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West German Society and Foreigners in the 1960s

Karen Schönwälder

In 1966, the Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände (BDA), an umbrella organization of employers' associations, held a conference on foreign labor in West Germany. In his opening remarks, BDA president Siegfried Balke proudly referred to a "similar event" the employers had organized in 1908.¹ He did not go so far as to quote from a 1908 paper arguing that as German workers were becoming more educated and better trained, it seemed desirable "to use understanding foreign workers for the more primitive tasks."² But Balke's reference to the 1908 gathering does illustrate that the recruitment of foreign labor in the 1960s was placed in a historical continuum and that this continuum was generally not seen as problematic. If there was an inherited burden, the BDA president suggested, it lay in the minds of ordinary Germans. Indeed, one of the main purposes of the conference was to counter prejudice and to win support for the idea that the employment of foreigners was indispensable: "We have to encourage understanding for the foreigners among German employees. 'They must learn

to tolerate differences because tolerance alone forms the key to an understanding of the foreigners."³ Balke emphasized that "[t]he world's general opinion of German hospitality and the German attitude to other countries depends not least on whether and to what extent we manage to solve this problem."⁴

The 1960s was a period of major migratory movements to (and from) West Germany. The 1961 census recorded 686,000 foreign citizens and stateless persons; over the next six years, that figure almost trebled. Between summer 1960 and autumn 1964, the number of foreign workers rose from 279,000 to about 1,000,000; by June 1966, a record 1.3 million non-Germans were working in the Federal Republic.⁵ Twenty-eight percent of them had already spent more than three years in Germany.⁶ The huge numbers of foreign workers, the continuation of foreign recruitment over several years, and the growing number of married couples, some with children, suggested that immigration was a phenomenon German society could not ignore.⁷ At the same time- as Balke's speech indicated- the question of how far West Germany had indeed overcome the Nazi past gained new urgency.

How did the history of the exploitation of millions of forced laborers during the Nazi era figure- if at all- in the policy debates of the 1960s about migrant

labor? This essay argues that the presence of the past was a characteristic feature of 1960s responses to the mass encounter with foreigners in West Germany. To some extent, this thesis runs counter to previous research. Scholars such as Knuth Dohse, Hartmut Esser, and Ulrich Herbert have been struck by the absence of a critical review of the wartime experience as large-scale employment of foreigners recommenced and the West German government partly revived older institutional and legal instruments to regulate it.⁸ While it is beyond doubt that the exploitation of forced laborers in Nazi Germany was not explored in detail or widely discussed in public in West Germany during the 1960s, I do not believe that this public silence reflected "ruptured perceptions" or an understanding of foreign recruitment as something novel.⁹ The past was present, if sometimes only in the subtext of public communication.

Explanations of the Presence of Labor Migrants

To help them make sense of the influx of hundreds of thousands of foreigners into their country, West Germans were offered several different justifications. 'the employment of foreigners was presented first as an economic necessity. Given that the "economic miracle" was a cornerstone of German self-confidence, this was

a very powerful argument. Secondly, migration was related to the European vision in which cooperation among the peoples of Europe and freedom of movement figured prominently. West Germans were thus encouraged to accept migration as a side effect of the European integration they desired and of the Federal Republic's acceptance into the Western community of nations. Thirdly, it was common to remind the public that Germany had traditionally used foreign labor. According to this line of argument, history showed that employment of foreigners was normal and nothing to fear. *Überfremdung* (overforeignization, or being overwhelmed by foreigners) was not a real threat.¹⁰ Although it often skipped over the period between 1910 and 1955, the historical argument presented the recruitment of foreigners as anormal feature of German economic life.

It is unlikely that the presence of millions of foreign workers on more or less every farm and in every factory across Germany during the Third Reich had been forgotten twenty years after the regime's collapse. Throughout the 1950s, before the increase in foreign recruitment, about half a million foreigners were registered in the Federal Republic.¹¹ In 1966, the number of *Heimatlose Ausländer* (literally, homeless foreigners) was estimated at 155,000; many of them were former forced laborers. These Displaced Persons provided the most obvious link between past and present, between Nazi

Germany's *Ostarbeiter* (eastern workers) and the Federal Republic's *Gastarbeiter* (guest workers).¹²

A number of scholars have noted that the term *Fremdarbeiter* (foreign workers) that had been commonly used before 1945 did not disappear until the late 1960s even though it was avoided in official usage.¹³ Nazism and the history of intolerance and racism were rarely explicitly mentioned. But when a journalist pointed out that Germany still had a long way to go before the transgressions (*Verfehlungen*) of the past would be forgiven and that the treatment of guest workers would be regarded as a test case for the sincerity of the Germans' commitment to democracy,¹⁴ or when a widely distributed magazine published by the Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (Federal Office for Political Education) argued that the injustice done to forced laborers during the war remained a burden that "even today we help to reduce with every friendly word, every helping hand extended to the guest workers,"¹⁵ they were only clarifying a message that was omnipresent. Vague references to a special German obligation to show tolerance typically coexisted with a lack of sensitivity displayed in the continued use of the terms *Fremdarbeiter* and *Überfremdung*.¹⁶ As there had been no public (or internal) debate about the past, there was no clear line between democratic attitudes and the nationalism of the past.

This is also illustrated by the ways in which the presence of foreign workers was used as an opportunity to boost German confidence. A one-page feature in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, for instance, emphasized the civilizing mission of the Germans. A "uniform, sober West German society" had "forced the softer southerners, if they wanted to get by, to adjust," the paper reported. "It seems that it is indeed possible to transform the more passive (*vegetativ*) Mediterranean type into a stable, focused worker type." The workers' countries of origin and Europe as a whole would thus profit from Germany's influence, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* concluded.¹⁷ Similarly, Hanns-Joachim Rüstow of the Munich-based ifo-Institut claimed "that through the training we give them these people become disciplined workers at home and valuable members of society."¹⁸

Had they not been valuable members of society before? Germans were invited to interpret the recruitment of thousands of foreign workers as evidence of their own economic superiority, of their role as a leading civic force in Europe and even as political educators. Life in "our free economic order" would, as BDA president Balke and Federal Labor Minister Theodor Blank believed, convince foreign workers of the advantages of that order.¹⁹ Labor migration thus contributed to the fight against communism. In this guise, nationalism and feelings of superiority were

allowed to survive and were even encouraged. But at the same time, German workers were reproachfully reminded of their duty to improve Germany's image abroad and thus- if often inexplicitly- of the burden and guilt of the past.

The Contained Conflict

There were hints of explosive potential in this mixture of continued nationalism and consciousness of a historic burden, a burden, notably, that was placed on the shoulders of ordinary Germans. A series on foreign labor in the mass-circulation (I tabloid *Bild* involved a grocer who, in a fictitious pub talk, rejected the demand that foreigners had to be treated with particular friendliness on account of "the horrible foreign-labor policy."²⁰ When the weekly magazine *Neue Illustrierte* published a ferocious attack on foreigners in 1965, it claimed that it was only articulating popular feelings suppressed by the fear that "the Germans would again be accused of racial prejudice."²¹ Similarly, a Bundestag member who belonged to the liberal Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei, FDP) argued that Germans should learn to discuss the question of *Überfremdung* unburdened by feelings of resentment²² - in other words, that they should overcome an enforced silence and openly complain about alleged *Überfremdung*.

Although radical right-wing views are commonly presented under the pretext of breaking taboos, there might be some truth in the assumption that the burdens of the past and the fear of negative consequences for the country's image abroad did indeed help contain hostility to the growing presence of foreigners in West Germany during the 1960s. As far as we know, there were very few incidences of racist violence or rioting against foreigners. Unlike Britain, strikes for "color bars" (i.e., quota on the employment of immigrants) and extended protests against foreign neighbors do not seem to have occurred. There were, of course, tensions. German workers are reported to have complained, for example, about preferential treatment of foreigners who were served special food in factory cafeterias or who received housing in employer-built hostels. Many Germans seem to have disliked the transformation of train stations into meeting places and the fact that foreigners hung around in the streets after work—something well-behaved Germans did not do at the time.²³ There was housing discrimination, and some pubs put up signs barring Italians and other foreigners from entry. In 1966, thousands of workers in the engineering industry went on strike after the widely read tabloid *Bild* published a headline suggesting that foreigners might be better workers than their German counterparts.²⁴ This event was quite exceptional, how-

ever. The protests did not extend beyond the factory gates and were quickly contained, thanks in part to the intervention of the metalworkers' union IG Metall. Union officials were worried about "residue from the past" (*Schlacken der Vergangenheit*) that might fuel a dangerous anti-immigration campaign.²⁵ Opposition to immigration was not an important campaign issue for the extreme right-wing National Democratic Party (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, NPD), but it is not clear whether the growing presence of foreigners nonetheless contributed to the party's success in a series of state elections in the late 1960s.²⁶ Foreign workers may have been subject to discrimination, but there was in general no open conflict over their presence in the Federal Republic.

The media generally supported a policy of appeasement. The papers were uninterested in exploring tensions and generally refrained from stirring them up. The above-mentioned criticism of *Gastarbeiter* in an issue of the *Neue Illustrierte* remained an isolated incident. There seems to have been an unspoken agreement to pass silently over issues that might adversely affect Germany's image abroad as well as to promote the image of the Federal Republic as a westernized and liberal society.

Although an open, critical debate on the exploitation offered laborers during the Nazi era did not take place in the 1960s the past was present in other ways. 'there

were feelings of guilt and an awareness that no grounds should be given to doubt the democratic character of West German society. When, for example, the Christian Democratic chancellor Ludwig Erhard and FDP leader Erich Mende publicly expressed their opposition to immigration and tried to exploit nationalist sentiment, they tread very carefully.²⁷ The presence of the past thus helped contain hostility to foreign workers and prevent the political exploitation of the immigration issue.

The "Hitler Man" Returns

This coexistence of caution and an unreflective confidence was also typical of government policy, as an event in the early phase of organized recruitment of foreign workers illustrates. On 28 May 1960, the German ambassador to Greece informed the Foreign Ministry in Bonn that he had put a member of the German recruiting office in Athens on a plane back to Germany that day.²⁸ A recruitment treaty had been signed on 30 March, and a three-man delegation arrived a month later to set up a recruiting office for the Federal Labor Agency (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit). In late May, left-wing Greek newspapers revealed that the chief recruiting officer, Herrmann Westermayer, was no newcomer to Greece: headlines in Athens labeled him "Tue Hitler man who sends workers to Germany again."²⁹

Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano and his deputy, State Secretary Karl Carstens, were embarrassed and angry. In Carstens's view, it had been "completely unacceptable politically that [Westermayer] was sent again to Greece to recruit laborers."³⁰ The Ministry of Labor needed to be lectured on the need to take account of the "political imponderables." As Carstens went on to explain, "Labor recruitment during the Third Reich is nowadays generally burdened with the infamy of deportation, even if individuals may have acted in a correct and loyal manner." The German authorities had to keep this view of the past in mind as it was "of the greatest importance" for the success and public image of the recruiting operation "that the activities of the German commissions are not in any way inhibited by burdens from the period of occupation."³¹

The Westermayer case is instructive for a number of reasons. Senior officials at the Federal Labor Agency had been aware of Westermayer's wartime service in Greece and had nevertheless decided to send him there once again. As nothing untoward had been held against him and Greek witnesses had helped him in his denazification proceedings, they thought Westermayer posed no problem; rather, his knowledge of Greece and its language made him seem well-qualified for the job.³² Obviously, they saw his wartime experience as valuable for the West German recruitment program.

Labor recruitment and displacement were not regarded as part of a system of occupation and exploitation of a foreign country, or of a criminal Nazi regime. Westermayer himself defended his wartime service, arguing that recruitment had been strictly voluntary. In the years 1942-44, he insisted, he had worked above all "for the poor and hungry Greeks."³³ "Even then," he declared, "my work was devoted to a 'unified Europe.'"³⁴

West German politicians and officials might perhaps have been careless because Germany's wartime exploitation of foreign labor turned out not to be a major public issue in Italy, Greece, or, later, Yugoslavia when the Federal Republic sought to recruit workers. Italian officials in 1954-55 partly used a 1937 agreement on labor recruitment as a model for the new agreement on labor migration. Because of the tradition of seasonal migration to Germany, they expected many Italians would be willing to work in the Federal Republic.³⁵ The Federal Ministry for Labor recorded reports of Italians willing to work in Germany on account of previous experience where.³⁶ Some German employers are reported to have written to Italians who had formerly worked for them (some as prisoners of war) asking them to come back.³⁷ Few scholars who have researched the subject have found evidence of reservations among Italians about labor migration to Germany on account of the treatment of their compatriots in Nazi Germany.³⁸ Ital-

ian and Greek newspapers, mainly on the left, occasionally drew parallels between past and present in criticizing the living conditions of foreign workers in Germany. For instance, an article in the communist paper *L'Unita* announced in October 1960: "Tue Italians in Germany have returned to the 'camps.'"³⁹ In Greece, the newspaper *Avghi* printed a series of articles that attacked the "racist arrogance" of the Germans and interpreted the exclusion of foreign workers from some pubs as a continuation of Nazi practices.⁴⁰

German authorities closely watched the media response to the recruitment program. The Federal Labor Agency reported to the Labor Ministry, for example, in response to a reader's letter in *L'Unita* alleging that Italian workers were housed in the barracks of a former concentration camp where the remains of a gas chamber could still be seen.⁴¹ And the Foreign Ministry's response to the Westermeyer case illustrates that at least the politicians and diplomats who were responsible for West Germany's image abroad were aware of the political dynamite contained in links with the past. The Foreign Ministry's nervousness should be placed in this context. In May 1960, Theodor Oberländer resigned as a government minister following accusations regarding his role as an SS officer during the war. And, as Ulrich Brochhagen has emphasized, the wave of anti-Semitic graffiti in 1959-60 had attracted considerable attention abroad.⁴² Although West Ger-

many's policy toward foreigners did not become the subject of inter-national media attention, a heightened sensitivity is clearly noticeable. Furthermore, the recruitment program was intended to help stabilize the conservative governments then in power in Italy and Greece and not to provide ammunition for communist critics. At the Foreign Ministry, Carstens was no more interested than his counterparts at the Federal Labor Agency and Ministry of Labor in what Westermayer might actually have been doing between 1942 and 1944.⁴³ It was West Germany's image abroad that concerned them.

"Practical evidence for our democratic commitments": The 1965 Aliens Act

Another example illustrates the heightened sensitivity to possible links between West German and Nazi policies evident from about 1960 onward. On 7 January 1960, the Berlin *Tagesspiegel* published an editorial demanding that the 1938 regulation on aliens that was still in effect, the *Ausländer-Polizeiverordnung*, be replaced. Given the "shameful 'handwriting on the wall' of our cities" [i.e., anti-Semitic graffiti], the newspaper saw an increasingly urgent need for a new law. "We have ample reason not just to stamp the federal eagle over the faded swastika on Germany's front entrance but rather to acquire a spotless new one."⁴⁴

The Berlin senator (minister) of the interior sent a copy of this editorial to the Federal Interior Ministry, which had already started work on drafting a new aliens act. Creating a more liberal and democratic legal framework was not the prime motive; rather, officials repeatedly mentioned the need to cleanse West German law of Nazi elements.⁴⁵ And from the outset-and this can be seen as a response to contemporary debates about the Nazi legacy-the new legislation was presented as an expression of a liberal and *weltoffen* (cosmopolitan, open-minded) policy toward foreigners. As Federal Minister of the Interior Hermann Höcherl (Christian Social Union) explained in 1964, the aliens act should "demonstrate to the whole civilized world that the Federal Republic of Germany is striving to overcome the unseemly aspects of the past through positive regulations."⁴⁶ At the same time, the bill was often presented to West Germans as a measure designed to allow the state to suppress the political activities of foreigners more effectively.⁴⁷ But when the Bundestag finally passed the bill in 1965, the emphasis was all liberalism and democratic renewal. As the three speakers uniformly emphasized, West Germany was breaking which the past with the new law and making "a major contribution to the reshaping of our internal order."⁴⁸ "We have provided practical evidence for our democratic commitments," the interior minister declared.⁴⁹

Was this pride justified? Opinions of the aliens act are, as might be expected, divided.⁵⁰ Critics have argued that the new law was in fact stricter than the 1938 ordinance.⁵¹ While this assessment is quite harsh, the new law did give authorities wide discretionary powers but did not grant foreigners the right to stay in the Federal Republic. It was based on the view that the state's interests should be given preference over the interests of the foreign individual. At the same time, though, the right to asylum, which had been guaranteed in the Basic Law and was now incorporated in the new law, marked major differences from the 1930s, and foreigners were also given opportunity to seek judicial review of administrative decisions.

The Bundestag had not made a serious effort to explore what a liberal and democratic policy toward foreigners might be. It did not seize the opportunity to reflect upon the treatment of foreigners in the past and in the present, upon the tolerance or intolerance of the Germans, or upon the implications of migration that was already turning into permanent immigration. Nor did the parliament ask whether it was wise to grant state and local authorities wide discretionary powers.

Criticism was raised, however, by the Social Democratic government of Hessen, which asked whether the bill did indeed represent "a progressive revision" of the law "that takes account of the modern view of the

priority of human rights and that is in line with the general efforts toward a far-reaching rapprochement among states." It demanded that restrictions on individual rights be applied with great caution.⁵² In contrast to their party colleagues in the Bundestag, Hessen's Social Democrats made their criticism of the proposed law public. In 1962, Hessian Minister of Labor Heinrich Hemsath argued in the Bundesrat (the chamber of states) that the bill included provisions that did not accord with the Basic Law. It failed to provide refugees with protection against deportation, he argued, and impinged upon the fundamental right of freedom of expression.⁵³ When the bill came up for vote in the Bundesrat, Hessen abstained.

Although the aliens law was passed unanimously in the Bundestag, there had been considerable debate behind the scenes on the choice between a more restrictive or a more liberal "westernized" policy on foreigners. It would be too simple to assume that all involved merely wanted to provide window dressing while retaining the substance of the 1938 regulations. State and federal authorities were at odds on how to balance perceived security needs and the goals of integration within the West and economic liberalization. The Federal Ministry of the Interior came under repeated criticism while drafting the new legislation from the Foreign Ministry and the Federal Economics Ministry, which feared that the law might counteract the trend

toward greater freedom of movement in Europe and could therefore provoke negative reactions abroad. The Economics Ministry believed some of the provisions in the draft legislation were more restrictive than the 1938 regulations and asked whether that was necessary. More liberal tendencies were to be preferred, the ministry maintained: "Otherwise the law would be in danger of being regarded as a step backwards." "Does liberalization alone mean progress?" retorted an Interior Ministry official in a note in the margin.⁵⁴ When the draft began which the statement that foreigners could be admitted if they were worthy of German hospitality, the Foreign Ministry complained that this formulation recalled National Socialist vocabulary by which "a foreigner was assumed inferior to the German master race until the opposite be proved."⁵⁵

The status of refugees and former displaced persons (DPs) was another source of controversy. A Foreign Ministry official remarked in 1963 that the time had come to restrict the rights of refugees.⁵⁶ Interior Minister Höcherl took a principled stance against demands from a Bavarian government led by his own party- and insisted that the right to asylum ranked above security concerns. As Höcherl's deputy explained, "Considering the past, the Federal Republic has a lot to make up for in this area."⁵⁷

The fact that only a few weeks later the Bundestag

was to take a decision on the statute of limitations (to allow a continued prosecution of Nazi crimes) may have been one reason for the decision to make the Bundestag "debate" on the aliens act a unified demonstration for an imagined foreign audience. No member of parliament voted against the new law.⁵⁸ In the parliamentary commission, a redrafting of the first paragraph had been instigated in order to give the law a friendlier appearance, since, as one Social Democratic member of parliament argued, it would attract more attention abroad than other bills.⁵⁹ Some very cautious reservations had been expressed regarding the limited political rights of foreigners and the provisions on expulsions.⁶⁰ But altogether the work of the Bundestag demonstrates that while immigration was being debated in public-sensitivity for human rights issues developed slowly. Neither Germany's history with regard to immigration and foreign employment and its consequences nor the contours of a democratic immigration policy were debated in the Bundestag. If this was a time of a "highly condensed debate on National Socialism," and if a "far-reaching consensus" existed on the need for a self-critical debate on the Nazi past,⁶¹ it did not extend to immigration policy. But it should also be noted that while clearly not every member of parliament approved of the mass employment of foreigners in Germany, there was no open and concerted re-

sistance against it.

As the controversies surrounding the aliens act demonstrate, West German politicians and governmental officials did try to draw conclusions from the experience of the past, albeit only tentatively and largely behind closed doors. In public, they did not see the need for a comprehensive re-evaluation of Germany's policy on foreigners in connection with the goal of presenting the country to the world as a liberal democracy. An open public discussion about the differences between authoritarian and liberal policies toward foreigners, about the past and its consequences, was not yet desired.

Concluding Remarks

As this essay has demonstrated, West German attitudes toward foreigners and views about the relevance of the Nazi past in thinking about foreigners were multifaceted. "The possibility of negative responses from abroad was a major factor in shaping policy on foreigners, as was the wish to demonstrate that democratic and liberal change had occurred in the Federal Republic. It was widely assumed that the treatment of foreigners was regarded as a test case of West Germany's commitment to democracy. But at the same time, politicians were often more concerned about appearance than substance, and they were usually con-

tent with superficial adjustments. Critical voices—among the public⁶² as well as among state and federal officials—called for a more substantial liberalization and more respect for individual rights. But an open and thorough-going debate about past experience with foreign labor and the treatment of foreigners did not take place. As the example of migration policy illustrates, the evidence of the parliamentary debates that the statute of limitations should not lead us to assume there was a general shift toward critical reflection on the nation's past.

The debate over migration policy lost much of its urgency following the economic downturn of 1966, which resulted in the more or less voluntary departure of thousands of foreign workers. When the debate resumed in the early 1970s, it was in many ways a transformed, more broadly critical discussion. But even then, references to the exploitation of forced laborers during the war were rare.⁶³ It was more common to liken the situation of foreigners in contemporary Germany to American blacks than to the *Fremdarbeiter* of the war years.

Notes

1. Siegfried Balke, "Begrüssung und Eröffnung," in *Magnet Bundesrepublik. Probleme der Ausländerbeschäftigung: Informationstag der Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände am 30. und 31. März 1966 in Bad Godesberg* (Cologne, 1966), 8. In a further contribution at the conference, Balke again emphasized Germany's "long tradition in the field of foreign employment." Siegfried Balke, "Die Ausländerbeschäftigung aus der Sicht der Wirtschaft," in *ibid.*, 168-82, here 177. Several aspects of this chapter of German history are explored in more detail in my book, Karen Schönwälder, *Einwanderung und ethnische Pluralität: Politische Entscheidungen und öffentliche Debatten in Grossbritannien und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von den 1950er bis zu den 1970er Jahren* (Essen, 2001).
2. Quoted in Ulrich Herbert, *Geschichte der Ausländerbeschäftigung in Deutschland 1880 bis 1980: Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter* (Bonn, 1986), 49-50. In 1957, Julius Scheuble, president of the Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung, had published a study written by his predecessor Friedrich Syrup. Here, Syrup emphasized the "great national dangers" a mass influx of foreign workers posed "for the body of the German Volk" (*für den deutschen Volkskörper*). In spite of revisions, the text remained marked by an attitude of superiority over the culturally inferior, dangerous foreigners. Friedrich Syrup, *Hundert*

Jahre staatliche Sozialpolitik 1839-1939, rev. Otto Neuloh, ed. Julius Scheuble (Stuttgart, 1957), 224ff.

3. Siegfried Balke, "Die Verantwortung der Betriebe," *Der Arbeitgeber* 17 (1965): 279.

4. Balke, "Begrüssung und Eröffnung," 9.

5. Figures should only be roughly compared, as the statistical basis was different. For 1961 census figures, see "Die Ausländer im Bundesgebiet," *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, no. 11 (1964): 645-50. Using the locally recorded figures for officially registered foreigners, a 1967 total of 1,807 million citizens was established. See "Ausländer im Bundesgebiet," *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, no. 7 (1969): 360-61, here 378. Embassy and consular staff as well as members of foreign armies were not included. Detailed figures on forcing workers (gainfully employed persons) can be found in the *Erfahrungsberichte* of the Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung.

6. Helmuth Weicken, "Die Ausländerbeschäftigung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland-Stand und Entwicklung," *Arbeit, Beruf und Arbeitslosenhilfe* 18 (1967): 5-9, here 6.

7. According to an estimate by the Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung, in 1966, 341,000 foreign couples lived in the Federal Republic. See Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung, ed., *Beschäftigung, Anwerbung, Vermittlung ausländischer Arbeitnehmer: Erfahrungsber-*

icht 1967 (Nuremberg, 1968), 20-21. 'The figures seem to be based on couples in which the man or both partners were foreigners.

8. Knuth Dohse, *Ausländische Arbeiter und bürgerlicher Staat. Genese und Fiktion von sozialistischer Ausländerpolitik und Ausländerrecht: Vom Kaiserreich bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Königstein, 1981); Hartmut Esser, "Gastarbeiter," in *Die Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, vol. 2: *Wirtschaft*, ed. Wolfgang Benz, updated and extended edition (Frankfurt am Main, 1989), 326-61.
9. Ulrich Herbert and Karin Hunn suggest that there was a "Wahrnehmungsbruch" and a "Fiktion der Voraussetzungslosigkeit der neuerlichen Ausländerbeschäftigung"; see Ulrich Herbert and Karin Hunn, "Gastarbeiter und Gastarbeiterpolitik in der Bundesrepublik: Vom Beginn der offiziellen Anwerbung bis zum Anwerbestopp (1955-1973)," in *Dynamische Zeiten: Die 60er Jahre in den beiden deutschen Gesellschaften*, ed. Axel Schilde, Detlef Siegfried, and Karl C. Lammers (Hamburg, 2000), 273-310, here 309-10. However, Herbert also argues that "in the formulation of policy toward foreign workers after 1955 and the crystallization of attitudes toward guest workers, experiences of a decade earlier which forced laborers were still a conscious and operative factor." See Ulrich Herbert, *A History of Foreign Labor in Germany, 1880-1990: Seasonal Workers, Forced Laborers, Guest Workers* (Ann Arbor, 1990), 4.
10. This line of argument was popularized by the Fed-

eral Employment Service. See Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung, ed., *Beschäftigung, Anwerbung, Vermittlung ausländischer Arbeitnehmer: Erfahrungsbericht 1964* (Nuremberg, 1965). Further examples include "1910 gab es mehr Gastarbeiter," in *Neue Ruhrzeitung*, 21 June 1964; "Gastarbeiter sind kein neues Problem für Deutschland," in *Welt der Arbeit*, 11 June 1965.

11. "Die Ausländer im Bundesgebiet," *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, no. 8 (1951): 313-15, 965-66; "Die Ausländer im Bundesgebiet" (1964). The presence of the Allied armies surly added to the perception that Germany had a sizable foreign population.
12. There are indications that the great posed by foreign laborers released after the war had made a deep impression on the Germans. An article in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, for instance, described hostile attitudes toward foreign workers on the part of Wolfsburg inhabitants who had not forgotten "dass es bei Kriegsende in Wolfsburg 'Tausende von plötzlich freigewordenen Fremdarbeitern gab, die sich für die erlittene Unbill an den Wolfsburgern schadlos hielten.'" See "Die Italiener in Wolfsburg haben Heimweh," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 23 November 1962. See also Ulrich Herbert, "Apartheid nebenan: Erinnerungen an die Fremdarbeiter im Ruhrgebiet," in *"Die Jahre weiss man nicht, wo man die heute hinsetzen soll". Fachismuserfahrungen im Ruhrgebiet*, ed. Lutz Niethammer (Bonn, 1983), 233-66, here 233, 259.

13. See, e.g., "Die wachsende List der Fremdarbeiter." in *Hamburger Abendblatt*, 11 March 1966; "Arbeitslosigkeit und Kurzarbeit Alarmsignale?" in *Politisch-Soziale Korrespondenz* 16 (1967): 15-16. Even in parliamentary debates the term was still used, for instance, by Hannsheinz Bauer, SPD (*Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages*, 12 December 1962, 2297), and on 25 March 1965 by Schwörer, CDU (8817f.) and Opitz, FDP (8822). But see also the critical comments by the trade union official Eberhard de Haan, who insisted that the term was discredited because of the treatment of millions of forced laborers during the Nazi regime. "Integration, Assimilation oder was?" in *Bildungswerk Europäische Politik, Arbeitsplatz Europa: langfristige Perspektiven und europäische Aspekte zum Problem ausländischer Arbeitnehmer* (Cologne, 1966), 52-55, here 53.
14. Richard Kaufmann, "Der Gastarbeiter als gesellschaftliches Problem," in *ibid.*, 19-39, here 29.
15. "Fremde-Gäste-Freunde: Gastarbeiter in Deutschland" was published in spring 1966; 182,000 copies were printed and distributed. A historical survey entitled "Von der 'Sachsen-gängerei' bis zu den 'Fremdarbeitern'" (20-21) described the period of forced labor as a "dark chapter" in which foreigners had been treated as second-class humans but had also encountered sympathy.
16. In the mid-1960s, the term *Überfremdung* became widely

used when debates in Switzerland seemed to suggest that the recruitment of foreigners involved such a threat. "Keine Gefahr der Überfremdung" (*Mannheimer Morgen*, 31 March 1966) was a typical newspaper headline after the 1966 BDA conference, where several speakers led ensured the audience that such a danger did not exist in Germany.

17. "Die Völkerwanderung zum Arbeitsmarkt," by Günther von Lojewski, 9 May 1964.
18. See Rüsrow's contribution to the discussion in "Probleme der ausländischen Arbeitskräfte in der Bundesrepublik: Bericht über den wissenschaftlichen Teil der 29. Mitgliederversammlung der Arbeitsgemeinschaft deutscher wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Forschungsinstitute e. V. in Bad Godesberg am 24. und 25. Juni 1966," *Beihefte der Konjunkturpolitik*, 110. 13 (1966): 158.
19. Balke, "Die Verantwortung der Betriebe." See also, with similar comments, Theodor Blank, "Ein Schritt zur Völkerverständigung," *Der Arbeitgeber* 17 (1965): 280.
20. "Nix Amore," 22 April 1966.
21. Major headlines included "Dreiste Gastarbeiter raus!" and "Noch gehört Deutschland uns," *-Neue Illustrierte*, no. 18, 2 May 1965.
22. Alfred Ollesch, "Einreisende Gastarbeiter schärfer kontrollieren," *fdk*, 15 March 1966.
23. While repeated surveys were carried out to assess

the prevalence of anti-Semitism, attitudes to foreigners or foreign workers were rarely investigated. In September 1965, according to an Emnid survey, 51 percent of the population still tended to oppose the importation of foreigners as guest workers. Only 27 percent generally supported this policy. About one-third of those opposed (that is, about 17 percent of those questioned) pointed to the behavior and alleged characteristics of the immigrants, including their racial characteristics. *Emnid-Informationen* 17, no. 49, 6 December 1965. In 1964, 32 percent had termed the "guest workers" a "difficult problem," while 36 percent thought things were going quite well. "Laut und sparsam: Wie die Deutschen die Gastarbeiter beurteilen," *Allensbacher Berichte*, no. 1 (1972): 6.

24. "Gastarbeiter fleissiger als deutsche Arbeiter," *Bild*, 31 March 1966.
25. Günter Stephan, Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, 7. Ordentlicher Bundeskongress Berlin, *Protokoll* [1966], 101.
26. See Hermann Bott, *Die Volksfeind-Ideologie: Zur Kritik rechtsradikaler Propaganda* (Stuttgart, 1969); Reinhard Kühnl, Rainer Rilling, and Christine Sager, *Die NPD: Struktur, Ideologie und Funktion einer neofachistischen Partei* (Frankfurt am Main, 1969). In contemporary press reports on the NPD, its attitude toward foreigners was rarely mentioned. See, however, "Gäste im Zerrspiegel,"

- Frankfurter Rundschau*, 30 December 1966, which claimed that NPD attacks on foreigners had won support for it.
27. Erhard repeatedly emphasized that if only the Germans were prepared to work one hour more per week, foreign employment could be substantially reduced. See, e.g., *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages*, 133. Sitzung/4. WP, 25 June 1964, 6529; *ibid.*, 5. WP, 10 November 1965, 17-33. FDP leader Erich Mende included hostile remarks on the employment of foreigners in speeches during the 1965 election campaign. See "DGB verteidigt Gastarbeiter," *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 16 September 1965; "Erich Mende: Was mein Bild betrifft ...," *Rheinischer Merkur*, 3 September 1965.
28. Telegraph Seelos, Athen, to Auswärtiges Amt, 28 May 1960, in Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Bonn (PA AA) 505/791; apart from this file, see also B 2/82 (Büro Staatssekretär) in the same archive.
29. See quotations from *Avghi* in Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in Athens to Auswärtiges Amt, 10 June 1960, in PA AA 505/791.
30. *Staatssekretär's* notes, 1 June 1960, in PA AA 505/791. Comments on several documents show that Carstens and the minister, Heinrich von Brentano, followed the case.
31. AA to BMA, 21 July 1960, in Bundesarchiv Koblenz (hereafter BA Ko) B 149/22390.
32. Note Dr. Zöllner, Bundesanstalt, 3 June 1960, in BA

Ko B 119/3076.

33. Bundesanstalt, note of 3 June 1960: "Stellungnahme des V.I. Hermann Westermayer zu dem Bericht der kommunistischen Zeitung 'die Morgenröte' in Athen vom 27.5.60," in BA Ko B 119/3076.
34. Memo Westermayer of 30 May 1960, in BA Ko B 119/3076.
35. Livia Novi, "Die italienisch-deutsche Anwerbevereinbarung von 1955 im Rahmen der italienischen Wanderungspolitik der fünfziger Jahre" (MA thesis, Osna-brück University, 1994), 47, 60.
36. Here I rely on Barbara Sonnenberger, who mentioned relevant comments to me that can be found in BA Ko B 149/6230. See also Yvonne Rieker, "Südländer, Ostagen-ten oder Westeuropäer? Die Politik der Bun-desregierung und das Bild der italienischen Gastarbeiter 1955-1970," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 40 (2000): 231-58, here 244.
37. Herbert Spaich, *Fremde in Deutschland* (Weinheim, 1981), 209. According to the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, a firm in Ramseck/Sauerland employed fifty Italian miners two-thirds of whom had already worked in Ramseck during the war ("Italienische Arbeiter bewähren sich", 2 September 1955). Again, I owe these references to Barbara Sonnen-berger.
38. Italians had initially been recruited, or sent by the Mussoli-ni regime, but after 1943, workers had been forced to stay

in Germany, and about six hundred thousand Italian prisoners of war were turned into forced laborers. See, however, Behrmann and Abate, who were told by Italian migrants from Sicily that they had initially been reluctant to apply for work in Germany because after the experience of World War II, fear of the Germans was still widespread. Meike Behrmann and Camine Abate, *Die Germansei: Geschichte und Leben einer süditalienischen Dorfgemeinschaft und ihrer Emigranten* (Frankfurt am Main, 1984), 41. Rieker believes that bad memories of Germany played an important part in the "collective memory" of the Italians, but seems to rely more or less on the evidence quoted here. See Rieker, "Südländer, Ostagenten oder Westeuropäer?" 245.

39.I used a translation in BA Ko B 106/47434. 'The article stated cynically that many German employers held the same attitudes as twenty years ago. It also claimed that recruitment was a "Menschenhandel im Stile der Deportation." 'The BA files also contain a translation of an article of 4 July 1956 in *L'Unita*, which claimed that the food Italian workers received recalled the memories of the concentration camps, BA Ko B 119/3040.

40.Undated translations are contained in "Wochenbericht der Deutschen Kommission in Griechenland an den Präsidenten der Bundesanstalt" of 5 May 1961, in BA Ko B 119/3075. 'The issue was also taken up by the GDR paper *Neues Deutschland*; sec "Protest Italiens

gegen Nazimethoden in Nürnberg," 2 June 1963, an article that referred to pub signs and quoted references to the "Nazism virus" and to racism from Italian papers.

41. The letter was published on 26 February 1965 under the heading "Italiani alloggiati nei vecchi campi di concentramento." The BA informed the BMA (on 13 July 1965) that the allegations were false (BA Ko B 149/22380).
42. Ulrich Brochhagen, *Nach Nürnberg: Vergangenheitsbewältigung und Westintegration in der Ära Adenauer* (Hamburg, 1994), 276ff. On page 295, Brochhagen quotes from a letter from the AA to the embassies of 10 March 1960, which stated that in the West nothing had been forgotten and confidence in the Federal Republic rested on a weak foundation.
43. According to his own report, Westermayer had in 1941 been sent to Yugoslavia to work as a *Vermittler* (recruitment officer). Early in 1942, he had been sent to Salonika to set up an office, which- after a few months- he also did in Athens, where he stayed until 1944. Memo of 30 May 1960, BA Ko B 119/3076. German recruitment in Greece started in January 1942 but was generally not very successful. Initially, recruitment seems to have been "voluntary," although in many cases unemployment and hunger forced Greeks to go to the Reich. According to some sources, organized recruitment to the Reich was terminated at the end of

1942. Hadziiossif reports that from autumn 1943, violence was used to recruit workers. See Christos Hadziiossif, "Griechen in der deutschen Kriegsproduktion," in *Europa und der "Reichseinsatz": Ausländische Zivilarbeiter, Kriegsgefangene und KZ-Häftlinge in Deutschland 1938-1945*, ed. Ulrich Herbert (Essen, 1991), 210-33. Westermayer may have been involved in recruiting Greek workers for German factories in Greece. For the general context, see Mark Mazower, *Inside Hitler's Greece: The Experience of Occupation, 1941-44* (New Haven, 1993), and Rainer Ecken, "Die wirtschaftliche Ausplünderung Griechenlands durch seine deutschen Okkupanten vom Beginn der Besetzung im April 1941 bis zur Kriegswende im Winter 1942/43," *Jahrbuch für Geschichte* 35 (1988): 235-66.

44. "Unsere Meinung: Ausländer-Polizeiverordnung," attached to Der Senator für Inneres Berlin to the Bundesminister des Innern, Gerhard Schröder, 9 January 1960, in BA Ko B 106/47380.

45. A memo by Unterabteilungsleiter Dr. Füsslein, BMI, of 26 October 1957, listed a number of reasons for a new law, including the fact that the current regulations still contained elements of National Socialist thinking, in BA Ko B 106/47379. I have analyzed the discussions about the need for a new aliens act and what form it should take in greater detail elsewhere. See Karen Schönwälder, "'Ist nur Liberalisierung Fortschritt?' Zur Entstehung des ersten Ausländergesetzes der Bundesrepublik," in *50 Jahre Bun-*

desrepublik-50 Jahre Einwanderung, ed. Jan Motte, Rainer Ohliger, and Anne von Oswald (Frankfurt am Main, 1999), 127-44, and chap. 3.3.2 in Schönwälder, *Einwanderung und ethnische Pluralität*.

46. Hermann Höcherl, "Ausländer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, no. 126, (1964), 1189-90.
47. See the interview with Hermann Höcherl on the WDR's *Die Woche in Bonn* on 17 March 1963, verbatim report of the Bundespresseamt, in *Presseauschnittsammlung des SPD-PV*, DW 2-9f4, in *Archiv der sozialen Demokratie*, Bonn. One of the SPD's home affairs spokesmen, Hermann Schmitt-Vockenhausen, demanded that the new aliens act provide measures "um verhindern zu können, dass hier ein Eldorado rechts- oder linksradikaler Emigranten-Organisationen entsteht." "Die SPD teilt mit," 30 April 1963, in BA Ko B 106/39959.
48. Hermann Schmitt-Vockenhausen, *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages*, 163. Sitzung/4. WP 12 February 1965, 8034; and similar words by Dietrich-Wilhelm Rollmann (CDU), *ibid.*, 8059-60. The three speakers included a representative of the parliamentary committee for interior affairs, of the SPD and the Interior Minister.
49. *Ibid.*, 8035-40.
50. For different views, see Ulrich Erdmann, "Das Ausländergesetz von 1965 im internationalen Vergleich," *Verwaltungsarchiv* 59 (1968): 311-44; Diemut Majer, "Entspricht unser Ausländerrecht der internationalen Rechtsauf-

- fassung? Ein Rechtsvergleich," in *Ausländergesetz '65. Alternativentwurf '70: Kritik und Reform*, ed. Forschungsinstitut der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, studentische politik no. 1 (1970), 50ff.
51. Fritz Franz, "Zur Reform des Ausländer-Polizeirechts," *Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt* 78 (1963): 797-803, here 797.
52. Der Hessische Minister des Innern to the BMI, 25 January 1962, in BA Ko B 106/39961.
53. *Verhandlungen des Bundesrates*, 249. Sitzung, 26 October 1962: 189.
54. BMWi to BMI, 11 December 1961; Ministerialdirektor Walter, BMWi, to Ministerialdirektor Schäfer, BMI, 7 February 1962, in BA Ko B 106/39961.
55. AA to BMI, 24 November 1961, in *ibid*.
56. Notes of Abt. V of the AA of 14 January 1963 on the parliamentary debates on the aliens bill, in PA AA V 6/1849. At a meeting of regional home office representatives, the Bavarian official Dr. Mayer remarked that times had changed, since under pressure from the occupying powers the asylum decree had been passed. Protocol of a meeting of AK I "Staatsrecht, Verwaltung und Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit" and AK II "öffentliche Sicherheit und Ordnung" of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Innenministerien der Bundesländer on 9 March 1964 in Bonn, in BA Ko B 106/39960.
57. BMI Höcherl to Staatsminister Heinrich Junker (Bavaria), 4

June 1964, in BA Ko B 106/39960; protocol of the meeting of the Ständige Konferenz der Innenminister der Länder on 11 and 12 June 1964 in Husum, 19-24, in BA Ko B 106/38054.

58. The second and third readings took place on 12 February 1965; the first reading had taken place on 16 January 1963, but without debate.
59. Deutscher Bundestag, 4. Wahlperiode, Kurzprotokoll der 72. Sitzung des Ausschusses für Inneres des Deutschen Bundestages, 28 November 1963, in Bundestags-Archiv, Bonn.
60. Deutscher Bundestag, 4. Wahlperiode, Kurzprotokoll der 84. Sitzung des Ausschusses für Inneres, 12 March 1964, in Bundestags-Archiv, Bonn.
61. Detlef Siegfried, "Zwischen Aufarbeitung und Schlussstrich: Der Umgang mit der NS-Vergangenheit in den beiden deutschen Staaten 1958 bis 1969," in Schildt, Siegfried, and Lammers, *Dynamische Zeiten*, 77-113, here 95, 100.
62. See, e.g., Paul Schallück, "Der unbequeme Bruder," *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte* 17 (1966): 257-61.
63. See, however, in the *Schwarzbuch: Ausländische Arbeiter* of the Jungsozialisten (Frankfurt am Main, 1972) a historical chapter that covered forced labor during the Nazi regime. See also Ruth Becker, Gerhard Dörr, and Karl H. Tjaden, "Fremdarbeiterbeschäftigung im deutschen Kapitalismus," *Das Argument* 68 (1971): 741-56.