date: 2024-06-20T11:21:30Z
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pdf:docinfo:title: Mexico?s battle with monopolies: reputation-based autonomy and self-undermining effects in antitrust enforcement
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subject: Doi: 10.1093/ser/mwae036 Socio-Economic Review, 00, 00, 2024 Publication Date: 28/05/2024 Abstract Despite increased scholarly attention to competition law enforcement against corporate monopolies, our understanding of this topic in developing countries remains very limited. This article addresses this gap by focusing on Mexico, using enforcement statistics, expert interviews and documentary resources. I find that Mexico initially pursued surprisingly high levels of anti-monopoly enforcement, which was followed by an equally surprising decline. Departing from the previous research that emphasized the influence of expert ideas, business power and international models, this study highlights two factors shaping the enforcement of competition law on monopolies in developing country contexts: the strategies employed by newly established competition authorities to foster organizational autonomy through a positive public reputation, and the subsequent self-undermining effects of these strategies. In addition to advancing the existing literature on competition policies, these findings shed light on the factors behind local variations in globally diffused institutions and the limitations of reputation-based bureaucratic autonomy.
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dc:title: Mexico?s battle with monopolies: reputation-based autonomy and self-undermining effects in antitrust enforcement
modified: 2024-06-20T11:21:30Z
cp:subject: Doi: 10.1093/ser/mwae036 Socio-Economic Review, 00, 00, 2024 Publication Date: 28/05/2024 Abstract Despite increased scholarly attention to competition law enforcement against corporate monopolies, our understanding of this topic in developing countries remains very limited. This article addresses this gap by focusing on Mexico, using enforcement statistics, expert interviews and documentary resources. I find that Mexico initially pursued surprisingly high levels of anti-monopoly enforcement, which was followed by an equally surprising decline. Departing from the previous research that emphasized the influence of expert ideas, business power and international models, this study highlights two factors shaping the enforcement of competition law on monopolies in developing country contexts: the strategies employed by newly established competition authorities to foster organizational autonomy through a positive public reputation, and the subsequent self-undermining effects of these strategies. In addition to advancing the existing literature on competition policies, these findings shed light on the factors behind local variations in globally diffused institutions and the limitations of reputation-based bureaucratic autonomy.
pdf:docinfo:subject: Doi: 10.1093/ser/mwae036 Socio-Economic Review, 00, 00, 2024 Publication Date: 28/05/2024 Abstract Despite increased scholarly attention to competition law enforcement against corporate monopolies, our understanding of this topic in developing countries remains very limited. This article addresses this gap by focusing on Mexico, using enforcement statistics, expert interviews and documentary resources. I find that Mexico initially pursued surprisingly high levels of anti-monopoly enforcement, which was followed by an equally surprising decline. Departing from the previous research that emphasized the influence of expert ideas, business power and international models, this study highlights two factors shaping the enforcement of competition law on monopolies in developing country contexts: the strategies employed by newly established competition authorities to foster organizational autonomy through a positive public reputation, and the subsequent self-undermining effects of these strategies. In addition to advancing the existing literature on competition policies, these findings shed light on the factors behind local variations in globally diffused institutions and the limitations of reputation-based bureaucratic autonomy.
pdf:docinfo:creator: Melike Arslan
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dc:description: Doi: 10.1093/ser/mwae036 Socio-Economic Review, 00, 00, 2024 Publication Date: 28/05/2024 Abstract Despite increased scholarly attention to competition law enforcement against corporate monopolies, our understanding of this topic in developing countries remains very limited. This article addresses this gap by focusing on Mexico, using enforcement statistics, expert interviews and documentary resources. I find that Mexico initially pursued surprisingly high levels of anti-monopoly enforcement, which was followed by an equally surprising decline. Departing from the previous research that emphasized the influence of expert ideas, business power and international models, this study highlights two factors shaping the enforcement of competition law on monopolies in developing country contexts: the strategies employed by newly established competition authorities to foster organizational autonomy through a positive public reputation, and the subsequent self-undermining effects of these strategies. In addition to advancing the existing literature on competition policies, these findings shed light on the factors behind local variations in globally diffused institutions and the limitations of reputation-based bureaucratic autonomy.
Keywords: competition; regulation; law; developing countries; transnational diffusion
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dc:creator: Melike Arslan
description: Doi: 10.1093/ser/mwae036 Socio-Economic Review, 00, 00, 2024 Publication Date: 28/05/2024 Abstract Despite increased scholarly attention to competition law enforcement against corporate monopolies, our understanding of this topic in developing countries remains very limited. This article addresses this gap by focusing on Mexico, using enforcement statistics, expert interviews and documentary resources. I find that Mexico initially pursued surprisingly high levels of anti-monopoly enforcement, which was followed by an equally surprising decline. Departing from the previous research that emphasized the influence of expert ideas, business power and international models, this study highlights two factors shaping the enforcement of competition law on monopolies in developing country contexts: the strategies employed by newly established competition authorities to foster organizational autonomy through a positive public reputation, and the subsequent self-undermining effects of these strategies. In addition to advancing the existing literature on competition policies, these findings shed light on the factors behind local variations in globally diffused institutions and the limitations of reputation-based bureaucratic autonomy.
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title: Mexico?s battle with monopolies: reputation-based autonomy and self-undermining effects in antitrust enforcement
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