providing some first descriptive empirical evidence.

However, to the best of my knowledge, there is no systematic study that explains which parties are represented in the Council and the logic of delegation. The lack of systematic empirical work on the party composition of the Council is even more surprising as the respective literature on government formation and coalition building in Europe is well developed. To understand the party structure of the Council, we need to systematically apply this literature to EU member states.

In my view, two questions are important to understand the party composition of the Council. First, we need detailed empirical studies that investigate the probability that a party will be represented in the Council. These studies should focus on a party's characteristics as the ideological position and the size of the party. Here we can draw on the literature of coalition formation, but have to be aware that not all the variables that are of interest to students of coalition building may be relevant for understanding delegation to the Council. Second, we are in need of a systematic study of the temporal dimension of the Council's party composition. We know that conservative parties dominated the Council in the eighties of the last century, whereas social democratic parties held a majority in the late nineties. So far, we have no systematic knowledge of the ideological composition of the Council for the whole period of European integration.

In the fourth chapter of this dissertation, I study the party composition of the Council in greater detail. In that chapter, I use empirical models of coalition building to explain the Council's party structure. At the end of the literature review in the following chapter, I will provide some first descriptive evidence on the party composition of the Council and compare it vis-à-vis the Commission and the EP.

2.5 Summary

Democratic institutions translate votes into seats very differently. As a consequence, political institutions enable different forms of citizen and elite linkages. Political institutions influence the selection of representatives, as a result of which some actors may benefit more than others from the specific setup of the political institutions in a country. Scholars of comparative politics have focused on electoral systems, party systems and cabinet formation to better understand how institutions impact on representation. These mechanisms are also at work in the EU, as the delegation to the Council, the EP and the Commission is enabled by a wide set of political institution. To understand representation in the EU, we have to understand the effects of institutions on delegation from members states to EU institutions.

One way to look at representation in the EU empirically is to focus on the party composition of EU institutions. Parties are central actors in democratic politics. They aggregate and shape political conflict, provide a vehicle for political careers and are at the centre of decision making in democratic institutions. Parties structure political competition in Europe. The relevance of parties has also been highlighted for political dynamics in the EU. Therefore, political parties provide an anchor to understand politics in the EU. Parties are also a good unit of analysis to understand representation in EU. We can trace the strength of parties from the ballot box to the decision dynamics in the Council, the Commission and the EP. By investigating this chain of delegation, we better understand to what extend representation is altered through political institutions. How do democratic institutions change the prospects of political parties in the EU?

EU member states have different forms of democratic systems. On the one end we find majoritarian electoral systems with a high bonus for the winning party and single party cabinets. This is the classical Westminster model as applied in democratic practice in the UK. On the other end we have permissive electoral rules with a highly proportional mapping of election results into parliamentary seat shares. The latter facilitates a higher number of parties in parliament and may also encourage minority governments as for example in Denmark and Sweden. However, there are many different forms of political institutions that effect how votes are translated into parliamentary seats and then contribute to government formation such as bicameral legislatures and various forms of electoral rules.

These variances in democratic institutions lead to different forms of representation in national governments and as a result of this also in EU institutions. I explore these connections in further detail for the Council and the College of Commissioners in two separate chapters. However, some patterns emerge immediately from the discussion in this chapter. Some member states (e.g. Spain, Portugal, UK) have mostly single party governments that last for long periods of time. As a consequence, these governments are represented in the Council for constant time periods and face no pressure from coalition partners. Other countries regularly form minority cabinets (Denmark and Sweden) and consequently do not have a government majority in parliament. As a member of the Council, these governments need the support of their national coalition members and the national parliamentary opposition. Finally, some member states (e.g. Belgium and Italy) show high levels of cabinet volatility and may therefore have a less powerful position in the Council. It has to be emphasised that national cabinet formation alters representation in the Council significantly. Only a subset of parties in parliament is represented in member states' governments and therefore in the Council. In chapter 4, I show which parties on the left/right and pro/contra EU integration dimension are more likely to be government (Council) members.

As long as electoral rules for EP elections were in line with national rules, the biases of certain

electoral systems translated directly into EP representation. In 2002, the Council of Ministers and the EP harmonised the electoral rules for EP elections (see Farrell and Scully 2005). The party composition of the EP mirrors national parliaments but two effects of electoral rules led to systematic deviations. First, although the same institutional regulations were applied in national and EP elections until 1999, smaller parties faced an increased effective threshold. This is based on the simple fact that there are fewer seats at stake in EP elections as a result of which the number of votes per seat increases. Second, a second-order logic in voting behaviour leads to deviations from the outcomes of national elections. Lower turnout and a 'punishment' of governing parties makes small, opposition and extreme parties more successful in EP elections. That is why it is easier for small parties to succeed in EP elections in terms of electoral results, but also more difficult to translate these votes into seats as each seat requires more votes. It could be assumed that the larger thresholds counterbalance the second-order election effect, as a result of which small parties have no effective advantage in EP elections. However, despite these two contrary institutional effects, the second-order election effect has a larger impact on the effective number of seats of small, opposition and extreme parties in EP elections, as empirical studies show. The higher threshold for a seat cannot counterbalance this effect.

We have now acquired a broad overview on empirical studies of representation and the relevance of parties in the EU. I provide more detailed analyses to advance our understanding of procedural representation in EU institutions throughout the next chapters. My discussion in this chapter has shown that we are in need of a better understanding of the Council's and the College of Commissioner's party structure. It goes without saying that we need systematic data on the outcomes of national and EP elections as well as on the composition of national governments and the College of Commissioners to study representation in the EU empirically. Unfortunately, this information is available only in heterogeneous sources and difficult to combine. To overcome these limitations, I present a new approach on data management for comparative politics in the next chapter and provide a new systematic database on the party composition of EU institutions as well as their political positions named ParGov.

3 Mapping Europe's political space

To understand the party composition of EU institutions, two sorts of information are necessary. First, we need data on the party composition of national parliaments and governments as well as data on the party composition of the EP and the Commission. Second, data on the ideological positions of these parties is needed to locate them and the political institutions they compose in a political space. This chapter suggests a new approach to the organization of data on political institutions that goes beyond traditional spreadsheet based methods. I propose to combine a database, programmed functions of a statistical software package and a dynamic website to organise the complicated data structure at hand. A reference implementation is presented at the end of the chapter. In the chapter, I discuss traditional ways political scientists have systematically collected information on political institutions and map the location of political actors therein. I summarise various indicators about decisive actors under different majority requirements. In addition, I apply these indicators to the political institutions of the EU and calculate them for the period from 1958 to 2004.

My discussion focuses on European democracies as I want to provide a better understanding of the party composition of EU institutions through this dissertation. After my discussion of various data sources and indicators used to locate political institutions, I present some empirical information about the party structure of EU institutions. Since the data management for my endeavour is rather complex, let me first evaluate the current state of data collection in political science and propose a new approach towards data management.

3.1 The party composition of parliaments and governments in Europe

Having data on political institutions at hand easily is one of the main prerequisites for using statistical data analysis techniques. Take for example scholars of political economy who have OECD data as a comprehensive and well maintained source of information. This allows scholars to focus their attention on questions of research design and statistical specifications. Research in political behaviour has a similar starting point with a wide range of centrally administered survey data available for scientific investigation. Comparativists working on political institutions, however, are in a more difficult position. Often their work does not start with downloading and analysing the known standard data sources, but with a lot of work to collect the required information. At the end, scholars are confronted with data coming from different sources and origins which have to be digitised first.

What information can we draw upon to generate a data set on the party compositions of EU institutions? First, we need information on the results of national elections and the composition of national governments. Fortunately, these data are relatively easy to collect for EU member

states. One of the most systematic and thoroughly collected source is Mackie and Rose (1991) which has been updated since 1992 by the yearly political data issue of the European Journal of Political Research (EJPR).[1] These two reports provide almost the standard data source on the party composition of parliaments in Western countries. The EJPR political data also include information on the composition of domestic governments and the division of ministerial portfolios. For the period before the first yearly data issue of the EJPR was published, Müller and Strøm (2000) as well asWoldendorp et al. (2000) provide comprehensive sources on the party composition of governments and the allocation of ministerial portfolios. These data sources allow one to create a data set about the party composition of the EU member states and hence the Council.

One of the major problems of the previously discussed data sources is their non-availability in machine readable form. All this data is only provided in print. One major and well maintained digital data source with information about the party compositions of parliaments and governments is provided at www.kolumbus.fi/taglarsson. However, making use of these digital data require some conversions of the online sources into a data set. This dissertation is based on this online data source which were updated and extended using the data sources presented previously. A preceding version of the data was first collected for and used in Manow et al. (2004).

In addition to data on the party composition of domestic legislatures and governments, we need information on the party composition of the EP and the Commission. Information on the EP is comparably easy to gather. Corbett et al. (2003) provides a comprehensive list about the results of EP elections. This list was digitised and various official publications of the EP were included to create a comprehensive data set on the results of EP elections and the EP's party composition. Information on the party composition of the College of Commissioners, however, was most difficult to collect. There is no central data source that gives information on the party affiliation of all Commissioners. As a result, I had to collect this information from scratch, relying on various biographical dictionaries and newspaper resources. The creation of the data set about the College of Commissioners is described in greater detail in one of the latter chapters of this dissertation.

Collecting information on the party composition of the three major institutions of the EU allows one to answer various questions about delegation and representation in the Union. These data are especially valuable, once they can be easily combined with various data sets on the ideological positions of parties. To facilitate combining the different data sets, I make use of unique party IDs for all party observations in the data set. Additional combinations can be performed by using the dates of the respective observations (election date, government formation etc.). These data management operations require the database that I created. But before I describe the struc-

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[1]The data handbook is provided in the last issue of a given year and is now also available in digital form.

ture of my database in greater detail, I first discuss how we can map the location of parties and political institutions. Let me start by providing an overview about different ways to determine the positions of political parties.

3.2 Locating party positions

Locating the political positions of parties has been an ever increasing task in comparative politics. The need for party positions has grown due to the reliance on statistical models and the arrival of spatial theories. This type of analysis asks for data on the party positions in different ideological dimensions. These dimensions may either be a general left/right dimension or policy specific issue dimension such as economic regulation or the protection of the environment.

Spatial models may best illustrate the need for data on party positions. These approaches assume that those actors that are close to each other in a political space are more likely to agree and therefore coalesce. Theoretical models developed in the paradigm make predictions about coalition formation or voting behaviour based on the ideological (policy) distance of actors. To test these models empirically, but also for more traditional questions of political science, data on the positions of political parties is needed.

Three types of data sources figure prominently as a basis to locate parties' positions. These are party expert surveys, the content analysis of party manifestos as well as mass surveys. I discuss the the merits and shortcomings of each of these approaches in more detail in the following sections.

3.2.1 Expert surveys

Expert surveys rely on the knowledge of country experts, who are asked to locate party positions. Most of the time, these experts are political scientists, familiar with the political system whose parties they are requested to locate. The approach is simple, researchers set up a list of experts, contact them and ask them to locate parties in their political system on provided policy scales. Nowadays, expert surveys are part of the standard toolbox to locate positions of political parties.

The approach was first used systematically by Morgan (1976) in a dissertation at the University of Michigan. Morgan needed data on party positions in Western democracies to test models of government formation. Independent of Morgan, Castles and Mair (1984) used the same approach to provide data on the left/right locations of political parties in Western democracies. Their expert survey is the first that has been widely recognised, and the data are used in several applied works by political scientists. Later expert surveys extended the methodology: Laver and Hunt (1992) asked about party positions in several issue dimensions as well as the salience of each of these issues. In addition, Laver and Hunt used the approach to get information on

the importance of national ministries. Huber and Inglehart (1995) also asked about the content of left/right, respectively the issue of highest contestation in a national political system and included several non-Western countries.

To study the EU, a wave of surveys conducted by various political scientists at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC) are especially important. Ray (1999) was the first to apply the method of a party expert survey in order to locate parties in EU member states on the issue of European integration. Gary Marks and Marco Steenbergen conducted a further expert survey in 1999 and another survey by UNC scholars was conducted in 2002 (Marks et al. 2006; Steenbergen and Marks 2007). All of these surveys build upon Ray's approach and are relying on identical party IDs, so that they can be easily merged. These surveys did also try to gain insights on the changes of party positions by asking the experts to evaluate the position of parties retrospectively for the eighties of the last century.

The most recent survey was conducted by Benoit and Laver (2006) and demonstrates how much the methodological toolbox of expert surveys has developed. Whereas earlier surveys sent paper forms to only a few national experts, the Benoit and Laver survey relies on internet survey methodology as well as a significantly higher number of respondents compared to all earlier surveys. This new approach is likely to be the new standard way of conducting expert surveys. It has also been applied by Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2007) to map party positions in Latin America.

Today, party expert surveys are one of the most popular approaches to locate parties in a political space. This may be well due to the fact that those surveys provide a manageable tool to map political positions. Over the last three decades, several data sets have emerged and can now be used in applied work. The methodology is still evolving but has already been applied by scholars working in different areas of political science.

3.2.2 Content analysis of political texts

Manifesto project One major alternative to the use of expert surveys is the reliance on manifesto data. Deriving political positions from party manifestos has been the goal of a major research project that has spanned almost three decades. This work by European political scientists has produced two outstanding volumes that give political positions for all Western democracies since 1945 and for the countries of Central- and Eastern Europe since 1990 (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006).

The project started in 1979 as the Manifesto Research Group (MRG) and continued later as the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP). Based on salience theory, it aimed at providing information on the importance of certain issue dimensions in West European democracies for the post-war period. In order to determine these positions, party manifestos of all parties that gained

seats in national legislatures were gathered. To analyse the manifestos, CMP used human coders who counted the number of quasi-sentences for given issue dimensions. These issue dimensions were provided as fifty-six categories in seven domains. A distinction between negative and positive attitudes was made for some of these categories. Coders had to identify all quasi-sentences, parts of the text with only one meaning, and were asked to classify them according to the coding schema (Klingemann et al. 2006, 164 ff.). Out of these information, data on the frequency of references (quasi-sentences) to certain issue dimension were derived.

The CMP data include also information on the issue of European integration (cf. Budge 2001, 33–34). One variable (per108) captures positive statements about the EU: "Favourable mentions of European Community/Union in general; desirability of expanding the European Community and/or of increasing its competence; desirability of the manifesto country joining or remaining a member." Another category (per110) focuses on negative statements: "Hostile mentions of the European Community/European Union; opposition to specific European policies which are preferred by European authorities; otherwise as 108, but negative." However, these variables give no positional information. Political positions on the EU dimensions can be derived by subtracting the two variables (per108-per110) or by calculating their ratio (per108 / [per108+per110]). However, both approaches may be problematic. Most of the party manifestos provide only positive statements on European integration (per108), some give negative statements (per110) but few have data for both variables. As a consequence, the first approach translates the salience of the dimension directly into positional information. The second simply turns the information into binary data indicating if a party supports or opposes integration.

It is important to note that the CMP analysis as developed by the CMP group was not designed to measure party positions in a political space. Its original focus was rather on providing information on the salience of certain issue dimensions. Yet, the demand for data on party political positions, especially for the left/right dimension, and the historical scope of the data set let comparativists use the data to map political party positions as well. Budge (2001) as well as Franzmann and Kaiser (2006) for example derive political positions by creating additive scales from the CMP policy categories. These approaches rely on classifying CMP policy measures as either left or right and create positions on a general left/right scale from these classifications. Alternatively, Gabel and Huber (2000) use statistical techniques (principal factor analysis) to derive left/right positions without specifying political positions beforehand as either left or right. The use of the CMP data is still controversial and has let to a fierce debate among advocates of party expert surveys and CMP researchers. Later in the chapter, I summarise this debate but before, I shortly present a newer approach to analyse party manifestos.

Computer coding   Recently, a second approach towards the analysis of party manifestos has captured a lot of attention. Whereas the CMP relied on human coders in order to evaluate the political positions of parties by focussing on quasi-sentences, newer approaches have tried to make use of modern computer based methods as developed in computer linguistics.

Laver et al. (2003) introduced the method to political scientist with their wordscore procedure. This approach derives political positions from political texts (virgin texts) by comparing their content to other political texts (reference texts) with known policy positions. To compare these documents, the relative word frequency of reference and virgin texts are analysed to statistically estimate the similarity of the documents. This automatic approach to extract political positions from political texts has been highly influential. It has already been applied to study legislative speeches in the Italian parliament (Giannetti and Laver 2005), to estimate political positions of Swiss (Hug and Schulz 2007) and German (Proksch and Slapin 2006) political parties from manifesto data and to estimate political positions of French presidential candidates (Laver et al. 2006).

Other approaches have tried to derive political positions from political texts via computer content analysis by relying on the relative frequencies of words (Slapin and Proksch 2008). These newer methods require no a priori political positions but were proposed only recently. Hence, the potential of these approaches has yet to be evaluated. All authors that suggest computer based methods to derive positional information from political texts also provide programmes to analyse these documents. However, studying the merits and shortcomings of these different approaches compared to more traditional techniques has only started recently.

3.2.3 Survey data

Finally, party positions can be derived from mass surveys. Positions can be applied from voter self placements by calculating a parties' location from positions given by its voters. Some surveys even ask respondents to locate all major parties of their country on a left/right scale or on other policy dimensions. Mass level surveys have the advantage that some of them have been conducted regularly over long time periods. Consequently, these surveys allow one to create time-series data for extended periods.

In addition, elite surveys may provide an alternative source for party positions. Especially regular surveys of national members of parliaments give information on the political positions of these actors. Consequently, these survey information allows one to construct party positions for the parties represented in parliament. There may also be surveys of the party elite, such as members of national party conventions that give information on the political views of active actors within national parties. I presented some approaches that combine survey data of vot-

ers' positions with elite surveys in my previous chapter when I discussed studies of substantive representation.

For the EU, the Eurobarometer Series (EB) and the series of European Election Studies (EES) provide indispensable mass level survey information. The EB has conducted questionnaires since 1973 and the EES gives information for all EP elections since 1979. That is why these information also provide a rich set of information on the temporal changes of attitudes among citizens of EU member states. With respect to elite surveys, Farrell et al. (2006) provide data on the MEPs. However, these elite surveys show a low response rate, which may bias the information.

3.2.4 Triangulation

The strength and weaknesses of mass level surveys, manifesto data and expert surveys have been evaluated extensively (e.g. Benoit and Laver 2006; Laver 2001; Marks 2007). However, most of these comparisons focus on CMP data and party expert surveys. Results demonstrate that the positions of these different approaches are highly correlated. However, there are some particular differences between the three data sources that I would like to discuss.

Benoit and Laver (2007, 103) evaluate hand-coded CMP data and expert surveys to compare left/right measures of party positions. They argue that expert survey positions are more accurate due to their lower levels of measurement error. In their view, the CMP approach which derives a left/right measure from substantial policy positions leaves room for improvement. Marks et al. (2007) discuss the merits and shortcomings of four approaches to derive party positions on European integration. The authors compare CMP data, expert surveys, European election studies and a survey of MEP positions for the late nineties. By using factor analysis, they can demonstrate that these very different sources reveal a single dimension. Consequently, all measures provide similar information on party positions in the EU dimension. In addition, the study provides also novel empirical insights about the weaknesses of each of these approaches. CMP and expert data show a high variance for positions of extreme parties. In addition to comparisons of different political positions, Netjes and Binnema (2007) evaluate the potential to derive salience measures on the European integration dimension. They compare CMP data, UNC expert survey from 1999 and data from the European Elections Study 1999. The authors find substantial convergence between the three data sources. However, they also conclude that it is difficult to explain variance in the importance of the EU dimension.

Finally, there have been some studies that evaluate the potential to derive time-series data on party political positions. This has always been one of the strengths of the CMP data because they provide political positions since 1945. McDonald et al. (2007) use this information to study systematic changes in political positions over time and patterns of party positional change. However, in Döring and Tiemann (2007) we are rather sceptical about raw CMP data as a source for

time-series political positions and suggest to include Eurobarometer data as well. Klemmensen et al. (2007) compare CMP data and wordscore results and show that CMP data have a slightly better performance. However, they still advocate the usage of the wordscore approach as a good alternative. Unfortunately, these comparisons have yet to produce systematic time-series data of parties' political positions of high quality.

A wide set of studies has compared the potential of manifesto, expert and mass survey data to estimate political positions of parties. Out of this work, several benchmarks for the quality of the different approaches have been developed. This work demonstrates that all approaches provide reliable measures of party positions. However, party expert surveys seems to be the most powerful data source for political positions in the left/right as well as EU integration dimension. Unfortunately, this optimistic assessment of the triangulation literature holds only for cross-sectional data on political positions. A systematic assessment as well as a set of different data sources with political positions in the temporal dimension has yet to be developed.

3.3 Locating political institutions

Locating political institutions in an issue space has been an important task of comparative politics. The issue has received less attention by scholars of European politics. After discussing how to locate parties in a political space in the previous paragraphs, I now turn to indicators developed in comparative politics to locate institutions, composed of parties, in a political space. In the first part of this section, I focus on parliaments and governments, the major actors in the legislative process of democratic states. In a second part, I discuss how we apply these indicators to the EU respectively the Council, the EP and the College of Commissioners. Having indicators of the ideological composition and the heterogeneity of interests for these institutions is of major importance for our understanding of various aspects of the EU, as I argued in the first chapter of this dissertation.

3.3.1 Indicators for majority rule

The indicators I discuss determine decisive, or pivotal, actors among a set of political actors with different strengths and ideological positions. These indicators rely on measures of the political positions such as the left/right scale and information of party strength such as seat shares in parliament. My discussion clarifies how these positions are translated into determining decisive actors and the assumptions upon which these models are built. Let us start with the most widely used indicator of majority rule.

Figure 1: A five parties legislature with seven legislators

median voter ($\tilde{x}_v$)

x_1 x_2 x_3 $\tilde{x}_4$ x_5 x_6 x_7

left x_a x_b $\tilde{x}_c$ x_d x_e *right*

median party ($\tilde{x}_p$)

Median party Theoretically most appealing among all indicators are veto players or pivot positions. We can apply these indicators to different rules of decision making such as simple or qualified majority. For a political institution deciding by simple majority, the median position is decisive. To calculate the median, two approaches are possible, each based on certain theoretical prerequisites. The question at hand is basically whether we calculate the median party ($\tilde{x}_p$) or the median voter ($\tilde{x}_v$) (legislator) of the given institution. If individual level preferences of the voters are given, determining the median voter $\tilde{x}_v$ among a set of voters in a one dimensional political space $\{x_{v_1}, x_{v_2}, \ldots, x_{v_n}\}$ where $x_{v_i} \leq x_{v_{i+1}}$ simply implies choosing the voter as shown in equation 1.

$$\tilde{x}_v = \begin{cases} x_{\frac{n+1}{2}} & \text{if } n \text{ is odd,} \\ \frac{1}{2}(x_{\frac{n}{2}} + x_{\frac{n}{2}+1}) & \text{if } n \text{ is even.} \end{cases} \tag{1}$$

However, often we have to calculate the median legislator without having data on the positions of all legislators as required for equation 1. In such a situation, we can infer the position of the median legislator from party positions and the party's respective strength. However, this requires making certain assumptions about the distribution of preferences among the parties.

Figure 1 gives a simple model of a legislature with five parties and seven legislators. It shows that the position of the median party is not necessarily equal to the position of the median legislator. As can be easily shown, the median legislator is a member of the median party but he may be one of its more extreme members depending on the distribution of party positions. In figure 1, the median legislator ($\tilde{x}_4$) is located to the left of the median party's position ($\tilde{x}_c$).

How do we determine the position of the median voter if we only have data on the position of the parties and their respective strength in the legislative body? The most simple approach assumes that parties control a certain interval and that positions of legislators in the interval follow a discrete uniform distribution. In this case, the median party ($\tilde{x}_p$) is determined among a set of parties $\{x_{p_1}, x_{p_2}, \ldots, x_{p_n}\}$ with their respective weights $\{w_{p_1}, w_{p_2}, \ldots, w_{p_n}\}$ that may either be the electoral result (number of votes) or the number of seats. With these two indicators for

our set of parties we have to calculate the weighted median. Determining the median party ($\tilde{x}_p$) asks for the solution of the following inequality.

$$\sum_{x_i < \tilde{x}_p} w_i \leq \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i \quad \text{and} \quad \sum_{x_i > \tilde{x}_p} w_i \leq \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i \tag{2}$$

After we have determined the median party we now have to interpolate the position of the median voter, a member of the median party. The most common indicator has been proposed by Kim and Fording (2001, 163). It assumes that the voters in a party are distributed uniformly over a certain interval. More concrete, each party captures an interval of the political space of the legislature, half of the space between its ideal point and the ideal points of the parties to its right and left. The authors base the notation of their formula on the position of the party left to the median party (L), the length of the interval that the median party controls (I), the number of voters (N) as well as the sum of the seats of all parties left to the median (F) and the number of seats of the median party (f). Kim and Fording provide the following formula to calculate the median voter ($\tilde{x}_v$).

$$\tilde{x}_v = L + I \cdot \frac{(N/2 - F)}{f} \tag{3}$$

Let me transform this formula into the notation I have used in my previous discussion and figure 1. Given a set of party postions $\{x_1, \ldots, \tilde{x}_{v_p}, \ldots, x_n\}$ and the respective weights $\{w_1, \ldots, w_n\}$ of these parties, the median voter ($\tilde{x}_v$), legislator, within the median party ($\tilde{x}_p$) can be calculated by the following formula.

$$\tilde{x}_v = \tilde{x}_{p-1} + \frac{\tilde{x}_p - \tilde{x}_{p-1}}{2} + \frac{\tilde{x}_{p+1} - \tilde{x}_{p-1}}{2} \cdot \frac{(\sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i / 2 - \sum_{i=1}^{\tilde{x}_{p-1}} w_i)}{w_p} \tag{4}$$

Equation 2 and 4 allow us to find the median party and to approximate the position of the median voter. With these formulas we have determined the key actors for decision making under simple majority rule in a one-dimensional political space. Unfortunately, no equivalent decisive actor can be found for a multi-dimensional political space. This was mathematically demonstrated by McKelvey (1976) in his famous chaos theorem. Consequently, empirical studies have to rely on calculations of decisive actors in one-dimensional political spaces.

Centre of gravity The median position is the theoretically most feasible indicator to determine a pivotal actor under majority rule. However, for some studies, an alternative indicator may be used that better captures empirical realities. The strong theoretical focus on the median legislators has not matched empirical realities in the study of portfolio distributions among coalition

53

Figure 2: Krehbiehl's pivot model of US legislation

members. Theoretical expectations would predict a high median premium, whereas empirical realities show a constant pattern of proportional portfolio divisions.

Instead of calculating the median position, the weighted mean has proven to be a better indicator to locate positions of coalition governments (see Powell Jr. 2006, 303). It is also sometimes called the 'centre of gravity' after a discussion of the indicator by Gross and Sigelman (1984). The weighted mean ($\bar{x}$) is calculated by the parties' positions (x_i) and their respective strength (w_i). For completeness we provide the simple formula here as well.

$$\bar{x} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i x_i}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i} \tag{5}$$

3.3.2 Beyond majority rule

Decision making in several political institutions is not determined by simple majority rule nor requires legislation to pass majorities in multiple chambers. These decision processes call for different indicators to locate decisive political actors in the political space. For political systems with multiple decision-making institutions we may simply calculate the decisive actors for any of the chambers and consider each as a veto point. I turn to these cases later in this section.

Let me first turn to supermajorities and show how we can determine decisive positions in these cases. Two theoretical approaches figure prominently in the literature and both allow us to calculate decisive actors in a given political institution. The first model has been proposed by Krehbiel (1998) as an approach to understand decisions making in the US Congress. Krehbiel calls decisive actors pivots and provides rules to determine their positions. The model has been applied to study decision making in the EU, but I discuss these applications more extensively in a later part.

Krehbiel's model is especially applicable for political systems with supermajorities. Figure 2 provides the model of decision making in the US Congress exemplified by eleven legislators in the legislature (Krehbiel 1998, 21 ff.). To determine decisive actors, three types of information are necessary beyond information on the legislators' positions. First, the position of the president (p) has to be known. His signature is required to enact legislation and only a 2/3 majority in Congress, the legislature, can override his veto. Second, it is important to know if the president's

position is to left or to the right of the median legislator. If the president's position is to the left of the median legislator as shown in the figure, the legislator that has no more than $1/3$ of the other legislators to his left is the *veto pivot* (v). His or her support is required in case the Congress wants to overrule a presidential veto. Finally, legislation can be blocked in the Senate by a filibuster, the right for an extended debate. A $3/5$ majority of the Senate, the legislature, can end the debate and invoke cloture. Therefore, the legislature with no more than $2/5$ of the other legislators to his right is the *filibuster pivot* (f). Again, his or her support is required in order to stop a filibuster. If the positions of these decisive actors are known, hypotheses about the likelihood of a legislative act to pass the legislature can be formed.

Tsebelis (2002) presents an alternative approach that establishes decisive actors for different decision modes. His veto player model can be applied to decision making under various majority requirements. Tsebelis asks under which condition the status quo can be changed and who are the actors that can veto alternative proposals that would challenge the status quo. He develops most of his models in a two-dimensional political space. Tsebelis derives several hypotheses based on his veto players theory. These hypotheses specify the conditions under which additional veto players increase policy stability and the potential of agenda-setting for different veto player configurations.

The theories of Krehbiel and Tsebelis are important to determine decisive actors, Pivots, or veto players, respectively, under complex majority requirements, which may either include certain super-majority requirements or decision making between multiple political institutions. Both theories specify rules on how we calculate positions of these political institutions and model the legislative process. The EU is a political system with exactly this bundle of different majority requirements as well as multiple legislative actors. Therefore, I include insights from pivot and veto-players theory in the next section to show how we determine decisive actors in the EU.

3.3.3 Determining decisive actors of EU institutions

Tsebelis applies his theory directly to the EU and demonstrates how we can calculate decisive actors for different legislative procedures in the EU. He specifies how to determine veto players in the Council, the Commission and the EP under their different majority requirements. This type of data is important to study decision making in the EU. To test formal models of EU legislation, we need indicators of the political actors involved into these decision processes. Therefore, I now discuss how we calculate the positions of decisive actors for the institutions of the EU.

The majority requirements of EU legislation depend on the legislative procedures spelled out in the EC/EU treaties. The legislative procedures also specify the involvement of the Commission and the EP. Several treaty reforms have changed these legislative procedures over time and

policy areas. The first treaty, the Treaty of Rome (1957) establishing the European Economic Community, states that the Commission drafts the proposals, the Parliament plays an advisory role only and the Council is the central decision-making body. Starting in 1957, the Commission was given the exclusive right of initiative which makes it an agenda-setter. The Commission is composed of the College of Commissioners who decide by simple majority. The College is appointed for a five-year term by the Council. In recent times, a new Commission also needs the approval of the EP.

According to the Treaty of Rome, the Council is the central decision-making body and takes most decisions unanimously and some by qualified-majority voting, depending on the policy area. In the mid 1960s, France challenged the qualified-majority voting in the Council by applying an 'empty chair' policy which lead to deadlock. The Luxembourg compromise, a political declaration signed by the foreign ministers, resolved the deadlock by establishing the right to veto any decision where national interest was at stake. As a consequence, this solution pressured the Council to find a consensus even in policy areas officially opened for qualified-majority voting. Over the years, qualified-majority voting has been gradually extended to many policy areas and has now become the normal procedure, unanimity being the exception. The Treaty of Nice (2003) changed the weighting of votes in the Council under qualified majority preparing the Union for the Eastern enlargement. Since there are two central procedures, unanimity and qualified majority voting, we have to determine the decisive actors in the Council under both.

In addition to the Council and the Commission, the EP is the third important legislative body. First, having been a pure consultative body without much influence, the competences of the EP, were enhanced significantly over the years. Shortly after the first direct elections in 1979, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled in 1980 that the Council may not act without consulting the EP. Each treaty reform since has strengthened the power of the EP. The Single European Act (1987) introduced the cooperation procedure and the EP officially gained a veto right under the Maastricht Treaty's codecision procedure in 1992. The Amsterdam Treaty (1999) then boosted the Parliament's powers by considerably extending the codecision procedure. The Treaty of Nice (2003) extended the codecision procedure again and granted the EP the right to bring actions before the Court of Justice of the European Communities. Codecision is now the standard procedure in the first pillar and usually goes hand in hand with qualified-majority voting in the Council. These reforms reduced the ability of the Council to overrule EP decisions and increased the EP's amendment power. The EP decides with absolute majority.

How do we determine decisive actors for these legislative requirements? We tackle the problem by determining the pivots for each of the three EU institutions independently. Once these positions are calculated, models of EU decision making have to be applied to formalise how these positions may translate into legislative outcomes. Franchino (2007, 122 ff.) gives an ex-

tensive discussion on how to calculate pivot positions for the Council, the Commission and the EP. He also provides first systematic data on these positions. I follow his suggestions in the subsequent sections.

We start with the two institutions that decide by simple and absolute majority requirements, the Commission and the EP. The Commission formally decides by simple majority. Although actual decision making is highly consensual, we calculate the position of the median Commissioner to find the pivotal actor. This calculation requires no approximation and we can directly apply equation 2 for the set of Commissioners and their respective party positions. An alternative measure for Commission preferences relies on the position of the Commissioner that holds the directorate-general in charge of the respective legislative proposal (Franchino 2007, 138–40). This information, however, requires data on legislative proposals so that we rely on the more general median position. The latter also helps us to better understand the relative location of the Commission vis-à-vis the Council and the EP.

A calculation of the decisive legislator in the EP requires the determination of the majority pivot. An absolute majority of the EP must approve amendments to Council proposals. However, the absolute majority requirement changes nothing for our calculations of the median position, since we do not include information on turnout patterns in MEP voting. Hence, abstentions are equal to negative votes and we simply apply the formulas that I discussed previously. We can determine the median party by using equation 2 and have to approximate the median legislator with equation 4.

Calculating the pivots for the Council is slightly more complex. To determine the pivot in the Council, we have to calculate positions for different majority requirements. First, we have to calculate the positions of the unanimity pivots. This simply asks us to determine the two most extreme actors along the policy dimension. Second, we have to calculate the pivots for qualified-majority voting (QMV). These QMV requirements in the Council have changed over time. Consequently, I give only the general equation here. For qualified majority requirements we modify equations 2 and 4 by including a value q that specifies the majority requirement. Whereas our previous equations asked for the simple majority by specifying a value of 0.5, we now leave the actual value unspecified.

$$\sum_{x_i < \tilde{x}_p} w_i \leq q \sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i \quad \text{and} \quad \sum_{x_i > \tilde{x}_p} w_i \leq (1-q) \sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i \tag{6}$$

$$\tilde{x}_v = \tilde{x}_{p-1} + \frac{\tilde{x}_p - \tilde{x}_{p-1}}{2} + \frac{\tilde{x}_{p+1} - \tilde{x}_{p-1}}{2} \cdot \frac{(q \sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i - \sum_{i=1}^{\tilde{x}_{p-1}} w_i)}{w_p} \tag{7}$$

Note that qualified majority requirements differ from simple majority in that there are status quo dependent. A median legislator can change any status quo in a one dimensional space. She

may vote with other legislators to her right to move a status quo that is left of her position more rightward. The same applies for a status quo to her right that she can change with legislators to her left. The same, however, does not apply for qualified majority voting as it is not symmetrical. Here, we either have to know the position of the status quo or we have to calculate the positions for both possible locations of the status quo. For the latter we would determine two QMV pivots, one for a left and another for a right status quo. Note that no position between these pivots can be changed as there is no (qualified) majority among the legislators that would support such a change. Krehbiel (1998) refers to these positions as the gridlock interval.

Having indicators for the pivotal actors in the Council, the Commission and the EP would allow us to study legislation in the EU in greater detail and to evaluate the power of formal models. However, this dissertation has a different focus. Its applied parts focus mostly on issues of procedural representation. Consequently, we only compare the median/mean positions of these actors. However, the data I present later also include pivots as specified in this section. Before I present the empirical data in greater detail, let me first discuss the characteristics of some additional indicators I have made use of previously.

3.3.4 Other indicators

Beyond the indicators presented in the previous sections, there are many more indicators that map certain characteristics of political institutions. In chapter 2.2.1, I relied on some electoral systems parameters in order to highlight how votes are translated into seats and used other measures to discuss differences among the party systems in EU member states. These indicators are also included into the database. The subsequent paragraph discusses their characteristics. A systematic comparison of different indicators of disproportionality and volatility is presented in Taagepera and Grofman (2003).

Disproportionality Translating votes into seats with perfect proportionality is mathematical impossible, as Balinski and Young (2001) point out. Consequently, all electoral systems distort vote-seat translation. Even highly proportional systems such as Denmark or the Netherlands do not result in perfect proportional representation as I discussed in chapter 2. Some institutional features of electoral systems are even created in order to reduce the number of parties in parliament (e.g. low district magnitudes, thresholds, malapportionment).

Different indicators have been proposed to quantify this disproportionality. Some of the first indicators were proposed by Loosemore and Hanby (1971) and Rae (1967). However, more recently, the least square indicator as first suggested by Gallagher (1991, 40) has become the standard way to measure disproportionality (Gallagher and Mitchell 2005, 602). For the dispro-

portionality (*D*) indicator we divide the sum of the difference of vote (*v*) and seat (*s*) shares for each party by two and take the square root of this value.

$$D = \sqrt{\frac{\sum\limits_{i=1}^{n} v_i - s_i}{2}} \qquad (8)$$

Effective number of parties   This indicator is used to give a figure for the number of relevant parties in a party system of the respective country. Just counting the number of parties would ignore the different sizes of the respective parties. Consequently, the effective number of parties provides an indicator of the heterogeneity of a given party system. The indicator was first proposed and discussed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979) and has subsequently been the standard indicator to determine the heterogeneity of a given party system (Gallagher and Mitchell 2005, 598). The effective number of parties (*N*) is calculated by the seat or vote share (p_i) of all parties in a party system.

$$N = \frac{1}{\sum\limits_{i=1}^{n} p_i{}^2} \qquad (9)$$

The indicator is included into the database for every election and every cabinet. As can be easily seen from the data, the indicator gives a higher number for spread party systems. If we compare the data we can also see that it shows a much higher number for parliamentary systems with proportional electoral systems. The latter fact follows naturally from Duverger's famous proposition.

Polarization   Finally, I include an indicator for the polarization of party systems. The need to systematically understand the ideological spread of parties was put forward convincingly by Sartori (1976). This book provided Sartori's famous typology of party systems based on the number of parties and their ideological fragmentation. However, it did not provide a measure of polarization that can be included easily into statistical analysis.

Recently, Dalton (2008) proposed an indicator for party polarization that is based on the number and strength of parties as well as their ideological positions. Dalton makes use of the left/right dimension as a general measure of party positions. The polarization index by Dalton combines the vote share (v_i) and ideological (left/right) position (i_i) of a party for all parties (*n*)

in the party system. However, I provide a slightly modified version based on the number of seats in parliament (s_i).

$$P = \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \left(\frac{s_i}{\sum_{j=1}^{n} s_j} * \frac{(i_i - \bar{i})}{5} \right)^2} \tag{10}$$

This index varies between zero and one. A value of zero indicates that all parties occupy the same position on the scale and a one value is provided if all parties are split between the extremes of the scale (Dalton 2008, 906). Consequently, the Dalton polarization index provides a good measure on the ideological spread of a party system. I include the index based on the left/right positions of various expert surveys into the database.

Scholars of comparative politics have come up with many more measures that provide parameters of party systems, electoral systems, election results and coalition building. I have presented here only three of these indicators that I made use of earlier. Alternative indices can easily be added into the database that I now present more thoroughly.

3.4 ParlGov: A database of political institutions

To combine information on the party composition of parliaments and governments with various data on party positions I have created a database that aggregates different data sources. It is named ParlGov, as a shortened version for parliaments and governments. Beside combining information on the strength and positions of parties, it also provides a wide range of functions to calculate important institutional parameters. This section explains the structure of ParlGov in detail. The appendix provides some additional information.

3.4.1 How to organise data on political institutions

Traditionally, data on political institutions were provided in data handbooks and not available in a machine-readable form without digitizing these source. Over the last decade, scholars have turned to CD-ROMS in order to distribute their data digitally. More recently, the Internet has provided a new way to publish data sets and enables scholars to put their data sets on their personal web page. Nevertheless, data on political institutions is still very heterogeneous and hard to combine.

One of the problems with most of the current data sets is the spreadsheet thinking of scholars. A data set is created by putting all the information necessary to answer the research question into one major spreadsheet. Most statistical software packages require this single source of data. As a consequence, a lot of information is typed in repeatedly from other data sources to

combine the information in need. In addition, some of the data points consist of combinations of other observations in the data set, but these data points are also often included statically. One alternative way to combine heterogeneous data sources is a reliance on databases. Databases are widely used to store and combine different information. One of their main advantages is that they allow one to store information non-redundantly, can be updated easily and allow one to combine different information quickly.

Looking at the EU, as an example, a good database would allow us to include different data on political positions and to incorporate new data quickly. In a database, all primary information are only saved once and different tables can be combined with the help of identifiers. A correction of a wrong entry requires the update of one observation only. In addition new data can be quickly combined with the old data tables and views allow one to create virtual tables that combine primary information. This information can be easily accessed by statistical software packages. To master the complex structure of the data at hand, it was one of the major goals of this dissertation to develop a coherent database schema. Take for example the unique identifier for each party. With this information, various tables can be combined. Consequently, one virtual data table can be created that contains information of parties in government, their strength in the respective parliament and their political positions as indicated in various external sources.

Most databases rely on SQL (structured query language) to perform complex data queries. SQL allows combining information on parliaments and governments just by combining the dates of the two. A SQL query could look for the results of the latest elections to determine the strength of the parties in cabinet. From a list of election dates, the query would pick the last election before the cabinet formed. Since both tables contain the same set of party identifiers all data on the strength of parties in parliament can be easily combined with the information on the government status. Relying on a database is especially helpful once bigger data sources are drawn on and if complex combinations of the various information is required. Nowadays, many statistical software packages can perform queries on a database.

The ParlGov database is saved in SQLite, a small database programme that can be run on any computer platform. It allows executing SQL commands in order to combine the data tables and to create tables as needed for statistical analysis automatically. In addition, SQLite has the advantage to be accessible through R, a common statistical programming languages (R Development Core Team 2008). Consequently, SQLite is used to perform all database operations and R to calculate the indicators for political institutions as previously discussed.

In terms of database operations, I rely especially on SQL's important capacities to combine different data tables via join operations. Take for example seat strength of governing parties. In order to determine the seat strength of governing parties, I coded all parties taking part in domestic governments. Instead of writing the seat strength directly into the data table of these

governing parties, I merge the coded parties with the respective parliament by picking the parliament that was elected before a government formed. Out of this parliament, I attach the respective seat share to each party as well as their seat share in the previous parliament. In addition, I add information on the political positions of the parties to the newly created table. In terms of the database design, my newly created table is a view. A view is not directly coded in the database but provides merely an access to a virtual table that combines several of the existing information.

In addition to the database management performed via SQL, I use R to calculate the indicators of political institutions as previously discussed. I access the database with R and use it to calculate the respective indicators. After calculating the indicators, I save them into the database as a static table. Consequently, all indicators have to be recalculated if entries in the database are changed.

To make data exploration easier, I have programmed a web interface to all relevant information in the database. It gives access to information on all parties, parliaments, governments and institutional parameters saved in the database. In addition, the web interface allows updating the data, to add further information and to file error reports. Hence, ParlGov provides a new approach to manage political science data.

3.4.2 Data on the political institutions of the EU

The ParlGov database provides information on the party composition of all EU institutions. Data on the party composition of the College of Commissioners and on the EP are directly stored in the database. Information on the party composition of the Council is derived from information on the party composition of EU member states' governments. I have also included information on the party composition of national legislatures. Finally, information on the positions of parties is provided through a linkage with various external data sources.

Most of the data is based on information provided at www.kolumbus.fi/taglarsson. I thoroughly reviewed and updated the data source by using data handbooks such as Mackie and Rose (1991); Müller and Strøm (2000); Rose and Munro (2003); Woldendorp et al. (2000) and the yearly data section of the EJPR. Data on the results of elections to the EP were taken from Corbett et al. (2003) and various official publications on the results of EP elections by the 'Directorate-General for Information and Public Relations'. As I discuss in more detail in my chapter on the party composition of the College of Commissioners (see chapter 5), data on the Commissioners have been coded relying on the Munzinger archive and various newspaper sources. Different information on the political positions of parties is made available in the ParlGov database. I include the expert surveys of Benoit and Laver (2006); Castles and Mair (1984); Huber and Inglehart (1995); Marks (2002). In addition, I provide an interface to the CMP data as distributed on CD-ROMs in Budge et al. (2001) and Klingemann et al. (2006).

It was difficult to find information on the political positions of all parties in EU member states. The existing data sets on party positions do not cover all parties represented in national parliaments and governments. Although, the CMP has coded all parliamentary parties, its left/right indicators are rather controversial. In addition, party manifestos often provide only positive statements on European integration, as I have previously discussed. Consequently, it is difficult to derive a continuous indicator on party positions in the EU dimension (Döring and Tiemann 2007). Furthermore, creating time-series data on party positions in general is still in a rather infant state. As discussed in one of the previous sections, there is still a need for a systematic combination and exploration of existing data on party political position to create valid time-series. Adding systematically to this debate is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Consequently, I simply combine the left/right scores provided by Benoit and Laver (2006); Castles and Mair (1984); Huber and Inglehart (1995); Marks (2002) to derive political positions in the left/right dimensions. For the integration/independence dimension, I combine the expert surveys by Benoit and Laver (2006) and Marks (2002).[2] To establish my scales, I rescaled all data sets to a 0 to 10 scale and calculated the mean positions from these data sets. To test the appropriateness of this approach, I performed a principal component analysis (PCA). Results show that the different expert surveys determine positions in one underlying dimension. I apply these policy scores for the left/right and integration/independence dimension in all my subsequent analyses.

The data I have presented so far forms the primary source of information for the ParlGov database. We have to distinguish primary data from information we calculate based on these sources. Primary data has to be coded or can be provided by linking existing observations to data sets created by other researcher. I call the latter type of data foreign data, indicating that it was collected and provided coherently by an external source. Now I turn to information that is based on primary and foreign data, but has to be calculated by programmed functions.

3.4.3 Calculating institutional parameters of the EU

To compare the party composition of the three EU institutions, I calculate all of the indicators as previously discussed. The database gives the median voter for every institution since 1958 by relying on the approach suggested by Kim and Fording (2001). I also calculate the centre of gravity (CoG) for all three institutions (Gross and Sigelman 1984). The median is sufficient to model decision making in the EP and the College of Commissioners. For the Council, I do also

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[2]Benoit and Laver (2006) provide multiple questions about European integration. For my analysis I make use of the question on EU authority. To calculate my left/right and my integration/independence scales for all parties, I include only those data points from Marks (2002) that were actually observed. I exclude all those data points, created from retrospective questioning.

provide the QMV pivots where weights of member states voting shares are taken from Felsenthal and Machover (1997, 34).

All of these calculations are performed by programmed scripts and generated automatically. These scripts are based on primary information from the ParlGov database and calculate institutional parameters from this information. Calculations are done through various R functions. This approach allows us to extend the data set easily. Once new information on party positions is available, we could quickly calculate all institutional parameters by linking the new information to the database.

Some conceptual decisions I made have to be discussed. The median and the CoG for the Council and the EP can be calculated in two different ways. Each of the two approaches to calculate pivotal players is based on specific assumptions about decision-making dynamics in the EU. First, we can calculate the median/CoG by determining the median/CoG position for every EU member state. We calculate the median/CoG position from the median/CoG positions of EU member states. In this perspective, decision making in the EU is a two step procedure starting at the national level. Hence, (national) parties, are constrained by domestic coalition dynamics and all decision-making processes take place at the national level first.

Second, we can calculate the median/CoG for all parties that are represented in the respective institutions, the Council or the EP. This approach would take parties as the unit of analysis to determine decisive actors. It would push a party perspective to its logical extreme. All parties across EU member states would be assumed to form decision-making coalitions without previous domestic coordination. For the ParlGov database, I calculated both values and found only minor differences between the measures. For the following description, I rely on the first approach that includes a national filter in the decision-making processes.

With ParlGov, we now have an extensive database on the party composition of EU institutions that provides us with various parameters of political institutions. With this information we can study how voters preferences are aggregated into the decision-making institutions of the EU. Before I make use of the ParlGov data to explain the party composition of the Council and the College of Commissioners, I shortly give a descriptive overview on the information in the database.

3.5 Descriptive evidence of Europe's party composition

The ParlGov database allows to answer a wide range of questions in comparative European politics. Here, I focus on the party composition of EU institutions to answer questions of representation in the EU. Let me give some descriptive evidence on the party composition of EU institution in the following paragraphs.

Figure 3 gives two dimensional political spaces for national parliaments, the Council, the EP

Figure 3: European political space at the Single European Act (SEA)

and the College of Commissioners at the ratification of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986. The graph provides information on all parties represented in these institutions and their political positions. It also visualises some of the institutional parameters I previously discussed. In line with the literature on EU politics, I make use of two substantial policy dimensions: left/right and pro/contra EU integration. The relevance of these two dimensions for EU policy making has been discussed before.

A snapshot of the political spaces at the SEA indicates several characteristics of delegation in the EU. I provide a more elaborate discussion of delegation from national parliaments to the Council in the next chapter, and will also provide a discussion on delegation to the Commission in one of the later chapters. However, figure 3 already provides first evidence about the mechanisms behind this chain of delegation for the Council. The Council assembles EU member states' governments. Hence, parties in the Council are a subset of all parties that are represented in member states' parliaments. This fact is also shown in figure 3. However, the figure also indicates a systematic pattern of government formation in parliamentary democracies. Moderate (left/right) parties are more likely to be government members. This follows naturally from the median party theory and is a constant empirical finding of the quantitative literature on coalition formation. This systematic aspect of coalition building has a consequence for the party composition of the Council in the integration/independence dimension. It follows that pro-integration parties are overrepresented in the Council and the logic of government formation systematically hinders the chance of contra-integration parties to be represented in the Council. This follows simply from the u-shaped relation of left/right and pro/contra integration.

According to figure 3 the composition of national parliaments and EP is very similar. The pure descriptive presentation hides some of the systematic differences in the composition of domestic legislatures and EP. I previously discussed the findings of the literature on the second-order election effects. According to these findings, opposition parties, small and left/right extreme parties have a higher chance to succeed in EP elections. Nevertheless, according to our figure, the composition of national parliaments and the EP are much alike.

Finally, figure 3 indicates that the party composition of the College of Commissioners is similar to the party composition of the Council. Later, I provide quantitative empirical support for this pattern as indicated in the graph. The figure also gives indices for some other systematic patterns of delegation from the Council to the College of Commissioners. It shows that the larger parties belonging to national governments are likely to have a seat in the College of Commissioners as well. This follows from the fact that domestic governments control the assignment of new Commissioners.

Figure 3 also shows that there are substantial differences between the two different measures of political institutions that we apply. The mean position tends to be more moderate than the

position of the median voter. Differences in the EU dimension mostly result from the negative skew of the distribution of EU positions. For this dimension, most parties tend to cluster at the pro-integration end of the scale.

We switch from a static perspective of the European political space to the temporal dimension in figure 4. It provides some more information on the party composition of EU institutions. The graph presents the median and mean positions for national parliaments, the Council (national governments), the College of Commissioners and the EP since 1958. When focussing on the figure, two points are important to note. First, there are differences in the party composition of all four institutions. Second, differences in the EU dimension are systematic with some institutions assembling more integration friendly parties than others. Consequently, it is important to discuss the two dimensions separately.

We find that the Council and the Commission have positions different from national parliaments. It is a simple fact that national governments have positions that are more extreme, either left or right, than the respective legislature. Because governmental parties are a subset of parties in parliament they have to be to one side of the parliamentary pivot. However, we do not know if the different locations of EU member states' governments are more left or right at certain points in time. There is no mechanism that leads to a systematic move into one direction but parties of one side may have controlled more governments at certain points in time.

For the Council, we find that right parties dominated the Council during the early periods of European integration and in the mid 1980s. Left parties' strength in the Council was high in the late 1970s and the late 1990s. In addition, the party composition of the College of Commissioners closely resembles those of the Council. Especially the figure with the median positions of the Council and the Commissioners highlights that governing parties in the Council assign Commissioners from their own parties. However, the graph with the mean position indicates that the Commission tends to be more moderate than the Council.

The pro/integration dimension highlights a different aspect of representation in the EU. Here we find that the composition of EU institutions differ systematically. The Council and the Commission are systematically composed of integration friendly parties. This pattern is constant over the whole time period of European integration. In addition, we find some minor evidence for the fact that integration sceptical parties are more successful in elections to the EP than in national elections. This is one of the patterns discussed in the second-order literature.

Finally, the graphs also reveal differences between mean and median based measures of the party composition of EU institutions. The mean position tends to be slightly less extreme than the median. In addition, the median seems to be more sensible towards changes than the mean. These differences are a result of the fact that the median voter position as calculated by the Kim

Figure 4: European political space over time

and Fording (2001) formula is always closest to the median party whereas mean positions are not limited to the interval controlled by the median party.

Simple descriptive presentations of the European political space allow us to reveal some patterns of delegation in the EU. These graphs help us to understand the political structure of EU institutions as well as developments over time. They also help us to see the consequences of some systematic mechanisms of delegation such as voting behaviour in EP elections (the second-order election effect). However, the mechanisms for systematic differences in the positions of national parliaments on the one hand and Council/Commission on the other are in need of further clarification. In addition, these differences have to be scrutinised by more systematic empirical studies. I focus on each delegation mechanism, to the Council and the Commission, separately in the succeeding chapters of this dissertation and discuss the underlying causal mechanisms. Results show that the descriptive accounts of this chapter are also valid after a more systematic investigation.

3.6 Summary

How easily can we study procedural representation in the EU empirically? How well developed are data sources, empirical indicators and statistical techniques in our discipline to pursue such a project? To what extend are there systematic studies on which we can base our own approach? The preceding sections have provided a rather heterogeneous set of answers to these questions.

First of all, we have well developed data sets and studies on the positions of political parties. We can draw on party expert surveys, manifesto data and mass level surveys to determine the political positions of parties. In addition, we find a wide set of studies informing us about the merits and shortcomings of each of these approaches. With these data sources we can map the political positions of all European parties in the post-war period. In addition, comparative politics has developed a wide range of indicators to determine the positions of political institutions. Once we have information on the parties that populate these institutions, we can calculate systematic indicators about the distribution of power therein. Finally, we have various data sources on the results of elections and cabinet compositions in Europe. Nevertheless, these data sources are heterogeneous and only available in different forms. Some of the most systematic sources are available in paper form only and there are few approaches to combine these sources.

We can quickly find all the information we need to study representation in the EU. However, once we have gathered all these information we realise that we have a wealth of information that we can hardly combine. Although we have all the information, we can not easily analyse these data sources with our statistical software packages. To overcome these shortcomings, I have proposed a new approach on data collection in comparative politics. This approach makes use of a database, statistical routines and a web interface to combine the different data sources sys-

tematically. I made use of these techniques to create the ParlGov database that gives information on the party composition of European democracies and EU institutions as well as their political positions. With this data set, we can overcome many of the previously discussed shortcomings.

The ParlGov database allows us to compare EU institutions systematically, as I have shown in this chapter. I used the ParlGov database to provide some general descriptive information on the EU's party fabric in the left/right and the pro/contra EU integration dimension. One of the results was that the composition of national parliaments and the EP as well as the composition of the Council and the College of Commissioners are very similar. However, we find that the composition of the first group differs systematically from the composition of the second group. The differences are robust in the EU integration dimension. Pro integration parties tend to be systematically overrepresented in Council and College and Commissioners. I systematically invest this pattern in the next two chapters and reveal the mechanism behind this bias in representation.

4 Coalition formation in Europe and the Council's party composition

We have previously discussed how parties matter in the decision making of the EU and presented the ideological dimensions of contestation in the Union. But how do we explain the party composition of the various EU institutions? Surprisingly little systematic evidence exists on the chain of delegation to EU institutions. The only legislative body that has been extensively studied in terms of its party political composition is the European Parliament. The literature has largely followed the Reif and Schmitt (1980) argument of a second-order election effect and several authors have claimed that the party composition of the Council and the EP differ systematically. Often an analogy is drawn to systematic differences in the party composition of bicameral legislatures. Hence, students of the EU hypothesise that "divided government is the norm"(Hix 2005, 206) or that "divided government [. . .] will be a permanent reality" in the European Union" (Bartolini 2006, 40).

However, the party composition of the Council is still rather poorly understood. We have gathered systematic evidence how the composition of EU member states' governments and outcomes of EP elections are connected (cf. Hix and Marsh 2007), but there is no systematic empirical evidence on the party composition of the Council. The lack of systematic knowledge about the party composition of the Council is even more surprising given the strong emphasise on democratic legitimacy provided through national elections *and* government formation (Moravcsik 2002, 612). Scholars who have argued against critiques of democratic accountability in the EU have mostly emphasised the fact that a member state's representation in the Council secures its influence by democratically elected governments. In this view, citizens elect their representatives in national elections and out of these elections democratic governments form. As these governments represent citizens' interest, decision making through the Council provides sufficient democratic representation and governments are accountable in national election, so the argument goes.

A systematic reading of the comparative politics literature on government formation shows that we have to tackle the issue with greater care. If we want to understand representation via the appointment of elected agents, we have to better specify the chain of delegation. In this respect, we have to ask how electoral systems distort representation through elections and if the formation of governments biases representation systematically. One of my earlier chapters has presented some evidence on the linkage of electoral systems and parliamentary representation. More interesting for the context of this study is a detailed investigation of the delegation from national parliaments to governments. Most European governments are controlled by coalition cabinets. As a consequence, we have to better understand coalition building in Europe in order to specify the party composition of the Council.

To understand coalition building in Europe, we can draw on a rich set of theoretical and empirical studies in the field of comparative politics. This literature is highly sophisticated, theoretically and empirically. Over the last four decades, work in this tradition has generated a systematic body of evidence on how coalition governments form and revealed the causal mechanisms behind the 'making and breaking of government', as a prominent book on the topic puts it (Laver and Shepsle 1996). The regional focus of this work has mainly been on Western Europe, so that we can draw on this rich literature in order to understand the party composition of the Council.

In this chapter, I discuss the party composition of the Council in greater detail. First, I shortly summarise the EU literature that investigates the influence of parties on EU decision making and present recent arguments about the party composition of the Council. Second, I discuss academic work on government formation in parliamentary democracies by summarizing the theoretical and empirical studies in this field of comparative politics. Out of this work, I generate a number of hypothesis about the party composition of the Council. Third, I present my empirical data, drawn from the ParlGov database in order to study government formation in EU member states. Finally, I present an empirical analysis that shows how and why the Council's party composition differs systematically from the composition of national parliaments.

4.1 National parties and the Council

Over the last decade, students of the EU have started to systematically investigate the role of parties in the decision making of the Council. This work is not as extensive as work on decision dynamics in the EP, but still more systematic than studies of potential influences of parties in the College of Commissioners. This may be due to the fact that information on the decision dynamics as well as the voting records of the Council is much harder to obtain compared to the EP. However, I present two streams of research were systematic evidence has been produced that parties do in fact influence the Council's decision making.

Mattila (2004) investigates decision making in the Council of Ministers empirically. In the study, Mattila analyses voting records of the Council from 1995 to 2000. According to the findings of this study, voting in the Council can be explained by the ideological positions of the actors involved. Mattila uses party positions as an indicator for the ideological stance of a government. Results show that left/right as well as integration/independence positions of an EU member state explain voting patterns. A recent study by Aspinwall (2007) supports Mattila's findings. Aspinwall studies voting behaviour in the Council of Ministers as well as at the 1997 Amsterdam intergovernmental conference. This analysis also shows that voting records can be explained by drawing on left/right and integration/independence positions of national governments.

A second stream of studies focuses on decision dynamics at intergovernmental conferences and regularly relies on parties as a unit of analysis. König and Hug (2000) provide an early study that accounts for the influence of party positions on the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. In order to investigate the ratification constrains, the authors rely on the political positions of all parties as derived from Eurobarometer voter self placements. Relying on models of two-level games as developed in the international relations literature, their results show that governments are constrained by positions of national parties that ratify the treaty in parliament. König and his coauthors take a similar approach in a different paper (Jensen et al. 2007). In order to predict governmental positions on a common EU foreign policy at the Constitutional Convention, the authors evaluate the positions of delegates based on different measures. They compare survey responses from delegates and party positions of the delegates. Results show that party positions are an important factor for understanding delegates' positions.

To sum up, there is systematic evidence that parties and their political positions matter in decision-making processes of the EU. This literature is very recent, but it has already produced substantial results that demonstrate the influence of parties at intergovernmental conferences and in the Council of Ministers. However, we are still in need of a more comprehensive understanding of the party composition of central EU actors.

4.2 Coalition formation in Europe

4.2.1 Theoretical models of government formation

To better understand the party composition of the Council, we have to rely on insights provided by students of government formation in Europe. Among comparativists, studying government formation or coalition building has been a major subfield. It has also been a research topic that has seen tremendous theoretical and empirical innovations. To better understand government building, we can now rely on a wide range of theoretical models and empirical studies of coalition formation.

Coalition government is the major form of party government in Europe. In fact only a small number of governments in the EU are single party majority governments (e.g. in the UK and Spain). Minority governments provide another special facet of coalition building that regularly exists in the Scandinavian countries. Scholars of government formation are mostly interested in finding a set of parties that are likely to form a coalition. In addition, comparativists ask how the composition of a governing coalition determines its success, stability and duration.

Students of coalition formation rely on the widely known distinction of party goals in terms of policy and office-seeking (Strøm 1990). In these studies, emphasis is either put on policy or on office motivations. To make predictions about likely coalitions, two sorts of information are

Figure 5: Coalition formation

$$2 \quad\quad 1 \quad\quad 3 \quad\quad 4 \quad\quad 1$$

left $\quad x_1 \quad\quad x_2 \quad\quad x_3 \quad\quad x_4 \quad\quad x_5 \quad$ *right*

needed. First, information about the relative strength of parties. Here, almost all studies rely on the seat share of parties in parliament. The seat share of a party is an important indicator because it helps us to understand how many coalition partners are needed for a given party to form a legislative majority. Second, we need information about the ideological positions of parties. Different ways to determine the political positions of parties were extensively discussed in earlier parts of this dissertation. Seat shares and political positions form the major building blocks for theoretical models of coalition theory and empirical studies on the topic.

Two major waves of research on coalition building in Western Europe can be highlighted. In the seventies scholars drew on Downs' median voter theorem to explain coalition building. This period of research was highly influenced by Riker's seminal book on coalition formation (Riker 1962). Riker argued that parties form minimal winning coalitions in order to maximise their share in government. In this view, those parties would form a governing coalition that required the minimal number of parties. However, the narrow focus on office motivation left a large percentage of empirical reality unexplained. Axelrod (1970) provided a theory that also considered the ideological positions of parties. According to Axelrod's theory, only parties that are close in a political space are likely to form governments. To map party positions in a political space, scholars have made use of single dimensional (left/right) scales. Although this may not be an exact picture of every country included into these studies, it has shown to be a fruitful approach to develop theoretical models with exact predictions and allows for various statistical models to test these theoretical propositions.

Simple models of government formation have now reached a point were they are included into major textbooks of comparative politics. These models do either rely on office or on policy motives or a combination of the two. A detailed specification of the assumptions is necessary to derive exact predictions about the parties that form a legislative coalition. Changing the assumptions about the motivation of coalition partners leads to different coalition predictions. Figure 5 provides an example of an eleven seats legislature with five parties. I present the major basic models of coalition formation subsequently and use the mini legislature in figure 5 as an example.

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Traditional models   A focus on office motives of politicians leads to the following predictions about likely coalition partners. First, if parties were only interested in office, or more plastically in power, they would form *minimal winning* coalitions (Riker 1962). Minimal winning coalitions include only the number of parties that are necessary to gain majority status. No oversized coalitions form, including members that add seats above legislative majority requirements. In our example all of the following sets could form minimal winning coalitions ($\{x_1, x_2, x_3\}$, $\{x_1, x_3, x_5\}$, $\{x_1, x_4\}$, $\{x_3, x_4\}$). Gamson (1961) provides another early theoretical argument for the formation of minimal winning coalitions based on the theory of games.

The argument is pushed even further by predictions that only *minimum size* coalitions will form. In this perspective coalition partners want to minimise the number of parliamentary seats that exceed majority requirements. Given that sharing government responsibility is accompanied by a division of the benefits that are provided through governing status, parties are likely to maximise their own share of governmental influence while minimizing the share of all other parties. It is not only the minimal number of parties necessary to form a government coalition but exactly these partners join forces that have the smallest number of majority seats combined. In our example of figure 5 all combinations of parties that control six seats would form a coalitions ($\{x_1, x_2, x_3\}, \{x_1, x_3, x_5\}, \{x_1, x_4\}$). Minimum size coalitions are logically a subset of minimal winning coalitions. Alternatively, minimum size coalitions can also be predicted relying on the number of parties instead of the number of seats (Leiserson 1968). Among the set of minimal winning coalitions, the ones containing the fewest number of parties would form. Given this perspective, $\{x_1, x_4\}$ would be the governmental coalition in our example.

Approaches relying on either the minimal winning or the minimum size perspective are policy blind. Empirical studies demonstrated that this was a major shortcoming of these theories. Office-seeking based theories can be extended by theories that include policy motivations. An important assumptions of these approaches starts with the view that ideologically close parties are more likely to become coalition partners. Pushed further, these theories predict that only those partners form coalitions that are next to another in a political space.

Among various forms of viable policy based coalition models, Axelrod (1970, 170–71) has proposed the model of *minimal connected winning coalitions*. In this perspective a party chooses partners next to its own position in the political space until the coalition gains majority status. Therefore, any coalition fulfils three properties. First, the parties are connected in the political space. Second, it is a winning coalition (controls a legislative majority) and, third, it can not loose any of its members (minimal winning). Axelrod predicts that minimal connected winning coalitions are more likely to form than other winning coalitions and that they show a longer duration. For our model in figure 5 the following set of parties fulfil all three criteria: $\{x_1, x_2, x_3\}$, $\{x_2, x_3, x_4\}$, $\{x_3, x_4\}$. It follows logically that all policy based models of coalition formation in-

clude the median party in every predicted coalition. The concept of connected winning coalitions has been influential since it added policy ambitions into the modelling of the coalition formation process. All models before Axelrod had focussed only on pure office-seeking ambitions.

It is important to note that these models developed about four decades ago have been very influential. These were the first systematic theoretical attempts to develop formal models of government formation. They also encouraged a lot of systematic data gathering and analysis shortly after the theoretical work was published. In fact, all of the first systematic attempts to gather data on the location of parties in a political space has been inspired by this work. I summarise the empirical literature later in this section, but before, let me turn to more recent theoretical accounts of government formation.

Contemporary models   In the last two decades, major progress has been made by including new game theoretical concepts and statistical techniques. This period has seen the advent of ever more sophisticated modelling for different aspects of governmental coalition building. Laver (1998) provides an early summary of this literature. Theoretical innovations have been informed by advances in game theory. Especially, game theoretical models of bargaining as developed in economics (Rubinstein 1982) and political science (Baron and Ferejohn 1989) form the basis of these new approaches. Modern models of coalition formation try to specify theoretically how institutions structure and constrain the making and breaking of governments. Consequently, formal models try to specify the exacts mechanisms behind coalition building and government termination.

A lot of this work has been put forward by Daniel Diermeier in cooperation with various collaborators. With this work, Diermeier has provided a set of models that investigate the institutional effects of the vote of confidence procedure (Diermeier and Feddersen 1998), bicameralism (Diermeier and Myerson 1999) as well as institutional causes of differences in government turnover (Diermeier and Merlo 2000). Diermeier has also tested these models empirically and I include a summary of his findings in my later discussion of recent empirical models of government formation.

Contemporary formal models of government formation have moved far beyond the early wave of models on government formation that focussed either on policy or on office motivations. Most of these recent advances of formal modelling have been based on non-cooperative game theory and are mainly developed by economists. Nevertheless, these models have yet to be included systematically into the comparative politics literature.

4.2.2 Empirical studies of government formation

Early empirical work   Early formal models of coalition formation saw also the advent of systematic empirical testing. Scholars started to collect data on government coalitions of most Western democracies and about the ideological positions of the parties involved. In fact, all early data sets on party positions were created for quantitative studies of coalition building. It has to be acknowledged that these studies were among the first studies in political science that systematically used multivariate methods to analyse these type of data sources.

Various important studies in this tradition of research were published in the seventies of the last century. One of the first studies that systematically tests coalition theories in a comparative framework was published by Browne (1971). He used descriptive statistics to test the predictive power of the theories developed by Gamson, Riker and Leiserson (see above). Swaan (1973) analysed coalition building in nine European democracies since World War I. Dodd (1976) also analysed European democracies since WWI and provides ordinal rankings of party positions for the actors involved. Morgan (1976) conducted the first systematic collection of party positions through an expert survey. As a result, his dissertation provided the first interval scales on party positions with information about a party's position on the major line of contestation as well as information about the content of this dimension. Later, further systematic attempts to test theories of coalition formation empirically were provided by Browne et al. (1984) as well as Franklin and Mackie (1984).

Recent empirical contributions on coalition building   Empirical studies of coalition formation have seen the arrival of several new approaches since the early studies in the 1970s. Innovations have included new statistical techniques as well as new data sets in order to understand empirical patterns of coalition formation in democracies. Warwick (1996, 472) distinguishes between the question of which coalitions do in fact form and the question of which parties participate in coalitions. For the first question we try to predict the actual coalition that formed from all potential, theoretically possible coalitions. In the second scenario we only predict if a given party is likely to take part in a future government. According to Warwick, the latter question is easier to answer. However, most empirical studies have focussed on the first question and try to predict which parties form a governing coalition. To my knowledge, only Warwick's paper and a paper by Mattila and Raunio (2004) systematically investigate the probability of a party to participate in coalition government. I make use of this approach in the empirical parts of this section, but let me first present an overview of other approaches to study coalition building empirically.

Warwick's work is based on a data set he created for his book on government survival (Warwick 1994). The data set contains information on government formation in Europe for the

post-war period. It is one of the most extensive data sets on coalition building with information about ideological positions, formateurs, cause of resignation etc. The data set is the basis for many subsequent empirical analyses of government formation (e.g. Golder 2006; Martin and Stevenson 2001). Müller and Strøm (2000) have provided another systematic data set about the institutional structure of government formation in West European democracies. The book asked experts on West European countries to collect detailed data on coalition building for their respective country. The data collection was based on a set of coding rules that provided the basis for a systematic data collection process. The data set goes beyond Warwick's data in that it combines quantitative and qualitative information. All information is summarised in detailed country chapters. The book provides the basis for more detailed analysis at the country level in Strøm et al. (2003) and a more advanced quantitative analysis of the data set in Strøm et al. (2008). Unfortunately, the data set has only been published very recently and does not cover all EU member states. Consequently, I can not make use of this data for my analysis. However the Müller and Strøm data set will be an indispensable set of information for students of the party dynamics in West European governments. It is the most systematic and transparent data set on coalition building in Western Europe today.

The most important recent contribution to the empirical study of coalition formation has been a paper by Martin and Stevenson (2001). This study explicitly tests theories of coalition formation and makes use of modern statistical estimation techniques. Empirical tests of coalition formation theories investigate which coalitions out of all possible coalition types actually form in order to discriminate between the different theories. As a consequence, these data sets include a huge number of observations. Martin and Stevenson point out that all previous studies relied on statistical techniques that could not deal effectively with a sample overrepresentation of countries with fragmented party systems and many government formation opportunities such as Italy and Denmark. The authors use a new statistical technique (conditional logit models) to overcome these shortcomings and provide a better statistical specification to test coalition formation theories. Their results show the importance of factors such as the investiture rule, party size and incumbency status. Consequently, these findings nicely add to recent modelling advances in coalition formation theories that specify the mechanisms of specific institutional rules.

Finally, there is a set of empirical studies that look at certain aspects of the government formation process. These studies investigate institutional determinants of government formation. Druckman and Thies (2002); Proksch and Slapin (2006) highlight the effect of bicameralism on coalition building. Volden and Carrubba (2004) explain the causes of oversized coalition. The early stages of the government formation process are studied by Golder (2006) with a focus on pre-electoral coalitions and by Ansolabehere et al. (2005) who investigate the role of the formateur. Other studies determine the causes of government duration (Diermeier and Myerson

1999). This summary highlights the fact that the study of the making and breaking of government is a vital and lively field of research in comparative politics. Consequently, we can build upon these wide array of studies to better understand how coalition building influences the party composition of the Council.

4.3 The party composition of the Council

In chapter 2.4.2, I have summarised the literature on the party composition of EU institutions. My discussion has highlighted the fact that there is no systematic study of the Council's party composition. The limited knowledge is rather astonishing as the wide literature on coalition formation in Europe provides a good basis for studying the party composition of the EU's most important decision-making body. This literature provides powerful theories and rich empirical designs that can be easily made use of to study the party composition of the Council. Only the rather limited or often difficult to handle data sets on the party fabric of European governments may be a factor that explains why we have no studies on the party composition of the Council. However, the ParlGov database provides a flexible data source in order to investigate how government formation in Europe and the party composition of the Council are interrelated. I have described the content and the structure of this database in chapter 3. So let me now turn to an earlier study of mine on the party composition of EU institutions.

In collaboration with Philip Manow, we have made the argument that representation in the Council is systematically biased towards pro-integration parties (Manow and Döring 2008). We base our observation on the empirical findings about the structure of the European political space and main insights from coalition theories. Various work that came out of the UNC expert surveys has shown that the two major dimensions of contestation in the EU, left/right and integration/independence, are u-shaped. These are the two dimensions that we are interested in to study the EU and the impact of these dimensions has been demonstrated in studies of EU decision making.

However, the EU dimension has no influence on the process of national government formation. There is some work on the, limited, influence of attitudes towards European integration on national elections (de Vries 2007). Nevertheless, I am not aware of any systematic work on the impact of European issues on coalition building. Consequently, we have to assume that the left/right dimension dominates coalition building. Policy based theories of coalition formation inform us that *moderate left/right parties have a higher chance of being represented in governments*. Especially, the median party has a high chance of being a government member. This follows simply from the median party theorem. These theoretical propositions have been empirically confirmed in various studies of coalition building in European democracies.

As a consequence moderate left/right parties are overrepresented in EU member states' gov-

Figure 6: European political space

Notes: Data source: ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2008)

ernments. However, these are exactly those parties that are more favourable towards European integration. Consequently, *parties in the Council should be on average more positive towards European integration than parties in national parliaments*. Figure 6 provides some descriptive evidence for the hypothesis. The graph shows all parties in EU member states separated between government and opposition parties. It confirms our claim that parties with pro integration positions are more likely to be government members. In Manow and Döring (2008) we support the argument with the same descriptive evidence. In addition, we compare the party composition of the Council and the EP. Our findings, in line with work on the second-order election hypothesis, show that the opposite aggregation effect takes place in the EP. Integration sceptical parties are more likely to succeed in elections to the EP. These findings are also supported by quantitative studies on the results of EP elections (e.g. Hix and Marsh 2007). But do the claims also hold for the Council once we study its party composition with appropriate statistical techniques?

Before turning to our empirical analysis, I specify other important factors that come out of previous empirical work on coalition building. These studies have first shown that parties with *previous governmental experience* are more likely to be in government. Second, parties that

showed *strong results at the most recent election* are good candidates for cabinet membership. Third, *incumbent government members* are often part of succeeding cabinets. Unfortunately, there are few theoretical arguments why these variables are important for the making of governments. Finally, there is one more important variable that has strong theoretical backing. The *largest party in parliament* is very often a coalition member. In fact, it provides the prime minister, the most important cabinet position. Institutional provisions in many European countries give the largest parliamentary party the right to start the first round of the coalition bargaining process. Hence, this party has the first chance to look for coalition partners and to establish a cabinet. This agenda-setting power enhances the chances of the largest party to form the government cabinet. We now test if these suggestions can find empirical support.

4.4 Empirical analysis

Let us combine the two streams of literature that I have previously discussed. What explains the party composition of the Council? In order to answer this question, I draw on work of comparative politics that discusses government formation and the EU literature on the European political space. Consequently, I ask how party characteristics and political positions influence chances to participate in domestic governments, hence the Council. In order to link my results to the EU, I include EU member states only and focus on the left/right as well as on the pro/contra EU integration dimension.

The literature of comparative politics provides us with theoretical and empirical evidence for the importance of the left/right dimension. Given that parties compete in a one-dimensional political space, a party is more likely to participate in government the more moderate its position in this dimension is. Consequently, extreme parties are less likely to participate in governments. However, students of the EU rely mainly on two political dimensions in order to understand political dynamics in the Union. The relevance of these dimensions has been shown in various contexts. Therefore, we should systematically include these two dimensions, left/right and pro/contra EU integration, for an analysis of the party composition of the Council.

The argument for including the two dimensions has to be further specified. It is a well known fact of government formation that parties' likelihood of forming coalitions with other parties increases with their proximity to these parties in some political space. Reducing the political space to a single dimensional left/right scale has turned out to be extremely helpful in order to understand coalition formation in Western democracies. However, the EU dimension has little influence on the process of government formation. Consequently, the interesting question is not if European issues influence coalition building but if coalition formation alters representation systematically in the EU integration/independence dimension. Manow and Döring (2008) con-

tent that there is a mechanical effect in the process of government formation that systematically favours pro-integration parties. The following empirical analysis tests this claim empirically.

4.4.1 Data

In this chapter I am interested in determining the factors that explain the party composition of the Council. Studies of coalition building have focussed on a wide set of variables that explain coalition formation. Among these variables, factors such as left/right positions, median status, seat share in parliament, incumbency status, formateur status and governmental experience have been included into statistical analyses. Although all of these variables, and many more, are theoretically and empirically feasible for studying coalition formation, not all are needed to set up a comprehensive statistical model to explain the party composition of the Council. Consequently, I limit my study to only some of these variables.

My summary of the empirical literature on coalition formation has emphasised that most analyses study the coalitions that actually form. These studies try to predict the characteristics of coalition governments under certain conditions. Consequently, they often include variables such as minimal winning coalitions, minority governments, formateurs etc. In these studies, "each potential coalition in a formation opportunity enters the estimation as a separate case" (Martin and Stevenson 2001, 38). However, I am only interested in understanding the party composition of the Council, not in testing models of coalition formation. For this reason, I take all parties represented in national parliaments at every government formation process as my unit of analysis. Out of these variables, I calculate a statistical model that determines whether a party becomes a government member or not. This information allows me to understand the party composition of the Council.

I base my empirical analysis on observations from the ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2008). Out of this database, I have generated a data set that includes all governments in EU member states. I combine this information with data on the party composition of parliaments in EU member states and data on the political positions of these parties. This data set is generated automatically and I add calculations for further variables out of information provided in the database. I limit my study to the period before the Eastern enlargement of the Union, hence to EU15 members only. The data set summarises 272 parties in 146 parliaments where 240 cabinets formed. Let me now discuss the variables I use in my statistical analysis in greater detail.

My unit of observation are parties that are represented in parliament at each instance of government formation. In the data set I discriminate between government and opposition parties with a binary variable. This observation is the dependent variable of my analysis. Among the set of independent variables, I include most of the information found to be relevant in previous studies of coalition building. I exclude information such as coalition type and formateur infor-

mation. These variables are important to assess strengths and weaknesses of different models of coalition formation but are of little help in order to understand which parties are selected into governing cabinets.

First of all, I make use of two types of observations for the size of a party. I include *seat share*, the share of parliamentary seats a party gained at the latest national election. In addition, I use *largest party*, a dummy variable for the party with the highest seat share in parliament. The largest party is most likely to be the formateur in the government formation process. Consequently, it should have a higher probability to be a government member.

Many parties in Europe have never been government members. These parties may be either too small or politically too extreme to be considered as coalition members. Warwick (1996) includes a variable for the proportion of previous governments each party belonged to. However, looking into this variable reveals that almost half of the observations indicate no previous governmental experience. Consequently, I include *experience* as a dichotomous variable, indicating if the party has ever been a government member before (in the post-war period). In addition, I use the variable *incumbent* to indicate whether a party has been a member of the government that preceded. Finally, *seats share change* indicates the difference in the percentage of seats a party controls in the current parliament compared to the one before.

In addition, I make also use of a set of variables that provide political positions of the parties in my data set. In line with the topic of this dissertation, I focus on two dimensions, left/right and pro/contra EU integration. According to policy based models of government formation and the median party theory, moderate parties are more likely to be included in governments. One dimensional theories of government formation focus mostly on the left/right dimension. Therefore, I include a continuous variable for *left/right extremeness* and a *left/right median* dummy. The latter indicates the party with the median legislator. Left/right positions are calculated from the policy positions provided by (Benoit and Laver 2006; Castles and Mair 1984; Huber and Inglehart 1995; Marks 2002). I rescale all this information to a 0–10 scale and use the mean values of these political positions for each party.

To include the pro/contra EU integration dimension, I make use of the variable *eu* that provides a party's position in this dimension. I follow the hypothesised relationship that EU friendly parties are more likely to be government members, first put forward by Manow and Döring (2008). Additionally, I make use of *eu median* to indicate the median legislator's party. In line with my usage of the left/right political positions, I draw on the data sets by (Marks 2002) and (Benoit and Laver 2006) (EU authority question) that provide information on party positions in the EU dimension. These data sets are rescaled to a 0–10 scale as well and I use mean values.

There is one caveat for my usage of party positions. I make no use of any temporal information on the positional changes of parties. To the best of my knowledge, there is no systematic

Table 4: Probability of government participation in EU member states

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
(Intercept)	−0.84	−4.18∗∗∗	−2.10∗∗	−3.94∗∗∗	−3.64∗∗∗
	(0.56)	(0.63)	(0.74)	(0.75)	(0.75)
seat share	0.05∗∗∗	0.03∗∗∗	0.01	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
largest party	1.12∗∗∗	2.33∗∗∗	1.33∗∗∗	2.16∗∗∗	2.57∗∗∗
	(0.30)	(0.32)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.47)
left/right median	1.48∗∗∗		1.19∗∗∗		
	(0.24)		(0.28)		
left/right extremness	−0.61∗∗∗		−0.33∗∗∗		
	(0.07)		(0.09)		
eu median		0.02		0.05	−0.41
		(0.20)		(0.23)	(0.35)
eu		0.40∗∗∗		0.25∗∗∗	0.21∗∗∗
		(0.04)		(0.05)	(0.06)
incumbent			1.96∗∗∗	2.04∗∗∗	1.73∗∗∗
			(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.22)
experience			1.13∗∗∗	1.24∗∗∗	1.37∗∗∗
			(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.34)
seats change			0.08∗∗∗	0.08∗∗∗	0.11∗∗∗
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
N	1669	1617	1465	1417	897
AIC	1543.06	1557.27	1147.79	1132.76	719.41
BIC	1954.98	1966.78	1613.27	1595.32	1141.73
$\log L$	−695.53	−702.63	−485.89	−478.38	−271.71

Notes: Data source is Döring and Manow 2008; country dummies omitted; standard errors in parentheses; significant codes: 0 '∗∗∗' 0.001 '∗∗' 0.01 '∗' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

attempt nor any data set available that generates time-series data on the positions of West European parties based on expert surveys. There is some recent debate on the potential of time series information provided in the CMP data (Bakker et al. 2008) and there are attempts to derive these information based on computational content analysis (Slapin and Proksch 2008). I have evaluated the current potential to derive left/right and pro/contra EU integration time-series positions with a former colleague of mine (Döring and Tiemann 2007) and I believe that mean values are an appropriate way to combine the available data sets. [3]

4.4.2 Statistical model

To test my hypotheses about the causes of government participation in EU member states empirically, I make use of a logit analysis. This statistical technique provides the appropriate maximum likelihood estimator in order to analyse dichotomous dependent variables. Using this technique is also in line with the practices of previous studies on the question of parties' government participation. I include country dummies to control for domestic effects. However, I do not present these variables in my result tables. Table 4 provides the results of my analysis and the subsequent paragraphs discuss the findings.

The table presents five statistical models, where the first and the second model test a sparse political position model of government formation for the left/right and the pro/contra EU integration dimension. These two models highlight the variables we are interested in to understand the party composition of the Council. Models three and four add the major variables from quantitative studies of government formation. I include these variables to test for the robustness of the political position models. Finally, I calculate one model (model 5) with observations after the first direct elections of the EP only. The pace of European integration increased dramatically in the 1980s. Consequently, we want to make sure that our major findings account for this period as well.

The policy models reflect our theoretical expectations. The odds of being a party in government are significantly higher for moderate left/right parties. According to the statistical model, the more left or right extreme a political party, the smaller the probability of being a government member. This empirical observation fits predictions from policy based models of coalition building. This finding confirms previous empirical studies of government formation and is of little surprise.

Whereas political extremeness explains a parties' chances of being in government with the left/right dimension, its political position in the EU integration/independence dimension translates directly into its chance of being among the ruling parties. The more EU friendly a party, the higher its chances of being in government, as model 2 demonstrates. This result adds solid quantitative support to the hypothesis put forward by Manow and Döring (2008). However, this finding is not surprising because moderate left/right parties are more EU friendly, as we know from the u-shaped structure of the European political space. Nevertheless, my results demonstrate that this structure of the European political space leads to a systematic overrepresentation of EU friendly parties in the Councils.

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[3]The UNC party positions include an retrospective evaluation of party positions. However, these data show that all parties in Europe have become increasingly more EU friendly between the early eighties and late nineties. Because I have not found any other evidence for this observations, I make only use of the positions measured non-retrospectively.

My statistical analysis also shows that the left/right median party has a higher probability of being a governing party. This finding is in line with previous empirical work on government formation as well as the median party theorem. However, my results demonstrate that the median party theorem does not hold for the EU dimension. The party with the median legislator in the EU dimension is not more likely to be a government member than all other parties. Finally, the largest party has a higher likelihood of being in government according to models 1 and 2. These models also indicate that party size in parliament has an effect on government participation. However, this effect is rather small as the analysis shows.

Let us now evaluate if these findings are robust when other control variables are included in the model. Models 3 and 4 include a set of variables that are important to understand government formation, as previous empirical work has demonstrated. The results of these models do not alter our previous findings substantially. It still holds that moderate left/right and EU friendly parties are more likely to be represented in European governments, hence the Council. In addition, these models highlight some more characteristics of the parties in European governments. According to the results, incumbent parties and parties with previous governmental experience are more likely to be among the governing parties. Those parties that have gained seats in the latest election are also more likely to be cabinet members. However, the substantial effect of changes in seat shares is rather small. Finally, all of these findings also hold if we look only at the period after 1979.

How do these findings compare to the results of earlier studies of government formation in Western Europe? Most of our findings are in line with the studies by Warwick (1996) and Mattila and Raunio (2004). These analyses also show that party size, ideological positions and previous government membership are the key variables of government membership. My research design was similar to the ones applied in these studies. However, there is room for improvement of estimation techniques as I discuss in my summary.

4.5 Summary

What do studies of coalition building tell us about representation to the Council? Our empirical study has shown that there is a systematic bias in favour of pro-European parties. This is due to the structure of the European political space. Moderate left/right parties tend to be more integration friendly than the more extreme parties on the left/right axis. However, the former group is systematically more likely to be in government than the latter group. These findings are robust once we include other factors of government participation such as government experience, party size and electoral success.

As a result, representation in the EU dimension is different to the left/right dimension. A party's absolute left/right position does not determine its chances of being a government mem-

ber. It is only the extremeness of these positions, their relative left/right positions that counts. The more extreme a party's left/right position, the lower its chances to be a cabinet member. Nevertheless, there is no empirical evidence that either left or right parties are more likely to be government members. The logic of representation differs for the EU dimension. Here, a party's absolute position matters for government participation. The more a party favours European integration the higher its chances to become a cabinet member. This finding holds if we include other influences on government participation as well. As a matter of fact, most of the governing parties in Europe have been major pro-integration parties.

These findings place doubt on the correspondence of voter and elite positions in the EU. Previous studies of substantive representation have shown that representatives in Europe are more integration friendly than their constituents. However, these studies where solely based on empirical indicators (survey data) of mass and elite positions. My findings provide a different mechanism which accounts for differences of voters and representatives in the EU. According to my results, it is the logic of government formation that favours pro-Europe parties. This is simply caused by the structure of the European political space. Parties form governments based on their position in the left/right dimension. However, this dimension is not linearly related to party positions in the EU dimension.

What are open avenues to better understand party delegation to the Council? In my view, two aspects need further investigation. On the one hand, we have to shift our attention to the duration of Council membership. How does the duration and termination of governments relate to representation in the Council? What are patterns across EU member states and over time? Hagemann and Hoyland (2008) show that changes in governments lead to differences in voting behaviour. Consequently, we should try to better understand how often these changes take place. On the other hand, we have to better understand the individual basis of representation and delegation in the Council. Do ministers show certain career patterns? Are some parties more likely to control specific portfolios? Is there a political or technocratic bias in some Council of Ministers? To answer these questions on government duration and portfolio distribution, we can draw on studies of cabinet dynamics in Western Europe. However, we should try to specify how these results help us to better understand the political composition of the Council.

What do my results provide to the study of coalition building? First of all, it demonstrates that we have a solid theoretical and empirical basis to transfer results from coalition studies to other areas of political science. Nevertheless, there is room for improvement on the data sources and statistical techniques used in studies of coalition formation. I have written on the mediocre state of systematic digital data sources about election results and government composition extensively in chapter 3. A lack of innovation in statistical analysis may be partially influenced by the lack of good data sources. However, students of coalition building should try to systematically incor-

porate new statistical techniques that allow us to better estimate cross-country data (e.g. random and fixed effects models). In addition, it may be useful to pay more detailed attention to potential interaction effects between the variables that influence coalition building dynamics.

The relevance of parties for the composition of the Council is straight forward. Parties in member states form governments, thereby controlling delegation to the Council. The role of parties in the appointment of Commissioners may differ as it incurs one further step of delegation. To specify the mechanisms of delegation to the College of Commissioners, I now turn to another detailed empirical investigation.

5 The Composition of the College of Commissioners: Patterns of Delegation[4]

The European Commission is a central political actor in the political system of the EU. It holds the monopoly to initiate legislation and can bring charges against member states before the European Court of Justice. As the bureaucracy in charge of initiating legislation, it often enjoys informational advantages vis-à-vis the member states. For a long time, the Commission has been seen as a major driving force behind further integration. However, given that member states appoint the members of the Commission, its degree of autonomy has remained controversial. Is the European Commission really a preference outlier?

Many studies contend that it is. In quite a few scholarly accounts, the Commission is pictured as being much more in favour of further integration and more liberal economically than the member states. Contrary to these arguments, Hug (2003) and Crombez (1997) have doubted that substantial differences can persist between the political preferences of the Commission and the member states. By using the mechanisms of appointment and by determining the extent of delegation, member states can keep the Commission effectively under control (see also Pollack 2003).

But do the member states really use the appointment of new Commissioners to exercise control over the Commission? To shed more light on this question, we have to gain a better empirical understanding of the composition of the College of Commissioners. What are the criteria upon which Commissioners are chosen? Does the College of Commissioners' composition reflect the distribution of preferences in the Council? Once we understand the mechanisms behind appointments to the Commission, we can better distinguish whether bureaucratic drift is in fact the result of the composition of the College or is caused by other processes.

Despite the considerable interest in the composition of the College of Commissioners, few empirical studies have been conducted on it. Hooghe (2001) analysed the factors that influence the preferences of high Commission officials. MacMullen (1997) was the first to provide biographical information on all Commissioners. Wonka (2007) linked the biographical information about Commissioners' previous careers to theoretical questions, as raised in the principal-agent literature. He questioned the extent to which member states use the appointment of Commissioners as a control device and contended that member states can control the College of Commissioners quite effectively via the appointment of loyal party members.

Valuable as these empirical studies are, several questions have remained unanswered concerning the relationship between the political preferences of EU member states and those of the

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[4]This chapter was previously published as an article (Döring 2007). I only updated some of the references, slightly changed the formatting and made some minor language revisions.

Commissioners. One way to shed more light on the preferences of Commissioners is to determine the party linkage of member states and the College of Commissioners. In this respect, two questions are of particular theoretical importance: First, to what extent does the party affiliation of Commissioners match the party composition of the appointing government? Second, to what extent is the increase of the Commission's political importance reflected in the patterns of appointment to the College of Commissioners? The following empirical analysis will answer both questions.

My study contributes to the existing literature in several respects. Unlike previous studies, I account systematically for the differences between large and small member states regarding delegation to the College of Commissioners. Moreover, drawing on a new indicator that captures the relative political importance of a prior political position – from state secretary to prime minister – I am able to observe changes in the relative political importance of appointed Commissioners. With this indicator I can analyse whether member states have sent more high-ranking politicians to the College of Commissioners in Brussels over time.

My analysis shows that, counter-intuitively, party affiliation has not grown in importance as an appointment criterion. Instead, a stronger party political alignment between member state governments and the College of Commissioners is the by-product of a reduction in the number of Commissioners that larger member states can send to Brussels. However, member states have increasingly appointed more important high-ranking politicians as Commissioners, as is shown by the political position previously held by each. In addition, the analysis shows that large and small member states differ substantially in their appointment patterns.

The study is divided into three sections. In the first part, I discuss different theoretical perspectives on the role of the Commission and derive empirical implications from this literature. Second, I present my empirical analysis of the composition of the College of Commissioners and discuss the results. I conclude by discussing my findings against the background of the theoretical debate on delegation in the EU.

5.1 The European Commission

5.1.1 The Commission's position in the European Union

Rational choice institutionalists have always claimed that the Commission plays an important role in EU policy-making (Crombez 1996; Steunenberg 1994). Contributions have focused on the ability of the Commission to influence legislation through agenda-setting. Three periods are usually distinguished to highlight the power of the Commission in the political system of the EU. In the first period after the Treaty of Rome, the Commission's power was limited. With the Single European Act (SEA), the Commission's agenda-setting power gained in importance, but

it was somewhat reduced by the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam, which introduced the codecision procedure (see Tsebelis and Garrett 2001, 359). Given that the Commission has the right to initiate legislation, it can use this power to shape the legislative agenda.

However, the empirical studies on European law-making have focused instead on the conditional agenda-setting power of the European Parliament (EP) in the wake of George Tsebelis's prominent article (1994). It was his provocative claim that shaped the agenda for empirical research. Therefore, more quantitative research has focused on the EP's ability to act as an agenda-setter than on the Commission's role in the legislative process (see e.g. Tsebelis et al. 2001). It seems as if the Commission's important role in the legislative process has been taken for granted as being rather uncontroversial.

Surprisingly little is known about the systematic differences in the interests of the Commission and the member states over longer periods of time. Most studies simply assume that the Commission and the EP have a much more pro-European agenda than the member states in the Council. This assumption would appear even more relevant given that critics have pointed out the possibility of the Commission being even more powerful than the agenda-setting models stipulate. For instance, Schmidt (2000) argues that the Commission not only may be able to choose the policy it prefers among the positions of the member states but also might be able to change the preferences of a member state by threatening to charge it with a treaty violation that would burden it with costly penalties. In addition, information asymmetries provide the Commission with more bargaining leverage, because it can put pressure upon member states in its role as the guardian of the treaties.

The emphasis on information asymmetries comes close to neofunctionalist accounts. From this perspective, high levels of uncertainty provide an advantage for the Commission in EU legislation. Furthermore, in neofunctionalist accounts the European Commission has more than formal agenda-setting power. Here the Commission forms alliances with interest groups to support policies that bolster further integration (Burley and Mattli 1993, 54). It is the central role of the Commission and its detailed knowledge of the treaties that place it in a more advantageous position vis-à-vis the member states.

To sum up, the various theoretical approaches to European integration agree that the European Commission plays a critical role in the political system of the EU, even though they differ in explaining how and why this is so. For example, rational choice models of EU legislation emphasise the formal agenda-setting power of the Commission after the SEA. According to this view, the Commission's role had been rather limited before this act. However, scholars in the neofunctionalist tradition emphasise the central role of the Commission as a motor of integration. Both approaches agree that the political importance of the Commission has substantially increased over time.

This increase in importance should also be mirrored in the assignment of the Commissioners, but how? Is it reflected in the higher status of the politicians appointed to the College of Commissioners or in a closer party alignment between Commissioners and the appointing governments? Before I address these questions, I will briefly discuss the relevant dimensions of conflict in the political system of the EU.

5.1.2 Dimensions of conflict in European politics

What are the issue dimensions relevant for EU politics? There is a consensus concerning the basic dimensions of political conflict in European politics. The literature usually distinguishes between the left/right and the integration/ sovereignty dimensions. These two dimensions have been shown to be relevant both for political parties in Europe and for the party groups in the EP (see Gabel and Hix 2002; Ray 1999).

The extent to which the left/right divide determines decision making in the EU has been analysed in a new wave of research. Hix et al. (2005) show that left/right is a main explanatory variable for party group coalitions in the European Parliament. Mattila (2004) provides evidence for the salience of the left/right divide in the Council. Franchino (2007) has offered the most extensive study of the party dynamics of European integration to date. He analyses decision making in the EU by comparing the party positions of the Council and the Commission on the left/right and integration/sovereignty dimensions for the past five decades.

Although the study of party conflicts in the EU has recently become one of the liveliest debates, almost nothing is known about party conflict in the College of Commissioners. Understanding the party dynamics of the appointment process may constitute a valuable first step. Is the political location of a member state government mirrored in the Commission? In other words, are Commissioners chosen on the basis of their political affiliation? We would expect party affiliation to be an important selection criterion for Commissioners. Yet, as we know, cooptation of the (major) opposition party by granting it one of the two Commissioners has often been used as a strategy to broaden support for EU policies and to remove the EU issue from domestic politics in the larger member states. Therefore, the empirical question is whether the average political position of the Commission is closer to the position taken by the member state parliaments or by member state governments. A more coherent understanding of the political dynamics influencing the appointment of Commissioners will contribute significantly to our general understanding of party conflict in the EU. It will allow us to better distinguish between different sources of bureaucratic drift, which I shall address now.

5.1.3 Delegation to appointed agents

Pollack (2003, 103–7) argues that the Commission serves functions that enhance the interest of EU member states. Treaty-based delegation has been created to increase the credibility of the member state commitment to their EU obligations. In particular, the substantial competence of the Commission to bring infringement proceedings against non-compliant member states highlights the Commission's role as a guardian of the treaties. In addition to asking why certain functions are delegated to the Commission, Pollack also answers the question about the way in which the Commission is monitored by the member states. In this context, comitology is perceived as a police patrol mechanism, with which the member states monitor the Commission's activities (see also Franchino 2000).

Besides comitology, Pollack (2003, 111–14) claims that member states also monitor the Commission via appointments to it, particularly of the Commission President. He claims that the appointment process is one of the major mechanisms through which member states can influence the decision making of the Commission. He emphasises that the member states are in full control of the nomination and renomination of their Commissioners. Only lately has the role of the EP in the appointment process been strengthened. Pollack highlights the fact that Commissioners are reappointed by their home countries or pursue a career in the domestic politics of their homelands after having served on the Commission.

There have been attempts to clarify the relationship between the Council and the Commission with the help of formal models. Crombez (1997, 7) predicts that the policy preferences of a Commissioner should be similar to the preferences of his or her domestic government. The main insight provided by his model is that member states will appoint only those Commissioners who are likely to initiate legislation that will find support in the Council.

Often the Commission is seen as a preference outlier that is much more in favour of European integration than are the member states in the Council. Drawing on Crombez, Hug (2003, 51) has taken issue with this common assumption in the EU literature. He argues that, in the light of principal-agent theory, it is rather doubtful whether a major divide exists between the Council and the Commission. Two arguments suggest that the Commission should have preferences similar or close to those of the member states. First, since a principal (here the member states) appoints an agent (the College of Commissioners), the preferences of the two should be related. Second, if there were a major divergence between a principal and its agent, the principal should be hesitant to delegate to the agent. Therefore, we should expect the Commission to have preferences similar to those of the Council through two mechanisms of control: the appointment process and the design of delegation.

To test these hypotheses empirically and to understand better what accounts for bureaucratic drift, we have to focus on these two mechanisms. On the one hand, we have to find out whether

the member states do in fact use the appointment of Commissioners as a means of control. To answer this question, we need more information on the patterns of delegation to the College. On the other hand, we have to find out whether Commissioners' decisions reflect the preferences of the governments that appointed them. Authors drawing strongly on organizational theory would say they do not. Egeberg (2006), for example, theorises about Commissioners' behaviour and identifies multiple roles that influence their decisions. Among the four roles he suggests – Commission role, portfolio role, country role and party role – only the last two can be easily manipulated by member states when they nominate a new Commissioner.

To sum up, my theoretical discussion has been an attempt to understand how the interests of the Council and the Commission differ by looking at the appointment process and the Commission's decision making. There is a lively debate on the degree to which the Commission's actions reflect member states' interests. To understand better how these interests are interrelated we have to find out how greatly the party political compositions of the Council and the Commission differ. In the empirical section, I shall show that member states use the appointment of Commissioners to delegate officials with similar profiles to that of the domestic government.

5.2 Determinants of selection

5.2.1 Empirical studies of Commission preferences

What do we know about the Commission's preferences so far? Liesbet Hooghe's work (2001) has substantially enhanced our understanding of the European Commission. In her detailed qualitative and quantitative analysis of the preferences of top Commission officials, Hooghe has shown which kinds of factor shape the preferences. In her view, the Commission officials are influenced by the length of their previous national administrative experience, the length of their work in the Commission, their party affiliation and the position of their home country in the EU. As Hooghe argues, the experience in the home country crucially shapes an official's views.

Other studies have explicitly focused on the composition of the College of Commissioners. MacMullen (1997) was, to the best of my knowledge, the first to collect information on all Commissioners. In his study, he focused on biographical aspects of the Commissioners such as age, gender and education. MacMullen provides detailed summaries in which he shows how biographical characteristics differ among Commissioners and indicates patterns over time. The relation between Commission and Council preferences, however, was not of particular interest for this study. Magnette (2005, 80) demonstrates that the College of Commissioners has become more political over time. Although he offers no information about the absolute number, he shows an increase within the last ten to fifteen years in the number of Commissioners who held high political positions before their promotion to the Commission.

A quantitative analysis of the College of Commissioners focusing on theoretical questions has been provided by Wonka (2007). He is the first to have studied the patterns on which the selection of European Commissioners is based. Wonka is particularly interested to know how relevant party membership is for the assignment of new Commissioners. In addition, he tries to assess how much more frequently the Commissioners have been politicians rather than bureaucrats. Wonka, like Hix (2005, 44–6), shows that over time most of the Commissioners held political positions rather than strictly administrative ones before they entered the Commission.

MacMullen and Wonka have made important contributions to an understudied aspect of the European Commission. My study goes beyond their analyses in several respects. First, my data set contains information on the importance of the previous positions of European Commissioners so that I can distinguish between the relative calibre of these positions. Second, using multivariate statistics, I can better determine how much the importance of party membership has increased and whether member states apply different appointment strategies. In particular, controlling for incumbency, I can better assess whether party affiliation has really become a more important appointment criterion over time. Before starting the empirical analysis, I will briefly summarise the hypothesis to be tested.

5.2.2 Delegation to the Commission

If the relationship between member states and the Commission is perceived to be a principal-agent game, we should expect that the principals (the member states) appoint agents (the Commissioners) with similar preferences. Given that party affiliation is a good indicator of the ideological position of a future Commissioner, it should be a relevant factor in the appointment process. In other words, governments that want to ensure that their interests are represented in the Commission should be more likely to nominate their own party members as Commissioners. *Commissioners are most likely to be members of parties that form the domestic government at the time of appointment.*

As discussed previously, the practical and political importance of EU policies has risen sharply over time. Most of the literature on legislation in the EU has focused on the period after the SEA in 1987. This treaty gave the Commission substantial agenda-setting power. This power was reduced by the treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam, but since the 1950s the Commission's role in the legislative process of the EU has become more important overall. This leads to two further implications: *The congruence between the party affiliation of appointed Commissioners and the party composition of the national governments should have become stronger over time. Countries have increasingly sent high-ranking politicians to Brussels; or the political importance of Commissioners' prior position has increased over time.*

The literature also suggests that the interests of small member states differ from those of

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large member states (see Pollack 2001, 224). Small states rely on international institutions for a 'voice', and international institutions are a more efficient means for small states to express their interest than they are for large states. Differences of interest evolve either from different positions in the world economy or from the more limited state capacities of smaller states. For the EU, Thorhallsson has argued explicitly that small states relate to the Commission differently from large states: '[D]ue to the limited capacity of the administration of the smaller states, they rely more upon the Commission to get their proposals through the Council' (Thorhallsson 2000, 114).

There is an institutional explanation that points in the same direction. Until the Nice Treaty, bigger member states were allotted two Commissioners. Starting with the Barroso Commission, only one Commissioner now represents every member state. This institutional feature may have generated different delegation patterns between small and large member states. Since small member states used to have only one seat in the College, they had less leverage to ensure that their interests were represented. Therefore, small states' governments should have an even stronger incentive to align their interests with those of their Commissioners. The following implications can be derived from these arguments: *Small EU member states are more likely to send Commissioners with an affiliation to the party in government. Commissioners from smaller member states have held higher political office at home than have Commissioners from larger member states.*

I test these hypotheses with a data set that provides information on the previous position of all Commissioners and their party affiliation. In the next section I discuss the data, introduce the methods I have chosen and present my empirical results.

5.3 Empirical analysis

5.3.1 Data

My data set contains information on all members of the College of Commissioners since 1958. Each Commissioner in every Commission is coded as one observation (N = 218). For five Commissioners biographical information was not available and for a few Commissioners information about their party affiliation was lacking. My criterion for differentiating between small and large member states is how many Commissioners the country is allowed to send to the Commission. Small states are the ones with only one Commissioner. The member states with two seats in the Commission – France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom – are considered to be large member states.[5] Time is measured in years from 1958, when the first Hallstein Com-

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[5]In the current Barroso Commission all member states are allowed to send only one Commissioner. Neither the exclusion of the Barroso Commission from the quantitative analysis nor its inclusion affects my results.

mission came into office. I also include a variable that indicates whether a Commissioner is an incumbent and therefore was a member of the previous Commission.

I use three different variables to measure the dimensions of change in the composition of the Commission. First, I use an indicator that provides information about the political importance of the highest position a Commissioner held before he or she was appointed (cf. Druckman and Warwick 2005). Second, I use a variable that simply codes whether a Commissioner held a political position before he or she entered the College of Commissioners. Former positions like MP, MEP, junior ministers, ministers and important positions within a party are coded as being political ones. Third, I include party affiliation as an additional variable. Let me describe these variables in some more detail, starting with this last one.

The party affiliation was easily determined for most of the Commissioners. Some Commissioners were not formal party members but had strong connections to one party in their previous career. Other Commissioners pursued a more independent political career. These were usually diplomats, administrators or policy experts. In the context of this study, it is of interest which party was in government at the time the Commissioner was assigned. I distinguish three scenarios: first, a Commissioner has a strong party connection and is affiliated with a party in government at the time he or she takes office in the College of Commissioners; second, a Commissioner has an affiliation with a national party that is presently in opposition; third, the Commissioner has no direct party affiliation.

It is more difficult to account for the political importance of the position that a given Commissioner held before he or she was nominated. Indexes that have been developed within comparative politics can help assess the importance of political positions. For example, researchers have been interested in the way different ministries are divided among coalition partners. One way to assess the political importance of government offices has been the use of expert surveys. Two approaches figure prominently in the literature. Laver and Hunt (1992, 105) use a ranking based on the importance of different ministries. Experts were asked to rank portfolios according to their importance, but without an underlying scale. The results from this survey show that in almost all countries 'finance' and 'foreign affairs' are considered the two most important portfolios. Recently, Druckman and Warwick (2005) also conducted an expert survey to evaluate the importance of portfolios for West European countries. Unlike Laver and Hunt, they asked country experts to base their evaluation on a scale provided in the survey. The logic of the scale is described by the authors in the following way:

> In order to obtain interval-level ratings of these posts, we provided our respondents with an anchor by asking them to apply a score of 1 to all posts whose importance they believed equalled the 'average' or 'normal' portfolio. They were then instructed that any post that is above average should receive a score above 1 that

Table 5: Party affiliation of Commissioners

affiliation	two seats		one seat		total
	total	incumbents	total	incumbents	
government	69	(33)	85	(22)	154
opposition	31	(10)	7	(6)	38
none	8	(4)	8	(4)	16

would reflect just how much more important it is than an average port folio (e.g., a score of 1.5 would indicate that the post is 50 per cent above average). Likewise, any below-average post would receive a proportional score of less than 1 (Druckman and Warwick 2005, 23).

I use the data set provided by Druckman and Warwick to compare the previous position of Commissioners across countries and time. I took the highest position that a person had reached in his or her career before he or she entered the Commission and assigned to it the score for that position in Druckman and Warwick's scale. Unfortunately, the Druckman and Warwick data set does not provide information for all member states or for all positions relevant to my context. Where values were unavailable, I assigned values to positions. One might have additional reservations concerning the use of the Druckman and Warwick data. The survey, conducted from 2000 to 2002, reports only one score for a ministry's importance, even though the relevance of some ministries might have changed significantly over time. In addition, cross-sectional comparability might be limited since experts may apply different definitions of an average position. Still, it is the best source available and, since information about the importance of Commissioners' previous positions is crucial for a better understanding of delegation within the EU, I make use of the Druckman and Warwick data in my subsequent analysis.

5.3.2 Descriptive analysis

Let me start with some descriptive statistics. Table 5 provides information about the party affiliation of Commissioners. Immediately we observe a strong difference between Commissioners from small and large member states. Although we find Commissioners who belong to parties both in office and in opposition, some patterns emerge. First of all, small states have a significantly higher percentage of Commissioners from governing parties than from opposition parties. If we control for the incumbent status of a Commissioner, we find that almost all Commissioners from small member states who belong to a domestic opposition party have been incumbents. In

fact, only one non-incumbent Commissioner from a small state was identified as belonging to an opposition party – the first Finnish Commissioner, Erkki Antero Liikanen.

However, several small states have sent Commissioners with no party affiliation. For example, Luxembourg and Denmark have always sent either members of the governing parties or persons with no party connection. Greece and Portugal have sent only Commissioners with an affiliation to the governing party. In general it seems as if the pattern has changed over time. In the latest Commissions, almost no Commissioner of a small state had an affiliation with an opposition party. This finding supports the expectation that small states in particular will want to secure the preference alignment between the domestic principal and the European agents in the Commission.

Table 6: Former positions of Commission presidents

Year	President	Highest former Position	Score[a]	Average[b]
1958	Walter Hallstein (D)	junior minister	0.84	0.55
1962	Hallstein II	(foreign affairs)		0.62
1967	Jean Rey (B)	minister economic affairs	1.02	0.53
1970	Franco Maria Malfatti (I)	minister state participation in industry	1.18	0.52
1972	Sicco Mansholt (NL)	minister agriculture	0.74	–
1973	Francis–Xavier Ortoli (F)	minister economy and finance	1.92	0.68
1977	Roy Jenkins (UK)	chancellor of the exchequer	1.64	0.84
1981	Gaston Thorn (L)	prime minister	2.17	0.95
1985	Jacques Delors (F)	minister economy and defense	1.92	0.80
1989	Delors II			1.00
1993	Delors III			1.01
1995	Jacques Santer (L)	prime minister	2.75	1.07
2000	Romani Prodi (I)	prime minister	2.48	0.94
2004	Jose Manuel Barroso (P)	prime minister	2.20	1.23

Source: *Munzinger* archive

[a] position score for Commission's president's highest former position

[b] average position score of all Commissioners in Commission

Table 6 suggests that there has been a substantial increase in the importance of the previous political positions held by Commission Presidents. Whereas the first President had formerly been a junior minister, subsequent Presidents had held a ministerial portfolio, often for the most

Figure 7: Box plot of former positions (scores) of Commissioners

important national ministries. Lately, Commission Presidents have been former prime ministers. In addition, all Commission Presidents were members of a party that was in government in their home country.[6]

The picture looks different when we analyse large member states. Here, no general pattern emerges, although some trends and tendencies can be depicted. Britain and Spain, for example, have always filled their two Commission seats with one Commissioner from each of the two main parties, Conservative/Labour and Partido Popular/Socialists, respectively. Germany has usually sent Commissioners who were affiliated with one of the governing parties, but never a Commissioner without any party affiliation. For France and Italy, no patterns can be found by simple data inspection. All in all, the difference between small, one Commissioner and large member states is striking. Larger members sent opposition members much more often. For the smaller members, almost all of the Commissioners with an affiliation to an opposition party had been incumbents (see below for the multivariate confirmation of this finding).

To assess the relative political importance of the previous position of an EU Commissioner, I make use of a new data set that provides us with a continuous measure for portfolio impor-

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[6]Malfatti resigned as President in 1972 to run for office in Italy. Sicco Mansholt, previously a Vice-President, took the position for the rest of the term. At the time, the Dutch social democrats (PvDA) were not part of government in the Netherlands.

tance (see Druckman and Warwick 2005). I use the Commission Presidents to demonstrate how positions are translated into 'importance scores' and thereby help explain better the measure applied here. Table 6 shows the highest previous position held by each Commission President. In addition, it shows the score assigned to these positions and the average position score of the Commission headed by the respective President. Keeping in mind that this scale of portfolio importance might provide us with a rough and basic measure only, we still can use this scale to depict trends and tendencies.

This observation is in line with the expectation that the heightened importance of the Commission should be reflected in the importance of Commissioners' previous positions. The box plot in figure 7 provides additional support for this hypothesis. It shows that the importance of the previous positions of Commissioners has increased over time. Both the median of the position scores and the highest position held by a Commissioner have risen. In addition, we see that the frequency of Commissioners in the lowest quartile has dropped. Commissioners with no previous political experience are given a score of 0.2, and Figure 7 shows that this group provided a significant number of Commissioners in the early years. The Barroso Commission, in contrast, has no member from this group.

The data clearly confirm our expectation. An increasing importance of the Commission is reflected in more powerful political actors delegated to the College of Commissioners over time. To analyse this link further, I continue with a multivariate analysis that enables me to control for additional factors such as incumbency and national background.

5.3.3 Multivariate analysis

In studying the changing composition of the Commission, I use three different indicators: first, the highest position held by a Commissioner – in other words, the position score; second, whether he or she had been in a political position before; and, third, the person's party affiliation at the time he or she was appointed to the Commission. Methodologically, these three variables are of different types and require different multivariate models. Party affiliation is coded as a categorical variable and has to be analysed with a multinomial logit model. Whether a Commissioner has held a political position before is coded through a dummy variable and analysed with a logit model. An ordinary least squares (OLS) model is used to analyse the position scores of the Commissioners. The results of the analysis are shown in table 7. I present a more in-depth discussion of these models in the following sections.

Table 7: Determinants of party affiliation and former positions of Commissioners

GLM – Model Dependent Variable	Model 1 Multinominal logit[a] Opposition party[c]	No party	Model 2 Logit[b] Political position	Model 3 OLS Position score[d]
Years since 1958	0.012	−0.039	1.067	0.011
	(0.78)	(1.95)*	(4.25)***	(3.72)***
Incumbent Commissioner	−0.656	0.151	−0.697	−0.091
	(1.44)	(0.20)	(0.93)	−1.18
Country with one seat	−3.711	−0.211	3.259	0.332
	(3.52)***	(0.28)	(2.65)***	(4.20)***
One seat and incumbent	3.528	0.786		
	(2.94)***	(0.73)		
Constant	−0.829	−1.430		0.473
	(1.77)*	(2.26)**		(5.21)***
N	208		213	213
Likelihood ratio χ^2	36.41		37.01	
Pseudo-R^2 (McFadden)	0.12		0.18	
R^2				0.19

Sources: Munzinger archive and LexisNexis for biographical information of Commissioners

Notes: absolute value of z-statistics (logit models) and t-statistics (OLS) in parentheses

*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%

[a] Reference category: Commissioners that were affiliated with a party in government

[b] Reference category: Commissioners that held a political position before

[c] Government status of Commissioners party from Woldendorp et al. (2000)

[d] Source: Druckman and Warwick (2005)

To find out how the factors that I have discussed, incumbency and country size, are interrelated with other factors, I present the results of a multivariate analysis. Based on the three categories for party affiliation – member of government party, opposition member, no party affiliation – I conducted a multinomial logit regression in which each category is compared with a reference group.

Model 1 of table 7 presents the results of this analysis. It indicates that there is in fact a strong difference between EU members with only one representative in the College of Commissioners and large member states with two Commission members. Commissioners with an affiliation to a domestic party in the opposition are less likely to be from smaller states. The results show also that, contrary to the theoretical expectations, Commissioners are not more likely to be members

Figure 8: Predicted probability of having a political position before

of governing parties over time. There is some evidence that the number of Commissioners with no party affiliation has decreased.

To shed more light on the political dimension of a Commissioner's previous career, I conducted a further analysis. I divided all Commissioners into two groups – politicians and Commissioners who had held no previous political positions. This variable separates politicians from Commissioners who previously had neither parliamentarian nor ministerial positions and therefore no politically relevant positions. Model 2 of table 7 displays the results of the logit analysis. It can be seen that Commissioners have been less likely to be in non-political positions over time. To illustrate the result of the logit analysis I have calculated the predicted values over time.[7] Figure 8 shows the results of this analysis. The figure illustrates that the probability that a Commissioner was in a political position before he or she took office in Brussels has increased sharply over time. In addition, the model predicts that almost half of the early Commission-

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[7]For the calculation, the incumbent status is set to 0. Therefore the predicted values on which the graph is based give probabilities for new Commissioners.

ers had never before held a political position. The graph also reveals a significant difference, decreasing over time, between small and large member states.

For small member states, the results confirm insights gained from the descriptive data analysis. First, if a Commissioner is a member of a domestic opposition party, he or she is most likely to have once been a member of the Commission. Second, the number of Commissioners with no party affiliation has decreased over time. The multivariate analysis also shows almost no changes in the party affiliation of Commissioners over time with respect to government/opposition status. Contrary to an often held view in the literature, Commissioners are not more likely to be government party members over time. This latter finding contradicts some of the expectations I raised in the first part of the study.

The effect of the finding changed through the institutional reform of the College of Commissioners in the Nice Treaty. Now every member state has one seat in the College of Commissioners. Given that countries with only one seat in the College delegate politicians from the governing parties as Commissioners, we find a closer similarity between the parties in the Council and those in the College of Commissioners.

Let me now turn to an analysis of the calibre of previous positions. The advantage of measuring the significance of previous positions as discussed above is that it provides a continuous scale with which to compare different positions held by Commissioners before they entered the Commission. In the analysis, I determine the influence of time and nation size on a country's delegation behaviour with the help of an OLS regression.[8] The increased importance of the Commission should be reflected in the fact that persons with higher political positions take office over time. In addition, I expect that especially small states have a strong interest in the European Commission. Therefore, they should send persons who have held higher political positions than those previously held by Commissioners from larger member states.

The results of the analysis are presented in model 3 of table 7. Generally, they confirm the implications drawn from the delegation literature. Some further discussion helps to clarify the implications of these results and the general performance of the model. To understand the results, we should keep in mind that the scale measuring the importance of previous positions can be divided into four categories. The highest category consists of former prime ministers and the most important national portfolios, the second category of average ministers, the third category of junior ministers and less important ministries, and the last category of almost all other, primarily non-governmental, positions (MPs, diplomats, policy experts, etc.). Given that each of these categories consists of a range of about 0.4, we can infer from the regression results

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[8]To evaluate the robustness of my analysis, I also analysed my regression results through a multinomial logit model. For this analysis I divided all previous positions into four groups and analysed how the composition changed over time. This analysis leads to the same results as the normal regression. Since the latter is easier to interpret, I present only these results here.

that the Commissioners' previous positions have shifted from those of former junior ministers and non-governmental positions especially diplomats, to those of governmental experience in average ministries.

Looking at the results of the regression analysis, we are surprised to see how significantly more high-profile politicians have been assigned as Commissioners by smaller member states. It is not so much the finding as such but the strength of the finding that catches our attention. Again considering the data in categorical terms, we note that, on average, smaller member states have delegated Commissioners one category above larger member states. More precisely, the data show us that larger member states were still sending junior ministers and MPs at a time when smaller member states were already sending former ministers to the Commission.

To sum up, the finding that the importance of delegates to the College of Commissioners has increased over time reflects the more important role of the Commission. More surprising is the fact that small states seem to delegate persons with a significantly higher profile than do the larger member states. It is not necessarily surprising that this is statistically significant, but it is more surprising with respect to the scope of this influence.

5.4 Summary

Commissioners are usually members of governing parties, and the increased importance of the Commission over time is reflected in the previous positions of EU Commissioners. Contrary to the arguments discussed in the theoretical section of this article, it cannot be statistically shown that the importance of a Commissioner's party affiliation has increased over time. It has been a constant pattern that most of the Commissioners are members of parties in domestic governments. As long as bigger member states delegated two Commissioners, one of them was often an opposition member. Only the number of Commissioners with no party affiliation has decreased. The increased political role of the Commission is represented in the previous positions of the Commissioners rather than in their party affiliation.

In the study, I reveal two patterns of delegation to the Commission that require more detailed investigation in the future. First, why do appointment strategies vary so significantly between small and large member states? Second, and partly related to the former, how can substantial differences in patterns of delegation among large member states be explained? The delegation behaviour of some large member states follows a principal-agent logic, these countries assign Commissioners from governing parties. In contrast, other states regularly include opposition members. These differences can hardly be explained in the light of principal-agent theory without including domestic factors. More comparative work investigating the appointment process may help to reveal these domestic factors.

Detailed knowledge of the appointment process is a first step toward a better understanding of

delegation to the Commission and of possible sources of bureaucratic drift. It sheds new light on the distribution of interests between the Commission and the Council. In my view, two further steps are necessary for a more coherent understanding of bureaucratic drift. First, we have to find out how the allocation of portfolios in the Commission influences decision making in the College. A member state government may try to guarantee its influence in the Commission not only by appointing loyal delegates but also by securing a portfolio that is of special interest to the country. Currently, we do not know enough about the logic of portfolio allocation in the College to investigate this link further. Second, we have to find out the extent to which Commissioners' decisions reflect their domestic parties' positions or those of their home countries. What is the linkage between national governments and Commissioners after the appointment of a new Commission? A broad literature based on organizational studies claims that the link is rather weak and that bureaucratic drift results from socialization in office. On both issues, the relevance of the portfolio allocation and the actual decisions of Commissioners, we still lack a comprehensive empirical understanding that would help us to discriminate between different theoretical explanations of bureaucratic drift. Having outlined the patterns of appointment to the College of Commissioners, I hope that this study provides insights for future research on the issue.

6 Conclusion

This dissertations focuses on representation in the EU and explores the role that institutions play in relating the preferences of citizens to the selection of policy makers. Studying representation is an essential task of political science because it analyses the effects of political institutions on the well being of people. So far, there is a broad literature on representation in democratic nation states. Comparatively little is know, however, about the effects of political institutions on representation in the EU. This dissertation has contributed to a better understanding of representation in a supranational setting such as the EU.

What have we learned about representation in the EU? This dissertation has offered a theoretically grounded empirical study on the chain of delegation to EU institutions. My research has demonstrated how political representatives in EU institutions are appointed. To specify the representative linkage of EU citizens and political delegates in EU institutions, I focussed on the Council, the Commission and the EP separately and analysed their party political composition. I conducted two detailed empirical investigations on the Council and the Commission and discussed the results of empirical studies of EP elections. In addition, I have developed a database with information on national and EP election results, cabinet parties, Commissioners and an interface to various data sets that provide information about the political positions of parties.

There are two separate lines of representation in the EU, an indirect and a direct one. The Council and the Commission derive their legitimacy through an indirect representation via domestic elections and government formation in member states. The EP, on the other hand, has been directly elected since 1979. However, results of EP elections differ systematically from national elections. Hence, we have two separate chains of delegation that are interrelated.

In order to understand how these two separate chains of delegation are interrelated and how they affect political dynamics in the EU, scholars focus on two dimensions, left/right and EU integration/independence. The former captures socio-economic attitudes in general, whereas the latter informs us about the level of support for European integration. Empirical research has demonstrated, that the two dimensions have a u-shape relation. Moderate left/right parties are strong supporters of European integration, whereas more extreme parties on the left and on the right are sceptical of or oppose European integration.

How do differences in democratic institutions among member states alter representation in the EU in these two dimensions? The Council is the most powerful institution in the Union representing member states' governments. Here, the main finding of my dissertation is that moderate and EU friendly parties are overrepresented in the Council. To understand this finding and the general pattern of representation in the Council, we have to focus on the composition of national governments. Therefore, this dissertation discussed the different electoral systems

in the EU member states. In order to understand the composition of national governments, we first have to be aware of the differences in representation in national parliaments. Electoral rules alter the results of national elections by providing different translations of votes into seats. Differences in these rules influence the chances of parties to be represented in parliament and shift vote strength into seat strength differently. In the EU, some member states have permissive electoral rules, that closely translate the percentage of votes into an equivalent number of seats with only marginal thresholds. As a consequence, these countries have a significant number of parties in parliament and it is not too difficult for small parties to win seats in national elections. Especially, the Scandinavian countries apply permissive electoral rules in order to secure proportional representation. Contrary, other member states make use of electoral rules that alter vote-seat translation significantly and foster strategic coordination between parties. Especially, single member districts with either plurality (UK) or majority run-off (France) rules reduce the number of parties represented in parliament significantly. In addition, these electoral systems provide systematic seat advantages to bigger parties. Through these electoral rules, parties gain a higher percentage of seats than the percentage of votes they won in the election. As a consequence of electoral rules, we find different party systems in EU member states' parliaments. On the one hand, we have multi party systems with no domination of a bigger party, encouraged by permissive electoral rules. On the other hand we find two dominating parties in parliament that alternate in government. Hence, electoral systems also influence a party's chance to take up governmental responsibility and to be represented in the Council.

However, there are some other dynamics that influence a party's chance to become a government member. First of all, the consequences of electoral systems may directly determine the governing party. This is the case in the Westminster model were the party that wins elections does also hold a majority of seats in parliament. As a consequence, there is one party government without the prerequisite of coalition formation. In Greece, a majority of seats for the strongest party in parliament has been accomplished by modifications of 'reinforced' proportional representation. In addition, Spain and Portugal have been mostly ruled by single party governments, although the influence of electoral systems is less severe in these two countries. Among the other member states, government formation has taken place through coalition formation. This is the dominant form of cabinet formation among EU member states where multiple parties share governmental responsibility. In addition, Denmark and Sweden have regular cases of minority governments where cabinet parties control no legislative majority.

In order to understand the party make up of the Council, we have to understand which of the parties in national parliaments are represented in domestic governments. In this dissertation, I have provided an answer to the question through a quantitative analysis. Theoretically, I drew on the median party theorem in order to highlight the fact that in a single dimensional space of

government formation, with policy-seeking parties, moderate parties are more likely to become government members. My statistical analysis confirmed this theoretical expectation. Coalition building takes place along the left/right dimension and party positions on European integration have no systematic influence on government formation. Hence, moderate left/right parties are more likely to be government members. However, these are also parties that are more positive towards European integration. As a consequence, we find a systematic overrepresentation of pro-European parties in the Council.

The second EU institution I analysed was the Commission. Here I found that exactly those parties that were represented in national governments were represented in the College of Commissioners, that is, moderate left/right pro-EU-integration parties. This finding can be explained by the fact that members of the Council do also determine the composition of the College of Commissioners. In terms of party affiliation, two patterns stand out. Smaller member states with only one Commission position always appointed members from governing parties or incumbent Commissioners. Bigger member states with two Commission positions did not exhibit regular patterns and did also systematically appoint opposition members. However, exactly those parties that were represented in national governments were represented in the College of Commissioners, moderate left/right pro-EU-integration parties.

My empirical investigation has delivered a second finding concerning representation in the College of Commissioners: It has shown that the appointment of Commissioners became more political over time. Most of the first Commissioners were high bureaucrats whereas more and more politicians took up a position in the College since the 1970s. Over time the political calibre of the former positions changed. Recently, most Commissioners were national ministers before they took up their College position.

A different picture emerges through the direct link of representation in the EP. A major finding concerning representation in the EP is that its party composition is very different from the party make up of the Council and the Commission. In elections to the EP, more extreme left/right parties that are sceptical towards European integration succeed. This has been explained by the second-order dynamics of EP elections. These elections show a lower turnout, a loss of votes for parties in government and the success of more extreme parties. However, in terms of representation, this generates a party composition of the EP that is very different from the party make up of the Council and the Commission. Coalition formation and voting alliances in the EP moderate this effect, because those parties that are almost exclusively represented in the Council form also the major legislative support in the EP. However, it is difficult for eurosceptic parties to influence decision making in the Union.

To sum up, my dissertation delivered insights into representation of EU institutions and showed that the party composition of EU institutions differers significantly between the Council and the

Commission on the one side and the EP on the other. The mechanisms of cabinet formation in Europe and the structure of the European political space with a u-shaped relation of left/right and pro/contra EU integration systematically exclude eurosceptic parties from representation in the Council and the Commission. However, exactly those parties are significantly more successful in EP elections than in national elections. As a consequence, we find no congruence of national parliaments and EU institutions in terms of their party political composition over time. Positions in decision making of the EU show a different picture, with a Commission and an EP that are in favour of more integration legislation and a Council that is more reserved. Nevertheless, here I purely focussed on an aggregative view and it was not my intention to explain the difference between aggregated positions and decision-making positions.

Studying the role of parties in the EU has recently led to a lively debate among EU scholars. This work is most prominently summarized in a recent special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy and its insights are similar to the arguments put forward in my work (cf. Lindberg et al. 2008). Different articles in the special issue scrutinise the role of parties in the European Council, the Council of Ministers, the College of Commissioners, the EP as well as the influence of parties on attitudes towards European integration. Lindberg et al. nicely summarise the evolution of research on the party dynamics of European integration. The authors' summary of the role of parties highlights the fact that appointment to all EU institutions is dominated by national parties. The evaluation of Lindberg et al. on the role of parties in legislative decision making is also in line with my previous summary of the literature. National parties have strong influence in the EP, decision making in the Council is partly structured along partisan lines but there is little information about partisan dynamics in the College of Commissioners.

Many more studies on the influence of parties on decision making in the EU can be expected for the future. This follows naturally from the amount of recent investigations that I have summarised here as well as from the discussion by Lindberg et al. and their coauthors. The influence of parties in the EP has already been widely studied. The EP is the legislative body of the EU where empirical data on the role of parties is the most extensive and easily accessible. New and better data on decision dynamics in the Council will further reveal the political alignment of actors in this central body of the EU's legislative process. Both streams of research, however, work on the Council and the EP, need to be more thoroughly combined in order to understand inter-institutional decision-making dynamics. Understanding the political alignments in the College of Commissioners is still difficult to explore and information about the factors that explain internal dynamics are hard to obtain. Nevertheless, new large scale research projects are trying to overcome these limitations (Hartlapp 2008). New insights into the role of parties in EU decision making will be provided through work in this dynamic field of European studies.

All of the previously discussed work focusses on the role of parties in EU decision making

only. Contrary, my dissertation has investigated political representation in the EU by studying the party make up of EU institutions. I have offered an empirical analysis to show which political actors are delegated to the Council, the College of Commissioners and the EP. Based on my analysis, what are open avenues we still need to explore to better understand these issues of representation and delegation in the EU?

As in studies of EU decision making, research debates are most lively on understanding the EP. Recently, we have seen greater efforts to understand the micro-dynamics of voting behaviour in EP elections. This research moves beyond the observation that voting in EP elections differs from national elections and does so in a systematic way. Scholars now ask: What explains these differences? Why is turnout lower in EP elections than in national elections? Do voters purely punish national governments or do they protest against European integrations? This shift of focus on the microfoundations of second-order dynamics in EP elections may help us to better understand the causal mechanisms behind vote shifts (cf. Hobolt et al. 2009; Manow 2005; Rohrschneider and Clark 2008). Results may also help to better clarify to what degree voting in EP elections reflects attitudes towards European integration. However, the empirical focus of my work has been on the Council and the College of Commissioners, to which I turn now more thoroughly.

To the best of my knowledge, there is no other systematic work on representation to the Council besides the study that I have provided in this dissertation. Studies of national coalition formation provide lively debates and help to understand cabinet building and termination at the national level systematically. What aspects out of this work may be of relevance to better understand the political composition of the Council? My study focussed purely on the probability of a party being represented in the Council. However, it may also be interesting to ask how long certain governments or parties are represented in the Council. Answering these questions would require to draw on theories of government duration and termination to understand the temporal dimension of representation in the Council. These studies are well developed in the study of national coalition building and provide insights into the mechanisms of government survival. Drawing on this research would allow scholars of the EU to better understand how long certain actors are members of the Council. How long is the duration of Council membership among EU governments? How likely is a return of political actors that were voted out of national governments? What is the party turnover for ministerial positions? Answers to these questions would help to better understand the dynamics of the Council composition.

A second open question about party affects in the Council may deal with portfolio allocations and, as a consequence, the composition of the various Council of Ministers. Franchino and Rahming (2003) content that the (Agri-) Fisheries Council is composed of ministers from national parties that are less in favour of protection to the environment and support fishermen (farmer)

issues more than the respective national governments. However, we do not know if this is a systematic pattern in other Council of Ministers as well. Are certain parties overrepresented in some national ministries? Do other Councils show partisan bias as well? Unfortunately, there has been only little systematic efforts to improve our understanding of portfolio allocations in general. Almost all of the studies that focus on the issue were conducted some time ago. Laver and Shepsle (1996) provide a portfolio allocation model and Budge and Keman (1990) a systematic empirical study of portfolio distribution in post-war European democracies. Work on portfolio division dynamics in cabinet formation has received little systematic attention in the last decade. Work in this area is outside the scope of recent innovations of modelling and testing theories of coalition formation. In addition, systematic (digital) empirical data on the allocation of ministerial positions in democratic states is rare. Consequently, it may be difficult to understand the party composition of the different Council of Ministers as long as the the study of portfolio allocation in general does not progress.

The same shortcoming applies to the College of Commissioners. We know little about the distribution of directorate-generals. Only very recently, Franchino (2009) has provided a first systematic investigation of portfolio distribution in the College. However, Franchino's study tests different models of portfolio allocation and provides only a very first step in understanding the importance of directorate-generals for member states and parties. We are still in need of more systematic empirical investigations on the allocation of responsibilities within the Commission. How are responsibilities distributed? What is the amount of leeway Commissioners or directorate-generals have in controlling decisions in the Commission? What are dimensions of conflict between the Commission and the respective Council of Ministers as well as the relevant parliamentary committee?

In addition, we should monitor if the political importance of the Commissioner position still increases, vis-a-vis the relevance of ministerial positions for political careers. However, in my view, there is only limited room for further studies of democratic delegation beyond the allocation of portfolios. The appointment of the College of Commissioner is only the last step of delegation. My study shows that Commissioners are nowadays high profile politicians from the largest governing party, especially after the recent reduction of the number of Commissioners to one for every member state. This process of appointment is of little interest to EU citizens. In addition there still seems to be a lower push of national parties and politicians towards a career in the Commission compared to a national ministerial career. Nevertheless, investigations of decision making within the Commission are a broad and open field for further investigations.

In this thesis, I focussed on parties as a unit of analysis in order to better understand representation in the EU. My previous discussion of open issues about delegation and representation to the Council, the EP and the College of Commissioners highlights the need to go one step further.

In addition, for understanding the party dimension of representation in the EU, we should try to better understand representation at an individual level. This asks us to focus on political careers in order to understand the political make up of EU institutions. What are national and European career patterns? How do they change over time? Who are the politicians serving in Europe's institutions? How do national political institutions alter political career patterns? Focussing on political careers may provide new insights about representation in the EU.

I drew on the distinction of procedural and substantive representation in my discussion of approaches towards studying representation in comparative politics (Powell Jr. 2004). Through my study, I have specified procedural representation in the EU. My analysis showed how democratic institutions alter representation to the Council, the College of Commissioners and the EP. I presented the results of the alternative approaches towards empirical studies of representation in chapter 2.2.2. Studies of substantive representation in the EU have shown that there are marked difference between citizen and elite attitudes towards issues of European integration (cf. Schmitt and Thomassen 1999). However, it may be interesting to combine studies of substantive and procedural representation. Do certain electoral systems show a better correspondence of citizen and elite attitudes? Can citizens hold politicians more accountable on issues of European integration under specific political institutions?

To sum up, this conclusion has demonstrated that there are still broad and open areas for studying representation in the EU. Studying representation and delegation is an essential task of political science and helps us to better understand the consequences of institutions for the well being of people. By exploring the role that institutions play in connecting the preferences of citizens and the selection of policy makers in the EU, my study has provided new insights about the effects of democratic institutions on representation in an area that is not yet well understood as representation in nation states.

A ParlGov database

The following summary lists all tables created for the ParlGov database in order to determine the party composition of EU institutions. I give a short description of each table and the including variables. Table descriptions are extracted from ParlGov ('info_table') and list of variables are extracted from database meta information. A description of variables is provided in table 'info_variable' but not included into this appendix. A more general introduction to the database, its data sources and indicators has been provided in chapter 3, esp. in section 3.4.

A.1 Primary tables

Primary tables provide information as coded from various data sources.

- cab_info

  Description information about cabinet

  Variables countryID, cabID, startingDate, endingDate, name, caretaker, wikipedia, data-source, comment

- cab_party

  Description list of parties that are members of a government

  Variables countryID, cabID, partyID, pm, partyIDsource, datasource, comment

- commission_info

  Description information about the European Union's College of Commissioners

  Variables commissionID, name, comment

- commissioner

  Description members of the European Union's College of Commissioners

  Variables commissionID, countryID, personID, personIDsource, startingDate, ending-Date, incumbent, oneseat, partyID, partyIDsource, partygov, president, portfolio, elected, scorePosition, highestPosition, datasource, comment

- country

  Description country data with links to other data sets

  Variables countryID, public, countryname, countryshort, cmp, castles, huber, unc, benoit, taglarsson, mp, euAccessionDate, ep, eppre1979

- ep_data

Description results of elections to the European Parliament

Variables epID, countryID, partyID, partyIDsource, pervote, seats, votes, datasource, comment

- ep_info

  Description information about elections to the European Parliament

  Variables epID, electionDate, accession, seatstotal, comment

- info_table

  Description description of ParlGov database tables

  Variables type, name, description

- info_variable

  Description description of variables in ParlGov database tables

  Variables tablename, variable, keytype, datatype, description, columnnr

- parl_data

  Description results of parliamentary election

  Variables countryID, parlID, partyID, partyIDsource, seats, pervote, votes, frontrunner, datasource, comment

- parl_info

  Description information about parliamentary election

  Variables countryID, parlID, electionDate, early, seatstotal, votesvalid, votescast, electorate, datasource, comment

- party

  Description party information with links to data sets (ParlGov foreign) that contain policy positons of parties

  Variables countryID, partyID, familyID, partyshort, partyname, partyorg, partyorgascii, wikipedia, cmp, castles, laver, huber, unc, benoit, comment

- party_change

  Description linking parties that evolved through changes; observation in this table link predessedor/successor parties (partyID) from 'party' table.

  Variables countryID, partyID, partyIDnew, yearchange, comment

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- party_family

  Description party family coding information

  Variables familyID, short, name, description

- party_naming

  Description information on official party names in case a party was renamed or if the official name is only used in shortened form

  Variables countryID, partyID, year, partyshort, partyname, partyorg, partyorgascii, comment

A.2 Foreign tables

Foreign tables, starting with 'foreign_', are included from external data sources. The content of this data is not changed. There are some minor modifications performed in order to import the external information into ParlGov by a script.

- foreign_country_iso

  Description official country codes for countries worldwide with some additional information

  Variables continent, region, country, capital, fips, iso2, iso3, isonumeric, internet

- foreign_party_cmp_party_name

  Description party names from the appendices of the Comparative Manifesto Project

  Variables id, partyshort, partyorg, partyname

- foreign_party_experts_1983_castles_mair

  Description Party position data from Castles, Francis G. and Peter Mair. 1984. "Left right political scales: Some expert judgments." European Journal of Political Research 12 (1): 73–88

  Variables id, country, partyname, partyorg, partyshort, rangeleft, rangeright, position, respondents

- foreign_party_experts_1995_huber_inglehart

  Description Party position data from Huber, John and Ronald Inglehart. 1995. "Expert interpretations of party space and party locations in 42 societies." Party Politics 1 (1): 73–111

Variables id, country, partyname, partyorg, partyshort, position, rangeleft, rangeright, sd, respondents

- foreign_party_experts_2002_unc_party

  Description Party data (party names) from Chapel Hill data sets on the Positioning of Political Parties (1996, 1999, 2002)

  Variables id, country, partyname, partyorg, partyshort

- foreign_party_experts_2002_unc_position

  Description Party position data from Chapel Hill data sets on the Positioning of Political Parties (1996, 1999, 2002)

  Variables country, id, year, position, salience, lrecon, lrgen, galtan

- foreign_party_experts_2006_benoit_laver_data

  Description Party position data (original) from Kenneth Benoit and Michael Laver. 2006. Party policy in modern democracies. London: Routledge

  Variables rowNumber, Country, id, Party, PartyName, Dimension, Scale, Mean, SD, N, Vote_Share, Election_Date

- foreign_party_experts_2006_benoit_laver_party

  Description Party data (party names) from Kenneth Benoit and Michael Laver. 2006. Party policy in modern democracies. London: Routledge

  Variables id, Country, Party, PartyName

- foreign_party_experts_2006_benoit_laver_position

  Description Party position data (transformed) from Kenneth Benoit and Michael Laver. 2006. Party policy in modern democracies. London: Routledge

  Variables id, citizensrights, civilliberties, decentralization, defensepolicy, deficitbonds, deregulation, environment, euaccountability, euauthority, euenlargement, eujoining, eulargerstronger, eupeacekeeping, eustrengthening, foreignlandownership, formercommunists, globalization, healthcare, immigration, leftright, mediafreedom, nationalidentity, nationalism, natopeacekeeping, neighborrelations, northernireland, palestinianstate, privacy, privatization, quebec, relationswithwest, religion, security, social, sympathy, taxesspending, urbanrural, usaffairs

- foreign_party_family

  Description party families as used in various other data sources

Variables familyID, cmp, cmplabel, caramani, caramanilabel, ceses, cseslabel, unc, unclabel, britannica, britannicalabel, zeus, zeuslabel

A.3 Views

Views, tables starting with 'view_', combine primary information to generate data tables from primary information for quantitative analysis. These operations are automatically performed by the database and the structure of the view is defined by an SQL query.

- Views linking ID variables (variable names in table name)
    - view_cabID_cabIDprevious
    - view_cabID_parlID
    - view_cabID_partyID_seats
    - view_eu_accession_parlID_cabID
    - view_parlID_parlIDprevious

- view_ep_composition

    Description primary table on EP composition combining 'ep_info' and 'ep_data'. see these tables for a documentation of the variables. in the table all results of an EP election are duplicated for an EU accesiton to cover the change of party compositon.

    Variables epID, startingDate, countryID, partyID, partyIDsource, pervote, seats, seatstotal

- view_government_formation

    Description table combines various of the primary ParlGov tables to generate information on coalition formation.

    Variables countryShort, cabName, startingDate, electionDate, countryID, parlID, cabID, partyID, cabParty, seats, seatsCabParties, seatsParlTotal, seatsShareParl, seatsShareParlPrevious, largestParty, incumbentCabParty, partyShareAllPreviousCabinets, minorityCab, leftright, econ, liberal, eu, partyshort, partyname

- view_government_formation_eu

    Description government formation in EU member states. for documentation of the variables see table 'view_government_formation'

    Variables startingDateEu, countryShort, cabName, startingDate, electionDate, countryID, parlID, cabID, partyID, cabParty, seats, seatsCabParties, seatsParlTotal, seatsShareParl,

seatsShareParlPrevious, largestParty, incumbentCabParty, partyShareAllPreviousCabinets, minorityCab, leftright, econ, liberal, eu, partyshort, partyname

- view_parliament

  Description results of parliamentary elections (main view)

  Variables countryID, parlID, electionDate, partyID, partyname, partyIDsource, pervote, seats, seatstotal

- view_parliament_eu

  Description election results in EU member states. for documentation of the variables see table 'view_parliament'

  Variables startingDateEu, countryID, parlID, electionDate, partyID, partyname, partyIDsource, pervote, seats, seatstotal

A.4 Calculated tables

Calculated tables, starting with 'view_calc_', are determined from primary information with an R script. This information can not be determined by a view. Tables are generated at regular intervals.

- view_calc_cab_space

  Description calculated parameters about cabinets; see list of variables for further details; these parameters are calculated by an R script at irregular intervals

  Variables leftrightMedianParty, leftrightMedianVoter, leftrightMean, leftrightMeanSD, leftrightMin, leftrightMax, leftrightPercCovered, econMedianParty, econMedianVoter, econMean, econMeanSD, econMin, econMax, econPercCovered, liberalMedianParty, liberalMedianVoter, liberalMean, liberalMeanSD, liberalMin, liberalMax, liberalPercCovered, euMedianParty, euMedianVoter, euMean, euMeanSD, euMin, euMax, euPercCovered, countryID, cabID

- view_calc_electoral_system_parameter

  Description calculated parameters about parliamentary elections; see list of variables for further details; these parameters are calculated by an R script at irregular intervals

  Variables countryID, parlID, effectiveNrElectoralParties, effectiveNrLegislativeParties, disproportionality, advantageRatio, polarization, dateCalculated

- view_calc_parl_space

Description calculated parameters about cabinets; see list of variables for further details; these parameters are calculated by an R script at irregular intervals

Variables leftrightMedianParty, leftrightMedianVoter, leftrightMean, leftrightMeanSD, leftrightMin, leftrightMax, leftrightPercCovered, econMedianParty, econMedian-Voter, econMean, econMeanSD, econMin, econMax, econPercCovered, liberalMe-dianParty, liberalMedianVoter, liberalMean, liberalMeanSD, liberalMin, liberalMax, liberalPercCovered, euMedianParty, euMedianVoter, euMean, euMeanSD, euMin, euMax, euPercCovered, countryID, parlID

- view_calc_party_position

Description policy positions of political parties in important dimensions as provided through various expert surveys

Variables countryID, partyID, leftright, econ, liberal, eu, dateCalculated

B Party compositions of EU institutions

B.1 National parliaments

Description Party composition of national parliaments during EU membership as coded in ParlGov. Elections are ordered according to date of the election or the entry of the country into the EU. Parties are ordered from left to right. Seat share of party in parliament is provided in parenthesis.

1958-01-01	BEL	KPB-PCB (1.9) PSC-CVP (44.8) Fp (0.5) LP-PL (11.8) BSP-PSB (40.6) Uc (0.5)
1958-01-01	DEU	SPD (34.9) FDP (8.3) CDU (42.8) CSU (10.6) DP (3.3)
1958-01-01	FRA	PCF (27.0) PS (16.2) PRR/RS (13.4) UNR (2.9) PRL (17.5) MRP (13.1) UDCA (9.4)
1958-01-01	ITA	PDS (24.2) PSI (12.7) PSDI (3.2) PRI (0.8) DC (44.6) SVP (0.5) PLI (2.2) MSI (4.9) MIS (6.8)
1958-01-01	LUX	LSAP (32.7) CSV (50.0) DP (11.5) KPL (5.8)
1958-01-01	NLD	CPN (4.7) PvdA (33.3) ARP (10.0) CHU (8.7) KVP (32.7) VVD (8.7) SGP (2.0)
1958-05-25	ITA	PDS (23.5) PSI (14.1) PSDI (3.7) PRI (1.0) DC (45.8) SVP (0.5) PLI (2.9) MSI (4.0) PMP (2.3) MIS (1.8) C (0.2) UV (0.2)
1958-06-01	BEL	KPB-PCB (0.9) PSC-CVP (49.1) Fp (0.5) LP-PL (9.9) BSP-PSB (39.6)
1958-11-23	FRA	PCF (2.2) PS (9.5) PRR/RS (4.9) UNR (42.6) PRL (28.6) MRP (12.3)
1959-02-01	LUX	LSAP (32.7) CSV (40.4) DP (21.2) KPL (5.8)
1959-03-12	NLD	CPN (2.0) PvdA (32.0) ARP (9.3) CHU (8.0) KVP (32.7) VVD (12.7) SGP (2.0) PSP (1.3)
1961-03-26	BEL	KPB-PCB (2.4) PSC-CVP (45.3) Fp (2.4) LP-PL (9.4) BSP-PSB (39.6) PSI (0.5)
1961-09-17	DEU	SPD (39.0) FDP (12.9) CDU (38.6) CSU (9.6)
1962-11-18	FRA	PCF (8.8) PS (13.8) PRR/RS (8.8) UNR (49.5) PRL (6.9) IR (3.9) MRP (8.0) PSU (0.4)
1963-04-28	ITA	PDS (26.3) PSI (13.8) PSDI (5.1) PRI (1.0) DC (41.3) SVP (0.5) PLI (6.3) MSI (4.3) MIS (1.3) UV (0.2)
1963-05-15	NLD	CPN (2.7) PvdA (28.7) ARP (8.7) CHU (8.7) KVP (33.3) VVD (10.7) GPV (0.7) SGP (2.0) PSP (2.7) Bp (2.0)
1964-06-07	LUX	LSAP (37.5) CSV (39.3) DP (10.7) KPL (8.9) MIP (3.6)
1965-05-23	BEL	KPB-PCB (2.8) RW (0.9) PSC-CVP (36.3) Fp (5.7) FDF (1.4) LP-PL (22.6) BSP-PSB (30.2)
1965-09-19	DEU	SPD (41.9) FDP (9.7) CDU (39.0) CSU (9.5)
1967-02-15	NLD	CPN (3.3) PvdA (24.7) D66 (4.7) ARP (10.0) CHU (8.0) KVP (28.0) VVD (11.3) GPV (0.7) SGP (2.0) Bp (4.7) PSP (2.7)
1967-03-05	FRA	PCF (15.3) PS (15.1) PRR/RS (10.0) CD (8.1) UNR (40.6) IR (8.7) PRL (1.5) PSU (0.6)
1968-03-31	BEL	KPB-PCB (2.4) RW (2.4) PSC (9.0) CVP (23.6) Fp (9.4) FDF (3.3) LP-PL (22.2) BSP-PSB (27.8)
1968-05-19	ITA	PDS (28.1) PSUP (3.7) PRI (1.4) DC (42.2) SVP (0.5) PLI (4.9) MSI (3.8) PSU (14.4) MIS (1.0)
1968-06-23	FRA	PCF (7.0) PS (7.2) PRR/RS (4.9) CD (5.5) UNR (60.0) IR (13.6) PRL (1.7)
1968-12-15	LUX	LSAP (32.1) CSV (37.5) DP (19.6) KPL (10.7)
1969-09-28	DEU	SPD (45.8) FDP (6.0) CDU (38.8) CSU (9.5)
1971-03-28	NLD	CPN (4.0) PPR (1.3) PvdA (26.0) DS70 (5.3) D66 (7.3) ARP (8.7) CHU (6.7) KVP (23.3) VVD (10.7) GPV (1.3) SGP (2.0) PSP (1.3) NMP (1.3) Bp (0.7)
1971-11-07	BEL	KPB-PCB (2.4) RW (6.6) PSC (9.4) CVP (22.2) Fp (9.9) FDF (4.7) PVV (9.4) PRL (5.2) BSP-PSB (28.8) PL (1.4)
1972-05-07	ITA	PDS (28.4) PSI (9.7) PSDI (4.6) PRI (2.2) DC (42.4) SVP (0.5) PLI (3.3) MSI (8.9)
1972-11-19	DEU	SPD (46.7) FDP (8.1) CDU (35.9) CSU (9.3)
1972-11-29	NLD	CPN (4.7) PPR (4.7) PvdA (28.7) DS70 (4.0) D66 (4.0) ARP (9.3) CHU (4.7) KVP (18.0) VVD (14.7) GPV (1.3) SGP (2.0) Bp (2.0) PSP (1.3) RKPN (0.7)

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1973-01-01	DNK	SF (9.7) Sd (40.0) RV (15.4) KF (17.7) V (17.1)
1973-01-01	GBR	Lab (45.7) SNP (0.2) Lib (1.0) Con (52.4) UI (0.5)
1973-01-01	IRL	Lab (12.5) FF (52.1) FG (34.7)
1973-02-28	IRL	Lab (13.2) FF (47.9) FG (37.5)
1973-03-04	FRA	PCF (15.4) PS (18.8) MRG (2.3) MR (6.3) CDP (4.4) UNR (37.6) IR (11.4) PRL (3.2) PSU (0.4)
1973-12-04	DNK	DKP (3.4) SF (6.3) Sd (26.3) RV (11.4) CD (8.0) KrF (4.0) KF (9.1) V (12.6) FrP (16.0) RF (2.9)
1974-02-28	GBR	Plaid (0.3) Lab (47.4) SNP (1.1) Lib (2.2) Con (46.8) UUP+L (1.7) SDLP (0.2)
1974-03-10	BEL	KPB-PCB (1.9) RW (6.1) PSC (10.4) CVP (23.6) Fp (10.4) FDF (4.2) PVV (9.9) PRL (4.2) BSP-PSB (27.8) PL (1.4)
1974-05-26	LUX	LSAP (28.8) CSV (30.5) DP (23.7) KPL (8.5) SDP (8.5)
1974-10-10	GBR	Plaid (0.5) Lab (50.2) SNP (1.7) Lib (2.0) Con (43.6) UUP+L (1.6) UI (0.2) SDLP (0.2)
1975-01-09	DNK	VS (2.3) DKP (4.0) SF (5.1) Sd (30.3) RV (7.4) CD (2.3) KrF (5.1) KF (5.7) V (24.0) FrP (13.7)
1976-06-20	ITA	PdUP (0.5) PDS (36.0) PSI (9.0) R (0.6) PSDI (2.4) PRI (2.2) DC (41.7) SVP (0.5) PLI (0.8) MSI (5.6) AO (0.3) LC (0.2)
1976-10-03	DEU	SPD (43.2) FDP (7.7) CDU (38.8) CSU (10.2)
1977-02-15	DNK	VS (2.9) DKP (4.0) SF (4.0) Sd (37.1) RV (3.4) CD (6.3) KrF (3.4) KF (8.6) V (12.0) FrP (14.9) RF (3.4)
1977-04-17	BEL	KPB-PCB (0.9) RW (2.4) PSC (11.3) CVP (26.4) Fp (9.4) FDF (4.7) PVV (8.0) PRL (6.6) BSP-PSB (29.2) PL (0.9)
1977-05-25	NLD	CPN (1.3) PPR (2.0) PvdA (35.3) DS70 (0.7) D66 (5.3) CDA (32.7) VVD (18.7) GPV (0.7) SGP (2.0) Bp (0.7) PSP (0.7)
1977-06-16	IRL	Lab (11.5) FF (56.8) FG (29.1)
1978-03-12	FRA	PCF (18.1) PS (21.5) MRG (2.1) UDF (26.2) RPR (30.0) PRL (2.1)
1978-12-17	BEL	KPB-PCB (1.9) PS (15.1) BSP (12.3) RW (1.9) PSC (11.8) CVP (26.9) Fp (6.6) FDF (5.2) PVV (10.4) PRL (6.6) RvA-UpD (0.5) VB (0.5) PL (0.5)
1979-05-03	GBR	Plaid (0.3) Lab (42.4) SNP (0.3) Lib (1.7) Con (53.4) UUP+L (1.6) UI (0.2) SDLP (0.2)
1979-06-03	ITA	PdUP (1.0) PDS (31.9) PSI (9.8) R (2.9) PSDI (3.3) PRI (2.4) DC (41.4) SVP (0.6) PLI (1.4) MSI (4.9) UV (0.2) LT (0.2)
1979-06-10	LUX	LSAP (23.7) CSV (40.7) DP (25.4) KPL (3.4) SDP (3.4) Ef (1.7) PSI (1.7)
1979-10-23	DNK	VS (3.4) SF (6.3) Sd (38.9) RV (5.7) CD (3.4) KrF (2.9) KF (12.6) V (12.6) FrP (11.4) RF (2.9)
1980-10-05	DEU	SPD (43.9) FDP (10.4) CDU (35.6) CSU (10.0)
1981-01-01	GRC	KKE (3.7) PASOK (31.0) ND (57.0) EK (5.3) EP (1.7) KN (0.7) KEE(I) (0.3) EDA (0.3)
1981-05-26	NLD	CPN (2.0) PPR (2.0) PvdA (29.3) D66 (11.3) CDA (32.0) VVD (17.3) GPV (0.7) RPF (1.3) SGP (2.0) PSP (2.0)
1981-06-11	IRL	WP (0.6) Lab (9.0) FF (47.0) FG (39.2) NHBC (1.2) SLP (0.6)
1981-06-14	FRA	PCF (9.1) PS (56.5) MRG (3.0) UDF (12.4) RPR (16.9) PRL (2.1)
1981-10-18	GRC	KKE (4.3) PASOK (57.3) ND (38.3)
1981-11-08	BEL	KPB-PCB (0.9) Ecolo (0.9) Agalev (0.9) PS (16.5) BSP (12.3) RW (0.9) PSC (8.5) CVP (20.3) Fp (9.4) FDF (2.8) PVV (13.2) PRL (11.3) RvA-UpD (1.4) VB (0.5)
1981-12-08	DNK	VS (2.9) SF (11.4) Sd (33.7) RV (5.1) CD (8.6) KrF (2.3) KF (14.9) V (12.0) FrP (9.1)
1982-02-18	IRL	WP (1.8) Lab (9.0) FF (48.8) FG (38.0)
1982-09-08	NLD	CPN (2.0) PPR (1.3) PvdA (31.3) D66 (4.0) CDA (30.0) VVD (24.0) GPV (0.7) RPF (1.3) SGP (2.0) PSP (2.0) CP (0.7) EVP (0.7)
1982-11-24	IRL	WP (1.2) Lab (9.6) FF (45.2) FG (42.2)
1983-03-06	DEU	Grue (5.2) SPD (38.8) FDP (6.7) CDU (38.8) CSU (10.2)
1983-06-09	GBR	Plaid (0.3) Lab (32.2) SNP (0.3) SDP (0.9) Lib (2.6) Con (61.1) UUP+L (2.3) UI (0.2) SDLP (0.2)
1983-06-26	ITA	DP (1.1) PdUP (1.0) PDS (30.5) PSI (11.6) R (1.7) PSA (0.2) PSDI (3.7) PRI (4.6) DC (35.7) SVP (0.5) PLI (2.5) MSI (6.7) UV (0.2) LV (0.2)

1984-01-10	DNK	VS (2.9) SF (12.0) Sd (32.0) RV (5.7) CD (4.6) KrF (2.9) KF (24.0) V (12.6) FrP (3.4)
1984-06-17	LUX	LSAP (32.8) CSV (39.1) DP (21.9) GAP (3.1) KPL (3.1)
1985-06-02	GRC	KKE (4.0) PASOK (53.7) ND (42.0) KEE(I) (0.3)
1985-10-13	BEL	Ecolo (2.4) Agalev (1.9) PS (16.5) BSP (15.1) PSC (9.4) CVP (23.1) Fp (7.5) FDF (1.4) PVV (10.4) PRL (11.3) RvA-UpD (0.5) VB (0.5)
1986-01-01	ESP	HB (0.6) IL/PCE (1.1) EE (0.3) ERC (0.3) PSOE (57.7) CDS (0.6) PNV EAJ (2.3) CiU (3.4) UCD (3.4) PP (30.3)
1986-01-01	PRT	PEV (0.4) PCP (13.6) PSP (22.8) PSD (35.2) PP (8.8) PRD (18.0) MDP (1.2)
1986-03-16	FRA	PCF (5.8) PS (35.6) MRG (2.3) UDF (23.0) RPR (26.3) PRL (0.7) FN (6.3)
1986-05-21	NLD	PPR (1.3) PvdA (34.7) D66 (6.0) CDA (36.0) VVD (18.0) GPV (0.7) RPF (0.7) SGP (2.0) PSP (0.7)
1986-06-22	ESP	HB (1.4) IL/PCE (2.0) EE (0.6) PSOE (52.6) CDS (5.4) PDP (6.0) UV (0.3) PNV EAJ (1.7) CiU (5.1) PAR (0.3) PP (20.9) PL (3.1) AIC (0.3) CG (0.3)
1987-01-25	DEU	Grue (8.1) SPD (37.2) FDP (9.2) CDU (35.6) CSU (9.4)
1987-02-17	IRL	WP (2.4) Lab (7.2) FF (48.8) FG (30.7) PD (8.4) DSP (0.6)
1987-06-11	GBR	Plaid (0.5) Lab (35.2) SNP (0.5) SDP (0.8) Lib (2.6) Con (57.8) UUP+L (2.0) SDLP (0.5) UI (0.2)
1987-06-14	ITA	DP (1.3) FdV (2.1) PDS (28.1) PSI (14.9) R (2.1) PSA (0.3) PSDI (2.7) PRI (3.3) DC (37.1) SVP (0.5) PLI (1.7) MSI (5.6) UV (0.2) LL (0.2)
1987-07-19	PRT	PEV (0.4) PCP (11.2) PSP (24.0) PSD (59.2) PP (1.6) PRD (2.8) ID (0.8)
1987-09-08	DNK	SF (15.4) Sd (30.9) RV (6.3) CD (5.1) KrF (2.3) KF (21.7) V (10.9) FrP (5.1) FK (2.3)
1987-12-13	BEL	Ecolo (1.4) Agalev (2.8) PS (18.9) BSP (15.1) PSC (9.0) CVP (20.3) Fp (7.5) FDF (1.4) PVV (11.8) PRL (10.8) VB (0.9)
1988-05-10	DNK	SF (13.7) Sd (31.4) RV (5.7) CD (5.1) KrF (2.3) KF (20.0) V (12.6) FrP (9.1)
1988-06-05	FRA	PCF (4.3) PS (46.8) MRG (1.6) UDF (23.4) RPR (22.2) PRL (1.4) FN (0.2)
1989-06-15	IRL	WP (4.2) Greens (0.6) Lab (9.0) FF (46.4) FG (33.1) PD (3.6) DSP (0.6)
1989-06-18	GRC	SYN (9.3) PASOK (41.7) ND (48.3) DIANA (0.3) Mus (0.3)
1989-06-18	LUX	GLEI (3.3) LSAP (30.0) CSV (36.7) ADR (6.7) DP (18.3) GAP (3.3) KPL (1.7)
1989-09-06	NLD	GL (4.0) PvdA (32.7) D66 (8.0) CDA (36.0) VVD (14.7) GPV (1.3) RPF (0.7) SGP (2.0) CD (0.7)
1989-10-29	ESP	HB (1.1) IL/PCE (4.9) EE (0.6) PSOE (50.0) EA (0.6) PA (0.6) CDS (4.0) UV (0.6) PNV EAJ (1.4) CiU (5.1) PAR (0.3) PP (30.6) AIC (0.3)
1989-11-05	GRC	SYN (7.0) PASOK (42.7) ND (49.3) I-E (0.3) Mus (0.3)
1990-04-08	GRC	SYN (6.3) PASOK (41.0) ND (50.0) ally (1.3) Mus (0.7) DIANA (0.3) I-E (0.3)
1990-12-02	DEU	PDS (2.6) Grue (1.2) SPD (36.1) FDP (11.9) CDU (40.5) CSU (7.7)
1990-12-12	DNK	SF (8.6) Sd (39.4) RV (4.0) CD (5.1) KrF (2.3) KF (17.1) V (16.6) FrP (6.9)
1991-10-06	PRT	CDU (7.5) PSP (31.4) PSD (58.4) PP (2.2) PSN (0.4)
1991-11-24	BEL	Ecolo (4.7) Agalev (3.3) PS (16.5) BSP (13.2) PSC (8.5) CVP (18.4) LVR (1.4) Fp (4.7) FDF (1.4) PVV (12.3) PRL (9.4) FN (0.5) VB (5.7)
1992-04-06	ITA	PRC (5.6) FdV (2.5) PDS (17.0) PSI (14.6) R (1.1) PSDI (2.5) PRI (4.3) DC (32.7) SVP (0.5) PLI (2.7) LN (8.7) MSI (5.4) LR (1.9) UV (0.2) LV (0.2) PP (0.2)
1992-04-09	GBR	Plaid (0.6) Lab (41.6) SNP (0.5) LD (3.1) Con (51.6) UUP+L (1.4) SDLP (0.6) DUP (0.5) UPUP (0.2)
1992-11-25	IRL	DLP (2.4) Greens (0.6) Lab (19.9) FF (41.0) FG (27.1) PD (6.0)
1993-03-21	FRA	PCF (4.0) PS (9.9) UDF (37.3) RPR (44.5) Droite (3.3) Gauche (1.0)
1993-06-06	ESP	HB (0.6) IL/PCE (5.1) ERC (0.3) PSOE (45.4) EA (0.3) CC (1.1) UV (0.3) PNV EAJ (1.4) CiU (4.9) PAR (0.3) PP (40.3)
1993-10-10	GRC	KKE (3.0) PASOK (56.7) ND (37.0) Pola (3.3)
1994-03-28	ITA	PRC (6.2) FdV (1.7) PDS (17.3) PSI (2.2) R (1.0) PI (2.1) AD (2.9) UDC (0.6) DC (5.2) SVP (0.5) CCD (4.6) FI (15.7) LN (18.6) AN (17.3) LR (1.0) PLD (0.3) UV (0.2) LAM (0.2)

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1994-05-03	NLD	SP (1.3) GL (3.3) PvdA (24.7) D66 (16.0) CDA (22.7) VVD (20.7) GPV (1.3) RPF (2.0) SGP (1.3) CD (2.0) AOV (4.0) Un55 (0.7)
1994-06-12	LUX	LSAP (28.3) CSV (35.0) ADR (8.3) DP (20.0) Greng (8.3)
1994-09-21	DNK	Enh (3.4) SF (7.4) Sd (35.4) RV (4.6) CD (2.9) KF (15.4) V (24.0) FrP (6.3)
1994-10-16	DEU	PDS (4.5) Grue (7.3) SPD (37.5) FDP (7.0) CDU (36.3) CSU (7.4)
1995-01-01	AUT	Grue (7.1) SPO (35.5) LF (6.0) OVP (28.4) FPO (23.0)
1995-01-01	FIN	VAS (9.5) VIHR (5.0) SSDP (24.0) L (0.5) KESK (27.5) RKP-SFP (6.0) SPP (3.5) KOK (20.0) KD (4.0)
1995-01-01	SWE	V (6.3) SAP (46.1) MP (5.2) Cp (7.7) FP (7.4) Kd (4.3) M (22.9)
1995-03-19	FIN	VAS (11.0) VIHR (4.5) SSDP (31.5) Eko (0.5) KESK (22.0) RKP-SFP (6.0) SPP (0.5) KOK (19.5) KD (3.5) NSP (1.0)
1995-05-21	BEL	Ecolo (4.0) Agalev (3.3) PS (14.0) BSP (13.3) PSC (8.0) CVP (19.3) Fp (3.3) PRL/FDF (12.0) PVV (14.0) FN (1.3) VB (7.3)
1995-10-01	PRT	CDU (6.5) PSP (48.7) PSD (38.3) PP (6.5)
1995-12-17	AUT	Grue (4.9) SPO (38.8) LF (5.5) OVP (28.4) FPO (21.9)
1996-03-03	ESP	HB (0.6) IL/PCE (6.0) BNG (0.6) ERC (0.3) PSOE (40.3) EA (0.3) CC (1.1) UV (0.3) PNV EAJ (1.4) CiU (4.6) PP (44.6)
1996-04-21	ITA	PRC (5.6) PCI (14.8) FdV (2.5) PDS (27.1) RI (4.1) DC (11.9) CCD (4.8) FI (19.5) LN (9.4) UV (0.2) LAM (0.2)
1996-09-22	GRC	KKE (3.7) SYN (3.3) DIKKI (3.0) PASOK (54.0) ND (36.0)
1997-05-01	GBR	Plaid (0.6) Lab (63.6) SNP (0.9) LD (7.0) Con (25.0) UUP (1.5) SDLP (0.5) SF (0.3) DUP (0.3) UKUP (0.2)
1997-05-25	FRA	PCF (6.4) PS (42.6) GE (1.4) UDF (18.9) RPR (24.1) Droite (1.4) FN (0.2) Gauche (5.0)
1997-06-06	IRL	SP (0.6) DLP (2.4) Greens (1.2) SF (0.6) Lab (10.2) FF (46.4) FG (32.5) PD (2.4)
1998-03-11	DNK	Enh (2.9) SF (7.4) Sd (36.0) RV (4.0) CD (4.6) KrF (2.3) KF (9.1) V (24.0) DF (7.4) FrP (2.3)
1998-05-06	NLD	SP (3.3) GL (7.3) PvdA (30.0) D66 (9.3) CDA (19.3) VVD (25.3) GPV (1.3) RPF (2.0) SGP (2.0)
1998-09-21	SWE	V (12.3) SAP (37.5) MP (4.6) Cp (5.2) FP (4.9) Kd (12.0) M (23.5)
1998-09-27	DEU	PDS (5.4) Grue (7.0) SPD (44.5) FDP (6.4) CDU (29.6) CSU (7.0)
1999-03-21	FIN	VAS (10.0) VIHR (5.5) SSDP (25.5) KESK (24.0) RKP-SFP (6.0) Rt (0.5) SPP (0.5) KOK (23.0) KD (5.0)
1999-06-13	BEL	Ecolo (7.3) Agalev (6.0) PS (12.7) BSP (9.3) PSC (6.7) CVP (14.7) Fp (5.3) PRL/FDF (12.0) PVV (15.3) FN (0.7) VB (10.0)
1999-06-13	LUX	DL (1.7) LSAP (21.7) CSV (31.7) ADR (11.7) DP (25.0) Greng (8.3)
1999-10-03	AUT	Grue (7.1) SPO (35.7) OVP (28.6) FPO (28.6)
1999-10-10	PRT	CDU (7.4) BdE (0.9) PSP (50.0) PSD (35.2) PP (6.5)
2000-03-12	ESP	IL/PCE (2.3) BNG (0.9) ICV (0.3) ERC (0.3) PSOE (35.7) EA (0.3) PA (0.3) CC (1.1) PNV EAJ (2.0) CiU (4.3) PP (52.3) CA (0.3)
2000-04-09	GRC	KKE (3.7) SYN (2.0) PASOK (52.7) ND (41.7)
2001-05-13	ITA	PIC (1.4) PRC (1.7) Giras (2.7) PDS (21.9) Marg (12.7) SVP (0.5) CCD/CDU (6.3) FI (28.3) LN (4.8) AN (15.7) N-PSI (0.5) UV (0.2)
2001-06-07	GBR	Plaid (0.6) Lab (62.5) SNP (0.8) LD (7.9) Con (25.2) UUP (0.9) DUP (0.8) SF (0.6) SDLP (0.5)
2001-11-20	DNK	Enh (2.3) SF (6.9) Sd (29.7) RV (5.1) KrF (2.3) KF (9.1) V (32.0) DF (12.6)
2002-03-17	PRT	CDU (5.2) BdE (1.3) PSP (41.7) PSD (45.7) PP (6.1)
2002-05-09	FRA	PCF (3.6) PS (24.4) GE (0.5) UDF (5.0) UMP (63.3) MF (0.2)
2002-05-15	IRL	SP (0.6) Greens (3.6) SF (3.0) Lab (12.7) FF (48.8) FG (18.7) PD (4.8)
2002-05-15	NLD	SP (6.0) GL (6.7) PvdA (15.3) D66 (4.7) CDA (28.7) CU (2.7) VVD (16.0) SGP (1.3) LPF (17.3) LN (1.3)
2002-09-15	SWE	V (8.6) SAP (41.3) MP (4.9) Cp (6.3) FP (13.8) Kd (9.5) M (15.8)

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2002-09-22	DEU	PDS (0.3) Grue (9.1) SPD (41.6) FDP (7.8) CDU (31.5) CSU (9.6)
2002-11-24	AUT	Grue (9.3) SPO (37.9) OVP (43.4) FPO (9.9)
2003-01-22	NLD	SP (6.0) GL (5.3) PvdA (28.0) D66 (4.0) CDA (29.3) CU (2.0) VVD (18.7) SGP (1.3) LPF (5.3)
2003-03-18	FIN	VAS (9.5) VIHR (7.0) SSDP (26.5) KESK (27.5) RKP-SFP (4.5) SPP (1.5) KOK (20.0) KD (3.5)
2003-05-18	BEL	Ecolo (2.7) PS (16.7) BSP (15.3) PSC (5.3) CD-V (14.0) N-VA (0.7) MR (16.0) PVV (16.7) FN (0.7) VB (12.0)
2004-03-07	GRC	KKE (4.0) SYN (2.0) PASOK (39.0) ND (55.0)
2004-03-14	ESP	IL/PCE (1.4) BNG (0.6) ERC (2.3) PSOE (46.9) EA (0.3) CC (0.9) PNV EAJ (2.0) CiU (2.9) PP (42.3) CA (0.3)

B.2 Council

Description Composition of national governments during EU membership as coded in Parl-Gov. Governments are ordered according to the starting date of a cabinet or the entry of the country into the EU. Parties are ordered from left to right. Seat share of party in parliament is provided in parenthesis. Party that holds the position of the prime minister in italic.

1958-01-01	BEL	*BSP-PSB* (41.0) LP-PL (12.0)
1958-01-01	DEU	DP (3.0) *CDU* (43.0) CSU (11.0)
1958-01-01	FRA	MRP (13.0) PS (16.0) *PRR/RS* (13.0) UNR (3.0) PRL (17.0)
1958-01-01	ITA	*DC* (45.0)
1958-01-01	LUX	LSAP (33.0) *CSV* (50.0)
1958-01-01	NLD	*PvdA* (33.0) ARP (10.0) CHU (9.0) KVP (33.0)
1958-03-29	LUX	LSAP (33.0) *CSV* (50.0)
1958-05-14	FRA	*MRP* (13.0) PS (16.0) PRR/RS (13.0) UNR (3.0) PRL (17.0)
1958-06-01	FRA	MRP (13.0) PS (16.0) PRR/RS (13.0) PRL (17.0)
1958-06-26	BEL	*PSC-CVP* (49.0)
1958-07-01	ITA	PSDI (4.0) *DC* (46.0)
1958-11-06	BEL	*PSC-CVP* (49.0) LP-PL (10.0)
1958-12-22	NLD	ARP (10.0) CHU (9.0) *KVP* (33.0)
1959-01-08	FRA	MRP (12.0) PRR/RS (5.0) *UNR* (43.0) PRL (29.0)
1959-02-15	ITA	*DC* (46.0)
1959-03-02	LUX	DP (21.0) *CSV* (40.0)
1959-05-19	NLD	ARP (9.0) CHU (8.0) *KVP* (33.0) VVD (13.0)
1960-03-25	ITA	*DC* (46.0)
1960-07-26	ITA	*DC* (46.0)
1960-09-03	BEL	*PSC-CVP* (49.0) LP-PL (10.0)
1961-04-25	BEL	BSP-PSB (40.0) *PSC-CVP* (45.0)
1961-11-14	DEU	FDP (13.0) *CDU* (39.0) CSU (10.0)
1962-02-21	ITA	PSDI (4.0) PRI (1.0) *DC* (46.0)
1962-04-14	FRA	MRP (12.0) UNR (43.0) PRL (29.0)

1962-12-06	FRA	UNR (49.0) IR (4.0)
1963-06-21	ITA	*DC* (41.0)
1963-07-24	NLD	ARP (9.0) CHU (9.0) *KVP* (33.0) VVD (11.0)
1963-10-16	DEU	FDP (13.0) *CDU* (39.0) CSU (10.0)
1963-12-04	ITA	PSI (14.0) PSDI (5.0) PRI (1.0) *DC* (41.0)
1964-07-15	LUX	LSAP (38.0) *CSV* (39.0)
1964-07-22	ITA	PSI (14.0) PSDI (5.0) PRI (1.0) *DC* (41.0)
1965-04-14	NLD	PvdA (29.0) ARP (9.0) *KVP* (33.0)
1965-07-28	BEL	BSP-PSB (30.0) *PSC-CVP* (36.0)
1965-10-26	DEU	FDP (10.0) *CDU* (39.0) CSU (9.0)
1966-01-08	FRA	UNR (49.0) IR (4.0)
1966-02-23	ITA	PSI (14.0) PSDI (5.0) PRI (1.0) *DC* (41.0)
1966-03-19	BEL	*PSC-CVP* (36.0) LP-PL (23.0)
1966-12-01	DEU	SPD (42.0) *CDU* (39.0) CSU (9.0)
1967-01-03	LUX	LSAP (38.0) *CSV* (39.0)
1967-04-05	NLD	ARP (10.0) CHU (8.0) *KVP* (28.0) VVD (11.0)
1967-04-06	FRA	*UNR* (41.0) IR (9.0)
1968-05-31	FRA	*UNR* (41.0) IR (9.0)
1968-06-17	BEL	BSP-PSB (28.0) PSC (9.0) *CVP* (24.0)
1968-06-24	ITA	*DC* (42.0)
1968-07-12	FRA	UNR (60.0) IR (14.0)
1968-12-12	ITA	PSU (14.0) PRI (1.0) *DC* (42.0)
1969-02-06	LUX	DP (20.0) *CSV* (38.0)
1969-06-20	FRA	CD (6.0) *UNR* (60.0) IR (14.0)
1969-08-08	ITA	*DC* (42.0)
1969-10-22	DEU	*SPD* (46.0) FDP (6.0)
1970-03-27	ITA	PSU (14.0) PRI (1.0) *DC* (42.0)
1970-08-06	ITA	PSU (14.0) PRI (1.0) *DC* (42.0)
1971-06-07	NLD	DS70 (5.0) *ARP* (9.0) CHU (7.0) KVP (23.0) VVD (11.0)
1972-01-21	BEL	BSP-PSB (29.0) PSC (9.0) *CVP* (22.0)
1972-02-17	ITA	*DC* (42.0)
1972-07-05	FRA	CD (6.0) *UNR* (60.0) IR (14.0)
1972-07-26	ITA	PSDI (5.0) *DC* (42.0) PLI (3.0)
1972-12-15	DEU	*SPD* (47.0) FDP (8.0)
1973-01-01	DNK	*Sd* (40.0)
1973-01-01	GBR	*Con* (52.0)
1973-01-01	IRL	*FF* (52.0)
1973-01-26	BEL	*BSP-PSB* (29.0) PSC (9.0) CVP (22.0) PVV (9.0) PRL (5.0)
1973-03-14	IRL	Lab (13.0) *FG* (38.0)
1973-04-02	FRA	CDP (4.0) *UNR* (38.0) IR (11.0)
1973-05-11	NLD	PPR (5.0) *PvdA* (29.0) D66 (4.0) ARP (9.0) KVP (18.0)
1973-07-07	ITA	PSI (10.0) PSDI (5.0) PRI (2.0) *DC* (42.0)
1973-10-04	BEL	RW (7.0) PSC (9.0) *CVP* (22.0) PVV (9.0) PRL (5.0)
1973-10-23	BEL	*BSP-PSB* (29.0) PSC (9.0) CVP (22.0) PVV (9.0) PRL (5.0)
1973-12-19	DNK	*V* (13.0)
1974-02-27	FRA	CDP (4.0) *UNR* (38.0) IR (11.0)
1974-03-04	GBR	*Lab* (47.0)
1974-03-14	ITA	PSI (10.0) PSDI (5.0) *DC* (42.0)

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1974-04-25	BEL	PSC (10.0) *CVP* (24.0) PVV (10.0) PRL (4.0)
1974-05-16	DEU	*SPD* (47.0) FDP (8.0)
1974-05-27	FRA	MR (6.0) CDP (4.0) *UNR* (38.0) IR (11.0)
1974-06-11	BEL	RW (6.0) PSC (10.0) *CVP* (24.0) PVV (10.0) PRL (4.0)
1974-06-15	LUX	*DP* (24.0) LSAP (29.0)
1974-10-18	GBR	*Lab* (50.0)
1974-11-23	ITA	PRI (2.0) *DC* (42.0)
1975-02-13	DNK	*Sd* (30.0)
1976-02-12	ITA	*DC* (42.0)
1976-04-05	GBR	*Lab* (50.0)
1976-07-29	ITA	*DC* (42.0)
1976-08-27	FRA	MR (6.0) UNR (38.0) IR (11.0)
1976-12-08	BEL	RW (6.0) PSC (10.0) *CVP* (24.0) PVV (10.0) PRL (4.0)
1976-12-15	DEU	*SPD* (43.0) FDP (8.0)
1977-03-04	BEL	PSC (10.0) *CVP* (24.0) PVV (10.0) PRL (4.0)
1977-03-30	FRA	MR (6.0) CDP (4.0) UNR (38.0) IR (11.0)
1977-06-03	BEL	BSP-PSB (29.0) PSC (11.0) *CVP* (26.0) Fp (9.0) FDF (5.0)
1977-07-05	IRL	*FF* (57.0)
1977-12-19	NLD	*CDA* (33.0) VVD (19.0)
1978-03-11	ITA	*DC* (42.0)
1978-08-30	DNK	*Sd* (37.0) V (12.0)
1978-10-20	BEL	BSP-PSB (29.0) *PSC* (11.0) CVP (26.0) Fp (9.0) FDF (5.0)
1978-10-31	FRA	*UDF* (26.0) RPR (30.0)
1979-03-20	ITA	PSDI (2.0) PRI (2.0) *DC* (42.0)
1979-04-03	BEL	PS (15.0) BSP (12.0) PSC (12.0) *CVP* (27.0) FDF (5.0)
1979-05-04	GBR	*Con* (53.0)
1979-07-16	LUX	DP (25.0) *CSV* (41.0)
1979-08-04	ITA	PSDI (3.0) *DC* (41.0) PLI (1.0)
1979-10-26	DNK	*Sd* (39.0)
1979-12-11	IRL	*FF* (57.0)
1980-04-04	ITA	PSI (10.0) PRI (2.0) *DC* (41.0)
1980-05-18	BEL	PS (15.0) BSP (12.0) PSC (12.0) *CVP* (27.0) PVV (10.0) PRL (7.0)
1980-10-18	ITA	PSI (10.0) PSDI (3.0) PRI (2.0) *DC* (41.0)
1980-10-22	BEL	PS (15.0) BSP (12.0) PSC (12.0) *CVP* (27.0)
1980-11-05	DEU	*SPD* (44.0) FDP (10.0)
1981-01-01	GRC	*ND* (57.0)
1981-04-06	BEL	PS (15.0) BSP (12.0) PSC (12.0) *CVP* (27.0)
1981-05-21	FRA	*PS* (22.0) MRG (2.0)
1981-06-22	FRA	PCF (9.0) *PS* (57.0) MRG (3.0)
1981-06-28	ITA	PSI (10.0) PSDI (3.0) *PRI* (2.0) DC (41.0) PLI (1.0)
1981-06-30	IRL	Lab (9.0) *FG* (39.0)
1981-09-11	NLD	PvdA (29.0) D66 (11.0) *CDA* (32.0)
1981-10-21	GRC	*PASOK* (57.0)
1981-12-17	BEL	PSC (8.0) *CVP* (20.0) PVV (13.0) PRL (11.0)
1981-12-30	DNK	*Sd* (34.0)
1982-03-09	IRL	*FF* (49.0)
1982-08-23	ITA	PSI (10.0) PSDI (3.0) *PRI* (2.0) DC (41.0) PLI (1.0)
1982-09-10	DNK	CD (9.0) KrF (2.0) *KF* (15.0) V (12.0)

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1982-10-01	DEU	FDP (10.0) *CDU* (36.0) CSU (10.0)
1982-11-04	NLD	*CDA* (30.0) VVD (24.0)
1982-12-01	ITA	PSI (10.0) PSDI (3.0) *DC* (41.0) PLI (1.0)
1982-12-14	IRL	Lab (10.0) *FG* (42.0)
1983-03-22	FRA	PCF (9.0) *PS* (57.0) MRG (3.0)
1983-03-30	DEU	FDP (7.0) *CDU* (39.0) CSU (10.0)
1983-06-11	GBR	*Con* (61.0)
1983-08-04	ITA	*PSI* (12.0) PSDI (4.0) PRI (5.0) DC (36.0) PLI (3.0)
1984-07-17	FRA	*PS* (57.0) MRG (3.0)
1984-07-20	LUX	LSAP (33.0) *CSV* (39.0)
1985-06-05	GRC	*PASOK* (54.0)
1985-07-26	GRC	*PASOK* (54.0)
1985-11-28	BEL	PSC (9.0) *CVP* (23.0) PVV (10.0) PRL (11.0)
1986-01-01	ESP	*PSOE* (58.0)
1986-01-01	PRT	*PSD* (35.0)
1986-03-20	FRA	UDF (23.0) *RPR* (26.0)
1986-07-14	NLD	*CDA* (36.0) VVD (18.0)
1986-07-25	ESP	*PSOE* (53.0)
1986-08-01	ITA	*PSI* (12.0) PSDI (4.0) PRI (5.0) DC (36.0) PLI (3.0)
1987-03-10	IRL	*FF* (49.0)
1987-03-11	DEU	FDP (9.0) *CDU* (36.0) CSU (9.0)
1987-04-17	ITA	*DC* (36.0)
1987-06-13	GBR	*Con* (58.0)
1987-07-28	ITA	PSI (15.0) PSDI (3.0) PRI (3.0) *DC* (37.0) PLI (2.0)
1987-08-17	PRT	*PSD* (59.0)
1987-09-10	DNK	CD (5.0) KrF (2.0) *KF* (22.0) V (11.0)
1987-10-21	BEL	PSC (9.0) *CVP* (23.0) PVV (10.0) PRL (11.0)
1988-04-13	ITA	PSI (15.0) PSDI (3.0) PRI (3.0) *DC* (37.0) PLI (2.0)
1988-05-09	BEL	PS (19.0) BSP (15.0) PSC (9.0) *CVP* (20.0) Fp (8.0)
1988-05-10	FRA	*PS* (36.0) UDF (23.0)
1988-06-03	DNK	RV (6.0) *KF* (20.0) V (13.0)
1988-06-23	FRA	*PS* (47.0) UDF (23.0)
1989-07-02	GRC	SYN (9.0) *ND* (48.0)
1989-07-12	IRL	*FF* (46.0) PD (4.0)
1989-07-14	LUX	LSAP (30.0) *CSV* (37.0)
1989-07-22	ITA	PSI (15.0) PSDI (3.0) PRI (3.0) *DC* (37.0) PLI (2.0)
1989-11-07	NLD	PvdA (33.0) *CDA* (36.0)
1989-11-23	GRC	PASOK (43.0) ND (49.0)
1989-12-05	ESP	*PSOE* (50.0)
1990-04-11	GRC	*ND* (50.0)
1990-11-28	GBR	*Con* (58.0)
1990-12-18	DNK	*KF* (17.0) V (17.0)
1991-01-18	DEU	FDP (12.0) *CDU* (40.0) CSU (8.0)
1991-04-12	ITA	PSI (15.0) PSDI (3.0) *DC* (37.0) PLI (2.0)
1991-05-15	FRA	*PS* (47.0)
1991-09-29	BEL	PS (19.0) BSP (15.0) PSC (9.0) *CVP* (20.0)
1991-10-31	PRT	*PSD* (58.0)
1992-02-11	IRL	*FF* (46.0) PD (4.0)

1992-03-07	BEL	PS (17.0) BSP (13.0) PSC (8.0) *CVP* (18.0)
1992-04-02	FRA	*PS* (47.0) MRG (2.0)
1992-04-10	GBR	*Con* (52.0)
1992-06-28	ITA	*PSI* (15.0) PSDI (3.0) DC (33.0) PLI (3.0)
1993-01-12	IRL	Lab (20.0) *FF* (41.0)
1993-01-25	DNK	*Sd* (39.0) RV (4.0) CD (5.0) KrF (2.0)
1993-03-29	FRA	UDF (37.0) *RPR* (45.0)
1993-04-28	ITA	PDS (17.0) PSI (15.0) PSDI (3.0) DC (33.0) PLI (3.0)
1993-07-09	ESP	*PSOE* (45.0)
1993-10-13	GRC	*PASOK* (57.0)
1994-05-10	ITA	UDC (1.0) CCD (5.0) *FI* (16.0) LN (19.0)
1994-07-13	LUX	LSAP (28.0) *CSV* (35.0)
1994-08-22	NLD	*PvdA* (25.0) D66 (16.0) VVD (21.0)
1994-09-27	DNK	*Sd* (35.0) RV (5.0) CD (3.0)
1994-11-17	DEU	FDP (7.0) *CDU* (36.0) CSU (7.0)
1994-12-15	IRL	DLP (2.0) Lab (20.0) *FG* (27.0)
1995-01-01	AUT	*SPO* (36.0) OVP (28.0)
1995-01-01	FIN	*KESK* (28.0) RKP-SFP (6.0) KOK (20.0)
1995-01-01	SWE	*SAP* (46.0)
1995-01-20	LUX	LSAP (28.0) *CSV* (35.0)
1995-04-13	FIN	VIHR (4.0) *SSDP* (32.0) RKP-SFP (6.0) KOK (20.0)
1995-05-17	FRA	UDF (37.0) *RPR* (45.0)
1995-06-23	BEL	PS (14.0) BSP (13.0) PSC (8.0) *CVP* (19.0)
1995-10-28	PRT	*PSP* (49.0)
1995-11-06	FRA	UDF (37.0) *RPR* (45.0)
1996-01-22	GRC	*PASOK* (57.0)
1996-03-12	AUT	*SPO* (39.0) OVP (28.0)
1996-03-21	SWE	*SAP* (46.0)
1996-05-05	ESP	*PP* (45.0)
1996-05-17	ITA	FdV (3.0) PDS (27.0) RI (4.0) DC (12.0)
1996-09-24	GRC	*PASOK* (54.0)
1996-12-30	DNK	*Sd* (35.0) RV (5.0)
1997-01-28	AUT	*SPO* (39.0) OVP (28.0)
1997-05-02	GBR	*Lab* (64.0)
1997-06-02	FRA	Gauche (5.0) PCF (6.0) *PS* (43.0) GE (1.0)
1997-06-20	IRL	*FF* (46.0) PD (2.0)
1998-03-23	DNK	*Sd* (36.0) RV (4.0)
1998-08-03	NLD	*PvdA* (30.0) D66 (9.0) VVD (25.0)
1998-10-07	SWE	*SAP* (38.0)
1998-10-21	ITA	PRC (6.0) FdV (3.0) *PDS* (27.0) RI (4.0) DC (12.0)
1998-10-27	DEU	Grue (7.0) *SPD* (45.0)
1999-04-15	FIN	VAS (10.0) VIHR (6.0) *SSDP* (26.0) RKP-SFP (6.0) KOK (23.0)
1999-07-12	BEL	Ecolo (7.0) Agalev (6.0) PS (13.0) BSP (9.0) PRL/FDF (12.0) *PVV* (15.0)
1999-08-07	LUX	DP (25.0) *CSV* (32.0)
1999-10-25	PRT	*PSP* (50.0)
1999-12-22	ITA	PRC (6.0) FdV (3.0) *PDS* (27.0) RI (4.0) DC (12.0) CCD (5.0)
2000-02-04	AUT	*OVP* (29.0) FPO (29.0)
2000-03-27	FRA	Gauche (5.0) PCF (6.0) *PS* (43.0) GE (1.0)

2000-04-13	GRC	*PASOK* (53.0)
2000-04-25	ITA	PRC (6.0) FdV (3.0) PDS (27.0) RI (4.0) DC (12.0) CCD (5.0)
2000-04-26	ESP	*PP* (52.0)
2001-05-31	ITA	*FI* (28.0) LN (5.0)
2001-06-08	GBR	*Lab* (63.0)
2001-11-27	DNK	KF (9.0) *V* (32.0)
2002-04-06	PRT	*PSD* (46.0) PP (6.0)
2002-05-06	FRA	UDF (19.0) *RPR* (24.0)
2002-06-06	IRL	*FF* (49.0) PD (5.0)
2002-06-17	FRA	UDF (5.0) *UMP* (63.0)
2002-07-21	NLD	*CDA* (29.0) VVD (16.0) LPF (17.0)
2002-10-21	SWE	*SAP* (41.0)
2002-10-22	DEU	Grue (9.0) *SPD* (42.0)
2003-02-28	AUT	*OVP* (43.0) FPO (10.0)
2003-04-17	FIN	SSDP (27.0) *KESK* (28.0) RKP-SFP (4.0)
2003-05-27	NLD	D66 (4.0) *CDA* (29.0) VVD (19.0)
2003-06-24	FIN	SSDP (27.0) *KESK* (28.0) RKP-SFP (4.0)
2003-07-12	BEL	PS (17.0) BSP (15.0) MR (16.0) *PVV* (17.0)
2003-10-19	FRA	UDF (5.0) *UMP* (63.0)
2004-03-10	GRC	*ND* (55.0)
2004-04-17	ESP	*PSOE* (47.0)

B.3 European Parliament

Description   Party composition of the EP from the first elections in 1979 to the Eastern enlargement (ParlGov database). Parties are ordered from left to right. National seat share and EP seat share are provided in parenthesis.

1979-06-10	BEL	PS (16.7, 1.0) BSP (12.5, 0.7) RW (8.3, 0.5) PSC (12.5, 0.7) CVP (29.2, 1.7) N-VA (4.2, 0.2) PVV (8.3, 0.5) PRL (8.3, 0.5)
	DEU	SPD (43.2, 8.5) FDP (4.9, 1.0) CDU (42.0, 8.3) CSU (9.9, 2.0)
	DNK	Fobe (25.0, 1.0) SF (6.2, 0.2) Sd (18.8, 0.7) CD (6.2, 0.2) KF (18.8, 0.7) V (18.8, 0.7) FrP (6.2, 0.2)
	FRA	PCF (23.5, 4.6) PS (27.2, 5.4) UDF (30.9, 6.1) RPR (18.5, 3.7)
	GBR	Lab (20.7, 4.1) SNP (1.2, 0.2) SDP (1.2, 0.2) Lib (1.2, 0.2) Con (73.2, 14.6) UUP (1.2, 0.2) DUP (1.2, 0.2)
	IRL	Lab (26.7, 1.0) FF (33.3, 1.2) FG (26.7, 1.0)
	ITA	DP (1.2, 0.2) PCI (30.0, 5.9) PSI (11.2, 2.2) R (3.8, 0.7) PSDI (5.0, 1.0) PRI (2.5, 0.5) DC (36.2, 7.1) SVP (1.2, 0.2) PLI (3.8, 0.7) MSI (5.0, 1.0)
	LUX	LSAP (16.7, 0.2) CSV (50.0, 0.7) DP (33.3, 0.5)
	NLD	PvdA (36.0, 2.2) D66 (8.0, 0.5) CDA (40.0, 2.4) VVD (16.0, 1.0)

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1981-01-01	GRC	KKE (12.5, 0.7) SYN (4.2, 0.2) PASOK (41.7, 2.3) ND (33.3, 1.8) EPEN (4.2, 0.2) KODISO (4.2, 0.2)
1984-06-17	BEL	Ecolo (4.2, 0.2) Agalev (4.2, 0.2) PS (20.8, 1.2) BSP (16.7, 0.9) PSC (8.3, 0.5) CVP (16.7, 0.9) N-VA (8.3, 0.5) PVV (8.3, 0.5) PRL (12.5, 0.7)
	DEU	Grue (8.6, 1.6) SPD (40.7, 7.6) CDU (42.0, 7.8) CSU (8.6, 1.6)
	DNK	Fobe (25.0, 0.9) SF (12.5, 0.5) Sd (18.8, 0.7) CD (6.2, 0.2) KF (25.0, 0.9) V (12.5, 0.5)
	FRA	PCF (12.3, 2.3) PS (24.7, 4.6) UDF (50.6, 9.4) FN (12.3, 2.3)
	GBR	Lab (39.5, 7.4) SNP (1.2, 0.2) SDP (1.2, 0.2) Con (55.6, 10.4) UUP (1.2, 0.2) DUP (1.2, 0.2)
	GRC	KKE (12.5, 0.7) SYN (4.2, 0.2) PASOK (41.7, 2.3) ND (37.5, 2.1) EPEN (4.2, 0.2)
	IRL	FF (53.3, 1.8) FG (40.0, 1.4)
	ITA	DP (1.2, 0.2) PCI (33.3, 6.2) PSI (11.1, 2.1) R (3.7, 0.7) PSA (1.2, 0.2) PSDI (3.7, 0.7) DC (32.1, 6.0) SVP (1.2, 0.2) MSI (6.2, 1.2) LibRep (6.2, 1.2)
	LUX	LSAP (33.3, 0.5) CSV (50.0, 0.7) DP (16.7, 0.2)
	NLD	GL (8.0, 0.5) PvdA (36.0, 2.1) CDA (32.0, 1.8) VVD (20.0, 1.2) SGP (4.0, 0.2)
1986-01-01	ESP	IL/PCE (5.0, 0.6) PSOE (46.7, 5.4) EA (1.7, 0.2) CDS (11.7, 1.4) CiU (5.0, 0.6) PP (28.3, 3.3) CEP (1.7, 0.2)
	PRT	PCP (12.5, 0.6) PSP (25.0, 1.2) PSD (41.7, 1.9) PP (16.7, 0.8) PRD (4.2, 0.2)
1989-06-18	BEL	Ecolo (8.3, 0.4) Agalev (4.2, 0.2) PS (20.8, 1.0) BSP (12.5, 0.6) PSC (8.3, 0.4) CVP (20.8, 1.0) N-VA (4.2, 0.2) PVV (8.3, 0.4) PRL (8.3, 0.4) VB (4.2, 0.2)
	DEU	Grue (9.9, 1.5) SPD (38.3, 6.0) FDP (4.9, 0.8) CDU (30.9, 4.8) CSU (8.6, 1.4) Rep (7.4, 1.2)
	DNK	Fobe (25.0, 0.8) SF (6.2, 0.2) Sd (25.0, 0.8) CD (12.5, 0.4) KF (12.5, 0.4) V (18.8, 0.6)
	ESP	IL/PCE (6.7, 0.8) PSOE (45.0, 5.2) EA (1.7, 0.2) PA (1.7, 0.2) CDS (8.3, 1.0) CiU (3.3, 0.4) PP (25.0, 2.9) AERM (3.3, 0.4) CN (1.7, 0.2) CEP (1.7, 0.2)
	FRA	PCF (8.6, 1.4) PS (27.2, 4.2) V (11.1, 1.7) UDF (32.1, 5.0) RPR (8.6, 1.4) FN (12.3, 1.9)
	GBR	Lab (55.6, 8.7) SNP (1.2, 0.2) SDP (1.2, 0.2) Con (39.5, 6.2) UUP (1.2, 0.2) DUP (1.2, 0.2)
	GRC	KKE (16.7, 0.8) PASOK (37.5, 1.7) ND (41.7, 1.9) DIANA (4.2, 0.2)
	IRL	WP (6.7, 0.2) Lab (6.7, 0.2) FF (40.0, 1.2) FG (26.7, 0.8) PD (6.7, 0.2)
	ITA	DP (1.2, 0.2) PCI (27.2, 4.2) FdV (6.2, 1.0) PSI (14.8, 2.3) R (1.2, 0.2) PSA (1.2, 0.2) PSDI (2.5, 0.4) PRI (2.5, 0.4) DC (32.1, 5.0) SVP (1.2, 0.2) PLI (1.2, 0.2) LN (2.5, 0.4) MSI (4.9, 0.8) Lad (1.2, 0.2)
	LUX	LSAP (33.3, 0.4) CSV (50.0, 0.6) DP (16.7, 0.2)
	NLD	GL (8.0, 0.4) PvdA (32.0, 1.5) D66 (4.0, 0.2) CDA (40.0, 1.9) VVD (12.0, 0.6) SGP (4.0, 0.2)
	PRT	PCP (16.7, 0.8) PSP (33.3, 1.5) PSD (37.5, 1.7) PP (12.5, 0.6)
1994-06-12	BEL	Ecolo (4.0, 0.2) Agalev (4.0, 0.2) PS (12.0, 0.6) BSP (12.0, 0.6) PSC (8.0, 0.4) CD-V (16.0, 0.8) N-VA (4.0, 0.2) PVV (12.0, 0.6) PRL (12.0, 0.6) FN (4.0, 0.2) VB (8.0, 0.4) CSP (4.0, 0.2)
	DEU	Grue (12.1, 2.3) SPD (40.4, 7.7) CDU (39.4, 7.5) CSU (8.1, 1.5)
	DNK	Fobe (12.5, 0.4) JuBe (12.5, 0.4) SF (6.2, 0.2) Sd (18.8, 0.6) RV (6.2, 0.2) KF (18.8, 0.6) V (25.0, 0.8)
	ESP	IL/PCE (14.1, 1.7) PSOE (34.4, 4.2) CiU (4.7, 0.6) PP (43.8, 5.4) CN (3.1, 0.4)
	FRA	PCF (8.0, 1.4) PS (17.2, 2.9) UDF (32.2, 5.4) FN (12.6, 2.1) ER/PRG (14.9, 2.5) MpaE (14.9, 2.5)
	GBR	Lab (71.3, 12.0) SNP (2.3, 0.4) SDP (1.1, 0.2) LD (2.3, 0.4) Con (20.7, 3.5) UUP (1.1, 0.2) DUP (1.1, 0.2)
	GRC	KKE (8.0, 0.4) SYN (8.0, 0.4) PASOK (40.0, 1.9) ND (36.0, 1.7) Pola (8.0, 0.4)
	IRL	Greens (13.3, 0.4) Lab (6.7, 0.2) FF (46.7, 1.4) FG (26.7, 0.8)
	ITA	PRC (5.7, 1.0) FdV (3.4, 0.6) PDS (18.4, 3.1) PSI (2.3, 0.4) R (2.3, 0.4) PI (3.4, 0.6) PSDI (1.1, 0.2) PRI (1.1, 0.2) DC (9.2, 1.5) SVP (1.1, 0.2) FI (31.0, 5.2) LN (6.9, 1.2) MSI (12.6, 2.1) LR (1.1, 0.2)
	LUX	LSAP (33.3, 0.4) CSV (33.3, 0.4) DP (16.7, 0.2) Greng (16.7, 0.2)

	NLD	GL (3.2, 0.2) PvdA (25.8, 1.5) D66 (12.9, 0.8) CDA (32.3, 1.9) VVD (19.4, 1.2) GPV (3.2, 0.2) SGP (3.2, 0.2)
	PRT	PCP (12.0, 0.6) PSP (40.0, 1.9) PSD (36.0, 1.7) PP (12.0, 0.6)
1995-01-01	AUT	Grue (4.8, 0.2) SPO (28.6, 1.0) LF (4.8, 0.2) OVP (33.3, 1.1) FPO (28.6, 1.0)
	FIN	VAS (12.5, 0.3) VIHR (6.2, 0.2) SSDP (25.0, 0.6) KESK (25.0, 0.6) RKP-SFP (6.2, 0.2) KOK (25.0, 0.6)
	SWE	V (13.6, 0.5) SAP (31.8, 1.1) MP (18.2, 0.6) Cp (9.1, 0.3) FP (4.5, 0.2) M (22.7, 0.8)
1999-06-13	AUT	Grue (9.5, 0.3) SPO (33.3, 1.1) OVP (33.3, 1.1) FPO (23.8, 0.8)
	BEL	Ecolo (12.0, 0.5) Agalev (8.0, 0.3) PS (12.0, 0.5) BSP (8.0, 0.3) PSC (4.0, 0.2) CD-V (12.0, 0.5) N-VA (8.0, 0.3) PVV (12.0, 0.5) PRL (12.0, 0.5) VB (8.0, 0.3) CSP (4.0, 0.2)
	DEU	Links (6.1, 1.0) Grue (7.1, 1.1) SPD (33.3, 5.3) CDU (43.4, 6.9) CSU (10.1, 1.6)
	DNK	Fobe (6.2, 0.2) JuBe (18.8, 0.5) SF (6.2, 0.2) Sd (18.8, 0.5) RV (6.2, 0.2) KF (6.2, 0.2) V (31.2, 0.8) DF (6.2, 0.2)
	ESP	HB (1.6, 0.2) IL/PCE (6.2, 0.6) BNG (1.6, 0.2) PSOE (37.5, 3.8) PA (3.1, 0.3) CiU (4.7, 0.5) PP (42.2, 4.3) CEP (3.1, 0.3)
	FIN	VAS (6.2, 0.2) VIHR (12.5, 0.3) SSDP (18.8, 0.5) KESK (25.0, 0.6) RKP-SFP (6.2, 0.2) KOK (25.0, 0.6) KD (6.2, 0.2)
	FRA	PCF (6.9, 1.0) PS (25.3, 3.5) V (10.3, 1.4) UDF (10.3, 1.4) RPR (13.8, 1.9) CPNT (6.9, 1.0) FN (5.7, 0.8) MpaE (14.9, 2.1) PSU (5.7, 0.8)
	GBR	GP (2.3, 0.3) Lab (33.3, 4.6) SNP (4.6, 0.6) SDP (1.1, 0.2) LD (11.5, 1.6) UKIP (3.4, 0.5) Con (41.4, 5.8) UUP (1.1, 0.2) DUP (1.1, 0.2)
	GRC	KKE (12.0, 0.5) SYN (8.0, 0.3) DIKKI (8.0, 0.3) PASOK (36.0, 1.4) ND (36.0, 1.4)
	IRL	Greens (13.3, 0.3) Lab (6.7, 0.2) FF (40.0, 1.0) FG (26.7, 0.6)
	ITA	PRC (4.6, 0.6) FdV (2.3, 0.3) PDS (17.2, 2.4) PSI (2.3, 0.3) R (8.0, 1.1) ID (6.9, 1.0) PRI (1.1, 0.2) RI (1.1, 0.2) DC (4.6, 0.6) SVP (1.1, 0.2) CCD (2.3, 0.3) CDU (2.3, 0.3) FI (25.3, 3.5) LN (4.6, 0.6) AN (10.3, 1.4) MSFT (1.1, 0.2) CI (2.3, 0.3) UDEUR (1.1, 0.2) PP (1.1, 0.2)
	LUX	LSAP (33.3, 0.3) CSV (33.3, 0.3) DP (16.7, 0.2) Greng (16.7, 0.2)
	NLD	SP (3.2, 0.2) GL (12.9, 0.6) PvdA (19.4, 1.0) D66 (6.5, 0.3) CDA (29.0, 1.4) VVD (19.4, 1.0) GPV (3.2, 0.2) RPF (3.2, 0.2) SGP (3.2, 0.2)
	PRT	PCP (8.0, 0.3) PSP (48.0, 1.9) PSD (36.0, 1.4) PP (8.0, 0.3)
	SWE	V (13.6, 0.5) SAP (27.3, 1.0) MP (9.1, 0.3) Cp (4.5, 0.2) FP (13.6, 0.5) Kd (9.1, 0.3) M (22.7, 0.8)
2004-06-13	AUT	Grue (11.1, 0.3) SPO (38.9, 1.0) OVP (33.3, 0.8) FPO (5.6, 0.1) HPML (11.1, 0.3)
	BEL	Ecolo (4.2, 0.1) Agalev (4.2, 0.1) PS (12.5, 0.4) BSP (16.7, 0.5) PSC (4.2, 0.1) CD-V (16.7, 0.5) PVV (12.5, 0.4) PRL (12.5, 0.4) VB (12.5, 0.4) CSP (4.2, 0.1)
	CYP	AKEL (33.3, 0.3) DIKO (16.7, 0.1) DISY (33.3, 0.3) GTE (16.7, 0.1)
	CZE	KSCM (25.0, 0.8) CSSD (8.3, 0.3) KDU/CSL (8.3, 0.3) ODS (37.5, 1.2) SNK-ED (12.5, 0.4)
	DEU	Links (7.1, 1.0) Grue (13.1, 1.8) SPD (23.2, 3.1) FDP (7.1, 1.0) CSU (49.5, 6.7)
	DNK	Fobe (7.1, 0.1) JuBe (7.1, 0.1) SF (7.1, 0.1) Sd (35.7, 0.7) RV (7.1, 0.1) KF (7.1, 0.1) V (21.4, 0.4) DF (7.1, 0.1)
	ESP	IL/PCE (3.7, 0.3) PSOE (46.3, 3.4) PA (5.6, 0.4) PP (42.6, 3.1) CEP (1.9, 0.1)
	EST	EK (16.7, 0.1) ESDP (50.0, 0.4) I (16.7, 0.1) ERe (16.7, 0.1)
	FIN	VAS (7.1, 0.1) VIHR (7.1, 0.1) SSDP (21.4, 0.4) KESK (28.6, 0.5) RKP-SFP (7.1, 0.1) KOK (28.6, 0.5)
	FRA	PCF (2.6, 0.3) PS (39.7, 4.2) V (7.7, 0.8) UDF (14.1, 1.5) UMP (21.8, 2.3) MF (3.8, 0.4) FN (9.0, 1.0)
	GBR	GP (2.6, 0.3) Lab (24.4, 2.6) SNP (3.8, 0.4) LD (15.4, 1.6) UKIP (15.4, 1.6) Con (34.6, 3.7) UUP (1.3, 0.1) SF (1.3, 0.1) DUP (1.3, 0.1)
	GRC	KKE (12.5, 0.4) SYN (4.2, 0.1) PASOK (33.3, 1.1) ND (45.8, 1.5) LAOS (4.2, 0.1)

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HUN	MSZP (37.5, 1.2) SzDSz (8.3, 0.3) Fidesz-MPSz (50.0, 1.6) MDF (4.2, 0.1)
IRL	SF (7.7, 0.1) Lab (7.7, 0.1) FF (30.8, 0.5) FG (38.5, 0.7)
ITA	PRC (6.4, 0.7) FdV (2.6, 0.3) PDS (11.5, 1.2) R (2.6, 0.3) UDC (6.4, 0.7) FI (20.5, 2.2) LN (5.1, 0.5) MSFT (1.3, 0.1) Ulivo (32.1, 3.4) CI (2.6, 0.3) N-PSI (2.6, 0.3) SC/DP/IV (2.6, 0.3) UDEUR (1.3, 0.1) PP (1.3, 0.1) AS (1.3, 0.1)
LTU	LSDP (15.4, 0.3) VNDS (7.7, 0.1) LiCS (15.4, 0.3) LDP (7.7, 0.1) TS-LK (15.4, 0.3) DP (38.5, 0.7)
LUX	LSAP (16.7, 0.1) CSV (50.0, 0.4) DP (16.7, 0.1) Greng (16.7, 0.1)
LVA	PCTVL (11.1, 0.1) LC (11.1, 0.1) JL (22.2, 0.3) TB/LNNK (44.4, 0.5) TP (11.1, 0.1)
MLT	MLP (60.0, 0.4) PN (40.0, 0.3)
NLD	SP (7.4, 0.3) GL (7.4, 0.3) PvdA (25.9, 1.0) D66 (3.7, 0.1) CDA (25.9, 1.0) CU (3.7, 0.1) VVD (14.8, 0.5) SGP (3.7, 0.1) EuTr (7.4, 0.3)
POL	SLD/UP (9.3, 0.7) PSL (7.4, 0.5) S (11.1, 0.8) UW (7.4, 0.5) PO (27.8, 2.0) PiS (13.0, 1.0) LPR (18.5, 1.4) SDPL (5.6, 0.4)
PRT	PCP (8.3, 0.3) BdE (4.2, 0.1) PSP (50.0, 1.6) PSD (37.5, 1.2)
SVK	Smer (21.4, 0.4) HZD (21.4, 0.4) SMK-MKP (14.3, 0.3) KDH (21.4, 0.4) SDKU (21.4, 0.4)
SVN	SD (14.3, 0.1) LDS (28.6, 0.3) SDS (28.6, 0.3) Nsi (28.6, 0.3)
SWE	V (10.5, 0.3) SAP (26.3, 0.7) MP (5.3, 0.1) Cp (5.3, 0.1) FP (10.5, 0.3) Kd (5.3, 0.1) M (21.1, 0.5) Jl (15.8, 0.4)

B.4 Commission

Description Members of the College of Commissioners and their party affiliation (ParlGov database). Commissioners are ordered by their starting date at the College and their last name. Parenthesis provide the party affiliation.

1958-01-10	Hallstein I	BEL	Rey, J. (PRL)
		DEU	Groeben, H. (CDU), Hallstein, W. (CDU)
		FRA	Lemaignen, R. (none), Marjolin, R. (PS)
		ITA	Malvestiti, P. (DC), Petrilli, G. (DC), Caron, G. (DC), Levi Sandri, L. (PSI)
		LUX	Schaus, L. (CSV)
		NLD	Mansholt, S. (PvdA)
1962-01-10	Hallstein II	BEL	Rey, J. (PRL)
		DEU	Groeben, H. (CDU), Hallstein, W. (CDU)
		FRA	Marjolin, R. (none), Rochereau, H. (none)
		ITA	Caron, G. (DC), Levi Sandri, L. (PSI), Paliano, G. (none)
		LUX	Schaus, L. (CSV)
		NLD	Mansholt, S. (PvdA)
1967-07-06	Rey	BEL	Coppe, A. (CVP), Rey, J. (PRL)
		DEU	Groeben, H. (CDU), Haferkamp, W. (SPD), Hellwig, F. (CDU)
		FRA	Barre, R. (none), Deniau, J. (UDF), Rochereau, H. (none)

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	ITA	Levi Sandri, L. (PSI), Martino, E. (DC), Paliano, G. (none)	
	LUX	Bodson, V. (LSAP)	
	NLD	Mansholt, S. (PvdA), Sassen, E. (KVP)	
1970-07-01	Malfatti	BEL	Coppe, A. (CVP)
	DEU	Dahrendorf, R. (FDP), Haferkamp, W. (SPD)	
	FRA	Barre, R. (none), Deniau, J. (UDF)	
	ITA	Malfatti, F. (DC), Spinelli, A. (PSI), Scarascia-Mugnozza, C. (DC)	
	LUX	Borschette, A. (none)	
	NLD	Mansholt, S. (PvdA)	
1973-01-06	Ortoli	BEL	Simonet, H. (BSP-PSB)
	DEU	Dahrendorf, R. (FDP), Haferkamp, W. (SPD), Brunner, G. (FDP)	
	DNK	Gundelach, F. (none)	
	FRA	Deniau, J. (UDF), Ortoli, F. (UDT), Cheysson, C. (PS)	
	GBR	Soames, C. (Con), Thomson, G. (Lab)	
	IRL	Hillery, P. (FF)	
	ITA	Scarascia-Mugnozza, C. (DC), Spinelli, A. (PSI), Guazzaroni, C. (none)	
	LUX	Borschette, A. (none), Vouel, R. (LSAP)	
	NLD	Lardinois, P. (KVP)	
1977-01-06	Jenkins	BEL	Davignon, E. (none)
	DEU	Brunner, G. (FDP), Haferkamp, W. (SPD)	
	DNK	Gundelach, F. (none)	
	FRA	Cheysson, C. (PS), Ortoli, F. (UDT)	
	GBR	Jenkins, R. (Lab), Tugendhat, C. (Con)	
	IRL	Burke, R. (FG)	
	ITA	Giolitti, A. (PSI), Natali, L. (DC)	
	LUX	Vouel, R. (LSAP)	
	NLD	Vredeling, H. (PvdA)	
1981-01-06	Thorn	BEL	Davignon, E. (none)
	DEU	Haferkamp, W. (SPD), Narjes, K. (CDU)	
	DNK	Gundelach, F. (none), Dalsager, P. (Sd)	
	FRA	Cheysson, C. (PS), Ortoli, F. (UDT), Pisani, E. (PS)	
	GBR	Richard, I. (Lab), Tugendhat, C. (Con)	
	GRC	Contogeorgis, G. (ND)	
	IRL	O'Kennedy, M. (FF), Burke, R. (FG)	
	ITA	Giolitti, A. (PSI), Natali, L. (DC)	
	LUX	Thorn, G. (DP)	
	NLD	Andriessen, F. (CDA)	
1985-01-06	Delors I	BEL	Clercq, W. (PVV-PLP)
	DEU	Narjes, K. (CDU), Pfeiffer, A. (SPD), Schmidhuber, P. (CSU)	
	DNK	Christophersen, H. (V)	
	ESP	Marin, M. (PSOE), Matutes, A. (PP)	
	FRA	Cheysson, C. (PS), Delors, J. (PS)	
	GBR	Clinton Davis, S. (Lab), Cockfield, F. (Con)	
	GRC	Varfis, G. (PASOK)	
	IRL	Sutherland, P. (FG)	
	ITA	Natali, L. (DC), Ripa di Meana, C. (PSI)	
	LUX	Mosar, N. (CSV)	
	NLD	Andriessen, F. (CDA)	

		PRT	Cardoso e Cunha, A. (PSD)
1989-01-06	Delors II	BEL	Miert, K. (BSP)
		DEU	Bangemann, M. (FDP), Schmidhuber, P. (CSU)
		DNK	Christophersen, H. (V)
		ESP	Marin, M. (PSOE), Matutes, A. (PP)
		FRA	Delors, J. (PS), Scrivener, C. (UDF)
		GBR	Brittan, L. (Con), Millan, B. (Lab)
		GRC	Papandreou, V. (PASOK)
		IRL	McSharry, R. (FF)
		ITA	Pandolfi, F. (DC), Ripa di Meana, C. (PSI)
		LUX	Dondelinger, J. (LSAP)
		NLD	Andriessen, F. (CDA)
		PRT	Cardoso e Cunha, A. (PSD)
1993-01-06	Delors III	BEL	Miert, K. (BSP)
		DEU	Bangemann, M. (FDP), Schmidhuber, P. (CSU)
		DNK	Christophersen, H. (V)
		ESP	Marin, M. (PSOE), Matutes, A. (PP), Oreja Aguirre, M. (PP)
		FRA	Delors, J. (PS), Scrivener, C. (UDF)
		GBR	Brittan, L. (Con), Millan, B. (Lab)
		GRC	Paleokrassas, I. (ND)
		IRL	Flynn, P. (FF)
		ITA	Ruberti, A. (PSI), Vanni D'Archirafi, R. (none)
		LUX	Steichen, R. (CSV)
		NLD	Broek, H. (CDA)
		PRT	Pinheiro, J. (PSD)
1995-01-06	Santer	AUT	Fischler, F. (OVP)
		BEL	Miert, K. (BSP)
		DEU	Bangemann, M. (FDP), Wulf-Mathies, M. (SPD)
		DNK	Bjerregaard, R. (Sd)
		ESP	Marin, M. (PSOE), Oreja Aguirre, M. (PP)
		FIN	Liikanen, E. (SSDP)
		FRA	Cresson, E. (PS), Silguy, Y. (RPR)
		GBR	Brittan, L. (Con), Kinnock, N. (Lab)
		GRC	Papaoutsis, C. (PASOK)
		IRL	Flynn, P. (FF)
		ITA	Bonino, E. (Pann), Monti, M. (none)
		LUX	Santer, J. (CSV)
		NLD	Broek, H. (CDA)
		PRT	Pinheiro, J. (PSD)
		SWE	Gradin, A. (SAP)
1999-09-16	Prodi	AUT	Fischler, F. (OVP)
		BEL	Busquin, P. (PS), Michel, L. (MR)
		DEU	Schreyer, M. (Grue), Verheugen, G. (SPD)
		DNK	Nielson, P. (Sd)
		ESP	Lo. (PP), Solbes, P. (PSOE), Almunia, J. (PSOE)
		FIN	Liikanen, E. (SSDP), Rehn, O. (KESK)
		FRA	Barnier, M. (RPR), Barrot, J. (UDF), Lamy, P. (PS)
		GBR	Kinnock, N. (Lab), Patten, C. (Con)

		GRC	Diamantopoulou, A. (PASOK), Dimas, S. (ND)
		IRL	Byrne, D. (FF)
		ITA	Monti, M. (none), Prodi, R. (Ulivo)
		LUX	Reding, V. (CSV)
		NLD	Bolkestein, F. (VVD)
		PRT	Vitorino, A. (PSP)
		SWE	Wallstroem, M. (SAP)
2004-11-22	Barroso	AUT	Ferrero-Waldner, B. (FPO)
		BEL	Michel, L. (MR)
		BGR	Me. (NDSV)
		CYP	Kyprianou, M. (DIKO), Kyprianou, M. (DIKO), Vassiliou, A. (KED)
		CZE	Splida, V. (CSSD)
		DEU	Verheugen, G. (SPD)
		DNK	Fischer Boel, M. (V)
		ESP	Almunia, J. (PSOE)
		EST	Kallas, S. (ERe)
		FIN	Rehn, O. (KESK)
		FRA	Barrot, J. (UDF)
		GBR	Ashton, C. (Lab), Mandelson, P. (Lab)
		GRC	Dimas, S. (ND)
		HUN	Kovacs, L. (MSZP)
		IRL	McCreevy, C. (FF)
		ITA	Frattini, F. (FI), Tajani, A. (FI)
		LTU	Grybauskaite, D. (none)
		LUX	Reding, V. (CSV)
		LVA	Piebalgs, A. (LC)
		MLT	Borg, J. (PN)
		NLD	Kroes, N. (VVD)
		POL	Huebner, D. (none)
		PRT	Barroso, J. (PSD)
		ROU	Le. (none)
		SVK	Figel, J. (KDH)
		SVN	Potocnik, J. (none)
		SWE	Wallstroem, M. (SAP)

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