アイテム詳細

要旨

Off-balance-sheet policies are an important but understudied phenomenon that emerged from a technical subtlety in the calculation of public debt statistics. Taking the case of an exemplary European off-balance-sheet policy, public–private partnerships (PPPs), this paper analyzes the technocratic processes that allow the emergence of such debt-neutral instruments. In the aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis, off-balance-sheet policies have become an important policy tool for Member States in the European Economic and Monetary Union, enabling them to strike a balance between the perceived ‘public investment gap’ and the mantra of fiscal consolidation. The case study shows how the lack of political solutions to Europe’s investment-consolidation conundrum leaves it to technical experts to find workable solutions within the existing rules. The off-balance-sheet status of PPPs came under threat in 2014 but was reaffirmed through a coordinated effort by two strange bedfellows: the European Investment Bank (EIB), a promoter of PPPs, and Eurostat, the European authority responsible for public debt and deficit indicators. I argue that Eurostat and the EIB have entered into strategic cooperation to increase each other’s room for manoeuvre, diffuse political pressure and avoid bureaucratic overload. This paper contributes to a better understanding of the role of technocrats and their expertise, which shape the mutual relations between fiscal constraints and financialized investment policies in the European investor states.