Shifting Punishment on Minorities: Experimental Evidence of Scapegoating

Bauer, Michael; Cahlíková, Jana; Chytilová, Julie; Roland, Gérard; Želinský, Tomáš

doi:10.1093/ej/uead005

アイテム詳細

登録内容を編集ファイル形式で保存

一時保存へ追加

タグ情報を表示リリース履歴を表示詳細要約

公開

学術論文

Shifting Punishment on Minorities: Experimental Evidence of Scapegoating

MPS-Authors

Cahlíková, Jana
Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society;

External Resource

http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3891611
(プレプリント)

Fulltext (restricted access)

There are currently no full texts shared for your IP range.

フルテキスト (公開)

公開されているフルテキストはありません

付随資料 (公開)

There is no public supplementary material available

引用

Bauer, M., Cahlíková, J., Chytilová, J., Roland, G., & Želinský, T. (2023). Shifting Punishment on Minorities: Experimental Evidence of Scapegoating. The economic journal, 133(652), 1626-1640. doi:10.1093/ej/uead005.

引用: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-000F-1A30-E

要旨

Do members of a majority group systematically shift punishment onto innocent members of an ethnic minority? We introduce an experimental paradigm, punishing the scapegoat game, to measure how injustice affecting a member of one's own group shapes punishment of an unrelated bystander. When no harm is done, we find no evidence of discrimination against the ethnic minority (Roma people in Slovakia). In contrast, when a member of one's own group is harmed, the punishment ‘passed’ onto innocent individuals more than doubles when they are from the minority, as compared to when they are from the dominant group.