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**Nanti evidential practice: Language, knowledge, and  
social action in an Amazonian society**

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**Nanti evidential practice: Language, knowledge, and  
social action in an Amazonian society**

by

**Lev David Michael, BA; MA**

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# **Nanti evidential practice: Language, knowledge, and social action in an Amazonian society**

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This dissertation examines the strategic deployment of evidential resources in communicative interactions among Nantis, an Arawak people of Peruvian Amazonia. In particular, this work focuses on Nantis' uses of evidentials to modulate representations of responsibility, and shows that two distinct types of responsibility must be distinguished in order to account for the socially instrumental properties of evidential resources: event responsibility and utterance responsibility. Event responsibility concerns praiseworthiness or blameworthiness for happenings in which the relevant individual is causally implicated; while utterance responsibility concerns the socially salient attributes of an utterance (e.g. truthfulness), and not the utterance's consequences. Evidential resources are shown to mitigate event responsibility in Nanti

interactions by serving as a pragmatic metaphor, whereby the sensory directness or indirectness encoded by evidentials yields inferences regarding individuals' participation in, and responsibility for, events. The use of evidential resources, principally quotative resources, to modulate utterance responsibility operates on quite different principles. Specifically, quotative resources serve to individuate utterances by attributing them to a particular source, thereby rendering explicit that individual's commitment to the stances expressed by the quoted utterance. In doing so, the use of the quotative resource emphasizes that individual's responsibility for the expressed stance. Quotative resources are also employed to decrease a first party's responsibility for a stance, by attributing it to a third party. In this case, inferences based on the Maxim of Quantity lead interactants to infer reduced commitment on the part of the first party on the basis of the attribution of strong commitment to a third party. Both epistemic stance and a variety of moral and evaluative stances are relevant to utterance responsibility. Significantly, utterance responsibility is one of the few areas in which a pragmatic tie exists between evidentiality and epistemic modality, indicating the relative marginality of epistemic modality to evidentiality in Nanti, even at the level of pragmatics. An ethnographic and historical sketch of the Nanti people is provided, and a grammatical description of the Nanti language is also included.

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

### 1.1 Introduction: empirical and analytical aims

This dissertation examines the ways in which Nantis employ evidential resources in communicative interactions, focusing on how they deploy evidential resources to modulate representations of individual responsibility in discourse.

The overarching goal of this dissertation is to advance the study of evidentiality as a part of communicative practice. That is, I am interested in the patterned deployment of linguistic structural resources in the context of real-time communicative interactions and as part of interactants' efforts to pursue interactional and social goals of various scales. I intend this study of *evidential practice*, as I call it, to serve both ethnographic and linguistic projects.

In the domain of ethnographic scholarship, my goal is to further our understanding of the social instrumentality of evidentiality, a topic that is still in its infancy (Fox, 2001; Sidnell, 2005). In particular, I seek to refine our understanding of the relationship between evidentiality and responsibility, which has been identified as the critical nexus between social action and evidential resources (Hill and Irvine, 1993b). In this regard, I argue that Nanti interactional data show us that we need

to distinguish two quite different forms of responsibility that have been largely conflated in the literature to this point: *event responsibility* and *utterance responsibility*. Event responsibility, as I explain in detail in Chapter 3, is based on an individual's role in causing some event or state of affairs; while utterance responsibility, discussed in detail in Chapter 4, concerns the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness that attaches to an individual by virtue of an utterance's attributes, such as its factuality or politeness. With regard to event responsibility, I show that in the Nanti case, individuals may deploy evidentials to distance themselves from events, thereby creating a representation of mitigated responsibility for that event. I also explicate the process by which evidentials achieve this distancing effect, which is based on a pragmatic metaphor (Silverstein, 1976) that relates increasingly indirect sensory modes of access to a given event encoded by evidentials to decreased causal responsibility for that event. With regard to utterance responsibility, which is modulated by quotative resources in Nanti discourse, I show that quotative resources ultimately serve to individuate the stances expressed by utterances, thereby rendering explicit an individual's commitment to a given stance. I argue that the responsibility-mitigating function commonly attributed to quotative resources results from inferences based on communicative maxims regarding the expression of commitment, and is not *inherent* to quotative resources. I also show that in the Nanti case, commitment to the factuality of utterances – which has been the focus of scholarship on responsibility in discourse – is but one type of stance that quotative resources may be used to express, and that Nantis also use quotative resources to indicate commitment to *moral* evaluative stances.

In the domain of linguistic scholarship on evidentiality, I aim to make two contributions. First, I seek to contribute to the debate concerning the relationship between evidentiality and epistemic modality. As discussed in detail in Chapter 2, an important school of thought has treated evidentiality as intimately related

to epistemic modality, either at the grammatico-semantic level or at the pragmatic level (e.g. Chafe and Nichols, 1986; Palmer, 1986; Willett, 1988). I show that Nanti evidential practice is only *partially* concerned with epistemic modality, even at the pragmatic level, and only as part of a broader practice by which Nantis individuate stances and indicate their commitment to them. This argument is a thread running through both Chapters 3 and 4. Second, I argue that although evidentiality is in some languages an inflectional category, in many languages that exhibit grammaticalized evidentiality, evidentiality is most perspicaciously treated as an aspect of communicative practice. I argue that efforts to treat evidentiality in purely structural terms, without reference to the social and interactional goals of speakers, leads to significant gaps in our understanding of this phenomenon.

The fieldwork on which this dissertation is based was carried out entirely monolingually. All glosses and translations are therefore my own.<sup>1</sup> Since monolingual work of this sort raises epistemological questions about data and analysis, I have included in this dissertation a grammatical description of Nanti, in Chapter 6. Apart from providing basic linguistic documentation of a minimally described language, this grammatical description serves as a means for the reader to critically evaluate the translations I give.

## 1.2 Ethnographic and historical background

### 1.2.1 Ethnographic Sketch

#### 1.2.1.1 Nanti social organization

Social life in Montetoni is organized along two principal axes: residence groups and kin groups. Residence groups are constituted by spatially proximal households among which exist strong social ties. These ties are often based on kinship relations,

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<sup>1</sup>I have also consulted with another speaker of both Nanti and English, Christine Beier, regarding the faithfulness of the glosses and translations presented in this work.

but need not be, since at the same time, it is not unusual for a group of adult kin to be scattered across multiple residence groups. Despite belonging to different resident groups, however, kin frequently interact with each other by visiting, sharing food, and participating in collaborative labor. In this section, I describe the organization of households and residence groups, and the social importance of kinship relations.

**1.2.1.1.1 Households** Households minimally consist of a couple or triple (if a man has two spouses) and their children. It is not unusual, however, for households to be organized around a senior couple, with one or more resident younger couples and their children.<sup>2</sup> In the majority of cases, younger co-resident couples consist of a daughter of the senior couple and her in-marrying husband,<sup>3</sup> although in rare cases the connection between the senior and junior couple may be between an older and a younger sibling.

In physical and spatial terms, Nanti households in Montetoni typically consist of two dwellings, a *kosuna*<sup>4</sup> or cooking hut, in which all cooking, as well as most manufacturing and socializing, is carried out; and a *maganTarira*, or sleeping hut. The sleeping hut has a raised floor, and in most cases, walls; it serves as a space to store valued material goods, as well as a sleeping area for the senior couple of the household. While in the village, Nantis spend the majority of their time in the cooking hut, seated by the fire. Cooking huts are always walled and have bare earth floors, which are covered by *shitatsi* mats. A small number of cooking huts have a small raised platform inside, but this is unusual. Normally each adult woman in the household has her own cooking fire inside the *kosuna*, although junior women may

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<sup>2</sup>Note that at this point, all triples in Montetoni are senior in their households.

<sup>3</sup>Note that although I use the terms ‘wife’, ‘husband’, ‘spouse’, and ‘marriage’ to refer to certain types of long-term relationships that Nantis form, I do so reluctantly, as Nantis do not participate in ritualized “marriages” as such; rather, couples are formed and broken through a series of locally salient interpersonal negotiations. In Nanti, the term *koriti* refers to a long-term domestic partner of either gender, thus *nokoriti*, ‘my partner/spouse’; *pikoriti* ‘your partner/spouse’; *okoriti* ‘her partner/spouse’; *ikoriti* ‘his partner/spouse’.

<sup>4</sup>Also, *kosena*.

share a fire with a senior woman if space is lacking. Typically, the main entrance of the sleeping hut and cooking hut face one another, and are separated by some 4 to 6 meters.

**1.2.1.1.2 Residence groups** A residence group is constituted by a group of spatially proximate households, which are typically clustered together closely around a common open area. Hunting, fishing, and gathering areas are shared by the members of a residence group, and it is common for members of a residence group to participate in collaborative subsistence activities. Food gathered by one member of a residence group is normally shared with other households of the residence group, but the sharing of food *between* residence groups normally only transpires when hunting or fishing has been unusually successful, or when a member of one residence group is attempting to build closer social relations with a member of another residence group.<sup>5</sup> While social interaction among members of a residence group is very frequent, interactions among members of different residence groups are considerably less frequent, even when the homes of the other group are nearby. During the 2003 to 2005 period in which I carried out my dissertation fieldwork, Montetoni had 33 households, organized into seven residence groups. Conversations with Nantis have led me to believe that contemporary residence groups are socially analogous to the communal dwellings Nantis lived in until the foundation of Montetoni, when they adapted to the use of quasi-nuclear family dwellings.

**1.2.1.1.3 Kinship groups** Like other Kampan peoples, Nantis exhibit a Dravidian kinship terminology system, in which a given individual and all same sex siblings are referred to with the same kin term. Thus, for example, both a person's

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<sup>5</sup>In this case, food is normally shared 'up', with food being given to more socially prominent individuals by less socially prominent individuals, without expectation of reciprocity.

biological mother and all of her sisters are referred to as *ina*.<sup>6</sup>

The significant kinship relationships for adults are quite different for men and women. Women typically retain strong ties with their mothers and sisters, who often play an important role in helping a woman raise her children. Indeed, in cases in which a man has two wives, it is common for the co-wives to be sisters. For men, however, relationships with parents and siblings weaken considerably as they enter adulthood, and in their place, strong ties normally develop with his wife's male siblings (*ishobanirite*) and his wife's father (*igonkirite*). The relationships between brothers-in-law tend to be very close, and brothers-in-law typically provide a great deal of labor assistance to each other, as when clearing gardens or constructing houses. Men tend to be deferential to their fathers-in-law, who have considerable authority over their young sons-in-law.<sup>7</sup> Typically, men leave the household of their parents to acquire a wife, and take up residence with the wife's family, while women typically remain with their family even after acquiring a husband. Even when a couple establishes its own household, however, the relationships of brother- and father-in-law remain very important for most men.

Although Nanti kinship terminology retains the traces of the cross-cousin marriage pattern common to the Kampan peoples (e.g. the inalienable nominal root *nebata* indicates both sister's daughter and son's wife for the male ego, while *tineri* indicates both brother's son and daughter's husband for the female ego.), there is no indication that Nantis now have any preference for cross-cousin marriage. Bride service to the wife's father is the norm for a man's first marriage, and matrilocality is the norm for at least the first several years of a couple's partnership. Most senior men in Montetoni now have two wives, and neither bride service nor matrilocality is associated with the second of two wives. Nantis characterize second wives as

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<sup>6</sup>Biological parents can be distinguished from their siblings with the suffix *-sano*, as in the case of the term *apasano* 'my true father', (cf. *apa* 'my father').

<sup>7</sup>Note that in recent years, Nantis have begun to speak of the role of *peresente*, or community leader, as analogous to the role of a father-in-law.

principally resulting from the initiative of the woman in question, an observation that appears to bear out in the majority of cases with which I am familiar. Many second marriages do not endure for more than a few years, and in most stable second marriages, the co-wives are sisters.

#### 1.2.1.2 Specialized social roles

Beyond the specialized social roles immanent in kinship groups, historically Nanti society did not exhibit recognized specialized social roles. However, in the years since Nantis initiated contact with the neighboring Matsigenka people, a number of specialized social roles have arisen, including that of *pereseteNte*, or community leader; *poromotoro*, or health worker; and *operatoro*, or communications radio operator.

In regards to specialized social roles in traditional Nanti society, perhaps the most striking fact is the absence of a specialized role of shaman or medicinal/spiritual specialist, a role which is common to all other Kampan peoples. The cognate terms for these specialists in other Kampan languages clearly reconstruct to Proto-Kampa *\*seripigari* (identical to the synchronic term in Matsigenka, *seripigari*, literally, ‘tobacco seer’), suggesting that this role is an old one among the Kampan peoples.

It should be noted that a number of practices which are related to shamanism among other Kampan peoples are also absent in Nanti society; these include belief in witchcraft, belief in female impurity, and extensive plant-based medicinal practices.

Many of the duties of the *seripigari* in other Kampan societies are non-specialist duties in Nanti society. For example, the preparation and use of *shìNkihato* ‘ayahuasca’ for curing purposes is an ability that most, if not all, adult men possess. Apart from the use of *shìNkihato*, most Nanti curing practices are in the hands of women. Women make extensive use of stinging plants to treat skin conditions and deep body pain; and they also perform minor surgery on injuries, including sewing



wounds closed.

Of the new specialist social roles to emerge in Nanti society, the most important is that of the *pereseteNte*, or community leader. This role was originally introduced by Araña, the Matsigenka schoolteacher who lived among the Nantis between 1991 and 1998 (see §1.2.2.6), primarily so that he would have a lieutenant and intermediary for maintaining his control over the Nanti population. During the period of the Nanti resistance to Araña (1996-1998), however, Migero, who then occupied the position of *pereseteNte* of Montetoni, reconfigured his role as that of a legitimate community leader, and actually spearheaded the resistance to Araña's excesses. Since then, the role of *pereseteNte* has become central to emerging Nanti ideologies of communal life, and the activities of the *pereseteNte* have become very important in both the relationships between Montetoni and the rest of the world, and in intra-settlement relationships. Subsequent to the fission of Montetoni and the establishment of Marankehari in 1998, each of these communities has continuously had an acknowledged *pereseteNte*, and currently the residents of both Montetoni and Marankehari consider this position indispensable to community life.

Above all, the *pereseteNte* is a mediator and an organizer of collective activities. Community-internally, Migero is frequently involved in mediating relationships, and especially conflicts, between individuals from distinct households or residence groups. Note that relationships of this sort are new to the multi-family group settlement pattern that emerged in the Nanti communities subsequent to their migration to the Camisea River basin (see §1.2.2.6), and the mediating role of the *pereseteNte* fills a gap that might otherwise exist in conflict resolution strategies. The *pereseteNte* also mediates community-level relations – both between Montetoni and Nanti individuals from other communities; and between Montetoni and non-Nanti individuals and institutions.

The *pereseteNte* also organizes community-level collaborative labor and sub-

sistence activities, including the periodic movement of the entire community, in order to exploit new farming areas or to take advantage of superior village sites;<sup>8</sup> the intermittent but regular clearing of village areas to impede forest encroachment; and the occasional large-scale, village-wide fishing trip using either *kogi* poison or fishing nets (see §1.2.1.3.2 below).

It merits mention that the *pereseteNte* has very little power to enforce his opinions or decisions; rather, his effectiveness depends heavily on his ability to persuade and convince others. As a result, he works to maintain a reputation for fairness, and generally avoids taking stances that would be unpopular with the majority of Nantis.

Two of the new specialist social roles in Nanti society on the Camisea River have emerged in recent years in direct connection with the introduction of new technology; these are the roles of communications radio operator (*operatoro*) and health worker (*poromotoro*, from the Spanish *promotor de salud* ‘health promoter’).

Montetoni presently has two *operatoro*, both young men who are Migero’s (biological or classificatory) sons. The *operatoro* are expected to turn on the radio each morning between 7:00 and 7:30 and make contact with the Matsigenka communities within radio range. On rare occasions, Nantis need to communicate information to individuals in these communities, but for the most part, the *operatoro* simply chats with the Matsigenka radio operators, sometimes picking up news that they pass on to the *pereseteNte* and other community members.

The *poromotoro* is a considerably more demanding role, requiring medical training from Ministry of Health personnel. The *poromotoro* keeps a small supply of Western medicines, which he<sup>9</sup> dispenses to people who come seeking his assistance. He also assists visiting medical teams and oversees the administration of courses of

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<sup>8</sup>Montetoni has moved a short distance twice, once in 1999, and again in 2001.

<sup>9</sup>Thus far, every Nanti *poromotoro* has been a young adult man, due to the relative freedom and mobility of this particular social group.

treatment recommended by visiting doctors, or by medical personal communicating over the radio.

### 1.2.1.3 Subsistence and surplus

A considerable fraction of the waking hours of any Nanti individual's life is devoted to obtaining, preparing, and consuming food; or to manufacturing the tools and tending to the resources necessary for doing so. Subsistence activities constitute the topic of much everyday conversation and form the context of many social interactions, making knowledge of this material basis of Nanti life indispensable for a properly socially-situated understanding of Nanti discourse.

Nanti subsistence practices are based on a combination of farming, fishing, hunting, and wild gathering of forest plant products and insects.

**1.2.1.3.1 Farming** Farming could be considered the basis of Nanti subsistence, as garden products are always available, regardless of hunting or fishing success; in fact, manioc is so essential a part of the diet that Nantis consider it harmful to eat meat or fish without consuming manioc at the same time.<sup>10</sup>

Nanti gardens generally consist of one-half to one hectare plots in which the primary cultigen is manioc, although plantains, corn and taro are also important crops. Nanti gardens have a productive life of approximately two years, and at any given time a man is likely to have three of them: a newly cleared garden, a productive garden (*itsamaitira*), and an older garden (*magashipogo*) from which some items remain to be harvested. The current abundance of metal tools has revolutionized Nanti farming practices on the Camisea, enabling Nantis to clear large gardens with relative ease. The result in Montetoni has been a tremendous abundance of garden produce, especially manioc, which in turn has allowed the

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<sup>10</sup>Consider the verb root *somaŋk* 'to consume manioc with'.

Montetoni Nantis to considerably increase the frequency and size of manioc beer feasts.

Agricultural labor is organized along gender lines: the clearing and planting of gardens is considered to be exclusively men's work,<sup>11</sup> and weeding is mainly performed by men. Harvesting, on the other hand, is mainly performed by women, although men frequently accompany women in an assistant's role. Gardens *per se* are considered to be men's property, but the produce is considered to be women's property. Currently in Montetoni, most adult men have at least one productive garden, with some having up to three, especially if he has two wives. In addition, some men clear 'hunting gardens', far away from the village in their favorite hunting grounds, in order to support long hunting or fishing trips. Otherwise, Nantis seek to have their gardens close to their homes – preferably within half a kilometer.

**1.2.1.3.2 Fishing** Nanti fishing practices include bow-fishing, hand-nets, throw-nets, hook-and-line fishing, hand-gathering, and the use of *kogi* poison. The first four methods are employed exclusively by men and boys; while men, women, and children all participate in the hand-gathering of fish.

For much of the year, the waters of the upper Camisea are crystal clear, making bow-fishing in its shallow waters a highly productive fishing strategy. Especially during the dry season, the scene of a lone man stalking fish in the shallows is common one. Nanti fishing arrows are distinctive in that they lack fletching and have barbed heads, made either of *kuri* palm, in the case of *kurikii* arrows, or in recent years, of cold-hammered penny nails, in the case of *karabatoNki* arrows.

The clear waters of the Camisea also make the hand-gathering (*okobagake*) of fish a highly productive strategy. A number of species of fish, but principally the ubiquitous *hetari*, rest on the undersides of rocks, making them easy prey for skilled gatherers. Unlike bow-fishing, which is carried out exclusively by men, the hand

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<sup>11</sup>The sole exception of which I am aware is the planting of *magona*, which is done only by women.

gathering of fish is carried out mainly by women, although men also participate. Although hand-gathering is not viable at times when the river is laden with sediment, it is a consistently productive strategy, meaning that at almost any time a Nanti can put together a small meal with less than an hour of gathering activity.

In contrast to bow-fishing and hand-gathering, hand-nets, throw-nets, and hook-and-line fishing are most productive when the river is thick with sediments. *Pogori* hand-nets, for example, are employed mainly during periods of intense flooding, when small fish seek shelter against steep river banks. Larger nylon throw-nets, first introduced by Matsigenka visitors in the late 1990s, are used in similar river conditions, though only a small number of younger adult men are competent in their use. Hook-and-line fishing, using *shameNtotsehi* thorns and *tamarotsa* cord, was also a traditional fishing technique, but a marginal one. However, since the mid-1990s the availability of metal fishhooks and nylon fishing line has made hook-and-line fishing more successful, and during periods of the year in which the water is turbid for weeks at a time, it is an important substitute for bow-fishing. For the most part, however, hook-and-line fishing remains largely the province of young and teen-aged boys.

All the preceding fishing strategies are essentially solitary ones, although a small group of men may work together when using a throw-net. In contrast, the use of *kogi* for fishing (*ikonahati*), is a collaborative activity that minimally involves a single household. *Kogi* (*Tephrosia toxicifera*, known as *barbasco* in Peruvian Spanish) is a plant whose roots release a milky fluid when pounded. This fluid contains rotenone, a chemical which impedes the ability of fish to absorb oxygen through their gills, either stunning or killing the fish, without rendering the flesh toxic. Nantis typically employ *kogi* in shallow water, which reduces the dilution of the chemical and facilitates the recovery of stunned fish by hand or by delivering a *coup de grace* with an arrow or machete. *Kogi* is unusual in that it is harvested exclusively by

men, and the plant itself is the sole plant that is treated as grammatically animate and exhibits masculine grammatical gender (see Chapter 6, §6.3.2).

Nantis frequently build dams (*ikamotoke*) to reduce the water level and thereby increase the efficacy of the *kogi*. Dams are built in areas where the river splits into several channels, an especially common phenomenon in the dry season when river levels drop considerably. One channel is dammed off, shunting water into the other channels and causing the water level in the dammed channel to drop. Because of the substantial labor that is frequently involved in building dams, and the large catches that result, multiple residence groups are usually involved. On several occasions, Migero has organized *kogi*-fishing trips in which the entire village of Montetoni participated. In large *kogi*-fishing trips, the catch can be huge, reaching 30 to 50 kilos of fish per household, for as many as 30 households. *Kogi*-fishing is by far the largest cooperative subsistence activity, involving, men, women, and children; and large trips are usually initiated by senior, socially prominent men who are able to attract companions at an early stage to assist with the labor to get the event off the ground.

**1.2.1.3.3 Hunting** Nanti men spend a considerable amount of time hunting, despite the fact that hunting is normally much less productive than fishing. Nevertheless, bird and mammal meat is highly prized by all Nantis, and hunting stories form a very important men's discourse genre.

Nantis hunt with bows and arrows,<sup>12</sup> using bows (*ibihane*) carved from the wood of the *kuri* palm. Arrows (*ichagore*) are made from *chakopi*, the slender flower stalks of *saboro* (*Gynerium sagittatum*) cane. All the *chakopi* for a year, around 200-300 stalks per man, must be gathered and dried in the brief 4 to 6 week period in which they are available (roughly late January to early March). The huge demand

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<sup>12</sup>In 2005, Montetoni received a single shotgun from the Dominican mission, but as of 2006, this item essentially remained a toy for young men.

this creates necessitates that Nanti men go on some of their longest trips, sending them on visits to distant headwaters regions which they otherwise rarely frequent. Subsequently, men spend many hours of the wet rainy season by their fires, making arrow after arrow, waiting for the weather to clear.

The primary Nanti hunting strategy focuses on visits to sites where animals are likely to feed, such as fruiting trees and salt licks. However, almost any time that a Nanti man leaves the village he will carry his bows and arrows with him, to take advantage of chance encounters with birds and animals. Nanti men make frequent use of hunting blinds, which they position near plants that animals or birds feed on. *IbaNkotira* are small, dome-like shelters built on the ground with room for one or two people and are normally placed at the edges of gardens, which draw agoutis (*sharoni*; *Dasyprocta variegata*), pacas (*samani*; *Cuniculus paca*) and peccaries (*shiNtori*; *Pecari tajacu*, and *imaranipage*; *Tayassu pecari*); near *posuro* plants (a small, sweet, wild plantain), which draw squirrel monkeys (*tsugeri*; *Saimiri spp.*), coatis (*kapeshi*; *Nasua nasua*), and birds like the olive oropendola (*paronpe*; *Gymnostimops yuracares*); or near the base of fruiting trees, which draw certain largely terrestrial birds, such as the (*kontona*; *Geotrygon sp.*). *ImeNkotira* are platforms hidden in the foliage of trees, which are positioned for firing on monkeys, especially woolly monkeys (*komaginaro*; *Lagothrix lagothricha*) and spider monkeys (*matsirari* or *osheto*; *Ateles sp.*), and large birds such as the *kusi* (*Pipile cumanensis*) that come to feed on flowering trees, such as the vividly yellow *shimashiritiga* and the red *taheri*.

Hunting is normally a solitary activity, or one carried out by small groups. There are two important exceptions: peccary-hunting and tapir-hunting. White-lipped peccaries (*shiNtori*, *Pecari tajacu*) form herds of up to two hundred animals, and when such a herd is spotted near the village, every available man sets out to help entrap the herd. Successful hunts of this sort sometimes yield more meat

than can be consumed. Nanti women will also frequently cooperate with men when large herds of peccaries are being hunted, serving as spotters, and helping to cut off the herd's escape. Tapirs (*kemari*, *Tapirus terrestris*) are also frequently hunted in groups. These large animals, which can weigh up to 200 kilos, are difficult to kill, and frequently must be chased and wounded several times before they can be brought down. Nantis' interest in dogs, which they first encountered in the early 1990s, is largely related to their utility in worrying wounded tapirs.

Nanti men also employ traps, especially for hunting birds. One ingenious trap, *kabehari*, consists of a set of slip-knots hung on the branch of a fruiting tree. Birds who seek to eat the fruits must stick their heads through the slipknots, and in doing so, cause the knots to tighten, which eventually strangles them.

**1.2.1.3.4 Wild-gathering** Both men and women wild-gather a range of foodstuffs, from *kahebi* fungus to *manataroki* palm fruits, as they fortuitously come across them in the course of pursuing other activities in forest. Such fortuitously discovered foodstuffs are frequently eaten on the spot, and Nantis do not set out on general wild-gathering trips, without a specific objective, in the way they may set out on a general hunting trip. Instead, gathering trips tend to be focused on specific resources that are normally available for only narrow windows of a few weeks every year.

The number of wild-gathered plant foods that are the object of concentrated collecting activity is limited, consisting of *keta*, a nut strongly reminiscent of a walnut; *kuri* palm fruits; and *hetsiki*, a fruit that is harvested primarily for its nutty seeds, although the sweet flesh of the ripe fruit is also desultorily eaten. The hearts of a variety of palms, including *kamona*, *kuri*, and *sega*, are also sought out sporadically.

Wild-gathered insects, on the other hand, form an important component of



the Nanti diet.<sup>13</sup> At several times of the year, the caterpillars of various moth and butterfly species are abundant, and other hunting and fishing activity wanes as men, women, and children go out in groups to collect these caterpillars in vast quantities. Some species are simply toasted in the coals of a fire, such as the hairy *kapoti*, which is scraped off of tree trunks, where they congregate in large numbers. Others, such as the smooth-skinned *tsuharo*, are gathered by climbing into the crowns of tall trees. *Tsuharo* must first be turned inside out to rid them of the toxic leaves of the *koho* tree, then subsequently cooked in large packets of *tsupana* (*Heliconia* sp.) leaves in great volcano-shaped fires. Grubs (beetle larvae), which are also seasonal, are highly prized for their fattiness, but are rarely gathered in large quantities, and only when chanced upon. The adult form of certain beetle species, especially *maho*, which are found in cane brakes, are also gathered when encountered.

Although wild-gathered plants do not form a major part of the Nanti diet, many wild-gathered plant materials are employed in the manufacture of the considerable majority of Nanti tools. Palm woods are very strong, and are used for bows, fishing arrowheads, spindles, and looms (*kuri*); raised house floors (*kamona*); and house walls (*taNtikota*). Before the introduction of large metal cooking pots, large vessels (*kamonaki*), were made by hollowing out *kamona* trunks. A variety of palm leaves are used for thatch, the most prized being *kapashi*. The soft bark of the *tamarotsa* tree is processed for the common spun twine used by Nantis (and formerly also used to weave fabric), while the strong fibers taken from the bark of the *kabehari* tree are used to spin *kabehatsa*, the tough cord used in bowstrings and bird traps. *Saboro* cane yields flower stalks used for the shafts of arrows, and the central vanes of the plant's long leaves are used to make the ubiquitous *shitatsi* mats that Nantis sit and sleep on. Bamboo (*kapiro*) is used in making arrowheads (*kapirokota*,

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<sup>13</sup>In addition to wild-gathered insects, Nantis also raise two kinds of fly larvae, *moguroNtsi* and *kaho*. Piles of manioc tuber skins are left in quiet spots near the village, and every few weeks the piles are taken to the river, where the larvae are rinsed out to be consumed raw.

*serikota*), single-use vessels for steaming fish (*kapirosanpi*), and for making torches.

The gathering of plant and insect foods and of plant materials is usually a mixed gender activity, as well as an activity that children frequently participate in. Women tend to form the majority of the groups that gather materials used in women's manufactory tasks, such as the weaving of *shitatsi* mats, and also tend to initiate these trips. Men, on the other hand, tend to initiate and form the bulk of groups that gather materials used in men's manufactory tasks, such as house construction. Men also usually lead activities that involve climbing trees, since tree-climbing requires the use of *magitentsi*, a climbing tool consisting of a loop of cords, and which, worn across the shoulders and chest, in past generations served as men's sole garment.

**1.2.1.3.5 Animal husbandry** Nantis are enthusiastic raisers of a wide array of birds and mammals that they capture as young and raise to adulthood – from monkeys to macaws, and even, on occasion, tapirs – and it is not uncommon for twenty species of animals to be represented in the village at one time. Animals are normally raised (*opiratakero*) by women, although men sometimes take a special interest in an animal. Some of these raised animals are eventually eaten, but most come to a natural end. Captured animals, especially birds, are highly prized by Matsigenkas, who commonly trade manufactured goods for them. However, Nantis do not explain their fondness for raising animals in utilitarian terms – they simply like doing it.

It is in this context that Nantis' large flocks of chickens (*chaberi*) are best understood. Although Nantis had some exposure to chickens in the Timpía region, prior even to their contact with Dominican missionaries, Nantis began raising chickens in earnest in 1993, when Araña brought the first breeding pairs. Chickens, which are owned exclusively by women, are now so numerous that they outnumber the Nantis themselves. Like captured pets, however, Nantis only eat chickens *in*

*extremis*, and the village's chicken population is kept in check mainly by wild predators, especially eagles and ocelots, and through trading them to visiting Matsigenkas and *mestizos*.<sup>14</sup>

#### 1.2.1.4 Geography and demographics

The geography of the regions in which the Nantis presently live and formerly lived has played an important role in Nanti history. In particular, the geography of these regions has permitted Nantis to maintain a relatively high degree of political autonomy and independence from Peruvian national society and the Peruvian state. The geography of these regions also significantly shapes present-day Nanti subsistence practices and community politics.

This study concentrates on the Nanti communities of Montetoni and Marankehari. These two communities are located at the navigable limits of the Camisea River, which is a tributary of the Urubamba River, one of the major rivers of the southern Peruvian Amazon. The headwaters region of the Camisea River, where Montetoni and Marankehari are situated, occupies a transitional zone between the lowland tropical rainforest, which stretches for thousands of kilometers to the north and east, and the cloudforest of the Andean foothills, which rise in ranks to the south and west.

A distinctive feature of this area of southeastern Peruvian Amazonia is a series of east-west ridges that march down from the Vilcabamba Range in the south, diminishing in altitude towards the north until they merge with the extreme lowland region of the Purús River basin, near the border with Brazil. These ridges create a distinctive geography of gorges and precipitously steep river valleys that makes both river and ground travel more difficult in this area than in most parts of Amazonia. To the east, these ridges are bracketed by the Fitzcarrald Bridge, a spur of hills

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<sup>14</sup>Thus far, the only Peruvian *mestizos* who have visited Montetoni have been associated either with the government, the ministry of health, or the petrochemical companies.

running from south to north from the Cordillera de Carabaya. The Fitzcarrald Bridge closes off the valleys formed by the sets of ridges at their eastern extreme, thereby creating a series of narrow, steep watersheds that drain from their eastern headwaters (adjacent to the Fitzcarrald Bridge) towards the west. This results in five major rivers, which, from south to north, are: the Yavero, the Tikompiniá, the Timpía, the Camisea, and the Mishagua. Towards their western extreme, the ridges in question are bisected by the Urubamba River, into which these five rivers drain. The Urubamba runs south-to-north from its sources in the Andes to its confluence with the Tambo River, at which point the river is re-named the Ucayali. The Ucayali continues north for some 1500 kilometers until it joins the Marañón River, forming the Amazon River proper.

Two of the previously mentioned river basins have been especially important for Nantis: the Timpía basin and the Camisea basin. Until the mid-1980s, all Nantis lived on the upper reaches of the Timpía River. The middle reaches of the Timpía are choked by a series of gorges that stretch for over 20 kilometers, making river travel completely impossible and making foot travel slow and dangerous.<sup>15</sup> Upriver of these gorges, the river valley opens up somewhat, providing a small quantity of arable land. Peaks as high as 2350 meters rise sharply from the valley floor (at roughly 800-900 meters), surrounding the territory in which the major Nanti settlements of Marihentari, Paryantimashiari, and Inkonene were found. This set of forbidding natural barriers provided a haven that apparently allowed the Nantis to avoid most of the ravages of the Rubber Boom era and to maintain relative independence from later missionary and government projects. Nantis have described the two grave disadvantages of this rugged terrain, however: a relative scarcity of arable land; and a relative scarcity of fish and game. These factors contributed

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<sup>15</sup>Efforts by Dominican missionaries to contact the Timpía Nantis during the 1970s and again in the early 2000s required a week of trekking from the Dominican mission at the mouth of the Timpía to reach the area in which most of the Nanti settlements were located.

to the attractiveness of the lands in the Camisea basin, to which Nantis began to migrate in the 1980s.

The Camisea basin lies immediately to the north of the Timpía basin and runs roughly parallel to it. The Nantis' migration to the Camisea required crossing a ridge with 1850 meter peaks and 1600 meter passes. In its extreme headwaters region, the Camisea basin is similar to the steep-sided Timpía basin, but arable land is more plentiful. Moreover, after passing the Montetoni gorge, some five kilometers upriver of the community of Montetoni, the hills suddenly drop off, and the valley opens up into a large, relatively flat area in which arable land is abundant. In addition, having come so far north, the Fitzcarrald Bridge is diminished to a small ridge that rises a mere 50 meters above the surrounding terrain, allowing easy access from the Camisea basin to the extensive Manu river basin in the east, and thereby vastly increasing the area available to Nantis for hunting and fishing. The Camisea is a slower flowing river than the Timpía, and is mostly navigable, but it is nevertheless dangerous above the downriver areas in which the Matsigenka communities of Segakiato and Cashiriari are located, due to the river's steep rapids. Not far upriver from the community of Montetoni, the Camisea ceases to be navigable, as the river is dotted with huge boulders and numerous closely-bunched rapids.

Presently we estimate that there are no more than 450 Nantis, of whom some 260-300 live in the Camisea River basin, and some 100-150 live in the Timpía River basin. In the Camisea basin there are two major settlements: Montetoni, with a population of approximately 170; and, located five kilometers downriver, Marankehari, with a population of approximately 50 individuals. A small settlement of approximately 20 individuals who left Marankehari in 2005 is located at the mouth of the Sakontohari river, some 10 kilometers downriver of Marankehari. In the opposite direction, about five kilometers upriver of Montetoni, two separate households are located near the mouth of the Pirihasanteni river, with a total population of

approximately 20 individuals.

My demographic information on the Timpía basin is less certain. Reports given by Nantis visiting Montetoni from the upper Timpía indicate that the communities there have been heavily hit by epidemics since the Dominican mission re-initiated contact efforts in 2001, and that the population has dropped significantly since then. Based on conversations with Nanti visitors to Montetoni from the Timpía, I estimate that prior to the epidemics there were approximately 150 Nantis still living in the upper Timpía region, but in the aftermath of the epidemics, that number may be considerably smaller. Most Nantis on the upper Timpía apparently live in the vicinity of Marihentari, with a number of smaller settlements located upriver of there.

### **1.2.2 Historical Sketch**

Nanti oral history is quite shallow, reaching back only as far as the late 1930s or early 1940s.<sup>16</sup> Nantis with whom I have discussed myths mention that their grandparents, who are described as having taught them the myths, directly witnessed the mythic events in question, placing the Nanti mythic era in the early 20th century. My brief summary of Nanti here reflects this characteristic of Nanti oral history, although I have supplemented it, where possible, with other sources of information. A more detailed account of Nanti history can be found in (Michael and Beier (2004)).

#### **1.2.2.1 To the limits of memory and beyond: 19th century – 1965**

In the early 1950s, when the current eldest generation were children, Nanti territory was limited to the Timpía River valley, from the area of the Inkonene settlement at its upriver extreme, to the area of the Shipetihari settlement, at its downriver

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<sup>16</sup>This state of affairs is in striking contrast with Matsigenka oral history that I have recorded, which regularly describes events of the 19th century, and also describes events that are probably Pre-Columbian.

extreme. Nantis had occasional amicable contacts with Matsigenkas of the neighboring Sotileha and Tikompinía River basins, but not with Matsigenkas living on the lower Timpía. Limited intermarriage between Nantis and Sotileha Matsigenkas took place until approximately 1940.

Nantis describe a settlement pattern and set of subsistence practices for this period that largely persisted until the 1980s, when Nantis began to migrate to the Camisea basin. Settlements consisted of 10 to 40 individuals living in one or two communal dwellings, which generally housed a single extended family each. Since Nantis practice shifting swidden agriculture, a settlement typically endured for some five to ten years before it was necessary to relocate it in order to have sufficiently close access to new land for farming. Land suitable for Nanti farming techniques was scarce in the Timpía basin and most arable land was concentrated near the mouths of major tributaries, from which settlements took their names. Consequently, despite the periodic relocation of settlements, the basic settlement areas in the Timpía basin remained stable.

Links of friendship between the scattered settlements were maintained by periodic manioc beer feasts, to which neighbors who live as far as several days' walk might be invited. At other times, Nantis – especially young men – made visits to the most distant Nanti settlements, keeping alive ties of friendship and seeking marriage partners. The residents of the roughly 10 settlements that were linked by visiting and manioc beer feasts constituted an in-marrying group with a common set of material practices, a common history, and a common set of experiences that still serves Nantis to define *noshaniNkahegi* ‘my fellows, my countrymen’.

One surprising aspect of Nanti history is the lack of any mention of contact with whites, or indeed, of any other indigenous group apart from the Matsigenkas, prior to the 1970s. This suggests that Nantis were already quite geographically isolated by the time the Rubber Boom swept through the Amazon basin with such

tragic consequences in the late 19th century. The upper Timpía basin is probably one of the least accessible regions of the Amazon basin, which may account for the Nantis (apparently) having escaped the ravages of that era. Only a short distance up from the mouth of the river, the Timpía River is no longer navigable, thus requiring anyone who wishes to visit the upper Timpía to trek approximately a week through a rugged terrain of cliffs and narrow river gorges, until they finally arrive in the relatively open area at the headwaters of the Timpía River which constituted the heart of Nanti territory.

#### **1.2.2.2 Conflict and social reorganization on the Upper Timpía: 1966 – 1973**

The Nanti polity described above was unexpectedly shaken by a series of violent incidents that took place in the mid- to late-1960s. These incidents ruptured the friendly relationships among many Nanti settlements, a division that has continued to have profound consequences to this day.

The incidents included a series of attacks on Nanti settlements that resulted in number of deaths, as well as several threatening encounters which Nantis describe as abortive attacks. The first and most notorious of these attacks occurred in approximately 1961, when a man named Guríguri and several of his allies attacked the settlement of Inkoneni, the uprivermost of the major Nanti settlements at that time. All 15-20 adults in the settlement were killed, and only five children escaped, fleeing to the settlements of the Marihentari area, where they were taken in and raised. Although the Camisea Nantis can identify the attackers, they have difficulty in explaining the motivation for this and the other attacks. Nantis indicate that the perpetrators were enraged (*itsimaNkake*), and suggest that the attack may have by triggered by the theft of produce from the attackers' gardens by the residents of Inkoneni.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>17</sup>The attack seems a disproportionate response to garden theft, and I suspect that this expla-



In response to this and the subsequent smaller attacks, the communities of the Marihentari area broke off all contact with the upriver communities, and began to refer to the upriver Nantis as *sarihanNtatsirira* ‘attackers’. According to Tyogura, a former resident of Inkonene with whom I conversed in 2002, contact between Nantis and the Matsigenka communities of the upper Sotileja region also ceased at about this time. In the space of a few short years, then, the former Nanti polity was split in two, and friendly contacts with the Sotileja Matsigenkas ceased.

### **1.2.2.3 Unexpected contacts and their consequences: 1974 – 1983**

The next major development in the lives of the Nantis was a series of unexpected encounters with Dominican missionaries and their Matsigenka agents, which began in approximately 1974. A Dominican mission had been established at the mouth of the Timpía River in the late 1950s; and in the early 1970s, the mission attempted to expand its operations to include the Nantis of the upper Timpía.

The mission made at least two major expeditions to the Nanti communities of Kinkateni and Marihentari, and made overflights of the Inkoneni area, where they dropped goods for the settlements they encountered. Initially terrified by the visitors, the residents of Marihentari and Kinkateni fled into the surrounding forest. After some time, however, they returned to their settlements and received presents of metal tools from the expedition, which included both missionaries and Matsigenka intermediaries.

After the initial exploratory expeditions, the mission founded a school and a small settlement at a site called Ibakichaa,<sup>18</sup> roughly half a day’s walk downriver from the Nanti settlements of Kinkateni and Heteriha. According to the Nantis, the

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nation is a *post hoc* explanation based on Nanti beliefs that theft triggers catastrophic and fatal consequences for the perpetrators. According to Glenn Shepard (personal communication), Matsigenkas in the Manu basin also learned of these attacks, and attribute them to a conflict over metal tools. Although I find this explanation plausible, Nantis with whom I have discussed this hypothesis have rejected it, saying that there were no metal tools in the region at that time.

<sup>18</sup>This site is known to Matsigenkas as Pakitsaari.

students for this school were taken by force and threat of violence from these two nearby settlements, and many of the residents of these settlements fled upriver to the Marihentari area after these events. Residents of Marihentari recall that an effort to bring children from Marihentari to Ibakichaa was frustrated when, forewarned of the arrival of the school teacher, the children of the settlement fled into the forest until the teacher returned downriver.

According to Nantis, the school and the adjacent settlement proved very unstable because the students fled repeatedly from the school to rejoin their families. The location of the school, far up the Timpía, also presented logistical problems for the school teacher and the mission, and after several years the school was closed, in approximately 1980. When the school was disbanded, some of the students and their families were taken to resettle close to the mission, at a site known as Kimaroari, while others fled to Marihentari until they felt it safe to return to the Kinkateni area, a few years later.

Another major consequence of this period of contacts was a number of severe epidemics that swept through the Nanti settlements, resulting in the death of a significant fraction<sup>19</sup> of Nantis from respiratory and gastro-intestinal illnesses. Fear of epidemics became so great during this time that residents of settlements would scatter into the forest at the first sign of major illness in order to wait out the epidemic. According to Nantis, once contact with the mission and its representatives ceased, the epidemics abated.

The experiences of the Timpía Nantis with the mission and the school had a number of important consequences. First, Nantis learned a great deal about whites and their indigenous allies, who were simultaneously sources of highly valued metal goods and inclined to kidnap Nanti children. Second, they became highly conscious

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<sup>19</sup>It is difficult to arrive at precise mortality figures for this period, but genealogical investigations indicate that at least 30% of the Nanti population died from introduced illnesses between the mid-1970s and the early 1980s. Note that ‘virgin soil’ epidemics like these are estimated to have mortality rates as high as 60% in other areas of Amazonia (Napolitano, 2007).

of the threat of illness from downriver regions. These factors combined to make the outside world both enticing and profoundly frightening. A third major consequence of contact with the mission was the introduction of a small quantity of metal tools, which significantly increased the ease with which Nantis could clear land for farming. At the same time, the scarcity of these tools resulted in closer ties between many of the Nanti settlements, as the sharing of these limited tools became an important aspect of Nanti subsistence practices. As we shall see, these closer ties, and Nantis' concerns about outsiders, play an important role in the next major event in Nanti history that we consider: the Nanti migration to the Camisea basin.

#### **1.2.2.4 Migration to the Camisea basin: 1983 – 1986**

In approximately 1981, contact between the Inkonene area settlements and the Marihentahari area settlements was re-established on an intermittent basis, after approximately ten years of mutual estrangement. Although relatively amicable relationships were eventually established, the first several encounters between these two groups were the source of great anxiety for the residents of the Marihentari-area settlements, as they suspected that the encounters with upriver Nantis were preliminaries to an attack. Although in retrospect this fear appears to have been unfounded, it played a pivotal role in a crucial event in Nanti history.

On one occasion in either 1981 or 1982, the residents of the Marihentari settlement panicked and fled from the settlement and crossed the 1500 meter ridge between the Timpía and Camisea basins to seek safety from the attack they feared was imminent.<sup>20</sup> This group remained in the Camisea headwaters region for several weeks, and what they found there impressed them. Fish and game were abundant in the region, and comparatively large areas of arable land were numerous. Signifi-

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<sup>20</sup>The residents of Marihentari were never attacked by the upriver Nantis, but this incident became the source of a story widely disseminated by Matsigenkas in subsequent years (and by some missionaries and anthropologists) that there had been an attack on Marihentari.

cantly, this rich area was unpopulated.<sup>21</sup>

The discovery of this new region soon led to a major migration of Nantis from the Timpía basin to the Camisea basin, motivated by a number of factors. Foremost among them was the desire to exploit the abundant resources of the Camisea basin, but some Nantis also hoped that it would be possible to acquire new metal tools to replace those that had been lost or worn out since they were acquired from the Dominican missionaries and their agents in the 1970s. Another motivation mentioned by some Camisea Nantis was to distance themselves from Nantis of the Inkonene region, who they still mistrusted, despite the renewal of peaceful relations.

Within a year or two of the discovery of the upper Camisea, Hoha, who in future years became a politically very important individual, cleared a small garden on the banks of the Makitihari, a small tributary of the upper Camisea, to support extended hunting and fishing trips in the upper Camisea basin. By 1983, his brother Bikotoro and his father-in-law Hoshi did likewise. Shortly thereafter, their extended family resettled to Makitihari, and began clearing new gardens a short distance downriver, on the banks of the Mayobeni, another tributary of the upper Camisea. When this family group resettled in Mayobeni in approximately 1984, other residents of Marihentari took over the abandoned Makitihari settlement. By 1986 a new set of gardens were cleared at Pirihasanteni, and the leading edge of the Nanti colonization of the Camisea basin expanded further downriver. As groups living in Mayobeni and Makithari left for the Pirihasanteni settlement, new migrants from the Marihentari area settled in Makitihari and Mayobeni.

The new gardens in Pirihasanteni were so fruitful that a group from Pirihasanteni, led by Samoero (died 1996) a socially prominent man at that time, made

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<sup>21</sup>The upper Camisea basin previously had been a Matsigenka settlement area, although it was never heavily populated. At the time that the Marihentari Nantis arrived in the region, however, it had been unpopulated for some 5 to 10 years, due to raids by a Panoan group based in the upper Manu basin against isolated Matsigenka households on the upper Camisea, which had led Matsigenkas to abandon the region.

trips to the more distant downriver Timpía settlements of Shipetihari, Hetariha, and Kinkateni, to invite the residents of these communities to relocate to Pirihasanteni. The invitation was received warmly, and within a few months, the residents of all these communities had resettled in Pirihasanteni. With these new arrivals, the population of Pirihasanteni had grown to approximately 100 individuals, by far the largest Nanti settlement ever, in the memories of the Nantis of that time. Pirihasanteni was also highly significant because it consisted of multiple family groups that lacked strong kinship ties, and thus represented a new type of settlement, and one which formed a model for the larger Nanti settlements founded in the 1990s.

#### **1.2.2.5 Voluntary contact and new relationships: 1987 – 1990**

By 1987, residents of Pirihasanteni were making extended hunting and fishing forays down the Camisea River that took them downriver of the precipitous Montetoni river gorge, which formed a significant barrier to most Matsigenka travel further up the Camisea. It was during a fishing trip far downriver of the Montetoni gorge that Nantis first voluntarily initiated contact with outsiders.

The fishing party, which included Hoha, Tito, and Migeró (all three served as community leaders in later years), saw a small group of Matsigenkas who were cutting palm fronds for thatch, near the mouth of the Marankehari, without being seen themselves. The Nantis noticed that the Matsigenkas were using machetes, and after some discussion, Tito decided to approach the Matsigenkas to negotiate for a machete. The encounter was at first frightening for both the Nantis and the Matsigenkas, and the two groups had difficulties in communication, but each side soon determined that the other had peaceful intentions, and a friendly interaction ensued.

Significantly, the Matsigenka group included a man named Martín Vargas, a retired schoolteacher who had worked closely with the Summer Institute of Linguis-

tics (SIL) during the time that the SIL was establishing contact with voluntarily isolated groups in the Manu region. Vargas promised the Nantis two machetes in exchange for help cutting thatch, and for two days the two groups worked together. As he got ready to return downriver to Segakihato, where he lived, he promised the Nantis to return the following year with more metal tools for them, but asked them to relocate their settlement downriver of the Montetoni gorge, to make it possible to visit them.

Encouraged by the prospect of more metal tools, and their fears of outsiders allayed by Vargas' friendly manner, the Nantis soon began clearing new gardens just downriver of the Montetoni gorge at a site called Pihegihato. By the time Vargas returned in 1988, Pihegihato already had approximately 40 residents. Vargas brought new axes and machetes, as well as some used cooking pots, all of which were eagerly received by the Nantis of Pihegihato. Vargas visited again in 1989 and 1990, each time bringing more gifts. Although Vargas clearly sought to 'civilize' Nantis by, for example, attempting to convince them to wear clothes, Nantis describe him as affable and kind, and he was remembered fondly when news of his death arrived in 2001.

#### **1.2.2.6 Imposition of a Matsigenka hegemony: 1991 – 1995**

Unknown to the Nantis, Vargas' policy towards the Nantis became part of broader plan that developed among certain politically-powerful Matsigenkas to concentrate the Nantis in a single settlement and bring them under Matsigenka control. The motivations for this plan were complex, and included a desire to gain control over the natural resources of the region, a move to gain an advantage in the political jockeying between the two rival Matsigenka indigenous federations, and the fact that many Matsigenkas have internalized an anti-indigenous ideology of *civilización* advanced by missionaries and the mestizo-controlled educational system.

With Vargas having convinced the Nantis of the good intentions of the Matsigenkas, the next step was to install a schoolteacher, Silvero Araña, in the Nanti community of Pihegiato. Araña arrived in approximately April 1991, accompanied by Vargas, who promised that Araña would be a steady source of metal goods and help maintain good relations between the Nantis and Matsigenkas. Little was said about the school that Araña would form. The Nantis, trusting the promises of the Matsigenkas, accepted Araña enthusiastically.

Although it did not become evident to the Nantis for some time, Araña's goal was nothing other than the total transformation of Nanti society into his vision of an ideal indigenous community, which was largely modeled on his understanding of Peruvian mestizo society. Araña soon came to express open disdain for the Nanti language, which he considered a broken form of Matsigenka, and for most Nanti material and cultural practices, from hunting with bows and arrows, to wearing traditional Nanti clothing, to *karĩntaa* poetry, the central event of Nanti manioc beer feasts.

Araña's first major goal after settling into Pihegiato was to concentrate all the Montetoni Nantis in a single settlement, which required a larger village site. Before the end of 1991, Araña had convinced the Pihegiato Nantis to clear a site for the settlement of Montetoni, and by the end of 1992, the residents of Pihegiato had relocated to the new settlement. Araña blamed the periodic epidemics that began to sweep through the Nanti settlements with his arrival on the communal dwellings the Nantis used until this point, and employed this argument to convince the Nantis to construct nuclear family dwellings in the new settlement.

At this point, Montetoni had approximately 100 inhabitants, but Araña also sought to concentrate in Montetoni the other 150 Nantis living in the Camisea basin. His swift success in doing so was due in large part to his reliance on Hoha, who, as one of the leaders of the migration from the Timpía, was widely respected by

Nantis. Hoha transmitted Araña's promises of metal goods for everyone who moved to Montetoni, and by the end of 1995, all but a handful of the Camisea Nantis were living in Montetoni. Not long after this point, Araña appointed Hoha the *presidente*<sup>22</sup> of the new community, and delegated to Hoha the enforcement and implementation of many of the directives he issued to the community regarding the community labor he demanded.<sup>23</sup>

As his power in the Nanti community grew, Araña began to use violence, intimidation, and threats of withholding metal goods to coerce Nantis to carry out clearing and construction tasks to build the community he envisioned. After Araña was satisfied with the basic infrastructure of the community, he began a campaign of coercion and humiliation aimed at ridding the Nantis of all practices that he deemed 'uncivilized', such as traditional dress and ornamentation. In the school he sought to 'correct' the language of his students by criticizing the use of lexical items that differed from their Matsigenka counterparts.

As the years wore on, he increasingly used Nanti labor for personal profit, especially for commercial logging, and he began a regular pattern of sexual assault on Nanti women and girls. In effect, Araña had come to treat Montetoni as his fief.

Despite the worsening conditions under Araña, Nanti resistance remained muted. Nantis expressed to me their profound fear of Araña's temper and inclination towards violence; and moreover, collective action against Araña was impeded by the fact that the Nantis' nominal leader, Hoha, was allied with Araña. In 1996, however, Araña finally overplayed his hand significantly, allowing Montetoni to escape from

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<sup>22</sup>The *presidente* is one of the three principal elected roles in the legal structuration of titled Peruvian native communities. Araña adopted this term without adopting any other part of the legal structuration. As described in greater detail below, the Camisea Nantis subsequently reconfigured the role of *peresente* to satisfy their own political ends.

<sup>23</sup>I first travelled to Montetoni in 1993 in the company of two Matsigenkas men. This visit lasted less than two weeks, but my observations of the interactions between Araña and the Nantis began at that time. For detailed discussion of my subsequent involvement in and relationship with the Camisea Nanti communities, see Beier and Michael (1998, 2002); Michael and Beier (2004); Michael (2001a).



his control.

#### **1.2.2.7 Nanti resistance: 1996 – 1998**

Not long after the Camisea Nantis were concentrated in Montetoni in 1995, Araña began planning to relocate the community further downriver, principally to make feasible the commercial agricultural activities he hoped to carry out using Nanti labor. In early 1996 he had the Nantis clear a five hectare space near the mouth of the Marankehari, which he then had them plant with achiote for subsequent sale downriver. In late 1996 he and some 80 Nantis moved to the new settlement, with the expectation that the other Nantis would follow soon after. The Nantis who relocated with Araña included a group of some ten young men, who as his students had embraced the vision of ‘civilization’ that he promoted in the school and were personally very loyal to Araña; a group of young women who served both as household servants and as additional wives; and the parents and siblings of these young women. Significantly, many of the Nantis who relocated with Araña, including Hoha, *presidente* of the new community, identified with Araña’s evaluation of traditional Nanti practices as inferior to Matsigenka practices, and even more so, mestizo ones.

As the months passed, it became increasingly clear that the approximately 170 residents of Montetoni were in no hurry to relocate to Marankehari, and so Araña began to step up pressure on them, threatening to withhold new metal goods, and even threatening to confiscate ones they already owned. These threats were delivered by Hoha to Migero, the *peresetente* of Montetoni that Araña had appointed in Hoha’s place, and brother to Hoha. Migero, however, had no desire to serve as Araña’s enforcer, and instead argued that the threats were unwarranted and unreasonable. After many months of stalling, Migero also clearly articulated that the Montetoni Nantis had no intention of relocating to Marankehari.

Tension between Araña and the Montetoni Nantis escalated, and Araña's threats became increasingly extreme – such as vowing to prevent a visiting government medical team to visit Montetoni – and outlandish, as when he warned the Nantis that the Peruvian military would bomb Montetoni unless they relocated. With the leadership of Migero, however, and out from under the threat of immediate violence,<sup>24</sup> the Montetoni Nantis became increasingly outspoken about Araña's behavior with visitors, including the author.

The information provided by the Montetoni Nantis eventually led, in 1998, to the Peruvian government investigating Araña's conduct, and then issuing a warrant for Araña's arrest on 14 counts of sexual assault against a minor. Tipped off by Matsigenka allies downriver, however, Araña evaded capture and subsequently fled with a group of approximately 15 Nantis, including his three wives and the young men who were his closest adherents. After living as a fugitive for some six months on the lower Camisea, he abandoned these Nantis, and fled to the distant Mipaya River. Although Araña was eventually stripped of his teaching position, he has remained free, despite a number of attempts to capture him.

#### **1.2.2.8 Negotiating autonomy and a new social order: 1999 – 2002**

Nantis' experiences with Araña and their resistance to him had profound effects on Nanti political organization and on Nanti attitudes towards a variety of outside institutions and groups. The abrupt departure of Araña from the upper Camisea also put the Nantis in uncontested control of their own communities for the first time since early 1991.

One of the major results was strong opposition from Nantis to the presence of schoolteachers in their communities, and a profound suspicion of Matsigenka

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<sup>24</sup>The threat of violence remained very real to the Nantis living in Marankehari, however. At one point, one of the oldest women in the village objected to Araña's rape of her granddaughter, leading Araña to assault her with a rock. She died from her injuries within a few days.

intentions. During the conflict between Araña and the Nantis, a number of Matsigenka leaders had sought to intimidate the Nantis into withdrawing their accusations against Araña, a course of action that led the Nantis to identify the Matsigenka political leadership as allied with Araña.

Nantis' resolve regarding school teachers was repeatedly tested, and Migeró rejected a number of efforts to place Matsigenka teachers in either Montetoni or Marankehari. For example, in approximately March of 2001, a new government-appointed Matsigenka teacher arrived in Marankehari, without prior consultation with Nantis. Despite their reservations, the residents of Marankehari acquiesced in the face of the teacher's promises. However, when the news of his arrival reached Montetoni, Migeró and a group of socially prominent men immediately travelled downriver to face the new teacher. Migeró explained in no uncertain terms that his presence was unwelcome, and ordered him to depart. The teacher attempted to convince Migeró to relent, but failing to do so, returned downriver the next day, and never returned.

Montetoni's conflicts with Araña also resulted in the explicit ideologization among the residents of Montetoni of their community as a moral and social collectivity, *hashihegi komoniraro* 'our (incl.) community'. This new understanding of community membership was clearly in play in 1999, when Migeró advocated that the community re-situate itself on the opposite bank of the river in order to be closer to the newer gardens and larger areas of arable land. Community members enthusiastically collaborated in the clearing of the new village site and in the construction of new dwellings, and explicitly characterized this collaborative work as a joint effort by the community, and not simply kinship-based collaboration. Led by Migeró, periodic collective labor to cut the grass in the center of the ring-shaped village also became ideologized as a manifestation of *komoniraro*.

The construction of the new settlement marked a period of increasing promi-

nence of manioc beer feasts in community life. Prior to this point, manioc beer feasts were held roughly every two to three weeks in Montetoni, and endured some 8 to 10 hours. In the new village, however, the tempo began to increase, until they came to be held roughly every seven days. The amount of manioc beer prepared for the feasts also increased, allowing feasts to last up to 24 hours, and in later years, up to 48 hours. As I describe in §1.3.1, manioc beer feasts are one of the primary contexts for inter-household interactions, and it is easy to see the increase in the frequency of the primary context for inter-family interactions as related to efforts in Montetoni to create a new form of multi-family community.

In the years immediately after Araña's departure, the most important relationships that the Nantis had with outsiders were with Ángel Díaz, a Matsigenka evangelical pastor, and with myself and Christine Beier. Díaz had begun visiting the Nanti communities intermittently in the mid-1990s, but his involvement with the Nanti communities intensified in 1997, when the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) became interested in translating a Nanti New Testament. Between 1998 and 2001, Díaz visited Marankehari two or three times each year, staying for several weeks each time. Díaz collected some linguistic data to aid in the translation project, organized the creation of a new school, and also began evangelical work in the community. The Camisea Nantis had a very high opinion of Díaz at the time, in part because of the role he had played in legal charges being brought against Araña, and they generally welcomed his presence. Also beginning in 1998, pairs of Nanti men were brought for a number of visits to the then SIL base in Yarinacocha, where they worked first with David and Judy Payne, and later with Wayne and Betty Snell,<sup>25</sup> on linguistic matters related to the preparation of Nanti educational materials and the translation of the New Testament. Díaz'd direct involvement in

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<sup>25</sup>The Paynes were involved with the Nanti translation project due to their expertise on the Ashéninka variants in the Kampan family. The Snells were involved due to their knowledge of Matsigenka, and had in fact themselves produced the existing translation of the New Testament into Matsigenka.

the Nanti communities tapered off significantly after 2001, when the SIL completed the translation project and ceased financing Díaz' visits to the Nanti communities.

Díaz's effort to found a school in Marankehari met with Nanti approval because he sought to meet their condition that any teacher in their communities be Nanti. Two young men who were considered the most promising students from Araña's school, Berenarto and Tekori, were provided with training and started teaching in Marankehari in 1999. Despite initial enthusiasm on the part of children and community members, however, the effort proved unsustainable, and Berenarto and Tekori stopped teaching. Although the school had little success from an educational standpoint, it did temporarily serve to relieve the pressure being put on the Nantis to accept a Matsigenka teacher.

In the period under discussion, Migeró's influence in Montetoni grew considerably, due to his remarkable leadership, which met with the approval of the community's residents. However, during the same period, the political leadership of Marankehari became a source of contention. Hoha had always displayed a much more authoritarian leadership style than his brother Migeró, and in July of 2000, increasing dissatisfaction with Hoha came to a head when he interfered with the burial of a woman who had recently died. In the dispute that followed, other complaints surfaced – such as the fact that Hoha had stepped in to arrange marriages that left several young women and their families unhappy; and in some cases had even resorted to physical coercion to assure that the young women stayed with their chosen husbands. In the aftermath of these events, several residents of Marankehari left to live in Montetoni, and others formed a new settlement at Sakontohari, several hours walk downriver of Marankehari. Hoha's social influence dropped significantly, and he left the position of *pereseteNte* towards the end of 2000. At this point, Díaz intervened and chose Berenarto, one of the two Nanti teachers, to replace Hoha as *pereseteNte*. Although Berenarto was well-liked, his youth (he was approximately 19

at the time) severely affected his ability to serve as an effective leader, which hampered the Marankehari Nantis' ability to organize concerted responses to outside pressures. Beginning in 2002, Hoha began a series of efforts to return to power, at least in substance if not in name. In response, Berenarto asked his father Anteres, who lived at that time in Montetoni and was one of the most respected Nanti men, to relocate to Marankehari. Anteres acquiesced to Berenarto's request. With his father by his side, Berenarto's efficacy as a leader increased significantly. Hoha's continued efforts to usurp Berenarto's power led to a series of conflicts between Montetoni and Marankehari in 2003 and 2004, and in their aftermath, the residents of Marankehari expelled Hoha from the community.

#### **1.2.2.9 The present and future: new challenges and new opportunities: 2003 – 2007**

Beginning in 2003, the Nanti communities began to have increasingly frequent contact with outside entities, including officials from the Manu National Park, petrochemical company representatives, and representatives of the Dominican mission.

In the first months of 2003, the Montetoni Nantis received an unexpected visit from officials of the Manu National Park, which lies some three kilometers to the east of Montetoni. I was not in the village at the time, and once I arrived I was unable to glean the principal reason for their visit; to the Montetoni Nantis, the most newsworthy aspect of their visit was that the park officials reportedly forbade the Nantis to either hunt or fish in the park without obtaining prior permission for each trip, and completely forbade agricultural activity within the park. These prohibitions initially caused great concern to the residents of Montetoni, since roughly half of the Nanti hunting and fishing territory lies in the park. Migero in particular sought to avoid a conflict with the park officials and at first sought to convince the families whose hunting areas lay in the park to hunt elsewhere. This suggestion was

highly impractical, however, and Migero soon sought only to stop the clearing of new gardens. Even in this, however, he was unsuccessful, and he eventually decided to wash his hands of the matter entirely. As of late 2006, park officials had not returned, or attempted to enforce their prohibitions.

In 1996, Shell announced plans to exploit the Camisea natural gas fields, one of the largest known deposits of natural gas in South America. In 1997, Shell began a projected 40-year multi-billion dollar project in the lower Camisea region with the active encouragement of the Peruvian government, but over the objections of numerous environmental and human rights groups. Shell anthropologists and environmental consultants made a number of brief visits to the Nanti communities, and installed a communication radio in Marankehari, but their presence, some 50 kilometers downriver of the Nanti communities, otherwise did not greatly interest or impact the Nantis. In 1998, Shell withdrew from the Camisea project due to disagreements with the Peruvian government.

The Peruvian government, however, was eager to have the Camisea fields developed, seeing them as a major boon to the Peruvian economy, and solicited new bids for the project. In 2000 the Peruvian government awarded the Camisea project contract to a consortium of international companies, led by the Argentinian company PlusPetrol.

PlusPetrol eschewed many of the environmental and social safeguards adopted by Shell, and has displayed much less concern for avoiding contact with indigenous peoples who themselves have chosen to avoid direct contact with mestizo society. Rather, PlusPetrol has supported a policy of integrating populations like the Nantis into Peruvian society.

An influential institution that has developed close ties with PlusPetrol is the Dominican mission, to the degree that the Timpía mission even received helicopter logistical support from the consortium to make contact with the Nantis of the up-

per Timpía in 2001. In 2003, the Dominican mission began a long-term effort to missionize the Nanti communities on the Camisea. This effort is being led by Padre David Martinez de Aguirre, an enthusiastic young priest who sees the increased integration of Nantis with Peruvian mestizo society as a desirable goal. Padre David made visits to Montetoni in 2003 and 2004, bringing gifts, and through Matsigenka translators, sought to convince the Montetoni Nantis to accept a mission school staffed by a mission-supervised Matsigenka schoolteacher. The community in general was quite unenthusiastic about this proposal, but Padre David was determined to convince the Nantis to accept the school, and made additional visits to attempt to sway them.

Then in approximately December 2004, PlusPetrol informed Migeró that his presence was required for a meeting in Lima, and flew him there. Although Migeró never learned the purpose of the meeting, the experience affected him profoundly. In particular, he found that because he was unable to speak Spanish, he was effectively shut out of all serious discussion at the meeting. Having become accustomed to being a central participant in all matters of political importance affecting Montetoni, since assuming of the position of *peresetente* some eight years earlier, Migeró found his abrupt marginalization highly troubling. Migeró's analysis of the situation was that it was his lack of mastery of Spanish that placed him in this disadvantageous position.

In this context, Padre David's arguments regarding the utility of Spanish suddenly had great weight, and upon his return to Montetoni, Migeró set about attempting to turn the tide of opinion in the community in favor of the proposed school. In April 2005, Padre David made another visit to Montetoni, and Migeró accepted the mission's proposal, but with the proviso that the proposed schoolteacher live in Montetoni with his wife, and only during the times of year that he would be actively teaching.



At the time that Migero agreed to the mission's proposal, the majority of the community opposed the decision to permit the Dominican mission to install a teacher and school. However, Migero convinced several of Montetoni's most socially prominent men of the wisdom of having a school in the community, and he appeared to have calculated that with their support, he would eventually be able to win the support of the majority of the community.

Padre David also wanted the Montetoni Nantis to agree to build an airstrip in the community, to facilitate the arrival of mission personnel in the community.<sup>26</sup> Migero was, however, much less enthusiastic about the proposal to build an airstrip in the community, and did not organize communal labor to clear it. The mission eventually responded, in 2006, by sending a group of hired Matsigenkas to clear the strip with chainsaws. It is unclear, however, whether the airstrip will prove viable in the longterm, as it must be regularly re-cleared, and it is by no means certain that Nantis will be interested in investing the labor necessary to do so.

The new Matsigenka school teacher, Willy Prialé, arrived in Montetoni in August 2005 to set up the school and begin teaching, and returned again in 2006. During my visit to Montetoni in December 2006, the residents of Montetoni expressed to me their general satisfaction with the behavior of the school teacher.

Recently, the nature of the mission's involvement in the Nanti communities has also been rendered uncertain, due to charges brought against the mission to the American Court of Human Rights by AIDSESEP, Peru's national Amazonian indigenous federation, accusing the mission of making contact with voluntarily isolated indigenous groups in legally protected areas, including the Reserva Kugapakori-Nahua.

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<sup>26</sup>As mentioned in §1.2.1.4 the terrain in the upper Camisea region is such that river travel is quite hazardous, especially to non-local travelers, and the mission, already having its own plane, would have far more frequent access to Montetoni were an airstrip available.

## 1.3 Nanti communicative life

The purpose of this section is to provide a brief ethnography of speaking, focusing on the major Nanti discourse genres. I provide information on the participation structures that typify each genre, restrictions on participation, and the distinguishing topical and formal features of each genre.

The most striking feature of the overall discourse ecology into which Nanti discourse genres fit is the division between manioc beer feasts and the remainder of Nanti social life. Several important genres are restricted to manioc beer feasts; and others that may occur outside of feast contexts are much more common within them. Significantly, multi-party genres are restricted to feasts, and feasts are the principal context in which Nantis interact with individuals outside their own resident groups. In fact, for many Nantis, especially women, feasts are the only time that they regularly interact with individuals living in residence groups distant from their own.

### 1.3.1 Feast communication

#### 1.3.1.1 Shitatsi talk

*Shitatsi* talk is a multi-party interactional genre restricted to feasts, when Nantis are seated, normally on *shitatsi* mats, drinking manioc beer. Topically, *shitatsi* talk focuses on entertaining, and typically humorous, themes. The genre is distinguishable acoustically by the prevalent intermixing of laugh tokens with utterances, and by the frequent laughter by non-speaking participants.<sup>27</sup> At any given time, *shitatsi* talk is typically focused on a single topic, say, an amusing mishap, to which any adult in the participating group may contribute. In striking contrast with many other Nanti discourse genres, *shitatsi* talk interactions are not dyadic; rather, speakers

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<sup>27</sup>In stark contrast, the small number of women who are distributing manioc beer to the seated group generally maintain a serious demeanor, and do not contribute to the interaction.

typically make their contributions in very loud voices, and without directing them to a particular individual (evidenced by eye gaze).

This genre is also characterized by a distinctive spatial arrangement, in which participants tend to seat themselves very closely to one another, often touching. The majority of the group is normally oriented towards a central area, which is situated in front of a cluster of the most highly socially prominent men present, who are usually seated together.

#### **1.3.1.2** *IkaNtagenati*

*IkaNtagenati*, perhaps best glossed as ‘ribbing’, is an interactional genre that occurs principally during the early stages of a feast, while most attendees are still seated on *shitatsi* mats, drinking manioc beer. The topics of *ikaNtagenati* are typically ones that would be considered grievously insulting in other contexts; but in this context, they elicit raucous laughter from the assembled group. A favorite topic of *ikaNtagenati* is sexual joking involving encounters with other people’s partners. Typically *ikaNtagenati* is organized around a dyadic interaction in which one party makes a variety of outrageous proposals to a second person, who is the embarrassed butt of the joke. Overhearers, who are typically laughing at the humor, may also join in with humorous commentary of their own. The person who is the butt of the joke largely maintains an embarrassed silence, but any responses he or she musters which turn the tables are highly appreciated by the audience of overhearers. Both men and women participate in the genre, although it is rare for women to be in the role of the primary ‘ribber’.

#### **1.3.1.3** *PereseteNte* oratory

Along with the novel social role of *pereseteNte*, or community leader, has emerged a new discourse genre: *pereseteNte* oratory. This genre is in large part the innovation

of Migero, the long-term *pereseteNte* of Montetoni, but its occasional use by others indicates that the genre is recognized as such by Nantis, and cannot simply be considered a personal speaking style.<sup>28</sup>

*PereseteNte* oratory is nominally dialogic, in that the speaker's attention is primarily focused on a particular individual, who responds with continuers appropriate to a typical Nanti conversational interaction. It is clear, however, that the speaker considers all the ratified overhearers to be recipients, in that his voice is normally much louder than typical for a dyadic conversation, and his gaze often flickers to the group of overhearers, suggesting that he is monitoring their reactions to his utterances. For their part, the ratified overhears are normally silent during *pereseteNte* oratory, suggesting that they recognize the existence of a conversational floor that extends beyond the nominal dyadic pair, and their gaze is often directed at the speaker.

*PereseteNte* oratory is characterized by turns at talk that are considerably longer than is typical for Nanti conversation, sometimes lasting several minutes. This genre also exhibits considerable thematic cyclicity, through which a small set of major themes are repeated several times in the course of the oration. Migero marks the transition from conversation to *pereseteNte* oratory with a unique form of throat clearing that is normally successful in both drawing the attention of the group of ratified overhearers and signalling to the nominal dyadic recipient that his or her responses should be limited to continuers.

I have witnessed *pereseteNte* oratory performed in a wide range of social contexts, but it is much more common in feast contexts than in non-feast ones. This is no doubt in large part due to the fact that this genre is generally employed to communicate matters of wide import to the community, and feasts are the principal

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<sup>28</sup>Migero has on occasion sought to groom young Nanti men to be able to replace him when he eventually steps down from the role of *pereseteNte*. As part of this process, Migero has encouraged these young men to perform *pereseteNte* oratory in appropriate contexts.

context in which large groups of individuals assemble. In fact, I have seen Migero deliberately postpone the discussion of a topic until a feast, so that he could address the topic, using *pereseteNte* oratory, in the presence of a large group of ratified overhearers.

#### 1.3.1.4 *KariNtaa* Chanting

*KariNtaa* is a genre of extemporaneous chanted poetry performed during manioc beer feasts. *KariNtaa* chanting breaks down into two major subgenres: one genre performed by both men and women, and one performed exclusively by women. The former genre is performed considerably more frequently than the latter.

Both genres share the same basic features.<sup>29</sup> After several hours of seated drinking at the manioc beer feast, individuals rise, form lines by joining hands, and begin to chant. As they chant, the lines of chanters move fluidly around the open areas near to those seated. These lines may range from two to 40 individuals, depending on various situational factors, and there may be as few as one or as many as five or six lines moving around the open areas simultaneously. The chanting itself consists of alternations between a fixed refrain and couplets of improvised lines, the *kariNtaa* proper. There are upwards of a hundred fixed refrains, which range from sequences of uninterpretable vocables to easily parsable clauses. At any given time, a group of chanters will chant the same refrain, though not necessarily in a synchronized manner. Switches between refrains, which typically occur every ten to twenty minutes, are normally initiated by a socially prominent individual who simply begins chanting a new refrain, upon which the other members of the line switch to the new refrain.

*KariNtaa* couplets consist of a pair of seven-mora lines, to which the improvised verses must conform. The beginning of each line corresponds to the beginning

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<sup>29</sup>For detailed description and discussion of this impressive verbal genre, the reader is referred to Beier (2001, 2003); Michael (2004a).

of a word, but pairs of lines may exhibit enjambment. The end of each couplet, however, corresponds to the end of a sentence. Verses are made to conform to the metrical constraints of the line through the morphophonological processes of vowel lengthening, syllable reduplication, word truncation at the ends of lines, and the addition of vocable suffixes.

*KariNtaa* chanting is frequently performed dialogically, or even in the manner of a multi-party conversation, as chanters respond to the extemporaneous verses of others with their own extemporaneous verses. Almost any topic may serve as an acceptable topic for *kariNtaa* couplets, but the genre's principal significance for the local discourse ecology lies in the fact that it is considered a socially appropriate site for expressing strong criticisms of others, for making significant requests of others, and for moralizing about others' behavior – all of which are communicative stances that are strongly dispreferred in other contexts.

The women's *kariNtaa* genre is principally distinguished by lines of women chanting a distinct set of refrains that are never performed by men, and by the fact that only other women may serve as dialogical chanting partners.

#### **1.3.1.5 Myth and oral history narration**

The narration of both oral history and myths is referred to with the verbal root *keNkitsu* – although the narrations of oral history and myths are clearly distinguishable, as I discuss below. Nevertheless, Nantis have clearly and explicitly expressed to me that the telling of these two kinds of narratives is appropriate only during manioc beer feasts.<sup>30</sup> Both forms of narration are mainly performed by men, although I have also heard older women participate in the narration of oral history.

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<sup>30</sup>A small number of Nanti men, especially my close friend Bikotoro, are sometimes happy to narrate oral history for my benefit outside of this context.

**1.3.1.5.1 Myth narration** Myths are told dialogically, with the two male narrators treating each other as recipients of the narrative. The two narrators typically alternate narrating scenes in the myth, although it is common for the ‘resting’ narrator to provide additional commentary at the same time, such that his contributions overlap considerably with those of the ‘primary’ narrator. Although the two narrators treat each other as recipients, there is typically a large group of ratified overhearers, who frequently interject questions that the narrators may respond to, while each still treats their co-narrator as the focal recipient.

I have never heard a myth narrated outside of the context of a feast, and in fact I have found Nantis to be flatly unwilling to narrate myths outside of the feast context. Indeed, myth narration is rare even in such contexts, and the instances I have witnessed have all been triggered by events that make the content of the myth relevant to everyday concerns. For example, the first and only time I have ever heard the myth that concerns the near-destruction of the world – which was triggered by the extinction of the moon, and subsequently averted by the re-ignition of the moon by the primordial tapir – was on the evening of a lunar eclipse. On that impressive occasion, the entire village was awake for several hours during the middle of the night, with men firing flaming arrows into the sky, and both men and women shouting a fixed phrase at the moon, all in order to help re-ignite the moon and prevent it from falling to earth and crushing everyone beneath it. In this context, I heard the relevant myth narrated numerous times in dyadic pairs. Even the very next day, however, I had no success in finding anyone who was willing to narrate the myth to me, despite the fact that several men had been very concerned that I hear and understand the myth the previous evening.

**1.3.1.5.2 Oral history narration** Interestingly, from the perspective of evidentiality, the narration of myths does *not* involve the use of quotative resources except for the quoted dialogue of characters within the myth, despite the fact that

narrators will happily clarify from whom they learned the myth (stereotypically, a grandparent). As such, in evidential terms, the narration of myths patterns with the relation of generally accepted facts and personal experience.

The narration of oral history is considerably more monological than myth narration, although such narratives are usually told to a specific recipient who responds with continuers and asks questions regarding the unfolding narrative. However, the recipient is not expected to co-narrate an oral history narrative, and on several occasions I have seen narrators express irritation when another individual seeks to contribute to the narrative, and even ask that they be permitted to continue their narrative without interruption. As with myth narration, there is normally a large group of ratified overhearers.

Oral history narration, unlike myth narration, makes extensive use of quotative resources, and evidential resources more generally. Personal experience and knowledge acquired through verbal report are normally carefully distinguished.

#### **1.3.1.6 Hunting talk**

Hunting talk is a narrative genre mainly performed by men, and mainly in the context of feasts. However, women may participate in hunting talk if they were involved in the events being narrated, and may sometimes be the recipients of hunting talk narratives when no other men are available as recipients. Although this genre reaches its greatest expression during feasts, it is also often performed by men when they narrate their hunting experiences outside of the feast context.

Hunting talk is a highly dramatized form of narration of a recent hunting experience, in which the details of the events surrounding a successful kill or a near miss are recounted in extreme detail. The genre is characterized by a number of characteristic phonetic features, including highly modulated speech and unusual intonational contours in which pitch drops dramatically over the course of the first



vowel of a word, which is also noticeably lengthened, and then rises back to the initial pitch level (Beier (2005)). The result is a highly rhythmic pitch and prosody that makes hunting talk instantly recognizable.

During feasts, hunting talk frequently becomes a multiparty interaction, in which others who were participants in the narrated hunting event contribute their own perspective; and others who were not involved in the focal event instead narrate their own recent experiences that bear similarities to the focal hunting event. Multiparty hunting talk is distinctive in that it is characterized by a high degree of overlapping talk, which is otherwise unusual in Nanti interactions.

### 1.3.2 Non-feast communication

#### 1.3.2.1 Visiting talk

During non-feast times, interaction between members of separate residence groups is quite limited, and is largely restricted to deliberate inter-household visits by one or a few individuals (*ikamosoti*). Although inter-household visits may be paid at any time of day, the hour or so before dusk is a favored time for visiting among men.

Visiting talk is characterized by a distinctive participation structure, a small set of stereotypical topics, and a sober, polite interactional tone. Visiting talk is strongly dyadic, which is reflected in the fact that visitors frequently frame their visit as a visit to a particular individual, using the formulaic expression given in (1.1), where X is a kin term or personal name.

(1.1) Noka tota noNkamosote X.

<i>no-</i>	<i>ka</i>	<i>tota</i>	<i>no=</i>	N-	<i>kamoso</i>	<i>-e</i>	<i>X</i>
1S-	QUOT	wait.a.sec	1S=	IRREAL-	visit	-IRREAL.I	

‘I said, “Wait a sec, I’m going to visit X.”’

Typically, a visitor will at first direct his (or her) attention to the single individual he is visiting, while other members of the household apart from that

visitee disattend the visitor. If the interaction eventually spreads to include other members of the visitee's household, it is common for interactions between the visitor and the other household members to be routed through the visitee, rather than for the visitor and the other household members to address each other directly.

The stereotypical topics for visiting talk are the subsistence activities of the visitor and the visitee and, to progressively lesser degrees, the activities of the other members of each of their households, and of their neighbors. Individuals participating in visiting talk generally keep their voices at a moderate volume, eschew joking, carefully avoid arguments, and tend to avoid overlapping the utterances of their interlocutors, all of which give the interaction a constrained and sober tone.

Participation in visiting talk is structured by gender and age. Men tend to visit more socially prominent men and equally socially prominent men, although some men systematically visit every household in the village, or in a given part of the village, in the hour or so before dusk. As a result of the practice of 'visiting up', socially prominent men, such as the *pereseteNte*, are overwhelmingly the *recipients* of visits, while comparatively socially marginal men tend to be the *givers* of visits. A woman's visiting activity, in contrast, is mainly focused on the households in which she reside her sisters or mothers (the category *ina* 'mother', includes both a person's biological mother and her sisters), although a small number of women visit broadly, in the manner described above for men.

Only Nantis that 'count' socially as adults participate in visiting talk, and the change in inter-household visting activity is a sign of an individual's transition to adulthood (roughly 17 for males and 15 for females). Children normally pass from household to household with little attention paid to them by adults, slipping into casual conversations and playing with their peers. As they become adults, however, their interhousehold visiting activities become more constrained. Young men frequently appear tongue-tied and inarticulate as they visit their elders and

strive to hold appropriate conversation, while the easy-going visiting of young women drops off considerably in comparison to that of their childhood.

## 1.4 Fieldwork and data

The data on which this dissertation is based are almost exclusively my own recordings of naturally-occurring discourse, mostly conversations between Nantis or conversations between myself and Nantis. The vast majority of my recordings were made in the two main contexts for interactions between members of distinct households: manioc beer feasts and inter-household visiting. Recordings from the former context include a number of distinguishable genres including *peresetente* oratory, *karinta* chanting, and *shitatsi* talk.

My corpus contains a relatively small proportion of recordings of intra-household interactions outside of feast contexts. The main reason for this is that by visiting another household, I key the ‘visiting’ frame, which demands the use of the visiting talk interactional genre. Since I am a socially-prominent resident of the community, it would be impolite for Nantis to let me slip into the interactional background during visiting talk, and consequently, my recordings of visits to other households principally consist of conversations between myself and the adult male head of household. Recordings made while Nantis visited my household, however, show more demographic and topical variety.

### 1.4.1 Grammatical description

The Nanti fieldwork setting imposed two conditions on my study of Nanti grammar that are unusual for contemporary linguistic descriptive work and therefore merit comment: complete reliance on monolingual fieldwork; and almost complete reliance on naturally-occurring conversational data.

The tidy monological linguistic text, which is the staple of much descriptive

work, is basically absent from corpus. Instead, my corpus mainly consists of dyadic or multi-party conversations. Even narrative and myth tellings are pervasively dialogical, and indeed, conversational, as Nantis expect the recipients of narratives to ask frequent questions and introduce relevant information of their own. I quickly learned that attempting to acquire ‘clean’ narrative texts, by eliciting a narrative and subsequently keeping my contributions to a minimum, did little more than make the narrator uncomfortable and bring the narrative to a swift end.

Without a doubt, I would have found elicitation a useful tool at many points. For example, although I frequently attempted to obtain well-formedness judgements from Nantis, my efforts were largely unsuccessful. I believe the source of my difficulties were two-fold. First, Nantis normally treat utterances as embedded in trajectories of social action, and as such, they found it hard to provide acceptability judgements of any sort for isolated utterances. Even when I sought clarification regarding transcribed utterances from interactions, my consultant’s first response was always to inquire about the participant framework and the social context in which the utterance occurred. Second, Nantis have very little experience with meta-linguistic commentary – that is, explicit commentary on linguistic form. Nantis were generally enthusiastic about discussing the social importance of an utterance, but I had grave difficulties in communicating that I was interested in the *form*, rather than the content, of utterances. As a consequence, when I asked Nantis to comment on whether a given utterance was acceptable or not, their overwhelming tendency was to evaluate its social or interactional appropriateness. Nantis were generally happy even with utterances that I knew to be grossly ungrammatical, as long as they could interpret them in light of the interactional context that I supplied.

As a result of these challenges, basic linguistic tasks such as eliciting paradigms or grammatical structures proved quite arduous. One technique I employed with some success was to steer conversations in particular ways, in the hope that my

interlocutors would spontaneously employ the form or construction I was interested in during the course of the interaction. Another useful technique in this context was to attend closely to the ways in which my interlocutors would rephrase utterances I produced, which provided important clues about well-formedness.

Most Nantis also had difficulties with providing paraphrases or glosses, even when they were interested in helping me to understand a lexeme that I did not understand. A small number of Nanti men who had travelled to Matsigenka communities – and consequently had had significant exposure to a different, if closely related, language – were able to gloss words and provide well-formedness judgements to a small degree. However, they did not seem to enjoy this activity at all, and so I generally made judicious use of their abilities.

All the merit of my corpus, then, accrues to the extensive and intensive time that I and my Nanti interlocutors have invested over the years in the project of making me a competent speaker of Nanti.

## 1.4.2 A note on personal names and place names

### 1.4.2.1 Personal names

All the personal names I use for the Nantis mentioned in this study are Nanti adaptations of Spanish names they received from Matsigenkas or *mestizos*.<sup>31</sup> Prior to being given Spanish names in the early 1990s, personal names were apparently very rare among Nantis. Most of the individual Nanti names that I have recorded belonged to men who played infamous roles in the violent incidents of the 1960s (see §1.2.2.2), including *Guríguri*, *KoshaNti*, and *Kapohari*. As far as I am aware, only one of the eventual residents of Montetoni had a personal name prior to contact

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<sup>31</sup>The majority of the Spanish names that Nantis have received were given to them by the Matsigenka schoolteacher Silverio Araña, who lived with the Nantis between 1992 and 1998. Between 1998 and 2001, the Matsigenka evangelical pastor Ángel Díaz also named some children. The majority of new Spanish names given to Nantis since 1998 have come from *mestizo* doctors who periodically visit the upper Camisea.

with the Matsigenkas, *YONka*,<sup>32</sup> who was given the Spanish name Yonatan by the Matsigenka schoolteacher Silverio Araña. I have only ever recorded a single Nanti name for a woman, *Tayo*,<sup>33</sup> a former resident of Inkonene.

As surprising as the rarity of personal names may be cross-culturally, all the Nantis with whom I have spoken about this topic are insistent that very few individuals had personal names. These findings are also consistent with the ethnographic data on the closely-related Matsigenkas (Johnson, 2003, pp. 9-10). Based on my discussions with Nantis and observations of current referential practice, it appears that individuals were formerly referred to by basic kin terms (e.g. *pishobanirite* ‘your brother-in-law’), by complex kin term expressions (e.g. *pishari ikoritiri* ‘your grandson’s wife’), and by nonce indexical expressions. Given that Nantis formerly lived in small settlements of 10 to 30 individuals, all of whom were usually related through kinship ties, the rarity of personal names is somewhat explicable.

The use of personal names remains rare among many Nanti adults, who retain the habit of referring to individuals via kins terms, and who frequently exhibit great difficulty in remembering the recently-given personal names of close kin such as children, siblings, and parents. Unsurprisingly, Nanti adults make the most use of personal names for socially prominent individuals to whom they cannot trace a kinship relation. Young Nantis, however, have embraced personal names and use them regularly, especially in reference to one another.

Borrowed names strongly reflect adaptations to Nanti phonology and phonotactics, as evident in the examples of men’s names given in (1.2), and women’s names given in (1.3).

(1.2) a. Áheri < Ángel

b. Bikotoro < Victor

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<sup>32</sup> *YONka* is the Nanti name for the Military Macaw, *Ara militaris*.

<sup>33</sup> *Tayo* is the Nanti name a species of scaled bottom-feeding fish.

- c. Bisárota < Lizardo
  - d. Erehón < Gideón
  - e. Hosukaro < Oscar
  - f. Ihonira < Leonidas
  - g. Irabi < David
  - h. Gónaro < Donaldo
  - i. Migero < Miguel
  - j. Terohite < Teodor
- (1.3)
- a. Aborora < Aurora
  - b. Éroba < Elva
  - c. Isabera < Isabel
  - d. Hororinta < Florinda
  - e. Horoteha < Dorotea
  - f. Márota < Marta
  - g. Nánkuse < Nancy
  - h. Óroma < Norma
  - i. Peranke < Francisca (and Francisco)
  - j. Rakera < Raquel

Since 1997, Nantis have developed additional forms for some names, so that they presently have both a historically prior Nanti form and a more recent form that more closely approximates Matsigenka or Spanish pronunciations of the name, as in (1.4).

- (1.4) a. José > Hóshi > Hosé

- b. Delfín > Teherina > Rerpín
- c. Ezekiel > Esekera > Esekira

Some other names, however, have developed forms that better accommodate Nanti phonotactics and are less like their associated Spanish forms, as in (1.5).

(1.5) Job > Hoke > Hókuse

#### 1.4.2.2 Place names

Rivers serve as the basic orienting geographic feature for Nantis when they discuss the locations of persons, areas, and things. River names also serve as the basis for naming communities and settlements, meaning that rivers and nearby communities normally share names. Such is the case for the Nanti community of Marankehari, for example, which takes its name from the small river that joins the Camisea some 200 meters downriver from that community.

An important exception to this general principle is the community of Montetoni itself, which takes its name from the river gorge of Montetoni, some five kilometers further up the Camisea. The name ‘Montetoni’ illustrates another important fact about Nanti settlement names: they may refer to multiple settlements in roughly the same area. Thus, the name ‘Montetoni’ has applied to three successive settlements, formed by relocating the entire settlement every few years to a better location.

For the most part, I choose to employ Nanti place names for locations and geographic features within Nanti territory, even if Matsigenka or Spanish alternatives exist. I make two exceptions though, for the Timpía and Camisea Rivers, which are well-known rivers that extend far outside Nanti territory. Nantis previously referred to the former as the *Ogorokaate*, but in recent years have largely adopted the Matsigenka name, *TiNpía*. Similarly, when the Nantis first migrated to the



Camisea basin in the mid-1980s, they referred to the Camisea River as the Shinkebe ([ʃiŋkseβe]). However, when they learned that the Matsigenkas already referred to the river as the Camisea, the Nantis adopted this name and modified it to Nanti pronunciation as Kamisuha [kamisuija]. Nantis have retained the name *ShiNkebe* for the portion of the Camisea upriver of the small Pirihasanteni tributary, and I do likewise.

In some cases, more than one form of a name is attested in Nanti discourse: a Matsigenka place name, plus one or more versions which showing the influence of Nanti phonology and morphology. Such is the case with the name of the community that I refer to as *MaranNkehari* [malanksejari] (lit. ‘Snake Creek’), which derives from the Matsigenka name, Marankeato. The suffix *-ato* – reconstructible in Proto-Kampa as a means of deriving names for small rivers and creeks from other nouns – is no longer productive in Nanti, and Nantis appear to have re-derived the name of the creek as *MaranNkehari*, using the derivational suffix *-hari*, which serves the same function.<sup>34</sup> These two names exist in a diglossic relationship, in which the Matsigenka name is frequently employed when speaking with Matsigenkas. Similarly, the tributary of the Manu river most commonly referred to as *Serehari* or *Sereha* by Nantis is also sometimes referred to by its Matsigenka name *Seraato*.<sup>35</sup>

## 1.5 Orthographic conventions, transcript symbols, and morpheme codes

The orthography is phonemic and largely self-explanatory; N represents a nasal unspecified for place of articulation.<sup>36</sup> In the first line of any interlinearized Nanti text, sans-serif **t** and **a** represent epenthetic segments; they are not segmented or

<sup>34</sup>Nantis also do this with place names far outside Nanti territory. The Matsigenka community of Segakiato, for example, is frequently referred to as Segakihari by Nantis.

<sup>35</sup>On most maps this river is marked as the *Río Manu Chico*.

<sup>36</sup>See Chapter 6, §6.2, for a detailed discussion of Nanti phonology.

glossed in other lines. In certain contexts a morphophonemic process neutralizes the surface contrast between the realis suffix *-i* and the irrealis suffix *-e*. The contrast is maintained in the morphemic segmentation.

Transcriptions consist of four lines. The first line is a broad transcription of the recording, in which the following transcription conventions are employed: ‘-’ indicates that the speaker has cut off the production of a word with a sharp glottal closure; ‘[’ indicates the point at which overlap begins between the line bearing the bracket and the line immediately above it; ‘=’ at the beginning of a line indicates latching with the previous line; ‘[...]’ indicates elided material. Nanti text preceded by a carat (^) in the first line is inaudible material, but material that is recoverable due to allophony that the inaudible material induces in the audible material, or because of morphological co-occurrence relations. The remaining lines are typical interlinearization, consisting of morphological segmentation (line 2), morpheme-by-morpheme gloss (line 3), and free translation (line 4). Note that in lines 2 and 3, ‘=’ is employed to indicate clitics, and not latching.

Table 1.1: Morpheme codes

MORPHEME CODE	MORPHEME	GLOSS
1S	no=	1st person subject
1O	=na	1st person object
2S	pi=	2nd person subject
2O	=Npi	2nd person object
3mS	i=	3rd person masculine subject
3mO	=ri	3rd person masculine object
3nmS	o=	3rd person non-masculine subject
3mO	=ro	3rd person non-masculine object
1P	no-	1st person possessor

2P	pi-	2nd person possessor
3mP	i-	3rd person masculine possessor
3nmP	o-	3rd person non-masculine possessor
ABIL	-ah	abilitive
ABL	-an	ablative
ADL	-apah	adlative
ADJVZR	-ni	adjectivizer
ALIEN.POSS	-ne ~ -re ~ -te	alienable possession
ANIM	-n-	animate
APPL:INDR	-ako	indirective applicative
APPL:INST	-a <sup>n</sup> t	instrumental applicative
APPL:PRES	-imo	presencial applicative
APPL:SEP	-apitsa	separative applicative
AUGM	-sano	augmentative
CAUS:AGNT	ogi-	agentive causative
CAUS:DSTR	oti <sup>n</sup> -	causative of destruction
CAUS:INFL	-akag	influential causative
CAUS:MAL	omi <sup>n</sup> -	malefactive causative
CAUS:NAGNT	o[+voice]-	non-agentive causative
CAR	-a <sup>n</sup> t	characteristic
CL	(various)	classifier
CNTF	=me	counterfactual
CNGNT	=ta	congruent stance
CONTRST	=ri	contrastive stance
CNTRSUP	=me	counter-suppositional
COND	=rika	conditional
COP	-Nti	copula

COLL	-page	collective plural
COORD	-Ntiri	coordinator
DEONT	=me	deontic
DERANK.REL.IMPF	-tsi	deranked relativizer, imperfective
DERANK.REL.PERF	-aNkicha	deranked relativizer, perfective
DEXT	-asano	desirable extremal
DSTR	-ge	distributive
DUR	-bage	durative
EXTR	-uma	extremal
EPIST	=rika	epistemic
EXIST.ANIM	ainyo	animate existential
EXIST.INAN	aityo	inanimate existential
EXT.NEG	matsi	external negation
FOC.PRO	(various)	contrastive focus pronouns
FRUS	-be	frustrative
HAB	-apini	habitual
IDENT	-ita	interrogative identity verb
IMPF	-∅	imperfective
INDEF	-ka	indefinite
INFR	=ka	inferential
IRREAL.A	-eNpa	irrealis, A-class verb
IRREAL.I	-e	irrealis, I-class verb
LOC	-ku	locative
MAL.REP	-na	malefactive repetitive
NCNGT	=Npa	non-congruent stance
NEG.IRREAL	ha	irrealis negation
NEG.EXIST	mameri	negative existential

NEG.REAL	te	realis negation
NOMZ	-rira	nominalizer
NPOSS	-tsi	non-possessed
PASS.IRREAL	-eNkani	irrealis passive
PASS.REAL	-agani	realis passive
PAT/THM	-ni ~ -ne	patient/theme argument
PERF	-ak	perfective
PL	-hig	verbal plural
PRED.FOC	oNti	predicate focus
PURP	-ashi	purposive
QUOT	ka	quotative
REAL.A	-a	realis, A-class verb
REAL.I	-i	realis, I-class verb
RECP	-abakag	reciprocal
REG	-ah	regressive
REL	=rira	relativizer
REP	ke	reportive
RET	-ut	returnative
REV	-reh	reversative
SUB	=ra	subordinator
TOP.PRO	(various)	topic pronoun
TRNLOC.IMPF	-aa	imperfective translocative
TRNLOC.PERF	-aki	perfective translocative
TRNS	-ab	transitivizer

## Chapter 2

# Evidentiality and evidential practice

### 2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide conceptual tools and define terminology that I use in my description and analysis of specific aspects of Nanti evidential practice in Chapters 3 and 4. I begin in §2.2 by discussing the competing definitions of evidentiality found in the literature, and then evaluating their strengths and weaknesses from both conceptual and empirical standpoints. In §2.3, I provide theoretical background for the concept of *evidential practice*, describing the concepts of social practice and communicative practice, and then clarifying the role of grammar in communicative practice. With this background, I turn in §2.4 to a discussion of the concept of evidential practice, and argue that a comprehensive account of evidentiality as a linguistic phenomenon requires recourse to this concept. Finally, in §2.5, I provide a summary of the Nanti evidential system and discuss its recent grammaticalization.

## 2.2 Evidentiality: definitions and debates

The grammatical study of evidentiality dates from Boasian linguists' engagement with North American indigenous languages in the early 20th century (e.g. Boas, 1911, 1938). However, significant theoretical and empirical attention to the phenomenon is much more recent, dating only to the 1980s (e.g. Chafe and Nichols, 1986; Barnes, 1984; Givón, 1982; Willett, 1988). The study of evidentiality as a discursive phenomenon is younger still. Chafe (1986) was the first to broach some of the pragmatic aspects of evidentiality, but only relatively recently has evidentiality attracted much attention as a discourse phenomenon (Atkinson, 1999; Hill and Irvine, 1993b; Fox, 2001; Mushin, 2001; Ifantidou, 2001; Sakita, 2002).

In this section, I discuss the different ways in which evidentiality has been understood in the linguistic and discourse-analytic literatures and I clarify how the term 'evidentiality' is used in the present work. In doing so, I will provide an overview of the scholarship on evidentiality, and draw a number of terminological and conceptual distinctions that I employ in subsequent sections, including the distinctions among 'grammatical evidentiality', 'evidential strategy', and 'evidential resources'.

### 2.2.1 Grammatical perspective on evidentiality

In prototypical instances of evidentiality, *source of information*<sup>1</sup> meanings are obligatorily marked by a tidy paradigm of bound morphemes, as in the Wanka Quechua (Quechuan, Peru) examples given in (2.1). This language marks a three-way evidential distinction among direct experience (*-m(i)*, DIR), inference (*-chr(a)*, CONJ), and report (*-sh(i)*, REP).

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<sup>1</sup>In Chapter 3, I argue that the notional definition of evidentiality as expressing *source of information* is misleading, and that it is more accurate to characterize evidentiality as expressing the *mode of sensory access* to an event. For the present discussion, however, I work with the common definition.

**Wanka Quechua** (Floyd, 1999)

- (2.1) a. *Lishi kanan wala -alu -n -ña -m.*  
Lishi now dawn -RPST -3 -now -DIR  
'Lishi, its morning now.' (I see the sun.)
- b. *Chay lika -a -nii juk -ta -chra -a lika -la.*  
that see -NOM -1P other -ACC -CONJ -TOP see -PST  
'The witness (lit. 'my seer') must have seen someone else.'
- c. *Shanti -sh prista -ka -mu -la.*  
Shanti -REP borrow -REF -AFAR -PST.  
'(I was told) Shanti borrowed it.'

While there is widespread agreement among linguists that systems like that of Wanka Quechua are examples of evidentiality, there is disagreement over what extensions from such prototypical cases constitute legitimate cases of evidentiality. There are two main ways in which scholars have sought to broaden the concept of evidentiality beyond cases like that of the notionally and paradigmatically tidy example presented by Wanka Quechua. First, some have notionally conflated source-of-information meanings and epistemic modality, or grouped them together under a grammatical super-category. Second, some have relaxed structural criteria of obligatoriness and paradigmatic regularity.

The result of such moves, as Aikhenvald (2004, p.16) has remarked, is that an increasingly broad set of phenomena has been included under the analytical category of 'evidentiality' in recent years. In response, some scholars have sought to narrow the scope of the term, in order to render it more technically precise and useful for grammatical typology (e.g. Aikhenvald, 2003a, 2004; De Haan, 1996, 2001). For expositional purposes, I will review this debate by focusing on Aikhenvald's sustained arguments for a narrow definition of evidentiality, and the ways in which



alternative definitions extend the concept of evidentiality from Aikhenvald’s narrow definition.

Aikhenvald argues that evidentiality is a distinct grammatical category<sup>2</sup> from epistemic modality, and that it is desirable to distinguish evidentiality as a grammatical category from periphrastic source-of-information meanings.

To argue for a distinct typological grammatical category from a functional-typological perspective, it is necessary to distinguish the category notionally from other categories (Plungian, 2001, p.350), and provide evidence that the category is at least sometimes realized as a distinct paradigm in particular languages. Both of these steps are easily achieved in the case of evidentiality. Notionally, evidentiality can be defined as expressing the ‘source of information’ for a proposition (Aikhenvald, 2003a; De Haan, 1999, 2005a,b). This clearly distinguishes evidentiality from epistemic modality, the category with which evidentiality is most frequently conflated. Basic notional definitions of epistemic modality, on the other hand, characterize it as expressing the “the degree of certainty the speaker has that what s/he is saying is true” (De Haan, 2005b). (Nuyts, 2001) provides the following, more expansive, definition:

Epistemic modality is defined here as (the linguistic expression of) an evaluation of the chances that a certain hypothetical state of affairs under consideration (or some aspect of it) will occur, is occurring, or has occurred in a possible world which serves as the universe of interpretation for the evaluation process, and which, in the default case, is the real

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<sup>2</sup>The term ‘grammatical category’ is potentially ambiguous, as it is used in two senses by functional typologists: viz. a *typological* grammatical category and a *language-specific* grammatical category. A typological grammatical category is a semantically/notionally defined category that may be realized as a language-specific grammatical category in a given language (Palmer, 2001, p.18-21). A language-specific category is a structurally well-behaved set of morphemes in a particular language that realize a typological category. There is some disagreement on what constitutes structural well-behavedness, as the following discussion shows. Nevertheless, it is clear that what Aikhenvald calls a (language-specific) grammatical category is what many would call an *inflectional category* (Stump, 2001).

world... (Nuyts 2001: p.21)

Having argued for the categorial distinctness of evidentiality, Aikhenvald proposes that the use of the term ‘evidentiality’ be restricted to cases in which evidentiality forms a language-specific grammatical category. Languages which do not exhibit grammatical evidentiality express the presumably universal human capacity to express source-of-information meanings through ‘evidential strategies’ or by ‘lexical’ means. For Aikhenvald, a language can be said to exhibit grammatical evidentiality if it possesses a set of morphemes that obey the following two requirements:

**Semantic primacy:** Evidential meanings are the ‘core’ meanings of the set of morphemes in question (cf. Aikhenvald, 2004, p.3).

**Obligatoriness:** The relevant constituent (normally a clause) must be marked by at least one evidential morpheme in any grammatical context that the constituent is capable of being so marked (cf. Aikhenvald, 2004, p.10).

Aikhenvald’s conception of a language-specific grammatical category is thus essentially that of an inflectional category (cf. Stump, 2001). Two other criteria related to grammatical evidentiality also surface in Aikhenvald’s discussion in a qualified manner, which we discuss below:

**Paradigmatic unilocality:** Evidential morphemes form a paradigm with a single syntagmatic locus (cf. Aikhenvald, 2004, p.9).

**Paradigmatic uniformity:** All the morphemes in the paradigm have evidential meanings as their core meanings (cf. Aikhenvald, 2003a, p.11).

All scholars engaged in the study of evidentiality would, I think, consider any set of evidential morphemes that fulfills all four criteria to be a prototypical instance

of grammaticalized evidentiality (as in the Wanka Quechua example, above). Not all, however, consider each of these criteria to be necessary ones for ‘evidentiality’. In fact, by relaxing one or more of these requirements, we arrive at the various alternate conceptions of evidentiality found in the literature.

I now consider each of these criteria, as well as the varied conceptions of evidentiality obtained by relaxing each of them. In the course of this discussion, I will also develop the definition of grammatical evidentiality that I employ throughout the present work. Tipping my hand, the position I will defend is that the semantic primacy condition is a necessary one for grammatical evidentiality, but that the paradigmatic unilocality and paradigmatic uniformity conditions are not. To be sure, evidential systems which additionally obey the latter two conditions constitute especially tidy evidential systems, and are consequently a natural focus for typological studies of evidentiality, for reasons of analytical convenience. Nonetheless, though such systems may provide the *best examples* of evidential systems, they do not constitute the *only* such systems.

I will also argue that the obligatoriness criterion is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for grammaticalized evidentiality. I maintain that the obligatory/non-obligatory dichotomy, which the obligatoriness condition appears to endorse, fails to adequately take into account the fact that evidential systems are found on a cline of grammaticalization, and many evidential systems exhibit highly grammaticalized, but not entirely obligatory, evidential systems. To treat such systems as of a piece with ‘evidentiality’ in languages such as English (cf. Fox, 2001) fails to acknowledge the fact that evidential meanings are often pervasive in languages with highly grammaticalized but facultative evidential systems, in a way they are *not* pervasive in languages that lack grammaticalized evidential systems.

### 2.2.1.1 Semantic primacy

Relaxing the semantic primacy condition yields the most common alternatives to the narrow definition of evidentiality. These alternatives generally involve the notional broadening of ‘evidentiality’ to include both source-of-information meanings and epistemic modality, or subsuming the two as subcategories of a broader notional category. Proponents of broader conceptualizations of evidentiality ground their proposals in one or more of following observations: 1) source-of-information and epistemic modal meanings share significant notional similarities, and 2) evidential morphemes frequently induce inferences regarding epistemic modality. I shall consider each of these observations in turn.

**2.2.1.1.1 Notional similarity** We can take Palmer (2001) to exemplify the position that evidentiality and epistemic modality are sufficiently notionally similar to consider evidentiality a kind of modality, on par with epistemic modality, subsuming both under a more general type of modality:

...[E]pistemic modality and evidential modality are concerned with the speaker’s attitude to the truth-value or factual status of the proposition and may be thus be described as ‘propositional modality’. (Palmer, 2001, p.24)

This supposed notional similarity of evidentiality and epistemic modality is questionable, however. The source of information does not *entail* anything about the truth-value or factual status of a proposition, as Aikhenvald (2003a) and De Haan (1996) forcefully argue (see also Faller, 2002, p.9). To be sure, general Gricean cooperative principles lead to routinized inferences regarding speaker commitment to the truthfulness of their utterances (Levinson, 1983), but this is not special to evidentials. It is also true, of course, that a language may possess portmanteau

morphs that express both evidential and epistemic modal meanings.<sup>3</sup> Such morphs encode information about both source of information and factual status. However, as Floyd (1999, p.21-7) has argued at some length, the tendency for certain evidential meanings to associate with grammaticalized epistemic modal meanings is not evidence against their conceptual distinctness.

Taking a slightly different approach to the notional similarity of evidentiality and epistemic modality, Chafe and Nichols (1986, p.vii) characterize evidentiality as an “attitude towards knowledge,” which permits epistemic modality to fall under a broad interpretation of evidentiality (Chafe 1986, p.262). Epistemic modality grammaticalizes judgements regarding the epistemic reliability of a proposition, which clearly counts as an ‘attitude towards knowledge’.<sup>4</sup> However, it is much more difficult to see source-of-information marking as an ‘attitude,’ since it does not involve any kind of overt evaluation of the knowledge expressed in a proposition.

All this is not to deny that evidentiality and epistemic modality exhibit similarities. For example, both evidential and epistemic modal marking index a knowing subject (see Chapter 3 for an extended discussion of this issue). This certainly suggests a greater conceptual similarity than that which obtains between, say, grammatical number and person. However, it is highly unclear if similarities of this sort are sufficient for positing a *grammatical* super-category into which evidentiality and epistemic modality fit, or for conflating the two categories. For the purposes of the present work, I conclude that there is no strong *notional* basis for conflating evidentiality with epistemic modality, or for subsuming the two under a broader grammatical category.

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<sup>3</sup>Faller (2002), for example, provides a detailed semantic analysis of three morphemes in Cuzco Quechua, showing that two of them encode only evidential meanings, but that the third encodes both evidential and epistemic modal meanings.

<sup>4</sup>See also Kockelman (2004) for a discussion of epistemic modality as ‘stance’ taking.

**2.2.1.1.2 Inferential Relationships** Another argument for the conflation of evidentiality and epistemic modality is that evidential morphology is ‘associated’ with epistemic modal meanings. Willett articulates this widely held view:

There is little doubt that evidentiality as a semantic domain is primarily modal. It participates in the expression of the speaker’s attitude towards the situation his/her utterance describes, rather than strictly orientational information about the temporal setting of the situation, as do tense and aspect... (Willett, 1988, p.53)

Palmer expresses a similar view regarding evidentials:

... their whole purpose is to provide an indication of the degree of commitment of the speaker: he offers a piece of information, but qualifies its validity for him in terms of the type of evidence he has ... they indicate the status of the proposition in terms of the speaker’s commitment to it. (Palmer, 1986, p.54)

These authors take the noted associations between evidentiality and epistemic modality to motivate the subsumption of evidentiality under modality. However, a close reading of Willett’s and Palmer’s remarks make it clear that they are not arguing that evidentials *encode* epistemic modal meanings,<sup>5</sup> but that these meanings arise pragmatically. This is especially obvious in Palmer’s invocation of communicative “purpose”. Bybee, who shares Palmer’s and Willett’s basic position, alludes to the pragmatic nature of these epistemic modal meanings more directly:

Certain evidential senses ... relate to epistemic modality. In particular, an indirect evidential ... *implies* that the speaker is not totally commit-

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<sup>5</sup>Of course, portmanteau evidential-epistemical modal morphemes exist, but that is a different issue.

ted to the truth of [a] proposition and thus *implies* an epistemic value.

(Bybee et al., 1994, emphasis added; p.180)

Of course, even if the pragmatic claims that these authors make are cross-linguistically valid (which they are not, see below), the fact that one typological grammatical category may induce inferences regarding another one is not evidence that they are the same category, or that they are subcategories of a higher-level category. If we take the secondary epistemic modal meanings of evidentials as grounds for grouping the two grammatical categories together, or for conflating them, then it follows that we should do the same with epistemic modality and aspect, or epistemic modality and tense.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, it is easy to see that this mode of reasoning would lead to the collapse of most typological grammatical category distinctions, clearly a *reductio ad absurdum*.

Moreover, it is clear that in so far as evidentiality and epistemic modality are related in specific languages, be it by inference or otherwise, this relationship is a contingent one. As such, no intrinsic relationship can be posited between evidentiality and epistemic modality as typological grammatical categories. The contingent nature of the relationship between the two categories is made especially clear by languages that express the two categories in distinct inflectional paradigms. This is the case in Andoke (isolate, Colombia), in which four epistemic modal morphemes realized in one paradigm can combine freely with three evidential markers (including a null direct experience marker) that form a distinct paradigm (Landaburu, 2005, p.1-4). Other languages known to exhibit the same basic behavior include Paez (Landaburu, 2005, p.4-8), Uwa (Landaburu, 2005, p.8-9), and Tsafiki (Dickinson, 2000).

Further evidence for the contingent pragmatic relationship between evidentiality and epistemic modality is provided by languages which essentially present us

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<sup>6</sup>It is relatively common, for example, for the perfect to develop indirect evidential overtones (Comrie, 1986, p.110).

with the opposite of the Andoke case, in which *all* evidentials are associated with a *single* epistemic modal value. Such is the case in Kashaya, in which all propositions marked by evidentials are taken to be certain and true (Oswalt, 1986, p.43).

Before closing this section, I think it is helpful to consider Floyd's comments on the relationship between evidentiality and epistemic modality, since he has developed one of the most detailed accounts of 'secondary' epistemic modal meanings associated with evidentials that I have encountered thus far. Floyd remarks that:

A fairly straightforward relationship between information source and validation [a modal category proposed by Floyd that includes epistemic modality] typically obtains. According to Givón, certainty judgements are an inferential by-product of the evidentiary, experiential aspect of knowledge (1982:25). (Floyd, 1999, p.25)

However, this relationship does not lead him to conflate the two typological grammatical categories, despite the fact that languages may grammaticalize epistemic modal meanings, together with evidential ones:

In principle, of course, validation and evidence are independent of each other. It is certainly possible, for instance, for someone to see something, but not believe it or accept it strictly on the basis of its appearance. But the prototypical associations – direct evidence with strong commitment and indirect evidence with weak commitment – are what become encoded grammatically in languages. ... Validation notions bear strong and obvious connections to source of information notions but are conceptually independent. (Floyd, 1999, p.26-7).

And since typological grammatical categories are defined "conceptually", Floyd is, in effect, affirming the categorial distinctness of evidentiality and epistemic modality.



### 2.2.1.2 Shared paradigms

Another argument adduced for grouping evidentiality and epistemic modality together is the existence of paradigms in specific languages that include both morphemes with primary evidential meanings and ones with primarily epistemic modal meanings.

Stenzel (2004), for example, in her grammar of Wanano (Tucanoan, Brazil), uses paradigm-structure arguments to justify treating evidentiality as a type of modality. Arguing against Aikhenvald's categorical distinction between evidentiality and (epistemic) modality, Stenzel remarks:

Furthermore, Aikhenvald also observes that in some languages, 'evidentiality markers occur in the mood and modality slot in a verbal word, and are thus mutually exclusive with conditional, imperative, interrogative markers and so on' (Aikhenvald 2003a:15). In other words, evidentials in some languages can be analyzed as one of the categories of modality because of their behavior within the overall paradigm. (Stenzel, 2004, p.339)

Note that Stenzel is making an argument about language-specific grammatical categories, suggesting that an evidential can be considered a modal *in a given language*, by virtue of its occupying a paradigm shared by modal morphemes. Specifically, Stenzel is not making an argument about the relationship between evidentiality and modality as *typological* grammatical categories, but rather about the behavior of language-specific modal or evidential systems. Indeed, Stenzel seems to evince skepticism about the entire project of identifying typological grammatical categories:

Such observations suggest that perhaps we should not attempt to make absolute cross-linguistic claims about the nature of evidential systems and the semantics they code. Though we can observe cross-linguistic

tendencies and use them as suggested frameworks, there are so many possible areas of semantic overlap that the only kinds of categorical statements possible are those which refer to the organization of the system in a single language. (Stenzel, 2004, p.339)

While Stenzel’s remarks about paradigm structure are cogent, I think that she misconstrues the nature of the “cross-linguistic claims” being made about the distinctness of evidentiality and (epistemic) modality. Moreover, I believe that there is a subtle incoherence in her overall position, stemming from the role of typological grammatical categories in identifying the semantics of particular morphemes in language-specific inflectional paradigms.

We can begin by observing that typological (i.e. cross-linguistic) grammatical categories are defined notionally, and never structurally (see above). Such categories may be realized by morphemes in a single paradigm, or scattered across multiple paradigms. In either case, the paradigm(s) in question may include morphemes expressing quite different grammatical categories (Carstairs-McCarthy, 1998). In short, language-specific morphosyntactic paradigms do not systematically correspond to typological grammatical categories, or vice versa. Consequently, language-specific notional heterogeneity at the paradigmatic level carries no consequences for the typological grammatical category membership of the paradigm’s morphemes. To return to Stenzel’s point, the fact that evidentials may occupy the same paradigm as modal morphemes entails nothing, one way or the other, about whether evidentials are a category of modals, *conceived as exponents of a typological grammatical category*. Even in the case of a particular language, all we can conclude is that evidentials and modals form a paradigm.

The argument I am making here may be clearer if we consider paradigms in which evidentials share a position with morphemes other than epistemic modal ones. Consider, for example, the case of M̃yky (Isolate, Brazil), in which two evidential

morphemes and negation form a paradigm (Montserrat and Dixon, 2003). The fact that negation and evidentials share a paradigm in M̄yky does not permit us to conclude that negation is a ‘category of evidentiality’, or that evidentiality is a ‘category of negation’. Returning to Stenzel’s claim above, by analogous reasoning, the presence of evidentials in a paradigm containing modal markers does not permit us to conclude that evidentials can be analyzed as a modal category.

A defense of Stenzel’s position might be that her claims pertain to evidential and modal *systems* in specific languages, and not to evidential and modal *categories*, in the typological sense. In this light, we could understand Stenzel’s basic point to be that, from language to language, evidential systems vary in their semantics, and as such, linguists cannot make categorical statements regarding what evidential systems encode. In some languages, evidential meanings may be realized in portmanteau morphemes with epistemic modality, or tense, or any number of other categories, whereas in others, morphemes may carry only evidential meanings. In some languages, evidentials form dedicated paradigms; whereas in others, evidentials are found with other kinds of morphemes. As such, Stenzel argues, “absolute cross-linguistics claims” – and it seems that Stenzel has Aikhenvald’s categorical distinction between evidentiality and epistemic modality in mind here – are untenable.

But I believe that Stenzel’s argument misses the mark, as she and Aikhenvald are concerned with different issues. Aikhenvald is concerned with the existence of a typological grammatical category, whereas Stenzel’s point concerns particular evidential systems. And crucially, Aikhenvald’s categorial claim has nothing directly to do with the semantic organization of particular evidential systems. In particular evidential systems, the semantics of evidentiality and epistemic modality may be complexly intertwined at both the morphemic and paradigmatic levels. But this does not, in itself, vitiate the claim that each are distinct typological grammatical

categories.

The final twist in defending Stenzel’s position would be to argue against the existence of typological grammatical categories themselves – an issue she seems to broach when she asserts that categorical statements are only possible in reference to the organization of language-specific systems.<sup>7</sup> But it is here, I submit, that Stenzel’s position is undermined by inconsistencies. In particular, without the notional grounding given by typological grammatical categories, it would not even be possible to define the category of any given morpheme in a paradigm. This would render moot any argument about how the notional composition of a paradigm structure may, in a language-specific manner, ‘re-categorize’ morphemes which would otherwise be classified as belonging to other categories. In the Wanano case that Stenzel discusses, for example, evidentials are argued to be modals by virtue of their sharing a paradigm with modals. To even begin this argument, however, Stenzel needs to identify particular morphemes as modals, a step that relies on the cross-linguistic category of ‘modal’. In short, Stenzel’s argument, which seeks to undercut absolute cross-linguistic claims, rests crucially upon such claims, in the form of the notional definitions of categories necessary to categorize individual morphemes.

There seems little reason, therefore, to take the existence of mixed paradigms as compelling evidence for conflating evidentiality and epistemic modality. For the purposes of the present work, then, evidentiality and epistemic modality, as typological grammatical categories, will be considered sufficiently distinct.

### **2.2.1.3 Obligatoriness**

Evidential meanings can be expressed in a variety of ways: as morphemes in an inflectional paradigm, as facultative morphology, or periphrastically. Indeed, it is commonly claimed – and there seems no reason to doubt this – that it is possible to

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<sup>7</sup>Such a stance would resemble that of Radical Construction Grammar (Croft, 2001).

express evidential meanings in any human language by some means or another (cf. Aikhenvald, 2004, p.10). Most linguists, however, are interested in distinguishing evidential systems which exhibit significant structural regularity from those which do not. Those which exhibit the greatest degree of structural regularity are referred to as grammatical evidential systems.

On Aikhenvald's view, the crucial feature that distinguishes grammatical evidentiality is its obligatoriness. Although obligatory evidential systems are exemplary instances of evidentiality, Aikhenvald's stark delimitation of grammatical evidentiality is open to criticism from grammaticalization-theoretic perspectives, which reject simple dichotomies between obligatoriness and non-obligatoriness, in favor of a gradient conception of obligatoriness, or more felicitously, frequency. On this view, obligatoriness is simply an extremum of the frequency continuum. Similarly, on this view, the sharp dichotomy between grammar and pragmatics is replaced with the concept of a grammaticalization cline, in which phonological simplification and dependence, semantic generalization, and frequency are criterial in determining the degree to which an element is 'grammaticalized' (Hopper and Traugott, 2003).<sup>8</sup>

This divergence of viewpoints regarding the delimitation of grammar leads to different judgements on whether particular evidential systems are instances of grammatical evidentiality or not. For example, researchers influenced by grammaticalization theory seem much more likely to characterize facultative evidential systems as instances of 'grammatical evidentiality' (see, for example, Epps's (2005) discussion of Hup evidentiality), than those who consider obligatoriness to be criterial in grammar. The reasoning behind the former judgement is that facultative morphology exhibits a greater degree of 'grammaticalization', measured by the above-mentioned criteria, than do periphrastic expressions of grammatical meaning. As such, facul-

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<sup>8</sup>In §2.3.3 I articulate a position that, instead of blurring the notion of 'grammar', delimits grammar sharply, and proposes that the regularity exhibited by 'partially grammaticalized' elements can be accounted for as a component of communicative habitus within a theory of communicative practice.

tative evidential morphology is an instance of a (partially) grammatical expression of evidentiality. For those who rely on the obligatoriness condition as an index of formal grammaticality, of course, facultative evidential morphology and periphrastic expressions of evidential meanings are equally motivated by pragmatics, and not by principles of grammatical well-formedness.

However, under Aikhenvald's proposal, only languages which realize evidentiality as an inflectional category may be said to exhibit 'evidentiality'.<sup>9</sup> It is clear that Aikhenvald's proposal is motivated by a desire to exclude from consideration systems that only express evidential meanings periphrastically (Aikhenvald, 2004, p.10). While acknowledging the important difference between grammatical evidentiality and other forms of structural realization of evidential meanings, I do not adopt Aikhenvald's proposal. My principal reason for this is that there are evidential systems which are certainly not inflectional, yet which exhibit considerably greater regularization than, say, the periphrastic system of English – such as the Hup system discussed below, and crucially, the Nanti system.

We now turn to two criteria that surface in Aikhenvald's discussion and definition of evidentiality in ambiguous ways: the *paradigmatic unilocality* criterion and the *paradigmatic uniformity* criterion. Satisfaction of these criteria, I will argue, is not a necessary condition for grammatical evidential systems, although they are characteristic of highly regular inflectional evidential systems.

#### **2.2.1.4 Paradigmatic unilocality**

The paradigmatic unilocality criterion is satisfied when a typological grammatical category is realized by a set of morphemes in complementary distribution in a single syntagmatic position. Evidential systems that do not obey the paradigmatic unilo-

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<sup>9</sup>It should be noted that despite the strong theoretical stance Aikhenvald (2004) takes in delimiting grammatical evidentiality, a perusal of the evidential systems she discusses show that in practice, she also treats facultative evidential systems as instances of grammatical evidentiality.

cality condition form what Aikhenvald calls ‘scattered’ evidential systems, in which evidential morphemes appear in multiple syntagmatic positions. Such systems are found in languages such as Hup (Nadahup, Brasil, Epps, 2005), Western Apache (Athabascan, USA, De Reuse, 2003), and Nanti.

Consider the evidential system of Hup. Hup makes five evidential distinctions: nonvisual =*h̃*, reportative =*mah*, two inferred distinctions, =*cud* and =*ni*, and visual, which is zero-marked. The non-visual =*h̃* and the inferred =*cud* pattern together, appearing either as enclitics on predicates or as a verbal ‘inner suffix’. The reportative =*mah*, on the other hand, may cliticize to any focused element in the clause, and may appear more than once in a clause, unlike the previous two evidentials. The reportative may also appear as an inner suffix, but unlike either the visual =*h̃* or the inferred =*cud*, cannot receive primary stress in this position. The second inferred evidential =*ni*, has yet another distribution, appearing only on clause-final predicates in inner suffix position.

It does not appear to be the case that scattered evidential systems are necessarily non-obligatory ones (as is Hup’s). The evidential system of Makah (Wakashan, USA) (Jacobsen, 1986) is apparently both scattered and obligatory.

The literature on evidentiality exhibits mixed views regarding the grammatical status of scattered evidential systems. Aikhenvald (2003a, p.10), for example, characterizes the scattered evidential system of Japanese (Aoki, 1986) as failing to form a “unitary grammatical category,” and concludes that scattered evidential systems are “only marginally relevant to the study of evidentiality” (Aikhenvald, 2003a, p.11). Fortescue’s (2003) discussion of evidentiality in Western Greenlandic Eskimo appears to align with this view also.

Aikhenvald (2004), however, seems to take a more liberal position, characterizing scattered evidential systems in the following terms:

The expression of evidentiality may itself be obligatory – but different

evidentiality specifications ‘scattered’ throughout the verbal system by no means make up a unitary category. They still, however, qualify as grammatical evidentials, but their status is different from the systems [that obey the paradigmatic unilocality condition]. (Aikhenvald, 2004, p.80)

The stronger position taken in Aikhenvald (2003a) has been argued against by Joseph (2003), who suggests that a grammatical category may be ‘cognitively unitary’ or ‘cognitively systematic’ without being syntagmatically so. He argues that scattered evidential systems may be examples of morphological ‘constellations’: sets of elements related by rules of co-occurrence and exclusion *across*, rather than *within*, syntagmatic positions. Joseph goes on to mention Sanskrit reduplication (Janda and Joseph, 1986), the Modern Greek negator  $\mu\eta(\nu)$  (Janda and Joseph, 1999), Arapesh plural marking (Dobrin, 2001), and Hindi postpositional *-ko* (Vasishth and Joseph, 2002) as other examples of other ‘scattered’ categories. In any event, regardless of the theoretical mechanism invoked to account for scattered categories, the existence of scattered inflectional categories is actually quite uncontroversial among morphologists (Carstairs-McCarthy, 1998, p.326-7).

At this point, then, there seems to be little support for the paradigmatic uniformity condition as a *necessary* feature of grammatical evidential systems. Consequently, I exclude it from the definition of grammatical evidentiality.

In concluding the present section, however, I want to acknowledge what I believe to be the methodological point behind Aikhenvald’s attitude towards scattered evidentiality – namely, that evidential systems that obey the unilocality criterion are particularly amenable to analysis. In the first place, it is much easier to evaluate the obligatoriness of evidential systems that obey the unilocality criterion. When evidentiality is scattered, the question of whether pervasive evidential marking is motivated by pragmatic reasons or by structural ones becomes more challenging to



resolve. In the second place, Aikhenvald suggests that the semantics of scattered evidential systems is more complicated:

Languages with ‘scattered’ evidentiality may employ semantic parameters which diverge somewhat from those recurrent in languages with evidentiality as a single tightly knit and coherent category. (Aikhenvald, 2004, p.9)

In light of these points, I think that Aikhenvald’s position on scattered evidentiality, even the stronger (2003) position, should be seen primarily as an effort to focus attention on the tidier evidential systems, rather than as an effort to exclude scattered evidential systems from the realm of grammatical evidentiality.

#### **2.2.1.5 Paradigmatic uniformity**

The paradigmatic uniformity condition is not explicitly discussed by Aikhenvald (2004), but emerges from her discussion of factors that “complicate” the grammatical status of evidential systems (Aikhenvald, 2003a, p.11). Explicitly formulated, the paradigmatic uniformity condition would stipulate that in grammatical evidential systems, paradigms containing evidential morphemes may not include morphemes with non-evidential core meanings.

The analytical relevance of the paradigmatic uniformity condition stems from the implications that mixed paradigm structures have for obligatoriness. If a paradigm includes both evidential and non-evidential morphemes, it not possible for evidentiality to be obligatorily marked, as the choice of non-evidential morphemes in the paradigm automatically excludes evidential morphemes.

The case of M̃yky, discussed above, in which two evidential morphemes share a paradigm with a negation marker illustrates the issue nicely. If we relax the paradigmatic uniformity condition, we let into the fold of grammatical evidentiality

those systems, like that of M̃ky, which mix evidential and non-evidential morphemes in a single paradigm. Under a strict interpretation of the paradigmatic uniformity criterion, the M̃ky evidential system would not count as a grammatical evidentiality system. But Aikhenvald does not explicitly commit to such an interpretation, leaving the matter somewhat ambiguous:

An informed decision concerning the categorial status of evidentiality and what exactly constitutes a grammatical category in these cases can only be made on the basis of language-internal criteria. (Aikhenvald, 2003a, p.11)

Although not explicitly stated, I believe that Aikhenvald's position on this issue stems from the fact that it is not uncommon for the marking of evidentiality to be restricted by mood- or tense-marking. It is cross-linguistically common, for example, for evidentials to be omitted in imperatives, as in the Yukaghir languages (Russia), (Maslova, 2003, p.228), and in clauses marked for future tense, as in Tariana (Arawak, Brazil) (Aikhenvald, 2003b, p.287-9).

From this perspective, it is possible to see the M̃ky case in another light – namely, that the mixed paradigmatic structure is simply an artifact of restrictions in evidential marking due to clause polarity, and consequently, in no way affects the obligatory, or more precisely, inflectional, status of evidentiality in the language.

For this reason I do not consider the paradigmatic uniformity criterion, in itself, to be necessary criterial for grammatical evidentiality, which leads me to include systems like the M̃ky one under the rubric of grammatical evidentiality.

#### **2.2.1.6 Concluding remarks on grammatical perspectives**

Taking Aikhenvald's restrictive definition of evidentiality as a starting point, I have explored and evaluated other definitions of evidentiality, which can be obtained by relaxing one or several of the conditions Aikhenvald specifies or alludes to. In light of

this discussion, I define grammatical evidentiality as a highly-grammaticalized, but not necessarily obligatory, category with primary source-of-information meanings. Grammatical evidential systems which *in addition* obey the paradigmatic unilocality and paradigmatic uniformity conditions are, in my view, especially structurally well-behaved cases of grammatical evidentiality, and may form privileged objects of study for grammaticalized evidentiality for methodological and analytical reasons. However, they do not exhaust the range of grammatical evidential systems.

### 2.2.2 Discourse-analytical perspectives on evidentiality

Having examined how ‘evidentiality’ is understood as a grammatical phenomenon, I now turn to how the term has been understood by discourse analysts.<sup>10</sup> In addition, I will introduce terminology that I employ throughout the remainder of this work and, hopefully, sort out some of the ambiguity created by overlapping, but distinct, terminological usages adopted by scholars approaching evidentiality from grammatical and discourse analytic perspectives.

Scholars who study evidentiality as a discourse phenomenon generally understand it differently than those who study it from a grammatical perspective. The most significant of these differences are: 1) their deemphasis on grammaticalization as a relevant criterion in the evaluation of evidential systems, and 2) their tendency to conflate source-of-information meanings and epistemic modality in the definition of evidentiality.

The following definition of evidentiality, given by Paul Atkinson, who specializes in analysis of medical discourse, is typical of discourse analysts’ delimitation of evidentiality:

Evidentiality refers to the diverse ways in which the relative credibility of

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<sup>10</sup>In this section, I am using the term ‘discourse analyst’ in a broad sense, to refer to scholars who examine discourse from the perspective of a number of affine disciplines including linguistic anthropology, linguistic discourse analysis, conversational analysis, and pragmatics.

reported events, acts or statements is conveyed in language. (Atkinson, 1999, p.98)

In the remainder of this section, I discuss the differences between grammatical and discourse-analytical approaches to evidentiality, as illustrated by Atkinson's definition, and then seek to develop terminology that allows us to take full advantage of the contributions of each tradition.

### **2.2.2.1 Evidential strategies and grammatical evidentiality**

Scholars who study 'evidentiality' in discourse almost uniformly disregard issues of grammaticalization with respect to elements with evidential meanings, considering both grammatically obligatory morphology and entirely optional affixes, clitics, and lexical elements as evidentials (see, for example, Atkinson, 1999; Fox, 2001; Ifantidou, 2001; Mushin, 2001). In so far as delimiting evidentiality is concerned, these scholars are concerned only with *notional* content, and are neutral with respect to the structural characteristics of how this notional content is realized in discourse.

I am generally sympathetic with this analytical strategy, if not with the terminological laxness embodied by this approach. In Nanti evidential practice, grammaticalized evidentials and periphrastic means for expressing source-of-information meanings (typically, verbs of perception) tend to be used in conjunction with each other, supporting each other in expressing sensory modes of access to events. As such, both highly-grammaticalized and weakly-grammaticalized elements which communicate source-of-information meanings are relevant to Nanti evidential practice. Consequently, I share the interest of discourse analysts in the general expression of source-of-information meanings, regardless of the manner of their structural realization. Unlike discourse analysts, however, I feel that it is important to distinguish the character of their realization, and particularly, to attend to questions of the structural regularity and discursive pervasiveness of their realization. To this end, I adopt

the term *evidential strategy* for non-obligatory, non-grammaticalized expressions of evidential meanings. Evidential strategies thus contrast with grammaticalized evidentiality, discussed in the previous section. I employ the term *evidential resource* in a structurally neutral manner to refer to notionally evidential affixes, clitics, or free lexical items, be they obligatory or facultative, grammaticalized or not.

By distinguishing evidential strategies from grammatical evidentiality, I hope to avoid the kind of ambiguity criticized by Aikhenvald, who, commenting on Fox's (2001) work on evidentiality in English, for example, remarks: "Saying that English has 'evidentiality' ... is misleading: this implies a confusion between what is grammaticalized and what is lexical in a language."<sup>11</sup>

Before continuing, I want to comment on the relationship of the terminology I have introduced here to extant terminology in the literature. This comment concerns Aikhenvald's sense of the term 'evidential strategy', which partially overlaps with my own, but is crucially different. Aikhenvald (2004, p.105) uses the term to refer to notionally evidential 'secondary meanings' of (primarily) non-evidential grammatical categories and forms. Aikhenvald appears to use the terms 'non-core' meaning and 'secondary' meaning to refer both to pragmatic meanings, i.e. meanings derived via inference, and properly semantic meanings which are subordinate to some other semantic meaning associated with a given morpheme. As such, her use of the term 'evidential strategy' makes an important empirical distinction. However, I argue that the term itself is infelicitous in two ways. First, in some cases, an 'evidential strategy' may cover highly automatic, non-defeasible secondary meanings which are hardly 'strategic' at all, in a practice-theoretic sense (see §2.3.2). This is the case, for example, with secondary evidential meanings of certain verbal inflectional categories in Macedonian and Albanian described by Friedman (2003,

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<sup>11</sup>In fairness to Fox, I think that what her use of the term 'evidentiality' indicates is not confusion about the grammatical/lexical distinction, but rather an *indifference* to that distinction, stemming from her interest in discourse analysis, rather than grammar.

p.212), where the secondary meanings are so closely tied to the primary tense, aspectual, and modal meanings that he characterizes evidentiality in these languages as a ‘grammaticalized strategy’. Second, Aikhenvald’s sense of ‘evidential strategy’ does not cover periphrastic or ‘lexical’ means for expressing evidential meanings, which surely are ‘strategies’, as the term is understood by discourse analysts, for expressing evidential meanings. In this present work, I reserve the use of ‘evidential strategy’ for the use of any optional evidential marking or defeasible linguistic meaning to indicate source of information.

#### **2.2.2.2 Evidentiality and epistemic modality in discourse**

The second way in which discourse analysts diverge in their use of the term ‘evidentiality’ from those who study evidentiality as a grammatical phenomenon is in their widespread adoption of the term to cover both source of information and epistemic modality (Atkinson, 1999; Ifantidou, 2001; Fox, 2001; Sakita, 2002). This difference plausibly stems from the fact that source-of-information meanings and epistemic modal meanings frequently induce pragmatic inferences about the other category (Floyd, 1999). This tendency, as remarked on above, leads even scholars who study evidentiality as a grammatical category to conflate source of information and epistemic modality, or subsume them under a broader category. Given that discourse analysts tend to be less concerned with the distinction between grammatical and pragmatic meanings, it is not surprising that they are even more likely to conflate the two categories. Regardless of tradition, however, the motivation for doing so seems to be the same, viz. the perception that evidentials induce strong pragmatic inferences regarding ‘speaker commitment’ and propositional ‘reliability’.

Moreover, despite the fact that the discourse-analytic literature has paid considerable attention the epistemic modal inferences induced by evidentiality, it would be an error to assume that these are the only inferences induced by evidentials.

As Philips (1993, p.255-6) has remarked, there are good reasons to believe that the deployment of evidentiality for purposes related to the reliability of knowledge (i.e. for epistemic modal reasons) is linked to culture-specific language ideologies. Philips cites Athabascan ideals of avoiding reference to others' internal states, and Tongan ideologies linking wisdom to particular hierarchical social positions, as other factors influencing the discursive deployment of evidentials. As I show in Chapters 3 and 4, in Nanti evidential practice, evidentials are discursively significant due to inferences that have little to do with epistemic modality, such as event responsibility and utterance responsibility. For these reasons, the relationship between evidentiality and epistemic modality, even at the level of discourse, in which the analyst may choose to collapse the distinction between grammatical and pragmatic meanings, should be treated as contingent, and requiring empirical investigation (cf. Philips, 1993, p.256).

In concluding this section, I wish to remark that it would be remiss of me to imply that all scholars studying evidentiality as a discourse phenomenon are insensitive to the contingent relationship between evidentiality and epistemic modality. Mushin (2001, p.23-26), for example, provides a cogent discussion of both the issues involved in distinguishing evidentiality and epistemic modality semantically, and the difficulties in distinguishing the two in discourse.

### **2.3 Grammar and communicative practice**

My central concern in the present work is how Nantis indicate their sources of knowledge in talk, and how they employ these evidential resources in linguistically-mediated social action. This particular entanglement of language and social action, which I call 'evidential practice', is a facet of what linguistic anthropologists and others call 'communicative practice'. In this section, my goal is to provide an introduction to the concept of communicative practice, and to discuss the place of

grammar in communicative practice, in preparation for my discussion of evidential practice in §2.4.2.1.

The concept of communicative practice that I describe here springs from two distinct sources.<sup>12</sup> The first source is the more general concept of ‘social practice’ as developed within practice theory. Practice theory, most closely identified with the names of Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens, is an effort to capture the patterning and regularities of social life, while at the same time acknowledging the agency of social subjects; the contingent, strategic nature of social action; and the historicity of social life.<sup>13</sup> The second source on which my articulation of communicative practice is based is the *discourse-centered approach to culture*, an approach to the relation between language and culture that seeks explore the role of discourse (understood as communicative interaction) as a site for the reproduction and transformation of culture and society.

### 2.3.1 Practice theory

I begin with a summary of practice theory, and introduce basic concepts developed within practice theory to talk about regularity, improvisation, and agency in social action. The first aspect of practice theory we consider is *habitus*, and its role in accounting for the regularity displayed by human social activity, without reducing it to mechanical rule-following.

We can set up Bourdieu’s account of habitus with two observations: first, social activity consists in great part of highly routinized activities, in which individuals repeatedly engage in actions in very similar ways. At the same, although

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<sup>12</sup>My discussion of communicative practice is heavily influenced by Hanks’s (1996) and Erickson’s (2004) articulations of the concept. Although with different emphases, both scholars seek to wed practice theory to North American approaches to language-in-interaction – the ethnography of communication and conversation analysis among them.

<sup>13</sup>Historically, practice theory emerged as an effort to avoid problems besetting structuralist social theory, principally, atemporality, ahistoricity, and the erasure of agency, while not succumbing to its antithesis, voluntaristic subjectivism.



people's actions display significant routinization, individuals also innovate and alter their behavior in accord with evolving personal projects and changes in the physical and social environment. The regularity of routinized behavior thus cannot be reduced to the following of social 'rules', since the actions of individuals always demonstrate elements of strategic maneuvering against a background of repetition and routinization.

The second relevant observation is that much of what we do on a day-to-day basis rests on knowledge to which we have limited conscious access. That is, we can perform actions fluidly, and negotiate our way through our social and physical worlds, without being able to describe precisely how we do so. Thus, our ability to function socially is not based on articulable, propositional knowledge, but rather on a practical mastery that results from embodied and situated interactions with the world.

Bourdieu argues that in order to account for these characteristics of social action, we cannot rely on anything like 'social rules' or 'social structure', but instead on what he calls *habitus*, which consists of:

...systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be objectively "regulated" and "regular" without in any way being the product of obedience to rules ... (Bourdieu, 1977, p.72)

As to the functional and cognitive status of the principles of *habitus*, Bourdieu remarks that they are:

...objectively adapted to their goals, without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them and, being all this, collectively orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor. (ibid. p.72)

Even when they appear as the realization of the explicit, and explicitly stated, purposes of a project or plan, the practices produced by the habitus, as the strategy-generating principle enabling agents to cope with unforeseen and ever-changing situations, are only apparently determined by the future. (ibid. p.72)

Under this view, social regularities emerge as the regularity of practices, which are rooted in the habitus of the socially and physically situated individual. The regularity of practice is not mechanical reproduction, but the outcome of interested, strategic action which, in the social contexts in which the habitus was acquired, tends to reproduce the conditions of that social context.

There is considerable similarity between Bourdieu's concept of habitus and what Anthony Giddens calls "practical consciousness". Like Bourdieu, Giddens reacts against the determinism of structuralism, and the "derogation of the lay actor" inherent in functionalism, by which the goals of social agents, and these agents' understandings of the consequences of their actions, are dismissed in favor of the 'goals' of society identified by the analyst (Giddens, 1979, p.71). Giddens takes as a starting point for social theory the observation that people are knowledgeable agents (Giddens, 1984, p.281). Their knowledge consists both of 'discursive consciousness', that is, articulable propositional knowledge; and 'practical consciousness,' which consists of:

tacit knowledge that is skillfully applied in the enactment of courses of conduct, but which the actor is not able to formulate discursively. (Giddens, 1979, p.57)

Practical consciousness includes the knowledge of rules and resources that actors draw on in the course of social conduct, which Giddens takes care to characterize as continuously reflexively-monitored and motivated. Significantly, Giddens'

conception of ‘rules’ is consonant with the “regulated improvisation” (Bourdieu 1977: p86) of habitus, and is quite distinct from the notion of ‘mechanistic’ social rules:

[r]ules imply methodological procedures of social interaction, as Garfinkel in particular has made clear. Rules typically intersect with practices in the contextuality of situated encounters: the range of ‘ad hoc’ considerations which he identifies are chronically involved with the instantiation of rules and are fundamental to the form of those rules. (Giddens 1984, p.18)

We see in both Bourdieu’s and Giddens’ work, then, the elaboration of concepts that allow us to discuss social action as simultaneously routinized and strategic, structured and improvised, conscious and unconscious.<sup>14</sup> Synthesizing the concepts of habitus and practical knowledge, on the one hand, and strategic action and the knowledgeable agent, on the other, we arrive at a particular vision of the social actor and social activity.

To begin with, it is clear that many of social actors’ actions are guided by schematic and open-ended knowledge of techniques and methods for conducting themselves in the social and physical world. This generative knowledge enables them to act fluidly in most contexts, improvising on a shifting interactional ground, without requiring a great deal of conscious effort. Indeed, much of this knowledge is only limitedly accessible to conscious awareness. I will refer to this generative, improvisation-enabling, schematic knowledge as *habitus*, adopting Bourdieu’s term. To be clear, though, the concept denoted by my use of this term owes as much to

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<sup>14</sup>It is worth commenting that remarkably similar ideas about practical knowledge and action have been developed by cognitive scientists seeking to understand the situated and embodied nature of cognition (Agre, 1997; Clark, 1997). Since both Bourdieu and Giddens make claims with significant cognitive and psychological ramifications, it is comforting that cognitive scientists, working with different data and analytical frameworks, have converged on similar conclusions.

Giddens' articulation of the concept of practical knowledge as it does to Bourdieu's conception of habitus.

Significantly, the social actor who deploys his or her habitus in concrete interactional settings is a socially-situated and interested agent. By saying that the social actor is situated, I mean that he or she stands in particular relations with respect to other actors and social institutions, and their habitus is significantly tuned to this position. Habitus is not, therefore, simply a rebranding of the holistic culture concept. To be sure, certain aspects of habitus may be widely distributed among the members of social groups, but others will be restricted to particular social roles, and even to particular individuals. The habitus of Nanti women, for example, differs in important ways from that of Nanti men, and the habitus of Migero, the community leader, is unique in important ways from that of everyone else, consonant with his inhabiting a unique social role in the community.

By saying that the social actor is an interested agent, I am emphasizing two related things. First, social actors are motivated, that is, their actions need to be understood as forming parts of personal or group projects of a variety of scales. Second, I am emphasizing that social actors strategize and maneuver in their social interactions, using resources such as social relationships and the patterns of language as means for achieving goals. As such, the social actor is neither the structuralist automaton guided by the algebraic logic of culture; nor the unwitting social ant of functionalism; nor even the social golem 'articulated' by 'discourses', as envisioned by anti-humanist postmodernism.

### **2.3.2 Communicative practice**

Having described the social agent and habitus in general terms as components of social activity, I now narrow my attention to communicative activity. Those aspects of social habitus in which the deployment of communicative structures or

resources is involved, I refer to as *communicative habitus*. No comprehensive theory of communicative habitus has been developed, although Hanks (1996) and Erickson (2004) elaborate aspects of such an account in their work on communicative practice. However, it is possible to make some observations, relating work in a number of language-centered disciplines to the concept of communicative habitus.

Given that habitus accommodates, and indeed, serves as the basis for strategic and improvisational action, we expect to find the same basic accommodation of strategy and improvisation in the communicative habitus. One does not have to look far to find aspects of language that fit this characterization. The context-sensitive and defeasible principles of pragmatics, for example, broached by Grice's introduction of the notion of communicative maxims, and since considerably refined and elaborated by a large number of scholars (Levinson, 1983; Mey, 1993), are obviously components of communicative habitus. The principles governing conversation, studied within the tradition of conversation analysis, which permit individuals to improvisationally, yet with great precision, organize their contributions to talk in groups, also shares these features. The quasi-rule-like nature of turn-taking principles which, in the context of concrete interactions between individuals, allow people to negotiate the distribution of access to the conversational floor in a strategic, improvisational, but normally fluid manner, is a clear exemplification of the phenomenological character of habitus. The schematic nature of habitus is also evident in the Goffmanian concept of frames, and scaling up from there, is also found in the concepts of discourse genres and speech events, as described in the ethnography of communication tradition and approaches influenced by it (Bauman and Sherzer, 1974; Hanks, 1987).

The second aspect of practice theory that is relevant for my discussion of communicative practice is its theorization of social reproduction and change, in particular, Giddens' theory of structuration. Giddens' theory of structuration is an

intrinsically dynamic conception of social structure, which emphasizes that social forms exist only through their recursive actualization in concrete social conduct. Central to Giddens' theory is the concept of 'duality of structure', by which:

... rules and resources are drawn upon by actors in the production of interaction, but are thereby also reconstituted through such interaction. (Giddens 1979, p.71).

The significance of Giddens' account of structuration for communicative practice is two-fold. First, it makes concrete instances of interaction the locus of the perpetuation and transformation of social forms. Second, by acknowledging the role of agency in interaction, Giddens opens up an analytical space for the socially transformational dimension of discourse.

This view of the role of interaction converges with the independent tradition represented by the *discourse-centered approach to culture*<sup>15</sup> (DCAC) (Sherzer, 1987; Urban, 1991; Farnell and Graham, 1998). Crucially, DCAC brings a specific focus on language that is lacking in the sociological orientation of practice theory.

The central idea of DCAC is that culture should not be conceived of as an abstract network of binary conceptual oppositions and transformations on them, as structuralists do; nor should it be understood in terms of reified notions of social structure, as functionalists do; nor even in terms of delocalized 'discourses', as post-structuralists do. Rather, culture should be understood as "localized in concrete, publically accessible signs, the most important of which are actually occurring instance of discourse" (Urban, 1991, p.1). On this view, to study the production, reproduction, and circulation of discourse is to study culture. The transformational dimension of discourse is made clear by Sherzer, who remarks that "...language use

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<sup>15</sup>Anthony Woodbury has commented that Anthony Giddens was friends with John Gumperz, who, with Dell Hymes, launched the ethnography of communication tradition, of which the discourse-centered approach to culture is a direct descendant. It may be, then, that the convergence I describe here is not merely fortuitous.

does not reflect culture but ... language use in discourse creates, recreates, and modifies culture.” (Sherzer, 1987, p.300).

DCAC contributes, through its disciplinary heritage, a substantial empirical and theoretical engagement with concrete instances of communicative interaction. Despite Bourdieu’s and Giddens’ insistence on the importance of practice and concrete interaction, both ultimately shy away from any serious empirical engagement with them. DCAC, on the other hand, has its roots in the empirically-oriented ethnography of communication, and beyond, to the Boasian approach to language and culture (Sherzer, 1987, pp.296-7). Work in the DCAC framework has sought to understand, for example, how discourse structure, genre, speech play and verbal art, and participant structures are implicated in the perpetuation and transformation of cultural forms.

I now wish to draw together the threads I have laid out and articulate the notion of communicative practice that will underpin my account of Nanti evidential practice. In the genesis of communicative action, several kinds of generative structures and resources come together in the context of concrete interaction. These include the communicative habitus, articulable knowledge and ideologies, and grammar. The interplay of these elements in the course of efforts to realize individual and group social projects in interaction with other social actors in specific social and physical setting yields *communicative practice*.

### **2.3.3 Communicative practice and the irreducibility of grammar**

The concept of communicative practice that I have outlined above provides a means for talking about certain regularities in communicative interaction. An obvious question that arises is where the limits of communicative practice lie, and how the concept of communicative practice shares its analytical and explanatory role with concepts such as grammar and pragmatics. It is the relationship between com-

municative practice and grammar that I now address. This relationship will prove especially relevant in making use of the scholarship on grammaticalized evidentiality in theorizing evidential practice (see §??ect:evidepistprac).

In this work I maintain that grammar is ontologically distinct from communicative habitus, and that communicative practice arises in part from the instrumental use of grammar by the communicative habitus. Neither grammar nor communicative habitus alone can account fully for the way in which concrete instances of discourse are patterned with respect to the signifying resources of language and the social contexts of which discourse forms a part.

In as much as grammar is an analytically useful concept, I contend, it denotes a dimension of the organization of linguistic resources that is independent of social or communicative instrumentality. An early formulation of this conception of grammar is given by Bloomfield (1926, p.154):

A needy stranger at the door says *I'm hungry*. A child who has eaten and merely wants to put off going to bed says *I'm hungry*. Linguistics considers only those vocal features which are alike in the two utterances, and only those stimulus-reaction features which are alike in the two utterances.

The grammar of a language is the sum total of distributional statements regarding the organization of linguistic tokens into types, based on their paradigmatic and syntagmatic distribution with respect to other linguistic tokens, themselves organized into types. On this view, we can speak of a property or function being 'grammatical' precisely by virtue of it being definable exclusively in terms of relations of syntagmatic and paradigmatic co-occurrence or exclusion between linguistic token types (grammatical function<sub>1</sub>, in the formulation of Silverstein (1987)). In Hanks's (1996) apt formulation, grammar is formally irreducible. Grammar, as I have characterized it, is thus different from communicative habitus in a crucial



way: grammar leaves no place for strategy or improvisation; grammar is a set of structural relationships removed from human agency, motivations, and reasons.

In order to avoid a possible misinterpretation of my analytical intentions, I wish to make clear that my interest in being precise about the distinction between grammar and communicative habitus is not motivated by a desire to justify discarding the latter in order to focus on the formal study of grammar. Distinctions that have sought to demarcate a domain of formal objects and properties of language, such as the Saussurean *langue/parole* distinction and Chomskyan competence/performance distinction, have indeed been invoked as a justification for focusing on grammar at the expense of discourse. These are reflexes of what Bauman and Briggs (2003) have analyzed as the tendency in the Western intellectual tradition to attempt to sever language from its social roots in order to ‘purify’ it, and render it suitable as a medium of, and object for, rational inquiry. My purpose here is quite different. My interest in distinguishing grammar from communicative habitus in the context of evidential practice stems from a sense of the pervasiveness of social and strategic considerations in evidential practice, and the relatively modest role played by grammar. In short, I am interested in demonstrating the thoroughly social nature of evidential practice. At the same time, however, it is crucial not to engage in social reductionism when grammatical properties play a role in communicative practice. Only by recognizing that grammar and communicative habitus have different properties, and different roles in communicative practice, can we hope to understand the social dimensions communicative practice, and evidential practice in particular.

## 2.4 Evidentiality and evidential practice

Following a tradition going back at least as far as Givón (1982), I consider evidentiality to form that part of communicative practice concerned with our *practical*

*epistemology* (Sidnell, 2005), or our everyday relationship to knowledge. I refer to this aspect of communicative practice as *evidential practice*.<sup>16</sup> Note that we should expect evidential practice, given the open-ended nature of communicative practice more generally, to be heterogeneous and difficult to delimit precisely. Thus, in focusing on how Nantis employ evidentials to negotiate responsibility in the present work, I am presenting only slice of a Nanti evidential practice, albeit an important one.

The idea that a satisfactory account of evidentiality requires looking beyond the solely grammatical dimensions of their distribution is not new. The earliest effort of which I am aware to situate evidentiality in a broader communicative framework is Givón's (1982) discussion of evidentiality in the context of a comprehensive "epistemic space". Under this account, encoded and inferred meanings stemming from evidentials and epistemic modal marking are distributed in discourse with respect to an exhaustive "epistemic continuum" of "subjective certainty" that a speaker has about a given proposition. According to this account, propositions with very low certainty cannot be evidentially marked, whereas highly certain propositions do not require evidential marking. This latter grouping includes "deictically obvious" and presupposed propositions, among others. Propositions in the intermediate range of the epistemic continuum are the typical locus of evidentiality.<sup>17</sup>

Mushin (2001) introduces the first comprehensive framework for analyzing evidentiality in pragmatic terms – which all subsequent ones, including my own, resemble in many respects. Mushin's account, which is heavily influenced by cognitive

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<sup>16</sup>Scholars have referred to partially similar concepts as *epistemic stances* (e.g. Agha, 2002; Kärkkäinen, 2003) or *epistemological stances or practices* (e.g. Chafe, 1993; Mushin, 2001)

<sup>17</sup>It should be noted that although Givón relates the use of evidentials to what is, in essence, a parameterization of epistemic modality, he does not conflate evidentiality and epistemic modality notionally or categorially. Rather, he seeks to account for the distribution of evidential resources in discourse with respect to speakers' epistemic evaluations of knowledge. That said, Givón's generalizations appear to be contradicted by subsequent scholarship on highly grammaticalized evidential systems which exhibit the use of evidentials in the utterances that express forms of knowledge at the extrema of his proposed epistemic space, where Givón predicts evidentials to be absent.

linguistics, centers on the notion of *epistemological stances*, which are universally-available values for the universal cognitive category of ‘evidentiality’ (essentially a cognitive framing of the typological grammatical category of evidentiality). According to Mushin there is, for example, an inferential stance available to speakers of all languages, which is expressed in any particular language with the grammatical and pragmatic resources available to that language. In Mushin’s model, a speaker’s choice of epistemological stance results from the intersection of his or her assessment regarding the source of information; his or her assessment of the ongoing interaction; and cultural conventions regarding epistemological stances. Once this choice is made, the linguistics resources available for expressing that epistemological stance are deployed, which may be dedicated morphemes, periphrastic expressions, or inferences stemming from other grammatical or lexical resources.

Agha (2002) presents a discussion of ‘epistemic stance’ that is broadly similar to Mushin’s discussion of ‘epistemological stance’, although he frames his discussion in terms of semiotics and interactional frameworks. Agha gives greater weight than Mushin does to the significant range of “social/interpersonal effects” that evidentials may have, including “affect, interpersonal alignment (challenge, dispute; sympathy, empathy toward another), politeness and ethical consequences (responsibility, culpability)” and to the contextually determined nature of meanings associated with evidentials.

#### **2.4.1 Motivating an evidential practice approach**

In this section, I argue that the comprehensive study of evidentiality as a linguistic phenomenon is not possible without attention to how it is enmeshed in communicative practice. I am not merely arguing that evidentiality *may* be studied from the perspective of communicative practice – we can presumably do so with any grammatical category – but rather that evidentiality is unlike many other well-known

grammatical categories in that failure to understand its role in communicative practice leads to pervasive misunderstandings regarding the phenomenon.

First I argue that for many, if not most, languages which exhibit grammaticalized evidentiality, the distribution of evidentials is significantly underdetermined by grammar, and that a robust account of evidentials in these languages requires attention to the strategic use of evidentials in interaction – in other words, evidential practice. A purely grammatical approach simply leaves unanswered important questions about the distribution of evidentials. Second, I argue that the suitability of a practice-oriented approach to evidentiality is supported by the fact that evidentiality, unlike most other grammatical categories, tends to be the object of language ideologies that link the use of these grammatical resources to local understandings of the relationships between language use and morality.

#### **2.4.2 Evidential practice, obligatoriness, and pervasiveness**

I argue that the notion of evidential practice is essential to providing a thorough account of the distribution of evidentials in languages in which evidentials are not structurally obligatory.

As discussed in §2.2.1.3, the issue of structural obligatoriness – or its absence – with respect to evidentials has been highlighted in recent scholarship by Aikhenvald’s (2004) insistence that source-of-information marking must constitute an *obligatory* language-specific grammatical category for it to count as ‘evidentiality’. This stipulation is Aikhenvald’s reaction to some scholars’ extension of the term ‘evidentiality’ to cover any expression of source of information (see §2.2.1), on the grounds that the optional periphrastic expression of a meaning associated with a given grammatical category has different consequences for linguistic well-formedness than does the grammaticalization of those meanings into a language-specific grammatical category. As Aikhenvald remarks, the fact that lexical items for ‘male’ and

‘female’ exist in a given language, and may be used optionally in any given sentence, has quite different morphosyntactic consequences than does the existence of grammatical gender in that language. It is therefore problematic to equate the lexical or periphrastic expression of biological sex (or social gender) with grammatical gender. Equating any expression of source-of-information with ‘evidentiality’ poses similar problems.

In this section I show that Aikhenvald’s stipulation regarding what constitutes an evidential system contains an important insight, but that the simple obligatory/non-obligatory dichotomy it sets up is too crude to usefully characterize the regularity of many evidential systems. In particular, a large number of evidential systems display ‘pervasive’ evidentiality, although the category is not *structurally* obligatory. In order to account for such systems, I argue that an approach based on communicative practice, and not solely on grammar, is required.

I begin by showing that in several prominent cases, the ‘obligatoriness’ displayed by highly-grammaticalized evidential systems is not *grammatical obligatoriness*, but instead a kind of *communicative obligatoriness* that stems from interactional maxims concerning the need to specify the source of information for a given utterance clear to interlocutors.

At this point, some orienting comments on grammatical obligatoriness will be helpful. To say that a grammatical category is ‘grammatically obligatory’ in a given language is to specify that in any construction type in which a grammatical category *can* be expressed, it *must* be expressed, in order for the construction to be grammatically well-formed. Note that this definition does not indicate that a category must be expressed in all construction types for it to be considered obligatory. In many evidential languages, for example, evidentiality is never marked in future-tense clauses.

The importance Aikhenvald gives to obligatoriness as a characteristic of

grammatical evidentiality is clear:

In languages with grammatical evidentiality, marking how one knows something is a must. [...] This is very much unlike languages where saying explicitly how you know things is a matter of choice for the speaker. (Aikhenvald, 2004, p.6)

However, when we closely examine particular systems of grammatical evidentiality, we begin to see that the issue of obligatoriness is not as straightforward a grammatical matter as it may at first seem. Consider the case of Tariana (Arawak; Brazil), a language that exhibits highly grammaticalized evidentiality. Speaking of this language, Aikhenvald (2004, p.2) remarks that “[o]mitting an evidential results in an ungrammatical and highly unnatural sentence,” suggesting that tense-evidential marking is grammatical obligatory in Tariana. However, in her detailed grammar of Tariana, Aikhenvald (2003b, p.289) also remarks that:

Tense-evidentiality specification is obligatory in *most* clauses. It can, however, be omitted under some circumstances, for instance, if the specification has already been established and/or is clear from context. (emphasis mine)

Aikhenvald (2003b, p.309-10) later expands on the conditions under which tense-evidential marking may be omitted:

For each clause a listener must be able to infer its tense and evidentiality status. [...] The tense-evidentiality enclitics can be omitted if the time-and-evidence frame is set in the previous or in the following clause, or is clear from the context, as in repetition. [...] The tense-evidentiality specification can be omitted in short answers where the specification is recoverable from the context.

These more detailed comments indicate that evidentiality is *not* grammatically obligatory in Tariana, since evidential marking is not required for morphosyntactic well-formedness *per se*. This is clear from the fact that evidentials may be omitted if they can be inferred from context. The correct generalization regarding the distribution of evidentials in Tariana is therefore a generalization about communicative practice, and *not* about grammatical form: the tense-evidential status of a proposition must be clear to interactants. This may be achieved either by overt marking or by inference from context.

Evidentiality appears to behave similarly in another language with highly-grammaticalized evidentiality, Shipibo-Konibo (Panoan; Peru):

Evidentials in SK [Shipibo-Konibo] are clitics that do not take part in the obligatory verb inflection. While inference and speculation are marked overtly, direct and reported information need only be coded in the first of a string of clauses, with zero-marking an option in subsequent clauses. Nevertheless, I argue that evidentiality is “obligatory” in the sense that the evidential value of the information has always been grammatically marked in the forgoing discourse and is clear to native speakers. (Valenzuela, 2003, p.57-8)

In the Shipibo-Konibo case too, then, evidential marking is not required for reasons of morphosyntactic well-formedness, but rather, because the evidential status of a proposition must be clear to interactants. As in the Tariana case, this may be achieved either via overt marking or via inference. I will refer to languages like Tariana and Shipibo-Konibo, in which this maxim is very strong, as displaying *communicatively obligatory* evidentiality.

These comments make clear that the ‘obligatoriness’ of Tariana and Shipibo-Konibo evidentiality is best understood not as consequence of requirements on morphosyntactic form, but rather of maxims governing ideal communicative interaction.

Specifically, in both languages it appears that the distribution of evidentials is governed by a communicative maxim requiring that the source of information on which a proposition is based be clear to the interactants. In short, the ‘obligatoriness’ in question is not a consequence of grammar, but a consequence of understandings regarding proper communication between individuals. As such, the distribution of evidentials in these languages is best analyzed as being governed by communicative habitus, and not solely by grammar.

The behavior of evidentiality in Tariana and in Shipibo-Konibo illuminates two important issues. First, evidentiality may be highly grammaticalized in a language without being grammatically obligatory. And second, the distribution of evidentiality in such languages is ultimately governed by aspects of communicative habitus.

The notion that the behavior of Tariana and Shipibo-Konibo is not anomalous, and may indeed be typical for languages with grammaticalized evidentiality, is supported by looking at other Amazonian languages with well-described evidential systems.

The evidential system of Hup (Nadahup; Brazil), for example, presents a case in which evidentiality may be omitted either because of recoverability from context, or simply because it is not deemed particularly relevant by interactants:

... the expression of evidentiality in Hup is to some degree optional, and it is guided more by Gricean-type pragmatic principles of informativeness rather than by any grammatical rule. Thus evidential markers are sometimes left off in situations where the information source is already made obvious by the discourse context or is otherwise seen as *relatively non-salient*. (Epps, 2005, p.779, emphasis mine)

Evidentiality in Hup is thus not grammatically obligatory, or even communicatively obligatory. However, Hup speakers employ evidentials with much greater



frequency than English speakers employ the ‘evidential’ system of English, as described by Fox (2001).

Similarly, the omission of evidential particles in Kamaiurá (Tupí-Guaraní) is described as leading to sentences that are in certain respects discursively odd, but crucially, not ungrammatical or ill-formed:

De fato, en dados elicitados, é comum que o falante omita partículas, limitando-se a incluir aquelas imprescindíveis para que o enunciado seja gramaticalmente e, em parte, semanticamente correcto na situação supostamente neutra do enunciado isolado. Despido das partículas, os enunciados soam como algo artificial, esterelizado, destituído de colorido.<sup>18</sup> (Seki, 2000, p.347)

One suspects that discourse context plays a major role in the assessment of the oddness or naturalness of evidential-free sentences, and a perusal of Seki’s grammar appears to confirm this: sentences lacking evidentials are legion (Seki, 2000, p.435-451 *passim*). Evidential particles are dense when a narrative or a scene begins, but once the evidential basis for a topic or scene has been established, evidentials become scarce.<sup>19</sup>

These scattered observations suggest that there is a cline in the strength of the relevant maxims and interactional principles governing the use of evidentials in interaction. This cline reaches from languages like Tariana and Shipibo-Konibo, which exhibit communicatively obligatory evidentiality, to ones in which norms regarding source-of-information clarity motivate much less frequent use of evidentials.

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<sup>18</sup>“In fact, in elicited data, it is common for the speaker to omit particles, limiting themselves to including only those necessary for the utterance to be grammatically and, in part, semantically correct in the supposedly neutral situation of the isolated utterance. Bereft of particles, the utterances sound like something artificial, sterile, and drained of color.” (my translation)

<sup>19</sup>This discursive distributional fact probably accounts for the awkwardness of the isolated sentences mentioned by Seki. As isolated sentences, they are, in a certain sense, the opening sentence of a narrative, and thus should bear evidential particles.

Hup, for example, presents a case in which evidentiality may be omitted either because of recoverability from context, or simply because it is not deemed particularly relevant by interactants. Further along the cline we find Western Apache. De Reuse (2003) observes that evidentiality is more pervasive in Western Apache (Athabaskan, USA) discourse than in English, though apparently far less so than in the cases of the languages discussed so far in this section:

Even though evidentiality is by no means an obligatory category in WA [Western Apache], WA speakers mark source of information more often and more precisely than European language speakers do. (De Reuse, 2003, p.95-6)

The preceding discussion of systems of grammaticalized evidentiality suggests that descriptive characterizations of evidential systems that solely distinguish whether evidentials are *morphosyntactically* obligatory or not fail to capture an important dimension of their use: their pervasiveness and regularity in discourse. We have seen, for example, how evidentials are pervasive in Tariana, Shipibo-Konibo, Hup, Kamaiurá, and Western Apache, without being grammatically obligatory. Dickinson et al. (2006) similarly argue that evidentiality in Tsafiki is “discursively obligatory” even though it is not an inflectional category, suggesting a pervasiveness of evidential marking more like that of Tariana. For these languages, the distribution of evidentials is grammatically constrained by, but is not reducible to formal rules. Rather, as Epps indicates for Hup, the occurrence of evidentials depends on communicative factors such as the relevance or salience of evidential information to the interactants in concrete contexts of communicative interaction.

If the distribution of evidentials is not a purely grammatical phenomenon even in most languages that exhibit grammaticalized evidentials, then we are left with a significant gap in our description of evidentiality between true morphosyntactic obligatoriness and entirely optional use of source-of-information resources. In

the next section, I discuss a proposal for filling this gap in our description of the systematicity of use of evidentials: evidential practice.

#### **2.4.2.1 Evidentiality, language ideology, and evidential practice**

One indication that a full understanding of evidentiality requires a practice-based approach is the fact that the use and misuse of evidentials is heavily ideologically freighted. Recall that communicative practice, as I discussed in §2.3.2 and following Hanks (1996) and Erickson (2004), consists of predispositions in the real-time deployment and interpretation of formal linguistic resources in the course of strategic social action (or better, interaction), as informed by ideologies that imbue these resources and the actions themselves with social meanings (Hanks, 1996, p.229-47). The ideological significance of evidentiality is manifest in the work of a number of different scholars.

Consider for example, the ideological framing that Hardman gives for the misuse of evidentials in the Jaqi languages:<sup>20</sup>

Those who ... state as personal knowledge [instead of using reportives] ... that which they know only through language (e.g. things that they have read in books) are immediately categorized as cads, as people who behave more like animals than humans... (Hardman, 1986, p.133)

The omission of evidentials in Jaqi is apparently not considered a grammatical error or a speech error, on par with the omission of morphology or incorrect word order. Rather, it is considered a moral or interpersonal failing: “[evidential] accuracy is a crucial element in the public reputation of individuals; misuse of data source ... is insulting to the listener” (ibid., p.114). Thus, the omission of evidentials is considered socially improper, but apparently results in perfectly intelligible,

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<sup>20</sup>The Jaqi family, more frequently referred to as Aymaran family, consists of Aymara, spoken in Peru and Bolivia, Jaqaru, and Kawki, considered by some to be a dialect of Jaqaru, both of which are spoken in Peru.

and so one assumes, grammatically well-formed, utterances. In short, the omission of evidentials flouts Jaqi language ideologies, not constraints on grammatical form.

The ideological nature of evidential use is reasonably cast by some linguists as a ‘cultural’ dimension of language that is reflective of a broader social orientation towards knowledge. Hardman (1986, p.136) characterizes Jaqi evidentiality as “pervasive and uncompromising, an integral part of the Jaqi world view,” and Weber (1989, p.420), speaking of Huallaga Quechua (Quechuan; Peru) society suggests that evidentials are instrumental in fulfilling the following set of cultural principles (cf. Nuckolls, 1993):

1. (Only) one’s own experience is reliable.
2. Avoid unnecessary risk, as by assuming responsibility for information of which one is not absolutely certain.
3. Don’t be gullible. (Witness the many Quechua folktales in which the villain is foiled because of his gullibility.)
4. Assume responsibility only if it is safe to do so. (The successful assumption of responsibility builds stature in the community.)

McClendon (2003) makes similar remarks on the role of evidentiality in supporting cultural ideals regarding appropriate language use in traditional Eastern Pomo (Pomoan; USA) society.

These observations strongly suggest that the misuse of evidentials is more similar to violations of ideologies of *politeness* than to violations of grammatical form arising from, say, misuse of tense or aspect inflections. Indeed, in the case of Japanese society, a number of scholars have argued that the use of evidentials is intimately tied to local ideologies of politeness (Aoki, 1986; Ide, 1989; Kamio, 1994; Trent, 1997).

De Reuse, speaking of Western Apache evidentials (mentioned in §2.4.2), provides an explanation of their use in terms of an ideology of personal autonomy:<sup>21</sup>

[Western Apache use of evidentials] might be due to Athabaskan attitudes about the autonomy of the person . . . resulting in a reluctance to speak for another person, or impute feelings to another person. (De Reuse, 2003, p.96)

The highly-socially salient nature of evidentials is also apparent in the fact that in some societies, the misuse of evidentials makes one a target for terms of abuse. Dickinson indicates that using a direct evidential to talk about an event that one did not witness, instead of the appropriate hearsay or indirect evidential, may lead one to be “. . . accused of being a *nene pun* ‘liar’, or at the very least presumptuous. . .” (Dickinson, 2000, p.409). Significantly, vulnerability to this designation depends in part on one’s social relations to the participants in the event in question. Speaking of the departure of a man to a nearby city, Dickinson continues “[t]he wife can use the direct form because she is a participant in the event in a way the neighbor is not.” In short, Tsafiki evidential practice is shaped by ideologies that license greater evidential freedom when speaker and referent are socially close than when they are socially distant. This is not a fact about grammar, but rather about the intersection of grammatical resources, interaction, and ideology – communicative practice, in short.

## 2.5 Evidentiality in Nanti

The specification of modes of sensory access is a pervasive aspect of everyday Nanti communicative interactions. As with the Western Apache speakers mentioned by de

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<sup>21</sup>Rushforth (1992) makes similar ethnographic observations about Bearlake Athapaskan (Canada) society, and provides extensive citations that echo these observations for other Athabaskan peoples.

Reuse, providing mode of access information is not obligatory for Nantis, but it is a significantly more pervasive aspect of communicative interaction for Nanti speakers than for speakers of English. Significantly, Nanti presently appears to be in the process of independently grammaticalizing evidentiality. This is important in part because it is consistent with my impressionistic claim regarding the pervasiveness of specifications of modes of access in Nanti discourse. As observed by Bybee (2003), among others, frequency is the primary contributor to grammaticalization. Thus, the ongoing grammaticalization of evidentials in Nanti is congruent with the high frequency of mode of sensory access meanings in Nanti discourse. The fact that Nanti evidentiality is an independent innovation, rather than one arising through language contact, is also important because it suggests that the high frequency of mode of access meanings in Nanti is driven by the active communicative needs of Nanti individuals. That is, the ideological and interactional aspects of Nanti communicative practice are driving the grammaticalization of evidentiality, rather than, say, the adoption of communicative or linguistic norms of a more prestigious language community in the context of language contact.

Since evidentials are not obligatory in Nanti, in the sense discussed in §2.2.1.3, a cogent treatment of Nanti evidentiality is thus inseparable from a treatment of Nanti evidential practice. We begin with a treatment of Nanti grammaticalized evidentials and the evidence for their recent independent grammaticalization. We then turn to a discussion of Nanti evidential practice, focusing on the discursive contexts for evidential marking, and the related role of inference in visual mode of access meanings.

Nanti exhibits three morphologized evidentials: a quotative clausal proclitic *ka*, exemplified in (2.2), a reportive clausal proclitic *ke*, exemplified in (2.3), and an inferential second-position clausal clitic *ka*, exemplified in (2.4). Under certain circumstances, unmarked declarative clauses are understood to be based on visual

access to the event in question, but this evidential meaning arises from inference, and will be treated separately.

(2.2) Ika te, nonake haNta.

*i- ka te no= N- n -ak -e haNta*  
 3NMS- QUOT NEG 1S= IRREAL- be -PERF IRREAL.I there  
 ‘He said, “No, I will live there.”’

(2.3) Chapi noke ikanti ainyo, irirenti.

*chapi no- ke i= kant -i ainyo ir- irenti*  
 yesterday 2S- REP 3MS= say -REAL.I EXIST.ANIM 3MP- brother  
 ‘Yesterday I heard he said he exists, his brother.’

(2.4) Ainyoka irimage.

*ainyo =ka i= ri- mag -e.*  
 EXIST.ANIM =INFR 3MS= IRREAL sleep -IRREAL.I  
 ‘He is presumably there sleeping.’ (Inference based on knowing the referent is at home, but there being no sign of activity.)

The quotative *ka* and reportive *ke* are transparently related to the verbs roots *kant* ‘say’ and *kem* ‘hear’, respectively. These evidentials were diachronically formed by taking the first bisyllabic foot of the corresponding inflected verbs.<sup>22</sup> Like their corresponding verb roots, these evidentials bear person markers,<sup>23</sup> and the quotative may bear the irrealis prefix *N-*, which otherwise only appears on verbs.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>22</sup>The development of quotatives from ‘say’ verbs is well-established cross-linguistically (Aikhenvald, 2004, p.271-2). The development of reportives from ‘hear’ verbs is apparently not as common, but is attested in Shibacha Lisu (Sino-Tibetan; China; Aikhenvald, 2004, p.274)

<sup>23</sup>This is relatively unusual for evidentials. The presence of person markers in the Nanti case may be understood at least in part as a consequence prosodic requirements: Nanti words are minimally bisyllabic (Crowhurst and Michael, 2005), and the person markers guarantee that these evidentials are bisyllabic.

<sup>24</sup>Lest a skeptic argue that these evidentials are nothing but inflected verbs which have had their final syllables clipped in fast speech, it should be noted that these bisyllabic evidentials uniformly bear stress on their initial syllable (e.g. *ika*). This is characteristic of bisyllabic words in Nanti (Crowhurst and Michael, 2005), but not of clipped words, which retain the stress pattern of the full word. In the case of the inflected verbs corresponding to the evidentials in question, clipping would result in stress on the final syllable of the evidential (e.g. *\*iká*).

The quotative *ka* seems to be the furthest along the trajectory of grammaticalization, as evidenced by the fact that it can serve as a complementizer to verbs of communication and cognition, as in (2.5), (2.6),<sup>25</sup> and (2.7).

(2.5) Nokenkitsatake noka nogankehaata Shanpinkihari.

*no= kenkitsa -ak -i no -ka no= gonke -haa*  
 1S tell.story -PERF -REALIS.I 1S -QUOT 1S= arrive CL:water  
*-a Shanpinkihari*  
 REAL.A place.name  
 ‘I told a story of my arriving in Shanpinkihari.’

(2.6) Inkante ika hara notomi nohati nonkamosote.

*i= N- kaNt -e i- ka ha =ra no-*  
 3MS IRREAL- say -IRREAL.I 3MS- QUOT NEG.IRREAL =TEMP 1P-  
*tomi no= ha -i no= N- kamoso -e*  
 son 1S= go REALIS.I 1S= REALIS- visit -REALIS.I  
 ‘He would say: I will not go and visit my son.’

(2.7) Opintsatake oka nonpokahe.

*o= piNtsa -ak -i o- ka no= N- pok*  
 3NMS= decide -PERF -REALIS.I 3NM -COMP 1S= IRREAL- come  
*-ah -e*  
 -REG -IRREAL.I  
 ‘She decided to come back.’

The inferential *=ka* is reconstructible in proto-Kampa. Cognates of this morpheme are found in several other Kampan languages. These include Ashéninka *-ka*, which functions as an interrogative marker (Wise, 1986, p.603), and which also surfaces in indefinite and interrogative pronouns such as *ts<sup>h</sup>ika* ‘where/wherever/what’

<sup>25</sup>Note that the matrix verb *kaNt* may be interpreted either as a verb of communication, ‘say’, or as a verb of cognition, ‘think’.



and *ninka* ‘who/whoever’ (Wise, 1986, p.573); Kakinte *-ka*, an indefinite marker<sup>26,27</sup> (Swift, 1988, p.45-6); and Asháninka *-kea*, an interrogative marker (Wise, 1986, p.614). For Matsigenka, the language most closely related to Nanti, Snell (1998, p.63) mentions several modal suffixes which are likely cognate with Nanti *=ka*, including *=rika* ‘indefinite’, *=raka* ‘possibility’, *=roka* ‘probability’, and *=rorokari* ‘probability’. It appears, then, that the Nanti inferential is an innovation in the Kampa family.

There is no evidence that the ongoing grammaticalization of Nanti evidentiality is due to language contact. Of the other language families found in the area of the Amazon Basin where Nanti is spoken, the Panoan and Southern Arawak languages are reported to exhibit evidentiality (Aikhenvald and Dixon, 1998). Of the Panoan languages, Shipibo-Conibo (Valenzuela, 2003), Amahuaca (Sparing-Chavez, 2001, cited in Sparing-Chavez (2003)), and Sharanahua (Deleague, 2006) are known to exhibit evidentiality, but they are located away from territories known to have been inhabited by Nantis (Michael and Beier, 2004), and there is no evidence of contact between Nantis and members of these Panoan groups. Moreover, other Kampan groups which live in closer proximity to these Panoan groups, especially the Ashéninka, exhibit no signs of having developed evidentiality as a consequence of language contact (Garcia Salazar, 1997). The sole Southern Arawak language spoken in the rough vicinity of Nanti is Yine (Piro), which is reported to exhibit evidentiality (Aikhenvald and Dixon, 1998, p.245). There is no known history of social contact between Yines and Nantis, however, and in any event, Matsigenka, which has had considerable contact with Yine, shows no signs of contact-induced evidentiality.

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<sup>26</sup>(Wise, 1986, p.603) glosses this as an interrogative marker, but Swift (1988) gives no indication that this morpheme functions as an interrogative, and an examination of Swift’s texts appears to confirm that *-ka* does not function as an interrogative marker in Kakinte. In addition, Swift (1988, p.34) mentions a relativizer *-ka*, which may or may not be related to the indefinite marker.

<sup>27</sup>Nanti indefinite pronouns reflect the prior role of *=ka* as an indefinite marker. e.g. *tyanika* ‘someone’, cf. *tyani* ‘who (interrogative)’.

The nearby Quechuan languages, of course, are well known for their evidential systems (see, e.g. Faller, 2002; Floyd, 1999; Weber, 1989), and the presence of Quechua loanwords in the Kampan languages is indicative of contact between the two language families. Contact with Quechua does not appear to be a viable explanation for the emergence of evidentiality in Nanti, however. First, the location of Nanti territory makes it unlikely that there was ever any direct contact between Nantis and Quechuas. Second, even if there were, at one point, contact between the ancestors of present-day Nanti speakers and Quechua speakers, it would likely have been several centuries in the past, probably before Matsigenka and Nanti diverged into different varieties. Consequently, if Nanti evidentiality arose through contact with Quechua, we would expect to see signs of a similar system in Matsigenka, which we do not.

Although Nanti exhibits grammaticalized evidentials, they are not morphosyntactically obligatory. Rather, the pervasiveness of evidentiality and of periphrastic mode of access information in Nanti discourse arises from the high salience of sources of information in Nanti communicative practice. There are numerous factors that influence the expression of mode of access information in Nanti utterances, but one in particular can be considered basic. Since it plays an important role in the inference of visual mode of access, I will briefly discuss it now. This factor in question is one already discussed in §2.4.2 in relation to other languages, namely, the communicative maxim that the mode of access to the event or state of affairs to which a given proposition refers should be clear to the participants. Such clarity may be achieved by overt specification, using evidentials or periphrastic expressions, or by inferences from discursive context. Conversely, such specifications may be omitted because the information imparted by the utterance is common knowledge (Michael, 2001b).

Since this particular motivation for mode of access specification is the *estab-*

*lishment* of mode of access to an event, rather than the formally-motivated marking of particular constituents, the turns of talk that introduce a body of information related to the event are particularly relevant sites for the specification of mode-of-access information. In short, mode-of-access specification tends to cluster in the early turns of talk related to a topic of event. In this particular phase of interaction, speakers tend to infer that utterances that do not overtly specify mode-of-access information lead are based on the visual mode of access. In other words, in this context, Nanti has pragmatically-based, formally unmarked, visual evidentiality. It is not the case, however, that all clauses that do not specify mode of access are understood as based on visual mode of access.

## Chapter 3

# Evidentiality, evidential practice, and event responsibility in Nanti society

### 3.1 Chapter overview

Previous work on the relationship between evidentiality and responsibility has focused on the role of source-of-information meanings in reducing speakers' responsibility for the *factuality* of utterances. In this chapter, I argue that evidentiality can also serve to mitigate responsibility for *events*. The close analysis of interactions between speakers of Nanti shows that these speakers deploy evidentials and periphrastic source-of-information meanings to negotiate event responsibility. Source-of-information specifications denote the nature of sensory access that indexed knowing subjects have to indexed events. Via conventionalized understandings regarding the prototypical circumstances under which particular evidentials are used, evidential meanings lead to inferences regarding the spatial and sensory relationship of the speaker to the event in question. Interactants are then able to infer the nature

of the speaker's involvement and causal responsibility for the event. On this basis, combined with cultural understandings about causal and moral responsibility, interactants reach conclusions regarding the moral responsibility of the speaker for the event in question.

### 3.2 Introduction

On March 5<sup>th</sup> 2005, I was sitting working in my house in the Nanti community of Montetoni when Hirero, my neighbor, called me out to inform me of an unfortunate incident: the community boombox had stopped working. I walked over to the community leader's house with Hirero, where the boombox had been in use during a communal manioc beer feast. A group of concerned-looking young men stood around the silent boombox. In an effort to determine the problem, I asked the assembled group what had happened. Within moments, everyone was talking. Several young men who were frequent operators of the boombox offered the most animated replies, each explaining that he hadn't seen what happened to it. Among these was Terohite, the community leader's son, who vehemently declared, using quotative and reportive evidentials, that he had learned of the demise of the boombox from others. Several bystanders contradicted Terohite, however, saying that he *had* seen what happened. But Terohite remained adamant: he had *heard* about the event from someone else. This dispute continued for several minutes without resolution. Eventually we determined that the problem was a loose wire, which I was able to fix. After several bowls of manioc beer, I returned to my house, intrigued by how my inquiry had led to a quickly-escalating evidential dispute. This chapter is an effort to understand why disputes like this arise in Nanti society, and to explicate their significance for our understanding of the social functions of evidentiality.

Evidentiality<sup>1</sup> has captured the attention of many socially-oriented students

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<sup>1</sup>Following De Haan (1999) and Aikhenvald (2004), I take evidentiality to be the grammaticalized

of language because of its obvious importance in the interactional construction of authority, responsibility, and entitlement (Atkinson, 1999, 2004; Fox, 2001; Hill and Irvine, 1993b; Sidnell, 2005). Most work on the relationship between evidentiality, a linguistic category, and responsibility, a social one, has focused on the use of evidentiality to construct responsibility for *attributes of discourse*, such as its factuality or its appropriateness relative to local norms of politeness. There has been much less work carried out on the use of evidentiality to construct responsibility for *events* and *situations*, such as mishaps or successes. My goal in this chapter is to clearly distinguish these two forms of responsibility, which I refer to as *utterance responsibility* and *event responsibility*, and to examine how evidentiality is employed in Nanti interactions to negotiate the latter. I argue that evidentials and related source-of-information specifications index relationships between knowing subjects and events, and that in Nanti society at least, these relationships can be deployed as metaphors for the subject's involvement in that situation. Involvement, in turn, serves as a basis for Nanti judgements of moral responsibility. The result is a *pragmatic metaphor* (Silverstein, 1976), through which evidential specification can come to stand for moral responsibility for the situations referred to by those evidentially-marked propositions.

If this argument is correct, then the social significance of the evidential disputation in the opening vignette with Terohite and the boombox, and the motivations of the interactants, become clearer. The question of the sensory access Terohite had to the event of the boombox's breakdown is immediately relevant to the interactional construction of responsibility for the unfortunate event.

In this chapter, I demonstrate one of the principal social-interactional functions of evidentiality in Nanti society by examining its use to construct responsibility of the source of information for a given proposition, thereby distinguishing evidentiality from epistemic modality and non-grammaticalized expressions of source-of-information. The denotational and indexical components of evidentiality are discussed in detail in §3.7.

ity for situations and eventualities among speakers of Nanti. I see this chapter as a bridge between typological-grammatical approaches to evidentiality and socially-oriented pragmatic approaches to knowledge-in-interaction. My goal is to draw on the complementary strengths of these approaches in order to develop a better understanding of the social and interactional functions of evidentiality, while clarifying the position of evidentiality in grammatically-oriented approaches to language. On the one hand, functional-typological approaches benefit from greater attention to the pragmatic and social aspects of language; on the other hand, pragmatically- and socially-oriented approaches benefit from the greater linguistic breadth of typological approaches, which make clearer the grammatical distinctions that we must attend to in language. In this chapter, then, I explore both the characteristics of evidentials as a category in the Nanti language and the affordances of evidentiality as a strategy for negotiating individual responsibility in Nanti society.

This chapter is organized as follows: section 3.3 reviews the previous scholarship on the relationship between evidentiality and responsibility. Section 3.4 presents a discussion of general philosophical and anthropological approaches to responsibility, while section 3.5 discusses responsibility in Nanti society. Section 3.6 presents an overview of Nanti evidentiality and evidential practice, including a discussion of how Nanti appears to be in the process of independently innovating evidential marking. Section 3.8 is the empirical heart of the chapter, providing an extended examination of the use of evidential resources and their relation to the interactional negotiation of event responsibility in a particular interaction. Section 3.7 provides a theoretical account of how evidentials come to be resources for the negotiation of event responsibility.

### 3.3 Evidentiality and responsibility: an overview

The fact that evidentiality is implicated in the interactional negotiation of responsibility is well established (Fox, 2001; Hill and Irvine, 1993b). What is not so clearly distinguished in discussions of evidentiality and responsibility is that there are at least two markedly different kinds of responsibility salient to the interactional role of evidentiality: responsibility for *utterances*, and responsibility for *events*. In this section, I define and distinguish these two forms of responsibility, and review the scholarship on the role of evidentiality and evidential practice in the interactional construction of responsibility, showing that both forms of responsibility are relevant to our understanding of the social functions of evidentiality.

*Utterance responsibility* refers to the accountability of speakers for particular attributes of discourse that are singled out as salient by interactants and local language ideologies. Under this construal of ‘responsibility’, interactants are evaluated as praiseworthy or culpable for how their discourse displays or fails to display qualities deemed relevant by participants in interactions. The discourse attributes that have received the most attention with respect to the social-interactional functions of evidentiality are factuality and politeness. Evidentiality is relevant to the negotiation of this form of responsibility as a means for mitigating or underscoring the responsibility of interactants for these discourse attributes.

Linguistic anthropologists and others have explored in some detail the use of quotative and reportive strategies for negotiating utterance responsibility.<sup>2</sup> We find that Hill and Irvine (1993b), Fox (2001), and Atkinson (1999), for example, comment that quotative and reportive evidentials serve to mitigate a speaker’s responsibility for the factuality of an utterance. This result is a consequence of the differentiation of principal and animator participant roles effected by quotatives and reportives. The mitigating effect stems from the fact that animators are typically shielded from

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<sup>2</sup>Utterance responsibility is simply referred to as ‘responsibility’ in these works.



responsibility for the discourse attributes of the utterances they animate (Goffman, 1979).<sup>3</sup> This burden is instead that of the principal, which role the reportive or quotative typically distinguishes from the speaker.

These same evidentials can also shield speakers from the disapproval risked by violating local norms regarding appropriate evaluative statements of others' behavior. For example, Irvine (1993), for Wolof society (Niger-Congo; West Africa), and Besnier (1993), for Nukulaelae society (Austronesian; Tuvalu), have shown how reported speech can insulate speakers from negative evaluations to which they may otherwise open themselves by making insulting or critical comments of others.

Although quotatives and reportives are most commonly discussed as means for mitigating (utterance) responsibility, it is also clear that they may be used in self-reports to *increase* a speaker's responsibility for an utterance. In such cases a *fusion* of animator and principal is achieved, rather than a *fission* of these roles. Responsibility enhancement of this sort has been reported by Bendix (1993, p.238) for Newari (Tibeto-Burman; Nepal and India), Haviland (2004, p.54) for Tzotzil (Mayan; Mexico), and Michael (2001a, p.104) for Nanti, and is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

While linguistic anthropologists have tended to focus on quotatives and reportives, descriptive and typological linguists concerned with grammaticalized evidential systems have observed that other forms of evidentiality are also implicated in speaker responsibility and commitment to factuality. In the case of Wanka Quechua (Quechuan; Peru), for example, Floyd (1999) has argued that the use of direct evidentials, especially visual evidentials, indicates strong speaker commitment to the truthfulness of utterances, and that the use of weak evidentials, such as reportatives or inferentials, is linked to weak speaker commitment. Chafe (1986), Willett (1988,

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<sup>3</sup>As Shuman (1993) and Hill and Irvine (1993a, p.13) observe, reportive and quotative strategies are not foolproof, and may ultimately fail to achieve the sought-after fission of principal and animator, leading to the inability of participants to escape responsibility for the utterances they animate.

p.85-8), and many others have made similar observations. De Haan (1996, cited in Stenzel (2004)) characterizes the relationship between evidentials and utterance responsibility in the following terms:

As far as the degree of confidence in the truth of the statement is concerned, by using evidentials, a speaker will not commit him or herself to any degree of confidence but will transfer any responsibility to the hearer.

The second type of responsibility I consider in relation to evidentiality and evidential practice, and the main focus of this chapter, concerns praiseworthiness or blameworthiness for events and states of affairs. I refer to this form of evidentiality as *event responsibility*. Under this form of responsibility, interactants are held accountable for certain situations or eventualities having arisen, rather than being held accountable solely for the attributes of discourse.

The role of evidentiality and evidential practice in the interactional construction of event responsibility has not attracted much attention from either linguistic anthropologists or linguists. This is no doubt in part because what I here distinguish as utterance responsibility and event responsibility are not clearly distinguished in the literature. Nevertheless, we do find sufficient mention of the relationship between evidentiality and event responsibility to infer both that the distinction between utterance responsibility and event responsibility is salient for speakers of genetically and areally disparate languages, and that evidentiality plays a role in the interactional construction of the latter.

Hill and Zepeda (1993), for example, discuss the use of discursive strategies to “distribute responsibility” in English-Tohono O’odham (Uto-Aztecan; USA and Mexico) bilingual interactions. A careful reading of their discussion makes it clear that their use of the term ‘responsibility’ covers both *event* and *discourse attribute* senses of the term. Their analysis shows that reported speech both mitigates

utterance responsibility via the animator/principal split discussed above (Hill and Zepeda, 1993, p.198), and diminishes event responsibility for the “troubles” that are the topic of the interactions. In the latter case, reported speech serves to iconically represent an interactant’s belated acquaintance with certain crucial facts (Hill and Zepeda, 1993, p.208), through which “she represents herself as being unable to directly influence the course of events . . . because she lacks the necessary knowledge at crucial junctures.” (Hill and Zepeda, 1993, p.198). As we shall see below, this echoes certain strategies employed by Nanti speakers to mitigate event responsibility.

Bendix (1993, p.241-2) briefly describes some strategic uses of Newari evidential morphology to mitigate event responsibility via implicatures regarding intentionality and volitionality. His discussion concerns an ‘internal’ evidential (INT), which indicates direct knowledge of the intention to perform a given action, and an ‘external’ evidential (EXT), which indicates knowledge obtained through having observed incontrovertible evidence for it. Bendix remarks that “with EXT . . . I distance myself from involvement in the event, and thereby from responsibility for it.” As we shall see, a similar evidential distancing function plays an important role in Nantis’ negotiation of event responsibility.

Dwyer (2000, p.51-2), speculates briefly on how speakers of Salar (Turkic; China) may use nonfirsthand evidentials to distance themselves morally from situations they deem shameful. Chirikba (2003, p.246) comments that speakers of Abkhaz (Abkhazo-Adyghean; Georgia, Turkey, and Ukraine) can use inferentials to indicate non-participation in an event as well as to reduce utterance responsibility for the factuality of an utterance. He makes similar observations about the reportive, noting that it can serve both to reduce responsibility for an utterance as well as to ‘distance’ the speaker from the source of information (ibid., p.261, 264). Similarly, Dixon (2003, p.169-170) remarks on an instance in which a Jarawara (Arawá; Brazil) narrator employs a recent past non-eyewitness evidential, by which he “dissociates

himself from responsibility for” a boat getting lost.

Event responsibility is in principle both positive, leading to praiseworthiness, and negative, leading to blameworthiness. However, to the extent that the literature discusses the relationship between evidentiality and event responsibility, the focus is on the role of evidentiality in mitigating blameworthiness. This asymmetry is also manifest in Nanti interactional data, where we find evidential resources being used to mitigate blameworthiness, but rarely, if ever, employed to construct praiseworthiness. This asymmetry may stem from the fact that evidentiality easily serves as a means for speakers to *distance* themselves from events, which readily lends itself as a strategy for reducing responsibility, but less so for increasing it.

Before closing this overview, I wish to briefly mention two types of language-related responsibility discussed in the literature that I will not be examining in this chapter: *responsibility for communicative competence* and *responsibility for meaning*. The assumption of responsibility for communicative competence is invoked in performance theory as the basic characteristic that distinguishes performance from non-performance (Bauman, 1977). On this view, performance is characterized by the assumption of responsibility to produce utterances (or potentially, any semiotically-freighted material) that display certain characteristics. Consequently, performance is grounded in a *prospective* form of utterance responsibility (see §3.4 for a discussion of prospective (*ex ante*) and retrospective (*ex post*) responsibility). There has been little work on the role of evidentiality in the negotiation of responsibility for communicative competence, but Bauman’s (1993) discussion of how reportive frames can be used as performance disclaimers suggests that this may be a fruitful area in which to further explore the interactional functions of evidentiality.

The concept of *responsibility for meaning* stems from the observation that the interactionally-relevant ‘meaning’ of an utterance is co-constructed among participants with regard to local language ideologies (Duranti, 1993). Consequently,

establishing who is considered to be responsible for the meaning of an utterance is an interactional, culturally-situated achievement. An ethnographic example of this concept at work is provided by Besnier's examination of interactions in Nukulaelae society in which one person is criticizing another. He found that speakers who produced the majority of critical talk in a given interaction employed strategies that involved other participants in the creation of critical utterances, thereby sharing the (utterance) responsibility for the critical meanings. Strategies included the production of vague statements which either prompt requests for clarification or require inferencing. In the former case, the recipient is regarded as having initiated the specificity of the criticism, who thereby becomes co-responsible for the critical meaning (Besnier, 1989), while in the latter case, the typically negative, affective meaning "is thus covert and indirect, and places the speaker in a position of diminished responsibility for meaning" (Besnier, 1993, p.172). Both strategies are non-evidential ones for diminishing utterance responsibility. Since responsibility for meaning does not appear to be directly implicated in the interactional construction of event responsibility, I will not discuss it further in this chapter.

In closing this section, I wish to make clear that the distinction between utterance responsibility and event responsibility does not simply reduce to 'responsibility for talk' and 'responsibility for actions', respectively. This tidy correspondence breaks down because utterances may be performative, making talk an act that brings about an event or a state of affairs. Event responsibility may thus in principle include responsibility for the social *consequences* of discourse (e.g. discord). This is one of the points made by Duranti (1993), who discusses how Samoan orators may be held blameworthy for the consequences of their talk. In cases such as this, the two forms of responsibility may overlap significantly, since blameworthy attributes of discourse can be seen as the causes of undesirable events.

### 3.4 Responsibility: philosophical and anthropological perspectives

In order to sharpen our analysis of evidentiality and event responsibility, it will be helpful to draw on philosophical and anthropological approaches to responsibility more generally. In general, these approaches treat the concept of ‘responsibility’ broadly, including, but not *restricted* to, constructions or representations of responsibility through discourse. Ethical philosophers typically distinguish three basic types of responsibility, which, following Birnbacher (2001), I will refer to as *ex post* responsibility, *ex ante* responsibility, and causal responsibility. *Ex post* responsibility corresponds to forms of retrospective responsibility that we associate with praiseworthiness or blameworthiness for acts or omissions:

Ex post responsibility is the kind of responsibility one incurs by being held ‘answerable’ for some act of one’s own, done by commission or by omission in the past. (ibid.: 9)

Both utterance responsibility and event responsibility are forms of *ex post* responsibility.

*Ex ante* responsibility is a prospective form of responsibility associated with undertaking to perform certain actions:

Ex ante responsibility is normally ascribed to an agent (individual or collective) for the production of a certain state of affairs, with the acts realizing this state of affairs lying in the future. (ibid.: 10)

Finally, causal responsibility is a non-moral form of responsibility, arising solely from substantive participation in a causal chain leading to some outcome:

Causal responsibility is not related to responsibility in the one or the other of its core meanings [i.e. *ex post* or *ex ante* responsibility]... The

fact that the event E1 is causally responsible for event E2 does not imply anything about *ex post* or *ex ante* responsibility in the case. It only means that E1 is the cause or one of the more important causal conditions of E2... (ibid.: p.11)

Although causal responsibility is not in itself a form of moral responsibility, we shall see that it does play an important role in the *assignment* of moral, specifically *ex post*, responsibility. This will be clearer if review the basic conditions of *ex post* responsibility. According to Birnbacher (2001, p.12-14, *passim*), a person is said to be *ex post* responsible if the following conditions are met:

1. The person held responsible is identical with the individual who performed the act for which responsibility is ascribed.
2. The person in question was free to act otherwise.
3. The person in question was under an obligation not to do, or not allow, the harm for which he or she is held responsible.
4. There exists a causal relation between the person's actions and the event for which he or she is being held responsible. That is the person is (partially or wholly) causally responsible for the event in question.

Clearly, causal responsibility is only one of the conditions necessary for *ex post* responsibility, and does not lead to *ex post* responsibility by strict deduction. Nevertheless, looking forward to our empirical discussion in §3.7, it is helpful to note that there is an important *practical* relationship between causal and *ex post* responsibility. The following is one way to understand this practical relationship: in specific interactional contexts, interactants frequently agree that *ex post* responsibility conditions 2 and 3 hold, based on shared world knowledge, cultural assumptions,

and moral principles. Under these circumstances, the determination of causal responsibility becomes the locus of negotiation over *ex post* responsibility, with the affirmation of causal responsibility leading to the deduction of *ex post* responsibility. In this way, *ex post* responsibility may come to turn on the contingent facts of causal responsibility. As we shall see in §3.7, the role of causal responsibility in the determination of moral (event) responsibility is central to the efficacy of evidentiality in negotiating event responsibility in Nanti interactions.

Since I seek to apply the philosophical distinctions outlined above to a non-Western society, it is important to consider them in light of the anthropological literature on responsibility, recalling that linguistic anthropologists commonly approach the culturally-decontextualized claims of philosophers with some skepticism.<sup>4</sup> Within anthropology, the earliest work on responsibility was carried out mainly by legal anthropologists. More recently, responsibility, and especially utterance responsibility, has come to interest linguistic anthropologists also. Both subdisciplines appear to take for granted the basic philosophical distinctions sketched above, in effect understanding cross-cultural variations in ideologies of responsibility in terms of culture-specific variants of the four basic conditions of *ex post* responsibility.<sup>5</sup> Documented areas of cross-cultural variation in ideologies of responsibility include local understandings of what constitutes an offense (condition 3), local theories of morally-relevant forms of causation<sup>6</sup> (condition 4), and the salience of intentionality as a factor in the assignment of responsibility (condition 2). The first of these areas of variation is an ethnographic commonplace: moral values are known to vary from

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<sup>4</sup>Consider, for example, Rosaldo (1982)'s criticism of speech act theory, which was an early salvo in a broad critique of personalist theories of meanings (Du Bois, 1993; Duranti, 1993).

<sup>5</sup>Attention to *ex ante* responsibility is unusual among anthropologists; Kuipers's (1993) discussion of Weyewa (Austronesian; Indonesia) "responsibility to the word" is a rare discussion of responsibility framed as prospective (discourse attribute) responsibility.

<sup>6</sup>An intriguing variant is reported for Dou Donngo society, in the form of a significantly weakened condition on causal responsibility (Just, 1990). In certain cases in this society, liability is established solely on the grounds of it having been causally *possible* that the accused committed the harm in question.



society to society. Variation in morally-relevant forms of causation is evident in work on classical topics in cultural anthropology, such as witchcraft (e.g. Evans-Pritchard, 1937) and taboos (e.g. Frazer, 1936).

Linguistic anthropologists' engagement with the concept of responsibility is motivated by a broader re-examination of 'personalist' theories of meaning (Duranti, 1993; Du Bois, 1993). Personalist theories seek to explain meaning in terms of the individual speaker's communicative intentions – a flawed approach for analysts who see meaning as negotiated through interaction. Sociocentric approaches, in contrast, seek to understand meaning as the outcome of interaction among multiple participants. The relevance of sociocentric approaches to meaning for understandings of responsibility is exemplified by Duranti's (1993) discussion of Samoan orators' responsibility for their utterances in political meetings (*fono*). Duranti observes that the socially-accepted meaning of an utterance is the consequence of the combined contextualizing and re-contextualizing contributions of multiple orators, especially higher-ranking ones. Accordingly, the meaning for which the original orator is held responsible may be quite divergent from the one he intended.

Consequently, for linguistic anthropologists, differences in the role of intentionality in the assignment of responsibility is frequently the most interesting parameter of variation. In terms of the conditions of *ex post* responsibility enumerated above, intentionality enters as a factor affecting the second condition, namely, that the agent to whom responsibility is to be attributed was in the position to act otherwise than he or she did. If the agent did not act intentionally, the reasoning goes, the agent was not in a position to choose not to bring about the event for which he or she would be held responsible. In early work, the significance of intentionality was framed in evolutionist terms, whereby its exclusion in determining responsibility (i.e. strict liability) was seen as a characteristic of "tribal" societies, and its inclusion a characteristic of "modern" legal systems (e.g. Gluckman, 1965). Moore (1972)

argued that this contrast is overdrawn, since ‘modern’ legal systems also include notions of strict liability (e.g. in tort law), and the close study of nominally strict liability systems shows that there is space in them for the consideration of intention (Just, 1990; McLaren, 1975). Some of the many societies that have been described as exhibiting strict liability include Barotse (Lozi, Bantu; southwestern Africa Gluckman, 1965), Yurok (Algic; USA; Kroeber, 1925), Jalé (Trans-New Guinea; Irian Jaya; Koch, 1978), Dou Donggo (Bimanese, Austronesian; Indonesia; Just, 1990), Nukulaelae (South Tuvaluan; Tuvalu; Besnier, 1993, p.166), and to a significant degree, Samoa (Duranti, 1993; Shore, 1982).

Given that the work of legal and linguistic anthropologists essentially presupposes the basic philosophical framework for responsibility developed by ethical philosophers, it seems reasonable to assume that this framework is viable for cross-cultural work on responsibility. It is clear that the various criteria are weighted differently in different societies – leading, for example, to the greater prominence of ‘strict liability’ in some societies than others. Similarly, culture-specific theories of morally-relevant causation may vary considerably. It will therefore be prudent to be sensitive to Nanti-specific weighings of these parameters.

### **3.5 Event responsibility in Nanti society**

The discursive construction of event responsibility is a major theme in Nanti interactions. In my experience, few mishaps that come to the knowledge of others are permitted to pass by without discussion of who bears responsibility for the unfortunate event. Determining the whos, hows, whats, and wherefores of mishaps is something into which Nantis frequently invest considerable interactional work – and on some occasions at least, appear to delight in. Although I have witnessed interactions in which the assignment of culpability may ultimately be abandoned, as when culpability appears to be gravitating towards socially prominent men, I

have rarely heard Nantis articulate the view that something ‘just happened’ or that an event was the consequence of chance, if people were involved in the event. The conclusion that there is no *moral* responsibility for an event or state of affairs is for the most part only reached in Nanti interactions if the participants do not identify any human *causal* responsibility in the event.

At the same time that event responsibility is a major interactional concern for Nantis, the assignment of responsibility frequently entails little or no further overt social sanction. Over the course of some 20 months in the community over a space of nine years, I have only witnessed a handful of cases in which an adult was explicitly reprimanded by others for their actions, and the majority of these cases involved rare instances of physical violence. More typically, the party who emerges as responsible for an event reacts by becoming interactionally withdrawn and quiet for a time, and the other interactants drop the matter. In most cases, then, it appears that it is a sufficient resolution to the issue for Nantis to interactionally enact their acceptance of the assignment of responsibility.

There is a distinct tendency for event responsibility to trickle down to the young and to women, following the tendency observed by Hill and Irvine (1993a, p.21) for less powerful members of a given society to be disproportionately saddled with culpability. Conversely, intentions, which generally do not play a major role in discussions about responsibility among Nantis, are much more frequently cited as a mitigating factor for socially prominent adult men than for anyone else.

The following incident exhibits the characteristically low importance placed on intentions in Nanti interactions involving responsibility. On October 11<sup>th</sup> 2004, I accompanied a group of some ten members of my residence group on a trip to a nearby stream to fish with *kogi* (barbasco), a plant whose roots can be pulped to release a milky fluid, which, diffused into water, stuns fish. We had been following the cloud of *kogi* fluid downstream for about half an hour when almost everyone in

the group froze: a *samani* (*Cuniculus paca*, a large nocturnal rodent valued for its meat) was emerging sleepily from its burrow in the creek bank only a few meters away. One young woman, Nora, had her back turned to the hole, however. As Hirero and Shanebo limbered their bows to fire at the *samani*, Nora turned to see what everyone else was intently gazing at, and was so surprised by the nearby agouti that she cried out: *Samani!* In the blink of an eye, the startled *samani* shot off into the undergrowth. The adults' faces fell, and the men rounded on Nora to criticize her for scaring off the animal. Even the children of the group got involved, mimicking Nora's cry of *Samani!* in mocking tones. Nora was very embarrassed and silently endured the criticisms and mockery. At no point in this interaction did the fact that her actions were unintentional surface as a relevant factor in her culpability for the events that had transpired.

When a mishap is revealed in the course of an interaction and the responsible party is not obvious, it is not unusual for vulnerable parties to scramble to protect themselves. Culpability is circling, and it must land somewhere. In fact, socialization into this view of responsibility is, to me, a striking aspect of Nanti childhood. Very young Nanti children are very rarely criticized for their actions or for the consequences of their actions. Indeed, they seem immune to blame and are sometimes even encouraged by adults, in the context of 'play', to display behaviors – such as expressing anger or greed, or demonstrating physical aggression – which are otherwise severely censured in Nanti society. However, this state of affairs changes radically at around four years of age, when children go from being virtually blameless to being magnets for culpability. Suddenly their actions become the objects of intense parental discursive scrutiny and assessments of culpability. Behaviors which are generally socially disapproved are, of course, objects of criticism and the assignment of culpability, but even minor unintentional mishaps may occasion extensive criticism and negative evaluation. When an infrequent theft occurs, or when

there is damage to property, children are almost always the first suspects, and they are overwhelmingly ultimately designated as guilty parties. Indeed, a child's mere proximity to some mishap may lead parents to hold them responsible.

Consider the following events: on March 30<sup>th</sup> 2005, I went to visit the household of Ihonishi and Behatrisa, in a neighboring residence group. On the way to their house, I noticed that their neighbor's, Horasa's, house had collapsed. Horasa rarely slept in his own house, preferring to stay in another residence group, and he did not maintain it. I asked Behatrisa about the house, and in a scolding voice (Beier, 2005) she responded, *Iryo tiNteronkanake* 'He knocked it down,' indicating her seven-year old son Bisako, who stood sheepishly at her side. She repeated this several times, scowling at her son. When I mentioned this in a later conversation with Horasa, he laughed, remarking, *Chichata oteronkanake* 'It fell down by itself,' and pointed out that the houseposts were completely rotten. Clearly Horasa did not entertain the idea that Bisako was even *involved* in the collapse of his house, and I, personally, could not see how this small child could have knocked down the house either. Nonetheless, Behatrisa took the opportunity to hold Bisako responsible for the collapse of the house, even though it seems very unlikely that Bisako had any direct hand in the matter.

In this way, children quickly learn not only that every mishap is someone's fault, but also that they themselves are particularly vulnerable to accusations. Not surprisingly, after a few years of such experiences, children begin to acquire discursive competence in deflecting the culpability that gravitates towards them. One of the central arguments of this chapter is that the strategic use of evidential resources is one way that they and adults do so. Nevertheless, sensitivity to blame, and the strong desire to avoid it, persists far into adulthood for most Nantis, especially for women.

One final comment is in order here: it would be an exaggeration to suggest

that intention is entirely irrelevant to Nanti in the assignment of responsibility, as has been suggested (incorrectly, I believe) for some societies (see §3.4). Consider the following incident, which began at a communal manioc beer feast in Montetoni. At one point during the evening's chanting and dancing, Bisarota, a young man trained as a health worker,<sup>7</sup> knocked down his father's brother's wife, Serina. Over the next few days, a public discursive consensus emerged that the event was an accident.<sup>8</sup> However, on the evening of the accident, Horasa, a young man unrelated to either Bisarota or Serina, had declared that he was offended by Bisarota's action and, as a consequence, would refuse to accept medical treatment from Bisarota in the future. Troubled by this, Bisarota mentioned the incident to me the next morning. Subsequently, when the community leader, Migero, learned that I had heard about this altercation, he came to me to express his concern that Horasa's declaration would lead to a suspension of medical aid to the community. Crucial to Migero's framing of the incident to me was the fact that Bisarota had knocked down Serina unintentionally, and therefore, his action should not yield any negative consequences, either for Bisarota himself or for the community at large.

### 3.6 Nanti evidentiality and evidential practice

The specification of sources of information, or *modes of sensory access* (see §3.7), is a pervasive aspect of everyday Nanti communicative interactions. Although the deployment of grammaticalized evidentials is not obligatory in Nanti discourse, they are a significantly more pervasive aspect of communicative interaction for Nanti speakers than for speakers of English.

In this respect, the use of grammaticalized evidentials in Nanti discourse

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<sup>7</sup>At the request of the community, my partner Christine Beier and I, in cooperation with the Peruvian ministry of health, trained Bisarota in the use of basic antibiotics to treat introduced illnesses; see Chapter 1 for more information.

<sup>8</sup>This is very plausible, since on dark evenings accidental collisions between chanters in the energetic dance-lines is a common event.

is more reminiscent of their use by speakers of languages such as Hup (Nadahup; Brazil; Epps, 2005) and Western Apache (Athabaskan; USA; De Reuse, 2003), than by those of Tuyuca (Tucanoan; Brazil; Barnes, 1984), a language known for its obligatory evidentiality. Describing Hup evidentiality, Epps remarks:

... the expression of evidentiality in Hup is to some degree optional, and it is guided more by Gricean-type pragmatic principles of informativeness rather than by any grammatical rule. Thus evidential markers are sometimes left off in situations where the information source is already made obvious by the discourse context or is otherwise seen as *relatively non-salient*. (Epps, 2005, p.779, emphasis mine)

Similarly, de Reuse describes the use of evidentials in Western Apache in the following terms:

Even though evidentiality is by no means an obligatory category in WA [Western Apache], WA speakers mark source of information more often and more precisely than European language speakers do. (De Reuse, 2003, p.95-6)

Significantly, Nanti presently appears to be in the process of independently grammaticalizing evidentiality (see below). This is important in part because it is consistent with my impressionistic claim regarding the pervasiveness of specifications of modes of access in Nanti discourse. As observed by Bybee (2003), among others, frequency is the primary contributor to grammaticalization. Thus, the ongoing grammaticalization of evidentials in Nanti is congruent with high frequency of mode-of-sensory-access meanings in Nanti discourse. The fact that Nanti evidentiality is an independent innovation, rather than one arising through language contact, is also important because it suggests that the high frequency of source-of-information meanings in Nanti is driven by the active communicative needs of Nanti individuals.

That is, the ideological and interactional aspects of Nanti communicative practice are driving the grammaticalization of evidentiality, rather than, say, the adoption of communicative or linguistic norms of a more prestigious language community in the context of language contact.

Since evidentials are not grammatically obligatory in Nanti, a cogent treatment of Nanti evidentiality is inseparable from a treatment of Nanti evidential practice (discussed in detail in Chapter 2.) By this latter term I refer to the real-time strategic deployment in interaction of both grammaticalized resources such as evidentials and epistemic modal morphemes, and periphrastic expressions in the communication of meanings associated with speakers' relations to their knowledge. Although evidentiality and epistemic modality are clearly distinct conceptual and grammatical categories, they both participate in humans' everyday practical epistemology. I refer to the intersection of communicative activity with this epistemology as evidential practice.

### 3.7 Evidentiality and event responsibility

In order to understand how evidentiality is implicated in the discursive construction of event responsibility in Nanti society, it is helpful to consider the indexical components of evidentiality and their relation to its denotational component. I take the position that evidentials denote the *mode of sensory access* that the knowing subject indexed by the evidential has to an indexed event or state of affairs.

Since as early as Jakobson's (1990) [1956] work on Bulgarian evidentiality, it has been recognized that evidentials have a triune structure. In Jakobson's original formulation, evidentials take into account three events: the narrated event ( $E^n$ ), i.e. the event described by the proposition over which the evidential has scope; the speech event ( $E^s$ ), i.e. the interactional circumstance in which the proposition is uttered; and the narrated speech event ( $E^{ns}$ ), the "alleged source of the narrated



event”. Jakobson’s insight is echoed in more recent work that seeks to characterize evidentiality as an indexical category.

Jakobson’s description of evidentiality is clearly oriented towards quotatives and reportives. If we generalize away from this orientation, we see that the ‘narrated speech event’ corresponds to evidentials’ *source of information*, or *source event* (Kockelman, 2004). Similarly, ‘speech event’ generalizes to a more generic notion of *event*. Mushin (2001) further refines this model by recharacterizing the indexical component  $E^s$  (speech event) as a component that indexes “some conceptualizer’s subjective viewpoint” (ibid: p.35). Agha (2002) makes a similar move when he characterizes evidentials as forming a “semiotic chain” that links *speaker* to *perceiver* to *source*, as does De Haan (2005a) when he speaks of evidentials as “encoding speaker perspective.”<sup>9</sup> I will refer to the entity indexed by this component as the *knowing subject*. In these terms, then, evidentials denote the sensory/cognitive mediation between the indexed knowing subject and the indexed event. De Haan (2005a) reaches a similar conclusion when he characterizes evidentiality as a form of propositional deixis that “mark[s] the relationship between the speaker and the action s/he is describing.”

I now wish to focus on the characterization of the mediation between the knowing subject and event denoted by the evidential. As indicated above, it is typical to speak of this mediation as the *source*<sup>10</sup> for the knowledge encoded by the proposition within the scope of the evidential. Strictly speaking, however, this is misleading. The source of the knowledge in question is always the event. Consider an event: the death of a tapir. A knowing subject may acquire knowledge of the tapir’s death by seeing the animal collapse with an arrow in its side, by hearing the

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<sup>9</sup>Nuyts (2001) also associates evidentiality with subjectivity. Kockelman (2004) is critical of the notion of subjectivity in the analysis of epistemic modality and evidentiality, preferring to speak of degrees of overlap between ‘commitment events’ and ‘narrated events’.

<sup>10</sup>This characterization is most apt for reported speech, where it is natural to speak of a narrated speech event as the ‘source’ of our knowledge.

animal’s death rattle, by inference upon noting slabs of tapir meat smoking over the fire, or via a hunter’s narrative of the event. In each of these cases, the speaker’s knowledge stems from some sensory input, whose ultimate source, in some direct or ramified casual chain, is always the event in question. It is more accurate to say that evidentials denote the nature of a speaker’s sensory/cognitive *access* to the event in question, not the source of information.<sup>11</sup> Recasting the denotational component of evidentiality in these terms will be helpful in understanding the role of evidentiality in event responsibility, without running afoul of previous work based on the ‘source of information’ definition. Figure 3.1 illustrates the set of relationships discussed thus far.




Figure 3.1: Evidentials: their denotational and indexical features

We now examine how the denotational and indexical relationships illustrated in Figure 1 form the basis for a chain of inference that relates evidentiality to event

<sup>11</sup>I believe Floyd (1999, p.161) takes a similar position when he speaks of evidentials expressing “how directly or immediately the speaker ‘contacts’ the designated scenario.”

responsibility. We begin by considering the implications of two simple observations. First, as much as a given speaker is a *knowing* subject, he or she is also an *embodied*, physical subject. This fact places significant constraints on the kinds of circumstances in which particular sensory/cognitive modes of access are available to any given subject. The visual mode of access, for example, typically requires physical proximity and the absence of intervening obstructions.

Second, there is a cross-linguistic pragmatic preference for speakers to use the strongest licensed evidential in a given circumstance. It was an early result in pragmatics that the use of an evidentially weak utterance implies that the use of a stronger one is not justified (see discussion in Horn (2004, p.15)). Recent work on the use of evidentiality strongly supports this observation as a cross-cultural trend, as argued by Aikhenvald (2004, p.307-9), De Haan (2001, p.197), Faller (2002), and Palmer (2001, p.51). Thus, the use of an auditory evidential implies that a visual evidential is not licensed, and the use of a quotative, reportive, or inferential evidential implies that no direct evidential is licensed.

Given the use of a particular evidential, these two considerations imply that the embodied subject was in a particular physical relation to the event in question – no closer and no more distant.<sup>12</sup> Evidentials are thus associated with prototypical physical circumstances that permit the sensory/cognitive access denoted by the evidential (Floyd, 1999, p.184-5). In short, the denotative content of an evidential leads to inferences regarding the physical relationship between the indexed embodied subject and the event.

Physical proximity to an event alone, of course, carries no moral entailments regarding that event. However, physical proximity makes it possible for a person

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<sup>12</sup>De Haan (2001) appears to go so far as to argue that presence/non-presence is part of the basic semantics of at least some evidentials. I think caution is advisable in this regard, however, since the relationship between evidentiality and physical presence is in general defeasible. Consider, for example, the fact that Shipibo-Konibo speakers use visual evidentials for events seen on television (Valenzuela, 2003, p.52).

to be *causally responsible* for that event. Physical proximity is relevant to causal responsibility in two ways. First, physical proximity to an event affects the efficacy of any efforts to alter the course of the event in question: if one is insufficiently close to an event, one cannot affect it. Second, proximity to an event affects one's knowledge of the event: if one is ignorant of an event, one cannot act to alter it. Conversely, sufficient proximity makes possible the potential efficacy and knowledge required to alter the course of an event. Taking efficacy and knowledge to be different facets of *involvement* in an event, we can summarize by saying that an individual's physical proximity to an event allows us to infer their *involvement* in that event. The plausibility of the inference from physical proximity to involvement, and the role of evidentiality in that inference is supported, I believe, by de Haan's remark that:

[e]videntiality is a notional category which directly reflects the degree of the speaker's involvement (or the lack thereof) in the action he/she describes. (De Haan, 2001, p.216)

The perceived relationship between evidentiality and involvement is also manifest in Bendix's comment, cited in §3.3, that Newari evidentials can diminish responsibility by distancing the speaker from involvement in the event in question.

If we take as given that evidentials permit inferences regarding involvement, and hence causal responsibility, the step to event responsibility is a short one. As discussed in §3.4, if causal responsibility is given, deduction based on world knowledge and shared moral principles allows one to arrive at the assignment of *ex post* responsibility, of which event responsibility is a type.

The complete chain of inferences, illustrated in Figure 3.2, is the following: evidential mode-of-access marking leads to inferences regarding physical proximity, which in turn lead to inferences regarding involvement and causal responsibility.

Assumptions regarding causal responsibility then lead to assignment of event responsibility, a form of moral responsibility.

I wish to be clear that the chain of implicatures that relates the mode of access denoted by the evidential and moral responsibility rests on culturally-based, if perhaps common, ideas regarding involvement and moral responsibility. The culturally-mediated nature of the relationship between evidentiality, involvement, and moral responsibility is clear when one compares Nanti evidential practice with Dickinson's (2000) description of Tsafiki (Barbacoan; Ecuador) evidentiality. Apparently, Tsafikis also employ evidentials to construct representations of involvement in events, with the inferential evidential serving to indicate reduced involvement. For Tsafikis, however, this distantiation serves to indicate moral condemnation of the events in question, rather than mitigating personal responsibility for them, as in the Nanti case. Although the Tsafiki case provides another example of evidentiality serving to indicate involvement, it also shows how the relationships between evidentiality, involvement, and moral responsibility are culturally-grounded.

### **3.8 Evidential practice and event responsibility in Nanti discourse: an example**

We now turn to an extended example of how evidential strategies are deployed in Nanti interaction to deflect culpability. The interaction involves six adults and several children. The principal participants are two women, Mecha (M) and Chabera (C); Pasotoro (P), Mecha's husband; Aherika (A), Pasotoro's sister-in-law; and Tomashi (T), Mecha and Pasotoro's son. The interaction takes place around noon in Mecha's cooking hut on September 27<sup>th</sup>, 2004.

The interaction we examine revolves around a burn that Mecha's daughter Rosa suffered the previous day. A few days beforehand, several men had cleared

the tall grass in an open area near Mecha’s family’s cooking and sleeping huts. The grass was left to dry, to be burned a few days hence in order to slow the growth of new grass. Before the adults could do so, however, a group of children gathered the grass into piles and set it alight – a common turn of events, but one nevertheless disapproved of by adults. In the ensuing fun, Rosa inadvertently stepped into a pile of burning grass, receiving a large burn on her foot and ankle. Rosa did not tell her parents about the burn at the time, however, and even slept in the family’s chicken coop that night to evade detection. Only the next day did Mecha finally learn of the mishap from Rosa’s younger brother, Tomashi. She then tracked Rosa down and severely chastised Rosa both for burning her foot and for concealing the fact.

I was apprised of these events when I was passing by Mecha and Pasotoro’s cooking hut and was invited in to drink manioc beer. After several minutes of appropriate visiting talk, Pasotoro told me of and showed me Rosa’s burn, and asked if I could treat it. I left to obtain some topical antibiotics and returned with my research partner, Christine Beier. Not long after I had returned to treat Rosa’s burn, Chabera, a good friend of ours and mother-in-law to Pasotoro’s brother Tomashi, arrived and was given manioc beer by Mecha. She then pointed to Rosa’s burn, and asked how it occurred. Note that in the transcript that follows I indicate at the right margin of each line the type of mode-of-access information contained in the line (e.g. VISUAL, INFERENCE, QUOTATIVE, etc.), and the corresponding evidential or periphrastic expression is underlined.

### 3.8.1 Interaction 1: Chabera asks about Rosa’s burn

1. C: *Tya oka<sup>n</sup>taka oka?*

<i>tya</i>	<i>o=</i>	<i>ka<sup>n</sup>t</i>	<i>-ak</i>	<i>-a</i>	<i>o-</i>	<i>oka</i>
where/how	3NMS=	happen	-PERF	-REAL.A	3NM-	this

‘Where/how<sup>13</sup> did this happen?’ (indicating Rosa’s burn)

2. M: *Kara chapì shìNpenashi.*

*kara chapì shìNpena -shi*  
there yesterday grass -CL:leaf  
‘Over there, yesterday, in the grass.’

3. *Otya maika oburoki nonehana^ke.*

VISUAL

*o- tya maika oburoki no= neh -an -ak -i*  
3NM- recently now yuca.beer 1S= see -ABL -PERF -REAL.I  
‘I saw (it) just now, (when I was making) yuca beer.’

4. *Otya maika nonehake.*

VISUAL

*o- tya maika no= neh -ak -i*  
3NM- recently now 1S= see -PERF -REAL.I  
‘I saw (it) just now.’

5. P: [*Oburoki ochapinitanahi.*

*oburoki ochapini -an -ah -i*  
yuca.beer evening -ABL -REG -REAL.I  
‘When she was making oburoki, in the late afternoon.’

6. M: [*Noka tata giNpi?*

QUOTATIVE

*no- ka tata og -i -Npi*  
1- QUOT what get -REAL.I -2O  
‘I said, what got you?’

7. C: [*Tya iro?*

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<sup>13</sup>Because of the indicated polysemy of *tya*, this utterance is ambiguous. Mecha’s response suggests that she interpreted Chabera’s question as relating to the location of the accident.

*tya iro*  
 where/how 3NM.FOC.PRO  
 ‘Where did it happen?’

8. M: *Oga ogima<sup>ˆ</sup>tira, iroka agapokihiro.* INFERENCE

*o- oga o= ogima -i =ra iro =ka agapokih*  
 3NM- that 3NMS= burn -REAL.I =SUB 3NM.PRO =INFR step.on  
*-i =ro*  
 -REAL.I =3NMO  
 ‘That (grass) which was burning, she presumably stepped on it.’

9. *O- o- otsararaha.*

*o= o= o= tsararah -a*  
 3NMS= 3NMS= 3NMS= horse.around -REAL.A  
 ‘She– she– she was horsing around.’

10. *Otya inka<sup>ˆ</sup>hara nonehake.* VISUAL

*o- tya inkahara no= neh -ak -i*  
 3NM- recently earlier 1S= see -PERF -REAL.I  
 ‘I saw (the burn) just a little earlier.’

11. *Noka tata giNpi?* QUOTATIVE

*no- ka tata og -i =Npi*  
 1S- QUOT what get -REAL.I -2O  
 ‘I said, what got you?’

12. *Oka onti tsitsi oga.* QUOTATIVE

*o- ka o- Nti tsitsi o- oga*  
 3NM- QUOT 3NM- COP fire 3NM- that  
 ‘She said, this is (due to) fire.’



13. C: *Ontini oga meroka<sup>ˆ</sup>ke.*

*o- Nti =ni o- oga merok -ak -i*  
3NMS- COP =CNSQ 3NM- that scorch.skin -PERF -REAL.I  
'So *that* is why that (i.e. Rosa's skin) is scorched.'

14. (pause)

15. C: *Magatiro ogamaika tagake?*

*magatiro o- oga =maika tag -ak -i*  
all.INAN 3NM- that =HEST burn -PERF -REAL.I  
'All that, uh, is burned?'

16. M: *Magatiro aka, aka, nero oka.*

*magatiro aka aka nero o- oka*  
all.INAN here here see.IMPER 3NM- this  
'All over here, here, see this.'

17. C: [Oga tera ityara piNkeme?] AUDITORY

*o- oga tera i- tya =ra pi= N- kem -e*  
3NM- that NEG.REAL 3M- when =TEMP 2S- IRREAL- hear -IREAL.I  
'You didn't hear it at the time?'

18. M: =*Tera. yoga iryo yo-, otya maika ika maika* QUOTATIVE

*tera i- oga iryo i= o o- tya maika*  
NEG.REAL 3M- that 3M.PRO 3MS= fragment 3NM- when now  
*i- ka maika*  
3NM- QUOT now  
'No. This one, he-, just recently he said now,'

19. T: =*Atsi* (unintelligible)

*atsi*  
 Hey  
 ‘Hey (unintelligible)’

20. A: [O- *otya maika oka notsi-, notsibuhoka^ke tsi^tsi oka tsitsi osakak^e.* QUOTATIVE

*o- o- tya maika o- ka no= tsi no= tsibuhok*  
 3NM- 3NM- TEMP now 3NM- QUOT 1S= fragment 1S= stir.up  
*-ak -i tsitsi, o- ka tsitsi o= sak -ak*  
 -PERF -REAL.I fire 3NM- QUOT fire 3NMS= burn.person -PERF  
*-i*  
 -REALIS.I

‘She- she just now she said, I stirred up the fire. She said the fire burned (me).’

21. *Oka tsitsi osakak^e.* QUOTATIVE

*o- ka tsitsi o= sak -ak -i*  
 3NM- QUOT fire 3NMS= burn.person -PERF -REAL.I

‘She said, the fire burned (me).’

[...]

22. C: *Ari (unintelligible) te piNkeme irage?* AUDITORY

*ari te pi= N- kem -e o= irag*  
 really NEG.REAL 2S= IRREAL- hear -IRREAL.I 3NMS= cry  
*-e*  
 -IRREAL.I

‘Really, you didn’t hear her cry?’

23. M: *Tenkanki irag^e.*

*teNkaNki o= irag -e*  
 NEG.FOC 3NMS= cry -IRREAL.I

‘She didn’t cry at all.’

24. P: [Te irage.

*te*            *o=*        *irag* -*e*  
NEG.REAL 3NMS= cry -IRREAL.I  
'She didn't cry.'

Some ethnographic contextualization of this interaction will be helpful in understanding the significance of the participants' strategic moves. First, Nanti mothers are generally considered responsible for the safety of their young children in Nanti society. This responsibility is not absolute, however, and the older a child becomes, the more the child herself is held responsible for her own safety. Rosa, who is approximately nine years old, is at a transitional age, when both she and her mother share responsibility for her safety. In the context of this interaction, then, both Rosa and Mecha are the candidates for culpability for the accident. Second, Chabera is generally inclined to be more openly critical of others' behavior than most Nanti women are, and she is also more socially mobile than most women, visiting distant households and conversing openly with both men and women in those households, in a manner more reminiscent of male than female inter-household visiting behavior. Mecha has ample reason to anticipate, therefore, that Chabera is likely to cast a critical eye on the events in question, and that Chabera will not hesitate to criticize Mecha's behavior to others if she believes Mecha to have been negligent. I have frequently heard Chabera's criticisms of others, and have at least once been subject to her criticisms myself.

As soon as Chabera starts inquiring into the events surrounding Rosa's burn, Mecha adopts intonational contours common among Nanti speakers who are defending themselves from criticism or accusations.<sup>14</sup> This behavior indicates that

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<sup>14</sup>In brief, Mecha uses a slight creakiness and nasalization throughout her speech; simultaneously, she deploys the upper extremes of her pitch range, beginning her breath groups at a high pitch and then lowering her pitch step-wise across the syllables of the breath groups. The interpretability of intonational contours is an important aspect of Nanti communicative practice, but not one that can be addressed in detail in the present context. The reader is referred to Beier (2005) and Beier (in prep.) for further information.

Mecha interprets Chabera's questions as relevant to the assignment of culpability for the events under discussion. This assessment is supported by Mecha's reaction to Chabera's questioning. Note, for example, that in responding to Chabera's initial question regarding where/how the burn occurred, Mecha moves immediately from a brief response to Chabera's explicit question to an extended discussion that distances her from the event in question. Most of Mecha's contributions to the conversation are protestations of her protracted ignorance of Rosa's burn and evidentially-qualified descriptions of the event. In fact, in this interactional strip, the focus is much less on how Rosa suffered the burn, and much more on who knew about it, when and how. This is particularly clear in Chabera's repeated efforts to clarify if either Mecha or Pasotoro have failed to mention earlier knowledge of the burn than they initially admit, in lines 17 and 22.

It is informative to contrast Mecha's reaction to Chabera's questioning with the interaction that took place some twenty minutes earlier, when Pasotoro first requested treatment from me for his daughter's burned foot. Reho (R) is the author.

### 3.8.2 Interaction 2: Pasotoro tells Reho about Rosa's burn

1. P: *Reho, tsitsi oka osakake.*

*Reho tsitsi o- oka o= sak -ak -i*  
 Lev fire 3NM- this 3NMS= burn.skin -PERF -REALIS.I  
 'Lev, fire burned this.' [Indicating Rosa's foot and ankle]

2. R: *Arisa? [pause] Nonkamosote.*

*arisa no= N- kamoso -e*  
 really 1S= IRREAL- check.on -IRREAL.I  
 'Really? [pause] I'm going to have a look'. [Goes over to sit by Rosa]

3. *Cha- pairani?*

*chapi pairani*  
yesterday long.ago  
'(Did this happen) yester- many days ago?'

4. P: *Te, otya iNkahara.*

*te o- tya iNkahara*  
NEG.REAL 3NM- recently earlier  
'No, very recently.'

5. R: *iNkahara?*

*iNkahara*  
earlier  
'Recently?'

6. P: *=He iNkahara.*

*he iNkahara*  
yes earlier  
'Yes, recently.'

7. R: *Onti oga, niha? Tera?*

*o- Nti o- oga niha tera*  
3NM- COP 3NM- that water NEG.REAL  
'That is due to (boiling) water? No?'

8. P: [ *Te-, tera iro.*

*te tera iro*  
NEG.REAL NEG.REAL 3NM.FOC.PRO  
'No-, not that.'

9. R: *Tsitsi.*

*tsitsi*  
 fire  
 Fire.

10. P: *Tsitsi, ok- kanyorira oga yogimashihageti, oga osak^ake .*

*tsitsi ok kanyorira o- oga i= ogima -shih -ge*  
 fire fragment like 3NM- that 3MS= burn -CL:leaf -DSTR  
*-i o- oga o= sak -ak -i*  
 REAL.I 3NM- that 3NMS= burn.skin -PERF -REAL.I  
 ‘Fire, like that (grass) they were burning, *that* burned (her).’

11. R: [*Aha aha. (pause) Atsi totata,*  
*shiNtsi noNpokahe.*

*Aha aha atsi totata shiNtsi no= N- pok -ah*  
 uhuh uhuh hey wait.a.sec quickly 1S= IRREAL- come -REG  
*-e*  
 -IRREAL.I  
 ‘Uhuh, uhuh. (pause) Hey, wait a sec, I’ll be back quickly.’

12. *Tota, oga haNpi name.*

*tota o -oga haNpi no= am -e*  
 wait.a.sec 3NM- that medicine 1S= bring -IRREAL.I  
 ‘Wait a sec, I’m going to bring some medicine.’ [R finishes his bowl of  
 manioc beer and stands to leave]

13. *Totata.*

*totata*  
 wait.a.sec  
 ‘Wait a sec.’

14. M: *Nehe.*

*neh -e*

see IRREAL.I

‘Here you go.’ [Hands R a new bowl of manioc beer; R quickly drains the bowl and leaves to get medicine]

Although this interaction also touches on the circumstances of Rosa’s burn, it proceeds very differently from Interaction 1. Note that Pasotoro makes no use of evidential resources in describing the events surrounding Rosa’s burn, and displays no concern regarding the assignment of responsibility. Significantly, the discussion of the circumstances of Rosa’s burn involved Pasotoro and myself,<sup>15</sup> rather than Mecha and another Nanti woman. As Rosa’s father, Pasotoro is in relatively little danger of being held responsible for Rosa’s burn, by Nanti standards. In addition, I have endeavored to maintain a helpful and non-judgemental persona in the community, which probably made Pasotoro even less worried about being held responsible by me than by other Nantis. It is reasonable, therefore, to infer that Pasotoro does not feel vulnerable to being held culpable for Rosa’s burn in this interaction, and that the significant difference in the way Pasotoro and Mecha react in the two interactions stems from the different risks the two face with respect to the assignment of responsibility for Rosa’s burn by their respective interlocutors. As a result, we see that Mecha invests significant interactional effort in unequivocally establishing the nature of her relationship to Rosa’s burn, while Pasotoro makes no such investment.

Pasotoro’s discussion of Rosa’s burn makes clear another important aspect of Mecha’s and Pasotoro’s shared epistemic orientation to the events in question: they appear to have no doubt in their minds regarding what happened to Rosa. Rosa herself admitted that she burned herself in the grass fire (see line 12, Interaction 1) and her little brother gleefully confirmed the account which Rosa sheepishly gave of her actions (see line 18, Interaction 1, which is an oblique mention of the

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<sup>15</sup>In inter-household visits like this one, men tend to address other men, and women tend to address other women, especially in the early stages of the visit.

little brother's testimony). Given this testimony and the circumstances of the grass burning, no one had any reason to doubt Rosa burned her foot in the grass, as she admitted. The certainty that the participants have regarding the events of Rosa's burn is evident in Pasotoro's unqualified description of what happened (lines 1 and 9, Interaction 2) when speaking only to me. Consequently, we cannot understand Mecha's use of sensory access specifications in Interaction 1 as deriving from her uncertainty regarding what happened, or from her concern about avoiding utterance responsibility for the factuality of her utterances regarding the events of the burn. Rather, she and the other participants are attending to a different kind of responsibility: event responsibility.

Bearing in mind the heightened salience of event responsibility in the interaction between Mecha and Chabera, let us now take a closer look at Mecha's deployment of mode-of-access information in that interaction. Mecha's contributions mainly serve to distance herself epistemically from Rosa's accident, principally via the use of inferentials and reported speech. Even when Mecha speaks of *seeing* Rosa's burn (line 3: *Otya maika . . . nonehanake* 'I saw just now'; see also line 10), this visual mode-of-access specification is deployed to temporally and spatially distance her visual access to the burn from the event of the burn itself (line 2: *kara chapi shiNpenashi* 'Over there, yesterday in the grass'). Interestingly, Mecha's use of *nonehanake* 'I saw' involves a subtle morphological feature that further emphasizes her prior ignorance: the use of the ablative suffix *-an*. When used with non-motion verbs, this suffix indicates *change of state*.<sup>16</sup> Mecha's use of the ablative therefore indexes a change of epistemic state: her having *come to see*, and know about, Rosa's burn.<sup>17</sup>

Mecha employs quotative evidentials several times, either quoting herself asking for information about the burn (lines 6 and 11) or quoting others informing

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<sup>16</sup>Payne (1982) describes a similar meaning for the cognate morpheme in Ashéninka.

<sup>17</sup>I thank Christine Beier for pointing out the salience of this morpheme to the present analysis.



her about the burn (lines 12, 18, and 21). These uses of quotatives allow Mecha to present question-answer pairs that index for Chabera, via the presupposition of ignorance underlying the use of interrogatives, Mecha's ignorance about the events surrounding the burn at the time that she first saw it (lines 6 and 11). Moreover, Mecha's use of quotatives to evidentially mark her own questions can hardly be seen as an effort to diminish her utterance responsibility, since she is reporting her own speech. Rather, she is indexing her epistemic relationship to the event of the burn. By depicting herself as ignorant about the event of the burn at the time that it occurred, she effectively characterizes herself as having been at a sufficient physical remove to be incapable of doing anything either to prevent Rosa's burn or to attend to it at the time. In other words, Mecha's use of the quotative leads to an inference of her lack of causal, and hence moral, responsibility for the accident.

Of course, the quotative-marked question-answer pairs also allow Mecha to report Rosa's utterances, which are effectively admissions of Rosa's own responsibility for the burn, since Rosa doesn't blame anyone else for the accident. Interestingly, it would have been perfectly acceptable, in the context of Nanti speech reporting practices, for Mecha to have reported only Rosa's speech. This is what Aherika does in line 20 of Interaction 1, when she employs a quotative to report Rosa's explanation that she received her burn in the course of stirring up the fire. However, if Mecha had simply reported Rosa's speech, this would not have so clearly indexed Mecha's ignorance of the accident. The fact that Mecha *did* report her own question – twice in fact – underscores the importance of the distancing effect of the evidential.

The epistemic distancing that Mecha introduces in line 6 with the use of the quotative is expanded upon by her use of an inferential. When in line 7 Chabera asks for information about how the accident occurred, Mecha responds in line 8 using an inferential, *Iroka agapokihiro*, 'she presumably stepped in it'. Mecha thereby characterizes her mode of access to the key event in the accident as indirect, again

leading others to infer that she was not causally responsible for the event.

Significantly, Mecha explicitly indexes the issue of responsibility in next line (line 9) by remarking *otsararaha* ‘she was horsing around’.<sup>18</sup> Note that this clause is not evidentially marked in any way, even though Mecha’s access to the events immediately preceding the burn were presumably the same as her access at the precise moment of the burn. Thus, when Mecha shifts from distancing herself from the accident to pinning the blame on Rosa, she drops all evidential marking. This is another indication that Mecha’s use of evidentials is related to her efforts to mitigate her own event responsibility.

In line 17, we see an interesting interactional move on Chabera’s part, when she asks if Mecha heard the event, even if she didn’t see it. Chabera appears intent on clarifying Mecha’s access to the event, and specifically, when she learned of it. In line 17, Mecha denies that she heard anything, and begins to indicate that her son told her about the burn, at which point almost everyone in the hut makes a bid for the conversational floor. In line 22, Chabera presses the issue even further, inquiring if Mecha didn’t perhaps hear Rosa crying subsequent to the burn. Mecha responds that she didn’t (recall that Rosa hid out in the family chicken coop to avoid detection), and her husband Pasotoro once again supports her.

We see in this interaction a great deal of work by the participants to clarify Mecha’s mode of access to the events of the burn. Mecha takes great care to characterize her access using inferentials and quotatives, thereby situating herself at a great remove from the events in question. She uses the periphrastic visual evidential only in reference to the recent event of belatedly seeing Rosa’s burn, some 24 hours after it occurred. Her husband Pasotoro twice supports her representation of her access to events of the burn. Chabera, on the other hand, appears to be working to eliminate all possibility that Mecha is understating her epistemological access to

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<sup>18</sup>The verb *tsararah* denotes reckless running around and hollering, typical behavior when children are chasing each other.

the events of Rosa's burn, by inquiring if Mecha might have heard the event, or at least heard Rosa's subsequent crying.<sup>19</sup> In both cases, however, Mecha and Chabera are working toward the *same goal*: clarifying Mecha's knowledge of, access to, and therefore, responsibility for, the event of Rosa's burn.

### 3.9 Conclusion

Most previous work on the relationship between evidentiality, evidential practice, and responsibility has focused on the role of evidentiality and periphrastic source-of-information meanings in reducing speakers' responsibility for the factuality of utterances. In this chapter, I have argued that evidentiality also serves to mitigate responsibility for *events*. This proposal makes use of a distinction that has not been clearly drawn to this point: the difference between responsibility for the socially-salient attributes of utterances and responsibility for events or states of affairs.

The analysis of interactions between Nantis shows that Nanti evidential practice includes the deployment of both evidentials and periphrastic mode-of-access meanings to negotiate individuals' responsibility for events. Mode-of-access specifications denote the nature of sensory access that indexed knowing subjects have to indexed events. Via participants' understandings regarding the prototypical circumstances under which the use of particular evidentials would be appropriate, these mode-of-access meanings lead to inferences regarding the spatial and sensory relationships between the speaker and the event in question. On this basis, interactants are able to infer the nature of the speakers' involvement and causal responsibility for the event in question. From this inference, and additional understandings about the nature of moral responsibility, interactants can reach conclusions regarding the moral responsibility of the speaker.

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<sup>19</sup>There may also be another issue at stake here, although none of the participants mention it: even if Mecha is blameless for the burn itself, it could certainly be seen by Nantis that a lapse of almost 24 hours before Rosa is treated for the burn is a sign of negligence on her parents' part.

This work makes three contributions to our understandings of responsibility and evidentiality. First, it clarifies the analytical distinction between utterance responsibility and event responsibility, a distinction implicit in previous work. Second, it shows that evidentiality is not crucially tied to responsibility for factuality, and hence, to epistemic modality, even in its pragmatic role. This is significant to the ongoing disciplinary debate regarding the status of evidentiality as a grammatical category distinct from epistemic modality. And third, this chapter provides a model of the inferences by which evidentials and periphrastic mode-of-access meanings come to serve as a pragmatic metaphor for moral responsibility for events.




Figure 3.2: Inferences linking evidential marking to event responsibility

## Chapter 4

# Evidential practice and utterance responsibility in Nanti society

### 4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I distinguished event responsibility from utterance responsibility, and described the role that evidential resources play in Nanti discourse in constructing representations of responsibility for events. In this chapter, I turn to the phenomenon of utterance responsibility, and examine the role of quotative resources (i.e. quotatives and verbs of saying) in modulating representations of this form of responsibility.

My main goal in this chapter is to show that the common understanding of the relationship between quotative resources and utterance responsibility — namely that quotative resources serve to mitigate responsibility for the factuality of utterances — is an *incomplete* understanding, and that the actual relationship differs in two important ways. First, I show that the basic communicative function of quota-

tive resources is to individuate stances, and that stance individuation is associated with the expression of commitment to, or *heightened* responsibility for, a stance. I argue that mitigation of utterance responsibility is in fact a secondary effect that results from inferences regarding the commitment of speakers with respect to third party quotations. Second, I show that epistemic stances — that is to say, degrees of commitment to the factuality of quoted utterances — are but *one type* of stance that quotative resources can be employed to express, and that quotative resources can also be employed to express a variety of *moral* evaluative stances. The strong pragmatic relationship to epistemic modality that many scholars attribute to quotative resources is thus, I argue, a special case of the more general use of quotatives to express evaluative stances.

The common view of quotative resources as means for diminishing responsibility is clearly articulated by numerous authors. Drawing principally from work in pragmatics and ordinary language philosophy, Clark and Gerrig (1990, p.792), for example, express the following view regarding the relationship between quotation and utterance responsibility:

[W]hen [speakers] quote, they take responsibility only for presenting the quoted matter — and then only for the aspects they choose to depict. The responsibility for the depicted aspects themselves belongs to the source speaker. So with quotations speakers can partly or wholly detach themselves from what they depict. That makes quotations useful for several purposes, including ... dissociation of responsibility...

Similarly, Fox (2001, p.174), whose work is more closely aligned with the linguistic anthropological tradition, remarks that:

by doing a message as “animator” [i.e. by quoting] ... a participant can be seen to distribute responsibility to other (perhaps noncopresent)

participants and thereby minimize the potentially negative consequences of their actions.

Examples representing this consensus view are abundant. Likewise, many scholars have drawn a strong connection between utterance responsibility and epistemic modality (e.g. Hill and Irvine, 1993a; Palmer, 1986). Even among those scholars who do not discuss the communicative functions of reported speech in terms of responsibility as such, at least since Chafe (1986, pp.268-9), reported speech has been widely understood to be intimately related to epistemic modality — as indeed, have evidential strategies more generally. Recently, for example, Sakita (2002, p.207) has remarked that as a form of evidentiality, reported speech is an indication of the “source and *reliability* of a speaker’s knowledge (emphasis mine).”

As I shall show, the common wisdom regarding the relationship between quotative resources, utterance responsibility<sup>1</sup> and epistemic modality expressed above is basically sound, *but* it only applies to a restricted set of uses of quotative resources. This partial empirical coverage leads, I argue, to subtle misunderstandings regarding the *ways* in which quotative resources modulate utterance responsibility and the relationship between quotative resources and epistemic modality.

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In §4.1.1 I define utterance responsibility and contrast it with event responsibility, to which the previous chapter was devoted. Then in §4.2, I take an extended look at concurrent quotative framing, a form of Nanti speech act participant quotation. I show that, as part of using this special form of quotation, quotative resources serve to individuate stances, and that stance individuation is intimately linked to the *emphasis*, rather than the mitigation, of responsibility. In §4.3, I show that epistemic stance is but one kind of stance modulated by quotative resources, which are best understood as

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<sup>1</sup>The cited authors do not distinguish event responsibility from utterance responsibility, but in their discussions of the relationships of quotation and reported speech to the broader phenomenon of responsibility, it is clear that they mainly have utterance responsibility in mind.



modulating evaluative stances more generally. In §4.3.2 I provide an account of the widely-recognized responsibility-*mitigating* functions of quotative resources, showing that these are second order pragmatic effects stemming from the combination of the responsibility-emphasizing functions of quotative resources and inferences guided by maxims regarding the articulation of commitments to stances. Finally, in §4.3.3 I compare the Nanti-specific phenomena discussed in the preceding sections to similar phenomena discussed in the literature, including self-quotation and first-person evidentiality.

#### 4.1.1 Defining utterance responsibility

A speaker can be said to be ‘responsible’ for his or her utterance in so far as he or she can be evaluated as praiseworthy or blameworthy for some attribute of that utterance, such as its factuality or its politeness. Thus, when an individual is held culpable for lying or for being rude, his or her *utterance responsibility* is invoked.

In distinguishing utterance responsibility from event responsibility, it is important to note that every utterance is, in a certain sense, an event, and as such, speakers may be assessed as displaying both utterance and event responsibility. The distinction between the two forms of responsibility lies in the fact that event responsibility focuses on the *consequences* of actions (which may include utterances), while utterance responsibility focuses on the *attributes* of utterances, without regard to the consequences of the utterance. To distinguish these two forms of responsibility, consider the utterance of a vulgarity. In such a case, responsibility can attach to the utterer in two ways: first, the utterer can be held blameworthy for violating local language ideologies regarding appropriate forms of expression in particular interactional contexts; second, the person can be held blameworthy for having offended a co-present party. The former type of culpability is an instance of utterance responsibility, while the latter type is an instance of event responsibility.

Note that these two kinds of responsibility are in principle independent of one another. Returning to the hypothetical example, a participant may judge the vulgarity to be inappropriate for the given context, even though he or she was not personally offended. Thus, a speaker may be held responsible either for the qualities of the utterance as such, or for the consequences of the utterance, or both. Making use of terminology from speech act theory, we can say that responsibility attaches to an utterance at both the illocutionary and perlocutionary levels.

## 4.2 Concurrent quotative framing and utterance responsibility in Nanti discourse

Although quotative evidentials and reported speech are broadly implicated in augmenting or emphasizing utterance responsibility in Nanti discourse, this effect is clearest in a particular form of Nanti quotation that I call *concurrent quotative framing* (CQF). This discursive strategy is characterized by the use of quotative resources — either a quotative evidential or the verb *kaNt* ‘say’ — to explicitly attribute an utterance from the unfolding interaction to a local speech act participant (i.e. a first or second person participant). CQF thus attributes an utterance to a speech event participant at the very time of utterance, rather than reporting an utterance from a prior interaction.

Consider the following example of CQF, drawn from the interaction concerning Rosa’s burn, which I examined in the previous chapter. At one point in this interaction, prior to Chabera’s arrival, Mecha was discussing the circumstances of Rosa’s burn with Aherika, her classificatory sister-in-law. In line 1, Aherika asks if Rosa was horsing around when she was injured, and Mecha responds that she was. In line 3, Mecha reaffirms that Rosa was horsing around, this time employing a quotative evidential to frame her assertion regarding Rosa’s actions. Note that

Mecha is not quoting her own utterance from a *previous* interaction, but instead is explicitly attributing to herself an utterance from the ongoing interaction.

#### 4.2.1 Interaction 1: Aherika and Mecha

1. A: Otsararaha?

*o= tsararah -a*  
 3nmS= horse.around -REAL.A  
 ‘Was she horsing around?’

2. M: Hee, otsararaha.

*hee o= tsararah -a*  
 yes 3nmS= horse.around -REAL.A  
 ‘Yes, she was horsing around.’

3. Noka otsararaha.

*no- ka o= tsararah -a*  
 1S- QUOT 3nmS= horse.around -REAL.A  
 ‘I say, “She was horsing around.”’

The virtue of CQF for clarifying the relationship between quotation and utterance responsibility in Nanti society lies in the fact that CQF utterances are not construed as reports of past utterances,<sup>2</sup> and are frequently instances of self-quotation. These characteristics confer the analytical benefit of largely removing

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<sup>2</sup>A long-standing debate revolves around the appropriateness of terms like *report* and *reported speech*, stemming from disagreement over whether or not reported speech should be considered a replication of past utterances. As a number of scholars have shown, there are clearly cases in which it is inaccurate to characterize ‘reported speech’ as a replication of past utterances (e.g. Clark and Gerrig, 1990; Koven, 2001; Mayes, 1990; Tannen, 1989), leading some to reject the term *reported speech* in favor of terms like *constructed dialogue* (Tannen, 1989) or *reporting discourse* (Sakita, 2002). Nevertheless, it is equally clear that in many interactional contexts, across many societies, reported speech is *construed* by interactants as being faithful, in some locally-relevant sense, to past utterances (e.g. Clark and Gerrig, 1990; Besnier, 1993). It is in this particular language-ideological sense that I speak of utterances as being construed as ‘reports’ of past utterances.

a significant confounding factor in the analysis of the communicative and social functions of quotative resources — namely, that quotation is also used extensively by Nantis in talking about past social interactions. Past interactions are typically narrated through extensive quotation of the involved parties, rather than by summarizing the contents of participants' contributions. Nantis also tend to avoid directly attributing subjective states — such as particular desires, intentions, emotions, and thoughts — to individuals, preferring to index such states through the quotation of relevant utterances. The resulting polyfunctionality of Nanti quotative resources in discussing past events can make it difficult to tease out effects particularly tied to utterance responsibility. However, the deployment of CQF in interactions cannot be understood as motivated by the need to report utterances from other interactions or individuals, which, as we shall see, brings into relief issues of utterance responsibility.

#### **4.2.2 CQF and stance individuation**

The basic claim I advance in this section is that CQF serves to *individuate* evaluative stances by explicitly attributing them to a participant in the unfolding interaction. The main piece of evidence I present for this claim is the distribution of CQF with respect to the type of stance-taking activity that interactions exhibit. Specifically, Nanti speakers mainly employ CQF in interactions in which they take conflicting stances on the given topic of discussion, whereas CQF is generally absent in the discussion of non-controversial topics and in interactions in which the participants seek to present the stances they express as generally valid or accepted.

Interactions in which Nantis express conflicting evaluations of an individual's behavior tend to be rich in CQF, especially when the interlocutors are social equals. I examine one such interaction now, which involved two socially prominent Nanti men, Bikotoro and Anteres, and which concerned the details of a social conflict between the residents of Montetoni and Marankehari. Also present for the interaction were

Migero, the *pereseteNte* of Montetoni and Bikotoro's younger brother; Hoha, elder brother to Migero and Bikotoro and the *de facto* leader of Marankehari at the time;<sup>3</sup> Maryo, a young man from Marankehari; and myself. The conversation took place in the early evening of March 4th, 2005, in Migero's family's cooking hut and concerned negotiations between the four men over the place of residence of three young women, Soira, Rerisuha, and Isabera, who had recently left Marankehari to live in Montetoni.

#### **4.2.2.1 Background to the interaction between Bikotoro and Anteres**

To understand the personal and political stakes in these negotiations, it is helpful to situate them in the political history of the Nanti communities of Montetoni and Marankehari. As discussed in Chapter 1, Marankehari was founded in 1997 in an effort by Araña, the Matsigenka schoolteacher, to relocate the Camisea Nantis further downriver. The creation of Marankehari split the Camisea Nantis into two groups: a larger one of some 180 people in Montetoni, and a smaller one of some 70 individuals in Marankehari.

Hoha assumed leadership in Marankehari after Araña's flight in 1998, and although he abandoned Araña's coercive strategies, he continued efforts to convince individual Nantis to relocate from Montetoni to Marankehari. Hoha's motives were partly similar to those of Araña: Hoha associated community size with political legitimacy in dealing with outside entities, such as petrochemical companies, missionaries, Matsigenka communities, and government representatives. Consequently, Hoha saw increasing the population of Marankehari as a means to build his own political power and that of his community.<sup>4</sup> Hoha initially was successful in con-

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<sup>3</sup>It merits mention that Anteres is brother-in-law to these three men — Anteres' wife Ines is Bikotoro's, Migero's and Hoha's sister — so resolving discord within this relationship is of great importance to all of them.

<sup>4</sup>Events since 1997 have shown that Hoha, and Araña before him, were essentially correct in associating community size with political legitimacy with respect to outside institutions.

vincing some residents of Montetoni to relocate to Marankehari, but dissatisfaction with Hoha's relatively authoritarian leadership style led them to return to Montetoni. Some long-term residents of Marankehari also joined them. Shortly afterwards, Hoha was forced from the titular position of *peresetente* by the community, although he continued to act as the community's *de facto* leader in many respects. The new *peresetente* was Berenarto, a young man who was held in high esteem by Angel Díaz, the Matsigenka evangelical pastor who had considerable influence in Marankehari at that time.

After a series of events in 2002 and 2003 which seriously undermined Hoha's social position in the community (Michael and Beier, 2004), he and several of his closest male allies left Marankehari for a six month visit to the Matsigenka community of Segakiato, between approximately May and November 2003. During this time, several women, some of whom had been left behind in Marankehari when their husbands departed with Hoha, relocated to Montetoni to live with their relatives there.

When Hoha returned from Segakiato, he succeeded in convincing most of those who had moved to Montetoni to return to Marankehari; but within months, young women began to trickle back to Montetoni, sometimes with their young husbands trailing behind.<sup>5</sup> In early 2004, this trickle became a flood when, in the space of two weeks, Soira, Rerisuha, Isabera, and one young man, Behani, relocated to Montetoni from Marankehari.

In the following weeks, the young women's husbands and these men's families made a number of visits to Montetoni, during which they unsuccessfully sought to convince and/or force the young women to return to Marankehari. Hoha partici-

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<sup>5</sup>Three main factors motivated these women to return to Montetoni. First, several of these young women had recently had their first children, and returned to Montetoni to live with their mothers and sisters to obtain help raising their infants, a common Nanti practice. Second, there was a manioc shortage in Marankehari, resulting from the fact that the men who had gone to Segakiato had not prepared new gardens to replace the older ones, which were being exhausted. And third, some young women were unsatisfied with their partners, who had been arranged for them by Hoha.

pated in these visits and played a major role in motivating the Marankehari group to visit Montetoni in order to recover the young women. With Hoha's encouragement, some of the visitors even attempted to physically coerce some of the young women to return with them — behavior which shocked the residents of Montetoni, and led them to criticize the visitors' actions in strong terms. Some of the Marankehari visitors, in turn, blamed their difficulties in returning the young women to Marankehari on the young women's kin in Montetoni. Not surprisingly, relations between the two communities grew strained.

As this acrimonious state of affairs dragged on, a small group of men from Marankehari, led by Hoha and Anteres, made another trip to Montetoni to negotiate a solution. This time they were successful, and an agreement was reached: Isabera (Anteres' young second wife) would remain in Montetoni, but Soira and Rerisuha would return to Marankehari. The fate of Behani was left unresolved. The conversation we now examine took place towards the end of this visit, and was one of the major steps towards the resolution of the situation.

Bikotoro's and Anteres' conversation concerned a number of issues surrounding the arrival in Montetoni of Bikotoro's daughter, Soira, and her possible return to Marankehari. To better understand the data segment we consider next, it is helpful to be aware of two aspects of Bikotoro's involvement in Soira's situation. First, Soira's return to Montetoni, and the subsequent demands that she return to Marankehari, put Bikotoro in a difficult interpersonal position. Bikotoro appeared quite happy to have his daughter living with him again, and Soira's mother Oroma was especially pleased and wanted Soira to stay. However, Bikotoro's brother Hoha was intent on seeing Soira return to Marankehari. Having observed Bikotoro's relationships with his two politically powerful brothers, Migeru and Hoha, over almost ten years, I have noted that Bikotoro generally accommodates their desires. It seemed to me that in this particular case he was inclined to do the same, and that

he was uncomfortable with opposing Hoha. This placed Bikotoro in a dilemma: he either risked angering his brother, if he supported Soira staying in Montetoni; or he risked angering his wife Oroma, if he supported Soira's return to Marankehari.

In the segment we consider, Bikotoro navigates the conflicting interests with which he is faced by choosing a third discursive position: he entirely recontextualizes Soira's arrival in Montetoni as an impulsive, temporary visit to her mother, and not as a permanent move at all. This discursive framing allows Bikotoro to sidestep the issue of whether he supports or opposes Soira's move to Montetoni by rejecting the presupposition that any such move took place.

The second matter relevant to understanding the following segment is that the visiting group from Marankehari, which had sought to return Soira to Marankehari, had accused Bikotoro of encouraging his daughter to return to Montetoni, and of subsequently supporting her resistance to return to Marankehari. The first accusation was, as far as I was able to determine, false (there had been no communication between father and daughter for many months), but it *was* true that Bikotoro had in no way aided the visitors in their efforts to return Soira to Marankehari. Regardless of the validity of their accusations, however, it was clear that Bikotoro was personally stung by them.

Thus, another discursive concern for Bikotoro in this segment is to present his actions, and those of his daughter, as reasonable and morally defensible. To this end, Bikotoro argues that Soira's return to her mother's home was an unpremeditated but appropriate response to being offended by the behavior of certain men in Marankehari during a manioc beer feast immediately prior to her departure, and that he himself had had no part in the matter. He characterizes Soira's actions as reasonable under the circumstances, but not indicative of any decision to permanently relocate to Montetoni.

In the interaction we examine, then, Bikotoro is working to present particu-



lar framings and interpretations of his own and Soira’s actions, which in at least two important ways contradict other understandings of the same events that were circulating at that time in the Nanti discursive sphere. Moreover, it is very likely that his interlocutor Anteres held the very views that were contradicted by Bikotoro’s reframing, since Anteres was one of the aggrieved parties visiting from Marankehari. As we shall see, Bikotoro’s interactional contributions are dense with CQF, as he indicates his personal commitment to the contested stances he takes.

#### 4.2.2.2 Interaction 2: Bikotoro and Anteres

1. B: Pine maika okaNtaka haNta naro, haNta,

*Pine maika o= kaNt -ak -a haNta naro haNta*  
 you.see now 3NMS= happen -PERF -REAL.A there 1PRO there  
 ‘You see what happened there, I, there,’

2. nokaNti irobenti, oNti pishiNkitara.

*no= kaNt -i irobenti o- Nti pi= shiNki*  
 1S say -REAL.I because.of.that 3NMS- COP 2S be.intoxicated  
 -a =ra  
 -REAL.A =DEP

‘I said, “It’s because of that, because you (the participants in the Marankehari manioc beer feast) were intoxicated.”’<sup>6</sup>

3. A: KaNtira aryo.

*kaNt -i -ra aryo*  
 say -REAL.I =DEP right  
 ‘Uh-huh.’<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup>Bikotoro is referring here to an interaction at Bikotoro’s home which occurred during a previous visit by the residents of Marankehari.

<sup>7</sup>The expression *kaNtira* and related ones such as *kaNtira aryo* are employed as continuers (Schegloff, 1982).

4. B: Iro arisano paita opintsata<sup>h</sup>ke ohatahe.

*iro arisano paita o= piNtsa -ak -i o= ha*  
 3NM.PRO indeed later 3NMS= decide -PERF -REAL.I 3NMS= go  
*-ah -e*  
 -REG -IRREAL.I

‘Because of that, she subsequently decided to return (to Montetoni).’

5. Iro piNka ari nokaNti.

*iro piNka ari no= kaNt -i*  
 3NM.PRO actually truly 1S= say -REAL.I  
 ‘Yeah, that’s what I say.’

6. A: =Ari pikaNti.

*ari pi= kaNt -i*  
 truly 2S= say -REAL.I  
 ‘Truly you say.’

7. B: Oga okaNtaka kogapagero.

*o= oga o= kaNt -ak -a kogapagero*  
 3NM= that 3NMS= happen -PERF -REAL.A no.reason  
 ‘That (Soira’s return to Montetoni) happened for no reason (i.e. without forethought).’

8. Matsi onpintsate onkante nohatahera hanta, onpokahe aka.

*matsi o= N- piNtsa -e o= N- kaNt*  
 NEG 3NMS IRREAL- decide -IRREAL.I 3NMS= IRREAL- say  
*-e no= ha -ah -e =ra hanta o= N-*  
 -IRREAL.I 1S= go REG -IRREAL.I =DEP there 3NMS= IRREAL-  
*pok -ah -e aka*  
 come REG -IRREAL.I here

‘Its not as if she decided, that she said, “I’m going back there (to Montetoni to live)” and came back here.’

9. (*unintelligible*) TyaNpa nonkante?

*tya* =Npa *no*= N- *kaNt* -e  
 INTERROG =ADVR 1S= IRREAL- say -IRREAL.I

‘What could I have said?’ (i.e. there was nothing I could/should say, because Soira’s actions were reasonable)

10. Oga okaNtaka maika onti oburoki.

*o-* *oga* *o*= *kaNt* -ak -a *maika* *o-* *Nti*  
 3NM- that 3NMS happen -PERF -REAL.A now 3NMS- COP  
*oburoki*  
 manioc.beer

‘What happened was due to the manioc beer (i.e. the events at the manioc beer feast).’

11. Agabehi okanti nohatahera haNta, inaku.

*o*= *agabeh* -i *o*= *kaNt* -i *no*= *ha* -ah -e  
 3NMS be.able -REAL.I 3NMS say -REAL.I 1S- go REG -IRREAL.I  
*=ra* *haNta* *ina* -ku  
 =DEP there my.mother -LOC

‘It was appropriate for her to say, “I’m going back there to my mother’s (to Montetoni).”’

12. ari piNka ari nokanti.

*ari* *piNka* *ari* *no*= *kaNt* -i  
 truly actually truly 1S= say -REAL.I

‘Yeah, that’s what I say.’

13. A: =ari pikaNti.

*ari* *pi*= *kaNt* -i  
 truly 2S= say -REAL.I

‘Truly you say.’

14. B: ari nokanti.

*ari no= kaNt -i*  
truly 1S= say -REAL.I  
'Yeah, that's what I say.'

15. A: ari piNka iNkahara nokanti pikema?

*ari piNka iNkahara no= kaNt -i pikema*  
truly actually earlier 1S= say -REAL.I you.hear  
'Indeed I said earlier, did you hear?'

16. (pause)

17. B: iro, iro patiro nokanti.

*iro iro patiro no= kaNt -i*  
3NM.PRO 3NM.PRO one.INAN 1S= say -REAL.I  
'That, that one (thing) I say.'

This segment exhibits a high density of verbs of saying (eight instances) that are deployed for purposes of CQF, and not for reporting speech from other interactions. Examining the instances of CQF in this segment of interaction, we find that they are uniformly associated with the articulation of contested stances. Bikotoro's first use of CQF in the segment is found in line 5, where it follows on his claims in lines 1-3 that Soira came to Montetoni because of her disagreeable experiences at the Marankehari manioc beer feast.<sup>8</sup> In lines 1-3 Bikotoro presents an account of the reason for Soira's arrival in Montetoni, and of his own role in these

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<sup>8</sup>The verb of saying in line 5 cannot be construed as a report of past speech for two reasons. First, reported speech complements typically follow the verb of saying in reported speech constructions, as part of the same sentence (see Chapter 6), and we see no such complement in line 5. Secondly, the immediately preceding clause (line 4), which might be construable as related to the verb of saying via the pronoun *iro* in line 5, is a descriptive observation, and not a segment of reported speech.

events, that differs starkly from the account given by the Marankehari visitors. In contrast to the position that Soira premeditatedly moved to Montetoni in order to live there, Bikotoro claims that the supposed move was an impulsive reaction to the events of the aforementioned feast. Bikotoro’s use of CQF here is thus associated with the expression a contested epistemic stance.

Bikotoro’s next use of CQF is found in line 12, following his argument in lines 7-11, in which he reprises his assertion that Soira’s return to Montetoni was unpremeditated, and adds the evaluation that her return to her mother’s home was an appropriate and reasonable action under the circumstances. Bikotoro’s use of CQF in this instance is thus associated with the expression of both contested epistemic and moral stances.

The contested nature of the evaluations under discussion is signalled by Anteres’ response in line 15. In this line, Anteres responds to Bikotoro’s articulation of his position, and perhaps specifically to the final point in the segment concerning the appropriateness of Soira’s actions, with the utterance *ari piNka iNkahara nokanti pikema?* ‘Indeed I said earlier, did you hear?’. This utterance exhibits two discourse particles associated with disagreement and incompatible evaluative stances. The first of these, *piNka* ‘actually’,<sup>9</sup> grammaticalized from the inflected verb *piNkanTe* ‘you will say’, is employed when a speaker expresses a proposition that either directly contradicts one expressed by their interlocutor, or contradicts a supposition or presupposition held by their interlocutor, as in (4.1).

(4.1) R: Tyani shiNtarō oka iNkenishiku?

*tyani shiNt -a =ro oka iNkenishiku*  
 who own -IRREAL =3nmO this forest.  
 ‘Who owns this (part of the) forest?’

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<sup>9</sup>I have found it difficult to find a clear counterpart to *piNka* in English, although ‘actually’ is used in similar ways in certain interactional contexts. In free translations I sometimes omit any overt translation of this discourse particle when no natural means exists in English to express it.

B: Teratya, piNka teratya.

*tera*            =*tya*    *piNka*    *tera*            =*tya*  
NEG.REAL =STILL actually NEG.REAL =STILL  
'Noboy yet, actually, nobody yet.'

The second discourse particle, *pikema* 'you hear' is grammaticalized from the inflected verb *pikemake* 'you heard', and serves as a sentence-final tag to project an affirmative continuer response to the assertion to which it is appended. It is especially common in interactions in which recipients exhibit skepticism about a speaker's assertions, or resistance to his or her demands.

Returning to the utterance in line 15, I am unable to determine with certainty to which previous utterance Anteres is referring to when he says *iNkahara nokaNti* 'I said earlier', but it is likely a reference to his assertion a few minutes earlier that Soira was not insulted or mistreated at the manioc beer feast in question, and that Soira's departure from Marankehari was unjustified. In any event, it is relevant that Bikotoro's articulation of his stance, and his use of CQF in lines 12 and 14, motivates Anteres to index his own stance, which is framed through the use of the discourse particles *piNka* and *pikema* as contesting Bikotoro's. In these uses of CQF, Bikotoro and Anteres each clearly individuate and distinguish their stances and acknowledge their contested nature.

#### 4.2.2.3 Interaction 3: Bikotoro and Anteres

We now consider a later segment of Bikotoro's and Anteres' conversation, which transpired approximately three minutes after the segment just discussed. After the coda of the previous interaction, Bikotoro and Anteres lapsed into silence for about a minute, while Migeru and Hoha talked. When Bikotoro and Anteres resumed talking, the theme of the interaction concerned what should be done to resolve the social crisis in which they were enmeshed. Bikotoro asserted that Berenarto, the

titular *pereseteNte* of Markankehari (and Anteres' son) should come to Montetoni himself and tell Soira that she should return to Marankehari. Effectively, Bikotoro is making the case that the responsibility of convincing Soira to return to Marankehari does not lie with him, but instead lies with Berenarto, the absent *pereseteNte*.

We consider this segment for two reasons. First, it illustrates the role of CQF in advocating for a future course of action, which shows how CQF can be associated with deontic illocutionary force; and second, the segment exhibits a particularly elaborate coda, in which Anteres and Bikotoro collaborate to unambiguously link Bikotoro's expressed evaluative stance to Bikotoro alone.

(4.2) 1. B: INkaNteme maika aka aryome.

*i=* N- *kaNt -e* =*me* *maika aka aryo*  
 3MS IRREAL- say -IRREAL.I =CNTF now here indeed  
 =*me*  
 =CNTF  
 'He should say now here, "No way."'<sup>10</sup>

2. ONtentanaheri.

*o=* N- *teNt -an -ah -e* =*ri*  
 3NMS IRREAL- accompany -ABL REG -IRREAL.I =3MO  
 'She would accompany him away (i.e. back to Marankehari).'

3. A: [kaNtira

*kaNt -i -ra*  
 say -REAL.I =DEP  
 'Uh-huh.'

4. A:=ikaNti, iNkaNteNp^i,

*i=* *kaNt -i* *i=* N- *kaNt -e* =*Npi*  
 3mS= say -REAL.I 3mS= IRREAL- say -IRREAL.I =2O

<sup>10</sup>Used in this manner, the expression *aryome* indicates disapproval of an action or state of affairs, which could translated as 'things are not as they should be.' I use the briefer 'no way' to capture this.

'He says, he will say to you,'

5. B: [InkaNteme paita oNkuta, (*unintelligible*) noN-, noN-, nopiNtsa~ti  
noka tota nagahe.

*i*= N- *kaNt* -*e* =*me* *paita* *oNkuta*, *no*=  
3mS= IRREAL- say -IRREAL.I =CNTF later morning 1S=  
N- *no*= N- *no*= *piNtsa* -*i* *no*- *ka* *tota*  
IRREAL- 1S= IRREAL- 1S= decide -REAL.I 1- QUOT hold.on  
*no*= *ag* -*ah* -*e*  
1S= take -REG -IRREAL.I

'He should say tomorrow morning, *unintelligible*, "I will-, I will-, I have  
decided to take (her) back."'

6. InkaNteme.

*i*= N- *kaNt* -*e* =*me*  
3NMS- IRREAL- say -IRREAL.I =CNTF  
'He should say (that).'

7. Aryo piNka aryo nokanti.

*aryo* *piNka* *aryo* *no*= *kaNt* -*i*  
indeed actually indeed 1S= say -REAL.I  
'Indeed, indeed I say.'

8. A: [aryoro pikaNti?

*aryoro* *pi*= *kaNt* -*i*  
truly 2S= say -IRREAL.I  
'Indeed you say?'

9. B: InkaNteme maika.

*i*= N- *kaNt* -*e* =*me* *maika*  
3NMS- IRREAL- say -IRREAL.I =CNTF maika  
'He should say (that) now.'

10. Ari ontentanake, (*unintelligible*).



*ari o= N- teNt -an -ak -e*  
 indeed 3mS= IRREAL- accompany -ABL -PERF -IRREAL.I  
 ‘Indeed she will accompany him away, (*unintelligible*).’

11. TyaNpa noNkaNte?

*tya =Npa no= N- kaNt -e*  
 INTERROG =NCGNT 1S= IRREAL- say -IRREAL.I  
 ‘What would I say?’ (i.e. I would not oppose him)

12. A: (*unintelligible*)

13. B: =Ari piNka aryo noKanti.

*ari piNka aryo no= kaNt -i*  
 indeed actually indeed 1S= say -REAL.I  
 ‘Indeed I say.’

14. A: Ari pikaNti?

*ari pi= kaNt -i*  
 truly 2S= say -REAL.I  
 ‘Indeed you say?’

15. B: Ari noKanti.

*ari no= kaNt -i*  
 truly 1S= say -REAL.I  
 ‘Indeed I say.’

16. iNtaga noKanti.

*iNtaga no= kaNt -i*  
 that.is.all 1S= say -REAL.I  
 ‘That’s all I say.’

17. A: iNtaga pikaNti.

*iNtaga pi= kaNt -i*  
 that.is.all 2S= say -REAL.I  
 ‘That’s all you say.’

18. B: [Intaga nokaNti.

*iNtaga no= kaNt -i*  
that.is.all 1S= say -REAL.I  
'That's all I say.'

In line 1 Bikotoro expresses a stance with deontic illocutionary force, namely, that Berenarto should intervene personally and come to tell Soira that her relocation to Montetoni is unacceptable. In line 2 he expresses an epistemic stance, predicting that Soira would listen to Berenarto and return to Marankehari, thereby resolving the crisis. He expands on this position in lines 6 and 7, then employs CQF in line 8: *aryo piNka aryoka nokaNti* 'Indeed, actually, indeed I say.' The course of action he advocates stands in stark contrast to how the social crisis has been dealt with thus far, and moreover, it is based on a very different assessment of where the responsibility for resolving the situation lies. Rather than placing responsibility in the hands of the residents of Montetoni, and specifically himself, Bikotoro effectively asserts that the situation is Berenarto's to resolve.

After Anteres responds with a continuer in line 8, Bikotoro reiterates his deontic stance, and adds in line 15 that he would acquiesce to Soira's departure. Moreover, the manner in which he articulates the latter point, *TyaNpa nonkaNte?* 'What would I say?', is generally strategically employed by Nantis to express non-involvement in situations which are framed as being none of the speaker's business. Bikotoro is thus seeking to make clear that the issue of Soira's place of residence is simply not his responsibility.

Having done this, Bikotoro then deploys CQF again in line 11, triggering an interleaved set of utterances in which both he and Anteres deploy CQF to unambiguously attribute the stance that Bikotoro has expressed to Bikotoro and Bikotoro alone. The coda to this topic is thus a collaborative effort on the part of both participants to individuate Bikotoro's stance in this segment of the interaction.

The two interactions we have examined in this section show that Bikotoro uses CQF to articulate contested stances, and that both he and Anteres employ CQF to unambiguously link these stances to Bikotoro alone. In doing so, Bikotoro and Anteres overtly co-construct the individuation of these stances and discard the possibility that the stances that Bikotoro expresses are widely held, or that they are considered generally valid by the broader discursive community of which they are a part.

### **4.2.3 CQF and stance collectivization**

In the previous section, I argued that CQF is a resource for attributing a given utterance to a particular speaker, and in doing so, for individuating the stance expressed by that utterance. In this section, I seek to reinforce this argument by showing that, in contrast, CQF is absent or rare in interactions in which speakers seek to *collectivize* or universalize evaluative stances, rather than individuate them. While this phenomenon is widespread in Nanti discourse, it is perhaps most strikingly present in the oratory of *pereseteNtes*, a genre in which these community leaders often seek to present particular evaluative stances as broadly valid, and not simply as their own *individual* evaluative positions. We consider one such interaction now, which illustrates how stances that are presented as universally valid or collectively held are not expressed with CQF.

#### **4.2.3.1 Background information for interaction 4 between Migero and Ariponso**

The segment we examine is part of an interaction between Migero and Ariponso, a Nanti visitor to Montetoni, which took place during a manioc beer party on March 3rd, 2004. The interaction took place in the cooking hut of Peranke and Beti, to which the village's adults had been invited to drink. Ariponso had arrived in

Montetoni a few days earlier with his wife Sara, from his home at Pirihasanteni (half-a-day's walk upriver from Montetoni), and had previously expressed that one of his major goals in visiting the community was to obtain some items of manufactured clothing. Migero initiated the following interaction by closely questioning Ariponso about his motives for visiting; and, having determined Ariponso's desire to acquire clothing, Migero carefully laid out the conditions under which Ariponso could acquire clothing, as well as the standards of behavior to which Ariponso was expected to hold in doing so.

Migero's goals in this interaction were no doubt shaped in part by Ariponso's dubious reputation among the Montetoni Nantis. Ariponso was an associate of the men responsible for the violence on the Timpía in the 1960s, and was a participant in one incident that some of the then-residents of Marihentari (and now residents of Montetoni) have described as the vanguard of an abortive attack on Marihentari (see Chapter 1). Probably even worse, from Migero's perspective, Ariponso was briefly a resident of Montetoni in 1994–1995, but had returned without warning to Marihentari, absconding with an axe and a machete. Ariponso's removal of valued metal goods from the community was considered theft by many Nantis in Montetoni, since he had been given them on the basis of his commitment to membership in the new community, a commitment on which he subsequently reneged.

To Migero, then, Ariponso was at this point an individual of dubious trustworthiness,<sup>11</sup> and Migero evidently felt it was necessary to determine what Ariponso's motives and plans were, and to lay down the conditions under which Ariponso would be permitted to visit the community and benefit materially from doing so.

As we shall see, in setting down these general community-wide norms, Migero articulated numerous evaluative stances. However, Migero's goal in this interaction

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<sup>11</sup>At the urging of Ariponso's wife Sara, their family settled in Montetoni later in the same year, living with Sara's sister Chabera, her spouse Erehon, and their family. Ariponso was in fact an exemplary community member, until his death in 2006, at approximately 60 years of age.

was not to express his *personal* evaluation or opinion, but rather, speaking as *pereseteNte*, to express the stance of Montetoni, as a *collectivity*, to their visitor. The segment of the interaction that we now consider focuses on Migeró's discussion of proper behavior with respect to acquiring manufactured goods from me.<sup>12</sup>

Migeró's choice of time and place to have this first interaction with Ariponso is also significant in understanding how to interpret Migeró's stance-taking. Ariponso had already been in the village for several days, and although Migeró had eagerly listened to news about Ariponso that people brought to him, he had carefully avoided going near Chabera and Erehon's home, where the visitors were staying. Instead, he chose to have his first conversation with Ariponso during the early hours of a feast day, when and where most of the village's socially prominent men were gathered together as ratified overhearers. This kind of maneuvering of foreseeable dyadic interactions into feasts is a strategy frequently employed by Migeró to express the articulation of stances that he wishes to be received as community-wide policy. In an important sense, then, Migeró's conversation with Ariponso served both as a way of expressing to Ariponso the conditions on his interaction with the community of Montetoni, and as a way to express a stance meant to be taken by the community as a whole as its stance towards Ariponso.

#### 4.2.3.2 Interaction 4: Migeró and Ariponso

In the segment we examine, Migeró seeks to make clear several principles underlying Ariponso's acquisition of manufactured clothing. First, Migeró expresses that I, Reho, am allowed to give clothes to Ariponso, and that Ariponso can ask for clothes

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<sup>12</sup>As compensation to the community, I provide manufactured goods requested by the community. Upon arriving in the community I turn over the majority of the goods to Migeró, which he immediately distributes in a single public session, which serves to make transparent the equal distribution of goods to all adults in the community. I typically retain a small store of goods for visitors from other settlements, like Ariponso. In distributing these additional goods I am still bound by community standards regarding the appropriate age, gender, and place of residence of recipients, a point to which Migeró alludes in his comments to Ariponso.

from me. Note that the clothes to which Migero refers are ones that I am holding for use by the community; and consequently, their distribution is under the control of the community, and of Migero in particular. Second, Migero wishes to make clear that there is a distinction between goods that I bring for the community, which are intended for distribution, and my personal possessions, which are not, and that Aripsons should neither ask for nor steal the latter.

1. M: Maika pinebituta<sup>^</sup>ke, tya ika<sup>n</sup>ti?

*maika pi= nebi -ut -ak -i tya i= ka<sup>n</sup>t -i*  
 now 2S= ask.for -RET -PERF -REAL.A how 3mS= say -REAL.A  
 ‘You went to ask now (for clothes), how did he respond?’

2. Yagabehi ipaki<sup>n</sup>pi.

*i= agabeh -i i= p -ak -i =Npi*  
 3mS= be.appropriate -REAL.I 3mS= give -PERF -REAL.I =2O  
 ‘It was appropriate for him to give (them) to you.’

3. Te i<sup>n</sup>ka<sup>n</sup>te hara nopiri, mameri.

*te i= N- ka<sup>n</sup>t -e hara no= p*  
 NEG.REAL 3mS= IRREAL- say -IRREAL.I NEG.IRREAL 1S= give  
*-i -ri, mameri.*  
 -REAL.I =3MO NEG.EXIST

‘He did not say, “I will not give you (anything), there aren’t any.”’<sup>13</sup>

4. Yagabehake ipake, nero.

*i= agabeh -ak -i i= p -ak -i*  
 3ms= be.appropriate -PERF -IRREAL.I 3ms= give -PERF -IRREAL.I  
*nero*  
 here.you.go  
 ‘It is appropriate that he gives, “Here you go.”’

<sup>13</sup>Responding *mameri* ‘there isn’t any’ is a relatively polite, if not always literally true, means to refuse a request.

5. Nero, nero, tata- tata pikogaNta^ka, pashikaroNtsi, sapiroNtsi.

*nero nero tata tata pi= kog -aNt -ak -a,*  
 here.you.go here.you.go what what 2S= want -INST -PERF -REAL.A  
*pashikaroNtsi, sapiroNtsi.*  
 blanket clothes  
 ‘‘Here you go, here you go, what- what you wanted, a blanket, clothes.’’

6. Mameri sapiroNtsi, tsonkat^aka.

*mameri sapiroNtsi tsonka -ak -a.*  
 NEG.EXIST clothes finish -PERF -REAL.A  
 ‘There are no shorts, they’ve run out.’<sup>14</sup>

7. Chapi tsonkatanaka sapiroNtsi.

*chapi tsonka -an -ak -a sapiroNtsi*  
 yesterday finish -ABL -PERF -REAL.A clothes  
 ‘The shorts ran out recently.’

8. Ogari (*unintelligible*) kanyorira oka gagu^ aityo.

*o- oga =ri kanyorira o-oka ogagu aityo.*  
 3nm- that =CNTRST be.like-NOM 3nm-this put.on EXIST  
 ‘Those on the other hand (*unintelligible*), like those you put on<sup>15</sup> (i.e. shirts), there are (some).’

9. Ogari (*unintelligible*), aityo, onti irashi iriro.

*o- oga =ri aityo o- Nti irashi*  
 3nm- that =CNTR EXIST.ANIM 3nmS- COP 3m.POSS.PRO  
*iriro*  
 3m.DEM.PRO  
 ‘Those on the hand (*unintelligible*), there are some, but those are *his*.’

<sup>14</sup>The term *sapiroNtsi* may refer to clothes in general, or specifically to shorts, the prototypical member of this category.

<sup>15</sup>The root *ogagu* refers specifically to the action of putting on a garment with a neck hole, like the traditional *magatsi*.

10. Tera iro na-, tera oka maika iro nagagetanahe, nonkante pena oga biro, pashi biro.

tera iro na- tera o- oka maika  
 NEG.REAL 3nm.PRO.FOC 1S NEG.REAL 3nm this now  
 iro no= ag -ge -an -ah -e no= N-  
 3nm.PRO.FOC 1S= take -DSTR -ABL -REG -IRREAL.I 1S= IRREAL-  
 kaNt -e p -e =na o- oga biro pashi  
 say -IRREAL.I give -IRREAL.I =1O 3nm that 2sg.PRO yours  
 biro.  
 2sg.PRO

‘I don’t-, I don’t take them away, I don’t say, “Give me that of yours, your own.”’

...

11. Hara iro pikaNti, pena oka posapitera.

hara iro pi= kaNt -i p -e =na  
 NEG.IRREAL 3nm.PRO.FOC 2S= say -REAL.I give -IRREAL.I =2O  
 o- oka pi= o- sapi -e =ra  
 3nm- this 2S= CAUS slip.into -IRREAL.I =DEP

‘Don’t say that, “Give me what you wear.”’

12. ONti irashi iroso.

o- Nti ir- ashi iroso  
 3nmS- COP 3m- POSS 3nm.PRO.DEM  
 ‘Those are his.’

13. A: Hara iro nokaNti pena oga posapi^tera.

hara iro no= kaNt -i p -e =na  
 NEG.IRREAL 3nm.FOC.PRO 1S= say -REAL.I give -IRREAL.I =1O  
 oga pi= osapi -e =ra  
 2S= IRREAL- wear -IRREAL.I =TEMP

‘I will not say, “Give me what you wear.”’



14. M: Onti maika ogari oga yamutakohiga^kena,

*o= Nti maika ogari oga i= amu -ako -hig*  
 3nmS= COP now those.particular.ones 3mS- help -APPL:INDR -PL  
*-ak -i =na*  
 -PERF -REAL.I =1O

‘But those, on the other hand with which he helps (us),’

15. onti nashihegi aka komoniraro, nashihegi aka.

*o- Nti no= ashi -hegi aka komoniraro no= ashi -hegi aka*  
 3nmS- COP 1= POSS -PL here community 1= POSS -PL here  
 ‘those are ours, our community’s, ours here.’

16. Tera onti nagakiti, nonkante gapitsatiri isapiro, nero.

*tera o- Nti no= ag -aki -i no= N-*  
 NEG.REAL 3mS COP 1S take -TRANSLOC -REAL.I 1S= IRREAL-  
*kanT -e ag -apitsa -i =ri i- sapiro*  
 say -IRREAL.I take -APPL:SEP -REAL.I =3MO 3mP- clothes  
*nero*

here.you.go

‘I do not take (his clothes) and say, “Take his clothes away from him, here you go.”’

...

17. Tetyarira, tetyarira ontime isapiro, iragabehe mahani inpakeri...

*tetya -rira tetya -rira o= N- tim -e i- sapiro*  
 not.yet -REL not.yet -REL 3nmS -IRREAL exist irreal.i 3mP clothes  
*ir- agabeh -e mahani i= N- p -ak*  
 3mS.irreal be.appropriate -REAL.I a.little 3mS= -IRREAL give -PERF  
*-e =ri*  
 -IRREAL.I =3mO

‘Those who do not yet, those who do not yet have clothes, it would be appropriate for him to give them a little...’

In this segment, Migero expresses evaluations of proper and improper behavior at several points, and presents potentially contentious framings of facts. In sharp contrast with Interactions 2 and 3, however, there is not a single instance of CQF in this segment — or, indeed, in the entire 27 minute long interaction between Migero and Ariponso. If, as I proposed in the previous section, CQF serves to individuate stances, then the absence of CQF in this interaction is to be expected. Migero, after all, seeks to communicate to Ariponso the general community-wide principles and evaluations relevant to Ariponso’s participation in the community economy, and Migero has no reason to frame these evaluations as being particularly his own. On the contrary, individuating these evaluative stances would only serve to weaken Migero’s efforts to impress on Ariponso that these evaluations and directives regarding Ariponso’s acquisition of manufactured goods are of general validity, and are held by the community as a whole. And indeed, I have, on numerous occasions, heard other socially prominent Nantis articulate stances similar to those expressed by Migero here.

In terms of the use of CQF, Migero’s expressions of evaluative stances in this interaction pattern with the expression of uncontested evaluative stances in Nanti discourse. For example, in lines 2, 4, and 17, Migero expresses the evaluation that it is appropriate for me to provide clothes to Ariponso, or individuals like him (line 17: *tetyarira oNtime isapiro* ‘those who do not yet have clothes’). This stance is presented without CQF, although it is clearly an evaluative stance. By articulating it without CQF, however, Migero presents it as an *uncontested*, and thus a widely-held or collective, stance. The fact that Migero is speaking for the community, and not simply for himself as an individual, is particularly clear in line 15, where he remarks, regarding the manufactured goods I brought to the community, *oNti nashihegi komoniraro, nashihegi aka* ‘they are our community’s, ours here.’ Here Migero articulates the collective ownership of the goods in question, and names the

novel collectivity, the *komoniraro*,<sup>16</sup> of which he is the head and spokesperson.

We also see that Migero does not employ CQF when he seeks to impress on Ariponso the distinction between clothes in my personal possession and clothes which I have brought for distribution in the community, in lines 9 and 12. This is especially striking because the notion on which this distinction rests — between personal property and property held by one individual for others — is a novel one in Nanti society, and is a potentially contestable one. However, instead of employing CQF, which would emphasize his personal commitment to this position, Migero presents this stance as an uncontested one.

#### 4.2.4 CQF, participant roles, and utterance responsibility

In the previous sections, I showed that Nanti speakers employ CQF to individuate evaluative stances. In this section, I argue that because this means of individuating stances relies on quotative resources, stance individuation also entails that the individual to whom the stance is attributed is morally accountable for that stance. My argument is that the close relationship between stance individuation and utterance responsibility derives from the fact that both stance individuation and the assignment of utterance responsibility depend on the capacity of quotative resources to identify the *sources* of utterances.

I begin by noting that the capacity of CQF to individuate stances lies in its capacity to single out a particular social subject, out of a world of possible subjects, as the source of an utterance. By attributing the utterance to a particular individual, quotative resources distinguish the stance expressed by the utterance from a generally held truth, or from a stance held by multiple individuals. Significantly,

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<sup>16</sup>The term *komoniraro* ‘community’ is a loan from Matsigenka, and ultimately originates from the Spanish *comunidad*. Nantis have adopted this term to refer to the novel settlement pattern, exemplified by Montetoni, which involves multiple family groups living in a single location. Nantis in Montetoni have also explicitly ideologized membership in the *komoniraro* by implicating individuals in collective labor obligations and in rights to share in collective subsistence activities.

quotative resources are also central to identifying the *participant roles* associated with a given utterance. Crucially, participant roles are differentiated precisely in terms of type of utterance responsibility that inhere in them. We consider this point now.

It has long been recognized that the notion of ‘speaker’ is insufficiently precise to distinguish the kinds of socially accountable persons associated with any given utterance (Goffman, 1986; Levinson, 1988). Goffman was the first to decompose the speaker into a larger set of accountable persons, which he called ‘participant roles’. Two such roles are especially important in understanding the role of quotatives in constructing utterance responsibility: *principal* and *animator*. The principal is the socially-acknowledged *source* of the utterance, who is held responsible for its attributes; while the animator is the individual who articulates an utterance, and is responsible, at most, for the faithful reproduction of another’s utterances.<sup>17</sup> Quotative resources are a discursively routinized, and in the case of Nanti quotative evidentials, a grammaticalized means for distinguishing principals from animators.

Both stance individuation and the attribution of utterance responsibility, then, turn on the question of utterance source. The use of quotative resources to *individuate* an utterance, by identifying a unique source for that utterance, thereby simultaneously identifies a principal for that utterance. CQF in particular renders explicit a speaker’s responsibility for an utterance by explicitly identifying them as the source of the utterance.

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<sup>17</sup>The preceding account glosses over, of course, some of the complexities that may arise in interaction. For example, empirical work shows that the boundary between animator and principal can be porous with respect to issues of utterance responsibility (Hill and Irvine, 1993a; Shuman, 1993). Similarly, the assignment of the participant roles of animator and principal is ultimately interactionally negotiated, and is not always a simple matter of reading off roles from quotative constructions. Levinson (1988) and Irvine (1996) have found that Goffman’s typology of participant roles is incomplete, and others have since expanded the typology to account for additional participants such as speech writers, who originate an utterance but neither animate it nor are socially responsible for its attributes. Despite these caveats, however, the animator/principal distinction remains central in the efforts of students of language to understand how social actors come to be held responsible for their utterances.

#### 4.2.4.1 CQF and types of utterance responsibility

Having argued that CQF renders explicit a speaker's responsibility for an utterance, I now discuss the *types* of utterance responsibility that Nantis employ CQF to indicate. My reason for doing so is to show that utterance responsibility has a wider scope than the scholarship on evidentiality and reported speech would have us believe. In particular, Nantis' uses of CQF show us that utterance responsibility in Nanti society extends far beyond epistemic modality to encompass responsibility for the moral aspects of utterances.

Utterance responsibility, as I have explained above, consists of praiseworthiness or blameworthiness for some attribute of an utterance. The bulk of attention in the literature on discourse and responsibility has focused on speakers' responsibility for the truthfulness of utterances — that is, epistemic stance-taking — and the role of evidential resources, and quotative resources in particular, to mitigate that responsibility. It is in this context that writers identify a strong link between evidential resources and epistemic modality.

The interactional effects of CQF in Nanti discourse certainly include the modulation of responsibility for epistemic stances, as can be seen in the interaction between Aherika and Mecha, as well in the one between Bikotoro and Anteres. In the former case, for example, Mecha employs CQF in asserting her commitment to the fact that her daughter was horsing around when she suffered her burn (§4.2.1 Interaction 1, line 3). Similarly, we see that Bikotoro employs CQF when he expresses his commitment to the fact that his daughter Soira left Marankehari for her mother's home in Montetoni due to her unpleasant experiences at the Marankehari manioc beer feast (§4.2.2.2 Interaction 2, lines 1-5). However, the interaction between Bikotoro and Anteres also shows us that CQF is employed to indicate commitment to moral evaluative judgements. Consider, for example, lines 11 and 12 in Interaction 2, repeated here for convenience, in which Bikotoro defends Soira's decision to return

to Montetoni after the events of the manioc beer feast in Marankehari.

11. B: Agabehi okanti nohatahera hanta, inaku.

o= agabeh -i o= kaNt -i no= ha -ah -e  
 3NMS be.able -REAL.I 3NMS say -REAL.I 1S- go REG -IRREAL.I  
 =ra hanta ina -ku  
 =DEP there mother.VOC -LOC  
 ‘It was appropriate for her to say, “I’m going back there (to Montetoni) to my mother’s.”’

12. Ari piNka ari nokaNti.

ari piNka ari no= kaNt -i  
 truly actually truly 1S= say -REAL.I  
 ‘Yeah, that’s what I say.’

The utterance within the scope of the CQF expresses an evaluative judgement, namely, that Soira’s decision was reasonable under the stated circumstances. Recall that in the context of the interaction in question, one of the major points of contention was whether Soira’s decision to relocate to Montetoni was reasonable and justified, which would support Soira’s expressed wish to remain in Montetoni; or whether it was unjustified, which would support the argument made by the visitors from Marankehari that she should return with them. By his use of CQF at this point in the conversation, Bikotoro is expressing his commitment to the former position, in the face of strong opposition. His commitment, however, is not to an *epistemic* stance regarding the fact of Soira’s relocation — about which everyone is in agreement — but rather to the contested *evaluative* stance regarding that relocation.

Another instance of the use of CQF to take a non-epistemic stance is found in Interaction 3 (§4.2.2.3), when Bikotoro advocates a course of action to resolve the stalemate regarding Soira’s place of residence. In lines 5-7, repeated here for

convenience, he expresses that Berenarto should come to Montetoni and take Soira in hand.

5. B: [InkaNteme paita oNkuta, (*unintelligible*) noN-, noN-, nopiNtsa<sup>ˆ</sup>ti noka tota nagahe.

*i*= N-            *kaNt* -*e*            =*me*            *paita* *oNkuta*    *no*= N-  
 3mS= IRREAL- say -IRREAL.I =DEONT later morning 1S= IRREAL-  
*no*= N-            *no*= *piNtsa* -*i*            *no-* *ka*    *tota*    *no*= *ag*  
 1S= IRREAL- 1S= decide -REAL.I 1- QUOT hold.on 1S= take  
 -*ah*    -*e*  
 -REG -IRREAL.I

He should say tomorrow morning, (*unintelligible*), “I will-, I will-, I have decided to take (her) back.”

6. InkaNteme.

*i*= N-            *kaNt* -*e*            =*me*  
 3NMS- IRREAL- say -IRREAL.I =CNTF  
 ‘He should say (that).’

7. Aryo piNka aryo noKaNTi.

*aryo*    *piNka*    *aryo*    *no*= *kaNt* -*i*  
 indeed actually indeed 1S= say -REAL.I  
 ‘Indeed, indeed I say.’

Bikotoro’s use of CQF in line 7 clearly does not indicate a commitment to the factual status of some state of affairs, since the utterances in the scope of the CQF are both conceptually and morphologically irrealis. Rather, Bikotoro is expressing his commitment to his evaluation that the course of action he has suggested is a desirable one, and is likely to meet with success.

In both of these examples, CQF is instrumental in expressing commitment to non-epistemic stances, and although occasional examples of the use of CQF to

express commitment to epistemic stances are to be found in my corpus of Nanti interaction, as in the case of Mecha's utterance in line 3 of Interaction 1, the former use of CQF is considerably more common. This fact suggests that CQF is best analyzed as a general means for expressing commitments to evaluative stances, and not only to epistemic ones.

### **4.3 Third person speech reports and utterance responsibility**

In the previous section, I described Nantis' use of concurrent quotative framing (CQF) to individuate stances, and argued that CQF serves to indicate a local speech act participant's commitment to the stances expressed by his or her utterances. In this way, CQF serves to render explicit this participant's responsibility for the utterances in question. In this section, I turn to the use of quotative resources to report the speech of third persons and show that third person quotation (TPQ) can behave in a very similar manner, individuating stances and emphasizing responsibility for those stances. I conclude by observing that these very functions of TPQ can be employed by speakers to disavow their commitment to or responsibility for those stances, producing the familiar responsibility-mitigating effect of quotation. I argue, however, that this effect is ultimately a second order effect that depends on the primary responsibility-emphasizing effect of quotation evident in CQF.

#### **4.3.1 TPQ, third party stance individuation, and responsibility emphasis in Nanti discourse**

My empirical focus in this section is on a segment drawn from a brief conversation between myself and Migero regarding a garden maintained by Barentin, a socially prominent Nanti man and resident of Montetoni. As I explain below, the location



of this garden is a source of significant concern for Migeró, and he had attempted to convince Barentin not to clear and plant it. Despite strong pressure from Migeró, however, Barentin cleared the garden. In the segment we examine here, Migeró makes clear to me that he and Barentin took opposing stances regarding the creation of the garden, and that Barentin cleared the garden against Migeró's express wishes. As with the instances of CQF we considered in the previous sections, then, the use of quotative resources in this example is associated with stance-taking with respect to a contested issue.

The dispute to which Migeró refers in this conversation has its roots in a visit made to Montetoni in early 2003 by official representatives of the Manu National Park, whose border lies some three kilometers to the east of Montetoni. During this visit — the first ever made by park officials to Montetoni — the officials told the Nantis that they were not permitted to farm within the borders of the national park, and could only hunt or fish there under restricted conditions. The residents of Montetoni subsequently ignored this injunction, as roughly half of their hunting and fishing territory lies within the boundaries of the park, and moreover, the prohibition made little sense to them.<sup>18</sup> As the community's leader and principal intermediary with outsiders, however, Migeró was deeply troubled by the potential conflict between the national park authorities and the residents of Montetoni. At first, he attempted to convince community members to cease hunting, fishing, and farming in the park, but he soon gave up his unsuccessful efforts in regards to hunting and fishing. It was simply impractical for the residents of Montetoni to give up such a large part of their hunting and fishing territory, and in the face of minimal monitoring, continued hunting and fishing within the park boundaries posed few

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<sup>18</sup>Nantis had been using the territory in question since the mid-1980s without any concern being expressed by the national park authorities. The sudden concern of the park officials was quite inexplicable to the residents of Montetoni, all the more so because it was quite clear that nobody else was using the indicated territory. Nantis recognize exclusive claims on territory based on the *use* of territory for hunting, fishing, gathering, or farming, but ownership of land *per se* remains an alien notion for most Nantis.

risks.

However, while hunting and fishing activities are fairly easy to conceal, farms are easy to detect in the course of superficial and infrequent inspections. Concerned that the park officials would carry out such inspections, Migero made a much more serious effort to convince those who had gardens in the national park to abandon them, and to prevent new ones from being cleared. Of all the Nanti gardens, Barentin’s was located the furthest into the park, and moreover, Barentin made intensive use of this garden to support hunting and fishing even further into the park. For Migero, then, Barentin’s garden became the rhetorical focus of his efforts to convince the residents of Montetoni to cease farming in this region. Despite all his efforts, Migero remained unsuccessful in curtailing farming within the national park, a result that left him clearly frustrated. He also expressed his concern to me that the situation would result in conflict between the community and the national park authorities, which he, as the community spokesperson, would need to handle.

The segment we now consider followed a brief exchange between Migero and myself regarding Barentin’s recent departure from Montetoni to the garden in question for an extended fishing trip. In line 1, I mention the visit of the park officials and their injunction against Nantis farming in the national park, which leads Migero to discuss at length his efforts to prevent Barentin from farming in the park, and to present his and Barentin’s contrasting stances on this sensitive issue.

#### 4.3.1.1 Interaction 5: Migero and Barentin’s garden

1. L: Nokenkihiro oga karaNki, yogari pariki ipokuti, ikaNtake oga hara pit-samaiti.

<i>no=</i>	<i>keNkih</i>	<i>-i</i>	<i>=ro</i>	<i>o-</i>	<i>oga</i>	<i>karaNki</i>	<i>i-</i>	<i>oga</i>
1S=	remember	-REAL.I	=3nmO	3nm-	that	some.time.ago	3m-	that
<i>=ri</i>	<i>pariki</i>	<i>i=</i>	<i>pok</i>	<i>-ut</i>	<i>-i</i>	<i>i=</i>	<i>kaNt</i>	<i>-ak</i>
=cntrst	park.official	3mS=	come	-RET	-REAL.I	3mS=	say	-PERF

*-i o- oga hara pi= tsamait -i*  
 -REAL.I 3mS- that NEG.IRREAL 2S= farm -REAL.I

‘I remember that some time ago, those park officials came briefly and said, “You will not farm that (land).”’

2. M: Hee, naro nokemake, te inkeme.

*hee naro no= ksem -ak -i te i= N-*  
 yes 1.TOP.PRO 1S= hear -PERF -REAL.I NEG.REAL 3mS= IRREAL-  
*kem -e*  
 hear -IRREAL.I

‘Yes, I paid attention (to the park officials), (but) he (Barentin) did not pay attention.’

3. Irironpa, irironpatyo<sup>19</sup> yonta Barentin.

*iriro =Npa iriro =Npa =tyo i- onta*  
 3m.DEM.PRO =INCNGNT 3m.DEM.PRO =INCNGNT =AFFECT 3m- this  
*Barentin*  
*personal.name*

‘Be it on his head, be it on his head, that Barentin.’

4. Iryonpa tsamaitakero.

*iryo =Npa tsamait -ak -i =ro*  
 3m.FOC.PRO =INCNGNT farm -PERF -REAL.I =3mO

‘He (and not anyone else) farmed it.’

5. Tera naro kanterime, tsamaite kamatitya.

*tera naro kaNt -e =ri =me tsamait*  
 NEG.REAL 1.FOC.PRO say -IRREAL.I =3MO =CNTEXP farm  
*-e kamatitya*  
 -IRREAL.I downriver

‘Contrary to what one might expect, I did not say to him, “Farm downriver!”’

<sup>19</sup>Nantis employ pronominal forms like *irironpatyo*, which bear the suffixes clitics *=Npa* and *=tyo*, to explicitly disassociate themselves from the words or actions of the referent, and to convey that person’s responsibility for the consequences of those doings, for good or for ill.

6. Chichata yogotake itsamaiti, ikaNti notsagabageta kamatitya.

*chichata* *i=* *ogo* *-ak* *-i* *i=* *tsamait* *-i* *i=*  
 freely 3m= think.of -PERF -REAL.I 3mS= farm -REAL.I 3mS=  
*kaNt* *-i* *no=* *tsaga* *-bage* *-a* *kamatitya*  
 say -REAL.I 1S= fish -DUR -REAL.A downriver  
 ‘On his own he thought of farming, he said, “I will fish downriver.”’

7. Irota haNta itsamaitashitaka, iNtsagate kobiri, mamori, saNkena, iNtagati.<sup>20</sup>

*iro* *=ta* *haNta* *i=* *tsamait* *-ashi* *-ak* *-a*  
 3nm.FOC.PRO =CNGNT there 3mS= farm -PURP -PERF -REAL.A  
*i=* N- *tsaga* *-e* *kobiri* *mamori* *saNkena* *iNtagati*.  
 3mS= IRREAL- fish -IRREAL.I fish.sp. fish.sp. fish.sp. that.is.all  
 ‘That’s why he farmed there, in order to fish for *kobiri*, *mamori*, and  
*saNkena*, that’s all.’

...

8. Heehee, ari ikaNti, ikaNti hara nokemi pariki, oga aka noNtsamaite, hara nokemi pariki.

*hehe* *ari* *i=* *kaNt* *-i* *i=* *kaNt* *-i* *hara*  
 yes indeed 3mS= say -REAL.I 3mS= say -REAL.I NEG.IRREAL  
*no=* *kem* *-i* *pariki* *o-* *oga* *aka* *no=* N-  
 1S= hear -REAL.I park.official that 3nm- here 1S= IRREAL-  
*tsamait* *-e* *hara* *no=* *kem* *-i* *pariki*  
 farm -IRREAL.I NEG.IRREAL 1S= hear -REAL.I park.official  
 ‘Yes, indeed he said, he said, “I will not listen to the park officials, I will  
 farm this (land) here, I will not listen to the park officials.”’

9. Hehe irota, aka naNtabagete aka, kameti onta.

<sup>20</sup>Note that *iNtagati* has scope over the verb *intsagate* only; in other words, Barentin has cleared the garden in order to be able to *fish* there, not in order to be able to *live* there.

*hehe iro =ta aka no= aNtabaget*  
 yes 3nm.FOC.PRO =CNGNT here 1S= carry.out.agricultural.labor  
*-e aka kameti o- onta*  
 -IRREAL.I here good 3nm- this  
 ‘Yes, that’s right, “I will farm here, (because) it (the land) is good.”’

10. Tera onti kogapage nontsamaite, onti nontsagatera.

*tera o- Nti kogapage no= N- tsamait -e*  
 NEG.REAL 3nm- COP without 1S= IRREAL- farm -IRREAL.I  
*o- Nti no= N- tsaga -e =ra*  
 3nmS- COP 1S= IRREAL- fish -IRREAL.I =TEMP  
 “I’m not farming for no good reason, but rather because I will fish (here).”

In this segment of interaction, Migero contrasts his own and Barentin’s stances regarding the validity of the park officials’ injunctions against farming in the park, and the justifiability of Barentin’s garden in particular. In line 2, Migero sets up in simple terms the basic contrast he subsequently explicates in greater detail: *Hee, naro nokemake, te inkeme*. ‘Yes, I paid attention (to the park officials), (but) he did not.’ Migero then strives to make clear that he himself does not support Barentin’s decision, and certainly did not encourage him to clear his garden within the park boundaries. An important part of Migero’s rhetorical strategy in this regard is to portray Barentin’s stance towards the park officials’ injunction and the desirability of farming within the boundaries of the park. To portray these stances, Migero makes extensive use of TPQ.

Migero represents Barentin’s basic stance in line 8, where he quotes Barentin as saying, *Hara nokemi pariki*. ‘I will not listen to the park officials.’, putting in Barentin’s mouth the stance he attributed to him in line 2. Significantly, Nantis’ use of the root *kem* ‘hear’ to express the acceptance or the rejection of an injunction carries with it an evaluation of the injunction in question as valid or invalid. Thus, when Migero quotes Barentin, Migero communicates not only that Barentin

intends to to disregard the injunction, but that Barentin evaluates the injunction as unjustified, unreasonable, and invalid.

Barentin's evaluation of his own planned course of action as justified and reasonable is the theme of the following two lines of TPQ. In line 9, Migero quotes Barentin as justifying his action because of the quality of the land: *kameti onta*, 'it's good', and dismissing the park officials' objections on the grounds of the benefit that Barentin will derive from the garden. Note that this stance in effect rejects the authority of the park officials to constrain his own subsistence activities, and by extension, those of any Nantis. In the following line, Migero quotes Barentin as he explicitly raises the issue of justification, remarking, *Tera onti kogapage noNtsamaite*, 'I'm not farming there for no good reason,' and justifying his plan to clear the garden by his intention to use it to support his fishing trips, a crucial subsistence activity.

Migero's uses of TPQ thus serve to represent Barentin's stance regarding the unjustifiability of the park officials' injunction against farming in the park, and the reasonableness and justifiability of Barentin's actions in contravention of that injunction. At the same time, Migero's use of TPQ serves to clearly individuate Barentin's stance and distinguish it from Migero's own stance regarding farming within the boundaries of the park. We consider this issue in the following section.

In concluding my discussion of the use of TPQ to attribute stances and utterance responsibility to third parties, I wish to point out that although it is clear that Migero's use of TPQ is associated with his representations of the stances to which Barentin is committed, a major confounding factor looms in this analysis that was not present in the preceding analysis of CQF and utterance responsibility. Specifically, the direct attribution of subjective states to others is generally avoided in Nanti interaction. Instead, Nantis typically make use of reported speech to discuss the opinions, desires, and decisions of others. Consequently, in interactions like the one we just examined, it is difficult to tease apart whether TPQ is being

employed to indicate the strong commitment of third parties to the epistemic and moral stances expressed in reported speech, or whether TPQ is simply being employed as the default means for discussing others' subjective states. It is likely that in many instances of TPQ, speakers *both* mean to attribute a subjective state to a third party *and* explicitly indicate that party's commitment to the stance expressed by an utterance, but it is very difficult to determine precisely what is being communicated by the use of TPQ. It is for this reason that CQF is methodologically so important in understanding the relationship between quotative resources and utterance responsibility, since CQF is used in cases in which speakers need not employ quotative resources to talk about subjective states — namely, when referring to their own subjective states. In regard to TPQ, then, we restrict ourselves to observing that its distribution overlaps with that of CQF in terms of the types of interactions in which it is found — namely, those in which contested stances are expressed or contrasted; and that the use of TPQ is consistent with the relationship between the use of quotative resources and representations of utterance responsibility encountered in CQF.

#### **4.3.2 TPQ and first party utterance responsibility mitigation**

In the preceding sections, I have demonstrated that Nantis employ quotative resources to individuate utterances and to indicate commitment to their evaluative stances. These uses of quotative resources run contrary to the common wisdom regarding the interactional function of quotative resources — namely, to *mitigate* utterance responsibility. In this section, then, I reconcile these two seemingly opposed points of view by clarifying the pragmatic mechanism by which third party quotation comes to mitigate first party responsibility. I argue that this particular responsibility-mitigating function is a consequence of *inferences* about first party commitment, based on understandings of the third party commitments indicated by

TPQ. As such, the responsibility-mitigating functions of quotative resources are a second order effect that ultimately relies on the more basic interactional function of these resources to indicate a speaker's commitment to particular epistemic, moral, and affective stances.

Migero's use of TPQ in the preceding conversation shows us that the attribution of utterances to third parties is capable of the same stance-individuating and utterance responsibility-emphasizing functions as CQF. At the same time, however, we see in this interaction that Migero is clearly employing TPQ to disavow his own support of Barentin's stances and to mitigate his responsibility for Barentin's actions. In this case, then, TPQ does display the responsibility-mitigating functions that we are led to expect by the literature on evidentiality, reported speech, and responsibility.

The argument I advance is that the responsibility-mitigating effect of TPQ with respect to first party stance-taking is the result of the *inference* of low first-party commitment on the basis of the *expression* of strong third party commitment. The basis of this inferential process is the evaluation of a given TPQ utterance with respect to the Maxim of Quantity<sup>21</sup> in light of a 'commitment hierarchy' (Dascal, 2003). Focusing briefly on the commitment hierarchy, we note that since TPQ does not indicate first party commitment to the quotatively framed stance, a TPQ utterance is necessarily lower on the commitment hierarchy than an utterance in which the speaker directly articulates that stance. At this point, the Maxim of Quantity becomes relevant: if a speaker employs TPQ to attribute a stance to a third party, the Maxim of Quantity leads us to infer that the speaker's commitment is less than that which would be indicated by the speaker's own direct articulation of that stance.<sup>22</sup> The result is that the speaker's commitment to the stance is

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<sup>21</sup>The Maxim of Quantity stipulates: i) Make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange; and ii) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

<sup>22</sup>This effect is easily illustrated in English with verbs of cognition, which are the primary means



mitigated.<sup>23</sup> Note, however, that this mitigation ultimately depends on the fact that TPQ indicates the commitment of the third party to the stance in question; and that the mitigation of the first party's responsibility arises as an *inference* but is in no way *directly* expressed by the use of TPQ.

### 4.3.3 Quotative resources and utterance responsibility in comparative perspective

The purpose of this section is to compare the role in Nanti society of quotative resources in individuating stances and modulating utterance responsibility with the role ascribed to similar quotative practices in other languages. I have already summarized the scholarly consensus on the relationship between quotative resources and utterance responsibility in the introduction to this chapter; in this section I wish to shed a comparative light on two phenomena closely related to CQF that I have not yet discussed — self-quotation and first person evidentiality. Finally, I compare the Nanti uses of quotative resources to the uses of 'locutives' in Weyewa society (Austronesia, Sumba, Indonesia), which display several several striking commonalities.

#### 4.3.3.1 Self-quotation

CQF is in many cases a form of self-quotation, a topic that has received some attention in the scholarship on reported speech.<sup>24</sup> Although most scholarship that

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of attributing in English. Consider the following hypothetical interchange: *A: Is manioc beer tasty? B: Well, Lev thinks so.* The inference in this circumstance is that B's commitment to the tastiness of manioc beer is not particularly strong.

<sup>23</sup>Note that in some language communities, such as Tewa (Kiowa-Tanoan, USA), Usan (Trans-New Guinea, Papua New Guinea), and Tauya (Trans-New Guinea, Papua New Guinea), the use of direct quotation of third parties is associated with skepticism or disbelief on the part of the speaker regarding the quoted proposition (Aikhenvald, 2004, pp.139-140). These represent more extreme cases of commitment mitigation than the Nanti one, but seem to operate on the same basic pragmatic principles.

<sup>24</sup>Golato (2002) has remarked that self-quotation is largely a neglected topic. Self-quotation received little attention during the 1980s boom of scholarship on reported speech, although it is mentioned as a possible form of quotation by Sternberg (1982) and is exemplified by Tannen (1989) in her criticism of naive accounts of reported speech as faithful utterance replication. Another early

addresses self-quotation mainly focuses on self-quotation of utterances that are construed as having been uttered in previous interactional contexts, there are a number of points of empirical and analytic overlap between my discussion of CQF and the scholarship on self-quotation that I wish to mention.

Maynard (1996)'s work on Japanese conversation was the first to examine self-quotation in detail. Maynard analyzed Japanese self-quotation principally in terms of Bakhtinian notions of 'polyphony' or 'multivoicedness', arguing that self-quotation is a means for combining multiple "semiotic contexts" via the different "voices" expressed by self-quotation, and that this mechanism allows a speaker to simultaneously occupy multiple "subject positions" in the unfolding interaction. A similar conclusion is reached by Koven (2001) in her work on the use of reported speech by Luso-French bilinguals, where she remarks that self-reporting (and reported speech more generally) creates "icons of credible utterances from culturally specific types of personas" (p.514). Both Maynard and Koven thus see self-reporting as a means for speakers to represent themselves as persons with certain moral and social attributes, sometimes laminating such personas for subtle interactional effect. It should be noted that for both authors, the phenomenon in question largely involves self-quotation of utterances that are construed by participants as originating in prior interactions.

I see Maynard's and Koven's analyses of the interactional consequences of self-quotation as congruent with my analysis of CQF. In particular, I agree that self-quotation (including CQF) enables speakers to index particular subject positions or social personas. However, I suggest that this effect is not achieved *directly* by self-quotation, but is instead *mediated* by stance-taking. As I have argued in the case of Nanti CQF, self-quotation is a means for expressing commitment to stances, and it is through this mediating mechanism that self-quotation serves to indicate subject

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work on reported speech, Macaulay (1987, p.22) remarks in passing that self-quotation serves a means for a speaker to represent him or herself as an "actor in a scene."

positions and social personas.

Maynard also makes a number of empirical claims regarding the interactional effects of self-quotation which merit some attention. The specific interactional effects that Maynard attributes to Japanese self-quotation include ‘distancing’ and ‘dramatization’,<sup>25</sup> the creation of ‘intimacy’, and speech act ‘emphasis’. Of these interactional effects, Maynard’s discussions of ‘intimacy’ (p.215) and ‘emphasis’ (pp.222-223) are exemplified with instances of CQF.<sup>26</sup> Inspection of these examples strongly suggests that CQF in Japanese serves to indicate commitment to a stance, much as it does in Nanti.

A quite different analysis of self-quotation in interaction is provided by Golato (2002), who examines the phenomenon in the context of troubles-tellings (focusing on German, but incorporating English and Greek data as well). Golato argues that in the interactions she examined, self-reporting serves as a strategy to demonstrate for the listener (rather than simply describe) the process by which decisions and evaluations were reached, thereby allowing or guiding the listener to reach the conclusion that the decision or evaluation was one that “‘had to be made’ by any fair and responsible person” (ibid. p.67). Golato argues that this form of demonstration (cf. Clark and Gerrig, 1990) is instrumental in cooperative theory-building (Ochs et al., 1992) and allows participants to co-construct an evaluation of the troubles and their resolution. In a significant sense, however, little in Golato’s discussion of self-quotation depends on the fact that the quotation in question is first person rather than third person, and as such, provides little insight into self-quotation as

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<sup>25</sup>Maynard also claims that self-quotation allows the speaker to dramatize and animate his or her own speech, which she argues “encourages a sense of closeness [between participants] while creating a distancing effect [between the speaker and the quoted utterance]” (p.216). This first part of this claim is much along the lines of Tannen’s (1989) account of the ‘involvement’-creating effects of reported speech in general.

<sup>26</sup>Maynard’s claim that self-quotation induces feelings of closeness and solidarity is based on the notion that self-quotation is a form of self-revelation that gives interlocutors access to otherwise private “inner conversation”. Maynard provides no evidence, however, for her claims regarding the capacity of self-quotation to create intimacy, and I remain skeptical of them.

such.

#### 4.3.3.2 First person evidentiality

The Nanti first person quotative *noka* is a form of ‘first person evidentiality’. This is a topic that has received attention in recent years because of the unusual pragmatic behavior of evidential constructions involving first persons (Aikhenvald, 2004; Curnow, 2002a,b). In this section I review this scholarship, and consider how the behavior of Nanti quotatives fits into the broader picture of first person evidentiality.

As Curnow (2002a,b) and Aikhenvald (2004, p.217-239 *passim*) have observed, evidentials that occur in clauses in which the first person plays a prominent role are frequently interpreted differently than those in clauses in which the participants are third person. First person evidential constructions with indirect evidentials frequently yield meanings of non-volitionality or unintentionality, while those with direct evidentials frequently yield meanings of deliberateness and control. Non-first person evidential constructions are normally neutral with respect to issues of volitionality and control. Nanti first person quotatives, however, do not yield interpretations of non-volitionality or unintentionality, despite the fact that quotatives are normally treated as a type of indirect evidential. Quite to the contrary, Nanti first person quotatives are employed to indicate commitment to an evaluative stance, which aligns more closely with notions of volitionality and intentionality than their opposites.

In this respect, the Nanti quotatives behave much more like visual evidentials than like indirect evidentials such as reportives or inferentials. Although first person visual evidentials may also yield interpretations of accidental or uncontrolled actions, as in Qiang (Aikhenvald, 2004, p.229), it is considerably more common for them to yield interpretations of deliberateness, control, and volitionality, as in Tucano and Yukaghir (Aikhenvald, 2004, p.238). Aikhenvald notes that this behavior is

consistent with the tendency for visual evidentials also to exhibit semantic extensions of an epistemic nature that convey meanings of certainty or commitment to the truth of a statement (ibid. p.192).

Reportives, which we might naively suppose to be the evidential type most closely related to quotatives, frequently yield senses of unintentionality, non-volitionality, or uncontrolledness and surprise when they have scope over propositions that feature first persons, as in Lithuanian (ibid. pp.225-6). In other cases, constructions of this type yield interpretations of denial or scepticism regarding the evidentially marked proposition, as in Nganasan (ibid. p.226). Whether or not first person reportive constructions yield such interpretations appears to vary from language to language. Curnow (2002a, pp.3-4) notes, for example, that the Wintu hearsay evidential and Tucano reportive receive normal interpretations with first person subjects. Significantly, neither Curnow nor Aikhenvald discuss first-person effects for quotatives.<sup>27</sup>

The fact that Nanti first person quotatives yield interpretations more typical of first person direct evidential constructions than of first person indirect evidential constructions stems from the fact that the prototypical circumstances under which quotatives are employed in Nanti society do not match the conditions which allow first person evidential constructions to yield meanings of non-volitionality and lack of control. Specifically, meanings of reduced volitionality and control arise in circumstances in which evidentials indicate greater sensory distantiation from the events in question than would be expected of a first person participant. However, the use of the first person quotative does not imply sensory distantiation in Nanti, but in fact the opposite. Typically, the use of a quotative in Nanti implies that: i) the speaker was present in the circumstances in which the quoted utterance was uttered;<sup>28</sup> and ii) that the quoted individual had direct sensory access to the events

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<sup>27</sup>Curnow (p.2) cites Rood's (1976, p.92) mention of a "quotative" in Wichita that yields an unintentional action interpretation in the first person, but remarks that inspection of the data suggests that the evidential in question is not a quotative, but rather a "non-witnessed" evidential.

<sup>28</sup>When this condition does not hold, Nanti speakers either employ a reportive in conjunction

expressed by the quoted utterance, unless otherwise specified.<sup>29</sup> A first person quotative, therefore, yields the inference that the speaker, by virtue of being the quoted individual, had direct sensory access to the events in question. As such, a first person quotative is, in effect, a direct evidential. As such, it is unsurprising that the Nanti first person quotative does not yield the interpretations of non-volitionality and lack of control associated with first person indirect evidential constructions.

### 4.3.3.3 Weyewa locutives

In this section, I discuss the use of ‘locutives’ by speakers of Weyewa (a.k.a. Wejewa), an Austronesian language spoken on the Indonesian island of Sumba (Kuipers, 1993). My reason for doing so is the striking similarities these elements display to the form and interactional function of Nanti quotatives, which suggests that the behavior of Nanti quotative resources that I have described in this chapter may not be atypical of quotative resources more generally.<sup>30</sup>

Weyewa locutives are quotatives<sup>31</sup> that inflect for person, in a manner very similar to Nanti quotatives. Like Nanti quotatives, they can be employed for CQF, the interactional effect of which Kuipers characterizes as “claiming responsibility for the [quotatively framed] speech” (ibid. p.93). Similarly, Kuipers characterizes the with the quotative, or employ multiple quotatives in order to clarify the chain of transmission between the speaker and the quoted utterance.

<sup>29</sup>This follows from the fact that evidentially-unmarked utterances are defeasibly interpreted as having a visual evidential basis (see Chapter 3).

<sup>30</sup>Quotative evidentials are relatively rare among languages that exhibit grammaticalized evidentiality, and there is much less discussion of the pragmatic properties of quotatives than of other types of evidentials.

<sup>31</sup>Kuipers rejects the term ‘quotative’ because they can inflect for the person and gender of the source and recipient of the utterance, which distinguishes them from the uninflectable “quotative” particles described by Whorf (1956, p.119) for Hopi. However, linguists would now characterize the latter particles as ‘reportives’ and not ‘quotatives’, removing the basis for Kuipers’ terminological qualms. Kuipers also argues that ‘locutives’ cannot be considered ‘evidentials’ because they do not indicate the ultimate source of information of the locutive-marked utterance — be it hearsay, visual, or otherwise. This latter point seems to stem from a misunderstanding of evidentiality, since quotatives *do* specify the source of information (a verbal report from a specific individual), albeit not the ultimate one, for an utterance.

interactional effect of locutives in terms very similar to those I have employed for Nanti quotative resources:

Rather than collectivizing discourse the way many Amerindian *verba dicendi* do, the import of Weyewa locutives in ritual speech contexts is to particularize and individuate it. This particularizing has the effect of heightening the connotation of personal responsibility for discourse.

We see, then, that on Kuipers' analysis, Weyewa locutives share the individuating function of Nanti quotatives, and that Kuiper attributes a responsibility-heightening effect to them. This remarkable coincidence in communicative function is paralleled by structural similarities — particularly the existence of CQF constructions and the person marking of the source of the quoted utterance on the locutive. The fact that similar structural characteristics are associated with similar communicative functional characteristics in each language suggests that the account I have provided in this chapter of the relationship between the structural-semiotic features of Nanti quotatives and their communicative functions may be of broader validity.

## Chapter 5

# Conclusion

In the preceding pages, I provided an analysis of Nanti evidential practice, focusing on the use of evidential resources to modulate representations of responsibility in discourse. This analysis was based on a detailed understanding of Nanti grammar (a description of which I provide in Chapter 6), and the close analysis of ethnographically contextualized transcripts of Nanti interactions.

At the outset of my examination of the instrumental role of evidentiality in modulating representations of responsibility, I drew an analytical distinction between two quite different forms of responsibility: *event responsibility* and *utterance responsibility*. This distinction has not been previously recognized in the scholarship on discourse and responsibility, but I show that the ways in which evidential resources modulate these two types of evidentiality are quite different. Event responsibility rests on the nature of a social subject's participation in a causal chain that brings about an event. Utterance responsibility, in contrast, rests on a subject's production of an utterance that interactants evaluate as having certain praiseworthy or blameworthy attributes, such as being 'vulgar' or 'true', *regardless* of the events that the utterance brings about.

In Chapter 3, I focused on the role played by evidential resources in Nan-



tis' efforts to modulate event responsibility. I showed that Nantis employ indirect evidentials, such as inferentials and quotatives, to mitigate their own responsibility for unfortunate events. I also provided a theoretical account for the efficacy of indirect evidentials in mitigating event responsibility, the central idea of which is that in Nanti evidential practice there exists a pragmatic metaphor relating the sensory mode of access to an event encoded by evidentials to moral responsibility for that event. I argued that this pragmatic metaphor is based on a chain of inferences that links modes of access to prototypical physical circumstances that allow the use of particular evidentials, which in turn yield inferences regarding causal responsibility, which in turn form the basis of judgements of moral responsibility. Inferentials and quotatives denote indirect modes of access that invoke prototypical circumstances of (physical) distance from events, yielding inferences of minimal causal responsibility for the event in question, and hence minimal moral responsibility for it.

As part of my analysis of the pragmatic metaphor by which Nantis mitigate event responsibility, I also argued that it is helpful to treat evidentiality as a mixed indexical-denotational category that indexes knowing subjects and events, and denotes a *mode of sensory access* that the former have to the latter. This way of articulating the semiotic content of evidentials brings into relief the fact that evidentials denote a relationship between the knowing subject and the event, which is the aspect of the evidential that is most salient to the chain of inferences that results in the mitigation of event responsibility.

In Chapter 4, I turned to the role of evidential resources, and in particular, quotative resources, in modulating utterance responsibility in Nanti discourse. I argued that quotative resources serve to individuate utterances by attributing them to a particular individual. In general, I showed, this use of quotative resources is associated with efforts to indicate an individual's commitment to the evaluative stance expressed by the quotative utterance, thereby rendering explicit that person's

responsibility for that stance. In order to avoid confounding effects due to the interdiscursive functions of quotative resources, I developed these arguments on the basis of data exhibiting concurrent quotative framing (CQF), a discourse strategy by which utterances from the ongoing interaction are placed under the scope of quotative resources. I subsequently showed that similar individuating, commitment-indicating effects are shown by third party quotations (TPQ.)

In concluding my discussion of utterance responsibility, I provided an account of how third party quotation comes to have (utterance) responsibility-mitigating effects, which is the interactional function typically attributed to quotatives in the scholarship on discourse and responsibility. I argued that this effect is a consequence of the application of the Maxim of Quantity to utterances, as evaluated against a scale of degrees of commitment. Attribution of a stance to a third party leads to inferences, via the Maxim of Quantity, that this is the strongest commitment that the speaker is willing to express, leading in turn to the inference that the speaker is not strongly committed to the stance expressed by the TPQ utterance.

This dissertation contributes to the disciplinary debate concerning the relationship between evidentiality and epistemic modality. In particular, we see that in Nanti society, epistemic modal meanings arise as inferences based on encoded mode-of-sensory-access meanings, and even then, only under restricted circumstances. Nantis' use of evidential resources to negotiate event responsibility, for example, is predicated on interactants' concerns regarding causal responsibility that are orthogonal to questions of epistemic reliability. As I showed in Chapter 3, interactants may not express any doubts about a given event, yet still make use of evidential resources to distance themselves causally and morally from that event.

Epistemic modality *does* surface as a salient issue in the realm of utterance responsibility, as one form of stance commitment modulated by quotative resources. As we saw in Chapter 4, however, epistemic stances are but one kind of evaluative

stance to which Nantis might express commitment in using quotative resources. In fact, in the interactions we examined, Nantis were principally concerned with expressing commitment to *moral* evaluative stances.

The fact that epistemic modality appears to play a minor role even in the *pragmatics* of evidential resources in Nanti further weakens arguments that there is an intrinsic link between mode-of-sensory-access meanings and assessments of epistemic reliability, either conceptually, or at the level of communicative instrumentality in interaction. Rather, it appears that semantic and pragmatic links between evidentiality and epistemic modality arise in particular languages and speech communities in locally idiosyncratic ways, on the basis of local understandings of the relation between knowledge and the senses.

This dissertation also makes a case for the utility of studying evidentiality as a component of communicative practice. As I argued in Chapter 2, the distribution of evidentials, even in languages which exhibit highly grammaticalized evidentiality, is frequently underdetermined by grammatical considerations alone, as truly *structurally* obligatory evidentiality is relatively rare. Consequently, in most languages that exhibit grammaticalized evidentiality, the distribution of evidentials in naturally-occurring discourse is at least in part determined by the interactional goals of speakers in specific interactional settings. As such, a purely grammatically-oriented approach to evidentiality is incapable of accounting fully for their distribution and their communicative function. I argued that the tendency for evidentiality to play a prominent role in local language ideologies argues for a practice-based approach, as ideology is integral to communicative-theoretic approaches. In addition, I showed that Nanti speakers deploy grammaticalized evidentials and evidential strategies (such as verbs of perception) *in conjunction* with one another, making an approach that attends to both grammaticalized and non-grammaticalized evidential resources essential to understanding the communicative instrumentality of mode of

access meanings in discourse.

## Chapter 6

# Classification and grammatical sketch of Nanti

### 6.1 Genetic classification

Nanti is a language of the Kampan<sup>1</sup> family, a group of closely-related Arawak<sup>2</sup> languages spoken in the Andean foothills region of southeastern Peru and the adjacent

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<sup>1</sup>Note that some scholars (e.g. Cysouw, 2007; Wise, 1986) refer to this family as the ‘Pre-Andine’ family. I avoid this term because of its confusing history. The term was originally coined by Rivet and Tastevin (1919-20) for a proposed grouping of Arawak languages that encompassed what are now commonly known as the Kampan and the Purús branches. The best known languages of the latter branch are Yine (Piro) and Apurinã (Ipurina). Later, Yaneshá (Amuesha) (e.g. Wise, 1976) and the Harakmbet family were added, and each subsequently removed (Wise, 1999). As Payne (1991) showed, however, there is little evidence to support even the grouping together of the Kampan and Purús languages. All recent classifications treat the Purús branch as coordinate with the Kampan branch within Southern Arawak (Aikhenvald, 1999; Campbell, 1997; Kaufman, 1994). Similarly, Yaneshá was removed from Pre-Andine, and is now sometimes grouped with Chamicuro (Payne, 1991). Those who retained the term ‘Pre-Andine’ employed it for this successively dwindling group, until only the Kampan languages remained, rendering ‘Pre-Andine’ coextensive with ‘Kampan’.

<sup>2</sup>Terminology varies somewhat. The core established group of historically-related languages is called ‘Arawak’ by some (e.g. Aikhenvald, 1999; Facundes, 2002; Ramirez, 2001) and ‘Maipurean’ (also, ‘Maipuran’) by others (e.g. Campbell, 1997; Payne, 1991). Some prefer the term ‘Arawakan’ for this group (e.g. Wise, 2005), but the recent tendency is to reserve ‘Arawakan’ for a higher-level speculative grouping that subsumes the Arawak/Maipurean languages, the Arawán languages (cf. Dixon, 2004), the Harakmbet languages (cf. Wise, 1999), and Puquina (Campbell, 1997; Facundes, 2002; Payne, 1991).

lowland regions of Peru and Brazil. In this section I review the scholarship on Kampan genetic classification, and then consider the place of the Kampan family within Arawak more generally.

Apart from Nanti, there are six commonly-recognized major varieties within this family: Asháninka, Ashéninka, Kakinte, Matsigenka, Nomatsigenga, and Pajonal Ashéninka (a.k.a. Pajonal Campa). There is substantial disagreement among linguists in distinguishing dialects from languages among these varieties, which leads to disparate internal classifications for the Kampan family. We now examine this issue. It should be noted that there has been no application of the comparative method<sup>3</sup> to the varieties of the Kampan family, meaning that none of the classifications, with their implicit groupings through merging varieties under single language names, can be considered entirely reliable. It is not clear that even lexicostatistical methods have been applied.

Kaufman (1994) and Campbell (1997) present the most conservative classifications, distinguishing only three languages.<sup>4</sup> Kaufman considers the three languages to be ‘emergent languages’, a term he adopts to characterize a level of differentiation between that which exists between clearly distinct languages and that which exists between dialects of a single language:

1. Ashéninga (dialects: Ucayali, Upper Perené, Pichis, Apurucayali, and Atsiri (Pajonal))
2. Asháninga
3. Matsigenga (dialects: Kakinte, Nomatsigenga, Machigenga [sic]).

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<sup>3</sup>That is, we have no classifications that are based on the reconstruction of the proto-Kampa phonological inventory and morphology and the subsequent deduction of subgroupings based on shared phonological and morphological innovations.

<sup>4</sup>In the following discussion, I use the language names employed by the cited scholars; this accounts for the orthographic inconsistencies in the remainder of this section.

Campbell's (1997:181) classification is essentially the same, although he enumerates fewer dialects: Ashéninga (dialects: Ucayali, Upper Perené, Pichis, Apurucayali), Asháninka, and Machiguenga (dialects: Caquinte and Machiguenga).

Solís Fonseca (2003) suppresses mention of dialects in his classification, but splits Kaufman's and Campbell's Matsigenka/Machiguenga, differentiating Nomatsigenka from Matsigenka and yielding four languages for the family:

1. Asháninka (= "Campa" Asháninka)
2. Ashéninka (= "Campa" del Gran Pajonal)
3. Nomatsiguenga
4. Machiguenga

I find the decision to distinguish Nomatsigenka as a distinct language to be well-motivated, as Nomatsigenka underwent a number of sound changes not experienced by the other Kampan languages. Nomatsigenka is also apparently the only Kampan language to display contrastive tone (Shaver, 1996).

Aikhenvald (1999) further splits the Matsigenka branch of the family, recognizing Kakinte as a distinct language; she also splits the Ashéninka branch, recognizing Pajonal Campa as distinct, yielding six languages:

1. Ashaninca
2. Asheninca
3. Caquinte
4. Machiguenga
5. Nomatsiguenga
6. Pajonal Campa (possible dialects: Perene, Pichis, and Ucayali)

Given the fineness of most classifications of the Kampan family, distinguishing Kakinte from Matsigenka is well-warranted on phonological and morphological grounds. Kakinte is also very lexically divergent from Matsigenka. Given the dearth of published material on Pajonal Kampa, however, I find it difficult to comment on the choice of considering it a distinct language within the Kampan family.

Aikhenvald's classification is similar to Payne's (1981) classification of the Kampan family, which also distinguishes six languages:

1. Ashaninca
2. Asheninca (dialects: Pajonal, Upper Perene, Pichis, Ucayali)
3. Axininca
4. Caquinte
5. Machiguenga
6. Nomatsiguenga

Gordon (2005) clearly owes much to Payne's (1981) classification and discussion of dialects, and appears to give the largest number of languages for the family, eleven. Upon closer inspection, however, it is clear that Gordon is diffident about differentiating between languages and dialects in the Kampan family. Although the varieties listed below are given at the level in Gordon's (2005) Ethnologue classifications that is normally reserved for distinct languages, one encounters numerous comments that undermine the inference that the listed varieties are all distinct languages. His remarks suggest that the listed varieties are sub-varieties of encompassing varieties, indicated by capital letters in the following list:<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>Note that the letters are *my* addition, based on my interpretation of Gordon's (2005) comments, and are not explicit in Gordon's classification. However, the resulting internal classification is quite similar to that given by Swift (1988, p.20).



- A. 1. Asháninka
- 2. Caquinte
- B. 3. Ajoyíninka Apurucayali
- 4. Pajonal Ashéninka
- 5. Perené Ashéninka
- 6. Pichis Ashéninka
- 7. South Ucayali Ashéninka
- 8. Ucayali-Yurúa Ashéninka
- C. 9. Nomatsiguenga
- 10. Machiguenga
- 11. Nanti

Several comments are warranted by this set of classifications. First, it is clear that within the Kampan family, we are dealing with a set of varieties whose degree of differentiation lies in that ambiguous area between language and dialect. In the absence of established disciplinary criteria for distinguishing languages from dialects, the degree of differentiation found in the Kampan languages leads individual linguists to varying classificatory judgments. This problem is compounded by the fact that no comprehensive descriptive grammar yet exists for any of the Kampan varieties,<sup>6</sup> rendering impossible any systematic comparison of morphology and morphosyntax across the entire family.

It is not clear that any substantive *linguistic* issues are at stake in where the line is drawn between language and dialect in the case of the Kampan languages. As long as the varieties are properly identified, and their genetic and areal relationships

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<sup>6</sup>The most detailed works are Payne's (1981) description of Apurucayali Ashéninka (a.k.a. Axininca) phonology and morphology, and Swift's (1988) description of Kakinte phonology and morphology, which is modelled on Payne (1981).

understood, the question of which varieties are considered distinct ‘languages’ is of no empirical or theoretical linguistic import. However, what varieties are called ‘languages’ or are considered ‘dialects’ is of great *political* and *social* significance, both in terms of relations with the state and with powerful para-governmental actors, such as missionary organizations and petrochemical companies; and in terms of political and social relations between groups of indigenous individuals. In large part, the importance of ‘languages’, so called, lies in their use by both indigenous and non-indigenous entities and individuals as proxies for identifying salient politico-cultural groupings (‘tribes’, ‘indigenous groups’, ‘peoples’, etc.). The recursive equating of linguistic difference with politico-cultural difference and autonomy leads both to exaggeration of linguistic difference and its to effacement, in a manner that parallels strategic positions taken towards politico-cultural solidarity with, or independence from, other groupings.<sup>7</sup>

Second, we note that the only classification that mentions Nanti, either as a dialect or as a language, is Gordon (2005). This reflects the fact that Nanti has only come to the awareness of linguists in the last few years (see also Payne (2001)). Given the varying degrees of fineness of the different classifications given above, I venture to predict that Nanti would be considered a dialect of Matsigenka by Kaufman and Campbell, and a distinct language by Aikhenvald.

Turning to the classification of Nanti, we can observe that of the Kampan varieties, Nanti exhibits the greatest similarity to Matsigenka, and specifically, to the Manu dialect of Matsigenka.<sup>8</sup> This is not entirely surprising, since various ethnohistorical facts suggest that the ancestors of the Nantis migrated from the Manu region to the upper Timpía region before or during the 19th century. In fact, conversations I have had with Matsigenka individuals who have visited the Nanti


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<sup>7</sup>I touch on some of these issues in the Nanti case in Chapter 1.

<sup>8</sup>Three major dialects of Matsigenka are commonly recognized by linguists and anthropologists working with Matsigenkas, and by Matsigenkas themselves: the Upper Urubamba, Lower Urubamba, and Manu dialects.

communities, as well as my own field observations, suggest that the relationship between Nanti and the Matsigenka dialects is best analyzed as a dialect chain, where adjacency in the following list indicates greater similarity: Upper Urubamba – Lower Urubamba – Manu – Nanti. My observations indicate that speakers of the Upper Urubamba dialect of Matsigenka experience the greatest difficulty communicating with Nantis, and that speakers of the Manu dialect experience the least.

Within the Kampan family, Nanti and Matsigenka obviously form a subgroup. This subgroup, in turn, probably forms a higher level grouping with Nomatsigenga, given the similarities in their morphological systems and what are probably some shared phonological innovations (see below). If this hypothesis is correct, then these three languages form a Southern Kampan (SK) branch, while Ashéninka, Asháninka, and Kakinte form a Northern Kampan (NK) branch. These observations yield the classification given in (6.1).<sup>9</sup> Note that I have suppressed details of the internal classification of Northern Kampan, since my principal concern at this point lies with the classification of Nanti, a member of the Southern Kampan branch.



Clearly, a definitive internal classification of the Kampan family must await the reconstruction of Proto-Kampa (PK) and the construction of a model of the diversification of the daughter languages. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify some

<sup>9</sup>The internal classification I propose is similar, in its overall form, to that given by Wise (1986). The principal difference is that Wise groups Kakinte and Asháninka together as a subgroup. Payne (1981, p.4), however, notes no genetic affinity between Kakinte and Asháninka, and in fact proposes that they are relatively distantly related.

likely shared innovations that support the internal classification given in (6.1). For example, the basic division between NK and SK is supported by the widespread loss or lenition of PK /g/ in NK, but its retention in SK. Within NK, evidence for grouping Ashéninka and Asháninka together is provided by these languages' shared loss of PK /h/, which Kakinte does not exhibit. Within SK, the proposed classification is supported by a number of shared innovations in Nanti and Matsigenka, which include the palatalized segments /tʲ/ and /rʲ/, that are not present in Nomatsigenka.

All recent classifications of Arawak place the Kampan family in Southern Arawak (Payne, 1991; Kaufman, 1994; Campbell, 1997; Aikhenvald, 1999), except for Ramirez (2001), who rejects the Northern and Southern Arawak subgroupings for Eastern and Western ones. For most Arawak specialists, Southern Arawak consists of all Arawak languages south of the Amazon river,<sup>10</sup> except possibly for Yaneshá (Amuesha) and Chamicuro, both of which have proved difficult to classify in relation to other Arawak languages.<sup>11</sup> Since there is no clear agreement among scholars on mid-level groupings within Southern Arawak, it is difficult to say a great deal about the relationship of the Kampan family to other low-level groupings in Southern Arawak, except that there is a strong tendency to view the Kampan and Purús families (Aikhenvald, 1999; Ramirez, 2001), and in some cases, Bolivia-Parana Arawak<sup>12</sup> families (Payne, 1991, p.489) as forming a single group at some level (see also comments by Wise (1986, p.568)).

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<sup>10</sup>Payne (1991) and Kaufman (1994) propose a slightly smaller Southern branch by placing Parecí and Waurá in a separate *Central branch*.

<sup>11</sup>Aikhenvald (1999) places Chamicuro and Amuesha with the Kampan and Purús families in a *South-Western branch*, as does Campbell (1997), while Payne (1991), Kaufman (1994), and Ramirez (2001) do not.

<sup>12</sup>Following Payne (1991), I employ the term *Bolivia-Parana Arawak* for a grouping that includes all the living Arawak languages in Bolivia, and Terena, which is spoken in southern Brazil. Aikhenvald (1999) essentially concurs with this grouping.

## 6.2 Phonology

### 6.2.1 Phonemic inventory

The Nanti phonemic inventory is typical for a Kampan language,<sup>13</sup> although Nanti exhibits several allophonic processes that are unique within the family. Similarly, the Nanti inventory shows much similarity to the common Arawak phonological profile described by Aikhenvald (1999, p.75-8), although, as discussed below, the Kampan languages as a whole diverge from this profile at a number of points.

The Nanti consonant and vowel inventories are given in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2, respectively. Allophones are given in square brackets next to the phoneme, and graphemes used in this text for phonemic representations are given in parentheses, if they are different from the standard IPA symbol.

#### 6.2.1.1 Consonant inventory

From a typological perspective, the most notable feature of the Nanti consonant inventory is the lack of symmetry between the voiceless and voiced stop series. Specifically, although /b/ and /g/ are found as the voiced counterparts to the voiceless stops /p/ and /k/, there is no voiced counterpart in the Nanti consonant inventory to the voiceless alveolar stop /t/.

This particular gap in the series of voiced stops is typical of the Kampan languages. Certain varieties, such as the Upper Urubamba dialect of Matsigenka, exhibit allophonic post-nasal voicing, which results in surface [nd] clusters, but in no Kampan language does one find a contrast between voiceless and voiced alveolar stops.

Gaps in the phonemic inventory of voiced stops are actually fairly common

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<sup>13</sup>In the subsequent discussion, Kampan comparative comments are based on phonological descriptions available in Kindberg (1980) for Asháninka, Payne (1981) for Ashéninka, Swift (1988) for Kakinte, Snell (1998) for Matsigenka, and Shaver (1996) for Nomatsigenga.

Table 6.1: Nanti consonant inventory

	LABIAL	ALVEOLAR	ALVEO-PALATAL	VELAR	GLOTTAL	UNSPECIFIED
VOICELESS STOP	p [p, pʰ]	t [t, tʰ]	tʰ (ty)	k [k, k̄s, k̄j, k̄c, k̄ʰ]		
VOICED STOP	b [b, bʰ, β, w]	ts̄ [ts̄, t̄j] (ts)	t̄j (ch)	g [g, ḡz, ḡʒ, ḡʰ, ḡʰ]		
AFFRICATE		s [s, ʃ]	ʃ (sh)		h	
FRICATIVE		r [r, rʰ] (r)	rʰ (ry)			
FLAP		n [n, ɲ]	ɲ (ny)			[m, n, ɲ] (N)
NASAL	m [m, mʰ]		j [j, ʒ, dʒ] (y)			
GLIDE						

among Arawak languages more generally, although the missing segments are typically /b/ or /g/, rather than /d/ (Aikhenvald, 1999, p.76). In fact, in her survey of Arawak phonological systems, Aikhenvald finds only two languages with a /k/-/g/ contrast, Resígaro and Garifuna (ibid.). Minimal pairs showing the contrast between voiceless and voiced velar stops in Nanti are given in (6.2). Note that although Nanti exhibits phonemic /β// and /g/, they are subject to the morphophonemic restriction that neither can appear in either verb root-initial or nominal root-initial position. Furthermore, /g/ is more generally forbidden in word-initial position, and /β/ is extremely rare in word-initial position, being restricted to pronominal elements that maintain their Proto-Kampan form (e.g. the second person pronoun *biro*) and certain bird species names such as *buburo*, that are probably onomatopoeic in origin. However, certain morphophonological process that strip verb stem-initial vowels occasionally result in surface forms that exhibit word-initial /β/ and /g/ (see §6.2.3).

(6.2) /k/ vs. /g/

- a. irakake ‘It ripened.’
- b. iragaka ‘He/she cried.’
- c. okotakero ‘She cooked it.’
- d. ogotakero ‘She knew it.’

Nanti exhibits a full series of contrastive palatalized segments corresponding to the series of alveolar stops and the alveolar flap. Similar series of palatalized segments are found in the other Kampan languages<sup>14</sup> but otherwise appear to be rare among Arawak languages, as evidenced by the fact that Aikhenvald (1999,

<sup>14</sup>In the orthographies of some of these languages, palatalized segments are represented as *Ci*. However, all evidence indicates that in these cases, the languages in question exhibit palatalized consonants, and not consonant-vowel sequences.

p.75-8) does not mention them at all in her discussion of the Arawak phonological profile.

Like all the other Kampan languages, Nanti exhibits a nasal unspecified for place of articulation in addition to the bilabial and alveolar nasal stops. Following Payne (1981), I indicate this segment by *N*. This underspecified nasal acquires its place of articulation features from the following voiceless stop or affricate, if present, as illustrated in (6.3). In these examples I use the irrealis prefix *N-* to illustrate the place assimilation of this segment.

(6.3) a. *ONtagake*. [ontagakse]

*o*=        *N-*        *tag*    *-ak*    *-e*  
 3nmS= IRREAL- burn -PERF -IRREAL.I  
 ‘It will burn.’

b. *ONpegakeNpa*. [ompegaksempa]

*o*=        *N-*        *peg*     *-ak*     *-eNpa*  
 3nmS= IRREAL- get.lost -PERF -IRREAL.A  
 ‘She will get lost.’

c. *ONkamake*. [oŋkamakse]

*o*=        *N-*        *kam*    *-ak*     *-e*  
 3nmS= IRREAL- die    -PERF -IRREAL.I  
 ‘It will die.’

There are two main reasons for positing the existence of this underspecified segment in the phonological inventory, instead of simply assuming that the segment in question is either the bilabial or the alveolar nasal stop displaying place of articulation assimilation. First, in cases in which the underspecified nasal and the voiceless stop are heteromorphemic (as in (6.3)), we find that there is simply no basis for preferring one nasal over another as an underlying form, since the underspecified nasal always place-assimilates to the following voiceless stop. Moreover,



if a voiceless stop is unavailable to provide place features, the underspecified nasal simply deletes (see §6.3.1.1.1 for further discussion). Although one might be able to explain the deletion of the nasal before a *voiced* stop as a result of a constraint on consonant clusters in Nanti, the deletion of the nasal in question before vowels largely rules out the possibility that the nasal in question has an underlying bilabial or alveolar place of articulation, since /n/ and /m/ are perfectly permissible in intervocalic position.

The second argument for positing an underspecified nasal in Nanti comes from monomorphemic forms. For forms in which the nasal and following voiceless consonant are tautomorphemic (e.g. *puNto* [pu<sup>h</sup>into] ‘frog sp.’), it may seem appealing, on grounds of representational transparency, to assert that the underlying segments in question are simply identical to their surface form. However, this analysis would force us to posit a velar nasal phoneme /ŋ/ to account for monomorphemic forms in which the underspecified nasal precedes a voiceless velar stop (e.g. *anKiro* [aŋk<sup>h</sup>iro] ‘rabbit’). However, since we otherwise have no evidence for this phoneme, this analysis is unsatisfactory.

Payne (1981, p. 62, 164-5) makes similar arguments for the corresponding segment in Apurucayali Ashéninka, and adduces additional psycholinguistic ones, based on evidence from Ashéninkas’ shifting use of either grapheme, ‘n’ or ‘m’, in representing the underspecified nasal.

### 6.2.1.2 Vowel inventory

Nanti exhibits five contrastive vowel qualities, as indicated in Table 6.2; vowel length is contrastive for all vowel qualities except the monomoraic diphthong, resulting in a total inventory of nine vowels. The Nanti vowel inventory is typical for an Arawak language, with the exception of the typologically unusual monomoraic diphthong /u<sup>h</sup>i/, represented by the grapheme *u*. The principal evidence for the lightness of this

diphthong comes from the fact that it patterns with short vowels, and specifically /o/ and /e/, for purposes of stress assignment (Crowhurst and Michael, 2005). Its phonetic duration also corresponds to that of a short vowel, rather than a diphthong or long vowel.

Table 6.2: Nanti vowel inventory

	FRONT	CENTRAL	BACK
HIGH	i, i: (ii)		u̠ (u)
MID	e, e: (ee)		o, o: (oo)
LOW		a, a: (aa)	

Vowel inventories show quite a degree of variation within the Kampan family. However Nanti, Matsigenka, and Nomatsigenka form a group of varieties with nearly identical nine-vowel inventories.<sup>15</sup> Asháninka, certain dialects of Ashéninka, and Kakinte each have eight-vowel inventories, lacking the light diphthong /u̠i/ or its counterparts. Finally, certain Ashéninka dialects exhibit a six-vowel inventory, further lacking the mid front vowels /e/ and /e:/.

Table 6.3 provides a quintuplet of verb roots demonstrating the contrastive nature of the vowel qualities given in Table 6.2. Table 6.4 provides minimal pairs illustrating the contrastive nature of vowel length in Nanti. Nanti permits the following diphthongs: /ae/, /ai/, /ei/, /oi/, and /ui/.

Table 6.3: Nanti vowel quality contrasts

	FRONT	CENTRAL	BACK
HIGH	<i>tig</i> ‘defecate’		<i>tug</i> ‘snuff tobacco snuff’
MID	<i>oteg</i> ‘hand feed’		<i>tog</i> ‘fell tree’
LOW		<i>tag</i> ‘burn’	

<sup>15</sup>The minor variation between the vowel inventories of these languages involves the cognates to Nanti *u*. In Nomatsigenka and the Upper Urubamba dialect of Matsigenka, the corresponding segment appears to be a simple high central vowel /i/.

Table 6.4: Nanti vowel length contrasts

QUALITY	SHORT VOWEL	LONG VOWEL
a	<i>saro</i> ‘grand-daughter (n. root)’	<i>saaro</i> ‘Datura sp. (plant)’
i	<i>ki</i> ‘seed (classifier)’	<i>kii</i> ‘stick (classifier)’
e	<i>morek</i> ‘give off light (v. root)’	<i>poreek</i> ‘burst into flames’ (v. root)
o	<i>og</i> ‘put, place (v. root)’	<i>oog</i> ‘consume, eat (v. root)’

### 6.2.2 Phonological processes

The rich allophony of Nanti consonants, evident in Table 6.1, is in large part due to three contrast processes: one that affects all stops and nasals (palatalization), a second one which only affects velar stops (alveolarization), and a third one which affects alveolar fricatives and affricates. I also describe a number of other important phonological processes in Nanti including sibilant contrast, vowel nasalization, and /h/-elision.

The distinction between lexical and postlexical phonology plays an important role in understanding the differences among the various processes that alter syllable structure. Lexical phonological processes are characterized by the facts that they can be conditioned by morphosyntactic environments, are structure preserving (i.e. map phonemes to phonemes), may suffer lexically-specified exceptions, and are not affected by speaking rate or style. Postlexical phonological processes are characterized by the facts that they are not affected by morphosyntactic environments, apply without lexical exceptions, are not necessarily structure preserving, and are affected by speaking rate and style (Ito and Mester, 2003; Kiparsky, 1982).

### 6.2.2.1 Palatalization

The process of palatalization affects all stops and nasals in Nanti, in the following non-local environment:

$$(6.4) C \rightarrow C^j / \_e(C)[+\text{high}]$$

The [+high] segment given in the rule in (6.4) may be any one of the following segments: the high front vowel /i/, any palatalized consonant, or the alveo-palatal affricate /tʃ/. In the first case, a consonant must intervene between the /e/ and /i/ to satisfy constraints on syllable structure.

Example (6.5a) illustrates this palatalization process with the palatalization of the voiceless bilabial stop when the [+high] segment is instantiated as the high front vowel; while (6.5b) shows that the stop in question is not palatalized outside of the environment specified by (6.4). An example of palatalization due to the alveo-palatal affricate is given in (6.5c).

- (6.5) a. peri [p<sup>j</sup>eri] ‘give it to him (imperative)’  
b. pena [pena] ‘give it to me (imperative)’  
c. omechohitake [om<sup>j</sup>et<sup>h</sup>oitakse] ‘it fruited (speaking of a plant)’

Since the palatalization process just described derives palatalized consonants which can then trigger further palatalization, right-to-left palatal spreading occurs under the right circumstances. One way to conceive of this process is to consider /e/ to be transparent to palatalization, so that when a word contains adjacent /Ce/ sequences, as well as a palatalization-triggering [+ high] segment, palatalization spreads from the [+high] segment, through the transparent intervening /e/s, to consonants to its left. An example of such spreading is given in (6.6a). In this example, /t/ palatalizes because of the following /eri/ sequence, and then in turn, /m/ palatalizes because of the following [et<sup>j</sup>] sequence. In (6.6c) we see an example

of how replacing /e/ with /a/ blocks palatalization spread from [etʃ] to [m]. The form exhibited in (6.6c), in which the final vowel of the word is not [+high], shows no palatalization at all because there is no [+high] segment to trigger palatalization.

- (6.6) a. ameteri [am<sup>h</sup>et<sup>h</sup>eri] ‘She will get used to him.’  
b. ametakeri [ametak<sup>h</sup>eri] ‘She got used to him.’  
c. ametena [ametena] ‘She will get used to me.’

Despite this widespread process of allophonic palatalization, there is nevertheless a phonemic contrast between alveolar stops, the alveolar flap, and their phonemic palatalized counterparts.<sup>16</sup> Minimal pairs are hard to come by, however, as the palatalized alveolar phonemes are relatively rare. Minimal or near-minimal pairs are given in (6.7) through (6.9).

(6.7) /t/ vs. /ty/

- a. teta ‘no, as I was saying’  
b. tetya ‘not yet’

(6.8) /n/ vs. /ny/

- a. okanomahiri ‘She is reproving him.’  
b. okanyota ‘it is like (verb)’

(6.9) /r/ vs. /ry/

- a. iryo ‘third person masculine pronoun’  
b. iro ‘third person non-masculine pronoun’

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<sup>16</sup>Certain Matsigenka dialects in addition exhibit a phonemic contrast between velar stops and palatalized velar stops, but Nanti does not.

### 6.2.2.2 Alveolarization

Velar stops undergo an additional height assimilation process, distinct from the palatalization described in the previous section. I refer to this additional process as *alveolarization*. In alveolarization, the blade of the tongue raises before the high and mid front vowels in the articulation of velar stops, resulting in a secondary alveolar, alveo-palatal, or palatal fricative articulation, upon release of the stop. The blade raises towards the alveolar ridge before /e/, and varyingly, towards the alveo-palatal or palatal regions before /i/. Examples of alveolarization of /k/ and /g/ are given in (6.10b&c) and (6.11b&c), respectively. Examples of environments which do not trigger alveolarization are given in (6.10a) and (6.11a) for comparative purposes.

The height to which the blade of the tongue is raised, and the resulting frication with which the secondary articulation is realized, varies with speaking style and rate, and between individuals, indicating that it is a postlexical process. The process appears to be most regular and consistent with teens and children, suggesting a diachronic process of regularization of this allophonic process.

(6.10) a. underlying form: /ipokahi/ ‘he came back’

surface form: [ipokāi]

b. underlying form: /ipoki/ ‘he is coming’

surface form: [ipok̠ci] ~ [ipok̠fi]

c. underlying form: /iNpoke/ ‘he will come’

surface form: [impok̠se]

(6.11) a. underlying form: /pogakero/ ‘you put it down’

surface form: [pogak̠sero]

b. underlying form: /pogiro/ ‘you are putting it down’

surface form: [pog̠ziro] ~ [pog̠ziro]

c. underlying form: /pogero/ ‘you will put it down’

surface form: [pog<sup>h</sup>zero]

It should be noted that this alveolarization process plays a significant role in Matsigenka perceptions of linguistic difference between the Matsigenka and Nanti languages. In particular, Matsigenkas perceive the [k<sup>h</sup>s] allophone of /k/ as /t<sup>h</sup>s/ and the [k<sup>h</sup>ʃ, k<sup>h</sup>ç] allophones of /k/ as /t<sup>h</sup>ʃ/.<sup>17</sup> As might be expected, Nantis face much less difficulty in correctly distinguishing the corresponding segments in Matsigenka speech (i.e. /t<sup>h</sup>s/ vs. /k/ and /t<sup>h</sup>ʃ/ vs. /k/), as doing so merely requires Nantis to correctly perceive a *subset* of allophones already associated with these segments in their own language. In fact, a number of young men who communicate with Matsigenkas on a relatively regular basis (principally via two-way radio), have developed a Nanti-Matsigenka koine, which involves the suppression of much of the allophony that differentiates Nanti from Matsigenka.

### 6.2.2.3 Sibilant contrast

A third contrast process neutralizes /s/ and /ʃ/ before the high front vowel /i/, as illustrated by the root final vowel in (6.12b). The non-gradient realization of this process and its structure-preserving nature indicate that this is a lexical phonological process.

(6.12) a. yabisake [jabisak<sup>h</sup>se]<sup>18</sup>

<i>i</i> =	<i>abis</i>	<i>-ak</i>	<i>-i</i>
3mS=	pass.by	-PERF	REAL.I
‘He passed by.’			

b. yabisi [jabifi]

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<sup>17</sup>In at least one case, this allophonic process is probably responsible for the reanalysis of the phonemic representation of a lexical item: the word /tserepato/ [tserepato] ‘kingfisher’ (common to several Kampan languages), has been reanalyzed as /kerepa/[kserepa] in Nanti, suggesting that the affinity that Matsigenkas perceive between [ks] and /t<sup>h</sup>s/ is also perceived, to a lesser degree, by Nantis.

<sup>18</sup>The *-i/-e* alternation after the perfective morpheme *-ak* is discussed in §6.3.1.1.1.

*i*=        *abis*        *-i*  
 3mS= pass.by -REAL.I  
 ‘He is passing by.’

Note that despite the contrast process just described, Nanti exhibits a contrast between /s/ and /ʃ/, as illustrated in (6.13):

(6.13) /s/ vs. /ʃ/

- a. isori ‘his calf’
- b. ishorita ‘his hips’

#### 6.2.2.4 Vowel nasalization and /h/-elision

Intervocalic /h/ triggers nasalization on the preceding vowel, an example of rhinoglottophilia (Matisoff, 1975). Nasalization is especially prominent on syllabic nuclei bearing primary stress. The degree of nasalization varies significantly across individuals, and depends on speaking style, with nasalization being more intense in emphatic utterances. Vowel nasalization is clearly a postlexical phonological process.

Intervocalic /h/ can delete, under circumstances described in §6.2.3, with the result that the only surface expression of /h/ is vowel nasalization, as in (6.14b).

(6.14) paho ‘gourd sp.’

- a. [pãho]
- b. [pão]

### 6.2.3 Prosodic phenomena

#### 6.2.3.1 Stress, metrical feet, and clipping

Stress assignment in Nanti depends on word class, with verbs exhibiting one stress pattern, and nouns exhibiting another. Adjectives derived from verbs tend to pattern with verbs, while underived adjectives tend to pattern with nouns. Adverbs



also pattern with nouns. We first examine verbal stress, and then consider nominal stress.

**6.2.3.1.1 Verbal stress** Nanti verbs exhibit a complex stress system based on the iterative left-to-right parsing of prosodic words by disyllabic iambic feet, as in (6.15a). Final syllables are extrametrical (marked, where relevant, by angle brackets) and certain clitics (e.g. object person markers and modal clitics) are ‘extraprosodic’, meaning that they do not form part of the prosodic word and are thus ignored for purposes of foot formation and stress assignment, as in (6.15b). The boundary between prosodic and extraprosodic material is marked by a right square bracket. Extraprosodic morphemes do form part of the *phonological word*, however, as evidenced by their participation in segmental phonological processes such as palatalization, as illustrated in (6.6a&b). Degenerate feet are not permitted, as illustrated in (6.16a), except when the creation of a degenerate foot would permit the main stress of the word to fall on syllable with an /a/-nucleus, as in (6.16b).<sup>19</sup> This latter phenomenon is part of a broader sensitivity of stress assignment to the sonority of syllabic nuclei. All other conditions being equal, stress is preferentially assigned to syllables with greater nuclear sonority, according to the scale  $a > e, o, u > i$ , even at the cost of disrupting iambicity. We can see an example of this phenomenon in the first foot of the forms given in (6.17). When both syllabic nuclei are of the same sonority (in fact, the same vowel), as in the first foot in (6.17a), we see the default iambic pattern. However, when the nucleus of the leftmost syllable of the the foot is of higher sonority than the rightmost one, as in the first foot in (6.17b), where /o/ outranks /i/ on the sonority scale, stress falls on the syllable with the higher-sonority nucleus, forming a trochaic foot and breaking the default iambic pattern.

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<sup>19</sup>An empirically equivalent analysis, followed by Crowhurst and Michael (2005), is to assume that in these cases the extrametricality of the final syllable is trumped, and a disyllabic foot is formed.

- (6.15) a. (i,pi)(ri'ni)<ti> 'he is sitting'  
 b. (i,pi)(ri'ni)<ti>]me.ra 'where he would be sitting'
- (6.16) a. (i'ha)tuî<ti> 'he went and returned'  
 b. (i,po)('ka)<k̂se> 'he came'
- (6.17) a. (it,i)(mi,mo)('ta)<k̂se>]na 'he lived with me'  
 b. (oti)(mi,mo)('ta)<k̂se>]na 'she lived with me'

In addition to sonority-based prominence, Nanti exhibits a four-level syllabic weight scale, in which syllabic weight depends on both the moraic quantity of syllabic nuclei and the presence of syllabic codas: (C)VVN > (C)VV > CVN > CV. The forms in (6.18a-c) exemplify the various pair-wise weight differences that make up the hierarchy by showing iambic-to-trochaic stress shifts.

- (6.18) a. (C)VN > (C)V  
 ('om.po)<k̂se> 'she will come'
- b. (C)VV > (C)VN  
 ('oo.ĝzeŋ)ka<ni> 'it is eaten'
- c. CVVN > CVV  
 (o,sa)('raan.tai)ga<k̂se> 'they (non-masc) tore it because'

The interaction of sonority-based prominence with the four-level syllabic weight scale results in a 12-level prominence system for stress assignment. In the assignment of primary and secondary stress, nuclear sonority interacts in a complex manner with syllabic weight, presence of syllabic codas, avoidance of stress clash, and the basic rightmost primary stress. The reader is referred to Crowhurst and Michael (2005) for details.

**6.2.3.1.2 Nominal stress** The nominal stress pattern in Nanti is considerably simpler than the verbal one. With the exception of forms that exhibit lexicalized stress, which I discuss below, Nanti nouns are parsed left-to-right by disyllabic iambic feet, as evident in (6.19a-d). The final syllable of each noun is extrametrical, and in contrast with verbs, no degenerate feet are permitted, as can be seen in quadrisyllabic forms like (6.19c). Primary stress is rightmost, as evident in (6.19d).

- (6.19) a. (i)<βe> ‘grub sp.’  
 b. (tse'ro)<k̂fi> ‘net bag’  
 c. (ak'a)pa<ra> ‘bird sp.’  
 d. (pi,ja)(ri'jen)<t̂si> ‘gourd sp.’

The major difference between nominal and verbal stress patterns is that nominal stress is insensitive to vowel quality.<sup>20</sup> The insensitivity of nominal stress to vowel quality is illustrated by the forms in (6.20) and (6.21). These forms exhibit feet in which the leftmost element is of a higher sonority class than the rightmost, according to the sonority hierarchy relevant to verbal stress (a > e, o, u > i). While in verbs this sonority class inequality triggers a shift to a trochaic foot type, it has no effect on the nominal stress pattern.

- (6.20) a. (pa'ro)<to> ‘balsa tree’ (a ≠ o)  
 b. (ka'β<sup>j</sup>e)<ti> ‘ant sp.’ (a ≠ e)  
 c. (pa'ku)pa<ku> ‘crab sp.’ (a ≠ u)  
 d. (a'ni)ga<k̂fi> ‘heart’ (a ≠ i)

- (6.21) a. (t̂fo'bi)bi<ni> ‘sandpiper sp.’ (o ≠ i)

<sup>20</sup>Nominal stress may also be insensitive to vowel quantity and the presence of codas, but long vowels and coda are sufficiently rare in nouns that it is not possible at this time to draw any definitive conclusions regarding the role of vowel quantity or codas in nominal stress assignment.

- b. (he'tsi)<kfi> 'tree sp.' (e ≠ i)
- c. (pu'i'ri)kfi<ti> 'swallow sp.' (u ≠ i)

Nanti nouns also exhibit widespread lexical stress, which is at the very least rare among verbs, if it exists at all. One of the major sources of lexical stress in Nanti is the lexicalization of the Proto-Kampa nominal gender classification system that is still partially productive in other Kampan languages (e.g. Nomatsigenga, Shaver, 1996). The traces of this system in Nanti are two gender classifier suffixes, *-ri* 'masculine' and *-ro* 'non-masculine', which are now lexicalized as part of the noun. The considerable majority of Nanti animal species names, and many plant species names, bear these no-longer-productive gender classifiers. Although the correlation between grammatical gender and the presence of the appropriate gender classifier is no longer perfect, it remains quite consistent, as can be seen in the examples given in (6.22) and (6.23). Significantly, these Proto-Kampa gender classifiers are homophonous with Nanti's third person masculine and non-masculine object clitics, and like them, behave as if they are extraprosodic. Although these suffixes are now lexicalized, the stress pattern of most nouns reflects the extraprosodicity of these suffixes. This behavior is most evident in trisyllabic forms, as in (6.22) and (6.23), since the exametricity of the final non-extraprosodic syllable forces word-initial stress. As one would expect, quadrisyllabic forms, as in (6.24), do not generally exhibit word-initial stress, since a full disyllabic foot can be formed.

- (6.22) a. ('tʃo)<βe>]ro 'large cockroach sp.' (non-masc.)  
 b. ('mo)<tso>]ro 'tadpole' (non-masc.)  
 c. ('o)<se>]ro 'crab sp.' (non-masc.)

- (6.23) a. ('no)<fa>]ri 'tayra (mammal sp.)' (masc.)  
 b. ('pi)<hi>]ri 'bat (general term)' (masc.)

c. ( $\widehat{\text{tsu}}\text{i}$ )<m<sup>j</sup> e>]ri ‘small bird (general term)’ (masc.)

(6.24) a. ( $\text{k}^{\text{j}}\text{e}'\text{fi}$ )<ta>]ro ‘beetle sp.’ (non-masc.)

b. ( $\widehat{\text{kfi}}$ 'pa)<go>]ri ‘fish sp.’ (masc.)

c. (ma'na)<ta>]ro ‘palm sp.’ (non-masc.)

**6.2.3.1.3 Clipping** For the purposes of the present work, the principal significance of the Nanti prosodic system lies in the fact that in fast speech, and in certain discourse genres, speakers frequently omit unfooted syllables, a process I refer to as *clipping*. Consider, for example, the monomorphemic form *tahena* ‘come! (imperative)’; in (6.25a) I provide the full underlying form, annotated with its metrical structure. The underlying form may surface in one of two ways: as the ‘full’ surface form given in (6.25b), or as the clipped form in (6.25c), where which the extrametrical, and hence unfooted, syllable *na* has been elided.

(6.25) a. ('ta.he)<na> ‘Come! (imperative)’

b. [tāena]

c. [tāhe]

In the transcripts of interactions that I present in this work, I indicate clipping in the first line of the transcript by placing a caret at the point at which the clipping takes place, as in (6.26a). If it is possible to reliably recover the clipped and inaudible material, I place the material following the caret, as in (6.26b).

(6.26) a. tahe<sup>^</sup> ‘Come!’

b. tahe<sup>^</sup>na ‘Come!’

In the particular case of the form given in (6.26a), which surfaces as [tāhe], deduction of the clipped segments is straightforward. The only other form that

could surface this way would be a clipped alternant of the imperative form of the verb *tah* ‘punch’. In this case, discourse context easily distinguishes the correct full form, allowing us to deduce the clipped segments.

In other cases, however, deducing clipped elements requires considerably more careful work, based on knowledge of both Nanti phonology and Nanti discourse practices, as well as a fine understanding of the active topic of conversation. Therefore, below I illustrate some of the issues involved in the more complicated cases, using surface forms related to the labile verb root *kamoso* ‘check on, visit’ – forms which are very frequently clipped in everyday Nanti discourse.

Let us begin by considering the surface form [noŋkamoso], which one could naively imagine being related to a large number of possible surface forms: *noŋkamosote* ‘I will visit (imperfective)’, *noŋkamosotake* ‘I will visit (perfective)’, *noŋkamosoteri* ‘I will visit him (imperfective)’, *noŋkamosotakeri* ‘I will visit him (perfective)’, etc.<sup>21</sup> Even in this partial listing, however, we have winnowed the possibilities by using our knowledge of Nanti morphology and phonology. For example, all the suggested full forms exhibit the I-class irrealis suffix *-e*. We deduce the presence of this suffix in the full form due to the presence of the irrealis prefix N- (see, for example 6.27b). Similarly, none of the candidates include much additional morphology following the root, such as derivational morphology or facultative inflectional morphology (e.g. directionals). We eliminate forms that contain such additional morphology from the candidate list because their presence would lengthen the word sufficiently to guarantee the creation of an additional foot to the right of the root *kamoso*, thereby preventing the clipping from reaching the right edge of the root.

It is possible to narrow down our list of candidates, enumerated in (6.27),<sup>22</sup> even further. The surface form in question may be derived from a full form via

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<sup>21</sup>Note that the choice of the object person marker in these candidate forms is arbitrary, and *=ri* could be replaced by any other object person marker.

<sup>22</sup>Note that the choice of object person marker in (6.27d&e) is arbitrary.

the omission of the extrametrical final syllable (marked by angle brackets), as in (6.27a); or of the penultimate extrametrical syllable and the final extraprosodic syllable (where the right square bracket marks the right edge of the prosodic, but not phonological, word), as in (6.27e). However, we can eliminate the forms in (6.27c&d) as candidates, because of the creation of a degenerate final foot because of the the sonority of /a/. The footing of this syllable would block its deletion, resulting in the minimal clipped form [noŋkamosota], rather than [noŋkamoso].

(6.27)

a. [noŋkamoso]

b. (noN.ka)(mo.so)<te>

*no*= N-            *kamoso* -∅        -*e*  
 1S= IRREAL- visit    -IMPF -IRREAL.I  
 'I will visit.'

c. (noNka)(moso)(ta) <ke>

*no*= N-            *kamoso* -*ak*        -*e*  
 1S= IRREAL- visit    -PERF -IRREAL.I  
 'I will visit.'

d. (noN.ka)(mo.so)(ta) <ke>]ri

*no*= N-            *kamoso* -*ak*        -*e*                =*ri*  
 1S= IRREAL- visit    -PERF -IRREAL.I =3mO  
 'I will visit him.'

e. (noN.ka)(mo.so)t<e>]ri

*no*= N-            *kamoso* -∅        -*e*                =*ri*  
 1S= IRREAL- visit    -IMPF -IRREAL.I =3mO  
 'I will visit him.'

Phonological and morphological analysis can take us no further in this case, leaving both (6.27a&d) as possible full forms. In some cases it is possible to choose either the transitive or the intransitive form over the other, on the basis of discourse context, but not always.

A slightly different deductive process is illustrated by the surface form [noŋkamosotak<sup>j</sup>e], which exhibits palatalization of the penultimate voiceless velar stop. Recall from §6.2.2 that consonants palatalize before /eC[+high]/ sequences, which indicates that the segments deleted from the form in question must be segments that supply the necessary environment for the palatalization; that is, the deleted segments must be /C[+high]/. In the position in question, the only morphologically possible sequences that satisfy the phonological requirement just deduced are /ri/, the third person masculine object marker, or /Npi/, the second person object marker. At that point, knowledge about communicative context is normally sufficient to reconstruct the underlying unclipped form as either *noNkamosotakeri* ‘I will visit him’ or *noNkamosotakeNpi* ‘I will visit you’.

### 6.2.3.2 Syllable structure, epenthesis, and deletion

Constraints on syllable structure play an important role in Nanti phonology by triggering widespread epenthesis and deletion of segments, largely in order to avoid illicit syllabic structures resulting from the concatenation of verbal morphology.<sup>23</sup>

An accurate description of permitted syllable types requires that we distinguish tautomorphemic syllables from heteromorphemic ones, and that we distinguish the evaluation of syllable structure at the level of lexical phonology from its evaluation at the level of postlexical phonology. The following structural constraints hold for all syllable types, and at all levels of the phonology:

- i) complex onsets are not permitted;

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<sup>23</sup>The concatenation of nominal morphology, minimal to begin with, never produces illicit syllabic structures.



- ii) onsetless syllables are permitted only in word-initial position;
- iii) the only permitted coda is the underspecified nasal N, and then only when followed by a voiceless stop in the onset of the next syllable (hence, no word-final nasals);
- iv) diphthongs cannot be of rising sonority; and
- v) triphthongs are not permitted.

Table 6.5: Nanti syllable types

$\sigma$ -TYPE	LEXICAL PHONOLOGY	POSTLEXICAL PHONOLOGY
tautomorphemic	(C)V(N), (C)V:N, (C)V <sub>1</sub> V <sub>2</sub> (N)	(C)V(N/S), (C)V:N, (C)V <sub>1</sub> V <sub>2</sub> (N)
heteromorphemic	(C)V(N), (C)V:N	(C)V(N), (C)V:N, (C)V <sub>1</sub> V <sub>2</sub> (N)

At the level of lexical phonology, then, both heteromorphemic vowel clusters and heteromorphemic consonant clusters (with the exception of NC sequences) are forbidden. When these illicit sequences of vowels or consonants arise from morphological concatenation, either epenthesis or deletion occurs, depending on the location of the illicit sequence with respect to the verb root. In the post-root environment, illicit consonant clusters are typically resolved by epenthesis of the segment /a/ between the two consonants, as in (6.28), where epenthetic /a/ appears between the root *keNt* ‘pierce’ and the frustrative suffix *-be*. Illicit sequences of vowels are resolved by epenthesis of the segment /t/ between the two vowels, shown in the same example, where epenthetic /t/ appears between the frustrative suffix and the perfective *-ak*.<sup>24</sup> Note that throughout the present work, epenthetic segments are indicated in the first line of interlinearized examples with a sans serif font (**a**, **t**).

<sup>24</sup>The first analysis of epenthesis for a Kampan language is found in Payne’s (1981) work on Apurucayali Ashéninka phonology, which my discussion here largely follows.

(6.28) *nokentabetakaro*

*no= keNt -be -ak -a =ro*  
 1S= pierce -FRUS -PERF -REAL.A =3nmO  
 ‘I failed to hit it with an arrow.’

In pre-root environments, where there is much less morphology, a different situation obtains. Because of the particular forms of Nanti verb prefixes and proclitics, no heteromorphemic consonant clusters ever arise from morphological concatenation in pre-root environments, though illicit heteromorphemic vowel sequences do. These instances of vowel hiatus are not resolved by epenthesis, however, but rather by deletion of the the first vowel in the heteromorphemic sequence, as in (6.29). In this example, there are two instances of vowel deletion: i) the deletion of the vowel in the second person subject marker, and ii) the deletion of the final vowel of the causative prefix.

(6.29) *pogaratiNkero* [pogaratiŋksero]

*pi= ogi- aratiNk -e =ro*  
 2S= CAUS- stand.up IRREAL.I =3nmO  
 ‘You will stand it up (e.g. a housepost) (polite imperative).’

As would be expected of a lexical phonological process, we find a small number of exceptions to the processes just described. In particular, we find irregularities in pre-root vowel hiatus resolution and post root consonant cluster resolution. In the former case, we find that pre-root vowel hiatus resolution behaves irregularly when the first person masculine subject marker *i=*, or the first person plural inclusive subject marker *a=*, are the first member of an illicit vowel sequence. In the former case, the person marker becomes a glide, instead of deleting, as in (6.30); whereas in the latter case, the *second* vowel of the illicit sequence deletes, rather than the first, as in (6.31). Note that these irregularities with respect to rules of vowel hiatus

resolution serve to preserve the surface contrast between third person masculine, third person non-masculine, and first person plural inclusive person markers.

(6.30) Yanuti.

*i*=        *anu*     $\emptyset$         *-i*  
 3mS= walk -IMPF -REALIS.I  
 ‘He is walking.’

(6.31) Abiikenpa oburoki!

*a*=            N-            *obiik*    *-enpa*        *oburoki!*  
 1pl.inc.S= IRREAL- drink -IRREAL.A manioc.beer  
 ‘Let’s drink manioc beer!’

Irregularities in post-root consonant cluster resolution principally involve clusters resulting from the suffixation of consonant-initial classifiers and incorporated nouns to particular consonant-final verb roots. In these cases, the consonant cluster is resolved by deleting the final consonant of the root instead of epenthesizing an /a/ between the root and the classifier or incorporated noun.

In (6.32), for example, we see that the final consonant of the root *orog* ‘dry’ deletes when the classifier *-bi* ‘1D.rigid.hollow’ is suffixed to it, and in (6.33), we see that the final consonant of the root *tot* ‘cut’ deletes when the incorporated noun *shi* ‘hair’ is suffixed to it.

(6.32) a. Norogakero.

*no*=    *o[+voice]-*        *rog*        *-ak*        *-i*            =*ro*  
 1S= CAUS:NAGNT- be.dry -PERF -REAL.I =3NMO  
 ‘I dried it.’

b. Norobitakero.

*no= o[+voice]- rog -bi -ak -i*  
 1S= CAUS:NAGNT- be.dry -CL:1D.rigid.hollow -PERF -REAL.I  
 =*ro*  
 =3NMO  
 ‘I dried it (arrow cane).’

(6.33) a. Ototahigakero.

*o= tot -hig -ak -i =ro*  
 3nmS= cut -PL -PERF -REAL.I =3NMO  
 ‘They cut it.’

b. Otoshitakena.

*o= tot -shi -ak -i =na*  
 3nmS= cut -HAIR -PERF -REAL.I =3NMO  
 ‘She cut my hair.’

### 6.2.3.3 Bare stem vowel deletion

Nanti generally does not permit the initial vowel of a verb stem to align with the left edge of a phonological word. In circumstances in which this impermissible alignment would occur, the vowel deletes. In (6.34), for example, the subject person clitic – which typically occurs at the left edge of the phonological word that contains the verbal grammatical word, as shown in (6.34) – has been stripped off by the process imperative formation (see §6.4.2.3), and the verb-initial vowel has been deleted with it.

(6.34) a. Genparo!

*oog -eNpa =ro*  
 consume -IRREAL.A =3nmO  
 ‘Eat it!’

b. Poogenparo.

*pi= oog -eNpa =ro*  
 2S= consume -IRREAL.A =3nmO  
 ‘Please eat it.’

Other processes that strip off the subject person clitic and trigger bare stem vowel deletion include NP extraction in interrogative constructions, as in (6.35) and subject focus constructions, as in (6.36).

(6.35) *Tsini tabagetakero oka osahari?*

*tsini aNtabaget -ak -i =ro o- oka osahari*  
 who cultivate -PERF -REAL.I =3nmO 3nm- this clearing  
 ‘Who cultivated this clearing?’

(6.36) *Iryo gipigahiro.*

*iryo ogi- pig -ah -i =ro*  
 3m.FOC.PRO CAUS:AGNT return -REG -REAL.I =3nmO  
 ‘He returned it.’

Note that bare stem vowel deletion sometimes creates illicit syllable structures that trigger further deletion, as in (6.35), where the deletion of the initial vowel /a/ creates an illicit /Nt/ complex onset. The onset is subsequently simplified by deletion of the the nasal. Note also that the vowel deleted in (6.36) pertains to the causative prefix, showing that the constraint against phonological word-initial vowels applies to the verb stem, and not simply to the verb root.

There are two indications that bare stem vowel deletion is a lexical phonological process. First, this process does not apply to certain irregular verbs, such as the existential verbs *ainyo* (animate) and *aityo* (inanimate). Second, there is clear evidence of lexical phonological rule ordering. In particular, it is clear that bare stem vowel deletion applies before vowel hiatus resolution, which I have argued to be a lexical phonological process. Consider, for example, the forms given in (6.37a) and

(6.37b). In (6.37a), we see that the bare verb stem has undergone vowel deletion, as expected. In (6.37b), however, the verb stem has not undergone vowel deletion, despite it lacking any surface manifestation of the deleted subject person clitic *o=*. The simplest explanation is that bare stem vowel deletion applies prior to vowel hiatus resolution. Under this hypothesis, bare stem vowel deletion does not apply to (6.37b) because the person subject marker has yet to be lost, meaning that at this point in the derivation, the stem-initial vowel is not yet aligned with the left edge of the phonological word.

(6.37) a. Hirikero!

*ahirik -e =ro*  
 hold -IRREAL.I =3nmO  
 ‘Hold it!’

b. Ahirikero.

*o= ahirik -i =ro*  
 3nmS= hold -REAL.I =3nmO  
 ‘She held it.’

#### 6.2.3.4 Postlexical /h/-deletion

The final process we consider is a postlexical one, that of intervocalic /h/-deletion. Under this process, any intervocalic /h/ may delete, providing that the resulting syllable obeys the constraint against syllabic nuclei of increasing sonority. The role of this constraint in governing /h/-deletion can be seen by comparing (6.38) and (6.39). In (6.38), the sole intervocalic /h/ can delete, because the resulting syllable is a diphthong of decreasing sonority. In (6.39), however, we find a more complicated situation, where two intervocalic /h/ are found in a sequence of the form /nehahi/. In this case, only the second /h/ deletes, since deletion of the first would result in a diphthong of increasing sonority.

(6.38) underlying form: pishaniNkahegi

surface form: [piʃaniŋkãegʒi]

(6.39) underlying form: nonehahiri

surface form: [nonehãiri]

Note that /h/-deletion is a counter-feeding process that produces heteromorphemic vowel hiatus which would be illicit at the level of lexical phonology, and which would be resolved by /t/-epenthesis at that level. However, since /h/-deletion is a postlexical process, /t/-epenthesis does not apply.

As one would expect of a postlexical phonological process, /h/-deletion is significantly affected by speaking rate and style. Otherwise deleted intervocalic /h/ frequently surfaces in emphatic speech, especially scolding talk (Beier, 2005), and in *karĩntaa* poetry (Beier, 2003; Michael, 2004a).

### 6.3 Word classes and morphology

Nanti exhibits clearly distinguished open classes of verbs and nouns, and closed classes of adjectives, adverbs, demonstratives, pronouns and clausal clitics. Each class is easily differentiated by its morphological characteristics; consequently I provide discussion of the criteria used to distinguish among them in the morphological description of each class. Two morphological systems, noun incorporation and the multiple classifier system, share certain features and cross-cut word classes in such a way that it is most convenient to treat them in their own section, following the word class based discussion of morphology. I distribute my discussion of exocentric morphology among word classes, treating particular processes with the word class they ultimately derive. I defer discussion of focus pronouns, demonstrative and topic pronouns, and reflexive pronouns to §6.4, since the description of these pronoun classes benefits from an understanding of their syntactic functions.

Nanti is a head-marking, polysynthetic language. The vast majority of grammatical relations are marked by verbal morphology, rather than by case markers or adpositions. Similarly, the vast majority of interclausal relations are marked by morphology on verbs in the main clause rather than by clause-linking morphology or syntactic elements located in the dependent clause. As a consequence, descriptions of Nanti verbal morphology and of Nanti syntax overlap at many points. And indeed, most morphology in the language is verbal morphology. In order to avoid redundancy in this sketch, I have chosen to postpone discussion of the aspects of morphology most closely tied to grammatical relations and interclausal relations to the following Syntax section (§6.4), though for the sake of completeness I do mention the relevant morphology in this section.

In this section, I largely follow the established modern terminology employed by Kampanists (e.g. Snell, 1998; Payne, 1981; Swift, 1988) for the morphemes and grammatical categories that I discuss. However, my terminology diverges from this tradition when Kampanist terminology is at odds with more widely used descriptivist terminology (for example, I employ the terms ‘perfective’ and ‘imperfective’ for the categories that Kampanists have called ‘completive’ and ‘incompletive’); or when wider Kampanist terminology is misleading with respect to Nanti (for example, the terms ‘reflexive’ and ‘irreflexive’ for verb classes, which I refer to as the ‘A-class’ and ‘I-class’ verb classes, see below).

### **6.3.1 Verbal morphology and morphophonology**

We can distinguish two basic groups of Nanti verbs: i) an open class of lexical verbs that can combine freely with derivational and inflectional morphology, and takes regular person-marking morphology; and ii) a small closed group of existential verbs and copulas that exhibit highly restricted combinatorial possibilities with respect to inflectional, derivational, and person-marking morphology. We begin by considering



the morphology and morphophonology of the former open class of verbs, and then turn to the latter closed class.

For expositional purposes I follow the traditional distinction between inflectional and derivational morphology (Beard, 2001; Stump, 2001). This distinction is useful for the bulk of Nanti verbal morphology, but there are some morphemes, such as the directionals and the trajectal *-ah*, which show a mixture of inflectional and derivational characteristics. Such instances will be discussed on a case-by-case basis.

The basic structure of the Nanti verb is given in (6.40). Derivational affixes are located closest to the verb root, with inflectional affixes and then verbal person-marking clitics forming the next morphological layers. The vast majority of verbal derivational morphology is suffixal, except for a small set of causative prefixes (see §6.3.1.3.3). Similarly, inflectional morphology is exclusively suffixal, with the exception of an irrealis reality status prefix (see §6.3.1.1.1). Subject and object person-marking clitics form the final layer, outside inflectional morphology.

(6.40) SUBJECT=IRREALIS-CAUSATIVE-**ROOT**-DERIVATION-INFLECTION=OBJECT

### 6.3.1.1 Inflectional morphology

Inflectional morphology is located in two regions in the Nanti verb: i) to the left of the verb root and any causative prefixes, in the sole case of the irrealis reality status prefix, and ii) to the right of the verb and any derivational suffixes, for the remainder of inflectional morphology. Suffixal inflectional morphology falls into two major groups: obligatory inflection, which consists of aspect and reality status marking; and a set of optional suffixes that includes directionals, locatives, number-marking associated with verbal referents, and several verbal quantificational and intensity suffixes. The ordering of inflectional morphology is given in Table 6.6.

Table 6.6: Nanti verbal inflectional suffixes

ROOT + DERIVATION	VERB QUANTIFIER	ARGUMENT NUMBER	DIRECTIONAL	ASPECT	REALITY STATUS
	- <b>uma</b> extreme - <b>bage</b> durative - <b>asano</b> complete - <b>na</b> malefactive repetitive	- <b>hig</b> plural - <b>ge</b> distributive	- <b>an</b> ablativ - <b>apah</b> adlative - <b>ab</b> semantic transitivizer - <b>ah</b> regressive (perfective) - <b>ut</b> returnative (perfective) - <b>aki</b> translocative (perfective) - <b>aa</b> translocative (imperfective)	- <b>ak</b> perfective - $\emptyset$ imperfective	- <b>i/a</b> realis - <b>e/-enpa</b> irrealis

**6.3.1.1.1 Reality status** In Nanti, a binary reality status<sup>25</sup> distinction between realis and irrealis is obligatorily marked on verbs. In this section, I focus on the morphology and morphophonology of this category, and its semantics in simple clauses. Reality status marking is also complexly enmeshed with negation, modality, and clause-linking; I describe the semantics and morphosyntax of this category in greater detail in my discussions of those phenomena.

Realis and irrealis morphemes exhibit allomorphy based on the membership of verb roots to which they attach in one of two arbitrary classes,<sup>26</sup> which I refer to as A-class verbs and I-class verbs, respectively. As shown in Table 6.7, the allomorphs of the realis morpheme are exclusively suffixes, but the allomorphs of the irrealis morpheme are circumfixes. For expositional convenience, I refer to the two parts of the circumfix as the *irrealis prefix* and *irrealis suffix*, respectively.

Table 6.7: Nanti reality status morphology

VERB CLASS	REALIS	IRREALIS
A-class	-a	N- -eNpa
I-class	-i	N- -e

Verb stems generally maintain the verb class of their roots, but certain derivational and quasi-derivational suffixes alter the class of the stem, such as the frustrative suffix *-be*. The verb-class altering behavior of the latter suffix is illustrated in

<sup>25</sup>The realis/irrealis distinction is variously treated as a modal distinction (e.g. Palmer, 2001) or a ‘status’ distinction (e.g. Van Valin and LaPolla, 1997). I follow Elliott (2000) in referring to this category as *reality status*. There is some debate over the typological validity of reality status (under whatever name) as a grammatical category. Arguments against the typological validity of the realis/irrealis distinction are made by Bybee et al. (1994) and Bybee (1998), while arguments in its favor are made by Mithun (1995) and Givón (1995), among others. The utility of the realis/irrealis distinction in describing Nanti morphology and morphosyntax (Michael, 2007) leads me to side with the latter scholars.

<sup>26</sup>Following Payne (1981), Kampanists generally refer to these two classes of verbs as *reflexive verbs* and *irreflexive verbs*. In Nanti, however, the correlation between reflexivity and the two verb classes is synchronically so weak that I have abandoned this terminology. In Nanti, semantic reflexivity is expressed through reflexive pronouns (§6.4.2.1.3).

(6.41), where in (6.41a) we see that in the absence of the frustrative, the verb root *neh* ‘see’ is an I-class verb, but when derived with the frustrative *-be*, as in (6.41b), the stem takes A-class reality status marking. If a stem includes multiple verb-class altering suffixes, the rightmost suffix determines the ultimate verb class of the stem.

(6.41) a. Nonehiri.

*no*= *neh*  $\emptyset$  *-i* =*ri*  
 1S= see -IMPR -REAL.I =3mO  
 ‘I see him.’

b. Nonehabetakari.

*no*= *neh* *-be* *-ak* *-a* =*ri*  
 1S= see -FRUS -PERF -REAL.A =3mO  
 ‘I saw him (but without the expected result).’

A small set of intransitive verb roots exhibits ‘mixed’ verb class behavior, taking *-a* for realis and *-e* for irrealis, such as the verb *shig* ‘run’, seen in (6.42); and *norih* ‘lie down’, seen in (6.43).

(6.42) a. Noshiga.

*no*= *shig* *-a*  
 1S= run REAL.A  
 ‘I run.’

b. Noshige.

*no*= N- *shig* *-e*  
 1S= IRREAL- run -IRREAL.I  
 ‘I will run.’

(6.43) a. Onoriha.

*o*= *norih*  $\emptyset$  *-a*  
 3nmS= lie.down -IMPF -REAL.A  
 ‘She is lying down.’

b. Onorihe.

o= N- *norih* -∅ -e  
 3nmS= IRREAL- lie.down -IMPF -IRREAL.I  
 ‘She will lie down.’

Allophony, phonotactics, and morphophonology play an important role in the surface realization of reality status marking; I discuss this now, considering first the irrealis prefix, and then the realis and irrealis suffixes. The irrealis prefix consists solely of a nasal unspecified for place of articulation. As already discussed in §6.2.1.1, this segment place-assimilates to the following voiceless stop, as in (6.44a&b). In the absence of an available voiceless stop, Nanti handles this phonotactic constraint in two ways: i) if a voiceless stop is available to the nasal by the metathesis of a single segment, as in (6.44b), the nasal is retained;<sup>27</sup> otherwise, the nasal is deleted, as in (6.44c). Note that the irrealis prefix has an allophone *r-*, which appears before vowel initial stems when the subject is third person masculine, as in (6.45).

(6.44) a. [ompatu<sup>h</sup>iije]

o= N- *patuh* -∅ -e  
 3nmS= IRREAL- break.in.two -IMPF -IRREAL.I  
 ‘It will break in two.’

b. [nantagu<sup>h</sup>itakse]

no= N- *atagu* -ak -e  
 1S= IRREAL- climb.up -PERF -IRREAL.I  
 ‘I will climb up.’

c. [nawowu<sup>h</sup>itero]

no= N- *abobu* -∅ -e =ro  
 1S= IRREAL- sew -IMPF -IRREAL.I =3NMO  
 ‘I will sew it.’

<sup>27</sup>Note that Nanti verb roots never begin with voiced stops.

(6.45) Iratsikakenpi.

*i*= *r*- *atsik* -*ak* -*e* =*Npi*  
 3mS= IRREAL- bite -PERF -IRREAL.I =2O)  
 ‘It (masc.) will bite you.’

Reality status suffixes are affected by a morphophonological process of vowel lowering that neutralizes the contrast between I-class realis and irrealis suffixes in certain morphological contexts. Following the perfective *-ak*, the I-class suffixes *-i* and *-e* neutralize to *-e*, as exemplified in (6.46).<sup>28</sup>

(6.46) Notogakero.

*no*= *tog* -*ak* -*i* =*ro*  
 1S= fell -PERF -REAL.I =3nmO  
 ‘I felled it.’

It should be noted that I have encountered some variation in the morphophonological neutralization of the reality status suffixes. For example, in the speech of some speakers, *-i* and *-e* do not always neutralize to *-e* when followed by the third person masculine enclitic *=ri*. Thus, the same basic form may surface, for example, as either *nonehakeri* or *nonehakiri* ‘I saw him’, though the former is certainly the most common variant. Another occasional neutralization is the that of *-i* and *-a* to *-a* before the first person object clitic *=na*, as exemplified in (6.47). I have yet to uncover the basis for the variation in these morphophonological processes.

(6.47) Ipana.

*i*= *p* -*i* =*na*  
 3mS= give -REALIS.I =1O  
 ‘He gave (something to) me.’

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<sup>28</sup>Note that in the case of verbs where the irrealis prefix N- also deletes, the neutralization in question results in verbs which are formally ambiguous with regard to reality status.

Turning to the semantics of reality status in Nanti, we find that realis marking is associated with positive polarity indicative of non-future temporal reference, as in (6.48); while irrealis marking is associated with future temporal reference, as in (6.49), with negative polarity, as in (6.50), and with counterfactual modality (see §6.4.3.4).

(6.48) Nosekataka inkahara.

*no= seka -ak -a inkahara*  
 1S= eat -PERF -REAL.A earlier  
 ‘I ate earlier.’

(6.49) Inpoke kamani.

*i= N- pok -e kamani*  
 3mS= IRREAL- come -IRREAL.I tomorrow  
 ‘He will come tomorrow.’

(6.50) Tera nonkeme.

*tera no= N- kem -e*  
 NEG.REAL 1S= IRREAL- hear -IRREAL.I  
 ‘I did not hear.’

Beyond this basic semantic core, the marking of reality status in Nanti becomes complicated, especially in contexts where multiple semantically irrealis features, such as negation and future temporal reference, combine in a single clause. These issues are discussed in §6.4.

Nanti exhibits two endocentric verbal derivations that affect the marking of reality status: the passive and the focal relativizer. The passive retains the basic realis/irrealis contrast but marks it with portmanteau passive-realis and passive-irrealis morphemes, *-agani* and *-enkani*, respectively (see §6.3.1.3.2). The focal relativizer *aNkicha* neutralizes the reality status distinction (see §6.4.3).

**6.3.1.1.2 Aspect, trajectals, and translocatives** Aspect is the other obligatory grammatical category of the Nanti verb. Nanti exhibits a basic perfective/imperfective contrast, which is marked either by dedicated aspectual morphemes, or by portmanteau morphemes with additional spatial meanings. The dedicated aspectual morphemes and the spatial-aspectual portmanteaus form a single morphological paradigm, whose members occupy the position immediately to the left of the reality status morpheme position. It should be noted that Nanti also exhibits a pair of optional directional morphemes, discussed below, which belong to a separate paradigm and exhibit aspectual extensions to their basic directional senses.

**6.3.1.1.2.1 Perfective and imperfective** The dedicated aspectual morphemes consist of the perfective *-ak* and the zero-marked imperfective, exemplified in (6.51a) and (6.51b), respectively.

(6.51) a. Yobiikaka.

<i>i=</i>	<i>obiik</i>	<i>-ak</i>	<i>-a</i>
3mS=	drink	-PERF	-REALIS.A
'He drank.'			

b. Yobiika.

<i>i=</i>	<i>obiik</i>	$\emptyset$	<i>-a</i>
3mS=	drink	-IMPF	-REALIS.A
'He is drinking.'			

In negated clauses, the perfective/imperfective contrast is neutralized (or unmarked), as in (6.52). The contrast is also neutralized in the passive voice (see §6.3.1.3.2.1).

(6.52) a. Tera inpoke.

<i>tera</i>	<i>i=</i>	N-	<i>pok</i>	<i>-e</i>
NEG.REAL	3mS=	IRREAL-	come	-IRREAL.I



‘He did not come’ (perfective reading)/‘He is not coming’ (imperfective reading)

b. \*Tera inpokake.

Nanti exhibits four portmanteau morphemes with spatial and aspectual meanings: two *trajectals*, morphemes that indicate trajectories of motion; and two *translocatives*, morphemes that indicate realization of the predicate at a distal point. Both trajectals additionally encode perfective aspect, while the two translocatives encode the same spatial meaning, but contrast in aspect.

**6.3.1.1.2.2 Regressive** When affixed to motion verbs, the regressive trajectal *-ah* indicates motion from some point back to a salient point of origin, as in (6.53).

(6.53) Ihatahi ibaNkoku.

<i>i=</i>	<i>ha</i>	<i>-ah</i>	<i>-i</i>	<i>i-</i>	<i>baNko</i>	<i>-ku</i>
3mS=	go	-REG	-REALIS.I	3mP-	house	-LOC
‘He went back to his house.’						

When the regressive *-ah* is suffixed to most non-motion verbs, the sense of repetition of the action (or return to the state) indicated by the verb obtains, as in (6.54) and (6.55). A number of verb roots also exhibit lexicalization of the regressive, e.g. *obetsikah* ‘repair’ (cf. *obetsik* ‘make’) and *ogotah* ‘recognize’ (cf. *ogo* ‘know’).

(6.54) Noshitikahiro.

<i>no=</i>	<i>shitik</i>	<i>-ah</i>	<i>-i</i>	<i>=ro</i>
1S=	tie.knot	-REG	REAL.I	=3NMO
‘I re-knotted it.’				

(6.55) Omagahi.

*o= mag -ah -i*  
 3nmS sleep -REG -REAL.I  
 ‘She went back to sleep.’

The regressive also gives rise to an abilitive modal reading in cases in which the spatial and repetition readings are unfavored, as in (6.56) and (6.57). The utterance in (6.56), for example, was produced by someone who was not able to draw the bow in question at all, and not by someone who was unable to draw it a second time.

(6.56) Tenontintsigahe.

*te= no= N- tintsig -ah -e*  
 NEG.REAL= 1S= IRREAL- draw.bow -REG -IRREAL.I  
 ‘I can’t draw the bow.’

(6.57) Iporonkantahi.

*i= poronk -ant -ah -i*  
 3mS= sting -CHAR -REG REAL.I  
 ‘It (a species of caterpillar) is capable of stinging.’

Finally, we note that the regressive alters the verb class of the stem to which it attaches, producing an I-class stem, as in (6.58b). In this respect, the regressive exhibits a property characteristic of derivational morphology, despite forming a paradigm with exclusively inflectional morphology.

(6.58) a. Nopigaka.

*no= pig -ak -a*  
 1S= return -PERF -REAL.A  
 ‘I returned.’

b. Nopigahi.<sup>29</sup>

*no= pig -ah -i*  
 1S= return -REG -REAL.I  
 ‘I returned.’

**6.3.1.1.2.3 Returnative** The returnative trajectal *-ut* indicates motion from some initial point to a distal point, and subsequently back to the initial point, without a significant lapse of time between the outbound trajectory to the distal point and the return trajectory back to the initial point. This spatial sense of the returnative obtains both with motion verbs and with non-state non-motion verbs. With motion verbs, the returnative simply indicates a ‘there and back’ trajectory. With non-state non-motion verbs, the returnative indicates that the action was carried out at the distal turning point of the trajectory, as in (6.60).

(6.59) Ishiguti.

*i= shig -ut -i*  
 3mS= run -RET -REAL.I  
 ‘He ran there and back.’

(6.60) Iputiri.

*i= p -ut -i =ri*  
 3mS= give -RET -REAL.I =3mO  
 ‘He gave it to him (going to him, giving it to him, then returning).’

When affixed to state verbs, the returnative *-ut* indicates that the state held for a brief period of time, as in (6.61). This interpretation is compatible with a distal realization interpretation, but does not require it.

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<sup>29</sup>The affixation of the regressive to the root *pig* ‘return’ may strike the reader as redundant. In this case, however, it expresses repetition of the act of returning to a particular place, with the resulting implication that the place in question is one that the subject frequently or habitually returns to, such as a home. Thanks to Christine Beier for clarification on this point.

(6.61) Nomaguti.

*no= mag -ut -i*  
1S= sleep -RET REAL.I  
'I slept briefly.'

**6.3.1.1.2.4 Perfective and imperfective translocatives** The two translocatives, *-aki* and *-aa*, have identical spatial meanings, indicating that the action expressed by the verb is realized at a point distal to the deictic center. The two morphemes contrast only in their aspectual meanings: *-aki* is perfective, while *-aa* is imperfective.

(6.62) a. Nokamosotakitiri.

*no= kamoso -aki -i =ri*  
1S= visit -TRNLOC.PERF -REAL.I =3MO  
'I visited him over there.'

b. Nonehaatiri.

*no= neh -aa -i =ri*  
1S= see -TRNLOC.IMPF -REAL.I =3MO  
'I saw him over there.'

**6.3.1.1.3 Grammatical number** While the person and gender of verbal arguments can be marked by means of the subject proclitics and object enclitics (see §6.3.1.2.1), or by free focus pronouns (see §6.4.1), the grammatical *number* of verbal arguments is generally specified by verbal suffixes, as person markers mostly do not carry number information.<sup>30</sup> There are two distinct verbal suffixes that mark grammatical number: the plural *-hig* and the distributive *-ge*.

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<sup>30</sup>The sole exception is the first person plural inclusive subject person marker *a=*.

**6.3.1.1.3.1 Plural** The plural suffix *-hig* indicates that at least one of the verb's arguments is plural. For intransitives, then, the plural suffix indicates that the subject is plural; while for transitive verbs, it indicates that either the subject, the object, or both, are plural, as illustrated in (6.63). Only discursive context and world knowledge can disambiguate the scope of the plural suffix in the latter case.

(6.63) *Ikamosohigakeri.*

*i*=      *kamoso* *-hig* *-ak*      *-i*      =*ri*  
 3mS=    visit      -PL    -PERF   -REAL.I   =3MO  
 'They visited him./He visited them./They visited them.'

**6.3.1.1.3.2 Distributive** The distributive suffix *-ge*, in addition to marking plurality of verbal arguments, indicates that the multiple referents in question are separated into groups (of possibly one referent each) which occupy distinct points in space, as in (6.64), and/or time, as in (6.65). The distributive exhibits an 'ergative' pattern, in that the distributive sense applies to the subjects of intransitives, as in (6.64) and (6.65) and the objects of transitives, as in (6.66). The distributive has also been lexicalized in a few cases, such as *kaNtagena* 'banter, kid around' (cf. *kaNt* 'say').

(6.64) *Inageti aka.*

*i*=      *n*                      *-ge*       $\emptyset$       *-i*      *aka*  
 3mS=    be.in.location   -DSTR   -IMPF   -REALIS.I   here  
 'They are here (at the same time, in different locations).'

(6.65) *Ihageti kara.*

*i*=      *ha* *-ge*       $\emptyset$       *-i*      *kara*  
 3mS=    go   -DSTR   -IMPF   -REAL.I   there  
 'They went there (in separate groups, at different times).'

(6.66) Tobaheri pogabisagetake.

*tobaheri*    *pi=*    *ogi-*                    *abis*    *-ge*    *-ak*    *-i*  
 companion 2S= CAUS:AGNT pass.by -DSTR -PERF -REAL.I  
 ‘You let various groups of your companions pass by.’

**6.3.1.1.4 Directionals** Nanti exhibits two directional suffixes: the ablative, *-an*, and the adlative *-apah*, which indicate the direction of motion of the subject of intransitives (6.67a,b) and the object of transitives (6.68a,b). The ablative indicates motion away from the deictic center, while the adlative indicates motion towards the deictic center. A third suffix, *-ab* ‘semantic transitivizer’, forms a paradigm with the two directionals, and judging by its cognates in the other Kampan languages (Snell, 1998; Swift, 1988; Payne et al., 1982), was historically a directional used with transitives to indicate motion of the subject towards the object of the verb. In Nanti, however, it appears that the directional sense is no longer operative (or is at least very rare), and the non-directional sense, discussed below, obtains synchronically. All these suffixes are optional. Note that adlative *-apah* derives I-class verb stems (see 6.117).

(6.67) a. Ishiganaka.

*i=*        *shig*    *-an*    *-ak*    *-a*  
 3mS= run    -ABL    -PERF    -REAL.A  
 ‘He ran away.’

b. Imonteapahi.

*i=*        *monteh*    *-apah*     $\emptyset$     *-i*  
 3mS= cross.river    -ADL    -IMPF    -REAL.I  
 ‘He is crossing the river towards (me).’

(6.68) a. Ihokanakero.

*i*=     *hok*     -*an*   -*ak*    -*i*        =*ro*  
 3mS=   discard -ABL -PERF REAL.I =3nmO  
 ‘He threw it away.’

b. Inoshikapahakero.

*i*=     *noshik* -*apah* -*ak*    -*i*        =*ro*  
 3mS=   pull    -ADL -PERF -REAL.I =3NMO  
 ‘He pulled it towards (him).’

All members of the paradigm also have non-directional meanings when used with non-motion verbs. An inceptive sense obtains for the ablative *-an*, as in (6.69), while a temporal sense ‘upon arriving’ obtains for the adlative *apah*, as in (6.70).

(6.69) Okatsitanake.

*o*=     *katsi* -*an*    -*ak*    -*i*  
 3nmS=   hurt   -INCP -PERF REAL.I  
 ‘It began to hurt.’

(6.70) Nonehapahiri.

*no*=   *neh* -*apah*       -∅     -*i*        =*ri*  
 1S=   see   -TEMP.ADL -IMPF -REAL.I =3mO  
 ‘I saw him upon arriving.’

As mentioned above, the suffix *-ab* has apparently lost all directional meaning in Nanti, and only the non-directional sense remains. The suffix *-ab* increases the semantic transitivity of the verb, in the sense of Hopper and Thompson (1980), and is affixed only to transitive verbs, indicating increased affectedness of the object or increased effort and attention on the part of the subject towards the object, as illustrated in (6.71b).

(6.71) a. Inehakinpi.

*i*=      *neh* *-ak*    *-i*            =*Npi*  
 3mS= see -PERF -REAL.I =2O  
 ‘He saw you.’

b. InehabakiNpi.

*i*=      *neh* *-ab*            *-ak*    *-i*            =*Npi*  
 3mS= see -STRANS -PERF -REAL.I =2O  
 ‘He watched you intently.’

Directionals in Nanti share attributes of both inflection and derivation. They are entirely productive, exhibit compositionality, do not alter the basic meaning of the root, and with the exception of *-apah*, do not alter the word class of the root, making them inflection-like. However, they are completely optional, a characteristic of derivational morphology. Nevertheless, the preponderance of inflectional characteristics leads me to treat directionals as part of the Nanti inflectional system.

**6.3.1.1.5 Intensity and quantification** Nanti exhibits several optional verbal suffixes that qualify the intensity with which, or degree to which, the action or state expressed by the verb stem is realized.

**6.3.1.1.5.1 Undesirable extremal** The undesirable extremal suffix *-uma* indicates that the action or state expressed by the verb to which it is affixed is realized to an extreme degree. This suffix is typically employed in contexts where the realization of an action or state, or in the case of negative polarity sentences, its lack of realization, is undesirable, unsatisfactory, or unpleasant.

This suffix interacts with sentence polarity in an interesting way. In positive polarity sentences such as (6.72a), the suffix indicates a high degree of realization of the action or state expressed by the verb. In negative polarity sentences, however, the suffix indicates that there was absolutely no realization of the action or state expressed by the verb, as in (6.72b). That is, the negative polarity sentence is not



simply the negation of the corresponding positive polarity sentence (which would permit, for example, readings of moderate-intensity realizations of the verb).

(6.72) a. NopiNkumati matsontsori.

*no= piNk -uma -∅ -i matsontsori*  
 1S= be.afraid -EXTR -IMPF -REAL.I jaguar  
 ‘I am really afraid of jaguars.’

b. Tera inpokumate chapi.

*tera i= N- pok -uma -∅ -e*  
 NEG.REAL 3mS= IRREAL- come -EXTR -IMPF -IRREAL.I  
*chapi*  
 yesterday  
 ‘He did not come at all yesterday.’

**6.3.1.1.5.2 Desirable extremal** The suffix *-asano* indicates that the action or state expressed by the verb is realized to a very high degree. This suffix typically carries the connotation that the high degree of realization is desirable or laudable, as in (6.73). The suffix is also employed in contexts where a given action is implicitly compared to a less exemplary realization of the same action. Consider (6.74), in which someone described the actions of a woman who had left her spouse on a temporary basis several times before finally moving back permanently to her family’s settlement.

(6.73) Yogotasanotakero anihane.

*i= ogo -asano -ak -i =ro a- nihane*  
 3mS= know -DEXT -PERF -REAL.I =3nmO 1pl.inc.P- speech  
 ‘He really knows our language.’

(6.74) Inpo maika ohatasanotahira.

*iNpo maika o= ha -asano -ah -i =ra*  
 then now 3mS= go -DEXT -REG -REAL.I =SUB  
 ‘And then she left for good.’

**6.3.1.1.5.3 Durative** The durative suffix *-bage* indicates that the action or state expressed by the verb endured over a long period of time, as in (6.75); or in the case of motion verbs, that the motion took place over a long distance, as in (6.76). The suffix has been lexicalized in the case of at least one verb root, *aNtabaget* ‘work in a garden’ (cf. *aNt* ‘manufacture’).<sup>31</sup>

(6.75) *Inabagetake kamatitya.*

*i= n -bage -ak -i kamatitya.*  
 3mS= be.in.place -DUR -PERF -REAL.I downriver  
 ‘He was downriver for a long time.’

(6.76) *Ikamaribagetake.*

*i= kamari -bage -ak -i*  
 3mS= crawl -DUR -PERF -REAL.I  
 ‘He crawled a long way.’

**6.3.1.1.5.4 Malefactive repetitive** The malefactive repetitive suffix *-na* indicates that the action of the verb is repeated multiple times by the subject of the verb to the detriment of some party. This party is typically not overtly expressed and must be recovered from context.

(6.77) *Inohasenatakero.*

*i= noha -se -na -ak -i =ro*  
 3mS= gnaw -CL:mass -MREP -PERF -REAL.I =3mO  
 ‘He (a mouse) gnawed it (a bag) repeatedly into a mass (of fibers) (to your detriment).’

<sup>31</sup>In Matsigenka, the root *aNt* has a more general meaning, ‘do’, which is probably the historical basis of the lexicalized form *aNtabaget*. Synchronically in Nanti, the corresponding verb is *og* ‘do’.

**6.3.1.1.6 Some rare morphemes** Finally, I wish to mention a number of morphemes that are extremely rare in Nanti – but which are frequently used and productive in other Kampa languages, and in Matsigenka in particular. These morphemes appear to be either in the later stages of being lost from Nanti, or in the initial stages of being borrowed from Matsigenka. They are used very infrequently, and as far as I have been able to determine, only with particular verb roots. Moreover, I have only heard them used by particular individuals.<sup>32</sup> These morphemes include *-apini* ‘habitual’, as in (6.78); *agarant* ‘partitive’, *-unte* ‘extreme durative’, *-apanaa* ‘in passing’, and *-apanu* ‘in passing (round-trip trajectory)’.

(6.78) *Paniro iniro papinitiro sekatsi.*

*paniro* *o-* *iniro* *p* *-apini* *-i* *=ro* *sekatsi*  
 only 3nm- mother give -HAB -REAL.I =3nmO manioc  
 ‘Only her mother gives her manioc (during her month-long menarch  
 seclusion).’

### 6.3.1.2 Verbal clitics

Nanti exhibits three verbal clitic paradigms: two paradigms of pronominal clitics that either express, or agree with, verbal arguments; and a third paradigm of modal clitics.

**6.3.1.2.1 Person marking clitics** Nanti person marking clitics are pronominal elements that either express verbal arguments, or agree with overt referential NPs or free pronouns. In this section, I restrict my attention to the morphological and morphophonological properties of these clitics. I refer the reader to §6.4.1 for discussion of the morphosyntactic status of these clitics.

<sup>32</sup>This perception, however, may simply be an artifact of my tending to speak to some individuals more than others. The individuals in question have more contact with Matsigenkas than the majority of people in the community, lending some support to the notion that these morphemes are being borrowed.

Nanti exhibits a nominative-accusative system of morphosyntactic alignment (see §6.4.1), and correspondingly, person markers fall into subject and object sets. Subject person markers are verbal proclitics and object person markers are verbal enclitics; the two sets are given in Table 6.8.

For the most part, Nanti verbs take at most a single non-subject marker. Verbs that are ditransitive (or tritransitive), either intrinsically or through derivation, only mark a single non-subject argument on the verb, the other arguments either being expressed as free NPs or free pronouns, or left unexpressed. As discussed in greater detail in §6.4.1, the single exception to this generalization involves constructions in which a third person ‘pragmatic oblique’ is added to the argument structure of a transitive verb. In this case, the verb’s third person theme/patient argument is expressed by the theme/patient object clitic *=ni*, and the pragmatic oblique is expressed with a regular third person object marker, as in (6.79).

(6.79) Okitahatiniri.

*o=        kita        -ha        -i        =ni        =ri*  
 3nmS= dip.out -CL:fluid -REAL.I =THM/PAT =3MO  
 ‘She dipped it out for him (i.e. She served manioc beer to him).’

Table 6.8: Nanti person-marking clitics

	SUBJECT PROCLITIC	OBJECT ENCLITIC
1st person	<i>no=</i>	<i>=na</i>
2nd person	<i>pi=</i>	<i>=Npi</i>
3rd person masc.	<i>i=</i>	<i>=ri, =ni</i>
3rd person non-masc.	<i>o=</i>	<i>=ro, =ni</i>
1st person pl. inclusive	<i>a=</i>	

Some comments are in order regarding the clitic paradigms given in Table 6.8. Nanti person markers distinguish first, second, and third persons, as well as

distinguishing masculine and non-masculine genders in the third person. Most Nanti person markers exhibit ‘generalized number’ (Corbett, 2000), meaning that they can refer to either singular or plural referents, with overt specification of plurality optionally marked by the verbal suffix *-hig* (see §6.3.1.1.3). The sole person marker that encodes plurality is the first person plural inclusive subject marker *a=*.

The Nanti subject and object clitic paradigms are for the most part symmetric. The first person plural inclusive is exceptional in this regard, as only a *subject* clitic occurs; the pronominal expression of the corresponding object requires the free pronominal form *haro* (see §6.4.1 for a description of the free pronoun paradigm).

The surface realization of subject person markers is affected by constraints that restrict heteromorphemic vowel hiatus, as discussed in §6.2.3. In the pre-root environment that subject person markers occupy, heteromorphemic vowel hiatus is resolved by vowel deletion or glide formation. The first person marker *no=*, the second person marker *pi=*, and the third person non-masculine marker *o=* all exhibit the regular process of pre-root vowel-hiatus resolution, which involves the deletion of the leftmost vowel in a pair of adjacent heteromorphemic vowels. This process is illustrated in (6.80) with the vowel-initial root *arateh* ‘wade’. Note that in the case of the third person non-masculine marker *o=*, exemplified in (6.80c), vowel hiatus resolution results in the total deletion of the marker.

(6.80) a. Naratehanake.

*no= arateh -an -ak -i*  
 1S= wade -ABL -PERF -REAL  
 ‘I waded away.’

b. Paratehanake.

*pi= arateh -an -ak -i*  
 2S= wade -ABL -PERF -REAL  
 ‘You waded away.’

c. Aratehanake.

*o*=        *arateh* -*an*    -*ak*    -*i*  
3mS= wade    -ABL -PERF -REAL  
'She waded away.'

Instances of vowel hiatus involving the third person masculine subject marker *i*= are generally resolved in a different manner: by glide formation, as in (6.81). Note that vowel hiatus resolution by glide formation, rather than deletion, preserves the contrast between masculine and non-masculine person markers before vowel-initial verb stems (cf. 6.80c).

(6.81) Yaratehanake.

*i*=        *arateh* -*an*    -*ak*    -*i*  
3mS= wade    -ABL -PERF -REAL.I  
'He waded away.'

There is one vowel hiatus context, however, in which *i*= deletes, instead of undergoing glide formation: before /i/-initial verb roots, as in (6.82a). In this environment, then, the contrast between the two third person subject person markers is neutralized, as can be seen by comparing (6.82a) and (6.82b). The risk of confusion posed by this potential ambiguity is quite low, however, as the only /i/-initial Nanti verb I am aware of, apart from *irag* 'cry', is *irak* 'be ripe'.

(6.82) a. Iragaka.

*i*=        *irag* -*ak*    -*a*  
3mS= cry    -PERF -REAL.A  
'He cried.'

b. Iragaka.

*o*=        *irag* -*ak*    -*a*  
3mS= cry    -PERF -REAL.A  
'She cried.'

Note that for the person markers *no=*, *pi=*, and *o=*, vowel hiatus resolution is not affected by the vowel quality of the initial segment of the following verb stem. In cases where the initial vowel of the verb stem is identical to that of the person marker, the latter vowel is still deleted, as evidenced by the absence of a resulting long vowel, as in (6.83a), (6.83b), and (6.83c).

(6.83) a. Nonkuhatakero niha.

*no= onkuha -ak -i =ro niha*  
 1S= follow.feature -PERF -REAL =3NMO river  
 ‘I followed the course of the river.’

b. Piragaka.

*pi= irag -ak -a*  
 2S= cry -PERF -REAL.A  
 ‘You cried.’

c. Oganaka.

*o= ogan -ak -a*  
 3nmS= be.mature -PERF -REAL.A  
 ‘It is mature (speaking of manioc).’

A third pattern of vowel hiatus resolution is exhibited in cases involving the first person plural inclusive subject marker *a=*: deletion of the initial vowel of the stem, as in (6.84).

(6.84) Abiikenpa!

*a= obiik -enpa*  
 1pl.inc.S drink -IRREAL.A  
 ‘Let’s drink!’

**6.3.1.2.2 Modal clitics** Nanti exhibits two modal clitics: the counter-suppositional and deontic verbal enclitic *=me*, and the epistemic modal verbal enclitic *=rika*. Both clitics are probably historically related to homophonous second position clausal clitics that are involved in clause-linking constructions, described in §6.4.3. In their clause-linking functions, *=me* expresses counterfactual conditionality, while *=rika* expresses non-counterfactual conditionality.

**6.3.1.2.2.1 Counter-suppositional and deontic clitic** The verbal enclitic *=me* exhibits two distinct functions: i) to mark the proposition expressed by an utterance as counter-suppositional, and ii) to indicate deontic modality. In the first case, the clitic indicates that the proposition which the clause expresses contradicts a supposition held by an interlocutor or another relevant discourse participant, as in (6.85). The supposition in question may have been explicitly stated in prior discourse, or the speaker may simply infer that the supposition is held by a relevant discourse participant.

(6.85) *Te nonehabakerime.*

*te*            *no=* N-            *neh* *-ab*            *-ak*    *-e*            *=ri*  
 NEG.REAL 1S= IRREAL- see -INTENT -PERF -IRREAL.I =3MO  
*=me*  
 =CNTRSUP  
 ‘I did not watch him (contrary to what you say/believe/insinuate).’

In a related function, the same morpheme is employed in rhetorical questions in which the supposed response is negative, as in (6.86).

(6.86) *Tyani haNta tabagetaherome aNtamihatira?*

*tyani* *haNta* *aNtabaget* *-ah*    *-e*            *=ro*            *=me*  
 who there work -REG -IRREAL. =3nmO =CNTRSUP  
*aNtamihatira?*  
 weeds



‘Who in the world would clear the weeds?’ (projected response: nobody)

There is one clear case of lexicalization of this morpheme, involving the form *aryome*. This lexicalized form includes the positive polarity element *aryo*, which frequently serves to indicate truth value focus. The lexicalized form *aryome*, however, is a counter-presuppositional negation, as illustrated in (6.87).

(6.87) Noka aryome tsagarontsi namagetahera.

*no- ka aryome tsagarontsi no= N- am -ge*  
 1- QUOT NEG.CNTRPRES fish.hook 1S= IRREAL bring -DSTR  
*-ah -e =ra*  
 -REG IRREAL.I =TEMP

‘I say: I did not bring back fishhooks (contrary to what you might expect).’

In its role as a marker of deontic modality, *=me* serves to indicate that the sentence bearing the clitic expresses either: i) a retrospectively desirable course of action that was not carried out, or ii) a course of action demanded by moral obligations. Used to express deontic illocutionary force, the clitic may be used either retrospectively or to express temporally indefinite moral obligations. An example of the former usage is given in (6.88), uttered by a man discussing a hunting trip that he had to cut short because he failed to bring enough food to make it an overnight trip. The latter usage is exemplified in (6.89), in which the Nanti community leader is reproving another man for not being fully open about his intentions regarding where he planned to live.

(6.88) Nonkihakeme sekatsi.

*no= N- kih -ak -e =me sekatsi*  
 1S= IRREAL- carry -PERF -IRREAL =DEONT yuca  
 ‘I should have carried (i.e. brought) yuca.’

(6.89) Ityasano pinkanteme otyomiha nogahiro.

*itya -sano pi= N- kaNt -e =me otyomiha no= og*  
 then -AUGM 2S= IRREAL say IRREAL.I =DEONT small 1S= do  
*-ah -i =ro*  
 -REG -REAL.I =3nmO  
 ‘A long time ago you should have said: I am building a small [house].’

In negative deontic contexts, the free form *hame*, formed on the irrealis negator *ha*, is used instead of the verbal clitic, as in (6.90).

(6.90) *Hame pitsosenatiro.*<sup>33</sup>

*ha =me pi= tsot -se -na -i*  
 NEG.IRREAL =DEONT 2S= slurp.up -CL:mass -MAL.REP -REAL.I  
*=ro*  
 =3nmO  
 ‘You shouldn’t slurp it up.’

(6.91) *Hame paniro apuNta.*

*ha =me paniro o= apuNt -a*  
 NEG.IRREAL =DEONT alone 3nmS= come.alone -IRREAL.A  
 ‘She should not come alone.’

Note that the presence of the verbal enclitic *=me* triggers irrealis marking on the verb, while the presence of *hame* triggers realis marking.

**6.3.1.2.3 Epistemic modality** The epistemic modal verbal enclitic *=rika* indicates uncertainty on the part of the speaker regarding the truth of the proposition expressed by the clause in which the *=rika*-bearing verb appears, as in (6.92). Note that the use of epistemic modal clitics in discourse is quite rare, as Nanti speakers tend to avoid articulating speculations.

<sup>33</sup>Note this example of irregular post-root consonant cluster resolution, in which the root-final consonant /t/ is deleted, instead of the epenthetic vowel /a/ being inserted between the root and the classifier.

(6.92) Ipigahirika.

*i*=      *pi**g*      *-ah*      *-i*      =*rika*  
3mS= return -REG -REAL.I =EPIST  
'He has probably returned.'

The epistemic modal clitic has also been lexicalized in the form *aryorika* 'perhaps'.

### 6.3.1.3 Verbal derivational morphology

Nanti exhibits a rich array of verbal derivational processes, especially valence-increasing ones. The following discussion is organized into two main parts: i) endocentric (word-class preserving) morphology, with subsections on valence-preserving, valence-decreasing and valence-increasing morphology; and ii) exocentric (word-class changing) derivation. All derivational processes described in this section are productive, except where specified otherwise.

#### 6.3.1.3.1 Endocentric valence-preserving morphology

**6.3.1.3.1.1 Reversative** The reversative suffix *-reh* derives a stem that indicates the reversal or undoing of an action or state, as in (6.93) and (6.94). This suffix is only attested to appear with achievement and accomplishment verbs.<sup>34</sup> Note that this suffix also plays a role in a word-class changing derivation, discussed below.

(6.93) Okucharehanake.

*o*=      *kuch*      *-reh*      *-an*      *-ak*      *-i*  
3nmS= snag -REV -ABL -PERF -REAL.I  
'It became un-snagged (speaking of snagged fishing net).'

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<sup>34</sup>Achievement verbs are non-durative telic verbs such as 'realize', while accomplishment verbs are durative telic verbs such as 'make'.

(6.94) Inkitarehanahi.

*i*= N- *kita* -*reh* -*an* -*ah* -*i*  
 3mS= IRREAL- enter.ground -REV -ABL -REG -REAL.I  
 ‘It will come back out of the ground (referring to an insect).’

**6.3.1.3.1.2 Frustrative** The frustrative suffix *-be* indicates that the action or state indicated by the verb stem was in some respect unsuccessful or interrupted, or that the expected sequel to the action failed to obtain. With non-state verbs, the action indicated by the verb root is understood to be completely realized, but that the expected sequel failed to obtain, as in (6.95). With state verbs, the frustrative indicates that the state expressed by the verb held for some period of time, but then ceased, as in (6.96). The frustrative derives an A-class verb stem, as was seen in (6.41).

(6.95) Ikahemabetaka, aka porohe.

*i*= *kahem* -*be* -*ak* -*a* *aka* *poroh* -*e*  
 3mS call -FRUS -PERF -REAL.A here clear.garden -IRREAL.I  
 ‘He unsuccessfully exhorted him, “clear your garden here.”’

(6.96) Ari otimabeta ikoriti, inpo ishigaka.

*ari* *o*= *tim* -*be* -*a* *i-* *koriti*, *inpo* *i*= *shig*  
 POS.POL 3nmS= exist -FRUS -REAL.A 3mS- spouse then 3mS run  
 -*ak* -*a*  
 -PERF REAL.A  
 ‘He had a spouse (but she left him), then he left.’<sup>35</sup>

The frustrative exhibits a mix of derivational and inflectional properties. The frustrative occupies the position of a derivational morpheme (to the left of the aspect

<sup>35</sup>Note that the presence of the temporal succession marker *inpo* shows this example to be an instance of a temporal succession construction and not a contrast construction (see §refsect:contrast).

and reality status inflectional paradigms), alters the verb class of its host, and does not form part of an obligatory morphological paradigm – all characteristics that align it with derivation. However, the frustrative is productive and exhibits largely compositional semantics, which aligns it with inflection.

**6.3.1.3.2 Valency-decreasing morphology** Nanti exhibits a relatively small number of valency-decreasing morphemes, consisting of the realis and irrealis passives, *-agani* and *-eNkani*, respectively, the characteristic morpheme *-aNt*, and the reciprocal *-abakag*.

**6.3.1.3.2.1 Passive** Nanti exhibits a pair of passive morphemes: the realis passive *-agani*, and the irrealis passive *-eNkani*. These passive reality status portmanteaus have the morphosyntactic distribution of realis and irrealis morphemes, as illustrated in (6.97) and (6.98). In (6.97) *-agani* is found in a positive polarity sentence with non-future temporal reference, the morphosyntactic context for realis-marking. In (6.98) *-eNkani* is found in a negative polarity sentence with non-future temporal reference, the morphosyntactic context for irrealis-marking.

(6.97) Oogagani.

<i>o=</i>	<i>oog</i>	<i>-agani</i>
3mS=	consume	-PASS.REAL
'It is eaten.'		

(6.98) Tera iNpenkani.

<i>tera</i>	<i>i=</i>	N-	<i>p</i>	<i>-eNkani</i>
NEG.IRREAL	3mS=	IRREAL-	give	-PASS.IRREAL
'He was not given (anything).'				

As can be seen by comparing the person marking in (6.99a) and (6.99b&c), passivization reduces the valence of the verb and makes the object of the active

verb the subject of the passivized verb. Note that there is no means in Nanti for re-introducing the active subject as an oblique argument of the passivized verb.

(6.99) a. IkeNtakero.

*i= keNt -ak -i =ro*  
 3mS= pierce -PERF -REAL.I =3nmO  
 ‘He shot it.’

b. OkeNtagani.

*o= keNt -agani*  
 3nmS= pierce -PASS.REAL  
 ‘It was shot.’

c. Tera onkeNteNkani.

*tera o= N- keNt -eNkani.*  
 NEG.REAL 3nmS= IRREAL- pierce -PASS.IRREAL  
 ‘It is not shot.’

**6.3.1.3.2.2 Characteristic** The characteristic suffix *-aNt* indicates that the action expressed by the verb stem is habitual, or characteristic of the subject of the verb.<sup>36</sup> This suffix reduces the valence of transitives, as in (6.100), but does not affect the valence of intransitives, as in (6.101).

(6.100) IporoNkaNti.

*i= poroNk -aNt -i*  
 3mS= sting -CHAR -REAL.I  
 ‘It stings (speaking of a species of caterpillar).’

(6.101) ImatsekaNti.

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<sup>36</sup>The sense of this derivation is perhaps best captured by the following colloquial English expressions corresponding to the two Nanti examples: *He’s a stinger!* and *He’s a jumper!*

*i*=     *matsek*  -*aNt*   -*i*  
 3mS=  jump    -CHAR  -REAL.I  
 ‘It jumps (speaking of a species of marmoset).’

Note that the characteristic morpheme is homophonous with the instrumental applicative *-aNt* (§6.3.1.3.3.6). However, the two morphemes are clearly distinct, as they have very different effects on argument structure; also, the instrumental derives an A-class stem, while the characteristic suffix does not alter the verb class of the root to which it is suffixed.

**6.3.1.3.2.3 Reciprocal** The reciprocal suffix *-abakag* alters the argument structure of the verb, indicating that the object of the verb acts on its subject, in addition to the expected action of subject on object, as in (6.102). If, in the corresponding non-reciprocal construction, the subject and object would be marked by person clitics of the same grammatical person, the reciprocal derives an intransitive A-class verb from transitive verb stem, as in (6.103). The resulting stem indicates that the action of the verb is carried out reciprocally by the multiple referents indicated by the grammatical subject. It should be noted that reciprocal-derived verbs appear to be obligatorily plural-marked, which is generally not the case in Nanti for verbs with multiple referents. Note also that Nanti exhibits a distinct reflexive construction, formed with a reflexive pronoun (see §6.4.2.1.3).

(6.102) *Ikisabakagahigena*.

*i*=     *kis*           -*abakag*  -*hig*  -*i*            =*na*  
 3mS=  be.angry  -RECP  -PL  -REAL.I  =1O  
 ‘He and I are angry at each other.’

(6.103) *Inihabakagahigaka*.

*i*=     *nih*    -*abakag*  -*hig*  -*ak*    -*a*  
 3mS=  speak  -RECP  -PL  -PERF  -REAL.A  
 ‘They spoke to each other.’

**6.3.1.3.3 Valence-increasing morphology** Nanti exhibits extensive valence-increasing verbal morphology, encompassing several causative and applicative affixes. The headmarking morphology described in this section serves most of the argument structure modifying and clause-linking functions in the language, as Nanti exhibits almost no adpositions and few dependent clause-situated clause-linking devices. In this section, I focus on the morphological properties of these valence-increasing morphemes; the syntactic properties of these morphemes are described in greater detail in §6.4.

Nanti causatives include a set of four causative prefixes, *ogi-*, *o[+voice]-*, *otiN-*, and *omiN-*, and one causative suffix, *-akag*. The causative affixes are distinguished by how they select for characteristics of the causee or how they add information about the caused action or the participants in the caused event. Causativization demotes the former subject (the causee) to object status and introduces a new subject (the causer). The precise morphosyntactic realization of the causee and, in the case of originally transitive or ditransitive verbs, the original object(s), is an involved question dependent on the syntax of objects in Nanti; therefore I defer the discussion of this topic to §6.4.1.

There are four applicative suffixes in Nanti, including the instrumental *-ant*, the separative *-apitsa*, the presential *-imo*, and the indirective *-ako*. Applicatives are typically defined as derivational morphemes that promote a peripheral argument to object status (Dixon and Aikhenvald, 2000; Payne, 1997).<sup>37</sup> The valence of the derived verb may increase, if originally intransitive, or may remain unaltered, if originally transitive. In the latter case, the semantic role of the object changes,

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<sup>37</sup>A mild difficulty arises in applying this standard definition of applicatives to Nanti, due to the paucity of morphosyntactic means that Nanti exhibits for expressing peripheral arguments. Indeed, for most applicative constructions in Nanti, there exists no analytic counterpart in which the applied object is expressed as a peripheral argument (but see the discussion of the presential applicative for one exception). In such cases, the only analytic alternative for expressing the applied object is periphrasis. As such, it is inaccurate, strictly speaking, to speak of Nanti applicatives as promoting a peripheral argument to object status. Otherwise, however, Nanti applicatives behave as expected.



with the original object being demoted to peripheral argument status or eliminated entirely. In Nanti, most applicative suffixes also function as clause-linking devices.

**6.3.1.3.3.1 Agent causative** The agent causative selects for verb roots whose subjects are volitional agents (generally, humans and animals), as in (6.104a). In all attested cases, the causer is a volitional agent that acts deliberately, and due to the selectional properties of the causative, the causee is typically a volitional agent, as in (6.104b). The causative is compatible both with readings in which a volitional causee is coerced, as in (6.105), and ones in which the causer enables or facilitates an action desired by the causee, as in (6.104b). Only context determines the appropriate reading. One also encounters a few cases of lexicalization of the causative, such as *ogiha* ‘follow’ (cf. *ha* ‘go’).<sup>38</sup> Since the subject of the selected verb root is a volitional agent, the agent causative does not appear with state verbs.

(6.104) a. NomonTehanake.

*no= monTeh -an -ak -i*  
 1S= cross.river -ABL -PERF -REAL.I  
 ‘I crossed the river.’

a. YogimonTehanakena.

*i= ogi- monTeh -an -ak -i =na*  
 3mS= CAUS:AGNT- cross.river -ABL -PERF -REAL.I =1O  
 ‘He helped me across the river (e.g. by taking me across in a boat).’

(6.105) YogikonTetanakeri.

*i= ogi- konTet -an -ak -i =ri*  
 3mS= CAUS:AGNT- leave -ABL -PERF -REAL.I =3MO  
 ‘He made him leave.’

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<sup>38</sup>Note that this lexicalized form supports Payne’s (2001) proposal that the causative *-ogi* originally had a sociative function in Proto-Kampa.

Note that although the agent causative selects for verbs with a volitional agent subject, the causee of the derived verb may, in certain cases, be non-volitional. Non-volitional causees principally occur with causativized motion verbs, as in (6.106). The intransitive verb root *piġ* ‘return’ in this example requires a volitional agent as a subject, but the causativized form of the verb permits a non-volitional causee – in this case *hacha* ‘axe’ – in object position.

(6.106) Nogipigahiro pihachane.

<i>no</i> =	<i>ogi-</i>	<i>piġ</i>	<i>-ah</i>	<i>-i</i>	<i>=ro</i>	<i>pi-</i>	<i>hacha</i>	<i>-ne</i>
1S=	CAUS:AGNT-	return	-REG	-REAL.I	=3nmO	2P-	axe	POSS.AL

‘I returned your axe.’

**6.3.1.3.3.2 Non-agent causative** The non-agent causative, *o[+voice]*, selects for verb roots whose subjects are not volitional agents. The form of the non-agent causative given in the morphological segmentation is a representational compromise aimed at providing a concatenative representation of this partially non-concatenative morphological process. More accurately, this morphological process consists of the substitution of the first consonant of a verb root with its voiced counterpart, if the phoneme exists in the Nanti phonological inventory, and the prefixation of the segment /o/. Thus the voicing alternation manifests only for /p/- and /k/-initial roots, respectively (recall that no Nanti verbs are voiced stop initial), as in (6.107) and (6.108).

In all attested cases, the causer is a volitional agent, but need not act deliberately, as in (6.109), which exemplifies an expression of someone accidentally dropping something (doing so deliberately requires the root *apakuh.*) Note that (6.107) and (6.108) show the non-activity causative with accomplishment and state verb roots respectively; a punctual verb root is exemplified in (6.109).

(6.107) Tera irobosaatero.

*tera*        *i=*        *r-*        *o[+voice]-*        *posaat*        *-e*        *=ro*  
 NEG.REAL 3mS= IRREAL- CAUS:NAGNT be.boiled -IRREAL.I =3nmO  
 ‘He did not cook it (by boiling).’

(6.108) Karabo yogatinkakero.

*karabo*    *i=*        *o[+voice]-*        *katink*        *-ak*        *-i*        *=ro*  
 nail        3mS= CAUS:MNPL- be.straight -PERF -REAL.I =3NM0  
 ‘He straightened the nail.’

(6.109) Yobarigakero.

*i=*        *o[+voice]-*        *parig*        *-ak*        *-i*        *=ro*  
 3mS= CAUS:NAGNT- fall        -PERF -REAL.I =3NM0  
 ‘He dropped it.’

As a consequence of the types of verbs to which the non-agent causative attaches, the causee associated with this causative is typically inanimate, although potentially volitional agents may be causees in rare cases, as in the case of the stative verb in (6.110b). The cited example also illustrates that the non-causative derives an A-class stem, as can be seen by comparing the reality status inflections of the two verbs.

(6.110) a. Ishinkitaka.

*i=*        *shink*        *-ak*        *-a*  
 3mS= be.drunk -PERF REAL.A  
 ‘He was drunk.’

b. Yoshinkitakena.

*i=*        *o[+voice]-*        *shink*        *-ak*        *-i*        *=na*  
 3mS= CAUS:NAGNT be.drunk -PERF -REAL.I =10  
 ‘He got me drunk.’

**6.3.1.3.3.3 Destructive causative** The destructive causative, *otiN-*, differs from the agent and non-agent causatives in that it qualifies the nature of the caused action, rather than selecting for verbs with certain kinds of subjects. This destructive causative indicates that the action expressed by the verb is a form of caused breaking of, or damage to, an inanimate object. Consequently, only non-volitional causees are attested, although both volitional and non-volitional causers are attested, as in (6.111) and (6.112), respectively. As one would expect, given the intrinsically non-static nature of acts of breaking and damaging, the destructive causative does not appear with state verbs.

(6.111)

a. YotiNpatuhakero.

*i=*      *otiN-*              *patuh*              *-ak*      *-i*              *=ro*  
 3mS= CAUS:DSTR- break.in.two -PERF -REAL.I =3NMO  
 ‘It (a fish) broke it (a fishing line) in two.’

b. Yobatuhakero.

*i=*      *o[+voice]-*              *patuh*              *-ak*      *-i*              *=ro*  
 3mS= CAUS:NAGNT- break.in.two -PERF -REAL.I =3NMO  
 ‘He divided it in two.’

(6.112) Tanpiha otiNteronkanakero.

*tanpiha* *o=*      *otiN-*              *teronk*      *-an*      *-ak*      *-i*              *=ro*  
 wind      3nmS= CAUS:DSTR- collapse -ABL -PERF -REAL.I =3NMO  
 ‘The wind knocked it down.’

The semantic effect of the destructive causative is evident if we compare the form *yotiNpatuhakero* in (6.111a), with the form *yobatuhakero* in (6.111b), which is derived with the non-causative but shares the same verb root, *patuh* ‘bisect’. In

the former case, the derived stem is understood to express an action of *breaking* the object in two, while in the latter case, the derived stem indicates the careful dividing of the object into two pieces, as by cutting or chopping.

**6.3.1.3.3.4 Malefactive causative** The malefactive causative, *omiN-*, requires that both the causer and causee be volitional agents, and indicates that the causee is adversely affected by the caused action, as in (6.113). The malefactive causative is the sole non-productive causative in Nanti, and I have found attestations with only a small number of verb roots. It also exhibits a few cases of significant lexicalization, as in the form *omiNtigaNk* ‘knock over’ (cf. *tigaNk* ‘disappear from sight’).

(6.113) YomiNtsarogakena.

<i>i=</i>	<i>omiN-</i>	<i>tsarog</i>	<i>-ak</i>	<i>-i</i>	<i>=na</i>	
3mS=	CAUS:MAL-	be.startled	-PERF	-REAL.I	=1O	
‘He startled me.’						

**6.3.1.3.3.5 Influential causative** Nanti exhibits a single causative suffix, *-akag*, the influential causative, exemplified in (6.114). This causative requires that both the causer and causee be volitional agents, and it indicates that the causer brought the causee to carry out the caused action by indirect or distinctly non-coercive means. Examples of ‘influential causation’ include bringing about someone’s departure by accompanying them, or requesting someone to carry out an action. This suffix has been lexicalized in some cases, such as *kemakag* ‘criticize, reprove’ (cf. *kem* ‘hear’).

(6.114) Te tsini pakuhakagarime.

<i>te</i>	<i>tsini</i>	<i>pakuh</i>	<i>-akag</i>	<i>-∅</i>	<i>-a</i>	<i>=ri</i>	<i>=me</i>
NEG.REAL	who	drop	CAUS:INFL	-IMPF	-REAL.A	=3MO	=CNTF
‘It’s not as if anyone induced him to abandon (his spouse).’							

**6.3.1.3.3.6 Instrumental applicative** The instrumental applicative, *-aNt*, indicates that the applied object was employed in realizing the action expressed by the verb. This may involve a straightforward instrumental reading, as in (6.115) and (6.116), or a trajectal or locative reading, as in (6.117). Note that the instrumental applicative derives an A-class stem, as in (6.115); the I-class inflection in (6.117) is a result of the directional *-apah*, which derives I-class stems and, because it appears to the right of the instrumental, trumps it. Note that this applicative also serves as a linkage marker in ‘reason’ clause linkage constructions (see §6.4.3).

(6.115) YoserONkANTakaro.

*i= oserONk -aNt -ak -a =ro*  
 3mS= slice -APPL:INST -PERF -REAL.A =3NMO  
 ‘He carved with it (a knife).’

(6.116) IkenaNta peke.

*i= ken -aNt -a peke*  
 3ms= head.in.direction -REAL.A peke.motor  
 ‘He came by peke motor.’

(6.117) NokenaNtahigapahi.

*no= ken -aNt -hig -apah -i*  
 1S= head.in.direction -INST -PL -ABL -REALIS.I  
 ‘We came along it (a path) towards (here).’<sup>39</sup>

**6.3.1.3.3.7 Presencial applicative** The presencial applicative suffix *-imo* indicates that the action of the verb is realized in the presence of the applied object, as in (6.118). The resulting construction may have a comitative sense, as

<sup>39</sup>The verbal object in this example was expressed through a gesture indicating the path in question. In Nanti, objects need not be formally marked if recoverable from the interactional context.

in (6.119), or a goal sense, as in (6.120). I have only encountered this applicative employed with originally intransitive verbs.

(6.118) Birari togimotakinpi.

<i>Birari</i>	<i>tog</i>	<i>-imo</i>	<i>-ak</i>	<i>-i</i>	<i>=Npi</i>
<i>personal.name</i>	<i>fell.tree</i>	<i>-APPL:PRES</i>	<i>-PERF</i>	<i>-REAL.I</i>	<i>=2O</i>

‘Birari felled (it) in your presence.’

(6.119) Pitimimohigakena.

<i>pi=</i>	<i>tim</i>	<i>-imo</i>	<i>-hig</i>	<i>-ak</i>	<i>-i</i>	<i>=na</i>
<i>2S=</i>	<i>live</i>	<i>-APPL:PRES</i>	<i>-PL</i>	<i>-PERF</i>	<i>-REAL.I</i>	<i>=1O</i>

‘You lived with us.’ (lit. ‘You lived in our presence.’)

(6.120) Opokimotakena.

<i>o=</i>	<i>pok</i>	<i>-imo</i>	<i>-ak</i>	<i>-i</i>	<i>=na</i>
<i>3nmS=</i>	<i>come</i>	<i>-APPL:PRES</i>	<i>-PERF</i>	<i>-REAL.I</i>	<i>=1O</i>

‘She arrived where I was.’ (lit. ‘She arrived in my presence.’)<sup>40</sup>

**6.3.1.3.3.8 Separative applicative** The separative applicative suffix *-apitsa* indicates that the action of the verb involves either: i) the separation of the subject from the applied object, in the case of an originally intransitive verb, as in (6.121b); or ii) the separation of a theme argument (which is optionally expressed) from the applied indirect object by the subject, in the case of an originally transitive verb, as in (6.122b). In both cases, there is a malefactive sense that the separation of the subject from the applied object, or of the theme argument from the applied object, runs counter to the wishes of the applied object.

<sup>40</sup>There is a subtle difference between this sentence and the related analytic, non-applicative construction *Opokake naroku*. ‘She arrived at my place.’ In the applicative construction, there is a sense that the woman arrived coincidentally at the location of the applied object; whereas in the locative construction, the woman is understood to have arrived deliberately at a place where the oblique argument is expected to be.

(6.121) a. Ishigaka.

*i= shig -ak -a*  
3mS= run -PERF -REAL.A  
'He ran.'

b. Ishigapitsatakeri.

*i= shig -apitsa -ak -i =ri*  
3mS= run -APPL:SEP -PERF -REAL.I =3mO  
'He ran away from him.'

(6.122) a. Ikoshitakero.

*i= koshi -ak -i =ro*  
3mS= steal -PERF -REAL.I -3NMO  
'He stole it.'

b. Ikoshitapitsatakeri (kotsiro).

*i= koshi -apitsa -ak -i =ri kotsiro*  
3mS= steal -APPL:SEP -PERF -REAL.I =3MO knife  
'He stole (a knife) from him.'

**6.3.1.3.3.9 Indirective applicative** The indirective<sup>41</sup> applicative *-ako* indicates that the action of the verb affects the applied object in an indirect manner. When the root in question expresses some type of physical manipulation or alteration of form, the indirective generally indicates that the action of the verb root makes the applied object accessible or available to the subject, but that the action is not carried out on the applied object itself, or if it is, only on a peripheral part. In (6.123), for example, the *hetsiki* fruit itself is not sliced, but rather its stalk is,

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<sup>41</sup>Following Payne (1981), Kampanists generally refer to the cognate morphemes in other Kampa languages as a 'dative'. The appropriateness of this term lies in the fact that applicatives frequently promote peripheral arguments to indirect object status, and the fact that dative case is typically associated with indirect objects. However, in languages such as Nanti with multiple applicatives, the appropriateness of this name for any single applicative wanes.



which allows the fruit to be harvested. Similarly, in (6.124), it is the soil *around* the object that is subjected to digging and not the object itself.

(6.123) NoserONkakotakerO hetsiki.

no= serONk -ako -ak -i =ro hetsiki  
 1S= slice -APPL:INDR -PERF -REAL.I =3NM O fruit.sp.  
 ‘I sliced the *hetsiki* fruit off (the branch).’

(6.124) NokigakotakerO.

no= kig -ako -ak -i =ro  
 1S= dig -APPL:INDR -PERF -REAL.I =3nm O  
 ‘I dug it up.’

When employed with verbs of perception, cognition, or emotion, the indirective indicates that the subject perceives, thinks or has feelings about the applied object, but that the applied object is not the direct object of the perception, thought, or feeling expressed by the verb root. The stem in (6.125), for example, indicates that the subject had heard *about* the object through someone else’s report, but did not directly hear utterances or sounds produced by the object. Similarly, the stem in (6.126) expresses that the subject is angry about a woman or girl – for example, about the way she has been treated – but not angry *at* her.

(6.125) Nokemakotakeri.

no= kem -ako -ak -i =ri  
 1S= hear -APPL:INDR -PERF -REAL.I =3m O  
 ‘I heard about him.’

(6.126) IkisakotakerO.

i= kis -ako -ak -i =ro  
 3mS= be.angry -APPL:INDR -PERF -REAL.I =3NM O  
 ‘He is angry about her.’

As we expect from Nanti applicatives, the indirective derives a transitive stem from an intransitive one, but does not alter the valence of a transitive stem. The verb stems in (6.123) and (6.125), for example, are transitive, as are the corresponding underived verb stems, while the stems in (6.124) and (6.126) are transitives derived from intransitive roots. The latter example also shows that the indirective derives an I-class stem, as the root *kis* ‘be angry’, is an A-class stem.

Perhaps more than any other applicative, the indirective has undergone lexicalization in several instances, such as *kogako* ‘ask about’ (cf. *kog* ‘search for’) and *nehako* ‘be familiar with’ (cf. *neh* ‘see, know’). The morpheme *-ako* also serves a role in constructions with peripheral arguments (see §6.4.1).

#### 6.3.1.4 Exocentric morphology

**6.3.1.4.1 Denominal reversative** The denominal reversative *-reh* derives an intransitive verb stem from a classifier or an inalienable noun. The resulting stem indicates either i) the loss of that part by the relevant whole, as in (6.127), or a break or structural failure at the part, as in (6.128); or ii) the breaking of a referent with the shape given by the classifier, as in (6.129), or the breaking of something *into* shapes given by the classifier, as in (6.130).

(6.127) *Yogitorehakero*.<sup>42</sup>

<i>i=</i>	<i>o[+voice]</i>	<i>gito</i>	<i>-reh</i>	<i>-ak</i>	<i>-i</i>	<i>=ro</i>
3mS=	CAUS:NAGNT	head	-REV	-PERF	-REAL.I	-3NMO
‘He decapitated it.’						

(6.128) *Oponkitirehanake*.

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<sup>42</sup>This transitive verb stem has additionally undergone derivation with a causative, a very common process with reversative-derived stems.

*o=*        *poNkiti*    *-reh* *-an* *-ak*    *-i*  
 3nmS= root.base<sup>43</sup> -REV -ABL -PERF -REAL.I  
 ‘It got up-rooted (speaking of a plant).’

(6.129) Obogutarehake.

*o=*        *bogut*        *-reh* *-ak*    *i*  
 3nmS= CL:circle -REV -PERF -REAL.I  
 ‘The bowl shattered.’

(6.130) Okotarehanake.

*o=*        *kota*        *-reh* *-an* *-ak*    *-i*  
 3nmS= CL:plank -REV -ABL PERF -REAL.I  
 ‘It broke off in a plank shape.’

### 6.3.1.5 Irregular verbs

Apart from the open class of lexical verbs, Nanti exhibits a small set of irregular verbs, consisting of a trio of existential verbs, *ainyo*, *aityo* and *mameri*, and a positive polarity class membership copula *Nti*.

The affirmative existential verbs *ainyo*, used with animate subjects, and *aityo*, used with inanimate subjects, are highly morphologically defective, as they never take person markers, and generally take no inflectional morphology (but see below). The affirmative existential verbs are also unusual in that they agree with the animacy of their argument, otherwise a property characteristic of adjectives (see §6.3.2.1 and §6.3.4 for further discussion of animacy agreement). However, the fact that these verbs can take the frustrative verbal derivational suffix *-be* (discussed below) supports the categorization of these elements as verbs.

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<sup>43</sup>That is, the point at which the roots come together to form a clump below the principal stalk or stem of a plant. Note that when the root *poNkiti* is used in relation to animate referents, it is interpreted as ‘foot’.

Existential verbs typically take an NP complement, as in (6.131), in which case they predicate the existence of the NP. They may also take a clausal complement, however, as in (6.132) and (6.133), in which case they predicate the presence of an entity realizing the action of the verb in a particular place.

(6.131) Ainyo piniro?

*ainyo*            *pi-*    *iniro?*  
 EXIST.ANIM    2P-    mother  
 ‘Do you have a (living) mother?’

(6.132) Ainyo obokiti.

*ainyo*            *o=*            *oboki*    *-∅*            *-i*  
 EXIST.ANIM    3nmS=    cook    -IMPF    -REAL.I  
 ‘She is there cooking.’

(6.133) Aityo ontarigaka sekatsi.

*aityo*            *ontarig*            *-ak*    *-a*            *sekatsi*  
 EXIST.INAN    pile.on.ground    -PERF    -REAL.A    manioc  
 ‘There is manioc piled up on the ground.’

Although this process is uncommon, the affirmative existential verbs may be derived with the frustrative derivation suffix *-be*, which enables the resulting stem to take inflectional morphology, as in (6.134). Even when these existential verbs undergo frustrative derivation, however, they do not take person marking.

(6.134) ainyobetaka

*ainyo*            *-be*            *-ak*            *-a*  
 EXIST.ANIM    -FRUS    -PERF    REAL.A  
 ‘although s/he existed’

The third existential verb is the negative existential *mameri*, exemplified in (6.135), which takes no verbal inflectional, person marking, or derivational morphology at all, but has the syntactic distributional properties of a verb. Specifically, *mameri* fulfills the requirement that every complete clause in Nanti include a verb.

(6.135) Mameri shima.

*mameri*     *shima*  
 NEG.EXIST fish  
 ‘There isn’t any fish.’

The positive polarity class membership copula *Nti* takes person marking, but no inflectional or derivational morphology, as exemplified in (6.136). The person marking paradigm for this verb is irregular in the first person singular (*nanti*), first person plural inclusive (*hanTi*), and second person singular (*biNTi*).

(6.136) INti surari.

*i=*     *Nti*     *surari*  
 3mS= COP.EQ male  
 ‘He is male.’

The regular third person non-masculine form of the verb, *oNti*, has also been grammaticalized in a quite different role: as a marker of contrastive predicate focus, as in (6.137).

(6.137) Ainyo ikoriti, oNti ihokanake (*personal name*).<sup>44</sup>

*ainyo*     *i-*     *koriti*   *oNti*   *i=*     *hok*     *-an*   *-ak*   *-i*  
 EXIST.ANIM 3mP- spouse ADVS 3mS= discard -ABL -PERF -REAL.I  
*personal name*  
 (*personal.name*)  
 ‘He had a spouse, but he left *personal name*.’

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<sup>44</sup>Omitted for reasons of privacy.

Although it is not an irregular verb, the verb *n* merits mention at this point. This is the verb used to express class membership in negated clauses, as in (6.138); it serves the attributive copular function, as in (6.139); and it also serves as the basic locative verb in Nanti, as in (6.140).

(6.138) Tera surari one.

*tera*            *surari* *o=*            *n*            *-e*  
 NEG.REAL man 3nmS= COP IRREAL.I  
 ‘She is not male.’

(6.139) Kirahari oni nosapiro.

*kirahari* *o=*            *n*            *-i*            *no-* *sapiro*  
 red 3nmS= COP -REAL.I 1P- clothing  
 ‘My article of clothing is red.’

(6.140) Onake nobankoku.

*o-*            *n*            *-ak*            *-i*            *no-* *banko* *-ku*  
 3nmS= COP -PERF -REAL.I 1S= house -LOC  
 ‘It is in my house.’

### 6.3.2 Nouns and nominal morphology

Nouns can be distinguished by their distinctive, if restricted, morphology and by their role as a target for animacy and gender agreement. Nanti nominal morphology is limited to two plural suffixes, a set of possessive affixes, and a single locative suffix. Nanti does not exhibit nominal compounding, with the marginal exception of noun-classifier forms, discussed in §6.3.7. Nanti exhibits only a single productive nominalization process; apparently a number of productive nominalizations found in the other Kampan languages have been lost in Nanti.

### 6.3.2.1 Noun classes and agreement

Nanti exhibits two noun class parameters: a binary animacy parameter (animate vs. inanimate) and a binary gender parameter (masculine vs. non-masculine). However, instead of the four noun classes one would expect from this combination of parameters, we find only three classes, since masculine nouns are obligatorily animate. Non-masculine nouns may be either animate or inanimate.

**6.3.2.1.1 Animacy** Animacy surfaces morphologically as agreement, although the particular lexemes that exhibit animacy agreement are generally irregular members of the word classes to which they pertain. In addition to nouns, some adjectives, numerals, and quantifiers, and the existential verbs exhibit animacy. Animacy agreement is marked via an alternation between /n/ (animate) and /t/ (inanimate), and in one case via an alternation between /ny/ and /ty/; these alternations are underlined in the examples in this section. Animacy agreement is found in numerals (e.g. *piteni* ‘two (animate)’, *piteti* ‘two (inanimate)’), in a small set of adjectives (e.g. *omarane* ‘big (animate)’, *omarate* ‘big (inanimate)’), in some indefinite quantifiers (e.g. *tobaheni* ‘many (animate)’, *tobaheti* ‘many’ (inanimate)), and in the existential verbs (*ainyo* ‘there is (animate)’ and *aityo* ‘there is (inanimate)’).

Generally speaking, nouns in the animate class denote individuable entities (hence, not mass nouns) that are capable of independent motion, including all animals and celestial bodies, except for stars. A notable exception to this generalization is the grammatically animatte *kogi* plant, which produces a potent fish poison.<sup>45</sup> Perhaps in analogy with *kogi*, a number of chemically potent introduced substances are also treated as animate, such as soap and gasoline.

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<sup>45</sup>Note that *kogi* is closely associated with men, being planted, harvested, and used only by men. Consequently, the animacy of the plant name may be a consequence of its grammatical gender, which is in turn due to the plant’s close association with men.

**6.3.2.1.2 Gender** Gender principally surfaces morphologically as agreement on verbal person markers and nominal possessive markers (see §6.3.1.2.1 and below). Demonstratives also agree in gender with their referents (e.g. *yoka* ‘this (masculine)’, *oka* ‘this (non-masculine)’), as do a small number of adjectives (*imarane* ‘large (masculine)’, *omarane* ‘large (non-masculine)’); *igatsantsani* ‘naked (masculine)’, *ogatsantsani* ‘naked (feminine)’). In addition, gender is overtly marked in a semantically transparent manner on a small set of nouns that denote humans (e.g. *antarini* ‘adult male’, *antaroni* ‘adult female’; *sari* ‘grandson’, *saro* ‘granddaughter’; *ichere* ‘male child’, *ochere* ‘female child’).

Comparison of the preceding forms shows two systems of gender agreement or marking: one diachronically related to the proclitic/prefix system of subject marking and possessor marking of verbs and nouns, respectively (*i=/o=*, *i-/o-*); and another diachronically related to the system of verbal object clitics (*=ri/=ro*). There is strong evidence that in Proto-Kampa, the latter system was productive, and that at least nouns denoting animate referents were marked with the gender classifying suffixes *-ri* (masculine) or *-ro* (non-masculine).<sup>46</sup> The remains of this gender classification system in Nanti are found in the large number of animal and plant names that end in the syllables *-ri* (e.g. *kemari* ‘Tapir’, *kapaheriri* ‘Common Opposum’, *tsugeri* ‘Squirrel Monkey’, *matsirari* ‘Spider Monkey’) or *-ro* (e.g. *masero* ‘toad’, *shinpero* ‘stink bug’, *tsiregiro* ‘burr plant’). Significantly, there is a substantial correlation between the actual grammatical gender of these nouns in Nanti and their predicted gender, based on the Proto-Kampa gender classifier hypothesis. Synchronically, neither the prefixal and suffixal forms of gender marking on nouns and adjectives remains productive.

Inanimate nouns are a subset of the non-masculine class, while animate nouns

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<sup>46</sup>This hypothesis is bolstered by the existence of obviously cognate nominal gender classifiers in other Arawak languages such as Apurinã, which exhibits the classifiers *-ru* ‘masculine’ and *-ro* ‘feminine’ (Facundes, 2000, pp. 226-232).



overlap with both the masculine and non-masculine noun classes. Note that any given human or animal individual, regardless of species, may be treated as grammatically masculine or non-masculine, in accord with their biological sex. Species as a whole, however, are assigned grammatical gender in a semantically non-transparent manner. Gender assignment to species does follow some broad patterns, although there are unpredictable exceptions. Generally speaking, mammals, birds, fish, reptiles, and social insects (e.g. ants and caterpillars) are grammatically masculine, while non-social insects (e.g. spiders and millipedes), amphibians, and aquatic reptiles are non-masculine.

It should be noted that the gender expressed by person markers associated with otherwise grammatically masculine agreement targets may be optionally switched to non-masculine in order to avoid referential ambiguity. Thus far I have observed this process applied only to grammatically masculine non-human referents, where the shift to non-masculine gender signals coreference with a non-human agreement target, as in (6.141). In this example, the person marking on the verb *oog* ‘consume’, which has as its target the grammatically masculine *shiNtori* ‘White-lipped Pecarry’, has been switched from masculine to non-masculine. Were the person marker in question to show masculine gender, either the hunter or the pecarry would be permissible antecedents, possibly leading to the incorrect interpretation that the hunter wounded the pecarry while the *hunter*, rather than the pecarry, was eating *pochariki*. The shift from masculine to non-masculine gender guarantees that the subject person marker of the verb *oog* is interpreted as coreferential with the non-human antecedent.

(6.141) Iken**ta**betaka shiN**to**ri oogara pochariki.

<i>i</i> =	<i>keNt</i>	<i>-be</i>	<i>-ak</i>	<i>-a</i>	<i>shiNtori</i>	<i>o</i> =	<i>oog</i>
3mS=	pierce	-FRUS	-PERF	-REAL.A	peccary	3nmS=	consume
<i>-a</i>	<i>=ra</i>	<i>pochariki</i>					
-REAL.A	=SUB	fruit.sp.					

‘He wounded a peccary (while it was) eating *pochariki*.’

**6.3.2.1.3 Plural suffixes** Nanti exhibits two nominal plural suffixes: the regular plural *-hegi*, illustrated in (6.142), and the collective plural *-page*, illustrated in (6.143). Both are optional for semantically plural referents, the plurality of which may instead be indicated by a numeral or an indefinite quantifier, or may simply be left to be inferred from context or world knowledge, as is most frequently the case.<sup>47</sup>

(6.142) Pinehake pishaniNkahegi?

*pi= neh -ak -i pi= shaniNka -hegi*  
2S= see -PERF -REAL.I 2S= fellow.person -PL  
‘Did you see your fellow people?’

(6.143) Anehakogetanake pashikarontsi<sup>48</sup>

*a- neh -ako -ge -an -ak -i pashikarontsi -page*  
1pl.incl see -DAT -DSTR -ABL -DSTR -REAL.I blanket -COLL  
‘We became familiar with blankets.’

Note that the plural forms of topic pronouns (see §6.4.1) exhibit the nominal plural suffix (e.g. *irirohegi* ‘they, them’, cf. *iriro* ‘he, him’), as do the plural forms of possessive pronouns (e.g. *nashihegi* ‘ours (exclusive)’, cf. *nashi* ‘mine’).

**6.3.2.1.4 Possession and possessive affixes** Like the other Kampan languages, Nanti exhibits a system of alienable/inalienable possessive marking, although the Nanti system appears to be eroding and shifting towards a morphologically simpler inherent/non-inherent possession system. Inalienable nouns must always appear with a possessive prefix as in (6.144) and (6.145), whereas alienable

<sup>47</sup>In terms of Corbett’s (2000) typology, nominal referents that are not explicitly plural-marked display *generalized number*.

<sup>48</sup>When commercially manufactured blankets were first introduced in Montetoni, the Matsigenka term *pashikarontsi* was adopted along with them.

nouns need not, as in (6.146a). Inalienably possessed nouns may also be incorporated into verbs and adjectives, in which case their (external) possession is indicated by verbal person markers (see §6.3.1.2.1). Alienable nouns appearing in possessive constructions take the same possessive prefix as inalienable nouns, but are additionally facultatively marked with an alienable possession suffix, as in (6.146b). In addition to the inalienable and alienable noun classes, Nanti exhibits unpossessable nouns. Nouns of this class typically refer to geographical features and celestial objects.

(6.144) a. notyona

*no- tyona*  
 1P- nose  
 ‘my nose’

b. \*tyona

(6.145) a. ikoriti<sup>49</sup>

*i- koriti*  
 3mP- spouse  
 ‘his spouse’

b. \*koriti

(6.146) a. seri ‘tobacco’

b. iserine

*i- seri -ne*  
 3mP- tobacco -POSS.AL  
 ‘his tobacco’

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<sup>49</sup>The root *koriti* is an eroded form of the considerably rarer *koritiri*, itself a nominalization of the verb *koriti* ‘sleep with another person’.

Nouns that take inalienable possessive morphology include the expected inalienable semantic domains of body parts and kin terms, and a small number of manufactured objects (e.g. houses and bows). Possession is marked by the nominal possessive prefixes given in Table 6.9. The reader will note that these are almost identical in form to the verbal subject person marker clitics.

Table 6.9: Nanti possessive prefixes

PERSON	GENERAL	PLURAL
1st	<i>no-</i> , ( <i>na-</i> )	<i>a-</i> (incl.)
2nd	<i>pi-</i> , ( <i>bi-</i> )	
3rd masc.	<i>i-</i> , <i>iri-</i>	
3rd non-masc.	<i>o-</i>	

Some comments on the paradigm of possessive prefixes are warranted. First, we find only one plural possessive prefix: the first person plural inclusive *a=*. The remaining prefixes are neutral with respect to the grammatical number of the possessor, with the default (but defeasible) interpretation being singular. Overt expression of plural number for a possessor in a possessive construction requires the use of a free plural possessive pronoun, discussed below.

Possessive prefixes undergo the same processes of vowel hiatus resolution experienced by verbal subject person markers (see §6.2.3) with a single exception. When prefixed to vowel-initial nominal roots, the third person masculine prefix *i-*, instead of undergoing glide formation like its verbal counterpart, alternates with its allomorph *ir-* (e.g. *irishinto* ‘his daughter’, cf. *ishinto*<sup>50</sup> ‘daughter’; *irotsitite* ‘his dog’, cf. *otsiti* ‘dog’).

The first and second person prefixes exhibit the irregular allomorphs *na-* and *bi-*. These allomorphs are rare and are found only with particular lexically-specified

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<sup>50</sup>This inalienable root is one of a number of forms that have retained a root-initial /i/ that has been lost in other Kampan languages.

inalienable roots (for example, *na-neni* ‘the space at my side’, *bi-neni* ‘the space at your side’). Internal reconstruction shows that these two allomorphs correspond to the historically prior form of both person markers and possessive prefixes in Pre-Proto-Kampa.

As indicated above, the marking of alienable possession differs morphologically from inalienable possession by the addition of a set of nominal suffixes to the possessive prefixes already discussed. These alienable possession suffixes include *-ne*, *-te*, and *-re*.<sup>51</sup> Their distribution is largely determined by prosodic factors: disyllabic nominal roots take *-ne* (e.g. *igusine* ‘his guan’, cf. *kusi* ‘guan (*Pipile guianensis*)’) and trisyllabic or larger roots take *-te* (e.g. *ochaberite* ‘her chicken’, cf. *chaberi* ‘chicken’). Note that no Nanti nominal roots are monosyllabic. The suffix *-re* appears on a small number of forms denoting manufactured objects. Alienable nouns that take *-re* often show other irregular features, suggesting that the possessed forms have undergone lexicalization (e.g. *ichagore* ‘his arrow’, cf. *chakopi* ‘arrow, arrow cane’, from the no longer productive nominal root *chako*, ‘arrow’).

It merits mention that the alienable possession suffixes are often omitted in casual conversation between Nantis, which may reflect a broader transition from an inalienable/alienable system to an inherent/non-inherent system. A piece of evidence consistent with this hypothesis is the loss in Nanti of a pan-Kampan process that derives alienable nouns from inalienable ones. In other Kampan languages, one can derive an alienable noun from an inalienable one with the suffix *-tsi*.<sup>52</sup> This process is no longer productive in Nanti, although one does encounter instances of frozen forms displaying this suffix (e.g. *paNkotsi* ‘house (alienable)’, cf. *baNko* ‘house (inalienable root)’). Instead of the non-posessed marker *-tsi*, Nanti speakers employ the first person plural inclusive possessive marker *a-*, which functions in this

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<sup>51</sup>Cognates of these suffixes are found in widely scattered Arawak languages, and probably reconstruct to Proto-Arawak.

<sup>52</sup>Cognates of this suffix are found in widely scattered Arawak languages (Aikhenvald, 1999, p.82).

context as an impersonal possessor, as in (6.147). Context serves to distinguish the possessive and impersonal senses of *a-*.

- (6.147) a. *a-*            *gito*  
           1pl.incl- head  
           ‘a head/our (incl.) head’
- b. \**gitotsi*

In this area, then, Nanti has replaced a derivational process based on a morphological alienable/inalienable distinction with an inflectional one based on an inherent/non-inherent system.

Finally, it should be noted that both inalienable and alienable nominal roots exhibit a morphophonological alternation conditioned by the presence of a possessive prefix. Specifically, the voiceless stops /p/ and /k/, when appearing in nominal root-initial position, alternate with their voiced counterparts /b/ and /g/ when following possessive prefixes, as illustrated by the following pairs: *pagiro* ‘mother-in-law (vocative)’, *obagirote* ‘her mother-in-law’; *kapashi* ‘palm thatch’, *igapashite* ‘his palm thatch’.<sup>53</sup>

**6.3.2.1.5 Possessive pronouns** In addition to the possessive prefixes already discussed, Nanti exhibits a set of possessive pronouns, listed in Table 6.10. These pronouns may be used demonstratively, as in (6.148), or in constructions that express contrastive possessor focus. Contrastive focus on a demonstrative possessive pronoun is expressed by combining the possessive pronoun with a topic/demonstrative pronoun, as in (6.149). Contrastive focus on a possessor is marked by combining a possessive pronoun with a possessive prefix, as in (6.150).

(6.148) ONti irashi.

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<sup>53</sup>Note that the same phonological alternation surfaces in relation to the non-causative derivation and noun incorporation.

Table 6.10: Possessive pronouns

	SINGULAR	PLURAL
1st	nashi	nashihegi (excl.), hashi (incl.)
2nd	pashi	pashihegi
3rd masc.	irashi	irashihegi
3rd non-masc.	ashi	ashihegi

*o= Nti irashi*  
 3nmS= COP 3mP.PRO  
 ‘It is his.’

(6.149) Tera iragabehe inkante, oNti nashi naro, hara pihati.

*tera i= r- agabeh -e i= N- kaNt*  
 NEG.REAL 3mS= IRREAL- be.able -IRREAL.I 3mS= IRREAL- say  
*-e o- Nti nashi naro hara pi= ha -i*  
 -IRREAL.I 3nmS= COP 1P.PRO 1.PRO NEG.IRREAL 2S= go -REAL.I  
 ‘It would be inappropriate for him to say, “it (a hunting territory) is *mine*, you can’t go (there to hunt).”’

(6.150) Irashi irinihane, iro te nogote.

*irashi iri- nih -ne iro te no= -ogo*  
 3mP.PRO 3mP- speech -POSS 3nm.FOC.PRO NEG.REAL 1S= know  
*-e*  
 -IRREAL.I  
 ‘I do not know *his* (a Matsigenka man’s) language.’

**6.3.2.1.6 Locative** The nominal locative suffix *-ku* is the sole means in Nanti of adding a peripheral argument to a verb. The suffix provides little information about the spatial relation between figure and ground other than proximity. The interpretation of the locative depends on the semantics of the verb with which the

peripheral argument is associated, and on world knowledge about the activities described in the clause. The locative in (6.151), for example, can be interpreted as expressing any of a number of spatial relations compatible with the relationship of bathing to rivers. Similarly, the locative in (6.152) yields a goal interpretation, rather than one compatible with a static spatial relationship, because the verb with which the locative-marked peripheral argument is associated is a motion verb.

(6.151) *Ikahati nihaku.*

*i*=     *kahat*   *-∅*     *-i*       *niha*   *-ku*  
 3mS=   bathe   -IMPF   -REAL.I   water   -LOC  
 ‘He is bathing in/at/by the river.’

(6.152) *Ihatake paNkotsiku.*

*i*=     *ha*   *-ak*     *-i*       *paNko*   *-tsi*     *-ku*  
 3mS=   go   -PERF   -REAL.I   house   -NPOSS   -LOC  
 ‘He went to the house.’

**6.3.2.1.7 Nominalization** Nanti exhibits only one productive nominalization, the deverbal nominalizer *-rira*. A number of productive nominalizations common in the other Kampan languages have been lost in Nanti. The Matsigenka deverbal nominalization *-agaNtsi*, for example, which has cognates in all other Kampan languages, is no longer productive in Nanti, and survives only in a few lexicalized forms that show semantic drift (e.g. *nihagaNtsi* ‘argument, dispute’; cf. *nih* ‘speak’).

When a verb undergoes nominalization with *-rira*, it loses all verbal inflection and subject person marking, as in (6.153). The resulting nominal is typically an agentive nominal, although verbal morphology can derive other types of nominals, such as the instrumental nominal in (6.154).

(6.153) *tomiNtarira*



*tomɪnt*                    *-rira*  
 have.male.child   -NOMZ  
 ‘parent of male child’

(6.154) *magaNtarira*

*mag*   *-aŋt*                    *-rira*  
 sleep   -APPL:INST   -NOMZ  
 ‘sleeping hut’

The deverbal nominalizer *-rira* has the same form as the relativizer *=rira* (see §6.4.3). Only their syntactic distribution distinguishes them: the nominalizer is a verbal suffix, while the relativizer is a second position clausal clitic. Note that since it is common for the verb to be either the first or only element in a clause, distinguishing deverbal nominalizations from headless relative clauses can be challenging.

Note that a number of Nanti nouns exhibit the Proto-Kampa nominalizer *-ri*, which is no longer productive in Nanti. Consider, for example, the inalienably possessed nominal root *koritiri* ‘spouse’, which is derived from the verb *korɪ* ‘sleep beside, snuggle’.

### 6.3.3 Demonstratives and determiners

Nanti exhibits a set of six elements that function both as ostensive demonstratives and determiners. Some of these elements also surface as hesitation particles.

Used ostensively, Nanti demonstratives encode a three-way distinction that combines proximal and distal relationships between referents, speakers, and addressees, as shown in Table 6.11. Nanti demonstratives also distinguish the grammatical gender of their referent. In their ostensive function, Nanti demonstratives are typically accompanied by gestures that indicate a referent of relevance to the ongoing interaction. Lip pointing, chin thrusts, and eye gaze are more common

than finger pointing for nearby referents, while finger pointing is more common for distant referents.

Table 6.11: Nanti demonstratives

NON-MASCULINE	MASCULINE	OSTENSIVE FUNCTION
<i>oNta</i>	<i>yoNta</i>	speaker and addressee proximal
<i>oka</i>	<i>yoka</i>	speaker proximal
<i>oga</i>	<i>yoga</i>	speaker distal

In their ostensive function, demonstratives may be used alone, as in (6.155), or as a verbal argument, as in (6.156).

(6.155) M: Tyati pikoga?

*Tyati*      *pi= kog -a*  
 which.INAN 2S= want -REAL.A  
 ‘Which do you want?’

I: Oka.

*oka*  
 this  
 ‘This (one).’

(6.156) Hara noporohi oka.

*hara*      *no= poroh -i*      *oka*  
 NEG.IRREAL 1S= clear -REAL.I this  
 ‘I will not clear this (indicating patch of land).’

Nanti demonstratives also exhibit a contrastive focus form, consisting of repetition of the demonstrative, with the contrast clitic =*ri* attached to the first instance of the demonstrative. The contrastive focus form of the demonstrative *oga* ‘that’, for example, is *ogari oga* ‘that.FOC’.

As previously indicated, Nanti demonstratives also function as determiners. Elements referred to as ‘determiners’ typically encode two semantically distinguishable features: ‘specificity’ and ‘givenness’ (Lyons, 1999; Gundel et al., 1993). All Nanti determiners indicate specificity, and each determiner encodes a different level of givenness. Generally, demonstratives that serve to indicate givenness appear as NP modifiers, although they may also appear alone.

‘Givenness’ is an attribute of a particular discourse referent at a particular point in a given stretch of discourse, corresponding to the salience or identifiability of a particular discourse referent prior to a specific mention (Gundel et al., 1993). Three levels of givenness are relevant to the use of Nanti demonstratives; these are, going from least given to most given: ‘uniquely identifiable’, ‘familiar’, and ‘active’.<sup>54</sup> Determiners always precede the NPs they modify. ‘Uniquely identifiable’ referents are specific referents which can be identified on the basis of the NP and its descriptive content, but which do not require the addressee to be familiar with the referent. In Nanti, uniquely identifiable referents are indicated by the demonstratives *oka* and *yoka*, as in (6.157) and (6.158).

(6.157) NaNtabageta oka osahari.

*no= aNtabaget -a oka osahari*  
 1S= work -REAL.I this clearing  
 ‘I am working the clearing.’

(6.158) Narori maika oka apite shirihaga, irota oka shirihaga, nohatuti.

*naro =ri maika oka apite shirihaga iro =ta oka*  
 1.FOC.PRO =CNTRST now this other dry.season 3nm= CNGNT this  
*shirihaga no= ha -ut -i*  
 dry.season 1S= go -RET -REAL.I  
 ‘I, in contrast, the past dry season, the dry season, I went for a short time.’

<sup>54</sup>In Nanti, the two extremes of the givenness hierarchy, ‘type identifiable’ and ‘in focus’, are expressed through bare NPs and pronominal elements, respectively.

‘Familiar’ referents are both uniquely identifiable and already (presumed to be) part of the interlocutor’s world knowledge, but have yet to be introduced into discourse (or were introduced and then not referred to again for a considerable period). Familiar referents are indicated by the demonstratives *oga* and *yoga*. The use of *yoga* to introduce a familiar discourse participant is exemplified in the utterance given in (6.159), which is drawn from a conversation in which Migero, the leader of Montetoni, is recounting a recent conversation. He mentions an important piece of news his interlocutor brought up, and then commented that his interlocutor learned this news from a man named *Gunaro*. This is the first mention of *Gunaro* in this conversation, and we can see in the example that he is introduced as a discourse participant by means of a topic NP (see §6.4.1), in which the demonstrative *yoga* modifies the personal name *Gunaro*.

(6.159) IkamaNtakeri yoga Gunaro.

*i= kamaNt -ak -i =ri i- oga Gunaro*  
 3mS= tell -PERF -REAL.I -3mO 3m- that *personal.name*  
 ‘Gunaro told him.’

Finally, ‘active’ referents are familiar referents that have previously been introduced into the discourse and which have been recently referred to. Active referents are indicated by the demonstratives *oNta* and *yoNta*. The use of these determiners to indicate active discourse referents is exemplified in the strip of interaction given in (6.160). In this segment, Christine Beier (C) and I (L) are talking with Bikotoro (B) about when he took his two spouses, Eroba and Oroma, as spouses. In line (6.160b) I introduce Oroma as a discourse referent, and in (6.160c), then in (6.160d), when Bikotoro refers to Oroma, a now active discourse referent, he employs the NP *oNta Oroma*.

(6.160) a. B: Nagakero Eroba.

no= ag -ak -i =ro Eroba  
 1S= take -PERF -REAL.I =3nmO personal.name  
 ‘I took Eroba (as my spouse).’

b. L: INpogini Oroma, iNpogini Oroma?

Npogini Oroma iNpogini Oroma  
 then personal.name then personal.name  
 ‘Then Oroma, then Oroma?’

c. C: iNpogini Oroma, oketyo Eroba?

iNpogini Oroma o- ketyo Eroba  
 then personal.name 3nm- first personal.name  
 ‘Then Oroma, first Eroba?’

d. B: oketyo oNta Oroma nagake.

o- ketyo oNta Oroma no= ag -ak -i  
 3nm- first this.nm personal.name 1S= take -PERF -REAL.I  
 ‘I first took Oroma (as my spouse).’

In (6.161), drawn from a different conversation between myself and Bikotoro about Nanti land use, Bikotoro uses *oNta* alone to refer to an activated discourse referent, a hypothetical piece of land we are discussing to clarify some of the political dimensions of Nanti land use. This referent is introduced in (6.161a), referred to again in (6.161d), and when Bikotoro refers to this active referent again in (6.161e), he uses the lone determiner *oNta*.

(6.161) a. B: IkaNti nani kametitake, paNtabagetake osahari. Hee.

i= kaNt -i nani kameti -ak -i pi= aNtabaget  
 1S= say -REAL.I OK be.good -PERF -REAL.I 2S= work  
 -ak -i osahari hee  
 -PERF -REAL.I clearing yes  
 ‘He says, fine, good, you work the clearing. Yeah.’

b. L: Tyani kaNti?

*tyani*                      *kaNt -i*  
 which.one.ANIM say -REAL.I  
 ‘Who says?’

c. B: *yo- maika yo- maika narohegi.*

*yo*    *maika* *yo*    *maika* *naro*                      *-hegi.*  
 FRAG now    FRAG now    1S.FOC.PRO -PL  
 ‘tha-, now, tha-, now, us.’

d. *Inpo nonkamaNte, nonkaNte ari nantabagetakero osarigahe.*

*iNpo* *no=* N-                      *kamaNt -e*                      *no=* N-                      *kaNt*  
 then 1S= IRREAL- tell                      -IRREAL.I 1S= IRREAL say  
*-e*                      *ari*                      *no=* *aNtabaget -ak*                      *-e*                      *=ro*                      *o=*  
 -IRREAL.I POS.POL 1S= work                      -PERF -REAL.I =3nmO 3nmS  
*sarig*                      *-ah*                      *-e*  
 clear.up -REG -IRREAL.I  
 ‘Then I will tell, I will say, “Indeed I am going to work it when the weather clears up.”’

e. *Nantabagetake, onta nonporohake.*

*no=* *aNtabaget -ak*                      *-e*                      *oNta* *no=* N-                      *poroh*  
 1S= work                      -PERF -IRREAL.I this 1S= IRREAL- clear.land  
*-ak*                      *-e*  
 -PERF -IRREAL.I  
 ‘I will work, I will clear it.’

Finally, it should be noted that Nanti hesitation particles stem from the demonstratives *yoga* and *oga*. The hesitation particles are distinguishable from the corresponding demonstratives by the reduction and centralization of their vowels, and by word-final glottalization, surfacing as [dʒəgəʔ] and [əgəʔ], respectively. These hesitation particles are mainly used when a speaker is executing a word search for a noun, and the choice of hesitation particle normally corresponds to the grammatical gender of noun in question.

### 6.3.4 Adjectives

In Nanti, members of the adjective class are easy to distinguish morphologically from members of the verb and noun word classes. With the exception of adverbs, adjectives are the most morphologically inert word class in Nanti. Adjectives cannot take any verbal inflectional morphology, such as reality status or aspect suffixes, nor can they take any nominal inflectional morphology, such as plural or possessive affixes. Adjectives are also excluded from nominal and verbal derivational processes, with one exception: most adjectives may participate in noun incorporation and classifier affixation, the former process one that applies to verbs, and the latter process one that applies to both verbs and nouns.

Nanti adjectives fall into two morphological classes: i) a large set of adjectives that are either synchronically derived from verbs, or, judging by their form, were so derived historically; and ii) a small set of adjectives which show no sign of having been derived from verbs. We begin by considering deverbal adjectives, which demonstrate the greatest morphological regularity.

#### 6.3.4.1 Deverbal adjectives

Deverbal adjectives outnumber the underived adjectives by a large margin, numbering in the hundreds. The majority of deverbal adjectives are derived from verb roots using the suffix *-ri*. Verb roots that undergo this derivation are mainly intransitive state verbs expressing stable physical properties such as taste (e.g. *kachori* ‘sour (adj.)’, cf. *kacho* ‘be sour (v.)’), mechanical properties (*amatsogaNpiri* ‘blunt (adj.)’, cf. *amatsogaNpi* ‘be blunt(v.)’), and ones expressing stable visual appearance properties (e.g. *shamehari* ‘longitudinally stripey (adj.)’, cf. *shameha* ‘have longitudinal stripes (v.)’), including color terms (e.g. *kutari* ‘white (adj.)’, cf. *kuta* ‘be white (v.)’). Some non-property state verbs also undergo this derivation (e.g. *katsi* ‘hurt (v. intr.)’ > *katsiri* ‘painful (adj.)’). More rarely, non-state verbs undergo

adjectival derivation, in which case the resulting sense is unpredictable, yielding either resultant state or propensity senses. Consider, for example, the resultative sense of *kipari* ‘cooked (by being wrapped in leaves and placed in coals)’ and the corresponding intransitive verb *akipa* ‘cook by wrapping in leaves and placing in coals’. Similarly, the propensity adjective *pohamari* ‘flammable (said of firewood)’ derives from the verb *pohama* ‘catch on fire’. A small set of deverbal adjectives are derived with other suffixes, including *-ni*,<sup>55</sup> as in *taabani* ‘painful’, *shabogaheni* ‘warm’, and the suffix *-aga*, as in *anihaga* ‘alive’.

Deverbal adjectives are highly regular in their morphosyntactic properties, unlike underived adjectives. None exhibit either animacy or gender agreement, and as far as I have been able to determine, all participate in noun incorporation and classifier affixation.

#### 6.3.4.2 Underived adjectives

There are approximately 25 underived adjectives in Nanti, mainly restricted to the semantic classes of value, dimension, quantification, and number. Unlike their deverbal counterparts, underived adjectives exhibit considerable morphological irregularities, including unpredictable manifestation of agreement, and participation in noun incorporation and classifier affixation processes. For example, although some underived dimension adjectives exhibit animacy agreement (e.g. *omarane/omarate* ‘large (animate/inanimate)’ and *otyomihani/otyomihati* ‘small (animate/inanimate)’), most do not (e.g. *kurayu* ‘tall’, *shabiti* ‘short’; *sharotsantsa* ‘long’, *kakicho* ‘short’). Quantifiers and numerals, on the other hand, generally show animacy agreement (e.g. *tobaheni/tobaheti* ‘many (animate/inanimate)’, *maganiro/magatiro* ‘all (animate/inanimate)’, *apiteni/apiteti* ‘the other (animate/inanimate)’), although we find some quantifiers which never show animacy agreement (e.g. *mahani* ‘few’, *pashini* ‘another’). Nanti,

<sup>55</sup>The suffixes *-ri* and *-ni* do not appear to be either historically or synchronically related to each other.



like many Amazonian languages, exhibits a restricted numeral system, with only two numeral terms. Nanti numerals agree with the animacy of the referent (overt or not) that they quantify: *paniro/patiro* ‘one (animate/inanimate)’ and *piteni/piteti* ‘two (animate/inanimate)’. Another irregularity is manifested by a small number of dimension adjectives that show gender agreement in addition to animacy agreement (e.g. *imarane/omarane* ‘large (animate masculine/animate non-masculine)'). Gender agreement is otherwise very rare in Nanti adjectives.

Another domain of irregularity in underived Nanti adjectives is their participation in noun incorporation and classifier affixation. Numerals as well as some quantifiers and dimension adjectives participate in noun incorporation or classifier affixation (e.g. *kakichotsoha* ‘short beaked’, cf. *kakicho* ‘short’ and *tsoha* ‘beak’), but others simply cannot (e.g. *kurayu* ‘tall’). On the other hand, there are a small number of adjectival roots which require a classifier (e.g. *tsirepe* ‘slender (adj. root)’, *tsirepetsa* ‘slender (string-like)’; e.g. *kara* ‘broad (adj. root)’, *karapokiri* ‘wide (path)’ (see §6.3.7 for further discussion).

### 6.3.4.3 Patterns of adjective use

Implicit in the discussion of deverbal adjectives is the fact that many property concepts may be expressed in Nanti either by verbs or by adjectives. Obviously, morphosyntactic environments may force the choice of one construction type over the other (for example, modification of an argument NP can only be achieved by an adjective), but in simple attributional constructions, either construction type is possible. For example, (6.162a) and (6.162b) are structurally distinct means of expressing the same, or at least very similar, meanings.

(6.162) a. Tenani oni.

<i>tena</i>	<i>-ni</i>	<i>o=</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>-i</i>
be.heavy	-ADJZ	2nmS=	COP	-REAL.I

‘It is heavy.’

b. Otenatake.

*o= tena -ak i*  
3nmS= heavy -PERF -REAL.I  
‘It is heavy.’

Despite the truth-functional equivalence of these constructions, patterns emerge in discourse that suggest that the two constructions serve different information structural functions. Positive polarity attributinal sentences tend to employ the adjectival construction, as in (6.163a), while negative polarity sentences tend to employ the verbal construction, as in (6.163b). Nevertheless, this tendency is not absolute, and one encounters examples like that in (6.163c).

(6.163) a. Kirahari oni.

*kiraha -ri o= n -i*  
be.red -ADJZ 3nmS= COP -REAL.I  
‘It is red.’

b. Tera onkirahate.

*tera o= N- kiraha -e*  
NEG.REAL 3nmS= IRREAL be.red -IRREAL.I  
‘It is not red.’

c. Tera kirahari one.

*tera kirahari o= n -e*  
NEG.REAL be.red -ADJZ 3nmS= COP -IRREAL.I  
‘It is not red.’

Similarly, simple interrogatives in which a property concept is being questioned normally exhibit the adjectival form of the property concept. These facts suggest that the adjective plus copula construction expresses contrastive focus on the property concept, whereas the verbal expression of the same concept does not.

### 6.3.5 Adverbs

Adverbs are distinctive among the Nanti word classes in showing no inflectional features whatsoever, and in not participating in any productive inflectional or derivational processes (with the exception of one adverb, mentioned below). Adverbs also form a small class of words in Nanti, since most adverbial concepts are expressed either through verbal morphology or by semantically complex verbal roots.<sup>56</sup>

The majority of Nanti adverbs have temporal and/or spatial meanings, although Nanti exhibits a number of other small semantic classes of adverbs, including event quantification, degree and manner.

The basic set of temporal adverbs are as follows, including some lexicalized collocations: *ityasano pairani* ‘a very long time ago’, *pairani* ‘a long time ago’, *karaŋki* ‘a while ago’, *chapi* ‘a few days ago’, *maika chapi* ‘yesterday’, *iŋkahara* ‘earlier in the same day’, *maika iŋkahara* ‘very recently earlier in the same day’, *maika* ‘today, within a few hours, right now’, *maikari maika* ‘right now’, *tahena* ‘soon, within minutes or hours’, *kamani oŋkuta* ‘(early) tomorrow’, *kamani* ‘in the next few days’.

Spatial adverbs include one set linked to the river-based system of spatial orientation and another set linked to a radial system of orientation. The former set includes *iŋtaati* ‘opposite side of river’, *pasotaatiro* ‘same side of the river’, *katoŋku* ‘upriver’, *kamatitya* ‘downriver’. The radial system set includes *choheni* ‘near’, *chohesamachoheni* ‘middlingly far’, and *samani* ‘far’. Nanti exhibits another pair of spatial adverbs based on the concept of *expected area* or *situationally relevant area*; the form *ainyoni* indicates a location within the relevant or expected area, and typically can be interpreted as ‘very near’ the form *parikoti* indicates a location outside the relevant or expected area, and typically can be interpreted as ‘very

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<sup>56</sup>Compare, for example, the verb roots *anu* ‘walk’, *shibaŋpiha* ‘walk lengthwise along a narrow surface’, *shite* ‘walk along a riverbank’, *apeshi* ‘walk in the rain’; or *ha* ‘go’, *ken* ‘go in a particular direction’, *tsa* ‘go to a particular destination’, and *oŋkuha* ‘go on a particular trajectory, following a major feature of the terrain’.

far'. In both cases, however, these glosses are potentially misleading. In the case of *parikoti*, for example, Nantis may use this term to refer to the land that I, the author, come from, which accords with the sense of 'very far'. However, Nantis also use the term to refer to nearby locations, as when an eyedrop falls to the side of the eye for which it was intended. The two uses share the sense of being outside a relevant or expected area, the part of the world known to Nantis, in the first case, and the eye in question, in the second.

Other spatial adverbs include *sotsi* 'outside', *tsonpogi* 'inside', and one associated with trajectories of motion, *okiro* 'directly, without stopping'.

Event quantification adverbs include *aikiro* 'again', and *tobaheti* 'many times'. The latter adverb also permits manner and degree interpretations depending on the aspectual class of the verb; the event quantification interpretation obtains for telic verbs.

Manner adverbs include *shin̄tsi* 'quickly', *chichanira* 'slowly, carefully', and *tobaheti* 'frequently'; the manner interpretation of the latter verb is available for telic verbs and activity verbs.

Degree adverbs include *païro* 'very, to a high degree', *tobaheti* 'frequently, a lot', *choheni* 'slightly' (note polysemy with *choheni* 'near'), and *pahentya* 'almost'; the degree interpretation of *tobaheti* is available for state verbs only. The adverb *pahentya* 'almost' is unusual in that it triggers irrealis marking on the verb, as in (6.164).

(6.164) Pahentya inkame.

<i>pahentya</i>	<i>i=</i>	N-	<i>kam</i>	<i>-e</i>
almost	3mS=	IRREAL-	die	-IRREAL.I
‘He almost died.’				

There are a very small number of adverbs that express adverbial qualities related exclusively to humans; by far the two most common are *chichata* 'of his/her

own volition’, and *kogapage* ‘without expected/desirable attribute or outcome’. The precise sense of the latter form depends crucially on the communicative context and may yield senses as disparate as ‘thoughtlessly, without a good reason’ and ‘without a spouse’.

### 6.3.6 Clausal clitics

Nanti exhibits two major sets of notionally-related clausal clitics, a set of discursive stance clitics and a set of evidential clitics, and a lone temporal clitic *=tya* ‘yet, still’.

#### 6.3.6.1 Discursive stance clitics

Nanti exhibits a set of three second-position clausal clitics that serve to indicate the stance of the speaker in relation to his or her own previous utterances, or in relation to the utterances of his or her interlocutor. These clitics include *=ta* ‘congruent’, *=npa* ‘incongruent’, and *=ri* ‘opposite’.

**6.3.6.1.1 Congruent stance clitic** The congruent stance clitic *=ta* indicates that the proposition bearing the clitic is ‘congruent’ with a previous utterance. In general, this means that the clause bearing the congruent stance clitic is construed as being rhetorically supportive of a recent proposition.

In order to understand what ‘congruence’ means in this context, consider the segment of interaction given in (6.165), in which Bikotoro and I are discussing the collaborative labor involved in clearing his garden. In (6.165a), Bikotoro tells me that all his friends and relatives helped clear his garden. I respond with a continuer in (6.165b), and Bikotoro follows with the assertion in (6.165c) that ‘everyone’ worked on the garden. This clause, which bears the congruent stance clitic, supports his prior assertion in (6.165a).

(6.165) a. B: Maganiro yamutakena.

*maganiro i= amu -ak -i =na*  
 all.ANIM 3mS= help -PERF -REAL.I =1O  
 ‘Everyone helped me.’

b. L: Aryo?

*aryo*  
 really  
 ‘Really?’

c. B: Hee. Maganirota naNtabagetahigake.

*hee maganiro =ta no= aNtabaget -hig -ak -i*  
 yes all =CNGT 1S= work -PL -PERF -REAL.I  
 ‘Yes. As I said, we all worked.’

The interactional sequence in (6.166) exemplifies a different type of rhetorical congruence, in which the clause marked with the congruent stance clitic *=ta* is construed as confirmatory evidence for, or a natural consequence of, a prior claim. In this strip of interaction, the community leader, Migero, is commenting on a young man who lived in a Matsigenka community for a few months before returning to a Nanti community. In (6.166a) Migero asserts that the young man lost interest in living there, and then follows this assertion with the *=ta*-marked clause in (6.166b), in which he cites the young man’s departure as evidence of, or a natural sequel to, his losing interest.

(6.166) a. IkaNti ari iperatahi.

*i= kaNt -i ari i= pera -ah -i*  
 3mS= say -REAL.I pos.pol 3mS= lose.interest -REG -REAL.I  
 ‘He<sub>i</sub> said, “He<sub>j</sub> lost interest again.”’

b. Pine nokaNti, ikaNtaketa nonPigahigahe.

*pine no= kaNt -i i= kaNt -ak -i =ta*  
 you.see 1S= say -REAL.I 3mS= say -PERF -REAL.I =CNGT  
*no= N- pig -hig -ah -e*  
 1S= IRREAL- return -PL -REG -IRREAL.I  
 ‘I assert, you see, that he<sub>j</sub> said, accordingly, “We are going to go back.”’

A related use of the congruent stance clitic is found in affirmative responses to questions that seek to confirm a fact the questioner already believes to be true, as in 6.167.

(6.167) C: Pipakeri Reho chapi hetari?

*pi= p -ak -i =ri Reho chapi hetari*  
 2S= give -PERF -REAL.I =3MO name yesterday hetari  
 ‘Did you give Reho *hetari* (fish sp.) yesterday?’

B: Nopakerita.

*no= p -ak -i =ri =ta*  
 1S= give -PERF -REAL.I =3MO =CNGT  
 ‘I did indeed give him (*hetari*).’

A third function of the congruent stance clitic is the explicit marking of inter-utterance coreference, exemplified in (6.168). In (6.168a) the speaker establishes a referent, and after his interlocutor responds with a continuer in (6.168b), he refers to the same referent, using the focus pronoun *iro*. The congruent clitic *=ta* is attached to the focus pronoun, indicating that there is an antecedent for the pronoun in the previous utterance.

(6.168) M: Pine, Soira irishiNto Bikotoro,

*pine Soira ir- ishiNto Bikotoro*  
 you.see Soira 3mP- daughter Bikotoro  
 ‘You see, Soira, Bikotoro’s daughter,’

E: Nehe.

*nehe*  
 yeah  
 ‘Yeah.’

M: *Irota, irota yagi.*

*iro =ta iro =ta i= ag -i*  
 3nm.foc. =CNGT 3nm.foc. =CNGT 3mS= take -REAL.I  
 ‘*Her*, he took *her* (i.e. as his spouse).’

Apart from marking anaphoric relationships between NPs, the clitic *=ta* is also frequently employed to emphasize an anaphoric relationship with an antecedent proposition. This function is illustrated in the brief discourse segment in (6.169), which consists of two adjacent sentences uttered by a single speaker, in which he reports a previous conversation.

(6.169) a. *IkaNti maika ipakerika peremiso.*

*i= kaNt -i maika i= p -ak -i =ri*  
 3mS say -REAL.I then 3mS= give -PERF -REAL.I =3MO  
*=ka peremiso*  
 =INFR permission  
 ‘He said then, “He presumably gave him permission.”’

b. *Irota maika ipokaNtakari aka.*

*iro=ta maika i= pok -aNt -ak -a =ri*  
 3nm.FOC.PRO now 3mS= come -INST -PERF -REAL.A =?  
*aka*  
 here  
 ‘He came because of that.’

In (6.169a), the speaker reports the utterance *ipakerika peremiso* ‘He presumably gave him permission’. In the next line (6.169b), the speaker continues the speech report, saying *Irota maika ipokaNtari aka* ‘He came because of that’, where the reason for the person’s coming is expressed by means of anaphoric reference



to the immediately preceding proposition. This proposition anaphoric reference is achieved by the element *irota*, which consists of the third person non-masculine pronoun, to which the congruent stance clitic is suffixed.

**6.3.6.1.2 Non-congruent stance clitic** The non-congruent stance clitic =*Npa* indicates that the utterance bearing the clitic expresses a stance that either runs counter to the desires or wishes expressed or presupposed by a preceding utterance, or contradicts an argument being constructed in preceding discourse. In (6.170) we see an example of the former function, where the non-congruent clitic is employed to express a desire contrary to that expressed by an interlocutor.

(6.170) A: Nero.

*nero*  
 here.you.go  
 ‘Here you go.’ (Handing someone a bowl of manioc beer.)

B: BiroNpa.

*biro*            =*Npa*  
 2.FOC.PRO =NCNGT  
 ‘You.’ (i.e. ‘You drink it, instead of handing it to me.’)

A similar use of the non-congruent clitic can be observed in (6.171), which is drawn from a conversation between Migero, the leader of the community of Montetoni, and Ariponso, a man recently arrived from the a settlement on the Timpía River. In this conversation Migero is counseling Ariponso on how he should behave, were oil company personnel to visit the community and give him clothes to wear, and specifically, that he should not reject them. Migero models what Ariponso should *not* say, where the rejection of the offer of clothes is indicated by the non-congruent clitic.

(6.171) Hara pikanti hara, aryONpa nogatsantsatahi.

*hara*            *pi= kaNt -i*            *hara*            *aryo*            =Npa            *no=*  
 NEG.IRREAL 2S= say   -REAL.I NEG.IRREAL POS.POL =NCNGT 1S=  
*gatsantsa -ah -i*  
 be.naked -REG -REAL.I  
 ‘Don’t say, “No, it is appropriate that I be naked.”’

The strip of interaction given in (6.172) exemplifies the use of the non-congruent clitic in marking a clause as expressing a rhetorical position opposed to that of an interlocutor. In the example in question, a woman is trying to make the case to Migero that when she left the downriver community of Marankehari to visit Montetoni, she left in a socially appropriate manner, which involves apprising socially prominent individuals of her intention to make an inter-village visit. In (6.172a) the woman attempts to bolster her case by mentioning that Migero’s mother saw her off. Migero, however, has many reasons to be suspicious about this framing of her departure, and responds, in (6.172b), with a skeptical question marked with the non-congruent clitic.

(6.172) a. H: Piniro onehabakena.

*pi- iniro o= neh -ab -ak -i =na*  
 2S- mother 3nmS= see -TRNS -PERF -REAL.I =1O  
 ‘Your mother watched me (go).’

b. M: Hoha, iryoNpa nehabakiNpi?

*Hoha iryo =Npa neh -ab -ak -i -Npi*  
 name 3mFOC.PRO =NCNGT see -TRNS -PERF -REAL.I =sO  
 ‘Hoha, did *he* watch you (go)?’

The word *ironpa*, formed on the third person non-masculine focus pronoun *iro*, exhibits lexicalization of the non-congruent stance clitic. *Ironpa* is employed at points in narratives in which a following action or event marks a sudden and stark change in the narrative line, as in (6.173).

(6.173) Nonporohakerika haNta parikoti, ironpa aka pokahena aka onkuta.

no= N-            poroh        -ak     -i            =rika    haNta    parikoti  
 1S= -IRREAL-    clear.land -PERF -REAL.I =COND    there    outside.area  
 ironpa    aka    pok    -ah    -i            =na    aka    onkuta  
 suddenly   here   come   -REG -REAL.I =1O    here   morning  
 ‘If I were to clear land over there outside of our territory, I would quickly  
 return the next day.’

**6.3.6.1.3 Polar contrast clitic** The polar contrast clitic =ri indicates that the utterance bearing the clitic should be construed as expressing a proposition that includes a value for some relevant parameter that is the *opposite* of the value found in some preceding expression. In this respect, it resembles the periphrastic English expression *on the other hand*.

(6.174) a. Tetyahenka noshigashigate.

te                    =tya    =henka    no=    shigashiga    -e  
 NEG.REAL    =yet    =INCH    1S=    run.away    -IRREAL.I  
 ‘I have not yet run away.’

b. Birori shigashigatanake.

biro                =ri            shigashiga    -an    -ak    -i  
 2.FOC.PRO    =pol.cnt    run.away    -ABL -PERF -REAL.I  
 ‘You, on the other hand, ran away.’

The use of the polar contrast clitic for a parameter other than clausal polarity is given in (6.175). The example is an excerpt from a conversation which I had with two Nanti men, Bisarota and Tomashi, about a trip they made to the Pirihasanteni, a small tributary of the Camisea. In (6.175a) I ask if the river was shallow at the mouth, to which Bisarota responds in (6.175b) that it was not. Tomashi then comments in (6.175c) that, on the other hand, the Pirihasanteni *was* shallow upriver, employing the contrastive polarity clitic.

(6.175) a. L: Okachohatake agatihaku?

*o= kachoha -ak -i agatiha -ku*  
 3mS= be.shallow -PERF -REAL.I river.mouth -LOC  
 ‘Was it shallow at the river mouth?’

b. B: Tera.

*tera*  
 NEG.REAL  
 ‘No.’

c. T: Karari katoNku.

*kara =ri katoNku*  
 there =POL.CNTR upriver  
 Upriver, on the other hand (it was shallow).

### 6.3.6.2 Evidential clitics

Nanti exhibits three evidential clitics: the inferential second-position clitic *ka*, the reportive proclitic *ke*, and the quotative proclitic *ka*. The reportive and quotative can be considered to form a single paradigm, but the inferential does not occupy the same position, which makes the Nanti evidential system an example of a *scattered* evidential system (Aikhenvald, 2004).

**6.3.6.2.1 Quotative** The quotative *ka* is a clause-initial clitic, which is inflected for the person of the utterer of the quotative-bearing clause, as in (6.176).

(6.176) Ika te, nonake haNta.

*i- ka te no= N- n -ak -e haNta*  
 3MS- QUOT NEG.REAL 1S= IRREAL- be -PERF -IRREAL.I there  
 ‘He said, “No, I will live there.”’

The quotative *ka* is transparently related to the verb root *kaNt* ‘say’,<sup>57</sup> and indeed, these evidentials were diachronically formed by taking the first disyllabic foot of the corresponding inflected verbs.<sup>58</sup>

**6.3.6.2.2 Reportive** Like the quotative *ka*, the reportive *ke* is a clause-initial clitic, inflected for person. In the case of the reportive, the person marking corresponds to the individual who heard the reportive-marked clause. The quotative *ke* is transparently related to the verb root *kem* ‘hear’,<sup>59</sup> and like the reportive, was formed diachronically by taking the first disyllabic foot of the corresponding inflected verbs.

(6.177) *Noke ikentabetaka kemari.*

*no- ke i= keNt -be -ak -a kemari.*  
 1- REP 3mS= pierce -FRUS -PERF -REAL.A tapir  
 ‘He wounded (that is, shot without killing) a tapir.’ (reportive)

(6.178) *Chapi noke ikanti ainyo, irirenti.*

*chapi no- ke i= kaNt -i ainyo ir- irenti*  
 yesterday 1S- REP 3MS= say -REAL.I EXIST.ANIM 3MP- brother  
 ‘Yesterday he<sub>i</sub> said that he<sub>j</sub> has a brother.’ (reportive)

<sup>57</sup>The development of quotatives from ‘say’ verbs is well-established cross-linguistically (Aikhenvald, 2004, p.271-2)

<sup>58</sup>Lest a skeptic argue that these evidentials are nothing but inflected verbs which have had their final syllables clipped in fast speech, it should be noted that these disyllabic evidentials uniformly bear stress on their initial syllable (e.g. *ika*). This is characteristic of disyllabic words in Nanti (Crowhurst and Michael, 2005), but not of clipped words, which retain the stress pattern of the full word. In the case of the inflected verbs corresponding to the evidentials in question, clipping would result in stress on the final syllable of the evidential (e.g. *\*iká*).

<sup>59</sup>The development of reportives from ‘hear’ verbs is apparently not as common as the development of quotatives and reportives from ‘say’ verbs, but is attested in Shibacha Lisu (Sino-Tibetan; China; Aikhenvald, 2004, p.274)

**6.3.6.2.3 Inferential** The inferential *=ka* is a second-position clitic, as can be seen by comparing the location of this element in (6.179) through (6.182). This historical provenance of this morpheme is unclear. Several Kampan languages exhibit a homophonous indefinite morpheme *-ka*, which also surfaces in Nanti indefinite pronouns (§6.4.3.1.3). The indefinite *-ka* is likely cognate to the interrogative *-ka*, attested in Ashéninka (Payne, 1981, p.28), as interrogatives are frequently derived from indefinites (Haspelmath, 1997, pp 174-176).

The evidential literature does not, as far as I am aware, mention instances of the development of inferentials from either interrogative or indefinite markers. However, there are clear instances of evidentials developing from modal categories. For example, Aikhenvald (2004, pp 278-279) discusses instances of declarative and declarative-indicative mood markers in Shipibo and Tariana, respectively, developing into direct and visual evidentials. Similarly, Aikhenvald cites cases of the development of non-direct evidentials from non-indicative modalities, as in the case of the Estonian reportive, which has been analyzed as developing from a potential mood marker (Metslang and Pajusalu, 2002, cited in Aikhenvald, 2004, p.277-278). The notion that the Nanti inferential developed from a Proto-Kampan interrogative/indefinite marker thus exhibits *prima facie* plausibility.

(6.179) Samanika itimabageti.

*samani =ka i= tim -bage -i*  
 far =INFR 3mS live -DUR -REAL.I

‘He must live far away.’ (Inference based on interlocutor’s comment that he had never seen the house of the person being discussed.)

(6.180) Ainyoka irimage.

*ainyo =ka i= ri- mag -e.*  
 EXIST.ANIM =INFR 3MS= IRREAL- sleep -IRREAL.I

‘He must be there sleeping.’ (Inference based on knowing the referent is at home, but there being no sign of activity.)

(6.181) Ihatakeka inkamosotera kamatitya.

*i= ha -ak -i =ka i= N- kamoso -e*  
 3mS= go -PERF -REAL.I =INFR 3mS= IRREAL- visit -IRREAL.I  
*=ra kamatitya*  
 -SUB downriver  
 ‘He must have gone to visit downriver.’

The following strip of interaction between the author and Teherina, during a visit the latter made to my dwelling, renders relatively explicit the basis of the inference expressed in the first line of the example.

(6.182) T: Arika yobiika Ihoniraku.

*ari =ka i= obiik -a Ihonira -ku*  
 POS.POL =INFR 3mS= drink -REFL.A *personal.name* -LOC  
 ‘They must be drinking at Ihonira’s place.’

R: Aryo?

*aryo*  
 POS.POL  
 ‘Oh?’

T: Pikema<sup>^</sup> ikabakaba.

*pi= kem (a) i= kabakab -a*  
 2S= hear frag 3mS= laugh -REAL.A  
 ‘You hear them laughing.’

### 6.3.6.3 Temporal clitic

The temporal clitic *=tya* ‘yet, still’ is second position clitic, as is evident by comparing (6.183) and (6.184).

(6.183) Irotya piriniti.

*iro*                    =*tya* *pirini* *-i*.  
 3nm.FOC.PRO =still sit        -real.i  
 ‘*She* is still sitting.’

(6.184) Tetya ontsohate.

*te*                    =*tya* *o=*        N-                *tsoha* *-e*  
 NEG.REAL =yet run.out -IRREAL.I  
 ‘It has not yet run out (re: manioc beer).’

### 6.3.7 Noun incorporation and classifier affixation

Nanti exhibits productive noun incorporation and classifier affixation. Noun incorporation and classifier affixation are clearly distinct morphosyntactic processes in Nanti, but the two processes are interrelated and share several features, making a combined discussion of the two phenomena economical. Because the two phenomena cross-cut word classes, I have also separated the discussion of noun incorporation and classifier affixation from the morphological descriptions of particular word classes.

#### 6.3.7.1 Noun incorporation

In Nanti, nouns can incorporate into verbs, adjectives, and numerals, although the processes differ somewhat among these classes. Only inalienably-possessed nominal roots may incorporate, and moreover, the inalienably-possessed nouns that can incorporate are all *part terms*. By this I mean that the nouns in question are part expressions in part-whole relationships – principally body part and plant part terms. We do not find, for example, incorporation of inalienably-possessed manufactured objects, such as bows.

**6.3.7.1.1 Noun incorporation in verbs** Nouns incorporate immediately following the verb root, prior to any derivational morphology, as in (6.185b). The incorporation of an inalienable nominal root alters the argument structure of the



verb through ‘possessor contrast’ (Perlmutter and Postal, 1983; Shibatani, 1994): the notional possessor of the incorporated root comes to occupy the argument position occupied by the possessum in the corresponding analytical expression.<sup>60</sup> Thus, the possessor of an inalienable noun filling the subject role in an analytical construction corresponds to the subject of the corresponding verb into which the alienable nominal root has been incorporated. In such cases, the subject of the verb is interpreted as the (external) possessor of the incorporated nominal root (Payne and Barshi, 1999).

An example of the incorporation of a noun root *negi* ‘chest’ is given in (6.185b), where the (external) possessor is indicated by the subject clitic *no=*. The corresponding analytical construction is given in (6.185a).

(6.185) a. Okatsiti nonegi.

*o= katsi -i no- negi.*  
 3nmS= hurt -REAL.I 1P- chest  
 ‘My chest hurts.’

b. Nokatsinegitake.

*no= katsi -negi -ak -i*  
 1S= hurt -chest -PERF -REAL.I  
 ‘My chest hurts (I am chest-hurting).’

Likewise, the possessor of an inalienable noun filling the object role in an analytical expression corresponds to the object of the verb into which the possessum has been incorporated. In such cases, the object of the latter construction is interpreted as the (external) possessor of the incorporated nominal root.

(6.186) a. Nomapatakero igitto.

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<sup>60</sup>Part of the definition of productive noun incorporation requires that each instance of incorporation in a given language correspond to an equivalent analytic construction, in which the nominal element is not incorporated (Mithun, 1984).

*no= mapa -ak -e =ro i- gito*  
 1S= pulverize -PERF -REAL.I =3nmO 3mP- head  
 ‘I pulverized his head (speaking of a smoked fish).’

b. Nomapagitotakiri.

*no= mapa -gito -ak -i =ri*  
 1S= pulverize -head -PERF -REAL.I =3mO  
 ‘I pulverized his head (I head-pulverized him).’

A systematic exception to the pattern of possessor contrast just described occurs for transitive verbs which incorporate roots whose possessors are coreferential with the subject of the verb. In this case, the verb becomes syntactically intransitive, and no person marker appears in object position as the external possessor of the incorporated root. Instead, the subject person marker indicates both the subject of the verb and the external possessor of the the nominal root, as in (6.187a). This behavior is consonant with the general behavior of reflexive and reciprocal constructions in Nanti (see §§6.3.1.3.2.3 and 6.4.2.1.3). Note that referents are necessarily disjunct in forms exhibiting possessor ascension with subject and object markers of the same person and gender, as in (6.187b).

(6.187) a. IpitaNkabakotake.

*i= pitaNk -bako -ak -i*  
 3mS= crush -hand -PERF -REAL.I  
 ‘He<sub>i</sub> crushed his<sub>i</sub> hand.’

b. IpitaNkabakotakeri.

*i= pitaNk -bako -ak -i =ri*  
 3mS= crush -hand -PERF -REAL.I =3nmO  
 ‘He<sub>i</sub> crushed his<sub>j</sub> hand.’

Noun incorporation in Nanti exhibits the ergative behavior typical of this process: the subjects of intransitives and the objects of transitives incorporate; oblique roots do not incorporate.

Incorporated nouns exhibit a morphophonemic alternation conditioned by the grammatical relation of their external possessor.<sup>61</sup> The alternation in question involves voiced and voiceless consonants in nominal root-initial position. This alternation is restricted to nominal roots whose underlying forms are either /p/- or /k/-initial, since these are the only two consonants with voiced counterparts. Incorporated roots with external possessors in subject position exhibit voiceless initial consonants, as in (6.188a) and (6.189a), while incorporated roots with external possessors in object position exhibit voiced initial consonants, as in (6.188b) and (6.189b).

(6.188) a. OkutapaNkiti.

*o*=        *kuta*        *-paNki*        *-i*  
 3nmS= be.white -feather/wing -REAL.I  
 ‘The feather/wing is white.’

b. YobatubaNkitakeri.

*i*=        *o[+voice]*        *patuh*        *-baNki*        *-ak*        *-i*        =*ri*  
 3mS= CAUS:NAGT bisect -feather/wing -PERF -REAL =3mO  
 ‘He cut its feather/wing.’

(6.189) a. Okamapohatake.

*o*=        *kam*        *-poha*        *-ak*        *-i*  
 3nmS= die -tree.trunk -PREF -REAL.I  
 ‘It died (speaking of a tree trunk).’

b. Yagabohatakero.

*i*=        *ag*        *-boha*        *-ak*        *-i*        =*ro*  
 3mS= take -tree.trunk-PREF -REAL.I =3mO  
 ‘He took it (speaking of a tree trunk).’

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<sup>61</sup>Alternatively, one could argue that the alternation is conditioned by the grammatical relation of the inalienable noun, prior to incorporation.

**6.3.7.1.2 Noun incorporation in numerals and adjectives** Inalienable nominal roots may also incorporate into numerals, as in (6.190); other quantifiers, as in (6.191); and adjectives, as in (6.192). In the cases of these word classes, the root incorporates via infixation, rather than by suffixation, as in the case of verbal noun incorporation.<sup>62</sup>

(6.190) patsehitiro

*pa -tsehi- tiro*  
 one -thorn- one  
 ‘one thorn’

(6.191) apihokite

*api -hoki- te*  
 other -eye- other  
 ‘other eye’

(6.192) kitegonakeri

*kite -gonake- ri*  
 yellow -elbow- ADJV  
 ‘yellow-elbowed’ (speaking of a species of crab)

The notional possessors of incorporated inalienable roots are not morphosyntactically expressed; possessor ascension and external possessors are absent in these cases of noun incorporation. Note that the phonological form of incorporated nouns in numerals and adjectives corresponds to that of nouns incorporated into intransitive verbs.

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<sup>62</sup>It is plausible that noun incorporation previously involved suffixation, rather than infixation, but that the previously productive morphology following the incorporated noun has been lexicalized.

### 6.3.7.2 The multiple classifier system

Nanti exhibits a large set of classifiers which mainly classify referents in terms of their shape and mechanical properties, such as rigidity and flexibility. These classifiers may affix to numeral, verbal, adjectival, and nominal stems, resulting in a *multiple classifier system* (Aikhenvald, 2000). The affixation of the classifier *ki~gi* is illustrated with each of the possible stem types in (6.193).

(6.193) a. pitekiti (numeral)

*pite -ki- ti*  
two -CL:seed- two  
'two (e.g. beads)'

b. Ipagitina. (verb)

*i= p -gi -i =na*  
3mS= give CL:seed -REAL.I =1O  
'He gave me (e.g. a bead).'

c. kirahakiri (adjective)

*kiraha -ki- ri*  
red -CL:seed -red  
'red (e.g. beads)'

d. chobaNkiriki (noun)

*chobaNkiri -ki*  
job's.tears.plant -CL:seed  
'Job's Tears (*Coix lacryma-jobi*) seed'

**6.3.7.2.1 Verbal classifiers** In most cases, classifiers categorize either the notional subject of an intransitive verb, as in (6.194), or the notional object of a transitive verb, as in (6.195), thereby displaying the same ergative behavior characteristic of noun incorporation.

(6.194) Omakakitatanake.

*o= maka -kita -an -ak -i*  
3nmS= rot -CL:mat -ABL -PERF -REAL.I  
'It began to rot (speaking of a mat).'

(6.195) Nosagubokiti.

*no= sagu -boki -i*  
1S= throw.water.on -CL:fire -REAL.I  
'I am throwing water on the fire.'

Unlike noun incorporation, however, classifier affixation extends to oblique arguments, as in (6.196) and (6.197). In all such cases, the oblique argument in question is of the morphologically unmarked 'pragmatic oblique' type described in §6.4.1.

(6.196) Hara nopiriniseta kipatsi.

*hara no= pirini -se -a kipatsi*  
NEG.IRREAL 1S= sit -CL:mass -REAL.A ground  
'I will not sit on the ground.'

(6.197) Ipasagiitiro pihiri.

*i= pasa -gii -i =ro pihiri*  
3mS= beat -CL:1D.rigid -REAL.I =3nmO bat  
'He is beating the bat with an arrow.'

Verbal classifiers have a pragmatically mediated effect on the overt realization of verbal arguments. A classifier may co-occur with the overt referential NP it classifies, as well as with a coreferential person marker, as in (6.198). Similarly, a classifier may co-occur with an overt referential NP, without a coreferential person

marker, as in (6.196), or with only a person marker, as in (6.194). In other cases, however, the classifier may be the only overt indication of a verbal argument, as in (6.199), (6.200), (6.197), and (6.195).

(6.198) *Oсотogamenitake kochara.*

*o=        sotog                    -meni                    -ak     -i        kochara*  
 3mS= come.out.of.hole -CL:2D.flat.rigid.thin -PERF -REAL.I spoon  
 ‘The spoon came out of the hole (in the bag).’

(6.199) *Ihokahati.*

*i=        hok     -ha            -i*  
 3mS= throw CL:liquid -REAL.I  
 ‘He threw (a fishing net) into the water.’

(6.200) *Notisarabantake.*

*no=    tisarah -bant                    -ak     -i*  
 1S= tear     -CL:2D.flexible -PERF -REAL.I  
 ‘I tore (something flat and flexible).’

The omission of even a person marker (in object position) in (6.199) and (6.200) is part of a broader pragmatic phenomenon in Nanti, in which speakers may omit the overt realization of a referent, either as a referential NP or a pronominal element, if they deem that their interlocutor is capable of recovering the referent from either the discourse context or the broader interactional context. Classifiers are one means by which information may be provided about a referent, permitting, in some communicative contexts, the omission of either a corresponding person marker, or a corresponding referential NP.

Classifiers are suffixed following any incorporated nouns, as in (6.201). It is rare, however, for a verb to exhibit both noun incorporation and classifier suffixation, and consequently, classifiers typically immediately follow the verb root.

(6.201) Nokibabakohatake.

*no*= *kib* -*bako* -*ha* -*ak* -*i*  
1S= wash -hand -CL:liquid -PERF -REAL.I  
'I washed my hands with water.'

Affixed classifiers display a morphophonological alternation between unvoiced classifier-initial stops and their voiced counterparts, much like the alternation described for incorporated inalienable nouns (see above). Classifiers which categorize a notional subject exhibit the unvoiced alternant, as in (6.202), while classifiers which categorize a notional object or a 'pragmatic oblique' exhibit the voiced alternant, as in (6.203).

(6.202) Omakapitake.

*o*= *maka* -*pi* -*ak* -*i*  
3nmS= decay -CL:1D.rigid.long.hollow -PERF -REAL.I  
'It (a segment of arrow cane) has decayed.'

(6.203) Nokobihakero.<sup>63</sup>

*no*= *kog* -*bih* -*ak* -*i* =*ro*  
1S= gather -CL:1D.rigid.long.hollow -PERF -REAL.I =3nmO  
'I gathered it (a piece of arrow cane).'

**6.3.7.2.2 Adjectival and numeral classifiers** Classifiers appear infixes in numerals, as in (6.204); other quantifiers, as in (6.205); and adjectives, as in (6.206) and (6.207).

(6.204) pakiitiro

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<sup>63</sup>Note the irregular post-root consonant cluster resolution, in which the root-final consonant /g/ is deleted, in place of the regular pattern of vowel epenthesis (see §6.2.3).



*pa -kii- tiro*  
 one -CL:1D.rigid.long- one  
 ‘one (referring to a length of arrow cane)’

(6.205) apipokite

*api -poki- te*  
 other -CL:path- other  
 ‘other (referring to a path)’

(6.206) kirahakiri

*kiraha -ki- ri*  
 red -CL:0D.hard- red  
 ‘red (referring to a bead)’

(6.207) omarahate

*omara -ha- te*  
 large CL:liquid- large  
 ‘large (referring to a river in flood)’

In many instances in which classifiers are infixes in numerals or adjectives, the referents which they classify are not overtly expressed, as in (6.208), although they can be, as in (6.209).

(6.208) Nagake pipiteti, nero.

*no= ag -ak -i pi -pi- teti nero*  
 1S= take -PERF -REAL.I two -CL:1D.rigid.hollow- two see  
 I got two (pieces of arrow cane), see.

(6.209) patakiniro hetari

*pa -taki- niro hetari*  
 one -CL:shell- one hetari  
 ‘two *hetari* (fish species with very hard scales)’

**6.3.7.2.3 Nominal classifiers** Classifiers also appear suffixed to alienable nouns, as in (6.210). Like verbal, adjectival, and numeral classifier affixation, nominal classifier affixation is productive. Unlike the former types of classifier affixation, however, many nominal forms resulting from classifier affixation exhibit lexicalization. Each of the forms given in (6.211) through (6.213), for example, are typically interpreted as referring to the specific referent types given in the glosses, rather than the referentially broader category predicted by the compositional semantics of the nominal root and classifier.

(6.210) *nairotsa*

*nairo* -*tsa*  
 nylon -CL:1D.flexible  
 ‘nylon thread (typically, nylon fishing line)’ (*nairo* < *nylon* (Sp.))

(6.211) *kurikii*

*kuri* -*kii*  
 palm.sp. -CL:1D.rigid  
 ‘fishing arrowhead’ (a long, slender arrowhead made of *kuri* palm (*Bactris gasipaes*) wood)

(6.212) *kapirokota*

*kapiro* -*kota*  
 bamboo -CL:plank  
 ‘game arrowhead’ (a broad, flat arrowhead made of bamboo)

(6.213) *tsitsihenka*

*tsitsi* -*henka*  
 firewood -CL:immaterial  
 ‘soot’

Classifiers generally attach to nouns that denote materials that can exhibit a variety of forms, either through human manipulation, as in (6.214) and (6.215), or natural differentiation, as in the case of plant parts. Note that the use of classifiers is optional with such nouns.

(6.214) *saborokii*

*saboro*     -*kii*  
 wild.cane -CL:1D.rigid  
 ‘cane stave’

(6.215) *saborokita*

*saboro*     -*kita*  
 wild.cane -CL:loosely.woven  
 ‘cane mat’

**6.3.7.2.4 Semantics and origins of Nanti classifiers** From a semantic perspective, Nanti classifiers largely fall into two groups: a large group of classifiers that categorize referents in terms of their geometrical and/or mechanical characteristics, and smaller group which categorizes small sets of manufactured objects.

The former group distinguishes point-like (*ki*, 0D), stick-like (*-kii*, *-tsa*, 1D), cylindrical (*-pi*, *-tonki*, *-poha*), sheet-like (*-bant*, 2D), circular (*-pogu*), spherical (*-hi*), and amorphous geometries (*-se*), as well the following mechanical properties: rigid solid (various), flexible solid (*-tsa*, *-bant*), powder (*-pane*), liquid (*-ha*), and immaterial (*-henka*).

The classifiers of this group synchronically retain their semantic generality and flexibility, as can be seen in their recent use to categorize electricity as a fluid, as in (6.216), and in their use for discussing the operation of recording devices as capturing a categorially immaterial referent, as in (6.217).

(6.216) Ohahatake.

*o*=        *ha -ha*        *-ak*    *-i*  
3nmS= go -CL:liquid -PERF -REAL.I  
'It flows (speaking of electrical current).'

(6.217) Agahenkatake.

*o*=        *ag -heNka*        *-ak*    *-i*  
3nmS= take -CL:immaterial -PERF -REAL.I  
'It records your voice (lit. it immaterial-takes).'

Other Nanti classifiers are restricted to small sets of manufactured objects and generally have not been extended to recently introduced objects. These classifiers include *-poki/boki(h)*, which categorizes cooking fires and paths; *-kita*, which categorizes woven mats and sieves; and *pona/bona(h)* which categorizes wrappers made of leaves. The classifier *meni*, which categorizes blades, belongs to this group, but unlike the others, has been extended to include some recently introduced metal implements, such as spoons.

It appears that many classifiers, if not all, ultimately derive from the grammaticalization of inalienable nouns. Many Nanti classifiers are phonologically similar – even identical – to inalienable nouns; this is especially the case with the geometrical/mechanical classifiers. For example, *-toNki*, which categorizes slender but stubby rigid cylindrical objects (like house nails) is identical to the inalienable root *-toNki* 'bone'. Similarly, the classifier *-kota*, which categories rigid, flattish objects like arrowheads, rock ledges, and wood planks, is identical to the inalienable root *-kota* 'palm bark/wood'.

Other classifiers no longer have obvious synchronic counterparts among Nanti inalienable nouns, but are clearly related to inalienable nouns in other Arawak languages, suggesting that these classifiers were formerly grammaticalized from inalienable nouns, which were subsequently replaced by new forms. One such example is

the classifier *-ki* ‘OD.hard’, which reconstructs to Proto-Arawak *\*aki* ‘seed’ (Payne, 1991, p.418).

It should also be noted that classifiers occupy the position in the verb immediately following incorporated nouns, supporting the proposal of an intimate relationship between classifiers and inalienable nouns.

## 6.4 Syntax

Headmarking languages such as Nanti present challenges to morphosyntactic description. Even issues as basic as what counts as a verbal argument (Jelinek, 1984; Evans, 1999) and how to determine basic constituent order (Mithun, 2003) remain issues of debate. In my description of Nanti syntax, I begin by addressing these two issues, and then turn to a description of the syntax of simple sentences, followed by a description of multi-clause constructions.

### 6.4.1 Argument realization, morphosyntactic alignment, and basic constituent order

Verbal arguments can be realized in a variety of ways in Nanti, reflecting the effects of both information structure and pragmatics. In this section, I describe the various ways in which arguments can be expressed, the marking of grammatical relations between verbs and their arguments, and issues of basic constituent order.

As I mentioned in the summary of Nanti verbal morphology, grammatical relations between NPs and their associated verbs are overwhelmingly marked on the verb, and not on the NPs themselves. In fact, overt dependent marking of grammatical relations is limited to the NP suffix *-ku*, mentioned in §6.3.2.1.4, which appears on oblique arguments and carries a very general locative meaning. Otherwise, where grammatical relations between NPs and their associated verbs are not indicated by verbal or nominal morphology, the identification of grammatical relations is left to

Table 6.12: Nanti classifiers

CLASSIFIER	ABBREVIATION	EXAMPLE	RELATED PART
-ako	CL:vessel	pot	NA
-bant	CL:2D.flexible	leaves, paper	-pana 'broad leaf'
-ha	CL:liquid	water, beverages	NA
-heNka	CL:immaterial	wind, smoke, steam, sound	-heNka 'scent'
-hi	CL:social.insects	wasps, ants, caterpillars	-hi 'large fruit'
-pa/ba	CL:crescent.fruit	plantains, <i>Inga sp.</i> fruit pods	-pa ' <i>Inga sp.</i> fruit pods'
-pogu/bogu	CL:2D.circular	bowls, coins	NA
-pane/bane	CL:powder	snuff, flour	-pane 'powder'
-poki/boki(h)	CL:path/fire	paths, fire pits	NA
-pona/bona(h)	CL:wrapping	leaf wrapping	NA
-ki/gi	CL:0D.hard	seeds, beads	NA
-kii/gii	CL:1D.rigid	sticks, arrows	NA
-kita	CL:loosely.woven	mats, strainers	NA
-kota	CL:plank	pona, chunks of yuca, wall slats	-kota 'palm bark'
-mai	CL:tangle	cloth, tangles of vines	NA
-meni	CL:blade	machetes, spoons	NA
-miriha	CL:cluster	small fruits, clouds	NA
-pi/bi(h)	CL:1D.rigid.hollow	arrows, shotgun barrels	-pi 'hollow stalk'
-poha/boh	CL:cylinder.solid	yuca roots, tree trunks	-boha 'tuber'
-se	CL:amorphous.mass	mush, grass, sand	NA
-shi	CL:slender.leaf	grass, palm fronds, hair	-shi 'leaf'
-tonki	CL:slender.cylinder.rigid.	nails, arrow heads, needles	-tonki, 'bone'
-tsa	CL:1D.flexible	ropes, tails, noodles	-tsa, 'liana, rope'

pragmatics.

#### 6.4.1.1 Core arguments

In everyday discourse, core verbal arguments are most commonly indicated by person clitics, such as the third person subject person clitic *i=*, seen in (6.218).<sup>64</sup>

(6.218) [I]<sub>S</sub>saNkanaka.

*i=*      *saNk*      *-an*   *-ak*   *-a*  
3mS= be.invisible -ABL -PERF -REAL.A  
'He disappeared.'

Core arguments can also be expressed by free pronominal elements, which are in contrastive distribution with person clitics. These free pronominal elements include contrastive focus pronouns, exemplified in (6.219), 'temporal' pronouns (§6.4.1.6.1), and reflexive pronouns (§6.4.2.1.3).

(6.219) *Nar*<sub>FOC,S</sub> *shiNta*[ro]<sub>O</sub>.

*naro*      *ashiNt*   *-a*      *=ro*  
1.FOC.PRO own -REAL.A =3NMO  
'I (and not anyone else) own it.'

One of the verb's core arguments may also be expressed by a referential NP, such as the personal name in (6.220).

(6.220) [No]<sub>S</sub>nehake *Erobakin*<sub>O</sub> aka.

*no=*   *neh*   *-ak*   *-i*      *Erobakin*      *aka*  
1S= see -PERF -REAL.I *personal.name* here  
'I saw Erobakin here.'

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<sup>64</sup>Subscripts indicate grammatical relations and information structure status. Coreference between arguments and topics are indicated by indices. Square brackets are used where necessary to delimit arguments.

In addition to these options for expressing verbal arguments, a topic expression may optionally co-occur with any of them. This topic expression consists of a topic pronoun, as in (6.221), or a referential NP, as in (6.222). Topic expressions are located at clause peripheries, and either have discourse referent tracking functions, or provide additional information about an argument in order to clarify reference. As I shall argue below, topics expressions are not arguments themselves, but are coreferential with them.

(6.221) [Iriro]<sub>TOP,i</sub> nonehahigaki[ri]<sub>i</sub>.

*iriro*            *no= neh -hig -ak -i =ri*  
 3m.TOP.PRO 1S= see -PL -PERF -REAL.I =3mO  
 ‘Him, we saw him.’

(6.222) Ika i<sub>S</sub>keNtahigake[ri]<sub>O,i</sub> matsigeNka<sub>TOP,i</sub>.

*i-*    *ka*        *i=*        *keNt -hig -ak -i =ri matsigeNka*  
 3m= QUOTE 3mS= shoot -PL -PERF -REAL.I =3mO person  
 ‘He said, “They shot him, a person.”’

In the remainder of this section, I will clarify the communicative factors that affect the morphosyntactic realization of core arguments and describe the principal morphosyntactic properties of each of the main strategies by which core arguments are expressed. For expositional purposes, it is useful to organize this discussion in terms of the focus status of arguments.

#### 6.4.1.1.1 Non-focused arguments: person clitics and referential NPs

Non-focused arguments can be expressed by either person clitics or referential NPs. These elements typically exhibit nominative-accusative morphosyntactic alignment, although Nanti exhibits traces of the fluid-S marking<sup>65</sup> found in other Kampan lan-

<sup>65</sup>Fluid-S marking is a system by which the single argument of an intransitive verb may either be marked like the subject of a transitive verb (*S<sub>A</sub>*) or the object of a transitive verb (*S<sub>O</sub>*), depending on backgrounding and foregrounding needs in discourse.



guages (Payne and Payne, 2005). In the case of person clitics, nominative-accusative alignment is evident in the fact that the S of intransitive verbs and the A of transitive verbs are both expressed by the same set of verbal proclitics, as can be seen by comparing (6.223a) and (6.223b). The P of transitive verbs is marked by a distinct paradigm of verbal enclitics, as evidenced by (6.223b). The full set of verbal subject proclitics and object enclitics is given and discussed in Table 6.8.

(6.223) a. O<sub>S</sub>hatake.

*o*=        *ha* *-ak*    *-i*  
 3nmS= go -PERF -REAL.I  
 ‘She went.’

b. O<sub>A</sub>tagake[ro]<sub>P</sub>.

*o*=        *tag*    *-ak*    *-i*        =*ro*  
 3nmS= burn -PERF -REAL.I =3NMO  
 ‘She burned it.’

Fluid-S marking is rare in Nanti discourse, but the occasional instances of the phenomenon typically appear in temporal succession clause-linking constructions, and involve a small set of intransitive verbs (principally *ha* ‘go’, *pok* ‘come’, and *pig* ‘return’) with first person arguments. In such constructions, the O-marked S arguments are found on the main verb of the temporally posterior clause, as in (6.224).

(6.224) Nonporohakerika hanta parikoti, ironpa aka pokahena<sub>S</sub>O aka onkuta.

*no*= N-        *poroh*    *-ak*    *-e*        =*rika*    *hanta*    *parikoti*  
 1S= IRREAL- clear.land -PERF -IRREAL.I =COND there far.away  
*ironpa*    *aka*    *pok*    *-ah*    *-e*        =*na*    *aka*    *onkuta*  
 suddenly here come -REG -IRREAL.I =1O here next.day  
 ‘If I were to clear land far away over there, I would promptly come back here the following day.’

Turning to non-focused referential NP arguments, we see that they occupy either a preverbal position, in the case of referential NP subjects, as in (6.225); or a postverbal position, in the case of referential NP objects, as in (6.226). Grammatical relations are not morphologically marked on referential NP arguments, but the position of these arguments – paralleling that of the person clitics – identifies their grammatical relation to the verb. Referential NP arguments are in complementary distribution with person clitics, and no free morphemes may intervene between a referential NP argument and its associated verb.

(6.225) Reho mutakotake.

<i>Reho</i>	<i>amu</i>	<i>-ako</i>	<i>-ak</i>	<i>-i</i>
<i>personal.name</i>	help	-APPL:INDR	-PERF	-REAL.I

‘Reho helped out.’

(6.226) Pashintakenpa magashipogo.

<i>pi=</i>	<i>ashiñt</i>	<i>-ak</i>	<i>-enpa</i>	<i>magashipogo</i>
2S=	own	-PERF	-IRREAL.A	garden

‘You will own the garden.’

Non-focused referential NP arguments are uncommon in everyday discourse, and are principally used to introduce new discourse referents that are not projected as being topical in subsequent utterances. The distribution of non-focused referential NPs and person clitics suggests that Nanti basic constituent order is SVO. In the corpus, however, there are no attested cases of transitive verbs where both arguments are realized as phonologically free elements, i.e. referential NPs or focus pronouns. When I have presented sentences to Nanti speakers with two phonologically free arguments, they have had no difficulty interpreting them, but they do not produce such sentences themselves.

#### 6.4.1.1.2 Focused arguments: focused pronouns and referential NPs

Nanti exhibits a preverbal focus position that may be filled by a focused pronoun, such as the contrastive focus pronoun in (6.227b), or a referential NP, as in (6.228). Focused elements can also be distinguished by the word-level stress they bear, in addition to their position. As evident in (6.227b) and (6.228), focused elements are in complementary distribution with person clitics, which are non-focused (see above).<sup>66</sup>

(6.227) a. H: Tera nomatike.

*tera*          *no=* N-          *matik* *-e*  
 NEG.REAL 1S= IRREAL- sing -IRREAL.I  
 ‘I didn’t sing.’

b. B: *Naro*<sub>FOC,S</sub>            *matikahigake*.

*naro*<sub>FOC,S</sub> *matik* *-hig* *-ak*    *-i*  
 1.FOC.PRO sing -PL -PERF -REAL.I  
 ‘We (excl.) sang.’

(6.228) *Piseka*<sub>FOC,O</sub> *noNkige*          .

*pi-* *seka*    *no=* N-          *kig* *-e*  
 2P- *manioc* 1S= IRREAL- *dig* -IRREAL.I  
 ‘I am going to harvest *your manioc*.’

Unlike person clitics, focused pronouns do not morphologically distinguish nominative and accusative forms, as can be appreciated by comparing the first person subject focus pronoun in (6.227b) with its object counterpart in (6.229). Similarly, the grammatical relations of focused referential NPs are not morphologically marked. The grammatical relations of focused elements are instead indicated by a ‘gap strategy’: the person clitic whose grammatical relation corresponds to that of

<sup>66</sup>The gaps left by absent person markers are indicated with an underline.

the focused element is omitted from the verbal complex. For example, in (6.229), we can determine that the focus pronoun *naro* ‘I/me’ is an object because the transitive verb *nebi* ‘make a request’ lacks an object person clitic. By the same argument, in (6.228) we can identify that the focused referential NP *piseka* ‘your manioc’ is an object. Similarly, we can determine that the focused pronoun in (6.227b) is a subject by the corresponding absence of a subject person clitic on the verb.

(6.229) *Tera narofoc,o onebite*\_\_.

<i>tera</i>	<i>naro</i>	<i>o=</i>	N-	<i>nebi</i>	<i>-e</i>
NEG.REAL	1.FOC.PRO	3nmS=	IRREAL-	request	-IRREAL.I

‘She didn’t request (it) from *me*.’

Focused and non-focused referential NP subjects can be difficult to distinguish on the basis of surface syntactic criteria alone, as both argument types appear between negation and the verb. However, the two argument types do differ syntactically: free forms cannot intervene between a non-focused subject and the verb, but they may intervene between a focused subject and the verb, as in (6.230). In interaction, of course, prosodic cues serve to distinguish the two argument types, and for the analyst, discourse context also aids in disambiguation.

(6.230) *Irofo,c,o aka ipokashitaka*\_\_.

<i>iro</i>	<i>aka</i>	<i>i=</i>	<i>pok</i>	<i>-ashi</i>	<i>-ak</i>	<i>-a</i>
3nm.FOC.PRO	here	3nmS=	come	-PURP	-PERF	-REAL.A

‘He came here for *her*.’

#### 6.4.1.2 Topic expressions

In this section, I describe the main communicative functions of topic expressions and the morphosyntactic features that distinguish them from verbal arguments. Topic expressions are pronominal or referential NP expressions that are not arguments

themselves but instead provide additional information about a verbal argument that aids in reference tracking, indicates ‘givenness’ (see §6.3.3), or clarifies reference. Topic expressions are either referential NPs, as in (6.231); or topic pronouns, as in (6.232). Topic pronouns form a distinct paradigm from focus pronouns, as can be seen in Table 6.13.

Table 6.13: Nanti topic and focus pronouns

PERSON	TOPIC PRONOUNS		FOCUS PRONOUNS	
	SINGULAR	PLURAL	SINGULAR	PLURAL
1	naro	narohegi	naro	
2	biro	birohegi	biro	
3 masc.	iroro	irorohegi	iryō	
3 non-masc.	iroro	irorohegi	iro	
1 pl. incl.		harohegi		haro

Topic expressions are dislocated constituents found at either the left or the right periphery of clauses, as is evident in (6.231) and (6.232), and (6.233) and (6.235), respectively.

(6.231) Pasotoro<sub>TOP,i</sub> [y]<sub>i</sub>otugake.

*Pasotoro*      *i*=      *otug*      *-ak*      *-i*  
*personal.name* 3mS=    fletch.arrow    -PERF    -REAL.I  
‘Pasotoro, he fletched an arrow.’

(6.232) Iroro<sub>TOP</sub> ashitakotakero.

*iroro*              *o*=              *ashi*    *-ako*              *-ak*      *-i*              *=ro*  
3nm.TOP.PRO 3nmS=    cover    -APPL:INDR    -PERF    -REAL.I    =3nmO  
‘*She*, she put her in menarche seclusion.’ (lit. ‘She covered her over.’)

Topic expressions are employed in two main ways to aid in reference tracking. The first is to indicate the givenness of a discourse referent, which normally involves

the use of a determiner, as discussed in §6.3.3. In (6.233), the topic expression *yoga Losu Cabri* is employed to introduce a new discourse referent, *Losu Cabri*, into discourse.

(6.233) Nokamosohigiri, [yoga Losu Cabri]<sub>TOP</sub>.

*no= kamoso -hig -i =ri i- oga Losu Cabri*  
 1S= visit -PL -REAL.I =3mO 3m- that *personal.name*  
 ‘We visited him, that Losu Cabri.’

Topic pronouns also aid in reference by disambiguating pronominal reference. In particular, the use of a topic pronoun indicates that the subject of a given clause is the same as the topical subject of the preceding stretch of discourse. In (6.234), for example, the topical subject is the third person masculine subject of the verb *kaNt* ‘say’, in the first line. In that line, however, another third person masculine referent, the subject of verb *keNt* ‘shoot’ is mentioned. Consequently, the reference of the third person masculine subject verb *puga* ‘respond in kind’, is ambiguous. The use of the third person masculine topic pronoun *iriro* indicates that the subject of this verb is coreferential with topical subject (i.e. the subject of the verb *kant* ‘say’ in the first line), rather than the subject of the immediately preceding verb, *kent* ‘shoot’.

(6.234) 1. B: I<sub>i</sub>kaNti i<sub>j</sub>keNtaNtake.

*i= kaNt -i i= keNt -aNt -ak -i*  
 3mS= say -real.i 3mS= shoot -CHAR -PERF -REAL.I  
 ‘He<sub>i</sub> said, “He<sub>j</sub> shoots (arrows).”’

2. INpo i<sub>i</sub>pugatakeri<sub>j</sub> iriro<sub>TOP,i</sub>.

*INpo i= puga -ak -i =ri iriro*  
 then 3mS= respond.in.kind -PERF -REAL.I =3MO 3m.TOP.PRO  
 ‘Then he<sub>i</sub>, he<sub>i</sub> responded in kind to him<sub>j</sub>.’

Referential NPs normally appear in topic expressions to clarify or narrow reference. The use of topic expressions to clarify reference is clearest in instances where both a topic expression and its associated coreferential verbal argument are referential NPs, as in (6.235). In this example, the topic expression *kapashi* ‘palm sp.’ clarifies the reference of the focused object *oshi* ‘leaf’, indicating that it is specifically *kapashi* leaves that the subject of the sentence went to get.

(6.235) Ihatake oshi<sub>FOC,O,i</sub> irage kapashi<sub>TOP,i</sub>.

*i=*     *ha* *-ak*     *-i*             *o-*             *shi*   *i=*             *r-*             *ag*   *-e*  
 3mS= go -PERF -REAL.I 3nmP- leaf 3mS= IRREAL- get -IRREAL.I  
*kapashi*  
 palm.sp  
 ‘He went to get *leaves*, *kapashi* (leaves).’

Topic expressions can be distinguished from verbal arguments because they occupy a distinct syntactic position from verbal arguments, and because they are optional, while verbal arguments are not. The distinct syntactic positions of topic expressions and verbal arguments are clearest in clauses with (internal) negation. Topic expressions occur to the left of negation, while arguments appear to the right, as shown by (6.236a&b).

(6.236) a. Miger<sub>TOP,i</sub> tera i<sub>S,i</sub>nkeNtero.

*Migero*             *tera*             *i=*             N             *-keNt*   *-e*  
*personal.name* NEG.REAL 3mS= IRREAL- shoot -IRREAL.I  
 =ro  
 =3nmO  
 ‘Migero didn’t shoot it.’

b. Tera Miger<sub>FOC,S</sub> keNtero.

*tera*             *Migero*             N-             *keNt*   *-e*             =ro  
 NEG.REAL *personal.name* IRREAL- shoot -IRREAL.I =3nmO  
 ‘*Migero* didn’t shoot it.’

The different syntactic distribution of topics and arguments is especially clear when comparing sentences with third person topic and focus pronouns, which have distinct forms. Comparing (6.237a) and (6.237b), for example, we see that the third person masculine topic pronoun *iriro* appears to the left of negation, while the third person masculine focus pronoun *iryo* appears to the right.

(6.237) a. *Iriro*<sub>TOP,i</sub> *tera* *i*<sub>S,i</sub> *keNtero*.

*iriro*                      *tera*                      *i*=                      N-                      *keNt*                      -*e*  
 3.masc.TOP.PRO    NEG.REAL    3mS=    IRREAL-    shoot    -IRREAL.I  
 =*ro*  
 =3nmO  
 ‘He didn’t shoot it.’

b. *Tera* *iryo*<sub>FOC,S</sub> *keNtero*.

*tera*                      *iryo*                                      N-                      *keNt*                      -*e*                                      =*ro*  
 NEG.REAL    3.masc.FOC.PRO    IRREAL-    shoot    -IRREAL.I    =3nmO  
 ‘He didn’t shoot it.’

Note that it is perfectly permissible for a focus pronoun to exhibit a coreferential topic, as in (6.238).

(6.238) *Iryo* *keNtakero* *Migero*.

*iryo*                      *keNt*                      -*ak*                      -*i*                                      =*ro*                      *Migero*  
 3m.FOC.PRO    shoot    -PERF    -REAL.I    =3nmO    *personal.name*  
 ‘He shot it, Migero.’

The ungrammaticality of arguments to the left of negation and of topics to the right of negation is demonstrated for referential NPs in (6.239a&b) and for pronouns in (6.240a&b). Note also that sentences which lack an element in argument position (focused or unfocused), are ungrammatical, as evident in (6.239a) and (6.240a).

(6.239) a. \**Migero*<sub>S</sub> *tera* *keNtero*.



- b. \*Tera MigerO<sub>TOP</sub> inkeNtero.
- (6.240) a. \*Iryo<sub>FOC,S</sub> tera keNtero.
- b. \*Tera iriro<sub>TOP</sub> inkeNtero.
- c. \*Iriro<sub>TOP</sub> tera keNtero.

In summary, topic expressions are optional, whereas verbal arguments are obligatory. Verbal arguments must either be expressed by person markers or unfocused referential NPs, or by focused pronouns or referential NPs. Topic expressions by themselves are insufficient to satisfy verbal argument structure, as evidenced by the ungrammaticality of (6.239a) and (6.240c).

**6.4.1.2.1 Identifying verbal arguments in Nanti** In this section, I advance the argument that person clitics, non-focused referential NPs, focused referential NPs, and focused pronouns function as verbal arguments, but that topic expressions do not.

When either referential NPs or free pronouns are the sole realizations of morphological material associated with a given referent, as in (6.241a) and (6.241b), it is uncontroversial to treat them as verbal arguments.

- (6.241) a. MigerO<sub>FOC/NFOC,S</sub> keNtakero.

*Migero*            *keNt*    *-ak*    *-i*            *=ro*  
*personal.name* shoot -PERF -REAL.I =3nmO  
 ‘Migero shot it.’

- b. Iryo<sub>FOC,S</sub> keNtakero.

*iryO*                    *keNt*    *-ak*    *-i*            *=ro*  
 3.masc.FOC.PRO shoot -PERF -REAL.I =3nmO  
 ‘He shot it.’

The two analytically challenging cases are those in which: 1) a person clitic is the sole morphosyntactic material associated with a referent, as in (6.242); or 2) a referent is associated with both a topic expression and a person clitic, as in (6.243a&b).

(6.242) Iken<sub>TAKER</sub>ero.

*i*=      *keNt*   *-ak*   *-i*      =*ro*  
 3mS= shoot -PERF -REAL.I -3nmO  
 ‘He shot it.’

(6.243) a. Miger<sub>TOP</sub>o i<sub>S</sub>ken<sub>TAKER</sub>ero.

*Migero*              *i*=      *keNt*   *-ak*   *-i*      =*ro*  
*personal.name* 3mS= shoot -PERF -REAL.I =3nmO  
 ‘Migero, he shot it.’

b. Iriro<sub>TOP</sub>o i<sub>S</sub>ken<sub>TAKER</sub>ero.

*iriro*                      *i*=      *keNt*   *-ak*   *-i*      =*ro*  
 3.masc.TOP.PRO 3mS= shoot -PERF -REAL.I =3nmO  
 ‘He, he shot it.’

In these cases, two analyses are possible: one in which the person clitic is treated as a verbal argument, and the other in which it is treated as an ‘agreement’ marker that does not constitute an argument as such. On the latter analysis, it is necessary to posit that the person clitic agrees with a non-overt or null argument in order to account for cases in which no topic expression is present, as in (6.242).

The agreement analysis for person markers confronts two difficulties. First, person markers need not agree in person with topic expressions. Consider (6.244), for example, where the topic expression *surari* ‘man’ co-occurs with the first person clitic *no*=. It is clear that in this example, the person clitic does not mark person agreement with the topic; rather, the topic provides additional information about

the argument expressed by the person clitic, which serves to clarify the reference of the person marker *no=*.<sup>67</sup>

(6.244) Surari naNtabagetahi.

*surari no= aNtabaget -ah -i*  
 man 1S= do.agricultural.work -ABIL -REAL.I  
 ‘Men, we can do agricultural work.’

Second, if we are willing to treat person clitics as agreement markers, we are led, by the same reasoning, to the unpalatable conclusion that phonologically free pronouns are agreement markers in constructions which exhibit a topic expression and a coreferential free pronominal element, as in (6.245). In this example, the phonologically free subject focus pronoun *iro* is coreferential with the topic expression *oga irento* ‘her sister’. Free pronominal elements like *iro* are typically not analyzed as agreement markers, but rather, as arguments. However, apart from it being focused, *iro* is semantically indistinguishable from the person clitic *o=*, with which it occurs in complementary distribution.

(6.245) [Oga irento]<sub>TOP,i</sub> [iro]<sub>FOC,S,i</sub>ta shiNtakota[ro]<sub>O,j</sub> [osekane]<sub>TOP,j</sub>.

*o- oga o- irento iro =ta shiNt*  
 3nm- that 3nmP- sister.of.female 3nm.FOC.PRO =CNGNT own  
*-ako -a =ro o- seka -ne*  
 -APPL:INDR -REAL.A =3NMO 3nmP- manioc -ALIEN.POSS  
 ‘Her sister, she, as I was saying, owns it, her manioc.’

A positive argument in favor of the argument status of Nanti person clitics is that they form a paradigm with referential NPs, which are obviously verbal arguments. The evidence for this claim is that person markers are in complementary

<sup>67</sup>Note that despite the absence of overt plural marking on the verb, it is clear from discursive context that the speaker had plural referents in mind. Plural marking is optional in Nanti and is only employed when necessary to disambiguate number (see §6.3.1.1.3).

distribution with referential nouns, and that they occupy the same positions at the margin of the verb, as shown in (6.246a&b).

(6.246) a. Nonhakeri aka.

*no= neh -ak -i =ri aka*  
 1S= see -PERF -REAL.I =3nmO here  
 ‘I saw him here.’

b. Nonhake Erobakin aka.

*no= neh -ak -i Erobakin aka*  
 1S= see -PERF -REAL.I *personal.name* here  
 ‘I saw Erobakin here.’

In Michael (2004b), I argue that Nanti person markers should be treated as phonological clitics, which form a phonological word with the verb due to minimum word requirements. Nanti has a disyllabic minimum word requirement (Crowhurst and Michael, 2005), while person markers are monosyllabic, and hence incapable of being phonologically free. In order to meet the minimum word requirement, person markers cliticize to the adjacent verb. Another property indicative of person markers being clitics is that object markers do not form part of the *prosodic* word, being ignored entirely in processes of foot formation (Crowhurst and Michael, 2005), despite forming part of the *phonological* word, as evidenced by their participation in triggering non-local palatalization (see §6.2.2).

### 6.4.1.3 Oblique and peripheral arguments

In Nanti, the addition of arguments to a clause is largely handled by applicative derivational morphology, instead of by adpositions (see §6.3.1.3.3.6 for a description of Nanti applicatives).<sup>68</sup> The only oblique arguments in Nanti are ones marked with

<sup>68</sup>Nanti also exhibits a large number of transitive verb roots with very specific spatial meanings, which obviates one of the major functions of adpositions in other languages – for example, *anonkoreh* ‘step over’, *atakont* ‘lay across’, *shibanpiha* ‘walk lengthwise along’.

the locative suffix *-ku* (see §6.3.2), as exemplified in (6.247).

(6.247) Pairani notimake Marihentariku.

*pairani*    *no=*    *tim*    *-ak*    *-i*            *Marihentari*    *-ku*  
long.ago    1S=    live    -PERF    -REAL.I    *place.name*    -LOC  
'Long ago I lived in Marihentari.'

Apart from applicatives and the locative suffix, Nanti exhibits three constructions through which a verb may acquire an additional argument: 1) the benefactive alternation construction, 2) the bare peripheral construction, and 3) the bare locative construction. Each of these constructions is discussed in turn in the following sections.

#### 6.4.1.4 Benefactive alternation and indirective derivation

The benefactive alternation construction is characterized by an alternation in the semantic role assigned to the non-subject argument (NSA) of a large number of transitive verbs. Under the benefactive alternation, an NSA that is prototypically interpreted as a theme or patient is instead interpreted as a beneficiary or recipient. When the benefactive alternation takes place, the prototypical patient or theme argument of the verb may optionally be overtly expressed as well, resulting in the overall addition of an argument. Note that the benefactive alternation does not involve any morphological alteration to the verb or any other formal alteration to the clause.

The class of verbs which participate in the benefactive alternation construction is very large, and consists of transitive verbs whose NSA argument is prototypically inanimate. Some recent loans are included in this class, suggesting that membership is productively determined by verbal semantics.

For verbs that undergo the benefactive alternation, the semantic role assigned

to NSAs depends on its position in the speech act participant (SAP) hierarchy given in (6.248).

(6.248) Nanti SAP hierarchy

first person, second person > third person

In the morphologically simplest realization of the benefactive alternation, the NSA is interpreted as PATIENT or THEME if it is third person, as in (6.249a) and (6.250a), but is interpreted as a BENEFICIARY or RECIPIENT if it is either first or second person, as in (6.249b) and (6.250b). Note that in the latter cases, the patient or theme argument of the verb may be optionally expressed by either a referential NP, as exemplified by the optional NP *tsitsi* ‘firewood’ in (6.249b), or by a focus pronoun, as in (6.250b). It should be noted that the benefactive alternation may be triggered by a phonologically free NSA, such as the form *birohegi* ‘you (pl.)’ in (6.251), as well as by person clitics, as demonstrated in (6.249b) and (6.250b).

(6.249) a. Inatakero.

*i= nat -ak -i =ro*  
 3mS carry -PERF -REAL.I =3nmO  
 ‘He carried it.’

b. Inatakena (tsitsi).

*i= nat -ak -i =na tsitsi*  
 3mS= carry -PERF -REAL.I =1O firewood  
 ‘He carried (firewood) for me.’

(6.250) a. Nogipigahero.

*no= N- ogi- pig -ah -e =ro*  
 1S= IRREAL- CAUS:AGNT- return -REG -IRREAL.I =3nmO  
 ‘I will return it.’

b. (Iro) nogipigahenpi.

*iro*                    *no*= N-            *ogi-*            *pig*    *-ah*    *-e*  
 3nm.FOC.PRO 1S= IRREAL- CAUS:AGNT- return -REG -IRREAL.I  
 =N*pi*  
 =2O  
 ‘I will return (*it*) to you.’

(6.251) Iramagetake birohegi.

*i*=        *r-*            *am*    *-ge*    *-ak*    *-e*            *biro*    *-hegi*  
 3mS= IRREAL- bring -DSTR -PERF -IRREAL.I 2S.PRO -PL.NOM  
 ‘He will bring (various items) to you.’

Patient NSAs typically alternate with beneficiaries, as in (6.249), and theme NSAs typically alternate with recipients, as in (6.250); but there are cases where the alternation does not fit this tendency, as in (6.252), in which a theme alternates with a beneficiary, rather than the expected recipient.

(6.252) Inoshihatkena oga pitotsi.

*i*=        *noshik* *-ha*            *-ak*    *-i*            =*na* *o-*        *oga* *pitotsi*  
 3mS= haul    -CL:fluid -PERF -REAL.I =1O 3nm- that boat  
 ‘He hauled the boat for me.’ (Not: ‘He hauled the boat to me.’)

Thus far we have examined cases in which the two NSA referents straddle the 1,2 > 3 SAP divide. In these cases, only the beneficiary/recipient can be indicated by a person clitic; if the patient or theme argument is to be overtly expressed, it must be expressed by a referential NP, as in (6.249b) or (6.253), or a focus pronoun, as in (6.250b).<sup>69</sup>

(6.253) Tsame pihokotagena mahenpa.

<sup>69</sup>Note that this is not surprising in Nanti: even when transitive verbs undergo valence-increasing derivations, such as causativization or applicativization, only a single NSA can be expressed as a person marker (see §6.3.1.3.3).

*tsame pi= hokotag -e =na mahenpa*  
 come.on 2S= point.out -IRREAL =1O tree.sp  
 ‘Come on, please point out the *mahenpa* for me.’

If, however, both the beneficiary/recipient and the patient/theme arguments in a benefactive alternation construction are third person, both may be marked by person clitics. In this case, the patient/theme is expressed by the patient/theme clitic *=ni* ~ *=ne*, and the beneficiary/recipient is expressed by a person clitic from the canonical paradigm, as in (6.254).

(6.254) Inataki[ni]<sub>PAT</sub>[ri]<sub>THM</sub>.

*i= nat -ak -i =ni =ri*  
 3mS= carry.on.shoulder -PERF -REAL.I =CORE =3M  
 ‘He carried it on his shoulder for him.’

Note that although it is typical for both the third person beneficiary/recipient and the third person patient/theme to be overtly marked in benefactive alternation constructions, they need not be. In (6.255), for example, the beneficiary is entirely omitted, and is not realized as either a person clitic or a referential NP.

(6.255) Iniro obokitake[ne]<sub>THM,i</sub> [oseka]<sub>TOP,i</sub>.

*o= iniro o= N- oboki -ak -e =ne*  
 3nmP= mother 3nmS= IRREAL- cook -PERF -IRREAL.I =PAT/THM  
*o= seka*  
 3nmP= manioc  
 ‘Her<sub>i</sub> mother will cook her<sub>i</sub> manioc (for her<sub>i</sub>).’

Likewise, it is not obligatory that the patient/theme argument be realized as person clitic; it may be realized solely as a referential NP, as in (6.256). The patient/theme argument may even be entirely omitted, as in (6.257a) (compare (6.257b)), although this is unusual.



(6.256) Pamake[ri]<sub>REC</sub> [kotsiro]<sub>THM</sub>.

*pi= am -ak -i =ri kotsiro*  
 2S= bring -PERF -REAL.I =3mO knife  
 ‘You brought him a knife.’

(6.257) a. Hara nopiri.

*hara no= p -i =ri*  
 NEG.IRREAL 1S= give -REAL.I =3nmO  
 ‘I will not give (it) to him.’

b. Pe[ne]<sub>THM</sub>[ri]<sub>REC</sub>!

*N- p -e -ne =ri*  
 IRREAL- give -IRREAL.I -THM/PAT =3mO  
 ‘Give it to him!’

Note that even when a theme/patient argument is expressed with a person clitic, a coreferential NP in the topic expression position may also appear, as in (6.255).

Unfortunately, my corpus does not shed light on the benefactive alternation in cases where a first or second person argument is a patient or theme and either a first, second, or third person argument is the beneficiary.<sup>70</sup>

<sup>70</sup>It is not clear at this point if this empirical gap is incidental or systematic. It is plausible that the gap is incidental, and arises due to the unusualness of this particular configuration of person and semantic roles in discourse. However, it may be the case that the gap reflects SAP hierarchy restrictions on the semantic roles of patient/theme and beneficiary/recipient in benefactive alternation constructions. In interactional contexts in which one might expect utterances that would fill this empirical gap, Nantis employ peripheral constructions to express the fact that an action affecting a first/second person argument is being carried out on behalf of another party.

Examination of published material on the other Kampan languages shows that the descriptions of the two other languages of the Southern branch, Matsigenka and Nomatsigenga, exhibit the same gap in the description of the related construction in those languages – that is, the absence of first or second person patients/themes with first, second, or third person beneficiaries (Snell, 1998; Shaver, 1996). However, these descriptions are both brief, and it is not clear whether the gap is incidental or systematic in those languages either. Descriptions of languages of the Northern branch show that both arguments are marked by person clitics in the benefactive alternation construction, and that the assignment of semantic roles is always ambiguous (Payne, 1981; Swift, 1988). Thus, in

The allomorphy of the patient/theme clitic is determined by the vowel quality of the reality status clitic that immediately precedes it, with the *=ni* allomorph following the *-i* realis suffix, as in (6.254), and the *=ne* allomorph following the *-e* suffix, as in (6.257b).

All verbs that undergo the benefactive alternation are transitive verbs that exhibit objects with either theme or patient semantic roles. I have not yet encountered any verbs of this type which cannot undergo the benefactive alternation, suggesting that most, and perhaps all, verbs with the mentioned morphosyntactic and semantic characteristics, participate in the benefactive alternation.

**6.4.1.4.1 Benefactive alternations and the indirective voice** The benefactive alternation results in the first and second person NSAs of a large number of verbs being interpreted as beneficiaries or recipients. In order to force a patient or theme interpretation for first and second person NSAs for this class of verbs, Nantis employ the indirective derivational suffix *-ako* (see §6.3.1.3.3) to block the effect of the SAP hierarchy in verbs that participate in the benefactive alternation, as in (6.258) (compare (6.249b)).

(6.258) Inatakotakena.

<i>i=</i>	<i>nat</i>	<i>-ako</i>	<i>-ak</i>	<i>-i</i>	<i>=na</i>
3mS=	carry	-PAT	-PERF	-REAL.I	=1O

‘He carried me.’ Note: ‘He carried it for me.’

A summary of the patterns of morphosyntactic realization of NSAs for verbs that participate in the benefactive alternation is given in Table 6.14.

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these languages, if a given verb is marked with a first or second person NSA clitic and a third person NSA clitic, either the first/second person argument or the third person argument may be considered a patient/theme, with the remaining NSA treated as a beneficiary/recipient.

Table 6.14: Morphosyntactic realization of non-subject arguments

	BENEFICIARY/RECIPIENT		
PATIENT/THEME	NONE	1,2	3
1,2	indirective voice	?	?
3	normal	benefactive alt.	-ne/ni -ri/ro

#### 6.4.1.5 Bare instrumental constructions

The bare instrumental construction allows Nanti speakers to add an overt referential instrumental NP argument to a large class of verbs, without requiring valency-increasing morphology to license the presence of the NP. It should be noted that otherwise, the instrumental applicative suffix *-aŋt* must be employed to add an instrument argument to a verb, as in (6.259).

(6.259) Iro<sub>FOC,O</sub> obokitaŋta.

*iro*                    *o=*            *oboki* *-aŋt*    *-a*  
 3nm.FOC.PRO 3nmS= cook -INST -REAL.A  
 ‘She cooked with it (a pot).’

The bare instrumental construction, however, permits the addition of a referential instrumental NP, shown in (6.261), to a transitive verb, shown in (6.260).

(6.260) Notogakero.

*no= tog*            *-ak*            *-e*            *=ro*  
 1S= fell.tree -PERF -REAL.I =3NMO  
 ‘I felled it (a tree).’

(6.261) Notogakero hacha.

*no= tog -ak -i =ro hacha<sub>INST</sub>*  
 1S= fell.tree -PERF REALIS.I =3NMO axe  
 ‘I felled it (a tree) with an axe.’

The addition of a bare instrumental argument to a clause is restricted by two factors. First, the prototypical event structure invoked by the verb must include an instrument that the agent of the event employs in realizing the action denoted by the verb. In (6.261), for example, the event of felling a tree prototypically involves some edged tool. Similarly, in (6.262), where the bare instrumental *shibitsa* ‘liana species’ appears with the normally transitive verb *oguso* ‘tie up’, the act of tying typically involves some cord-like object.

(6.262) *Nogusoshitakero shibitsa<sub>INST</sub>.*

*no= oguso -shi -ak -i =ro shibitsa*  
 1S= tie.up -CL:leaf -PERF -REAL.I =3nmO liana.sp.  
 ‘I tied it (a bundle of *kapashi* palm fronds) up with *shibitsa*.’

In most cases, verbs that permit bare instrumentals in Nanti are in accord with expectations of speakers of Standard Average European languages regarding events that require instruments. However, a small number of Nanti verbs treat notionally locative arguments as instrumental arguments. The intransitive verb *pirini* ‘sit’, for example, treats the object sat upon as an instrument, as evidenced by the use of the instrumental applicative *-a<sub>nt</sub>* in (6.263). Consequently, the verb can take a bare instrument argument, as in (6.264).

(6.263) *Nopirinita<sub>nt</sub>akaro.*

*no= pirini -a<sub>nt</sub> -ak -a =ro*  
 1S= sit -APPL:INST -PERF -REAL.A =3NMO  
 ‘I sat on it (a chair).’

(6.264) Hara nopirineti kipatsi.

*hara*            *no= pirini -se*            *-ak*            *-i*    *kipatsi*  
NEG.IRREAL 1S= sit            -CL:mass -REAL.I soil  
'I will not sit on the ground.'

The second restriction on the bare instrumental construction is that the instrument argument must be readily recognizable as an instrument appropriate for realizing the action denoted by the verb. In most instances this restriction requires that the instrument argument be realized as a referential NP, as in (6.261), (6.262) and (6.264). Note that this semantic restriction plays a crucial role in distinguishing topics from bare instruments. If, for example, we replace the referential NP *hacha* 'axe' in (6.261) with *eNchato* 'tree', as in (6.265), the interpretation of the NP switches from that of a bare instrument to a topic.

(6.265) Notogake[ro]<sub>i</sub> eNchato<sub>TOP,i</sub>.

*no= tog*            *-ak*            *-i*            *=ro*            *eNchato*  
1S= fell.tree -PERF REALIS.I -3NMO tree  
'I felled it, a tree.' (Not: 'I felled it with a tree.')

In general, then, bare instruments cannot be pronominal elements, as they provide insufficient information regarding the argument to permit them to be interpreted as instruments. There are, however, two classes of exceptions to this general principle. I discuss one class here; focus pronouns can serve as bare instrumentals if: 1) the focus pronoun bears the congruent clitic *-ta*, which serves to explicitly indicate coreference with the argument of a previous clause, and 2) the antecedent is a referential NP that appears in the immediately preceding clause and is an appropriate instrument; this is shown in (6.266).

(6.266) B: Pamagetakero kobiti.

*pi= am -ge -ak -i =ro kobiti*  
 2S= bring -DSTR -PERF -REAL.I =3nmO pot  
 ‘You brought her various pots.’

[Iro]<sub>INST</sub>ta ontiNkasetake.

*iro =ta o= N- otinK -se -ak*  
 3nm.FOC.PRO =CNGNT 3nmS= IRREAL- mash -CL:mass -PERF  
 -e  
 -REAL.A  
 ‘She will prepare the manioc beer mash with *them*.’

The second class of exceptions involves interrogative pronouns; I defer discussion of this topic to §6.4.2.2.

Finally, I wish to mention that verbal classifiers can be interpreted as categorizing non-overt instruments, effectively indexing an instrumental object in the event structure associated with the verb. Classifiers are construed as categorizing instruments when it is clear that the classifier does not categorize any of the verb’s core arguments, as in (6.267).

(6.267) Nokibakohatake.

*no= kib -bako -ha -ak -i*  
 1S= wash -hand -CL:fluid -CL:fluid -REAL.I  
 ‘I washed my hands with water.’

Of course, classifiers may also categorize overt bare instruments, as in (6.268), where the vessel classifier *-ako* categorizes the bare instrument *kapirosoNpi* ‘bamboo segment’.

(6.268) Ogobatakotake[ri]<sub>i</sub> hetari<sub>TOP,i</sub> [kapirosoNpi]<sub>INST</sub>.

*o= o[+voice]- koba -ako -ak -i =ri hetari*  
 3nmS= CAUS:NAGNT- be.hot -CL:vessel -PERF -REAL.I =3mO fish.sp.  
*kapiro -saNpi*  
 bamboo -segment  
 ‘She cooked the *hetari* in a bamboo segment.’

**6.4.1.5.1 Bare locative constructions** Nanti also exhibits a construction which permits the addition of a locative argument to certain verbs, without requiring verbal valence-increasing morphology or the use of the locative nominal suffix *-ku*. The verbs that partipate in this construction are mainly verbs of motion, the most common being *ha* ‘go’ and *ken* ‘head in a direction’. The bare locative NP must be identifiable as denoting a location, with the result that most bare locatives are proper place names, as in (6.269). NPs that do not clearly denote a location, such as *iri* ‘her father’, in (6.270), must bear a locative suffix.

(6.269) Ihatake Tayakome.

*i*=     *ha*  *-ak*  *-i*       *Tayakome*  
 3mS= go  -PERF  -REAL.I  *place.name*  
 ‘He went to Tayakome.’

(6.270) Ohatahi iriku.

*o*=     *ha*  *-ah*  *-i*       *o-*     *iri*     *-ku*  
 3nmS= go  -REG  -REAL.I  3nmP- father  -LOC  
 ‘She went back to her father’s place.’

Note that in all attested cases, the bare locative indicates a goal or endpoint of motion, but never an origin, which must be marked with the locative suffix, as in (6.271).

(6.271) Iponiha Kurihaku.

*i*=     *ponih*       *-a*       *Kuriha*     *-ku*  
 3mS= come.from  -REAL.A  *place.name*  -LOC  
 ‘He came from Kuriha.’

**6.4.1.5.2 Non-subject arguments of ditransitive verbs** In the preceding sections I have described the morphosyntax of argument realization for transitive and intransitive verbs, and described certain constructions in which verbs may have two non-subject non-oblique arguments. The purpose of this section is to focus on verbs of the latter type and to clarify the morphosyntax of ditransitive verbs proper.

Properly delimiting the class of ditransitive verbs in Nanti is non-trivial, as the language exhibits several classes of verbs which may express up to two non-subject non-oblique arguments. These verbs include transitive verbs derived with applicative or causative morphology (§6.3.1.3.3), verbs that participate in the benefactive alternation (see above), and transitive verbs that exhibit bare instrument arguments (see above). For all of these verbs, only a single non-subject argument (NSA) need be expressed; the expression of a second NSA is always optional.

Only some of these classes of verbs, however, display semantic and morphosyntactic properties consistent with prototypically ditransitive verbs. Consider, for example, the basically transitive verbs that participate in the benefactive alternation, and which by doing so, acquire a second NSA. I do not consider these to be properly ditransitive verbs for two reasons: i) because the additional NSA (i.e. the beneficiary or recipient) is extraneous to the basic event structure of the verb, and ii) because the semantic role of the added argument is constrained by the grammatical person of the argument.

I define a ditransitive Nanti verb to be one for which: i) a second NSA referent is always understood to be present, even when only a single NSA is expressed, and ii) the semantic role of neither NSA argument is restricted by their grammatical person. Defined in this way, Nanti ditransitives include those transitive verbs derived with applicatives and causatives and a small set of verbs that participate in the benefactive alternation, such as *p* ‘give’ and *aNpina* ‘borrow, lend’.

If we look at (6.272a), we can see that that if the verb *p* ‘give’ has only a



single overt NSA (the recipient), the presence of another NSA referent (the theme) is assumed.<sup>71</sup> We also see that the third person non-masculine NSA in (6.272b) is interpreted as a recipient. This is significant because it shows that the verb is not subject to the benefactive alternation, which would automatically assign a patient or theme role to a third person NSA.

(6.272) a. Nopakeri.

*no= p -ak -i =ri*  
 1S= give -PERF -REAL.I =3mO  
 ‘I gave (it) to him.’

b. Nopakero.

*no= p -ak -i =ro*  
 1S= give -PERF -REAL.I =3nmO  
 ‘I gave (it) to her.’

If the recipient argument is either first or second person, the theme argument must be expressed as either a free pronominal element or a referential NP, as in (6.273). Note that I have found no attestation of non-third person theme arguments.

(6.273) Ipakena otsiko.

*i= p -ak -i =na otsiko*  
 3mS= give -PERF -REAL.I =1O fishhook  
 ‘He gave me a fishhook.’

If both the theme and recipient arguments are third person, the theme argument may be expressed by the patient/theme clitic *=ni* ~ *=ne*, as in (6.274). Of course, the argument may still be expressed by a free pronominal element or referential NP. With third person themes we thus see a structural overlap between the ditransitive and benefactive alternation constructions.

<sup>71</sup>One piece of evidence for this claim is that the question *Tata?*, ‘what?’ may be used in response to the utterance in (6.272a) and be correctly interpreted as referring to the non-overt NSA.

(6.274) Nopakiniiri.

*no= p -ak -i =ni =ri*  
1S= give -PERF -REAL.I =THM =3mO  
'I gave it to him.'

#### 6.4.1.6 Noun phrases

Thus far I have mainly considered arguments consisting of simple NPs; in this section I describe the structure of complex NPs and NP coordination.

Nanti noun phrases are consistently right-headed. Modifiers found in Nanti noun phrases include adjectives, as in (6.275); quantifiers, as in (6.276); and determiners/demonstratives, as in (6.277).

(6.275) Nonehake omarate paNkotsi.

*no= neh -ak -i omarate paNkotsi*  
1S= see -PERF -REAL.I big.INAN house  
'I saw a big house.'

(6.276) Aityo piteti kobiti.

*aityo piteti kobiti*  
EXIST.INAN two.INAN pot  
'There are two pots.'

(6.277) Yogari puNto, poshini ini.

*i= oga =ri puNto poshini i= n -i*  
3mS= that =CNTRST tree.frog.sp. tasty 3mS= COP -REAL.I  
Those *punto* (tree frog sp.), in contrast, are tasty.

When a modifier provides sufficient information about its associated noun to enable recovery of the noun from context, overt nouns are frequently omitted.

Consider, for example, the brief segment of conversation given in (6.278), where in the first sentence the speaker establishes that the subject of the sentence eats *hetari*, a particular species of fish. In the following sentence, in which the speaker comments on the same subject consuming more than just one fish, the full NP *patiro hetari* ‘one *hetari*’ is reduced to *patiro* ‘one’, since the parallelism of the two sentences renders the omitted NP easily recoverable.

(6.278) B: Ihati haNta hetari yoogara.

*i= ha -i haNta hetari i= oog -a =ra*  
 3mS= go -REAL.I there fish.sp. 3mS= consume -REAL.A =SUB  
 ‘He goes there, where he eats *hetari* (fish species).’

Tera patiro iroogeNpa.

*tera patiro i= r- oog -eNpa*  
 NEG.REAL one.INAN 3mS= IRREAL- consume -IRREAL.A  
 ‘He doesn’t eat (just) one (*hetari*).’ (= ‘He eats a lot of *hetari*.’)

In fact, complex NPs are quite rare in everyday Nanti discourse, and speakers seem to avoid them when feasible. The presence of more than one modifier in a single NP is not attested. Apart from simple noun elision, just exemplified, another important strategy for avoiding complex NPs is noun incorporation and classifier suffixation in adjectives and numerals (see §6.3.7.1.2). The use of classifier suffixation is illustrated in (6.279a), where the addition of the fluid classifier to the adjective suffixes to identify the referent, which could otherwise be expressed as a free element, as in (6.279b).

(6.279) a. Okahatake katsiNkahari.

*o= kahat -ak -i katsiNka -ha -ri*  
 3nmS= bathe -PERF -REAL.I be.cold -CL:fluid -ADJVZR  
 ‘She bathed with cold (water).’

b. Okahatake katsiNkari niha.

*o*=        *kahat -ak -i        katsiNka -ri        niha*  
 3mS= bathe -PERF -REAL.I be.cold -ADJVZR water  
 ‘She bathed with cold water.’

NP coordination is attested in Nanti, although it extremely rare in everyday discourse. Nanti exhibits two coordinating elements: *iNtiri*, which is employed when the NP following the coordinating element is third person masculine, as in (6.280); and *oNtiri*, which is used all other cases, as in (6.281).<sup>72</sup>

(6.280) Ihatuti Barentin iNtiri Bisarota iNtiri Rerpin.

*i*=        *ha -ut -i        Barentin        iNtiri        Bisarota*  
 3mS= go -RET -REAL.I *personal.name* COORD.MASC *personal.name*  
*iNtiri        Rerpin*  
 COORD.MASC *personal.name*  
 ‘Barentin and Bisarota and Rerpin went there briefly.’

(6.281) Nohahigake, iriro oNtiri naro.

*no*=    *ha -hig -ak -i        iriro        oNtiri    naro*  
 1S= go -PL -PERF -REAL.I 3m.TOP.PRO COORD 1.TOP.PRO  
 ‘We went, he and I (fem.).’

In all attested cases, the coordinated NPs appears as a post-verbal topic expression, suggesting that coordinated NPs cannot appear in argument position, and that their weight leads them to be postposed to the verb.

**6.4.1.6.1 Pronominal elements** Nanti exhibits several paradigms of pronominal elements, which appear in either topic or focus positions. These include topic pronouns, contrastive focus pronouns, and three paradigms of portmanteau elements

<sup>72</sup>The gender-based alternation of these forms makes it probable that the coordinating element developed from the copula *Nti*.

that combine pronominal and temporal meanings, which I describe in this section. Nanti also exhibits reflexive pronouns, which are described in §6.4.2.1.3.

Nanti topic pronouns, enumerated in Table 6.15, exhibit the full range of number, gender, and inclusivity distinctions of which Nanti is capable. Plural topic pronouns are formed with the nominal plural suffix *-hegi*. Topic pronouns appear in clause-peripheral topic expressions, and also function as demonstrative pronouns.

Table 6.15: Nanti topic and focus pronouns

PERSON	TOPIC PRONOUNS		FOCUS PRONOUNS	
	SINGULAR	PLURAL	SINGULAR	PLURAL
1	naro	narohegi	naro	
2	biro	birohegi	biro	
3 masc.	iro	irohegi	iry	
3 non-masc.	iro	irohegi	iro	
1 pl. incl.		harohegi		haro

Nanti contrastive focus pronouns show the same gender and inclusivity distinctions as do topic pronouns, but do not combine with nominal plural suffixes, leaving the first person plural inclusive form *haro* as the only plural focus pronoun. In order to express plural number for arguments realized by focus pronouns, the verbal plural suffix *-hig* must be employed, as exemplified in (6.282).

(6.282) H: Tera nomatike.

*tera*            *no*= N-            *matik* *-e*  
 NEG.REAL 1S= IRREAL- sing -IRREAL.I  
 ‘I didn’t sing.’

B: Naros \_\_matikahigake.

*naro*<sub>FOC,S</sub> *matik* *-hig* *-ak* *-i*  
 1.FOC.PRO sing -PL -PERF -REAL.I  
 ‘We (excl.) sang.’

Note that the number-encoding behavior of focus pronouns exactly parallels that of person clitics in this regard. Focus pronouns are uniformly disyllabic, unlike topic pronouns, and the third person focus pronoun forms exhibit phonological reduction, resulting in distinct topic and focus forms in these parts of the paradigms. Focus pronouns only appear in the preverbal focus position.

Both topic and focus pronouns were clearly formed from the Pre-Proto-Kampa person markers *na* ‘first person’, *bi* ‘second person’, *iri* ‘third person masculine’, and *iro* ‘third person non-masculine’ by the addition of the suffix *-ro*. Though the meaning of the latter suffix is not clear at this point, it should be noted that suffixation of this sort is a widespread strategy in Arawak languages for forming phonologically independent pronouns from phonologically dependent person markers (cf. Aikhenvald, 2003b; Danielsen, 2007; Parker, 1995). Focus pronouns in addition exhibit the loss of the segment /r/ from this suffix, an instance of the widespread historical process of loss of intervocalic-/r/ in the Kampan languages.

Nanti also exhibits three paradigms of ‘temporal pronouns’, which are portmanteau morphemes that incorporate both pronominal and temporal meanings. The meanings of these pronouns indicate that they were diachronically formed by addition of the temporal morphemes *=tya*, *=ra*, and *=ketyo* to person markers, but it is clear that they are now lexicalized, as evidenced by the presence of the archaic person markers *na-* and *bi-* (see above). In this section I describe the syntax of the ‘recent’ and ‘first’ pronouns; ‘overlap’ pronouns are employed in temporal overlap clause-linking constructions described in §6.4.3.5.

‘Recent’ and ‘first’ pronouns share the morphosyntactic properties of contrastive focus pronouns. They appear exclusively in the preverbal focus position, and are in complementary distribution with person clitics. As with contrastive focus pronouns, only singular forms are attested for temporal pronouns.

‘Recent’ temporal pronouns indicate that the action denoted by the verb was

Table 6.16: Nanti temporal pronouns

PERSON	RECENT	gloss	OVERLAP	gloss	FIRST	gloss
1	natya	‘I recently’	natyara	‘when I’	naketyo	‘I first’
2	bitya	‘you recently’	bityara	‘when you’	biketyo	‘you first’
3m	itya	‘he recently’	ityara	‘when he’	iketyo	‘he first’
3nm	otya	‘she recently’	otyara	‘when she’	oketyo	‘she first’

realized recently, as in (6.283). These pronouns optionally appear with the temporal adverb *maika* ‘now’, which indicates that the action was realized very recently, as in (6.284), or with the temporal adverb *inKahara* ‘earlier’, which indicates that the action was realized less recently.

(6.283) Bitya<sub>S</sub> pokake?

*bitya*                      *pok*    *-ak*    *-i*  
 2.RECENT.PRO    come    -PERF    -REAL.I  
 ‘Did you arrive recently?’

(6.284) Otya<sub>O</sub> maika nonehanake.

*otya*                              *maika*    *no=*    *neh*    *-an*    *-ak*    *-i*  
 3nm.RECENT.PRO    now    1S=    see    -ABL    -PERF    -REAL.I  
 ‘I saw it just now for the first time.’

‘First’ temporal pronouns indicate that the argument expressed by the pronoun is the first to realize or be affected by the action denoted by the verb, as in (6.285). First temporal pronouns most commonly appear in *-aNkicha* focus constructions (described in §6.4.3.1.1), as in (6.286).

(6.285) Oketyo nagake, inpo nagakero Eroba.

*oketyo*<sub>O</sub>            *no= ag -ak -i iNpo no -ag -ak*  
 3nm.FIRST.PRO 1S= take -PERF -REAL.I then 1S= take -PERF  
*-i =ro Eroba*  
 -REAL.I =3nmO *personal.name*  
 I took her first (Oroma) (as my spouse), then I took Eroba (as my spouse).’

(6.286) Te iketyo<sub>S</sub> shiganaNkicha.

*te iketyo shig -an -aNkicha*  
 NEG.REAL 3m.FIRST.PRO run -ABL -REL.FOC  
 ‘He did not run away first.’

## 6.4.2 Syntax of monoclausal sentences

In this section, I describe the basic monoclausal sentence types in Nanti: declarative, interrogative, imperative, and interjective. Since all non-declarative sentence types can be economically described in terms of how they differ from declarative sentences, I discuss the principal syntactic operators (e.g. focus and negation) in my description of declarative clauses.

### 6.4.2.1 Declarative sentences

**6.4.2.1.1 Basic structure of simple declarative sentences** Much of the basic syntax of declarative sentences has already been treated in the preceding discussion of argument positions and argument realization. The basic structure of sentences consisting of a single declarative clause with a transitive verb is given in (6.287). With the exception of ostensive declaratives, which I discuss below, every Nanti declarative sentence must have a verb. Only subjects are fully formally obligatory, as objects may be omitted if recoverable from context. At most one core argument can be realized as a phonologically free NP, and this argument may appear in either an unfocused argument position, or in the preverbal focus position.



At most one topic expression, coreferential with either a person clitic, unfocused NP, or focused NP, may appear in any given sentence.

(6.287) [TOPIC] [EXTERNAL NEG] [INTERNAL NEG] [PRED FOCUS] [ARG FOCUS] S V  
O OBL [TOPIC]

In principle, all other positions may be simultaneously filled in a sentence. Arguments supporting the relative placement of the various focus positions, negation positions, and topic positions depicted in (6.287) are provided below.

**6.4.2.1.2 Ostensive declaratives** Ostensive declarative sentences are structurally very restricted, consisting of a referential NP followed by a demonstrative, as in (6.288). This sentence type is only employed in conjunction with a gesture that identifies the referent ostensively. Ostensive declarative sentences are unusual among Nanti sentence types in not requiring a verb.

(6.288) Bayana oka.

*bayana*            *o-*    *oka*  
plantain.variety 3nm- this  
'This is a *bayana* (plantain variety).'

**6.4.2.1.3 Reciprocals and reflexives** Nanti exhibits distinct reciprocal and reflexive constructions. The reciprocal construction is formed with the derivational suffix described in §6.3.1.3.2.3, to which the reader is referred. The reflexive construction is formed with a reflexive pronoun chosen from the paradigm given in Table 6.17.<sup>73</sup> Note that reflexive pronouns, like their focus pronoun counterparts and unlike their topic pronoun counterparts, do not exhibit plural forms (§6.4.1.6.1). Reflexive pronouns exhibit lexically-specified leftmost stress.

<sup>73</sup>The expected first person plural inclusive form, predicted to be *hakiro*, is unattested in my corpus.

Table 6.17: Nanti reflexive pronouns

nakiro	‘myself’
bikiro	‘yourself’
ikiro	‘himself’
okiro	‘herself’

As evident in (6.289), verbs in reflexive constructions are syntactically intransitive. Reflexive pronouns may occupy an argument position, as in (6.289), or a topic position, as in (6.290).

(6.289) Ikiroka toshitake.

*ikiro*                    =ka    to    -shi      ak      -i  
 3m.REFL.PRO =INFR cut -CL:hair -PERF -REAL.I  
 ‘He must have given himself a haircut.’

(6.290) Nakiro nokenTake.

*nakiro*            no=    keNt    -ak      -i  
 1.PRO.REFL 1S= pierce -PERF -REAL.I  
 ‘I shot myself with an arrow.’

**6.4.2.1.4 Negation** Nanti exhibits a relatively complex system of negation, which includes three clausal negators, a negative existential verb, and a set of negative pronouns. Negation interacts in a complex manner with reality status, and imposes restrictions on aspect.

**6.4.2.1.4.1 Clausal negation** Nanti exhibits three clausal negators, *te*, *ha*, and *matsi*, which are distinguished by their scopal properties and their selectional properties with respect to the reality status of their complements. The negator

*matsi* expresses *external* negation, while both *te* and *ha* express *internal* negation.<sup>74</sup> The latter two forms of negation select for the notional reality status of their complements, with *te* selecting for notionally realis complements, and *ha* selecting for notionally irrealis complements. I first describe the morphosyntactic properties of the internal negators and then turn to the external negator *matsi*.

**6.4.2.1.4.2 Internal negation** The internal negators *te* and *ha* are monomoraic elements, which phonologically cliticize to the element to their right.<sup>75</sup> They typically cliticize to second position clitics, such as congruent stance clitic *=ta*, shown in (6.291).

(6.291) Teta nashi<sup>h</sup>ntakote<sup>n</sup>pa<sup>ro</sup>.

<i>te</i>	<i>=ta</i>	<i>no=</i>	<i>ashi<sup>h</sup>nt</i>	<i>-ako</i>	<i>-e<sup>n</sup>pa</i>	<i>=ro</i>
NEG.REAL	=CNGNT	1S=	own	-APPL:INDR	-IRREAL.A	=3nmO

‘I do not, as I was saying, own it.’

In some cases, the negator cliticizes directly to a preverbal, phonologically free nominal element, as in (6.292). In the absence of any intervening phonologically free element between the negator and the phonological word that includes the verb, the negator cliticizes to the verb itself,<sup>76</sup> as in (6.293).

(6.292) Te naro ka<sup>n</sup>te pi<sup>n</sup>pokake aka. =[tenaro]<sub>PhWd</sub>

<i>te</i>	<i>naro</i>	<i>ka<sup>n</sup>t</i>	<i>-e</i>	<i>pi=</i>	<i>N-</i>	<i>pok</i>	<i>-ak</i>
NEG.REAL	1.FOC.PRO	say	-IRREAL.I	2S=	IRREAL-	come	-PERF

*-e*            *aka*  
-IRREAL.I    here

<sup>74</sup>Internal negation, also known as narrow-scope negation or constituent negation, has scope over a constituent in the clause, while external negation, also known as wide-scope negation or propositional negation, has scope over the entire proposition.

<sup>75</sup>Note that Nanti exhibits a disyllabic minimum word requirement, which would not permit the negators in question to form independent phonological words.

<sup>76</sup>Note that in such circumstances, the negation forms a phonological word with its host, but remains extrametrical, and neither participates in foot formation nor receives stress.

‘I didn’t say to him, “Please come here.”’

(6.293) Te noNperi. = [tenomp<sup>i</sup>eri]<sub>PhWd</sub>

*te*                    *no=* N-            *p*    *-e*                    *=ri*  
 NEG.REAL= 1S= IRREAL- give -IRREAL.I =3mO  
 ‘I didn’t give (it) to him.’

The internal negators *te* and *ha* frequently form a phonological word with the clitic *=ra*, a polyfunctional element with a variety of clause-linking functions. The resulting forms *tera* and *hara* appear to be semantically equivalent to the ‘light’ forms *te* and *ha*, and appear to be obligatory only in utterances where no other element is available to serve as a host for the internal negators (e.g. in single word utterances), or when stress is placed on the negator to express contrastive focus, as in (6.294). In these contexts *=ra* is effectively a dummy element that serves to satisfy the minimum word requirement for the negative element.

(6.294) R: Ainyo kaNtaNkicha hara piporohi?<sup>77</sup>

*ainyo*                    *kaNt* *-aNkicha* *hara*                    *pi=* *poroh*            *-i*  
 EXIST.ANIM say -REAL NEG.IRREAL 2S= clear.land -REAL.I  
 ‘Are there those who say, “You cannot clear (this land).”?’

B: Hara, tera inkaNte.

*hara*                    *tera*                    *i=*            N-                    *kaNt* *-e*  
 NEG.IRREAL NEG.REAL 3mS= IRREAL- say IRREAL.I  
 ‘He would not, he does not say (that).’ (i.e. ‘Nobody says that.’)

Internal negation occupies a syntactic position immediately to the left of the focus position, as evident in (6.295), and immediately to the right of the topic position, as evident in (6.296).

<sup>77</sup>Note that I, the speaker, make a grammatical error in this sentence by employing an existential verb in the main clause, which is not permitted with this particular relative clause type.

(6.295) Hara naro bokitiro.

*hara naro oboki -i =ro*  
 NEG.IRREAL 1.FOC.PRO cook -REAL.I =3NMO  
 ‘I will not cook it.’

(6.296) Yoga Choteri, te irinihe.

*yoga Choteri te i= ri- nih -e*  
 that.MASC personal.name NEG.REAL 3mS= IRREAL- speak -IRREAL.I  
 ‘That Choteri, he didn’t speak.’

The two internal negators subcategorize for the notional reality status of their complements. The ‘realis negator’ *te* selects for notionally realis complements, while the ‘irrealis negator’ *ha* selections for notionally irrealis complements. The morphological realization of reality status in negated clauses interacts in a complex manner with internal negation, as discussed below.

The selectional properties of *te* and *ha* can be seen by comparing the positive polarity sentences with realis and irrealis clauses in (6.297a) and (6.298a), with their negative polarity counterparts in (6.297b) and (6.298b).

The notionally and morphologically realis clause in (6.297a) is negated with the realis negator *te* in (6.297b). The resulting negated clause takes irrealis marking, which is consistent with the notional basis of irrealis, which encompasses states of affairs that are either ‘unrealized’ or ‘unknowable’ (Mithun, 1995). The negative polarity clause in (6.297b) expresses a proposition regarding a state of affairs that failed to obtain prior to the moment of speaking, which is arguably the prototypical unrealized state of affairs.

(6.297) a. Ipoki.

*i= pok -i*  
 3ms= come -REAL.I  
 ‘He is coming.’

b. Tera inpoke.

*tera*            *i=*        N-            *pok*    *-e*  
 NEG.REAL 3mS= IRREAL- come -IRREAL.I  
 ‘He is not coming.’ ~ ‘He did not come.’

The notionally and morphologically irrealis clause in (6.298a) is in turn negated with the irrealis negator *ha* in (6.298b). The resulting clause is, of course, notionally irrealis, and could easily be seen as ‘doubly irrealis’ – once due to future temporal reference and second due to negation. Unexpectedly, the verb takes *realis* marking. And indeed, the irrealis negator *ha* always triggers realis marking on the verb, as evident in its appearance in conditional (§6.4.3.3), counterfactual (§6.4.3.4), and deontic (§6.3.1.2.2.1) constructions.

(6.298) a. Inpoke.

*i=*        N-            *pok*    *-e*  
 3ms= IRREAL- come -IRREAL.I  
 ‘He will come.’

b. Hara ipoki.

*hara*            *i=*        *pok*    *-i*  
 NEG.IRREAL 3mS= come -REAL.I  
 ‘He will not come.’

There are two broad approaches to understanding this phenomenon. One is constructional: doubly irrealis clauses are simply marked by the discontinuous morphemes *hara . . . -i*. On this view, the understanding of the morphological behavior in these contexts will ultimately be grounded in a development of a historical account of the Kampan negation and reality status system. A second approach, sketched in Michael (2007), treats this phenomenon as an result of scopal interaction between negation and reality status operators. For our present descriptive purposes, the constructional approach is perfectly adequate.

The interaction between negation and reality status is summarized in Table 6.18.

Table 6.18: Negation and reality status marking

POLARITY	NOTIONAL REALITY STATUS		
	REALIS	IRREALIS	DOUBLY IRREALIS
POSITIVE	<i>-i</i>	N- ... - <i>e</i>	NA
NEGATIVE	NA	<i>te</i> N- ... - <i>e</i>	<i>hara -i</i>

Finally, it should be noted that the presence of internal negation neutralizes the perfective/imperfective distinction in that clause (see §6.3.1.1.2.1).

**6.4.2.1.4.3 Existential negation** Nanti exhibits a negative existential verb, *mameri* ~ *mame*, which is the negative polarity counterpart of the existential verbs *aityo* and *ainyo* (see §6.3.1.5). The verb may take either a nominal or a clausal complement, although nominal complements, as in (6.299), are by far the most common.

(6.299) Mameri ibatsa.

*mameri*    *i*        *batsa*  
 NEG.EXIST 3mP- meat  
 ‘There is no meat.’

When *mameri* takes a clausal complement, an additional locative sense obtains, just as a locative sense obtains with clausal complements of positive polarity existential verbs (§6.3.1.5). In particular, the negative existential indicates the negation of the complement with respect to a specific location, as in (6.440) and (6.300).

(6.300) Mame pinehairo oburoki.

*mame*      *pi= neh -ah -i*      *=ro oburoki*  
 NEG.EXIST 2S= see -REG -REAL.I =3nmO manioc.beer  
 ‘You will not see manioc beer again (where you live).’

**6.4.2.1.4.4 External negation** The external negator *matsi* demonstrates starkly different morphosyntactic properties from the internal negators *te* and *ha*. *Matsi* appears to the right of topic expressions, as in (6.301), but to the left of positive polarity markers, such as *ari* ‘indeed’, (6.302), and internal negators, (6.303). The presence of the external negator has no effect on reality status marking on the verb, as is evident in (6.302), where the verb retains realis marking despite the presence of external negation. In the presence of internal negation, the verb would take irrealis marking in this context. Note that *matsi* does not select for the reality status of its complements, and that external negation may even co-occur with internal negation, as we can see in (6.303).

(6.301) Ogari oburoki matsi pinehahiro haNta pitimirora.

*oga =ri oburoki matsi pi= neh -ah -i*  
 that =CNTRST manioc.beer EXT.NEG 2S= see -REG -REAL.I  
*=ro haNta pi= tim -i =ro =ra*  
 =3nmO there 2S= live -REAL.I =3nmO =SUB  
 ‘Oburoki, it is not the case that you will see it there where you live.’

(6.302) Matsi ari haNta pitimakero haNta.

*matsi ari haNta pi= tim -ak -i =ro haNta*  
 NEG.EXT POS.POL there 2S= live -PERF -REAL.I =3nmO there  
 ‘It is not the case that you, indeed, live there.’

(6.303) Matsi te pishineteNparo oka.

*matsi te pi= shine -eNpa =ro oka*  
 NEG.EXT NEG.IRREAL 2S= be.happy -IRREAL.A =3nmO this  
 ‘It is not the case that you are not happy with this.’



**6.4.2.1.4.5 Negative pronouns** Nanti negative pronouns are binomial expressions consisting of an internal negator – either *tera* or *hara* – and an interrogative pronoun (see §6.4.2.2.2). For example, the negative pronoun *tera tsini* ‘nobody’, exemplified in (6.304), is formed with the interrogative pronoun *tsini* ‘who’. A negative pronoun formed with *hara* is illustrated in (6.305).

(6.304) *Tera tsini hatake incharihate kamatitya?*

*tera tsini* N- *ha -ak -e i=* N-  
 NEG.REAL who IRREAL- go -PERF -REAL.I 3mS= IRREAL-  
*chariha -e kamatitya*  
 fish.with.throw.net -IRREAL.I downriver  
 ‘Nobody went downriver to fish with a throw net?’

(6.305) *Hara tya nohati.*

*hara tya no= ha -i*  
 NEG.IRREAL where 1S= go -REAL.I  
 ‘I will go nowhere.’

The negative pronoun always appears in the preverbal focus position, as evident in (6.306) and (6.307), which feature object negative pronouns.

(6.306) *Ika tera tata noge, nopasehata.*

*i- ka tera tata no= N- og -e no= paseha*  
 3mS- QUOT NEG.REAL what 1S= N- do -IRREAL.I 1S= visit  
*-a*  
 -REAL.A  
 ‘He said, “I wasn’t doing anything, I was (just) visiting.”’

(6.307) *Ika te tyani nage.*

*i- ka te tyani no= ag -e*  
 3m- QUOT NEG.REAL who 1S= take -IRREAL.I  
 ‘He said “I took nobody (as my spouse).”’

The reality-status marking on verbs that have negative pronouns as arguments matches that which we expect for the given negator, i.e. irrealis marking with *te* and realis marking with *ha*.

**6.4.2.1.5 Focus constructions** Nanti exhibits both NP and predicate contrastive focus constructions. Nanti NP focus constructions include two distinct constructions for focusing verbal arguments: one that makes use of a syntactic preverbal focus position, and a second ‘cleft’ construction that makes use of a relativization strategy. Nanti also exhibits a possessive pronoun focus construction. Predicate focus in Nanti is indicated by the marker *onti*, which appears in clause initial position.

**6.4.2.1.5.1 Preverbal focus position** The most common strategy for focusing a verbal argument is to place it in the preverbal focus position. Subject, object, and oblique NPs may all be focused with this construction, as exemplified in (6.308), (6.309), and (6.310), respectively.

(6.308) *Naro*<sub>S,FOC</sub> *chapi pahigakeri*.

*naro*            *p*    *-hig* *-ak*    *-i*            *=ri*  
 1S.FOC.PRO give -PL -PERF -REAL.I =3mO  
 ‘I gave (it) to them yesterday.’

(6.309) *Iryo haNta nokamosotake*.

*iryoo*<sub>O,FOC</sub>    *haNta* *no=* *kamoso* *-ak*    *-i*  
 3m.FOC.PRO there 1S= visit -PERF -REAL.I  
 ‘I visited *him* there.’

(6.310) *Aka* [MONTetoniku]<sub>OBL,FOC</sub> *intaga pimatikake*.

*aka* *Montetoni* *-ku* *iNtaga* *pi=* *matik* *-ak* *-i*  
 here *place.name* *-LOC* *that.is.all* *2S=* *sing* *-PERF* *-REAL.I*  
 ‘You only sing here *in Montetoni*.’

As all three of the preceding examples illustrate, adverbs can intervene between the focused NP and the verbal phonological word. This clearly distinguishes the preverbal focus position from the subject position, as adverbs cannot intervene between the subject and the verb, even when the subject is phonologically distinct from the verb (see §6.3.5).

**6.4.2.1.5.2 ‘Cleft’ focus constructions** Nanti exhibits a subject focus construction which has the same structure as a Nanti deranked relative clause. This cleft focus construction can be identified by the fact that the verbs in the construction undergo derivation with one of two suffixes also found on verbs in deranked relative clauses: *-aNkicha*, the perfective deranked relativizer, or *-tsi*, the imperfective deranked relativizer (the reader is referred to §6.4.3.1.1 for details regarding these morphemes), as in (6.311) and (6.312), respectively.

(6.311) *Bironpatyo kogaNkicha*.

*biro* *=Npa* *=tyo* *kog* *-aNkicha*  
 1.FOC.PRO =NCNGT =AFFECT want -DRNK.REL.PERF  
 ‘It was you (and not anyone else) who wanted (to pursue a particular course of action).’

(6.312) *Iro magatsi*.

*iro* *mag* *-tsi*  
 3nm.FOC.PRO sleep -DERANK.REL.IMPF  
 ‘She is sleeping.’

The derivations in question apply only to verbs with a single nominal argument: that is, either strictly intransitive verbs or verbs that take clausal complements, as in (6.313). Note that the complement may be elided, as in (6.311).

(6.313) Narome kaNtānkichame aka piNpokaheera aka.

*naro =me kaNt -aNkicha =me aka pi= N- pok*  
 1S.PRO =CNTF say -SEC.PRED =CNTF here 2S= IRREAL- come  
*-ah -e =ra aka*  
 -REG -IRREAL.I =TEMP here

‘It was not *I* (but rather someone else) who said to him, ‘Come back here,’  
 contrary to what you imply.’

In cleft focus constructions, the subject – the focused element – must be expressed by a phonologically free element. The focused status of one of these subjects is illustrated in (6.314), which presents two adjacent sentences from a longer stretch of discourse. In the first sentence, the speaker quotes another individual, Bikotoro, as expressing his intention to live in Marankehari, the community downriver from Montetoni. In the second sentence, the speaker expressed that he, in contrast, will continue to live in Montetoni.

(6.314) a. Yoga Bikotoro ipokaati ikaNti ari no= N -timake haNta Marankehari.

*i- oga Bikotoro i= pok -aa -i i=*  
 3mS- that *personal.name* 3mS= come TRAN.IMPF -REAL.I 3mS  
*kaNt -i ari no= N- tim -ak -e haNta*  
 say -REAL.I POS.POL 1S= IRREAL live -PERF -IRREAL.I there  
*Marankehari*  
*place.name*

‘That Bikotoro came and said, “I will live there in Marankehari.”’

b. Noka nani, narō aka timānkichame aka.

*no- ka nani narō aka tim -aNkicha =me*  
 1- QUOT OK 1.FOC.PRO here live -DRNK.REL.PERF =DEONT  
*aka*  
 here

‘I said, “Fine, I (in contrast to you) have to live here.”’

It should be noted that coreferential topic expressions may co-occur with the focused element, and are normally used to clarify the reference of the focused element, as in (6.315).

(6.315) [Iburokite]<sub>TOP</sub> [oketyo]<sub>FOC,S</sub> tsititanaNkicha.

*i-        buroki        -te        o-        ketyo        tsitit        -an        -aNkicha*  
 3mP-    manioc.beer    -POSS    3nm-    be.first    begin    -ABL    -SEC.PRED  
 ‘His manioc beer was the first to begin (i.e. We drank his manioc beer first.).’<sup>78</sup>

Cleft focus constructions differ in one way from the deranked relative clauses which they so closely resemble: while negative polarity deranked relative clauses are unattested, negative polarity cleft focus constructions, as in (6.316), are perfectly acceptable.

(6.316) Te oketyo shiganaNkicha.

*te                o-        ketyo        shig        -an        -aNkicha*  
 NEG.REAL    3nm-    be.first    run        -ABL    -DERANK.REL.IMPF  
 ‘She did not run away first.’

I have not encountered any evidence that there is a difference in meaning between the cleft focus construction and the preverbal focus position construction. It should be noted, however, that it can be difficult to distinguish unfocused subjects from subjects focused by means of the preverbal focus position construction. The latter are distinguished from the former only by word stress and by the fact that the latter permits adverbs to intervene between the NP and the verbs, while the latter does not. The use of the cleft focus construction makes it very clear that the subject is being focused, suggesting that its use may be motivated by the desire of Nanti speakers to disambiguate the information structure status of focused subjects.

<sup>78</sup>Occasionally, manioc beer (*oburoki*), though always made by women, is identified as pertaining to the male head of the household, (*iburoki*), in as much as he has the freedom and obligation to invite other men to partake of it.

**6.4.2.1.5.3 Predicate focus** Predicate focus in Nanti is indicated by the free syntactic element *onti*, which appears in clause initial position, as we see in (6.317). In this example, the speaker seeks to assure his addressee that a third man is only joking about making overtures to the addressee’s spouse. The speaker employs contrastive predicate focus in his second utterance, thus contrasting the actual state of affairs with the addressee’s possible fears.

(6.317) M: Hara yagapitsati*ŋ*pi.

*hara*            *i=*        *ag*    *-apitsa*        *-i*            =*ŋ*pi  
 NEG.IRREAL 3mS= take =APPL:SEP -REAL.I =2O  
 ‘He will not take (your spouse) from you.’

Onti ika*ŋ*tagenatake.

*onti*            *i=*        *kaŋtagena*    *-ak*        *-i*  
 PRED.FOC 3mS= joke.around -PERF -REAL.I  
 ‘He is *joking around*.’

## 6.4.2.2 Interrogative constructions

**6.4.2.2.1 Polar interrogatives** Polar interrogatives are distinguishable from their declarative counterparts by their characteristic intonation contour, which consists of a rising-falling contour over the last syllables of the utterance. Polar interrogatives also exhibit a reduced range of NP positions in comparison to their declarative counterparts, although the restricted NP distribution in polar interrogatives is not sufficient to unambiguously identify this construction type.

Both argument and topic NPs exhibit restricted distributions in polar interrogatives, relative to their declarative counterparts. Free argument NPs in interrogative constructions obligatorily appear in the pre-subject focus position, as in (6.318) and (6.319), whereas in declarative constructions, they may also appear in non-focus position. The object argument NPs in (6.318) and (6.319), for example,

could appear in either the post-verbal object position or the pre-subject focus position in the declarative counterparts to these sentences, but can only appear in the focus position in polar interrogative constructions.

(6.318) Pikoriti pitenta?

*pi- koriti pi= tent -a*  
 2P- spouse 2S= accompany -REAL.A  
 ‘Are you accompanying your spouse?’

(6.319) Shima opakipi?

*shima o= p -ak -i =Npi*  
 fish 3nmS= give -PERF -REAL.I =2O  
 ‘Did she give you fish?’

Topic NPs are also limited in their syntactic distribution in polar interrogative constructions, where they obligatorily appear at the right margin of the clause, as in (6.320) and (6.321), in contrast to declarative clauses, where they may appear at either margin.

(6.320) Ihataati pitomi?

*i= ha -aa -i pi- tomi*  
 3mS= go -TRNLOC.IMPF -REAL.I 2S- son  
 ‘Is your son going over there?’

(6.321) Te ontime pikoriti?

*te o= N- tim -e pi- koriti*  
 NEG.REAL 3nmS= IRREAL- exist -IRREAL.I 2P- spouse  
 ‘Don’t you have a spouse?’

**6.4.2.2.2 Content interrogatives** Content interrogative constructions are characterized by the presence of an interrogative pronoun in sentence initial position, and the concomitant omission of the person marker that would have the same grammatical relation to the verb as the interrogative pronoun. Interrogation of core arguments is thus characterized by the same person clitic gap strategy found in focus constructions (see §6.4.1). The interrogation of non-core arguments does not exhibit concomitant person clitic gapping, since non-core arguments are not marked on the verb. The full set of Nanti interrogative pronouns is given in Table 6.19.

Table 6.19: Nanti interrogatives

INTERROGATIVE	GLOSS
<i>tata</i>	‘what’
<i>tsini</i>	‘who, whom’
<i>tyani</i>	‘which one (animate)’
<i>tyati</i>	‘which one (inanimate)’
<i>tya(ra)</i>	‘where’, ‘how’

The interrogative pronouns *tsini* ‘who/whom’ and *tyani* ‘which one (animate)’ have very similar morphosyntactic distributions, since both can be used to interrogate human core arguments, as can be seen by comparing (6.323a) with (6.322). In so far as I have been able to observe a difference in their use, *tsini* appears to be used principally in contexts where the speaker appears to have no idea about the possible candidates, while *tyani* appears to be used in situations where the speaker has some idea about the answer to the question.

(6.322) *Tyani pimaNtaherome oga sapiroNtsi?*

<i>tyani</i>	<i>pimaNt</i>	<i>-ah</i>	<i>-e</i>	<i>=ro</i>	<i>=me</i>	<i>oga</i>
which.one.ANIM	give	-REG	-IRREAL.I	=3nmO	=CNTF	that
<i>sapirontsi</i>						
clothes						
‘Who in the world will give (you) clothes?’						



Note that there are gaps in the interrogative pronoun paradigm, including elements corresponding to ‘why’ and ‘whose’. As I discuss below, Nanti makes use of applicative morphology and periphrastic strategies to expand the set of interrogative constructions beyond the set of simple interrogative constructions described here.

The interrogation of core arguments is exemplified in (6.323) by two distinct interrogative constructions formed on the transitive verb *neh* ‘see’ and the interrogative pronoun *tsini* ‘who/whom’. Subject interrogation is illustrated in (6.323a), where the subject marker has been omitted, and object interrogation is illustrated in (6.323b), where the object person marker has been omitted. In both cases, the omission of the given person marker permits us to identify the grammatical relation of the interrogative pronoun to the verb. The declarative sentence corresponding to the interrogative sentences is given in (6.323c).

(6.323) a. *Tsini<sub>S</sub> \_nehakeri?*

*tsini neh -ak -i =ri*  
 who see -PERF -REAL.I =3MO  
 ‘Who saw him?’

b. *Tsini<sub>O</sub> inehake\_?*

*tsini i= neh -ak -i*  
 whom 3mS= see -PERF -REAL.I  
 ‘Whom did he see?’

c. *Inehakeri.*

*i= neh -ak -i =ri*  
 3mS= see -PERF -REAL.I =3mO  
 ‘He saw him.’

Note that when the argument being interrogated is an applied argument, the identity of the *semantic* role that is being interrogated is determined by the applicative. For example, the interrogated object in (6.324) is an applied object, whose

semantic role is determined by the purposive applicative *-ashi*. Thus, although *tata* ‘what’ normally serves to interrogate theme or patient arguments, as in (6.325), it serves to interrogate a purpose in (6.324).

(6.324) *Tata pipokashitaka?*

*tata pi= pok -ashi -ak -a?*  
 what 2S= come -PURP -PERF -REAL.A  
 ‘What did you come for?’

(6.325) *Tata pooga?*

*tata pi= oog -a*  
 what 2S= consume -REAL.A  
 ‘What are you eating?’

The interrogation of a non-core argument is illustrated in (6.326), with the intransitive verb *ken* ‘head in a direction’ and the interrogative pronoun *tya* ‘where’/‘how’. No person marker is omitted on the verb, since the interrogative pronoun does not correspond to a core argument.

(6.326) *Tya pikena?*

*tya pi= ken -a*  
 where 2S= head.in.direction -REAL.A  
 ‘Where did you head?’

Note that interrogative constructions may be formed off the bare instrumental construction (see §6.4.1.5). This interrogative construction is identifiable by the fact that the interrogative pronoun is *tata* ‘what’, which normally interrogates an argument, but there is no corresponding person clitic gap. In (6.327), for example, the fact that neither the subject nor object marker of the the verb *oguso* ‘tie together’ is omitted indicates that a peripheral argument is being interrogated.

(6.327) Tata pogusotakero?

*tata pi= oguso -ak -i =ro*  
what 2S= tie.together -PERF -REAL.I =3NMO  
'What did you tie it together with?'

**6.4.2.2.3 Interrogative identity verb** The irregular verb *ita* appears in interrogative constructions that seek information regarding the identity or type of a given referent, as in (6.328). This verb always pairs with the interrogative pronoun *tata* 'what'. The verb does not take inflection, but does take a third person subject proclitic. Interestingly, these subject proclitics undergo none of the vowel hiatus resolution processes typical in this morphosyntactic environment (see §6.2.3). As a result, one finds the verb forms *oita* and *iita*, instead of the form *ita*, which one would expect on the normal application of vowel hiatus resolution rules. Note that the blocking of this lexical phonological process serves to maintain the morphological contrast between masculine and non-masculine referents.

(6.328) Tata oita?

*tata o= ita*  
what 3nmS= IDENT  
'What is it?'

The basic construction given in (6.328) also appears embedded in interrogative constructions with lexical verbs, as in (6.329). The resulting construction expresses a demand for specificity regarding the interrogated argument.

(6.329) Tata oita pikoga?

*tata o= ita pi= kog -a*  
what 3nmS= IDENT 2S= want -REAL.A  
'What exactly is it that you want?'

**6.4.2.2.4 Periphrastic interrogative constructions** Nanti does not exhibit dedicated interrogative pronouns that serve to interrogate reasons or causes (i.e. a counterpart to ‘why’), possessors (i.e. an analog to ‘whose’), or quantities (i.e. a counterpart to ‘how many’ or ‘how much’). Instead, Nanti speakers make use of either periphrastic constructions or applicative morphology in conjunction with the more limited set of interrogative pronouns already mentioned. The use of applicative morphology in this regard was discussed above; in this section I describe Nanti periphrastic interrogative constructions.

Interrogatives constructions that serve inquire about reasons or causes are bi-clausal ones, in which the first clause consists of the intransitive light verb *kaNt* ‘happen’,<sup>79</sup> preceded by the interrogative pronoun *tya* ‘how’, as in (6.330) and (6.331). The second clause denotes the state of affairs that is the subject of the question.

(6.330) *Tya okaNtaka haNta pimagaetanake haNta?*

<i>tya</i>	<i>o=</i>	<i>kaNt</i>	<i>-ak</i>	<i>-a</i>	<i>haNta</i>	<i>pi=</i>	<i>mag</i>	<i>-ge</i>	<i>-an</i>
how	3nmS=	happen	-PERF	-REAL.A	there	2S=	sleep	-DSTR	-ABL
<i>-ak</i>	<i>-i</i>	<i>haNta?</i>							
-PERF	-REAL.I	there							

‘Why did you sleep there?’

In some cases, the main verb of the second clause bears the subordinating clitic *=ra*, as in (6.331). It is not clear if this variation is due to fast speech elision of the clitic, or if it is simply optional.

(6.331) *Tya okaNtaka piperatara haNta Tayakome?*

<i>tya</i>	<i>o=</i>	<i>kaNt</i>	<i>-ak</i>	<i>-a</i>	<i>pi=</i>	<i>pera</i>	<i>-a</i>
how	3nmS=	happen	-PERF	-REAL.A	2S=	lose.interest	-REAL.A
<i>=ra</i>	<i>haNta</i>	<i>Tayakome</i>					
=SUB	there	place.name					

<sup>79</sup>This root, it will be noted, is homophonous with the form for ‘say’. The verbs are distinguishable by their verb classes: ‘say’ is an I-class verb, and may take a speech report complement, while ‘happen’ is an A-class verb and cannot take a clausal complement.

‘Why did you lose interest there in Tayakome?’

The interrogation of possessors normally requires the use of the verb *ashiNt* ‘own’, as in the monoclausal question in (6.332).<sup>80</sup>

(6.332) Tyani shiNtaro magashipogo?

*tyani ashiNt -a =ro magashipogo*  
who own -REAL.A =3nmO mature.garden  
‘Who owns this mature/abandoned garden?’

Questions that might call for the use of possessive interrogative pronouns in languages that possess them are handled in Nanti with a relative clause construction, as in (6.333).

(6.333) Tyani shiNtaro yoga magashipogo nonehirira chapi?

*tyani ashiNt -a =ro i- oga magashipogo no= neh*  
who own -REAL.A =3nmO 3m= that mature.garden 1S= see  
*-i =rira chapi*  
-REAL.I =REL yesterday  
‘Who owns the mature garden that I saw yesterday?’ (cf. ‘Whose mature garden did I see yesterday?’)

Interrogative constructions that serve to inquire about quantities or sizes require the use of the verb *kara* ‘come to an end, measure up to’ (cf. *kara* ‘cut in two’) and the interrogative word *tya* ‘where’/‘how’, as in (6.334). Note that sense of quantity expressed by this construction is very general, encompassing count and mass quantities, and even size.

(6.334) Tya okarati?

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<sup>80</sup>The sole exception to this generalization is found in ostensive interrogative constructions, discussed below.

*tya*            *o=*            *kara*            *-i*  
 where/how 3nmS= measure -REAL.I  
 ‘How many were there?’ or ‘How much was there?’ or ‘How large was it?’

**6.4.2.2.5 Ostensive interrogatives** Interrogative constructions that seek information regarding the identity of a referent that is identified by means of a demonstrative pronoun constitute one of few verbless clause types in Nanti. The only interrogative pronouns attested in this construction are *tata* ‘what’, as in (6.335); *tyani* ‘who’, as in (6.336); and *tsini* ‘who’.

(6.335) *Tata oka?*

*tata*    *o-*            *oka*  
 what 3nm- this  
 ‘What is this?’

(6.336) *Tyani yoga?*

*tyani*    *i-*            *oga*  
 who 3m- that  
 ‘Who is that?’

Interestingly, in ostensive interrogative constructions it is possible to directly interrogate a possessor of an NP, as in (6.337), which otherwise requires the use of the lexical verb *ashiŋt* ‘own’, as discussed above.

(6.337) *Tyani paŋkotsi oka?*

*tyani*    *paŋkotsi*    *oka*  
 who house this  
 ‘Whose house is this?’

**6.4.2.2.6 Embedded questions** Embedded questions are attested exclusively in direct speech complements to verbs of communication, as in (6.338). As such, embedded questions in Nanti are identical to non-embedded ones.

(6.338) Tera nonkogakote tyani kaNtankicha hara pagi tsinani.

*tera no= N- kog -ako -e tyani kaNt*  
 NEG.REAL 1S= IRREAL- want -APPL:INDR -IRREAL.I who say  
*-aNkicha hara pi= ag -i tsinani*  
 -REL.DRINK.PERF NEG.IRREAL 2S= take -REAL.I woman  
 ‘I did not ask, “Who said, ‘You will not take a woman (as your spouse).’?”.’

**6.4.2.2.7 Rhetorical questions** Nanti speakers make extensive use of rhetorical questions.<sup>81</sup> Nanti exhibits two main types of rhetorical questions. The first type makes use of the second position ‘non-congruent’ clitic =Npa (see §6.3.6.1.2), and projects that there is no positive response to the question, as in (6.339).<sup>82</sup>

(6.339) TyaNpa aratehanake?

*tya =Npa o= N- arateh -an -ak -e*  
 where =NCNGT 3nmS= IRREAL- wade -ABL -PERF -IRREAL.I  
 ‘Where in the world would she wade (across the river)?’ (= ‘There is nowhere to wade (across the river).’)

The second type makes use of non-specific relative pronouns (see §6.4.3.1.3) in place of interrogative pronouns, and indicates that the speaker does not know the answer to the question, as in (6.340).

(6.340) Tyaka ipaita?

<sup>81</sup>For present purposes I define a rhetorical question as an utterance that shares basic structural features with an interrogative construction, but does not carry interrogative illocutionary force.

<sup>82</sup>A functionally very similar construction, making use of the counter-suppositional clitic =me is described in §6.3.1.2.2.1.

*tyaka*    *i=*    *pait*    *-a*  
 however 3mS= be.named -REAL.A  
 ‘What in the world is his name?’ (= ‘I have no idea what his name is.’)

### 6.4.2.3 Imperatives and polite directives

The imperative in Nanti is characterized by irrealis inflection on the verb and the omission of the subject person marker and any coreferential free pronoun, as in (6.341).

(6.341) Time aka!

*tim*    *-e*    *aka*  
 live -IRREAL.I here  
 ‘Live here!’

Because imperatives systematically strip the person subject marker of the verb, stem initial vowels are deleted, as in (6.342).<sup>83</sup> The object of a transitive verb in an imperative construction may be expressed by a person marker, as in (6.342), or by a non-focused referential NP, as in (6.343). Topic NPs and topic pronouns are not permitted, however, in imperative constructions.

(6.342) Gero!

*ag*    *-e*    *=ro*  
 take -IRREAL.I =3nmO  
 ‘Take it!’

(6.343) Make paryanti!

*am*    *-ak*    *-e*    *paryanti*  
 bring -PERF -IRREAL.I plantain  
 ‘Bring plantains!’

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<sup>83</sup>See §6.2.3 for a discussion of this general morphophonological process.



Note that Nanti does not exhibit a negative polarity imperative construction; negative polarity directives are instead formed via the polite directive construction, discussed below.

Nanti also exhibits two suppletive imperatives: i) *tahena* ‘come!’; and ii) *tsame* ‘get going!’ or ‘let’s go!’, shown in (6.344), which can also be interpreted as ‘get on with it!’ in contexts in which a motion interpretation not readily available. Note that *tahena* also functions as an adverb with the sense ‘right away’, as in (6.345).

(6.344) Tsame pihokotagena mahenpa.

*tsame pi= hokotag -e =na mahenpa*  
 come.on 2S= point.out -IRREAL =IO tree.sp  
 ‘Come on, please point out the *mahenpa* for me.’

(6.345) Tahena pihate!

*tahena pi= ha -e*  
 right.now 2S= go -irreal.i  
 ‘Go right now!’

Nanti exhibits a polite directive construction, which, while structurally distinct from the imperative construction, fulfills a similar interactional function by expressing a directive to an interlocutor. The polite directive construction is structurally identical to the future temporal reference declarative construction, being characterized by irrealis marking, as shown in (6.346) and (6.347).

(6.346) Pamakero.

*pi= N- am -ak -i =ro*  
 2S= IRREAL- bring -PERF -REAL.I =3NMO  
 ‘Please bring it.’

(6.347) Pi<sub>n</sub>koirahigakero.

*pi* =N- *koira* *-hig -ak -i =ro*  
 2S= IRREAL- take.care.of -PL -PERF -REAL.I =3NM0  
 ‘Please take care of it.’

As mentioned above, negative polarity directives are formed with the polite directive construction in Nanti. As one would expect, given that the positive polarity polite directive is irrealis-marked, its negative polarity counterpart takes the irrealis negator *hara* and realis marking, as in (6.348).

(6.348) Hara pinoshimaitiro!

*hara* *pi= noshik -mai -i =ro*  
 NEG.IRREAL 2S= haul -CL:fabric REAL.I = 3nm0  
 ‘Don’t pull on it (a piece of fabric)!’

#### 6.4.2.4 Interjections

Nanti exhibits an interjection construction characterized by realis marking on the verb and omission of the subject person marker (and any coreferential NPs and free pronouns), as in (6.349). The interjection construction is restricted to intransitive verbs with third person notional subjects and that denote past events. This construction does not permit the addition of any adverbs or adverbial expressions. The construction is typically employed to express a rueful evaluation of a state, change of state, or of a punctual action, as in (6.349) through (6.351).

(6.349) Hati!

*ha -i*  
 go -REALIS.I  
 ‘(S/he) left!’

(6.350) Kamake!

*kam -ak -i*  
die. -PERF -REAL.I  
'(S/he) died!'

(6.351) KatsiNkahatanake!

*katsiNka -ha -an -ak -i*  
be.cold -CL:liquid -ABL -PERF -REAL.I  
'(The water) got cold!'

### 6.4.3 Conceptual linkages and clause-linking constructions

#### 6.4.3.1 Relative clauses

Nanti exhibits three distinct relative clause constructions. The first one we consider, the *deranked relative clause* construction, is characterized by presence of either of the derivational suffixes *-anNkicha* or *-tsi* on the verb of the restrictive clause. Verbs derived with these suffixes do not show reality status marking, yielding the name for this construction. The second construction type we consider, the *ranked relative clause*, is characterized by the presence of the second position clitic *=rira* in the restrictive clause. Restrictive clause verbs exhibit the full range of inflectional morphology. The distribution of deranked and ranked relative clauses is determined by syntactic features of restrictive and main clauses. Restrictive clauses in deranked relative clause constructions must be positive polarity, and its verb must be a 'nominally intransitive' lexical verb (this latter restriction is explained at length below). In addition, existential verbs are forbidden in the main clauses of deranked relative clause constructions. Restrictive and main clauses that violate the restrictions on deranked relative clause constructions force the use of ranked relative clause constructions. The third major construction type we consider is the *non-specific relative*

*clause construction*, which is formed with a distinctive set of non-specific relative pronouns.

Nanti relative clauses exhibit a very limited range of relativizable positions, being restricted to subject relativization, in the case of deranked relative clauses; or to subject and object relativization, in the case of ranked and non-specific relative clauses.

Both the deranked and ranked relative clause constructions exhibit two structural subtypes: a ‘standard’ relative clause and a correlative clause. A standard relative clause is characterized by the presence of a single NP which serves as an argument of both the main and restrictive clause. A correlative clause is characterized by the absence of a shared argument, and instead, the presence of coreferential pronominal or demonstrative elements in both the main and restrictive clause. The distribution of standard relative and correlative clauses is determined by positional requirements on NP constituents, as discussed below. Deranked relative clauses in addition exhibit a headless subtype, characterized by the omission of the argument of the restrictive clause (note that this is distinct from the non-specific relative construction mentioned above).

**6.4.3.1.1 Deranked relative clause constructions** The deranked relative clause construction is characterized by the presence of the derivational verbal suffixes *-aŋkicha* or *-tsi* on the restrictive clause, as in (6.352) and (6.353).

(6.352) Inti irashi Barentin maika hataŋkicha Serehaa.

<i>i=</i>	<i>Nti</i>	<i>irashi</i>	<i>Barentin</i>	<i>maika</i>	<i>ha</i>	<i>-aŋkicha</i>
3mS=	COP	3m.POSS.DEM	<i>personal.name</i>	now	go	-DRNK.REL.PERF
			<i>Serehaa</i>			
			<i>river.name</i>			

‘It is *Barentin’s*, who just recently went to the Serehaa (a river).’

(6.353) Hose iryo shigapahatsi ikanti kobake!

*Hose*            *iryō*            *shig* -*apah* -*tsi*            *i*=  
*personal.name* 3m.FOC PRO run -ADL -DERANK.REL.IMPF 3mS=  
*kaNt* -*i*            *kobake*  
say -REAL.I watch.out  
‘Hose, he who was running towards us, said, “Watch out!”’

The derivational morphemes *-aNkicha* and *-tsi* strip the verb of all reality status morphology and displace normal aspect morphology. The two suffixes, however, encode an aspectual contrast: *-aNkicha* is perfective, while *-tsi* is imperfective. Quasi-inflectional morphology such as verbal number and directionals are retained under derivation with *-aNkicha* and *-tsi*. The subject of the derived verb must be a phonologically free element:<sup>84</sup> either a referential NP, as in (6.352) above; a contrastive focus pronoun, as in (6.353);<sup>85</sup> or a demonstrative, as in (6.354).

(6.354) *Yoga maika kamaNkicha, Samohero, ari itimi Koginiroku.*

*i-*    *oga*    *maika*    *kam* -*aNkicha*            *Samohero*    *ari*  
3m- that now die -DERANK.REL.PERF *personal.name* POS.POL  
*i*=    *tim* -*i*            *Koginiro*    -*ku*  
3mS= live -REAL.I *place.name* -LOC

‘That one who died, Samohero, he lived in Koginiro.’

As mentioned previously, the deranked relative clause construction imposes restrictions on the main and restrictive clauses. The major restriction imposed by this construction is on the verb of the restrictive clause, which must be ‘nominally intransitive’. A nominally intransitive verb is one that has only a single nominal core argument. This class of verbs includes strictly intransitive ones, such as *shig* ‘run’, in (6.353) above, and *kam* ‘die’, in (6.354); verbs which take clausal complements, such as *kog* ‘want’ in (6.355); and verbs which take optional bare peripheral arguments, such as *ha* ‘go’, as in (6.352).

<sup>84</sup>In the non-specific deranked relative construction the subject is omitted entirely.

<sup>85</sup>In this example the proper name *Hose* is a topic expression coreferential with the focus pronoun.

(6.355) Ika hara pogabisahiri kogaNkicha inPasehabagetake.

*i-* *ka* *hara* *pi=* *ogi-* *abis* *-ah* *-i*  
 3m- QUOT NEG.IRREAL 2S= CAUS:NAGNT- pass.by -REG -REAL.I  
 =*ri* *kog* *-aNkicha* *i=* N- *paseha* *-bage* *-ak*  
 =3mO want -SEC.PRED 3mS= IRREAL- visit -DUR -PERF  
 -*e*  
 -IRREAL.I

‘He said, “Don’t permit those who want to visit for a long time to pass by again.”’

Further limitations imposed by this construction include a restriction against negative polarity restrictive clauses, and a restriction against existential verbs in the main clause. Relative clause constructions whose restrictive verbs obey the nominal intransitivity restriction but violate these restrictions on the main clause and on polarity are formed with ranked relative clauses, as exemplified in (6.370) and (6.368).

Deranked relative clauses exhibit three structural subtypes: standard relative clauses, correlative clauses, and non-specific relative clauses. The standard subtype is characterized by the presence of a single NP that serves as an argument in both the main and the restrictive clause, as in (6.352) and (6.356). In this construction type, relative clauses are always postnominal.

(6.356) Nokamosotake ige, biikanatsi hanta.

*no=* *kamoso* *-ak* *-i* *ige* *obiik* *-an*  
 1S= visit -PERF -REAL.I my.brother drink -ABL  
 -*tsi* *hanta*  
 -DERANK.REL.IMPF there

‘I visited my brother, who was drinking there.’

In the correlative clause construction, no NP is shared by the two clauses; instead an element with pronominal characteristics appears in each clause, as in

(6.353) and (6.357). Coreference between the two relevant pronominal is not overtly marked, and must be deduced from context.

(6.357) [Yonta]<sub>i</sub> pokahigaNkicha, matsi nopake[ri]<sub>i</sub> maika peremisa.

<i>i=</i>	<i>oNta</i>	<i>pok</i>	<i>-hig</i>	<i>-aNkicha</i>	<i>matsi</i>	<i>no=</i>	<i>p</i>
3m=	that.one	come	-PL	-DERANK.REL.PERF	NEG.CL	1S=	give
<i>-ak</i>	<i>-i</i>	<i>=ri</i>	<i>maika</i>	<i>peremisa</i>			
-PERF	-REAL.I	=3MO	now	permission			

‘Those who came, I did not give them permission.’ (= ‘I did not give permission to those who came.’)

Standard and correlative clauses are functionally equivalent, in that they both serve to provide clausal modification to a referent in the main clause. Structurally, however, the two are in complementary distribution. Standard relative clauses only occur when the head of the relative clause is the unfocused object of the main clause. This restriction stems from two constraints: first, that the head precede the restrictive clause; and second, that the head occupy an argument position in the main clause. These two constraints rule out the possibility of the head being either a subject or a focused argument in the main clause, because in either preverbal position, the restrictive clause would not be permitted to intervene between the head and the main verb.<sup>86</sup> Correlative clauses appear in precisely the contexts in which standard deranked clauses are not permitted, namely, when the referent being modified is the subject of the main clause or a focused argument appearing in the preverbal focus position.

The third structural subtype, the headless non-specific deranked relative construction, is illustrated in (6.355) and (6.358). In the attested examples, the subject of the main clause is expressed by a person clitic, and the coreferential null head of the deranked clause is interpreted as non-specific.

<sup>86</sup>No material may intervene between a subject NP and a verb (see §6.4), and only adverbs may intervene between a focused argument and the verb (see §6.3.5).

(6.358) *Inpo pok -hig -tsi i= kamaNt -i i-*  
 then come -PL -DERANK.REL.POS 3mS= tell -REAL.I 3m=  
*ka o= Nti o- oka Kamisuha*  
 QUOTE 3nmS= COP 3nm- this Camisea.River  
 ‘Then, whoever it was that came told (us), “This is the Camisea River.”’

**6.4.3.1.2 Ranked relative clauses** Ranked relative clauses are distinguishable from main clauses by the presence of the relativizer *=rira*, which appears in second position in the restrictive clause, as can be seen in (6.359) and (6.360).<sup>87</sup> Ranked relative clauses are in complementary distribution with unranked ones, generally requiring a transitive restrictive clause verb (some exceptions are addressed below).

(6.359) [*Nagakitirira chakopi*<sub>HEAD</sub> *chapi*]<sub>RC</sub> *nonkotsibite*

*no= ag -aki -i =rira chakopi chapi no= N-*  
 1S= get -TRNS -REAL.I =REL arrow.cane yesterday 1S= IRREAL-  
*kotsi -bi -e*  
 rub -CL:1D.hollow -IRREAL.I  
 ‘I will straighten the arrow cane that I got yesterday.’

(6.360) [*O*]<sub>i</sub> *nihake* [*birorira make*[ro]<sub>i</sub>]<sub>RC</sub>.

*o= nih -ak -i biro =rira am -ak -i*  
 3nmS= speak -PERF -REAL.I 2.FOC.PRO =REL bring -PERF -REAL.I  
 =ro<sub>H</sub>  
 =3NMO  
 ‘The one (the two-way radio) *you* brought works (lit. speaks).’

The preceding examples illustrate that there are two distinct subtypes of relative clause constructions: a ‘standard’ relative clause construction, and a correlative clause construction. In standard relative clause constructions a single NP –

<sup>87</sup>In the following examples the restrictive clause is delimited by square bracket and labeled with a subscripted ‘RC’. The head of the relative clause is also indicated with a subscripted label, while coreferential pronominal elements are indicated by matched indices.



the head of the relative clause – functions as an argument in both the main clause and the restrictive clause. In (6.359), for example, the NP *chakopi*, functions both as the object of the main verb *kotsi* ‘straighten’ and as the object of the restrictive clause verb *ag* ‘get’. In the correlative clauses, in contrast, although a referent is shared by the two clauses, no *argument* is shared between the main and restrictive clauses. Instead, the shared referent is marked by a distinct person clitic in each clause. In (6.360), for example, the shared referent is a radio, but this referent is not expressed by a referential NP in this sentence. Instead, this shared referent is indicated by a subject person clitic in the main clause and and an object person clitic in the restrictive clause. Correlative clause constructions are typically ambiguous, and contextual factors are normally necessary to identify the shared referent.

The complementary distribution of ranked standard relative clauses and ranked correlative clauses is governed by same basic syntactic factors that govern their unranked counterparts.

**6.4.3.1.2.1 Standard relative clauses** A standard relative clause may either be headed, as in (6.361a), or unheaded, as in (6.361b).

(6.361) a. Sharoni okigake sekatsi<sub>HEAD</sub> [teriria naNtabagete]<sub>RC</sub>.

*sharoni* o=      *kig* -ak    -i      *sekatsi* *te*      =*rira*  
 agouti 3nmS= dig -PERF -REAL.I manioc NEG.REAL =REL  
*no*= *aNtabaget* -e  
 1S= weed      -IRREAL.I  
 ‘An agouti dug up the manioc that I didn’t weed.’

b. Sharoni okigake  $\emptyset$ <sub>HEAD</sub> [terira naNtabagete]<sub>RC</sub>.

*sharoni* o=      *kig* -ak    -i      *te*      =*rira* *no*=  
 agouti 3nmS= dig -PERF -REAL.I NEG.REAL =REL 1S=  
*aNtabaget* -e  
 weed      -IRREAL.I  
 ‘An agouti dug up (what) I didn’t weed.’

Both subjects and objects may be relativized, as exemplified in (6.362) and (6.359), respectively. Relativization of obliques or of any relation higher on the relativization hierarchy is unattested.

(6.362) Pinehake yoga maika sintotarira Horiha?

*pi= neh -ak -i i- oga maika sinto -a*  
 2S= see -PERF -REAL.I 3m- that now engender.daughter -REAL.A  
 =*rira Horiha*  
 =RANK.REL *personal.name*  
 ‘Did you see that (one) who engendered Horiha?’ (= ‘Did you see Horiha’s father?’)

The heads of standard relative clauses may either be RC-external, in which case they exhibit a gap case recoverability strategy<sup>88</sup> as in (6.361a); or RC-internal, in which case they appear *in situ*, as in (6.359). The alternation between RC-external and RC-internal heads appears to be governed by the requirements of the main clause verb regarding the position of its arguments. That is, the position of a given relative clause head with respect to a restrictive clause is determined by the positional requirements imposed on the same constituent by virtue of its being an argument of the main clause verb. Consider, for example, (6.361a) in which the head of the relative clause, *sekatsi* ‘manioc’ is the unfocused object of the main clause. In this case, the head of the relative clause is forced to be RC-external, since it is the object of the restrictive clause. Were the head to appear in RC-internal position, following the restrictive clause verb, it would be unable to occupy the unfocused object position in the main clause. Contrast this state of affairs with that exemplified by (6.359). In this case, the relative clause head, *chakopi* ‘arrow cane’, is the *focused* object of the main clause, meaning that it must appear in the preverbal focus position of the main clause. This, in turn, forces the relative clause

<sup>88</sup>Note that this gap strategy is pervasive in Nanti, and serves to identify the grammatical relations of interrogative pronouns and focused NPs (see §6.4.1).

head to appear RC-internally, *in situ*, in order for the head to occupy the focus position of the main clause. Note, incidentally, that the positional requirements on the relative clause head also determine the position of the relative clause with respect to the main clause, since the head cannot be separated from the restrictive clause. The set of possible combinations between matrix and restrictive clauses, and the elements that are relativized in each case are given in (6.363).<sup>89</sup>

- (6.363) 1. S V O<sub>S</sub> [     V (O) ]<sub>RC</sub>  
 2. S V O<sub>O</sub> [ S V     ]<sub>RC</sub>  
 3. [S V     ]<sub>RC</sub> S<sub>O</sub> V (O)

Note that the preceding considerations also govern the complementary distribution of ranked standard relative clauses and ranked correlative clauses. The three clause combinations given in (6.363) are those that can be formed via the standard relative clause construction, while all others must be formed with correlative clauses. In particular, the clause combination given in (6.364), can *only* be realized by means of correlative clauses.

- (6.364) S<sub>i</sub> V (O) [ S<sub>i</sub> V (O) ]

**6.4.3.1.2.2 Headless ranked relative clauses** Headless ranked relative clauses display the same basic features as their headed counterparts, except that the head is omitted. Specifically, they obey the same restrictions as headed relative clauses on relativizable elements and on the relative position of main and restrictive clauses. Similarly, they can be distinguished from correlative clauses by the absence of coreferential person clitics in both main and restrictive clauses. It should be noted that headless relative clauses do not yield a non-specific interpretation of

<sup>89</sup>The constituents bearing subscripts in the main clause are the heads of relative clauses. The subscripts on the heads indicate their grammatical relationship to the verb of the restrictive clause, while the empty (underlined) position indicates the position from which the head was relativized.

the null head.<sup>90</sup> To the contrary, the overt head is omitted only when the referent is easily recoverable from context. In this respect, headless ranked relative clauses are unlike their unranked counterparts, which yield a non-specific interpretation for null heads.

(6.365) [Terira  $o_{HN}$ tapatote  $\emptyset_{HEAD}$ ] $_{RC}$  notsohatake.

*te*            *=rira* *o=*        N-            *tapato*    *-e*            *no=* *tso*  
 NEG.REAL =REL 3nmS= IRREAL.I- cover.pot -IRREAL.I 1S= finish  
*-ha*        *-ak*        *-i*  
 -CL:fluid -PERF -REAL.I  
 ‘I finished the one (a pot of oburoki) that she did not cover.’

**6.4.3.1.2.3 Correlative clauses** Correlative clauses exhibit coreferential arguments expressed by pronominal elements markers. The pronominal element of the restrictive clause is typically a person clitic, as in (6.366), but may also be a determiner, as in (6.367). Only person clitics are attested in the main clause.

Unlike standard relative clause constructions, correlative clause constructions impose no restrictions on clause ordering, as can be seen by comparing (6.366a) and (6.366b).

(6.366) a. [Terira  $o_i$ Nkemero] $_{RC}$   $o_i$ Npokake.

*te*            *=rira* *o=*        N-            *kem* *-e*            *=ro*  
 NEG.REAL =REL 3NMS= IRREAL- hear -IRREAL.I =3NMO  
*o=*        N-            *pok* *-ak*        *-e*  
 3NMS= IRREAL- come -PERF -IRREAL.I  
 ‘She who has not heard it (a recording of chanting), will come.’  
 (intended reading)  
 ‘She who was not heard by her, will come.’ (alternate reading)

b.  $O_i$ Npokake [terira  $o_i$ Nkemero] $_{RC}$ .

<sup>90</sup>Nanti exhibits a distinct non-specific relative construction, discussed below.

(6.367) YoNta<sub>i</sub> [nehiririra]<sub>RC</sub>, Esekera, i<sub>i</sub>Nkante iragabehake inpokake.

yoNta            neh -i            =ri            =rira] Esekera            i=  
 3m.PROX.DEM see -REAL.I =3mO =REL personal.name 3mS=  
 N-            kant -e            i=            r-            agabeh -ak -e  
 IRREAL- say -IRREAL.I 3mS= IRREAL- be.able -PERF -IRREAL.I  
 i=            N-            pok -ak -e  
 3mS= IRREAL- come -PERF -IRREAL.I

‘That one who knows him, Esekera, would say, “He can come.”’

If we define ‘relativization’ as including coreference relations between a person marker in a restrictive clause and one in the main clause, then we can say that correlative clause constructions permit the relativization of both subjects, as in (6.366), and objects, as in (6.360).

#### 6.4.3.1.2.4 Intransitive ranked restrictive clauses

As indicated above, the =rira construction relativizes the arguments of transitive verbs – but there is one exception. If the main verb is one of the existential verbs *aityo* (inanimate) or *ainyo* (animate), the relative clause is obligatorily formed with the =rira relativizer, whether the verb of the restrictive clause is transitive, as in (6.368), or intransitive, as in (6.369). Another characteristic of these constructions is that they require person clitic heads.

(6.368) a. Aityo oburoki<sub>i</sub> [birorira tinki[ro]<sub>i</sub>]<sub>RC</sub>?

aityo            oburoki            biro            =rira tink -i            =ro  
 EXIST.INAN manioc.beer 2.FOC.PRO =REL mash -REAL.I =3nmO  
 ‘Is there any manioc beer that *you* mashed?’

b. Aityo [birorira tinki[ro]<sub>i</sub>]<sub>RC</sub> oburoki<sub>i</sub>?

(6.369) Yoga<sub>i</sub> [pahentyarira [i]<sub>i</sub>Nkame] ainyo?

yoga            pahentya =rira i=            N-            kam -e            ainyo  
 that.masc almost -REL 3mS= IRREAL- die -IRREAL.I EXIST.ANIM

‘Is that (chicken) which almost died here?’

(6.370) [Terira [∅]<sub>i</sub>ageNkani]<sub>RC</sub>, kameti pagaati[ro]<sub>i</sub>.

<i>te</i>	<i>=rira</i>	<i>o=</i>	<i>ag</i>	<i>-eNkani</i>	<i>kameti</i>	<i>pi=</i>	<i>ag</i>
NEG.REAL	=REL	3nmS=	take	-PASS.IRREAL	good	2S=	take
<i>-aa</i>		<i>-i</i>	<i>=ro</i>				
-TRNSLOC.IMPF		-REAL.I	=3nmO				

‘It is good for you to go take what is not yet taken.’

**6.4.3.1.3 Non-specific relative clauses** Nanti exhibits a non-specific relative construction, where the head of the relative clause is a non-specific relative pronoun. The pronouns are formed from an interrogative pronoun (see §6.4.2.2.2) with the addition of the indefinite suffix *-ka* (see §6.3.6.2.3). The paradigm of attested non-specific relatives is given in Table 6.20.

Table 6.20: Nanti non-specific relative pronouns

NON-SPECIFIC RELATIVE	GLOSS
<i>tataka</i>	whatever
<i>tsinika</i>	whoever, whomever
<i>tyanika</i>	whoever, whomever
<i>tyatika</i>	whichever (inanimate)
<i>tyaka</i>	somehow, wherever, however

Free relative pronouns behave syntactically like focused pronouns, appearing in the preverbal focus position, and are in complementary distribution with person markers, as exemplified by the non-specific relative *tataka* ‘whatever’, in (6.372).

Both subjects and objects may be relativized in non-specific relative constructions, as in (6.371) and (6.372), as well as NPs in temporal and spatial adverbial expressions, as in (6.373).

(6.371) Tyanika nihake ika ina kamake.

*tyani -ka nih -ak -i i- ka ma kam*  
 who -INDEF speak -PERF -REAL.I 3m- QUOT my.mother die  
*-ak -i*  
 -PERF -REAL.I

‘Whoever spoke (on the two-way radio) said, “My mother died.”’

(6.372) *HaNtari hanta ha pinehahiro, onti hanta tataka<sub>O</sub> kanyorira pooga.*

*haNta =ri haNta ha pi= neh -ah -i =ro*  
 there =CNTR there NEG.IRREAL 2S= see -REG -REAL.I =3nmO  
*onti haNta tata ka kanyorira pi= oog -a*  
 PRED.FOC there whatever INDEF for.example 2S= consume -REAL.A  
 ‘There, you will not see it (the food eaten in Montetoni), rather (you will see) whatever you eat there.’

(6.373) *Tyaka ihati, nogihatakeri.*

*tya -ka i= ha -i no= ogiha -ak -i =ri*  
 where -INDEF 3nmS= go -REAL.I 1S= go -PERF -REAL.I =3nmO  
 ‘Wherever he goes, I will follow him.’

### 6.4.3.2 Complement clauses

Nanti exhibits a small number of complement-taking verbs.<sup>91</sup> All regular Nanti complement-taking verbs share a number of properties that can be mentioned at the outset. First, all complements are post-verbal, and most alternate with object NPs. Verbs of communication, cognition, and perception may have non-coreferential subjects in main and complement clauses, but all other complement-taking verbs require coreferential subjects in two clauses. With the exception of verbs that take direct speech complements, only the main clause may be negated.<sup>92</sup>

<sup>91</sup>I have identified 19 complement-taking verbs, but there are likely more that are simply rarely employed.

<sup>92</sup>Thus, equivalents of ‘I don’t want to be sick’ are possible, but not ‘I want to not be sick.’

It should be noted that verbs derived with the applicatives *-ashi* ‘purposive’ and *-ant* ‘instrument’ may take clausal complements in place of the applied object. These specific constructions are described in §6.4.3.9 and §6.4.3.10.

The single largest set of complement-taking verbs in Nanti are verbs of communication, which all take direct speech report complements, as in (6.374), which exhibits two such verb *kogako* ‘ask’, and *kaNt* ‘say’, easily the most ubiquitous member of its class.

(6.374) Tera nonkogakote [tyani kaNt aNkicha hara pagi tsinani]<sub>COMP</sub>.

*tera*            *no=* N-            *kogako* *-e*            *tyani* *kaNt* *-aNkicha*  
 NEG.REAL 1S= IRREAL.I ask    -IRREAL.I who say    -DRNK.REL  
*hara*            *pi=* *ag*    *-i*            *tsinani*  
 NEG.IRREAL 2S= take REAL.I woman  
 ‘I did not ask, “Who was it that said, ‘Don’t take a woman (as your spouse).’?”’

Other verbs that take direct speech complements include *kahem* ‘call out, exhort’, *kamaNt* ‘tell’, *keNkitsa* ‘narrate’, and *nih* ‘speak’. The complements of verbs of communication optionally take a quotative proclitic, which appears in the initial position of the complement, as in (6.375) and (6.376).

(6.375) Ikenkitsatake ika haNta nohati.

*i=*            *keNkitsa* *-ak*    *-i*            *i-*    *ka*    *haNta* *no=* *ha* *-i*.  
 3mS= narrate    -PERF    -REAL.I 3m- QUOT there 1S= go    -REAL.I  
 ‘He narrated, “I went there.”’

(6.376) Te nonkaheme noka piNpokahe aka.

*te*            *no=* N-            *kahem* *-e*            *no-* *ka*    *pi=* N-  
 NEG.REAL 1S= IRREAL- exhort -IRREAL.I 1- QUOT 2S= IRREAL-  
*pok*    *-ah*    *-e*            *aka*  
 come -REG -IRREAL.I here  
 ‘I did not exhort him, “Come back here!”’



Nanti displays two verbs of cognition which resemble verbs of communication in their ability to take direct speech complements: *sure* ‘think’ and *piNtsa* ‘decide’, exemplified in (6.377) and (6.378), respectively.

(6.377) *Isuretaka haNta ipirinitake, hara nohati notomi nonkamosote.*

*i= sure -ak -a haNta i= pirini -ak -i*  
 3mS= think -PERF -REAL.A there 3mS= sit -PERF -REAL.I  
*hara no= ha -i no- tomi no= N- kamoso*  
 NEG.IRREAL 1S= go -IRREAL.I 1P- son 1S= IRREAL- visit  
 -e  
 -IRREAL.I  
 ‘He thought, “He is sitting (there), I will not go to visit my son.”’

(6.378) *IpiNtsatake hara nokemi pariki.*

*i= piNtsa -ak -i hara no= kem -i pariki.*  
 3mS= decide -PERF -REAL.I *neg.real* 1S= hear -REAL.I park.official  
 ‘He decided, “I will not listen to the park officials.”’

Unlike verbs of communication, these two verbs of cognition also permit indirect complements, in which the values of deictic elements are calculated with respect to a speaker-centered origo, as in (6.379) and (6.380). This construction is distinguished from the previous direct speech complement construction by the requirement that indirect complement be irrealis-marked, regardless of the temporal reference of the clause. In both (6.379) and (6.380), for example, the complement clause denote actions that have already transpired, but the verbs in these clauses are nevertheless irrealis-marked.

(6.379) *Pisuretakaro chichata pinpokake.*

*pi= sure -ak -a =ro chichata pi= N-*  
 2S= think -PERF -REAL.A =3nmO of.own.volition 2S= IRREAL-  
*pok -ak -e*  
 come -PERF -IRREAL.I

‘You thought that you would come for your own reasons.’

(6.380) Ipintsatanake ika irihatahe.

*i= piŋtsa -an -ak -i i- ka i= ri- ha*  
 3mS= decide -ABL -PERF -REAL.I 3m- COMP 3mS= IRREAL- go  
 -ah -e  
 -REG -IRREAL.I  
 ‘He decided that he would go back.’

The complements of these two verbs of cognition may take the quotative, just as do verbs of communication. Significantly, the use of quotatives has extended even to the indirect complement construction, as illustrated in (6.380). This suggests that the grammatical function of the quotative is extending, and that it is in the early stages of being grammaticalized as a complementizer.

The only other complement-taking verb of cognition of which I am aware in Nanti is *ogo* ‘know’. The reality status of the complement clause matches that of the main clause, as can be seen by comparing (6.381) and (6.382).

(6.381) Pogoti pikitsogi?

*pi= ogo -i pi= kitsog -i*  
 2S= know -REAL.I 2S= knot.weave -i  
 ‘Do you know how to knot-weave?’<sup>93</sup>

(6.382) Te nogote noncharihate.

*te no= ogo -e no= N- chariha*  
 NEG.REAL 1S= know -IRREAL.I 1S= IRREAL- fish.with.throw.net  
 -e  
 -IRREAL.I  
 ‘I don’t know how to fish with a throw net.’

<sup>93</sup>Knot-weaving, *kitsog*, is a technique used to make *tseroki*, strong mesh bags.

Interestingly, *ogo* ‘know’ does not take factive complements<sup>94</sup> or embedded interrogatives. Instead of using a verb of cognition with a factive complement, Nanti speakers employ a complement-taking verb of *perception* that either indicates the mode of sensory access that they had to the state of affairs; or in the case of ignorance, the mode of access through which one would *expect* to have knowledge of the state of affairs. Similarly, instead of employing an embedded interrogative complement to *ogo* ‘know’, Nanti speakers employ periphrastic constructions in which the interrogative clause forms a distinct sentence, as in (6.383).

(6.383) Tata oita? Te nogote.

*tata o- ita te no= ogo -e*  
 what 3nmS= IDENT NEG.REAL 1S= know -IRREAL.I  
 ‘What is it? I don’t know.’ (= ‘I don’t know what it is.’)

Nanti exhibits two complement taking verbs of perception: *neh* ‘see’ and *kem* ‘hear’. When the verb *neh* ‘see’ takes a complement, two slightly different senses arise: a straightforward perceptual sense, exemplified by (6.384) and (6.385); and another with cognitive and factive sense. In examples showing instances of the latter sense, such as (6.386), the verb indicates the subject having become aware of the proposition expressed in the complement by virtue of direct experience.

(6.384) Nonehake Rerísuha gonketahi.

*no= neh -ak -i Rerísuha ogoNke -ah -i*  
 1S= see -PERF -REAL.I *personal.name* arrive -REG -REAL.I  
 ‘I saw Rerísuha arrive back.’

(6.385) Tera nonehe onpokera Rerísuha.

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<sup>94</sup>A factive complement is one that expresses a proposition that is presupposed to be a fact about the world, such as the complement in the following English sentence: *I know that he is sick.*

*tera*          *no=* N-          *neh -e*          *o=*          N-          *pok*  
 NEG.REAL 1S= IRREAL- see IRREAL.I 3nmS= IRREAL- come  
*-e*          *=ra*          *Rerísuha*  
 -IRREAL.I =SUB *personal.name*  
 ‘I did not see Rerísuha come.’

(6.386) *Nonehi inti matsigeNka.*

*no= neh -i*          *i=*          *Nti*          *matsigeNka*  
 1S= see -REAL.I 3mS= COP moral.person  
 ‘I saw that he was a moral person.’

The reality status marking in complement clauses of verbs of perception matches that of the main clause, as can be seen by comparing (6.384) and (6.385). The complement clause is sometimes marked with the subordinate clause clitic *=ra*, as in (6.385), but this is relatively infrequent.

There are two main types of complements to *kem* ‘hear’: hearsay complements and auditory sensory access complements. Hearsay complements, as in (6.387), are employed to indicate that the speaker acquired knowledge about the state of affairs expressed in the complement via a speech report, without specifying the source of that report.<sup>95</sup> Hearsay complements may also be employed in conjunction with a quotative evidential, as in (6.388), which serves to defease the inference that the speaker was an immediate witness to the quoted utterance.

(6.387) *Nokemake inehiri haNta.*

*no= kem -ak -i*          *i=*          *neh -i*          *=ri*          *haNta*  
 1S= hear -PERF -REAL.I 3mS= see -REAL.I =3mO there  
 ‘I heard that he saw him there.’

(6.388) *Nokemake ika mameri, te iragahero.*

<sup>95</sup>This construction is no doubt the context in which the reportive clitic *ke* grammaticalized from the verb *kem* ‘hear’.

*no= kem -ak -i i- ka mameri te i=*  
 1S= hear -PERF -REAL.I 3m- QUOT NEG.EXIST NEG.REAL 3mS=  
*r- ag -ah -e =ro*  
 IRREAL- take -REG -IRREAL.I =3nmO  
 ‘I heard he said, “There isn’t any (~ it isn’t there), he didn’t get it back.”’

Auditory access complements, as in (6.389), denote states of affairs to which the subject of the main clause verb has auditory sensory access.

(6.389) *Te piNkeme irage?*

*te pi= N- kem -e o= irag -e*  
 NEG.REAL 2S= IRREAL- hear -IRREAL.I 3nmS= cry -IRREAL.I  
 ‘Didn’t you hear her cry?’

Complements of *kem* exhibit the same reality-status marking as that of the main verb, as can be seen by comparing (6.387) and (6.389).

The final major group of complement-taking verbs we consider are the phasal verbs *tsiti* ‘begin’, *apakuh* ‘stop’,<sup>96</sup> *agat* ‘complete’, and *tsoNka* ‘finish’.

In this class of verbs, the subject of the main and complement clause are necessarily coreferential, and the realis mood marking of the complement matches that of the main verb, as exemplified in (6.390) and (6.391) for the verb *tsoNka* ‘finish’.

(6.390) *ItsoNkatanake ipimaNtagetake.*

*i= tsoNka -an -ak -i i= pimaNt -ge -ak*  
 3mS= finish -ABL -PERF -REAL.I 3mS= give.gift -DSTR -PERF  
*-i*  
 -REAL.I  
 ‘He finished giving gifts.’

<sup>96</sup>The phasal complement-taking verb *apakuh* ‘stop’ probably developed from the homophonous transitive verb meaning ‘drop’.

(6.391) Tetya noNtsonkate noNporohe.

*te*            =*tya* *no*= N-            *tsonka* *-e*            *no*= N-            *poroh*  
 NEG.REAL =yet 2S= IRREAL- finish -IRREAL.I 1= IRREAL- clear  
 -*e*  
 -IRREAL.I  
 ‘I have not yet finished clearing.’

Beyond verbs of communication, cognition, and perception, complement taking verbs form a fairly heterogeneous set: *kog* ‘want’, *agabeh* ‘be able, be appropriate’, and *kameti* ‘be good’. Within this heterogeneous set we find perhaps the most frequent complement-taking verb in Nanti discourse, other than *kant* ‘say’: *kog* ‘want’. Its complement is obligatorily irrealis-marked, regardless of whether the main clause is realis-marked, as in (6.392), or irrealis-marked, as in (6.393). The subject of the main and complement clauses are necessarily coreferential.

(6.392) Ikogake kara irihatake.

*i*=        *kog*    -*ak*    -*i*        *kara*    *i*=        *ri-*        *ha-* -*ak*    -*i*  
 3mS= want -PERF -REAL.I there 3mS= IRREAL- go -PERF -REAL.I  
 ‘He wanted to go there.’

(6.393) Tera noNkoge noNkamosote.

*tera*            *no*= N-            *kog*    -*e*            *no*= N-            *kamoso*  
 NEG.REAL 1S= IRREAL- want -IRREAL.I 1S= IRREAL- visit  
 -*e*  
 -IRREAL.I  
 ‘I don’t want to visit.’

The next verb we consider, *agabeh* ‘be able/be appropriate’, yields different senses, depending on the reality status of the complement clause. When the clause refers to a specific event, reality status marking on the main clause follows the general principles for reality status marking in monoclausal sentences, and the reality

status marking on the complement clause matches that of the main clause. Thus, for example, speaking about a past event, we find realis marking on the main and complement clauses, as in (6.394). If however, the sentence articulates a general principle of appropriate behavior, the main clause verb behaves as if it were notionally irrealis, as does the complement. Reality status morphology is predictable from clause polarity, as in the notionally irrealis positive polarity (6.395), and as in the notionally doubly irrealis negative polarity sentence in (6.396). In both construction subtypes, the subjects of the main and complement clause are obligatorily coreferential.

(6.394) Yagabehake yobiikaka oburoki.

*i= agabeh -ak -i i= obiik -ak -a*  
 3mS= be.appropriate -PERF -REAL.I 3mS= drink -PERF -REAL.A  
*oburoki*  
 manioc.beer  
 ‘It was appropriate that he drank manioc beer.’

(6.395) Yogari surari iragabehake inkaNte aityo.

*i= oga =ri surari i= r- agabeh -ak -e*  
 3m= that =CNTRST man 3mS= IRREAL- be.able -PERF -IRREAL.I  
*i= N- kaNt -e aityo*  
 3mS= (IRREAL)- say -IRREAL.I EXIST.INAN  
 ‘It would be appropriate for him to say, “There is (manioc beer).” to a man.’  
 (= ‘It is appropriate for me to invite men to drink manioc beer.’)

(6.396) Ogari tsinani hara nagabehiro nonihiro.

*o- oga =ri tsinani hara no- agabeh*  
 3nm- that =CNTRST woman NEG.IRREAL 1S= be.appropriate  
*-i =ro no= nih -i =ro*  
 -REAL.I =3nmO 1S= say -REAL.I =3nmO  
 ‘It would be inappropriate, on the other hand, for me to speak to a woman.’

The final complement-taking verb we consider, *kameti* ‘be good’, displays some morphological irregularities. This verb behaves as a morphologically regular verb only in negative polarity clauses, as in (6.397). In this case, the main and complement clause both obligatorily take irrealis marking, and the subject of the main clause verb is always expressed as a third person masculine person clitic. In positive polarity clauses, in contrast, the verb uniformly lacks any expression of a subject, as can be seen in (6.398). The complement may be either realis or irrealis marked, in accord with the temporal reference of the clause.

(6.397) Tera oNkametite iraparatero kapashi.

<i>tera</i>	<i>o=</i>	N-	<i>kameti</i>	<i>-e</i>	<i>i=</i>	<i>r-</i>	<i>apara</i>
NEG.REAL	3nmS=	IRREAL-	be.good	-IRREAL.I	3mS=	IRREAL-	waste
<i>-e</i>	<i>=ro</i>	<i>kapashi</i>					
-IRREAL.I	=3nmO	palm.sp					

‘It is not good that he is wasting *kapashi* (palm thatch).’

(6.398) Kametitake ipigahi.

<i>kameti</i>	<i>-ak</i>	<i>-i</i>	<i>i=</i>	<i>pig</i>	<i>-ah</i>	<i>-i</i>
be.good	-PERF	-REAL.I	3mS=	return	-REG	-REAL.I

‘It is good that he returned.’

### 6.4.3.3 Possible and epistemic conditionals

Nanti conditional constructions are formed with the second position conditional clitic *=rika*, which appears on the condition clause. Nanti distinguishes ‘possible conditional’ and ‘epistemic conditional’ constructions. The possible conditional construction involves either hypothetical conditions or ones that can only be satisfied in the future, while epistemic conditionals involve conditions that have conclusively already transpired or failed to transpire, but about which which the speaker is ignorant or uncertain. The possible and epistemic conditional constructions are



distinguished by their reality status marking and the form of negation employed. The condition clause overwhelmingly precedes the result clause in both possible and epistemic conditionals, but the opposite order is also attested.

Both the condition and result clauses of Nanti possible conditional constructions are notionally irrealis. Accordingly, the verbs of positive polarity condition clauses take irrealis marking,<sup>97</sup> as illustrated by the form *noNkogerika* ‘if I want’ in (6.399); while negative polarity condition clauses are notionally doubly irrealis, and consequently take the irrealis negator *ha*, to which the conditional clitic *=rika* attaches, as in (6.400).

(6.399) *Nonkogerika nohate, nagabehake nohatake.*

<i>no=</i>	N-	<i>kog</i>	<i>-e</i>	<i>=rika</i>	<i>no=</i>	N-	<i>ha</i>	<i>-e</i>
1S=	IRREAL-	want	-IRREAL.I	=COND	1S=	IRREAL-	go	-IRREAL.I
<i>no=</i>	N-	<i>agabeh</i>	<i>-ak</i>	<i>-e</i>	<i>no=</i>	N-	<i>ha</i>	<i>-ak</i>
1S=	IRREAL-	be.able	-PERF	-IRREAL.I	1S=	IRREAL-	go	-PERF
		<i>-e</i>						
		-IRREAL.I						

‘If I were to want to go, I could go.’

(6.400) *Harika otimi haNpi, hara nokanti maika aka piNtimake aka.*

<i>ha</i>	<i>=rika</i>	<i>o=</i>	<i>tim</i>	<i>-i</i>	<i>haNpi</i>	<i>hara</i>	<i>no=</i>
NEG.IRREAL	=COND	3NMS=	live	-REAL.I	medicine	NEG.IRREAL	1S=
<i>kaNt</i>	<i>-i</i>	<i>maika</i>	<i>aka</i>	<i>pi=</i>	N-	<i>tim</i>	<i>-ak</i>
say	-REAL.I	now	here	2s=	IRREAL-	live	-PERF
						IRREAL.I	here

‘If there were no medicine, I would not say, “Please live here.”’

Similarly, positive polarity result clauses in possible conditional constructions take irrealis marking, as in (6.401), while negative polarity ones take the irrealis negator *hara*, as in (6.402).

<sup>97</sup>Existential verbs, as in (6.401), are an exception to this generalization, as they do not distinguish realis and irrealis forms.

(6.401) Ainyorika kogaŋkicharira oŋkante noŋkigera pisekane.

*ainyo*            *=rika*    *kog*    *-aŋkicha*                            *-rira*    *o=*  
 EXIST.ANIM =COND want -DERANK.REL.PERF -NMLZR 3mS=  
 N-            *kant*    *-e*                            *no=*    N-            *kig*    *-e*                            *=ra*    *pi-*  
 IRREAL- say -IRREAL.I 1S= IRREAL- dig -IRREAL.I =TEMP 2P-  
*seka*    *-ne*  
 manioc -ALIEN.POSS

‘Were there someone who wanted (her manioc), she would say, “I will harvest your manioc.”’

(6.402) Panirorika iŋkente, hara nagabehi.

*paniro*    *=rika*    *i=*            N-            *keŋt*    *-e*                            *hara*                            *no=*  
 one        =COND 3mS= IRREAL- shoot -IRREAL.I NEG.IRREAL be.able  
*agabeh*    *-e*  
 -IRREAL.I

‘If he shot (only) one (monkey), it would not be appropriate (for me to go to eat at his home).’

Epistemic conditional constructions differ from possible conditional constructions in that the condition clause is notionally realis. Consequently, positive polarity condition clauses take realis marking, while negative polarity clauses are singly irrealis, and take the realis negator *te*, as in (6.403). The reality status marking of the result clause depends on its temporal reference and polarity.

(6.403) Terika iŋtoŋke, hara yami ibatsa.

*te*    *=rika*    *i=*            N-            *toŋk*    *-e*                            *hara*                            *i=*  
 1S =COND 3mS= IRREAL- shoot -IRREAL.I NEG.IRREAL 3mS=  
*am*    *-i*            *i-*            *batsa*  
 bring -REAL.I 3mP- meat

‘If he did not shoot (an animal), he will not bring meat.’

#### 6.4.3.4 Counterfactual conditionals

The Nanti counterfactual conditional clause-linking construction is formed with the second-position clausal counterfactual clitic *=me*. The counterfactual clitic must appear on the clause expressing the counterfactual condition, as we see in both (6.404) and (6.405). Note that positive polarity counterfactual clauses are obligatorily irrealis-marked.

There are two subtly different subtypes of this construction, only one of which takes the counterfactual clitic on the result clause as well. The first subtype, shown in (6.404), expresses a counterfactual conditional relation in which the counterfactual result is no longer available as a possibility. In this construction type, the result clause takes the counterfactual clitic. The second subtype, shown in (6.405), expresses a conditional relation in which the condition is known not to hold (i.e. is counterfactual), but which remains open to being satisfied. In this case, the result clause does not bear the counterfactual clitic. The condition and result clauses are freely ordered with respect to one another, but the strong discursive tendency is for the condition clause to appear first.

(6.404) Inkaharame nohate, noNtsonkerome.

*iNkahara* =me    *no*= N-    *ha* -e    *no*= N-    *tsoNk*  
earlier    =CNTRF 1S= IRREAL- go -IRREAL 1s= IRREAL- finish  
-e            =ro            =me  
-IRREAL.I =3NMO = CNTF  
‘Had I gone earlier, I would have finished it (clearing the garden).’

(6.405) Iragabehake, inkogakeme.

*i*=    *r*-            *agabeh* -ak    -e            *i*=    N-            *kog*  
3mS= IRREAL- be.able -PERF -IRREAL.I 3MS= IRREAL- want  
=ak    -e            =me.  
-PERF -IRREAL.I =CNTF  
‘He would be able to (settle here), were he to want to (which he does not).’

Negative counterfactuals are formed with the irrealis negator *ha*, which, because it frequently appears in clause-initial position, hosts the counterfactual clitic, as in (6.406) and (6.407). As is typical of clauses formed with the irrealis negator *ha*, negative polarity counterfactual conditional clauses are obligatorily realis marked.

(6.406) Hame nokisainiti matsontsori, nohatakeme inkenishiku.

*ha*                    =*me*    *no=*   *kisaini*   *-i*            *matsontsori*   *no=*   *ha*   *-ak*  
 NEG.IRREAL   =CNTF   1S=   dream   -REAL.I   jaguar            1S=   go   -PERF  
*-e*                    =*me*    *iNkenishiku*  
 -REAL.I   =CNTF   forest  
 ‘Had I not dreamed of a jaguar, I would have gone into the forest.’

(6.407) Hame opigahi, ari piNkante nagabehe nohatake nokamosotakiti.

*ha*                    =*me*    *o=*            *pi*   *-ah*   *-i*            *ari*            *pi=*  
 NEG.IRREAL   =CNTF   3nmS=   return   -REG   -REAL.I   POS.POL   2S=  
 N-                    *kaNt*   *-e*                    *no=*   *agabeh*   *-e*                    *no=*   N-                    *ha*  
 IRREAL-   say   IRREAL.I   1S=   be.able   IRREAL.I   1s=   IRREAL-   go  
*-ak*   *-e*                    *no=*   *kamoso*   *-aki*                    *-i*  
 -PERF   IRREAL.I   1S=   visit            TRANSLOC   -REAL.I  
 ‘Were she not to return (which she has), it would be appropriate for me to go and visit over there.’

### 6.4.3.5 Temporal succession

The successive temporal ordering of events can be expressed through two similar but distinct clause linkage constructions. In each construction, the clauses appear in time-iconic order, and one of two possible free syntactic elements appears in the initial position of the second clause. This free element may either be *iNpogini* ‘then’,<sup>98</sup> or more commonly, its shortened form *iNpo*, as in (6.408); or *irompa* ‘suddenly’, as in (6.409).

<sup>98</sup>This form appears to be a deverbal adverb derived from the root *iNpogi* ‘go after’ (cf. *ohiba* ‘go before’).

(6.408) ONti yoogakara posuro, iNpo ikobagake hetari.

*ont*            *i=*        *oog*        *-ak*    *-a*        *=ra*    *posuro*            *iNpo*  
 PRED.FOC 3mS= consume -PERF -PERF -SUB wild.plantain.sp then  
*i=*        *kobag*            *-ak*    *-i*        *hetari*.  
 3mS= gather.hetari -PERF -REAL.I fish.sp  
 ‘He eats *posuro* (a wild plaintain), and then he gathers *hetari* (a small fish).’

(6.409) Tobaheti kara imagake, ironpa ihatanahi.

*tobaheti*    *kara*    *i=*        *mag*    *-ak*    *-i*        *ironpa*    *i=*        *ha*    *-an*  
 many.INAN there 3mS= sleep -PERF -REAL.I suddenly 3mS= go -ABL  
*-ah*    *-i*  
 -REG -REAL.I  
 ‘He slept there for a long time (i.e. for many days) and then suddenly he went back away.’

The difference in meaning between *iNpogini* and *ironpa* appears to be that the latter indicates an interruption, typically an abrupt one, in an enduring activity or course of action; whereas the former simply indicates succession, without adding any further information about the characteristics of the alternation in activity.

Note that there are not restrictions on the subjects of the two clauses in temporal succession constructions. They may either be coreferential, as in the preceding examples, or not, as in (6.410).

(6.410) Yobetsikake pibanke, inpogini nokaNti tsame.

*i=*        *obetsik*    *-ak*    *-i*        *pi-*    *banke*    *inpogini*    *no=*    *kanT*    *-i*  
 3mS= make    -PERF -REAL.I 2S- house then 1S= say -REAL.I  
*tsame*  
 let’s.go  
 ‘He built your house, and then I said “Let’s go!”’

There appears to be no dedicated construction for expressing temporal posteriority in Nanti (i.e. a construction analogous to clauses with the *after* clause linker

in English), and that time-iconic temporal succession provides the sole means for indicating that one event follows another.

#### 6.4.3.6 Brief temporal overlap and spatial overlap

In Nanti, the same set of clause-linking constructions is employed to indicate brief *temporal* overlap between two events and to indicate that the *location* of two events overlap. I will begin by discussing the use of these constructions for expressing temporal overlap. It should be noted that the temporal and spatial overlap constructions are very similar to the purposive construction, discussed below, and in certain contexts, are indistinguishable from it.

Brief temporal overlap between the events in two clauses is indicated by marking the verb of the semantically supporting clause with the subordinate clause marker =*ra*, as in (6.411). The reality status of the subordinate clause must match that of the main clause, which is determined by temporal reference and polarity. Either both clauses are realis-marked, as in (6.411), or both are irrealis-marked, as in (6.412). The main clause typically precedes the subordinate clause, as in (6.411) and (6.412), but may follow it, as in (6.413).

(6.411) PikoNperatake pairani Rima pabisakera.

*pi= koNpera -ak -i pairani Rima pi= abis -ak*  
 2S= buy -PERF -REAL.I long.ago Lima 2S= pass -PERF  
*-i =ra*  
 -REAL.I =SUB  
 ‘You bought (it) a long time ago when you passed through Lima.’

(6.412) Tsame aNkoshihigeri ishiNkiteNpara.

*tsame a= N- koshi -hig -e =ri i=*  
 come.on 1pl.incS= IRREAL- steal -PL -IRREAL.I =3mO 3mS=  
*N- shiNki -eNpa =ra*  
 IRREAL- be.drunk -IRREAL.A =SUB

‘Come on, let’s steal from him when he is drunk.’

(6.413) Oshirihagara ipokahi.

*o= shirihag -a =ra i= pok -ah -i*  
3nmS= river.drop -REAL.A =SUB 3mS= come -REG -REAL.I  
‘When it (the river) drops, he comes back.’

The same construction can be employed to indicate spatial overlap between the actions expressed by two clauses, as in (6.414) and (6.415). In many cases, only interactional context determines the appropriateness of either the temporal or the spatial overlap reading.

(6.414) Ohatake okotapihira koheNpeki.

*o= ha -ak -i o= kotapih -i =ra*  
3nmS= go -PERF -REAL.I 3nmS= eat.off.ground -REAL.I =SUB  
*koheNpe -ki*  
tree.sp. -CL:0D.hard  
‘It (a pet female tapir) went to where it eats *koheNpe* fruit off the ground.’

(6.415) Pogero opirihatira.

*pi= og -e =ro o= piriha -i =ra*  
2S= put -IRREAL.I =3nmO 3nmS= dry =SUB  
‘Please put it (firewood) where it is dry.’

#### 6.4.3.7 Prolonged temporal overlap

Prolonged temporal overlap between the events expressed in two linked clauses is indicated by the presence of a temporal pronoun in the subordinate clause. The temporal pronoun may occur in focus position, as in (6.416), or in topic position, as in (6.417). The clause in which the temporal pronoun appears always describes a prolonged action or event, such as being sick, as in (6.416), or building a house,

as in (6.417). The clause bearing the temporal pronoun always precedes the other clause of the construction.

(6.416) Ityara maNtsigatake amakerime.

*i-*     *tyara*   *maNtsiga*   *-ak*    *-i*       *o=*       *am*    *-ak*    *-e*  
 3mS-   when   be.sick    -PERF -REAL.I   3nmS=   bring -PERF -IRREAL.I  
 =*ri*     =*me*  
 =3mO   =DEONT  
 ‘When he was ill, she should have brought him.’

(6.417) Ityara yogakero aka, aka te onake isekane.

*i-*     *tyara*   *i=*       *og*    *-ak*    *-i*        =*ro*       *aka*   *aka*   *te*  
 3mS   when   3mS=   put   -PERF -REAL.I   =3nmO   here   here   NEG.REAL  
*o=*     *n*            *-ak*    *-i*        *i-*        *seka*    *-ne*  
 3nmS   LOC.COP -PERF -REAL.I   3mP-   manioc -POSS  
 ‘When he put it (i.e. built his house) here, he didn’t have any manioc here.’

#### 6.4.3.8 Temporal anteriority and posteriority

The Nanti temporal anteriority clause-linking construction is characterized by the collocation *tetyara* ‘when not yet’ in the initial position of the temporally anterior clause. *Tetyara* is formed from the realis negator *te*, the temporal second position clitic =*tya* ‘yet, still’, and the subordinate clitic =*ra*. The ordering of the temporally anterior and temporally posterior clause is free, as can be seen by comparing (6.418) and (6.419).

(6.418) Tetyara oNkihe, agabehake omeraNkake.

*te*            =*tya*   =*ra*        *o=*        N-            *kih*    *-e*            *o=*  
 NEG.REAL   =yet   =TEMP   3nmS=   IRREAL-   enter -IRREAL.I   3nmS=  
*agabeh*   *-ak*    *-i*            *o=*        *omeraNnk*   *-ak*    *-i*  
 be.able -PERF -REAL.I   3nmS=   ferment    -PERF -REAL.I  
 ‘Before she enters (her menarche seclusion), she is allowed to ferment (manioc beer).’



(6.419) Nohagetanake Kinkateniku, tetyara yonta pairani nonehake Emiriha.

*no= ha -ge -an -ak -i Kinkateni -ku te*  
 1S= go -DSTR -ABL -PERF -REAL.I place.name -LOC NEG.REAL  
*=tya =ra yonta pairani no= neh -ak -e*  
 -YET =SUB that.MASC long.ago 1S= see -PERF -IRREAL.I  
*Emiriha*  
*personal.name*

‘I went to Kinkateni several times, long ago, before I knew Emiriha.’

As mentioned in §6.4.3.5, Nanti exhibits no temporal posteriority clause-linking construction; temporal posteriority is instead expressed by iconic ordering of sentences or by the temporal succession clause-linking construction.

#### 6.4.3.9 Purpose

Nanti exhibits two structurally distinct types of purposive clause-linking constructions, which are functionally distinguished by the directness with which the action of the main clause is instrumental in bringing about the desired goal expressed by the subordinate clause.

In the first construction type, the relationship of the action expressed in the main clause to the goal expressed in the subordinate clause is direct and immediate. This construction exhibits distinct variants for positive and negative polarity purpose clauses. The positive polarity purposive clause variant exhibits a subordinate irrealis clause, as in (6.420). Note that verb of the subordinate clause typically carries the subordinate clitic *=ra*.<sup>99</sup>

(6.420) Yagutake niha irobiikenpara.

<sup>99</sup>Since the subordinate clitic *=ra* is never footed, it is highly susceptible to fast speech elision. However, whenever I have asked Nanti individuals to carefully repeat an utterance in which I would expect the subordinate clitic, they have clearly produced the subordinate clitic. This suggests that the clitic is grammatically obligatory in the constructions in which it appears, but is frequently elided in conversation.

*i= agu -ak -i niha i- r= obiik*  
 3mS= climb.down -PERF -REAL.I water 3mS= IRREAL- drink  
*-eNpa =ra*  
 -IRREAL.A =SUB  
 ‘He (a howler monkey) climbed down to drink water.’

(6.421) Te iripoke inkamosote.

*te i= ri- pok -e i= N- kamoso*  
 NEG.REAL 3mS= IRREAL- come -IRREAL.I 3mS= IRREAL- visit  
*-e*  
 -IRREAL.I  
 ‘He did not come to visit.’

The negative polarity variant of this construction is formed quite differently, with the negative purpose element *hani* ‘so that not’ in subordinate clause-initial position, as in (6.422). The verb of the subordinate clause is obligatorily realis, as one would expect from the relationship of *ha*-negation to reality status marking.

(6.422) Norobite hani omakasabiti.

*no= o[+voice]- rog -bi -e hani o=*  
 1S= CAUS- dry -CL:1D.rigid -IRREAL.I NEG.PURP 3nmS=  
*makasa -bi -i*  
 decay -CL:1D.rigid -REAL.I  
 ‘I will dry (the arrow cane) so that it does not decay.’

For both the positive and negative polarity variants, clause order is rigid, with the main clause preceding the subordinate one. Note that the subject of the two clauses are normally coreferential, but need not be, as in (6.423).

(6.423) Pamake inhirora.

*pi= am -ak -e i= neh -i =ro =ra*  
 2S= bring -PERF -IRREAL.I 3mS= see -REAL.I =3nmS =SUB  
 ‘Bring (it), so that he can see it.’

The second type of purposive clause-linking construction is characterized by a main verb bearing the applicative purposive suffix *-ashi*, which licenses a purposive complement clause, as in (6.424). This construction differs functionally from the prior type in that the relationship between the action of the main clause and the goal expressed in the purpose clause is relatively indirect. In (6.424), for example, the making of a garden only indirectly facilitates fishing, by resolving food supply issues raised by the remoteness of the fishing site.

(6.424) *Itsamaitashitaka intsagate kobiri, mamori, saNkenapoha.*

*i= tsamai -ashi -ak -a i= N- tsaga -e*  
 3mS= garden -PURP -PERF -REAL.A 3mS= IRREAL- fish -IRREAL  
*kobiri mamori saNkenapoha*  
 fish.sp. fish.sp. fish.sp.  
 ‘He made his garden (there) in order to fish for *kobiri*, *mamori*, and *saNkenapoha*.’

For this construction type, only positive-polarity purposive clauses are attested, which are obligatorily irrealis-marked. As evident in (6.425), the order of the main and subordinate clauses is flexible, although it is far more common for the purposive clause to follow the main clause.

(6.425) *Ashitakotakero iniro, obetsikashitakero shitatsi.*

*o= N- ashi -ako -ak -e =ro*  
 3nmS= IRREAL- cover.with.mat -APPL:INDR -PERF -IRREAL.I =3nmO  
*o- iniro o= obetsik -ashi -ak -i =ro*  
 3nmP- mother 3nmS= make -APPL:PURP -PERF -REAL.I =3nmO  
*shitatsi*  
 woven.mat  
 ‘Her mother made a mat in order to put her in menarche seclusion.’

It should be noted that the suffix *-ashi* also has an adverbial, non-clause-linking function. In this adverbial function, the suffix indicates that the action was

carried out intentionally or deliberately, with some unspecified goal in mind, as in (6.426) and (6.427).

(6.426) *Yoga ityarira iromanashitero; inkaNte hara nokamanti.*

*i- oga itya -rira i= r- oman -ashi -e*  
 3m- that recent -NOM 3m- IRREAL- conceal -PURP -IRREAL.I  
 =ro i- N- kaNt -e hara no= kamaNt  
 =3nmO 3mS= IRREAL- say IRREAL. NEG.IRREAL 1S= tell  
 -i  
 REAL.I  
 ‘That young man (lit. new one) will deliberately conceal it; he will say, “I won’t tell.”’

(6.427) *Chichata ihatake kara; ihatahitake biroku.*

*chichata i= ha -ak -i kara i= ha -ashi -ak*  
 freely 3mS= go -PERF -REAL.I there 3mS= go -PURP -PERF  
 -i biro -ku  
 -REAL.I 2.PRO -LOC  
 ‘He went there of his own volition; he went to your place intentionally/with something in mind.’

#### 6.4.3.10 Reason, cause, and result

In Nanti discourse, relationships of cause and effect between propositions are rarely explicitly marked and are instead normally left for speakers to infer, either between apposite clauses, as in (6.428) and (6.429), or between clearly distinct sentences, as in (6.430) and (6.431).<sup>100</sup>

(6.428) *Ipokapahi, itaseganaka.*

*i= pok -apah -i i= taseg -an -ak -a*  
 3mS= come -ADL -REAL.I 3mS= be.hungry -ABL -PERF -REAL.A  
 ‘He came towards (the village), (because) he had become hungry.’

<sup>100</sup>Note that the only criterion for distinguishing between apposite clauses and distinct sentences in Nanti is intonational contour, and the distinction is not always clear.

(6.429) Hara paNtabageti, onti irashi pariki.

*hara pi= aNtabaget -i o- Nti irashi*  
 NEG.IRREAL 2S= cultivate -REAL.I 3nmS= COP 3m.POS.PRO  
*pariki*  
 park.official  
 ‘Don’t cultivate (that land), (because) it belongs to the park officials.’

(6.430) Ha agabehi ohate. ONkaahate.

*ha o= agabeh -i o= ha -e o=*  
 NEG.IRREAL 3nmS= be.able -IRREAL.I 3nmS= go -IRREAL.I 3mS=  
 N- *okaaha -e*  
 drown -IRREAL.I  
 ‘She shouldn’t go. She would drown.’

(6.431) Matsi naketyo katimabake noka pamakena chariha. Te nogote

noNcharihate.

*matsi naketyo katim -ab -ak -i no- ka pi=*  
 EXT.NEG 1.first approach -TRANS -PERF -REAL.I 1- QUOT 2S=  
 N- *am -ak -e =na chariha te no*  
 IRREAL- bring -PERF -IRREAL.I =1O throw.net NEG.REAL 1S=  
 N- *=ogo -e no= N- chariha -e*  
 IRREAL- know -IRREAL.I 1S= IRREAL- fish.with.throw.net -IRREAL.I  
 ‘It is not the case that I am the first to approach and say, “Please bring me a  
 throw net.” I don’t know how to fish with a throw net.’

Although they are used infrequently, there are nevertheless two grammaticalized clause-linking constructions that indicate a causal relationship between the events of the two clauses. The first one we consider makes use of the light verb *kant* ‘do’,<sup>101</sup> which appears in the clause that marks the reason why the action in the other clause was carried out. The light verb is obligatorily realis-marked but may

<sup>101</sup>Note that the root of this verb and the root of the verb ‘say’ are homophonous. The two verbs are distinguished by their verb class: ‘do’ is an A-class verb, while ‘say’ is an I-class verb.

appear either with the perfective, as in (6.432), or without, as in (6.433). The cause and result clauses may appear in either order, as the two examples illustrate.

(6.432) Inpo okantaka antarotaka asitakotakero iniro.

*iNpo* *o=* *kaNt* *-ak* *-a* *o=* *aNtaro* *-ak*  
 then 3nmS= do -PERF -REAL.A 3nmS= have.menarche -PERF  
*-a* *o=* *asi* *-ako* *-ak* *-i* *=ro* *o=*  
 -REAL.A 3nmS= cover -APPL:INDR -PERF -REAL.I =3nmO 3nmP-  
*iniro*  
 mother  
 ‘Then, because she had her menarche, her mother put her in menarche  
 seclusion.’

(6.433) Yogihatakero, pine okaNta Abororo itakaro.

*i=* *ogiha* *-ak* *-i* *=ro* *pine* *o=* *kaNt* *-a*  
 3nmS= follow -PERF -REAL.I =3nmO you.see 3nmS= do -REAL.A  
*Abororo* *i=* *t* *-ak* *-a*  
*personal.name* 3mS= be.emotionally.attached.to -PERF -REAL.A  
*=ro*  
 =3nmO  
 ‘He followed her<sub>i</sub>, because, you see, Abororo<sub>i</sub>, he was emotionally attached to  
 her<sub>i</sub>.’

The next causal relation construction we consider is formed with the instrumental applicative *-aNt*, which appears on the verb in the consequent clause, as in (6.434). In a variant of this construction, the clause is replaced by the interclausal anaphoric element *irota* (see §6.3.6.1.1), whose antecedent is an immediately preceding clause, as in (6.435). The two clauses may appear in either order.

(6.434) Tetya ihataNta oNparige inkani.

*te* *=tya* *i=* *ha* *-aNt* *-a* *o=* N-  
 NEG.REAL =yet 3mS= go -APPL:INST -REAL.A 3nmS= IRREAL-  
*parig* *-e* *inkani*  
 fall -IRREAL.I rain

‘Its raining, and consequently, he has not gone yet.’

(6.435) a. IkaNti maika ipakerika peremiso.

*i= kaNt -i maika i= p -ak -i =ri*  
 3mS say -REAL.I then 3mS= give -PERF -REAL.I =3MO  
 =ka peremiso  
 =INFR permission  
 ‘He said then, “He presumably gave him permission.”’

b. Irota maika ipokaNtakari aka.

*iro=ta maika i= pok -aNt -ak -a =ri*  
 3nm.FOC.PRO now 3mS= come -INST -PERF -REAL.A =?  
 aka  
 here  
 ‘He came because of that.’

The final construction we consider is not a clause-linking construction per se, but one that indicates a causal relationship between the propositions expressed in two distinct sentences. In this construction, the first sentence expresses the cause, as in (6.436a), and the second sentence, where the element *irobenti* ‘consequently’ appears in sentence-initial position, expresses the consequent, as in (6.436b). The two sentences may be uttered by a single speaker, as in the example given, or may be uttered by different speakers.

(6.436) a. Maikari maika noke onti otomi timake.

*maika =ri maika no- ke onti o- tomi tim*  
 now =CNTRST now 1- REP PRED.FOC 3mP- son exist  
 -ak -i  
 -PERF -REAL.I  
 ‘Now I hear that she is *pregnant*.’

b. Irobenti tera irinihe.

*irobe Dnti    tera    i=    ri-    nih    -e*  
 consequently NEG.REAL 3mS= IRREAL.I speak -IRREAL.I  
 ‘That’s why he didn’t speak.’

#### 6.4.4 Contrast

Nanti exhibits two clause-linking constructions which serve to indicate a contrast between the events described in the two clauses. The first construction is characterized by the use of the frustrative derivational suffix *-be* in the first clause, as in (6.437). This contrast construction indicates that despite the action of the first clause being realized, its desired sequel did not obtain, but instead, the action described in the second clause occurred. Only positive polarity realis clauses are attested for the first clause of this construction, while there appear to be no restrictions on the polarity or realis status of the second clause.

(6.437) NokaNtabetakari, te inkeme.

*no=    kaNt    -be    -ak    -a    =ri    te    i=    N-*  
 1S= say -FRUS -PERF -REAL.A =3mO NEG.REAL 3mS= IRREAL-  
*kem    -e*  
 hear -IRREAL.I  
 ‘Although I spoke to him, he did not listen.’

The second contrast clause-linking construction is characterized by the presence of the free syntactic element *oNti* in the initial position of the second clause. Recall that this element is employed to indicate predicate focus (§6.4.2.1.5.3) There are two variants of this construction. In the first, the clause bearing the predicate focus marker denotes an event that is unexpected in light of the event or state of affairs described by the other clause, as in (6.438).

(6.438) Ainyo ikoriti, oNti ihokanakero.



*ainyo*        *i-*        *koriti*    *oNti*        *i=*        *hok*        *-an*    *-ak*  
 EXIST.ANIM 3mS- spouse CL.CNTRST 3mS= discard -ABL -PERF  
*-i*            *=ro*  
 -REAL.I =3nmO  
 ‘He has a spouse, but he left her.’

In the second variant, the first clause consists of the negation of a supposition held by an interlocutor, while the second clause consists of a statement of the actual contrasting state of affairs, as in (6.439) and (6.440). Only positive polarity clauses are attested for the second clause.

(6.439) *Te inpahigena, oNti itsanehanakaro.*

*te*            *i=*        N-        *p*        *-hig*    *-e*            *=na*    *oNti*  
 NEG.REAL 3mS= IRREAL- give -PL -IRREAL.I =1O CL.CNTRST  
*i=*        *tsaNeh*    *-an*    *-ak*        *-a*            *=ro*  
 3mS= deny    -ABL -PERF -REAL.A =3nmS  
 ‘He didn’t give (them) to me, on the contrary, he denied them (to me).’

(6.440) *Mame iritsamaite, oNti yoogakara posuro.*

*mame*        *i=*        *ri-*        *tsamait*    *-e*            *oNti*        *i=*  
 NEG.EXIST 3mS= IRREAL- farm    -IRREAL.I CL.CNTRST 3mS=  
*oog*        *-ak*        *-a*            *=ra*        *posuro*  
 consume -PERF -REAL.A =SUB wild.plantain.sp  
 ‘He doesn’t farm at all (there), rather, he eats *posuro* (wild plantain species).’

It should be noted that *oNti* also serves to indicate contrastive predicate focus, and that this clause-linking construction could be considered to stem from the apposition of a predicate-focused clause to the clause with which it contrasts.

### 6.4.5 Coordination

Clausal coordination is very rare in Nanti discourse, but the element *oNtiri*, which coordinates NPs (see §refex:nounphrases), can also be employed to coordinate clauses,

as in (6.441). The rarity of its occurrence in Nanti discourse makes it difficult to determine the functional role of clausal coordination.

(6.441) Ogikontetakero ontiri onkahatake katsinkahari.

<i>o=</i>	<i>ogi-</i>	<i>koNte</i>	<i>-ak</i>	<i>-i</i>	<i>=ro</i>	<i>oNtiri</i>	<i>o=</i>
3nmS=	CAUS.AGNT-	leave	-PERF	-REAL.I	=3nmO	CNJNCT	3nmS=
N-	<i>kaha</i>	<i>-ak</i>	<i>-e</i>	<i>katsiNka</i>	<i>-ha</i>	<i>-ri.</i>	
IRREAL-	bathe	-PERF	-IRREAL.I	be.cold	-CL:fluid	-ADJVZR	

‘She will make her leave (her menarche seclusion) and she will bathe with cold water.’

Disjunctive coordination is not attested in Nanti discourse.

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# Vita

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