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Supranational Modernisation or National Partisanship? Explaining Variation in Recovery and Resilience Plans in Central and Eastern Europe

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Simons,  Jasper P.       
Politische Ökonomie, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society;
European Studies Department, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands;

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Citation

Simons, J. P., & Oellerich, N. (2023). Supranational Modernisation or National Partisanship? Explaining Variation in Recovery and Resilience Plans in Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of European Public Policy. doi:10.1080/13501763.2023.2231029.


Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-000D-697A-5
Abstract
The European Union’s Recovery and Resilience Facility is an unprecedented investment opportunity for economic modernisation. However, while the supranational European Commission assumes considerable influence over the design of national Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRPs), there is substantial diversity among RRPs. This paper analyses the interaction between national governments and the Commission in the coordinative RRP design process. We argue that national policy preferences, rooted in the partisan profiles of governing coalitions, ultimately explain variation in RRP content. We analyse the policymaking process in three semi-peripheral economies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) – Estonia, Romania, and Slovakia. CEE countries are especially suitable because as expected rule-takers, they function as least likely cases for the relevance of government agency, i.e., national partisanship. Through elite interviews, we trace various elements of each RRP to specific positions of governing coalitions and, with national variation, the Commission’s ability to impose its own policy preferences.