日本語
 
Help Privacy Policy ポリシー/免責事項
  詳細検索ブラウズ

アイテム詳細


公開

学術論文

Self‐Interest and Sympathy in Economic Behaviour

MPS-Authors
/persons/resource/persons41196

Hausken,  Kjell
Theorien und Methoden, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society;

External Resource
Fulltext (restricted access)
There are currently no full texts shared for your IP range.
フルテキスト (公開)

IJSE_23_1996_Hausken.pdf
(全文テキスト(全般)), 196KB

付随資料 (公開)
There is no public supplementary material available
引用

Hausken, K. (1996). Self‐Interest and Sympathy in Economic Behaviour. International Journal of Social Economics, 23(7), 4-24. doi:10.1108/03068299610122371.


引用: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-000D-7F86-E
要旨
Analyses self‐interest and sympathy in game‐theoretic terms. Evaluates the relative weight of self‐interest and sympathy in the theories of Hobbes, Hume and Adam Smith in an economic framework. Demonstrates through game‐theoretic tools that sympathy as an actuating motive in human nature gives rise to human interaction having other and, for organizations and societies, more beneficial characteristics than does merely self‐interested interaction. Uses the emphasis on the time factor and the importance of the future in Hume’s more than in Hobbes’ theory to show how co‐operation can emerge in large organizations. Introduces government or an organizational structure to further induce co‐operative behaviour.