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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, D-53113 Bonn
https://www.coll.mpg.de

Overlapping-Generations Economies under Uncertainty: Dynamic Inefficiency/Efficiency with Multiple Assets and no Labour*

Martin F. Hellwig
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, D-53113 Bonn, Germany
hellwig@coll.mpg.de

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Abstract

The paper gives conditions for efficiency and inefficiency of equilibrium allocations in an overlapping-generations model with a constant rate of population growth and with multiple assets, but without labour. Optimal portfolio choice implies that, for any period and history up to that period, the conditional certainty equivalents of the one-period-ahead marginal rates of return must be the same for all assets that are held in positive amounts. The efficiency or inefficiency of equilibrium allocations depends on whether this common conditional certainty equivalent of returns on assets is larger or smaller than the population growth rate. If the growth rate is uncertain, the standard of comparison is the certainty equivalent of the population growth rate when interpreted as a marginal rate of return on an asset.

Key Words: Dynamic Inefficiency, overlapping-generations models, First Welfare Theorem, certainty-equivalents criterion.

JEL: D15, D61, E21, E22, E62, H30.

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1 Introduction

In overlapping-generations models with infinite time horizons, equilibrium allocations under *laissez-faire* need not be Pareto efficient.[1] Such "dynamic inefficiency" is often tied to the question whether the real rate of return r on capital is smaller or larger than the real growth rate g of the economy. If r is less than g, efficiency can be improved by reducing capital investments in all periods and using the resources saved to provide for the consumption of old participants. The "rate of return" that any agent achieves by participating in this package, reducing capital investment in one period in order to provide for older participants' consumption and receiving a "return" in the form of payments from younger people in the future, who in turn reduce their capital investments, is equal to the growth rate g. If g exceeds r, each participant gains from this change.

The argument is clear if all real assets are riskless so that in equilibrium they all bear the same rate of return. The argument is unclear, however, if some assets, or even all, are risky so that their rates of return are given by random variables, rather than real numbers. What are we to conclude if the equilibrium rate of return on safe assets is smaller than the growth rate of the economy and the expected rates of return on risky assets are larger than the growth rate of the economy?

For a particular class of overlapping-generations models, this paper shows that the relevant variable for comparison with the growth rate is given by the certainty equivalent of the uncertain marginal rate of return on any risky asset that is actually held. By standard portfolio choice considerations, this certainty equivalent is the same for all assets. If a riskless asset is available and is held in positive amounts, the certainty equivalent is equal to the marginal rate of return on this riskless asset.[2] With uncertainty about asset returns, the r versus g comparison is as relevant as in the certainty case provided one thinks of r as the common certainty equivalent of the uncertain marginal rates of return on assets that are held.

I also consider the case where the population growth rate is uncertain. Under the assumption that population growth rates from one period to the

[1] The argument goes back to Allais (1947, Appendix 2), Samuelson (1958), and Diamond (1965). Blanchard (2019) as well as von Weizsäcker (2014) and Weizsäcker and Krämer (2019/2022) have provided the discussion with a new impetus.

[2] For a somewhat different model, a special case of this finding with a single risky asset is already given in Hellwig (2022). The present paper distils the underlying principles.

next are given by a sequence of independent and identically distributed random variables, I show that, for the class of models under consideration, the assessment of dynamic efficiency and inefficiency of an equilibrium allocation hinges on the comparison of the common certainty equivalent of the uncertain marginal rates of return on assets that are held to the certainty equivalent of the marginal rate of return on a fictitious asset whose uncertain rate of return is equal to the population growth rate.

This result contradicts a claim in Abel et al. (1989, p. 13f.), that certainty equivalents of marginal rates of return on assets being smaller than growth rates is not a sufficient condition for dynamic inefficiency.[3] These authors, however, do not prove their claim. They merely support it with an example involving an infinitely-lived representative consumer. This example has nothing to do with overlapping generations.

Abel et al. (1989) also have a theorem on overlapping-generations models. This theorem gives sufficient conditions for dynamic efficiency and for dynamic inefficiency in terms of the sign of net payment flows between the consumer sector and the producer sector of the economy, without any explicit reference to rates of return on assets. However, these conditions are far from necessary. For the class of models considered here, they are much stronger than the sufficient conditions I give in terms of the r versus g comparison. In fact, the "gap" between my sufficient conditions for dynamic inefficiency and my sufficient conditions for dynamic efficiency concerns only the case $r = g$.

The class of models I consider is special in that there is no labour. At any date, output is produced with capital that belongs to members of the old generation. This output makes up the old generation's real income at that date. Members of the young generation have a commodity endowment that they can use for immediate consumption and for investments in different kinds of assets. A generalization giving the young generation a labour endowment that they can use for their own production of current consumption and investments would be trivial.

In a companion paper (Hellwig 2021), I also consider the case in which production involves the young generation's labour in combination with the old generation's assets. In this specification, however, which corresponds to the model of Blanchard (2019), the wage rate at any one date depends on the

[3] Most of the literature has followed Abel et al. (1989) in presuming that assessments of dynamic inefficiency must consider aggregate returns on all assets, risky as well as riskless. See, e.g., Homburg (2014), Geerolf (2018), Blanchard (2019), Yared (2019), Acharya and Droga (2020), Reis (2020).

productivity shocks at that date and is thus correlated with the returns on assets held from the predecing period. The uncertainty about productivity at any date affects not only the returns on the old generation's past investments but also the wage incomes of the members of the young generation. The young generation's consumption and investments depend on these wage incomes. The equilibrium value of the certainty equivalent of the uncertain marginal rate of return on any asset that the young generation at date t invests in therefore also depends on the wage rate at date t and, indirectly, on the date t productivity shock. This dependence raises the possibility that the r versus g comparison at date t might depend on the wage rate at date t. In the companion paper, I discuss this issue in detail and give a more general criterion for dynamic efficiency and inefficiency.

The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the basic model. Given that labour plays no role, there is not direct trade between the two generations that are alive in any period t. I define and and characterize the autarky allocation and show that it can be generated as an equilibrium allocation in a sequence of markets that involves a complete one-period-ahead system of contingent claims at any one date. Section 3 studies the efficiency properties of the autarky/equilibrium allocation. The efficiency concept used is *interim* Pareto efficiency where each generation t assesses a change of allocation from an *interim* perspective, assuming that generation t knows the history of productivity shocks up to and including t. This information assumption eliminates the scope for Pareto improvements from having people born in period t take over some of the return risks of people born in period $t-1$.

Section 4 provides further perspectives on the main result. Section 4.1 shows that this result implies the theorem of Abel et al. (1989) that was mentioned above. Specifically, the sufficient conditions that Abel et al. (1989) give for the dynamic efficiency or inefficiency of an equilibrium allocation are stronger than the sufficient conditions given in this paper. Section 4.2 relates the analysis to the First Welfare Theorem for competitive equilibria in a complete market system *ex ante.* To preclude risk sharing between generations born in subsequent periods, I assume that agents are distinguished according to the histories up to and including the times of their births. Under this assumption, the autarky allocation can be obtained as a competitive equilibrium allocation in a complate market system *ex ante*. It is efficient if the value of aggregate consumption at equilibrium prices is finite and inefficient if the value of aggregate consumption at equilibrium prices is unbounded.

This criterion is equivalent to the criterion given by the r versus g comparison. Section 4.3 extends the analysis to allow for uncertainty about the population growth rate. As mentioned above, this case yields a generalized r versus g criterion, in which g is replaced by the certainty equivalent of the population growth rate when interpreted as the uncertain rate of return on a fictitious asset.

Proofs are in part sketched in the text and in part given formally in the appendix.

2 A Simple Overlapping-Generations Model

Consider an economy in periods $t = 1, 2, ...$ In each period t, there is a single produceable good. This good serves for consumption and investments. There are I types of investments. For $i = 1, ..., I$, an investment k_i^t of type i in period t generates an output $f_i(A_{t+1}, k_i^t)$ in period $t+1$, where A_{t+1} is the realization of a nondegenerate random variable $\tilde{A}_{t+1}$ with values in a finite set $\mathcal{A} = \{a_1, ..., a_S\}$. This realization only becomes known in period $t+1$. After production, investments of all types are fully depreciated. For any $a \in \mathcal{A}$, the return functions $f_i(a, \cdot)$, $i = 1, ..., I$, are continuously differentiable, nondecreasing, and concave, with $f_i(a, 0) = 0$. Moreover, for any $a \in \mathcal{A}$, $f_i'(a, 0) > 0$ for at least one $i \in \{1, ..., I\}$.

In each period t, a new generation of N_t people is born and lives for two periods. There are also $N_0 = N$ old people in period 1. I assume that the population grows at a constant rate n, so $N_t = (1+n)^t N_0$ for all t.

For simplicity, I assume that, except for the old people in period 1, all people have the same characteristics. A person born in period $t \geq 1$ has an initial endowment $E > 0$ of the period t good and no endowment of the period t' good for $t' \neq t$. Moreover, this person is interested in the utility

$$u(c_1^t) + v(c_2^t) \tag{2.1}$$

that is obtained from consuming c_1^t in period t and c_2^t in period $t+1$. The utility functions $u(\cdot)$ and $v(\cdot)$ are assumed to be twice continuously differentiable, increasing and strictly concave, with $u'(0) = \infty$ and $v'(0) = \infty$ and with nonzero second derivatives. An old person in period 1 has past investments $k_1^0, ..., k_I^0$ and is interested in the utility $v(c_2^0)$.

In the absence of an trade, i.e. under autarky, a person born in period $t \geq 1$ chooses a first-period consumption level c_1^t, and investment levels k_i^t, $i = 1, ..., I$ under the constraint

$$c_1^t + \sum_{i=1}^{I} k_i^t = E. \tag{2.2}$$

The person also chooses a plan $c_2^t(\cdot)$ for second period consumption subject to the constraint that

$$c_2^t(a_s) = \sum_{i=1}^{I} f_i(a_s, k_i^t) \tag{2.3}$$

for $s = 1, ..., S$. An old person in period 1 just has the consumption

$$c_2^0(a_s) = \sum_{i=1}^{I} f_i(a_s, k_i^0)$$

for $s = 1, ..., S$. I assume that $\sum_{i=1}^{I} f_i(a_s, k_i^0) > 0$ for all s.

The parameters $\tilde{A}_1, \tilde{A}_2, ...$ are assumed to be independent and identically distributed, with strictly positive probabilities $p_1, ..., p_S$. for the outcomes $a_1, ..., a_S$. A person born in period $t \geq 1$ thus gets the expected utility

$$u(c_1^t) + \sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s \cdot v(c_2^t(a_s)) \tag{2.4}$$

from the plan $(c_1^t, k_1^t, ..., k_I^t, c_2^t(\cdot))$.

An *autarky allocation* is an array of plans $(c_1^t, k_1^t, ..., k_I^t, c_2^t(\cdot))$ for $t = 1, 2, ...$ such that, for each t, the plan $(c_1^t, k_1^t, ..., k_I^t, c_2^t(\cdot))$ maximizes (2.4) subject to the constraints (2.2) and (2.3). Given the assumptions imposed on utility functions and return functions, the following lemma is immediate.

Lemma 2.1 *There is a unique autarky allocation. For each generation $t \geq 1$, the autarky allocation involves the unique plan $(c_1^a, k_1^a, ..., k_I^a, c_2^a(\cdot))$ that satisfies the first-order conditions*

$$u'(c_1^a) \leq \sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s \cdot f_i'(a_s, k_i^a) \cdot v'(c_2^a(a_s) \tag{2.5}$$

for $i = 1, ...I$, as well as the constraints (2.2) and (2.3), where, for any i, (2.5) holds as an equation unless $k_i^a = 0$. This plan satisfies $c_1^a > 0$ and $c_2^a(a_s) > 0$ for all s.

The autarky allocation can be implemented as an equilibrium allocation in a sequence of complete one-period-ahead market systems. For suppose that, in period t, there is a market system in which consumers can buy state-contingent claims for period $t+1$ consumption at prices

$$\pi(a_s) := \frac{p_s \cdot v'(c_2^a(a_s))}{u'(c_1^a)}, s = 1, ..., S, \tag{2.6}$$

and they can sell the period t good to firms at a price $q_t = 1$. These firms acquire the period t good at the price $q_t = 1$ in order to make investments, and they dispose of the state-dependent outputs from these investments by selling state-contingent claims for the period $t+1$ good at the prices $\pi(a_s)$, $s = 1, ..., S$. The profits of these firms are distributed to people of generation t.

Lemma 2.2 *For any t, the autarky consumption plan $(c_1^t, c_2^t(\cdot)) = (c_1^a, c_2^a(\cdot))$ maximizes the expected utility (2.4) of a person born in period t subject to the budget constraint*

$$c_1^t + \sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi(a_s) c_2^t(a_s) = E + \Pi^t, \tag{2.7}$$

where

$$\Pi^t = \max_{k_1^t, ..., k_I^t} \left[\sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi(a_s) \sum_{i=1}^{I} f_i(a_s, k_i^t) - \sum_{i=1}^{I} k_i^t \right] \tag{2.8}$$

and, moreover, the maximum in (2.8) is attained at the autarky investment plan $(k_1^t, ..., k_I^t) = (k_1^a, ..., k_I^a)$.

In any period, old agents play no active role because they do not trade. They merely consume the returns on the contingent claims they acquired in the preceding period. From Lemma 2.2, one therefore obtains the following result.

Proposition 2.3 *Suppose that, in each period t, there is a market system of the sort considered in Lemma 2.2. A sequence $\{q_t\}_{t=1}^{\infty}$ of price vectors satisfying*

$$q_t = (1, \pi(a_1), ..., \pi(a_S)) \tag{2.9}$$

for all t and all histories $(A_1, ..., A_t)$ up to t, supports the autarky allocation as a rational-expectations equilibrium allocation.

The sequence of markets in this proposition is *not* equivalent to a complete market system *ex ante* in which claims on all contingencies can be traded. In a complete market system *ex ante*, there would be active trading of contingent claims on the period t goods that allows people born in period $t-1$ to share some of their return risk with people born in period t. Such risk sharing cannot take place if people born in period t know the realization of $\tilde{A}_t$ when they enter the market.

3 Welfare Assessments

Without risk sharing between generations, the equilibrium allocation in Proposition 2.3 is not *ex ante* efficient. I therefore consider an *interim* perspective where each generation t assesses a change of allocation on the basis of the information that it has, assuming that it knows the history $A_1, ..., A_t$ of productivity parameters up to t. From this perspective, an allocation is *interim* Pareto-preferred to another if, conditioning on the information that is available to agents when they take their decisions and regardless of the value that information may take, no participant is worse off and some participants are strictly better off under the first allocation than under the second allocation.

To assess the *interim* Pareto efficiency of the autarky allocation, I consider the welfare impact of reducing the first-period consumption of agents born in period t by $\Delta > 0$ and increasing second-period consumption of these agents by $(1+n)\Delta$ while leaving everything else unchanged. With a population growth factor $1+n$, this change is obviously feasible. For a person born in period t expected utility shifts from $u(c_1^a) + \sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s \cdot v(c_2^a(a_s))$ to $u(c_1^a - \Delta) + \sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s \cdot v(c_2^a(a_s) + (1+n)\Delta)$. For small Δ, the change is approximately equal to

$$\left[-u'(c_1^a) + \sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s \cdot (1+n) \cdot v'(c_2^a(a_z))\right] \cdot \Delta = -u'(c_1^a) \left[1 - (1+n) \sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi(a_s)\right] \cdot \Delta, \tag{3.1}$$

where π_s is given by (2.6). If the term in brackets is positive, the intervention considered lowers welfare; if this term is negative, the intervention raises welfare. In the latter case, the new allocation Pareto dominates the autarky allocation, in the former case, it does not dominate the autarky allocation.

Proposition 3.1 *If* $(1+n)\sum_{s=1}^{S}\pi(a_s) < 1$, *the autarky allocation is interim Pareto efficient. If* $(1+n)\sum_{s=1}^{S}\pi(a_s) > 1$, *the autarky allocation fails to be interim Pareto efficient.*

The second part of Proposition 3.1 follows from the argument sketched above. That argument also shows that, if $(1+n)\sum_{s=1}^{S}\pi(a_s) < 1$, the specified intervention does not provide a Pareto improvement. A more general argument is needed, however, in order to show that in this case no intervention at all provides for a Pareto improvement, not even an intervention that provides for the sharing of risks from the random variable $\tilde{A}_{t+1}$ between generations t and $t+1$.

The *interim* efficiency or inefficiency of the autarky allocation thus depends on whether the sum $\sum_{s=1}^{S}\pi(a_s)$ is less than or greater than $\frac{1}{1+n}$. To understand what this comparison is about, it is useful to recall that, for any t and any s, $\pi(a_s)$ is the period t price of a claim on the period $t+1$ good contingent on the event $\tilde{A}_{t+1} = a_s$ expressed in units of the period t good. The sum $\sum_{s=1}^{S}\pi(a_s)$ is therefore the period t price of a non-contingent claim on the period $t+1$ good expressed in units of the period t good. The proposition asserts that the interim efficiency or inefficiency of the allocation depends on whether this price is less than or greater than $\frac{1}{1+n}$.

Proposition 3.1 makes no reference to assets or asset returns. Rates of return enter implicitly because the equilibrium price system depends on the allocation and the allocation in turn reflects the available investment opportunities. Using (2.6) and Lemma 2.1, one finds that, for any asset i satisfying $k_i^a > 0$, one has

$$\frac{1}{\sum_{s=1}^{S}\pi(a_s)} = \frac{u'(c_1^{a)}}{\sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s \cdot v'(c_2^a(a_s))} = \frac{\sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s \cdot f_i'(a_s, k_i^a) \cdot v'(c_2^a(a_s))}{\sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s \cdot v'(c_2^a(a_s))}. \quad (3.2)$$

Upon combining this finding with Proposition 3.1, one obtains:

Proposition 3.2 *The autarky allocation fails to be interim Pareto efficient if*

$$\frac{\sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s \cdot f_i'(a_s, k_i^a) \cdot v'(c_2^a(A_s))}{\sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s \cdot v'(c_2^a(a_s))} < 1+n \quad (3.3)$$

for all i. *The autarky allocation is interim Pareto efficient if*

$$\frac{\sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s \cdot f_i'(a_s, k_i^a) \cdot v'(c_2^a(a_s))}{\sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s \cdot v'(c_2^a(a_s))} > 1+n \quad (3.4)$$

for all i satisfying $k_i^a > 0$.

The term on the left-hand side of (3.3) and (3.4) is a marginal-utility-weighted expectation of the marginal return random variable $f_i'(\tilde{A}_{t+1}, k_i^a)$ for asset i. This marginal-utility-weighted expectation is the same for all assets that are actually held. It can be interpreted as the certainty-equivalent of the marginal return $f_i'(\tilde{A}_{t+1}, k_i^a)$, i.e., as that value of the marginal return on a (possibly fictitious) riskless asset at which the investor would be indifferent between a marginal investment in asset i and in the riskless asset.

The term $1+n$ on the right-hand side of (3.3) and (3.4) can be interpreted as a rate of return that is implicit in participants's paying Δ in the first period of their lives and receiving $(1+n)\Delta$ in the second period of their lives. Proposition 3.2 asserts that, if this implicit rate of return exceeds the common value of the certainty equivalents of the marginal returns on assets, the autarky allocation is Pareto dominated; if this implicit rate of return is smaller than than the common value of the certainty equivalents of the marginal returns on assets, the autarky allocation is Pareto efficient.

For an asset that satisfies

$$f_i'(a_s, k_i^a) = \hat{f}_i'(k_i^a) \tag{3.5}$$

for some function $\hat{f}_i$ and all s, the left-hand side of (3.3) and (3.4) is simply equal to $\hat{f}_i'(k_i^a)$.

Corollary 3.3 *Assume that the autarky allocation satisfies $k_i^a > 0$ for some asset i that is riskless, i.e., that satisfies (3.5) for all s. Then this allocation is interim Pareto efficient if $\hat{f}_i'(k_i^a) > 1+n$ and interim Pareto-dominated if $\hat{f}_i'(k_i^a) < 1+n$.*

Corollary 3.3 restates the old result that the efficiency or inefficiency of a competitive-equilibrium allocation in an overlapping-generations economy depends on whether the marginal rate of return on a riskless asset that is held in positive amounts exceeds the growth rate of the economy or falls short of it. In contrast to the discussion in Abel et al. (1989), the criterion for efficiency and inefficieny is specified only in terms of the marginal rate of return on the safe asset, seemingly without regard to the rates of return on risky assets. Implicitly, though, the marginal rates of return on risky assets come in because, by portfolio choice considerations, the certainty equivalents of marginal rates of return must be the same for all assets that are held in positive amounts.

The follows remark shows that that there exist constellations in which the assumption $k_s^a > 0$ is satisfied so Corollary 3.3 is not vacuous.

Remark 3.4 *Suppose that asset* 1 *is riskless, so that* $f_1(a_s, \cdot) = \hat{f}_1(\cdot)$ *for some function* $\hat{f}_1$ *and all* s. *Then* $k_1^a > 0$ *if there exists a state in which the returns on all other assets are zero, i.e., if, for some* s, $f_j(a_s, k_j^a) = 0$ *for all* $j \neq 1$. *The condition* $k_1^a > 0$ *is also satisfied if* $\lim_{k_j \to \infty} f_j'(a_s, k_j) = 0$ *for all* $j \neq 1$ *and all* s *and the endowment* E *is very large.*

The first part of Remark 3.4 concerns constellations in which safe investments are needed as protection against the positive-probability event that risky investments may be completely lost. The second part concerns constellations in which endowments are so large that, without safe investments, the marginal returns on risky investments would be so low (with probability one) that, at the margin, these investments would be dominated by safe investments.

If there is no riskless asset, one can still define a "shadow" safe rate of return

$$R^a := \frac{1}{\sum_{s=1}^S \pi(a_s)} = \frac{u'(c_1^{a)}}{\sum_{s=1}^S p_s \cdot v'(c_2^a(a_s))} \tag{3.6}$$

as that value of the rate of return on a fictitious safe asset at which agents would be exactly indifferent about a marginal investment in this asset. This number is given by the consumers' marginal rate of substitution between non-contingent changes in consumption in the first and second periods of their lives.

Corollary 3.5 *The autarky allocation is Pareto efficient if* $R^a > 1 + n$ *and Pareto-dominated if* $R^a < 1 + n$.

4 Pareto Improving Fiscal Interventions

4.1 Allowing for Participants' Responses to Interventions

In the preceding sections, the Pareto improvements for the case $(1+n)\sum_{s=1}^{S}\pi(a_s) > 1$ are implemented by direct interventions in the overall allocation of consumption. I will now show that these improvements can also be achieved by specific fiscal interventions that leave the participants free to adjust. For this purpose, I consider the effects of imposing a lump sum tax T on each person when this person is young and providing a lump sum subsidy S to each person when this person is old, leaving all other features of the model unchanged. Both T and S are measured in units of the good of the period in question.

I assume that this intervention involves no waste of resources. In any period t, therefore, $N_t T = N_{t-1} S$ and hence

$$S = (1+n)T. \tag{4.1}$$

Proceeding as before, I define a *T-autarky allocation* as an array of plans $(c_1^t(T), k_1^t(T), ..., k_I^t(T), c_2^t(\cdot|T))$ for $t = 1, 2, ...$, such that, for each t the plan $(c_1^t(T), k_1^t(T), ..., k_I^t(T), c_2^t(\cdot|T))$ maximizes the expected utility

$$u(c_1^t) + \sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s \cdot v(c_2^t(a_s))$$

under the constraints

$$c_1^t + \sum_{s=1}^{S} k_i^t = E - T \tag{4.2}$$

and, for $s = 1, ..., S$,

$$c_2^t(a_s) = (1+n)T + \sum_{i=1}^{I} f_i(a_s, k_i^t). \tag{4.3}$$

Using the same arguments as before, one easily finds that the conclusions of Lemma 2.1 hold for a *T-autarky allocations* with $T \in (0, E)$ as well as $T = 0$. In particular, for any such T, there exists a unique T-autarky allocation, which involves the same plan $(c_1^a(T), k_1^a(T), ..., k_I^a(T), c_2^a(\cdot|T))$ for all generations $t = 1, 2, ...$ Moreover, the T-autarky allocations can be implemented as equilibrium allocations in a sequence of complete one-period-ahead market systems. The following result is an analogue of Proposition 2.3.

Proposition 4.1 *Let $T \in [0, E)$. Suppose that, in each period t, there is a market system of the sort considered in Lemma 2.2, in which consumers can buy state-contingent claims for the period $t+1$ good in return for the current good and firms sell state-contingent claims for the period $t+1$ good. Then the sequence $\{q_t\}_{t=1}^{\infty}$ of price vectors satisfying*

$$q_t = (1, \pi(a_1|T), ..., \pi(a_S|T)), \tag{4.4}$$

with

$$\pi(a_s|T) := \frac{p_s \cdot v'(c_2^a(a_s|T))}{u'(c_1^a(T))}, \quad s = 1, ..., S, \tag{4.5}$$

supports the T-autarky allocation as a rational-expectations equilibrium allocation.

The expected utility a person obtains from the T-autarky plan $(c_1^a(T), k_1^a(T), ..., k_I^a(T), c_2^a(\cdot|T))$ is written as

$$W(T) = u(c_1^a(T)) + \sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s \cdot v(c_2^a(a_s|T)). \tag{4.6}$$

By a straightforward application of the envelope theorem, one obtains

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dW}{dT} &= u'(c_1^a(T)) \cdot \frac{dc_1^a(T)}{dT} + \sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s \cdot v'(c_2^a(a_s|T)) \cdot \frac{dc_2^a(a_s|T)}{dT} \\ &= -u'(c_1^a(T)) + (1+n) \sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s \cdot v'(c_2^a(a_s|T)) \\ &= -u'(c_1^a(T)) \left[1 - (1+n) \sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi(a_s|T) \right]. \end{aligned} \tag{4.7}$$

The following result is immediate.

Proposition 4.2 *If $1 < (1+n) \sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi(a_s|0)$, then, for small $T > 0$, any person's expected utility under the T-autarky allocation is greater than the person's expected utility under the autarky allocation without a fiscal intervention.*

4.2 Crowing Out or Crowding In of Investments?

In Blanchard (2019), with a single asset, a lump sum tax-and-transfer scheme of the sort considered here crowds out private investments. If the *laissez-faire* allocation is inefficient, such crowding out is useful because the rate of return on the tax payment T that is implicity in the subsidy $S = (1+n)T$ exceeds the certainty equivalent of the return on any asset.

With multiple assets, however, the lump sum tax-and-transfer scheme may affect different assets differently. For a specification with two assets, one risky and one riskless, the following result shows that the lump sum tax-and-transfer scheme may actually *crowd in* the risky investment. Specifically, with decreasing absolute risk aversion, the wealth effect from the tax-and-transfer scheme may create enhanceed incentives for investing in the risky asset.

Proposition 4.3 *Assume that $I = 2$ and that, for all s, $f_1(a_s, k_1) = rk_1$ for some $r > 0$ and all k_1 and $f_2(a_s, k_2) = \rho(a_s)k_2$ for some function ρ from $\mathcal{A}$ to $\mathbb{R}_+$. Assume also that the utility function $v(\cdot)$ exhibits strictly decreasing absolute risk aversion. If the autarky allocation (with $T = 0$) satisfies $1 < (1+n)\sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi(a_s|0)$ as well as $k_1^a(0) > 0$ and $k_2^a(0) > 0$, then, for T slightly above zero, $k_1^a(T) < k_1^a(0)$ and $k_2^a(T) > k_2^a(0)$. If $k_1^a(0) = 0$ and $k_2^a(0) > 0$, then, for T slightly above zero, $k_1^a(T) = 0$ and $k_2^a(T) < k_2^a(0)$.*

If the autarky allocation is Pareto dominated and $k_1^a(0) > 0$, the lump sum tax-and-transfer scheme of the sort considered here provides a net subsidy that is equivalent to

$$-T + (1+n)\sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi(a_s|0) \cdot S = \left[(1+n)\sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi(a_s|0) - 1\right] \cdot T.$$

This subsidy induces an increase in first-period consumption and, if risk aversion is strictly decreasing, an increase in risky investment. Both increases are accompanied by a decrease in safe investment. In contrast, if $k_1^a(0) > 0$, the intervention always causes risky investment to go down. The reason is that the intervention reduces the need for a store of value; if risky investments are the only store of value held, they must go down.

Blanchard's result that a tax-and-transfer scheme by itself will crowd out risky investment is due to the assumption that there is only one real asset. As had already been stressed by Tobin (1963), with more than one asset, the comparative statics analysis of fiscal interventions must allow for changes in portfolio composition. In the present context, if $k_1^a(0) > 0$, the fiscal intervention crowds out safe investments, for which it is a close substitute, but may crowd in risky investment if the income effects from the efficiency gain reduce risk aversion.

5 Discussion

5.1 Relation to Abel et al. (1989).

Abel et al. (1989) introduced another criterion, which on the face of it has nothing to do with rates of return. For any one period t, their net-dividend criterion compares the returns to investments that are payed out to consumers in that period to the payments for new investments that consumers make in that period. In the context of the model considered here, the comparison concerns the returns $N_{t-1} \cdot \tilde{d}_t := \sum_{i=1}^{I} f_i(\tilde{A}_t, k_i^{t-1})$ on past investments that go to the old generation in period t and the new investment $N_t \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{I} k_i^t$ that is made by the young generation in period t. According to Proposition 1 in Abel et al. (1989), under the assumption that production exhibits stochastic constant returns to scale, an equilibrium allocation is Pareto efficient if, for some $\varepsilon > 0$, $\tilde{d}_t \geq (1+\varepsilon)(1+n) \sum_{i=1}^{I} k_i^t$ for all t with probability one, and the allocation is Pareto dominated if, for some $\varepsilon > 0$, $\tilde{d}_t \leq (1-\varepsilon)(1+n) \sum_{i=1}^{I} k_i^t$ for all t with probability one. For the autarky allocation in the present analysis, these conclusions are actually a special case of Corollary 3.5. This is shown by the following result.

Proposition 5.1 *Assume that production exhibits stochastic constant returns to scale, i.e., that, for some functions $\rho_1(\cdot), ..., \rho_I(\cdot)$ from $\mathcal{A}$ to $\mathbb{R}_+$,*

$$f_i(a_s, k_i) = \rho_i(a_s) \cdot k_i \tag{5.1}$$

for all s and all $k_i > 0$. Then the autarky allocation satisfies $R^a > 1 + n$ if, for some $\varepsilon > 0$,

$$\sum_{i=1}^{I} f_i(a_s, k_i^a) \geq (1+\varepsilon)(1+n) \sum_{i=1}^{I} k_i^a \tag{5.2}$$

for all s. It satisfies $R^a < 1 + n$ *if, for some* $\varepsilon > 0$,

$$\sum_{i=1}^{I} f_i(a_s, k_i^a) \leq (1 - \varepsilon)(1 + n) \sum_{i=1}^{I} k_i^a \tag{5.3}$$

for all s.

The proof of Proposition 5.1 makes essential use of the stationarity of the autarky allocation. The fact that $k_i^t = k_i^a$ for all t makes it possible to translate the net-dividend criterion into a rate-of-return criterion: Given (5.1), (5.2) takes the form

$$\sum_{i=1}^{I} \rho_i(a_s) \cdot k_i^a \geq (1 + \varepsilon)(1 + n) \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{I} k_i^a \tag{5.4}$$

for all s, implying that, in all possible states of nature, the overall rate of return on the portfolio $(k_1^a, ..., k_I^a)$ is at least $(1 + \varepsilon)(1 + n)$. From the optimization conditions (2.5), one has

$$u'(c_1^a) \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{I} k_i^a = \sum_{i=1}^{I} \sum_{s=1}^{S} [p_s \cdot v'(\tilde{c}_2^a) \cdot \rho_i(a_s) \cdot k_i^a],$$

so the net-dividend condition (5.4) implies

$$u'(c_1^a) \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{I} k_i^a \geq \sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s \cdot v'(\tilde{c}_2^a) \cdot (1 + \varepsilon)(1 + n) \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{I} k_i^a$$

and, therefore,

$$1 \geq \sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi(a_s) \cdot (1 + \varepsilon)(1 + n)$$

or

$$R^a \geq (1 + \varepsilon)(1 + n),$$

which implies interim Pareto efficiency. Similarly, (5.3) implies that in all possible states of nature the overall rate of return on the portfolio $(k_1^a, ..., k_I^a)$ is at most $(1 - \varepsilon)(1 + n) > 1 + n$, so that the optimization conditions (2.5) yield

$$u'(c_1^a) \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{I} k_i^a \leq \sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s \cdot v'(\tilde{c}_2^a) \cdot (1 - \varepsilon)(1 + n) \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{I} k_i^a$$

and, therefore,

$$R^a \leq (1-\varepsilon)(1+n),$$

implying a failure of interim Pareto efficiency.

Without stationarity, the status of the result of Abel et al. (1989) is unclear. Their conditions compare payouts of returns from investments of period $t-1$ with new investments of period t. Without some kind of stationarity, this comparison seems unrelated to rates of return. Chattopadhyay (2008) has examples where the technology involves technical regress, so investments decline over time. In these examples, the condition $\tilde{d}_t \geq (1+\varepsilon)(1+n)\sum_{i=1}^{I} k_i^t$ holds for all t with probability one, and yet the competitive-equilibrium allocation is Pareto-dominated.[4]

5.2 Realation to the First Welfare Theorem

"Dynamic inefficiency" has little to do with dynamics. "Dynamic inefficiency" reflects a breakdown of the First Welfare Theorem in certain economies with an infinity of goods and an infinity of consumers.[5] The First Welfare Theorem asserts that, in the absence of external effects, public goods, and the like, under quite general assumptions on preferences and technologies, competitive equilibrium allocations are Pareto efficient. For a breakdown of this theorem, having a "large-square" economy with a large number of agents (at least two for every good) as well as a large-number of goods is crucial. The scope for a breakdown depends on the structure of the equilibrium price system, which in turn depends on the interplay of consumer preferences and investment opportunities. In the absence of investment and production, only consumer preferences matter.[6]

[4] Because technical regress is compatible with the assumptions of Abel et al. (1989), it follows that their Proposition 1 is invalid as stated. Their formal argument uses a Lagrangian approach to the Paretian problem of maximizing the payoff to one person subject to the constraint that no other person is made worse off, but they fail to verify the conditions on the system of Lagrange multipliers that must hold for this approach to work when there are infinitely many constraints. Using the same kind of Lagrangian approach, the proof of Proposition 3.1 in the Appendix involves showing that these conditions on the system of Lagrange multipliers hold if $\sum_{s=1}^{S}\pi(a_s) < 1$. They do not hold if $\sum_{s=1}^{S}\pi(a_s) > 1$.

[5] See, e.g., Balasko and Shell (1980), Mas-Colell et al. (1995), Ch. 20.H.

[6] Although the total number of participants in this *ex ante* market system is countably infinite, the definition and analysis of competitive equilibrium do not raise any technical

In the present context, these observations are relevant even though the sequence of markets in Proposition 2.3 is *not* equivalent to a complete market system *ex ante* in which claims on all contingencies can be traded. The reason is that, for a slightly modified economy, the sequence of markets in Proposition 2.3 is equivalent to a complete market system *ex ante* in which claims on all contingencies can be traded. In this modified economy, the failure of interim Pareto efficiency when $(1+n)\sum_{s=1}^{S}\pi(a_s) > 1$ is in fact a failure of the First Welfare Theorem.

The modified economy differs is identical to the one studied so far *except* that the set of agents is expanded by treating agents born in period t as different agents if the histories $(A^1,...,A^t)$ up to period t are different. Thus an agent born in period t is treated as S^t different agents, who differ from each other according to the histories $(A^1,...,A^t) \in \mathcal{A}^t$. Following any one history up to t, the set of agents in the economy at t is the same as in the original model. However, from an *ex ante* perspective, this construction eliminates the scope for using active trading of contingent claims on the period t goods to allow people born in period $t-1$ to share some of their return risk with people born in period t. Such risk sharing cannot take place if the plans of people born in period t condition on the histories up to and including t that determine their identities.[7]

Proposition 5.2 *The autarky allocation is a competitive equilibrium allocation in a complete system of contingent-claims markets ex ante in which agents born in period t are distinguished by the histories $(A^1,...,A^t)$ up to t as well as their names. The equilibrium involves a sequence $\{q_t(\cdot)\}$ of time-and-history-contingent prices for the consumption that satisfies the equations*

$$q_1(A_1) = 1 \tag{5.5}$$

and, for any $t > 1$ and history $(A_1,...A_t)$ up to t,

$$q_t(A_1,...,A_t) = \pi(A_t) \cdot q_{t-1}(A_1,...,A_{t-1}). \tag{5.6}$$

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or conceptual problems. Because of the underlying overlapping-generations specification of preferences, technologies and endowments, the number of participants interested in any one contingent claim is finite, so the aggregate excess demand for that claim is well-defined as a finite sum of excess demands of the interested participants.

[7] This procedure is the same as the procedure for constructing the agent normal form of an extensive-form game, treating the same agent at two different information sets at two different agents. See Selten (1975).

For the modified economy in which agents born in period t are distinguished by the histories $(A^1, ..., A^t)$ up to t as well as their names, the concepts of *interim* Pareto efficency and *ex ante* Pareto efficiency coincide because, in this economy, each agent naturally conditions on the history up to and including the date of his or her birth. Proposition 3.1 thus becomes a result about *ex ante* Pareto efficiency. The comparison of $\sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi(a_s)$ and $\frac{1}{1+n}$, which is crucial for the distinction between the efficiency and inefficiency pats of Proposition 3.1 can now be translated into a condition on the equilibrium price system $\{q_t(\cdot)\}$.

Proposition 5.3 *If $\sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi(a_s) < \frac{1}{1+n}$, the value of aggregate consumption at the equilibrium prices in Proposition 5.2 is finite, and the autarky allocation is ex ante Pareto efficient for an economy in which agents born in period t are distinguished by the histories $(A^1, ..., A^t)$ up to t as well as their names. If $\sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi(a_s) > \frac{1}{1+n}$, the value of aggregate consumption at the equilibrium prices in Proposition 5.2 is unbounded, and the autarky allocation fails to be ex ante Pareto efficient for an economy in which agents born in period t are distinguished by the histories $(A^1, ..., A^t)$ up to t as well as their names.*

The standard proof of the First Welfare Theorem begins by observing that, if an alternative allocation provides each participant with greater utility than the competitive equilibrium allocation, then for each participant the consumption plan under the new allocation must be unaffordable at the equilibrium prices. Upon adding this inequality over all consumers, one finds that the value at equilibrium prices of aggregate consumption under the alternative allocation must exceed the value of aggregate consumption under the competitive equilibrium allocation and therefore the value of the aggregate available resources. This leads to the conclusion that the alternative allocation cannot be feasible: For at least one good, the alternative allocation must stipulate consumption in excess of the resources available for providing this good.

In the present model, with infinitely many agents and infinitely many goods, one for each period and history up to that period, this argument goes through if the value of aggregate consumption at the equilibrium prices in Proposition 5.2, as it is if $\sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi(a_s) < \frac{1}{1+n}$, and it breaks down if this value is unbounded, as it is if $\sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi(a_s) > \frac{1}{1+n}$. Proposition 5.3 thus links the classification of cases in Proposition 3.1 to applicability or breakdown of the standard proof of the First Welfare Theorem in a "large-square" economy, an economy that has an infinity of people as well as an infinity of goods.

5.3 Uncertainty about Population Growth

The analysis so far has made extensive use of the assumption that the population growth rate is constant. There is an easy generalization, however, to the case where the population growth rate from period t to period $t+1$ is the realization of a random variable $\tilde{n}_{t+1}$ and the random variables $\tilde{n}_1, \tilde{n}_2, ...$ are independent and identically distributed. Without loss of generality, one can write

$$\tilde{n}_t = \nu(\tilde{A}_t), \tag{5.7}$$

so that the state of the world in period t determines not only the returns on assets held from period $t-1$ but also the size of generation t relative to generation $t-1$. The autarky allocation is the same as before, but the transfer scheme considered in Section 3 now takes the form of a payment $\Delta > 0$ in period t by a person born in that period and a receipt $(1+\tilde{n}_{t+1})\Delta$ by that person in period $t+1$. Given this modification, for small Δ, the effect of such a scheme on the expected utility of a person born in period t now takes the form

$$\left[-u'(c_1^a) + \sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s \cdot (1+\nu(a_s)) \cdot v'(c_2^a(a_z))\right] \cdot \Delta, \tag{5.8}$$

which specializes to (3.1) if $\nu(a_s) = n$, regardless of a_s. Along the same lines as before, one obtains the following generalization of Proposition 3.2:

Proposition 5.4 *In the model with uncertain population growth given by 5.7), the autarky allocation fails to be interim Pareto efficient if*

$$\frac{\sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s \cdot f_i'(a_s, k_i^a) \cdot v'(c_2^a(A_s))}{\sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s \cdot v'(c_2^a(a_s))} < \frac{\sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s \cdot (1+\nu(a_s)) \cdot v'(c_2^a(a_z))}{\sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s \cdot v'(c_2^a(a_s))} \tag{5.9}$$

for all i. The autarky allocation is interim Pareto efficient if

$$\frac{\sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s \cdot f_i'(a_s, k_i^a) \cdot v'(c_2^a(a_s))}{\sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s \cdot v'(c_2^a(a_s))} > \frac{\sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s \cdot (1+\nu(a_s)) \cdot v'(c_2^a(a_z))}{\sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s \cdot v'(c_2^a(a_s))} \tag{5.10}$$

for all i satisfying $k_i^a > 0$.

To understand this result, consider a possibly fictitious asset whose rate of return from period t to period $t+1$ is equal to the population growth rate, so one unit of the good invested in this asset in period t yields $1+\tilde{n}_{t+1}$ in period $t+1$. The term on the right-hand sides of (5.9) and (5.10) can be interpreted as the certainty equivalent of the one-period rate of return on this asset. The proposition assets that the interim efficiency or inefficiency of the autarky allocation depends on how the certainty equivalent of marginal returns on assets that are held compare to the certainty equivalent of the marginal returns on this fictitious asset. The underlying rationale is the same as before: The transfer scheme considered in (5.8) can be interpreted in terms of an "investment" Δ in period t and a "return" $(1+\tilde{n}_{t+1})$ in period $t+1$.

A Proofs

The first-order conditions in Lemma 2.1 as well as Lemma 2.2 and Proposition 2.3 follow by standard arguments, so their proofs are left to the reader. Positivity of c_1^a and $c_2^a(A)$ for all $A \in \mathcal{A}$ follows from the first-order conditions in Lemma 2.1 and the assumptions that $u'(0) = \infty$, $v'(0) = \infty$, $p_s > 0$ for all $s \in \{1, ..., S\}$ and that, for all $s \in \{1, ..., S\}$, there exists some i such that $f_i'(a_s, 0) > 0$.

As for the proof of Proposition 3.1, the argument in the text shows that the autarky allocation is *interim* Pareto-dominated if $\sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi(a_s) > \frac{1}{1+n}$. It remains to be proved that the autarky allocation is *interim* Pareto efficient if $\sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi(a_s) < \frac{1}{1+n}$. I follow the same strategy as Abel et al. (1989). The idea is to show that the equilibrium allocation maximizes the welfare of the old generation in period 1 over the set of feasible allocations subject to the constraint that no other generation be made worse off, using a Lagrangian approach to deal with the constraints. The approach requires some care in order to ensure that the duality conditions underlying the Lagrangian approach are satisfied.

If $\mathcal{A} = \{a_1, ..., a_S\}$ is the set of possible values of the productivity parameters in any one period, then $\mathcal{A}^t$ is the set of possible histories of the productivity parameter up to t, i.e., the set of contingencies on which choices at t may be conditioned. The space

$$\mathcal{E} := \bigcup_{t=1}^{\infty} \left[\{t\} \times \mathcal{A}^t\right], \tag{A.1}$$

corresponds to the union of these sets of contingencies over all t. Notice that $\mathcal{E}$ is a countable union of finite sets and is therefore a countable set.

An allocation is a list that assigns to each date t and each history $(A_1, ..., A_t)$ up to t he actions that are to be taken at this date and history. For any pair $[t, (A_1, ..., A_t)] \in \mathcal{E}$, this list specifies a vector $(c_1^t(A_1, ..., A_t), k_1^t(A_1, ..., A_t),...,$ $k_I^t(A_1, ..., A_t)$ of first-period consumption and investments for generation t and the second-period consumption $c_2^{t-1}(A_1, ..., A_t)$ for generation $t-1$ following the history $(A_1, ..., A_t)$. An allocation is *feasible* if it satisfies the constraints

$$c_2^{t-1}(A_1, ..., A_t) + (1+n)\left[c_1^t(A_1, ..., A_t) + \sum_{i=1}^{I} k_i^t(A_1, ..., A_t)\right] \leq (1+n)E + \sum_{i=1}^{I} f_i(A_t, k_i^{t-1})), \tag{A.2}$$

for any $[t, (A_1, ..., A_t)] \in \mathcal{E}$, where, for $i = 1, ..., I$, $k_i^{t-1} = k_i^0$ for $t = 1$ and $k_i^{t-1} = k_i^{t-1}(A_1, ..., A_{t-1})$ for $t > 1$.

An allocation is interim Pareto-preferred to the autarky allocation if it satisfies the inequalities

$$v\left(c_2^0(A_1)\right) \geq v\left(\sum_{i=1}^{I} f_i(A_1, k_i^0)\right) \tag{A.3}$$

for all $A_1 \in \mathcal{A}$ and

$$u(c_1^t(A_1, ..., A_t)) + \sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi(a_s) v(c_2^t(A_1, ..., A_t, a_s)) \geq u(c_1^a) + \sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi(a_s) v(c_2^a) \tag{A.4}$$

for all $[t, (A_1, ..., A_t)] \in \mathcal{E}$ with $t > 1$.

The proof strategy is to show that, for each $A_1 \in \mathcal{A}$, the autarky allocation is a solution to the problem of maximizing $v\left(c_2^0(A_1)\right)$ subject to the feasibility constraints (A.2) and the Pareto constraints (A.4). The argument involves two steps. One step involves showing that the autarky allocation is a solution to the problem of maximizing a suitably specified Lagrangian. The second step involves showing that, because it maximizes the specified Lagrangian, the autarky allocation also solves the Paretian problem of maximizing $v\left(c_2^0(A_1)\right)$ subject to (A.2) and (A.4).[8]

To specify the Lagrange multipliers $\lambda_t(A_1, ..., A_t)$ for the feasibility constraints (A.2), I set

$$\lambda_1(A_1) = v'\left(\sum_{i=1}^{I} f_i(A_1, k_i^0)\right) \tag{A.5}$$

for $t = 1$ and $A_1 \in \mathcal{A}$ and

$$\lambda_t(A_1, ..., A_t) = (1+n) \cdot \pi(A_t) \cdot \lambda_{t-1}(A_1, ..., A_{t-1}) \tag{A.6}$$

for $t > 1$ and $(A_1, ..., A_t) \in \mathcal{A}^t$. For the Pareto constraints, I specify Lagrange multipliers $\mu_t(A_1, ..., A_t)$ such that

$$\mu_t(A_1, ..., A_t) = \frac{1+n}{u'(c_1^a)} \cdot \lambda_t(A_1, ..., A_t) \tag{A.7}$$

for all $[t, (A_1, ..., A_t)] \in \mathcal{E}$. Given these Lagrange multipliers,for any $A_1 \in \mathcal{A}$, a Lagrangian function $\mathcal{L}(\cdot|A_1)$ is specified by setting:

$$\mathcal{L}(\{c_2^{t-1}(\cdot), c_1^t(\cdot), k_1^t(\cdot), ..., k_I^t(\cdot)\}_{t=1}^{\infty}|A_1) = v\left(c_2^0(A_1)\right) \tag{A.8}$$

$$+ \sum_{[t,(A_1,...,A_t)]\in\mathcal{E}} \mu_t(A_1, ..., A_t)\left[u(c_1^t(A_1, ..., A_t)) + \sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s v(c_2^t(A_1, ..., A_t, a_s)) - W^a\right]$$

$$+ \sum_{[t,(A_1,...,A_t)]\in\mathcal{E}} \lambda_t(A_1, ..., A_t)[(1+n)E + \sum_{i=1}^{I} f_i(A_t, k_i^{t-1}(A_1, ..., A_{t-1})])$$

$$- \sum_{[t,(A_1,...,A_t)]\in\mathcal{E}} \lambda_t(A_1, ..., A_t)\left\{c_2^{t-1}(A_1, ..., A_t) + (1+n)\left[c_1^t(A_1, ..., A_t) + \sum_{i=1}^{I} k_i^t(A_1, ..., A_t)\right]\right\},$$

where

$$W^a := u(c_1^a) + \sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s u(\tilde{c}_2^a(a_s)) \tag{A.9}$$

[8]This second step is missing in Abel et al. (1989) and is not actually valid at the level of generality of their formulation. For counterexamples, see Chattopadhyay (2008).

is the expected utility obtained by a member of generation $t > 0$ at the autarky allocation.

Lemma A.1 *For any $A_1 \in \mathcal{A}$, the value of the Lagrangian (A.8) is maximized at the autarky allocation, which has $c_2^0(A_1) = \sum_{i=1}^{I} f_i(A_1, k_i^0)$ and, for $t = 1, 2, ...$ and $A_1, ..., A_{t+1}$,*

$$\begin{aligned} c_1^t(A_1, ..., A_t) &= c_1^a, \\ c_2^t(A_1, ..., A_{t+1}) &= c_2^a(A_{t+1}), \end{aligned}$$

and, for $i = 1, ..., I$,

$$k_i^t(A_1, ..., A_t) = k_i^a.$$

The value of the Lagrangian at the autarky allocation is $v\left(\sum_{i=1}^{I} f_i(A_1, k_i^0)\right)$.

Proof. By construction, the autarky allocation satisfies the constraints (A.4) and (A.2) with equality. Therefore the value of the Lagrangian at the autarky allocation is $v\left(\sum_{i=1}^{I} f_i(A_1, k_i^0)\right)$. By the concavity assumptions on utility and return functions, for any allocation, (A.8) yields

$$
\begin{aligned}
&\mathcal{L}(\{c_2^{t-1}(\cdot), c_1^t(\cdot), k_1^t(\cdot), ..., k_I^t(\cdot)\}_{t=1}^{\infty}|A_1) - v\left(\sum_{i=1}^{I} f_i(A_1, k_i^0)\right) \qquad \text{(A.10)}\\
&\le \left(c_2^0(A_1) - \sum_{i=1}^{I} f_i(A_1, k_i^0)\right)\cdot v'\left(\sum_{i=1}^{I} f_i(A_1, k_i^0)\right)\\
&+ \sum_{[t,(A_1,...,A_t)]\in\mathcal{E}} \mu_t(A_1, ..., A_t)\cdot u'(c_1^a)\cdot[c_1^t(A_1, ..., A_t) - c_1^a]\\
&+ \sum_{[t,(A_1,...,A_t)]\in\mathcal{E}} \mu_t(A_1, ..., A_t)\cdot \sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s v'(c_2^a(a_s))[c_2^t(A_1, ..., A_t, a_s) - c_2^a(a_s)]\\
&+\lambda_1(A_1)\cdot\left(\left(\sum_{i=1}^{I} f_i(A_1, k_i^0) - c_2^0(A_1)\right) - (1+n)\left((c_1^1(A_1) - c_1^a) + \sum_{i=1}^{I}(k_i^1(A_1) - k_i^a)\right)\right)\\
&+ \sum_{[t,(A_1,...,A_t)]\in\mathcal{E}\setminus\{[1,A_1]\}} \lambda_t(A_1, ..., A_t)\cdot\sum_{i=1}^{I} f_i'(A_t, k_i^a)[k_i^{t-1}(A_1, ..., A_{t-1}) - k_i^a]\\
&- \sum_{[t,(A_1,...,A_t)]\in\mathcal{E}\setminus\{[1,A_1]\}} \lambda_t(A_1, ..., A_t)\cdot[c_2^{t-1}(A_1, ..., A_t) - c_2^a(A_t)]\\
&- \sum_{[t,(A_1,...,A_t)]\in\mathcal{E}\setminus\{[1,A_1]\}} \lambda_t(A_1, ..., A_t)\cdot(1+n)\cdot[c_1^t(A_1, ..., A_t) - c_1^a]\\
&- \sum_{[t,(A_1,...,A_t)]\in\mathcal{E}\setminus\{[1,A_1]\}} \lambda_t(A_1, ..., A_t)\cdot(1+n)\cdot\sum_{i=1}^{I}[k_i^t(A_1, ..., A_t) - k_i^a].
\end{aligned}
$$

I claim that the right-hand side of (A.10) is nonpositive. To prove this claim, I first note that the difference $(c_2^0(A_1) - \sum_{i=1}^{I} f_i(A_1, k_i^0))$ enters the right-hand side of (A.10) with a total weight $v'\left(\sum_{i=1}^{I} f_i(A_1, k_i^0)\right) - \lambda_1(A_1)$. By (A.5), this is equal to zero, so the terms involving this difference vanish. The difference $(c_1^t(A_1, ..., A_t) - c_1^a)$ enters with a total weight

$$\mu_t(A_1, ..., A_t)\cdot u'(c_1^a) - (1+n)\cdot\lambda_t(A_1, ..., A_t).$$

By (A.7), this is also zero, so, for any t and any $(A_1, ..., A_t)$, the terms involving the difference $(c_1^t(A_1, ..., A_t) - c_1^a)$ also vanish. The terms involving the difference $(c_2^t(A_{1,...,}A_t, a_s) - c_2^a(a_s))$ have the total weight

$$\mu_t(A_1, ..., A_t)\cdot p_s v'(c_2^a(a_s)) - \lambda_{t+1}(A_1, ..., A_t, a_s).$$

By (A.7), (A.6), and the definition of $\pi(a_s)$, this is also zero, so these terms also vanish. Finally, for any i, the difference $(k_i^t(A_1, ..., A_t) - k_i^a)$ enters the right-hand side of (A.10) with a total weight equal to

$$\sum_{A_{t+1}\in\mathcal{A}} \lambda_{t+1}(A_1, ..., A_{t+1}) \cdot f_i'(A_{t+1}, k_i^a) - (1+n) \cdot \lambda_t(A_1, ..., A_t).$$

By (A.6), this expression is equal to

$$\left(\sum_{A_{t+1}\in\mathcal{A}} \pi(A_{t+1}) f_i'(A_{t+1}, k_i^a) - 1\right) \cdot (1+n) \cdot \lambda_t(A_1, ..., A_t).$$

By the definition of $\pi(A_{t+1})$ and the first-order condition for k_i^a,

$$\sum_{A_{t+1}\in\mathcal{A}} \pi(A_{t+1}) f_i'(A_{t+1}, k_i^a) = \sum_{s=1}^{S} \frac{p_s v'(c_2^a(a_s)) f_i'(A_{t+1}, k_i^a)}{u'(c_1^a)} \leq 1,$$

and the inequality is strict only if $k_i^a = 0$. If $k_i^a > 0$, it follows that the weight with which the difference $(k_i^t(A_1, ..., A_t) - k_i^a)$ enters the right-hand side of (A.10) is equal to zero. If $k_i^a = 0$, the difference $(k_i^t(A_1, ..., A_t) - k_i^a)$ is nonnegative, and the contribution to the right-hand side of (A.10) of the terms that involve this difference is nonpositive. ■

Proposition A.2 *If $\sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi(a_s) < \frac{1}{1+n}$, then, for any $A_1 \in \mathcal{A}$, the autarky allocation is a solution to the problem of maximizing $v\left(c_2^0(A_1)\right)$ subject to the feasibility constraints (A.2) and the Pareto constraints (A.4).*

Proof. Given the system of Lagrange multipliers $\lambda_t(A_1, ..., A_t)$, $\mu_t(A_1, ..., A_t)$, $t = 1, 2, ...,$ $(A_1, ..., A_t) \in \mathcal{A}^t$, the formulae

$$\lambda^\infty(\{t\} \times \{(A_1, ..., A_t)\}) := \lambda_t(A_1, ..., A_t) \quad \text{(A.11)}$$

and

$$\mu^\infty(\{t\} \times \{(A_1, ..., A_t)\}) := \mu_t(A_1, ..., A_t) \quad \text{(A.12)}$$

define a pair of set functions on the singletons in $\mathcal{E}$. One easily sees that these set functions can be extended to additive measures $\lambda^\infty, \mu^\infty$ on the algebra of all finite subsets of $\mathcal{E}$. I will show that these measures are bounded if $\sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi(a_s) < \frac{1}{1+n}$. I begin with λ^∞ and note that, for any $t > 1$, one has

$$\begin{aligned}
\lambda^\infty(\{t\} \times \mathcal{A}^{t-1}) &= \sum_{(A^1,...,A^t)\in\mathcal{A}^t} \lambda_t(A_1, ..., A_t) \\
&= \sum_{(A_1,...,A_t)\in\mathcal{A}^t} [(1+n)^{t-1} \cdot \pi(A_t) \cdot ... \cdot \pi(A_2) \cdot \lambda_1(A^1)] \\
&= (1+n)^{t-1} \cdot \sum_{A_t\in\mathcal{A}} \pi(A_t) \cdot ... \cdot \sum_{A_2\in\mathcal{A}} \pi(A_2) \cdot \sum_{A_1\in\mathcal{A}} \lambda_1(A_1) \\
&= \left[(1+n) \cdot \sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi(a_s)\right]^{t-1} \cdot \sum_{A_1\in\mathcal{A}} \lambda_1(A_1).
\end{aligned}$$

If $(1+n)\cdot\sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi(A_s) < 1$, (A.12) implies that the infinite series $\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \lambda^\infty(\{t\}\times \mathcal{A}^t)$ is well defined and satisfies

$$\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \lambda^\infty(\{t\} \times \mathcal{A}^t) = \frac{1}{1-(1+n)\cdot\sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi(a_s)} \cdot \sum_{A_1\in\mathcal{A}} \lambda_1(A_1).$$

The additive measure λ^∞ on the algebra of all finite subsets of $\mathcal{E}$ is therefore σ-finite and has a unique extension λ^∞ to the algebra of all subsets of the countable set $\mathcal{E}$.[9] This yields

$$\begin{aligned}
\lambda^\infty(\mathcal{E}) &= \frac{1}{1-(1+n)\cdot\sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi(a_s)} \cdot v'\left(\sum_{i=1}^{I} f_i(A_1, k_i^0)\right) \\
&\leq \frac{1}{1-(1+n)\cdot\sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi(a_s)} \cdot v'\left(\min_{s'} \sum_{i=1}^{I} f_i(a_{s'}, k_i^0)\right). \quad \text{(A.13)}
\end{aligned}$$

By the assumption that $\sum_{i=1}^{I} f_i(a_s, k_i^0) > 0$ for all s, (A.13) provides a finite upper bound on $\lambda^\infty(\mathcal{E})$.

The corresponding claim for μ^∞ follows upon observing that, by construction, $\mu^\infty(\cdot) = \frac{1}{u'(c_1^a)} \cdot \lambda^\infty(\cdot)$.

The product $\lambda^\infty(\cdot) \otimes \mu^\infty(\cdot)$ is a bounded additive set function on the algebra of all subsets of the product $\mathcal{E} \times \mathcal{E}$. By a straightforward generalization of Theorem IV.8.16 in Dunford and Schwartz (1958), it follows that the

[9] See Theorem A, p. 54, in Halmos (1950).

measure $\lambda^\infty(\cdot) \otimes \mu^\infty(\cdot)$ defines a bounded linear functional, an element of the dual space to $[\ell_\infty(\mathcal{E})]^2$, the space of pairs of bounded real-value functions on the countable space $\mathcal{E}$. The space $[\ell_\infty(\mathcal{E})]^2$ is the space of violations of the constraints (A.2) and (A.4). By Theorem 1, p. 220, in Luenberger (1969), therefore, the proposition follows from Lemma A.1. ■

Proposition 3.1 follows immediately. Proposition 3.2 and Corollaries 3.3 and 3.5 follow by the arguments sketched in the text.

Proof of Remark 3.4. The first statement follows from the first-order condition (2.5) in Lemma 2.1 and the observation, that for the critical s, $k_i^a = 0$ would imply $c_2^a(s) = 0$ and $v'(c_2^a(s)) = \infty$.

To prove the second statement, suppose that $\lim_{k_j \to \infty} f_j'(a_s, k_j) = 0$ for all $j \neq i$ and s and that $k_i^a = 0$ even if E is large.

I claim that, if E is very large, then, by the first-order condition (2.5), c_1^a is very large and $u'(c_1^a)$ is close to zero. Otherwise, $u'(c_1^a)$ would be bounded away from zero and, by (2.5), for every $j \neq i$, there would exist s such that $v'(c_2^a(s))f_j^{'}(a_s, k_j^a)$ is also bounded away from zero. For the specified s the,n $c_2^a(s)$ is bounded and so is k_j. However, if $k_i^a = 0$ and c_1^a as well as $k_j^a, j \neq i$, are bounded, then, for large E, the constraint for generation t's first-period choices is not exhausted, contrary to the optimality of the autarky plan.

Given that $u'(c_1^a)$ is close to zero if E is large, (2.5) implies that, for all j and all $s, v'(c_2^a(s))f_j^{'}(a_s, k_j^a)$ is close to zero if E is large. Hence there exists j such that k_j^a is large if E is large. For this j, the first-order conditions (2.5) imply

$$\sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s v'(c_2^a(a_s)) f_j'(a_s, k_j^a) \geq \sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s v'(c_2^a(a_s)) \hat{f}_i'(0),$$

hence

$$\max_s f_j'(a_s, k_j^a) \geq \hat{f}_i'(0).$$

Given the assumption that $\lim_{k_j \to \infty} f_j'(a_s, k_j) = 0$ for all $j \neq i$ and s, it follows that k_j^a is bounded even if E is large. The assumption $\lim_{k_j \to \infty} f_j'(a_s, k_j) = 0$ for all $j \neq i$ and s and that $k_i^a = 0$ even if E is large has thus led to a contradiction and must be false. ■

Proposition 4.1 follows by the same arguments as Proposition 2.3. Proposition 4.2 follows by the argument given in the text.

Proof of Proposition 4.3. Under the specified assumptions, the pair $(c_1(T), k_2(T))$ in the T-autarky plan is easily seen to maximize the objective

$$u(c_1) + \sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s \cdot v((1+n-r)T + r(E-c_1) + (\rho(a_s)-r)k_2).$$

The first-order conditions for this maximization are given as

$$u'(c_1) - r\sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s \cdot v'((1+n-r)T + r(E-c_1) + (\rho(a_s)-r)k_2) = 0$$

and

$$\sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s \cdot (\rho(a_s)-r) \cdot v'((1+n-r)T + r(E-c_1) + (\rho(a_s)-r)k_2) = 0.$$

By the implicit function theorem, it follows that

$$\frac{dc_1}{dT} = (1+n-r) \cdot r \cdot \frac{AC-B^2}{u'' \cdot C + AC - B^2}$$

and

$$\frac{dk_2}{dT} = -(1+n-r) \cdot \frac{u'' \cdot B}{u'' \cdot C + AC - B^2},$$

where

$$\begin{aligned}
A &= \sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s \cdot v''((1+n-r)T + r(E-c_1) + (\rho(a_s)-r)k_2), \\
B &= \sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s \cdot (\rho(a_s)-r) \cdot v''((1+n-r)T + r(E-c_1) + (\rho(a_s)-r)k_2), \\
C &= \sum_{s=1}^{S} p_s \cdot (\rho(a_s)-r)^2 \cdot v''((1+n-r)T + r(E-c_1) + (\rho(a_s)-r)k_2).
\end{aligned}$$

By the strict concavity of u and v, $A < 0, C < 0$, and $AC - B^2 > 0$. Thus, $1+n-r > 0$ implies $\frac{dc_1}{dT} \in (0, (1+n-r)r)$.

Furthermore, by standard arguments, decreasing absolute risk aversion in $v(\cdot)$ implies $B > 0$.[10] Thus, $1+n-r > 0$ implies $\frac{dk_2}{dT} > 0$. The proposition follows immediately. ■

[10] See, e.g., Leroy and Werner (2001), p. 119.

The proof of Proposition 5.1 follows from the argument sketched in the text. Proposition 5.2 follows from Proposition 2.3.

Proof of Proposition 5.3. For a participant who is to be born in period t, following the history $A_1, ...A_t$, the value of the autarky consumption vector $(c_1^a, c_2^a(a_1), ..., c_2^a(a_S))$ at the equilibrium prices in Proposition 5.2 is equal to the value $q_t(A_1, ..., A_S) \cdot (E + \Pi^a)$, where

$$\Pi^a = \sum_{s=1}^{S} \sum_{i=1}^{I} \pi(a_s) f_i(a_s, k_i^a) - \sum_{i=1}^{I} k_i^a$$

is the value of the maximum in (2.8), in Lemma 2.2. The aggregate of this value over all participants who are to born in period t at all is equal to

$$(1+n)^t \cdot N_0 \cdot \sum_{(A_1,...,A_S) \in \mathcal{A}^t} q_t(A_1, ..., A_S) \cdot (E + \Pi^a).$$

By (5.6) and (5.5), this expression is equal to

$$(1+n)N_0 \cdot \left[(1+n) \sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi(a_s) \right]^{t-1} \cdot (E + \Pi^a).$$

By standard arguments, the infinite series that is obtained by adding over t converges if $(1+n)\sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi(a_s) < 1$ and diverges if $(1+n)\sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi(a_s) > 1$. In the case of convergence, *ex ante* Pareto efficiency follows by the usual argument for the First Welfare Theorem. In the case of divergence, the failure of *ex ante* Pareto efficiency follows by the argument used to prove Proposition 3.1. ■

The proof of Proposition 5.4 follows step by step the same line of argument as the proof of Proposition 3.1. If one replaces the term $(1+n)$ in conditions (A.2), (A.6), (A.7), and (A.8) by $(1 + \nu(A_t))$, one finds that Lemma A.1 remains valid without change. The conclusion of Proposition A.2 then follows from the assumption that $\sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi(a_s)(1 + \nu(a_s)) < 1$, with a proof that is the same except for the replacement of $\sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi(a_s)(1+n)$ by $\sum_{s=1}^{S} \pi(a_s)(1+\nu(a_s))$.

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