date: 2024-08-12T13:45:07Z
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pdf:docinfo:title: Sectors versus borders: interest group cleavages and struggles over corporate governance in the age of asset management
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subject: Doi: 10.1093/ser/mwad072 Socio-Economic Review, 22, 3, 2024 Publication Date: 09/01/2024  Universally invested asset managers like BlackRock have established a dominant position in equity markets around the globe. While extant contributions have explored their voting behaviour and role in shaping corporate governance at the firm level, less is known about their potential to build interest coalitions with other business groups, and their leverage over state-level corporate governance institutions. This article investigates conflict over a far-reaching reform to co-determination in Germany. Qualitative content analysis of over 100 stakeholder statements yields that asset managers forge coalitions with short-term-oriented investors to abolish key tenets of corporatist institutions. However, a domestic countercoalition of financial and non-financial firms prevented momentous institutional change. This article improves our understanding of international asset managers? preferences and highlights coalition building as a key determinant of the political power of international finance. By aligning the costs of institutional change for incumbents, corporatist institutions continue to act as shields against financialization.
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dc:title: Sectors versus borders: interest group cleavages and struggles over corporate governance in the age of asset management
modified: 2024-08-12T13:45:07Z
cp:subject: Doi: 10.1093/ser/mwad072 Socio-Economic Review, 22, 3, 2024 Publication Date: 09/01/2024  Universally invested asset managers like BlackRock have established a dominant position in equity markets around the globe. While extant contributions have explored their voting behaviour and role in shaping corporate governance at the firm level, less is known about their potential to build interest coalitions with other business groups, and their leverage over state-level corporate governance institutions. This article investigates conflict over a far-reaching reform to co-determination in Germany. Qualitative content analysis of over 100 stakeholder statements yields that asset managers forge coalitions with short-term-oriented investors to abolish key tenets of corporatist institutions. However, a domestic countercoalition of financial and non-financial firms prevented momentous institutional change. This article improves our understanding of international asset managers? preferences and highlights coalition building as a key determinant of the political power of international finance. By aligning the costs of institutional change for incumbents, corporatist institutions continue to act as shields against financialization.
pdf:docinfo:subject: Doi: 10.1093/ser/mwad072 Socio-Economic Review, 22, 3, 2024 Publication Date: 09/01/2024  Universally invested asset managers like BlackRock have established a dominant position in equity markets around the globe. While extant contributions have explored their voting behaviour and role in shaping corporate governance at the firm level, less is known about their potential to build interest coalitions with other business groups, and their leverage over state-level corporate governance institutions. This article investigates conflict over a far-reaching reform to co-determination in Germany. Qualitative content analysis of over 100 stakeholder statements yields that asset managers forge coalitions with short-term-oriented investors to abolish key tenets of corporatist institutions. However, a domestic countercoalition of financial and non-financial firms prevented momentous institutional change. This article improves our understanding of international asset managers? preferences and highlights coalition building as a key determinant of the political power of international finance. By aligning the costs of institutional change for incumbents, corporatist institutions continue to act as shields against financialization.
pdf:docinfo:creator: Dustin Voss
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dc:description: Doi: 10.1093/ser/mwad072 Socio-Economic Review, 22, 3, 2024 Publication Date: 09/01/2024  Universally invested asset managers like BlackRock have established a dominant position in equity markets around the globe. While extant contributions have explored their voting behaviour and role in shaping corporate governance at the firm level, less is known about their potential to build interest coalitions with other business groups, and their leverage over state-level corporate governance institutions. This article investigates conflict over a far-reaching reform to co-determination in Germany. Qualitative content analysis of over 100 stakeholder statements yields that asset managers forge coalitions with short-term-oriented investors to abolish key tenets of corporatist institutions. However, a domestic countercoalition of financial and non-financial firms prevented momentous institutional change. This article improves our understanding of international asset managers? preferences and highlights coalition building as a key determinant of the political power of international finance. By aligning the costs of institutional change for incumbents, corporatist institutions continue to act as shields against financialization.
Keywords: corporate governance; firm strategy; Germany; institutional complementarity; power; political economy
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dc:creator: Dustin Voss
description: Doi: 10.1093/ser/mwad072 Socio-Economic Review, 22, 3, 2024 Publication Date: 09/01/2024  Universally invested asset managers like BlackRock have established a dominant position in equity markets around the globe. While extant contributions have explored their voting behaviour and role in shaping corporate governance at the firm level, less is known about their potential to build interest coalitions with other business groups, and their leverage over state-level corporate governance institutions. This article investigates conflict over a far-reaching reform to co-determination in Germany. Qualitative content analysis of over 100 stakeholder statements yields that asset managers forge coalitions with short-term-oriented investors to abolish key tenets of corporatist institutions. However, a domestic countercoalition of financial and non-financial firms prevented momentous institutional change. This article improves our understanding of international asset managers? preferences and highlights coalition building as a key determinant of the political power of international finance. By aligning the costs of institutional change for incumbents, corporatist institutions continue to act as shields against financialization.
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title: Sectors versus borders: interest group cleavages and struggles over corporate governance in the age of asset management
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pdf:docinfo:keywords: corporate governance; firm strategy; Germany; institutional complementarity; power; political economy
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