

INFORMATION TO USERS

This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.
4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from "photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.
5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received.

University Microfilms International

300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 USA
St. John's Road, Tyler's Green
High Wycombe, Bucks, England HP10 8HR

7812654

LEVINSON, STEPHEN CURTIS
SOCIAL DEIXIS IN A TAMIL VILLAGE.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY, PH.D.,
1977

University
Microfilms
International 300 N. ZEEB ROAD, ANN ARBOR, MI 48106

© 1977

STEPHEN CURTIS LEVINSON

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

Social Deixis in a Tamil Village

By

Stephen Curtis Levinson

A.B. (Hons.) (University of Cambridge) 1970

M.A. (University of California) 1972

DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

Anthropology

in the

GRADUATE DIVISION

of the

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

Approved:

.....
.....
.....
..... (E. ANNAMALAI)
.....
.....
Committee in Charge

..... DEGREE CONFERRED DECEMBER 9, 1977

LEVINSON: SOCIAL DEIXIS IN A TAMIL VILLAGECONTENTS

	Page No.
List of figures	iii
List of tables	vi
List of matrices	vii
Acknowledgments	viii
A note on the Tamil transcription	xi
 Chapter I: <u>Introduction and background</u>	
1.0 Introduction	2
1.1 Sociological background	8
1.2 Sociolinguistic background	20
1.2.1 Tamil	20
1.2.2 The language situation in the village	25
 Chapter II: <u>The theory of social deixis</u>	
2.0 Introductory remarks	37
2.1 Social deixis: general considerations	38
2.1.1 Deixis	38
2.1.2 Social deixis	41
2.1.3 The rational and strategic origins of honorifics	47
2.2 Grammar and social deixis	60
2.2.1 The semantics/pragmatics of social deixis	61
2.2.2 Syntax and social deixis: some problems	75
2.2.3 Social deixis in Tamil	86
2.2.3.1 Referent honorifics	88
2.2.3.2 Addressee honorifics	103
2.3 The usage of socially deictic items: honorifics	107
2.3.1 Geoghegan's theory	111
2.3.2 Brown and Gilman's theory	134
2.3.3 Steps towards a revised theory	146
 Chapter III: <u>The basic data: T/V usage in the village</u>	
3.0 Narrowing the focus	180
3.1 Methods and limitations in the collection of the data	183
3.2 The data in code-rule format	193

Chapter IV: Inter-caste usage: sociological implication I

4.0	Introductory remarks	218
4.1	Explanation of matrix manipulations	220
4.2	Initial matrix: informal observations	225
4.3	The inference of rank relations	233
4.3.1	The valuation of media and moves within them	234
4.3.2	Scaling	250
4.3.2.1	Scaling as a members activity	251
4.3.2.2	Two media and four scales	264
4.3.2.3	Some additional media: honorifics and dishonorifics	293
4.3.3	Further inferences from overall patterns	321
4.3.3.0	Introductory remarks	321
4.3.3.1	T/V behaviour: passive score board or competitive game	322
4.3.3.2	Consensus on hierarchy	345
4.3.3.3	Dissensus on ranking	343
4.4	The inference of alliance relations	372
4.4.1	REL: patterns of exchange and blocs of allies	374
4.4.2	Symmetrical exchange in other media	394
4.4.3	Additional media: 'fictitious kin terms'	400
4.5	Power and class: the case of the <u>periya kavuNTars</u>	425
4.6	Some conclusions	430

Chapter V: Intra-caste usage: sociological implications II

5.0	Introductory remarks	439
5.1	The Tamil kin terms	443
5.1.0	General remarks	444
5.1.1	The terminologies of the village	449
5.1.1.1	Superficial syntax and logical form	450
5.1.1.2	Semantic (and/or pragmatic) interpretation of the logical form	462
5.2	Kinship categories and pronominal usage: details for one caste	503
5.3	Castes compared: variation in intra-caste T/V usage	534
5.4	Emergent patterns and their implications	555
5.4.1	Some emergent patterns	555
5.4.2	Explanations and implications	565
5.4.2.1	T/V usage and caste hierarchy: an instance of a sociolinguistic universal	565
5.4.2.2	T/V usage and the left-right division	584
5.5	Conclusions	589

Chapter VI:	<u>The uses of linguistic data in sociology</u>	
6.0	Introductory remarks	594
6.1	Summary of the study	594
6.2	Implications for sociolinguistics	600
6.3	The role of sociolinguistics in sociology	604
Footnotes		612
Bibliography		623

LIST OF FIGURES

	Page No.
1.1 Economic dependencies among castes	15
2.1 Axes of social deixis	46
2.2 Historical succession of second person Tamil pronouns	50
2.3 Historical succession of third person masculine Tamil pronouns	50
2.4 The evolution of honorifics	56
2.5 The evolution of addressee honorifics from referent honorifics	59
2.6 Example of correspondences provided by a code segment	113
2.7 Example of correspondences provided by a simple code rule	114
2.8 Example of flow chart representing an ordered code rule	115
2.9 Example of redundancies in an ordered code rule	116
2.10 Example of a marking rule represented by directed graph	120
2.11 Samal marking rule (after Geoghegan)	121
2.12 Code rule version of marking rule in Figure 2.10	122
2.13 Historical progression of T/V systems according to Brown and Gilman...	137
2.14 The information processing underlying T/V usage: first approximation...	149
2.15 Caste and non-caste sources of personal status: Hiebert's model...	161
2.16 The information processing underlying T/V usage: second approximation...	172
4.1 T/V universes: the five major types	232
4.2 Predicting T/V usage	258
4.3 Rank by T giving	269
4.4 Rank by V giving	272
4.5 Rank by V receiving	273
4.6 Rank by T receiving	275
4.7 Rank on two dimensions compared	278

4.8	Giving and receiving compared	279
4.9	Ranks by thresholds for V usage	287
4.10	Summary of derived ranks	289
4.11	Ranks derived from <u>ppaa</u> usage	297
4.12	Ranks derived from <u>Taa</u> usage	303
4.13	Ranks derived from <u>naam</u> usage	310
4.14	Ranks derived from <u>saami</u> usage	314
4.15	Ranks derived from <u>esamaanka</u> usage	317
4.16	Summary of derived ranks in additional media	320
4.17	Ranks on a variety of non-linguistic media	332
4.18	Game outcomes with minimax strategies	337
4.19	Game with partial coalition	341
4.20	Cooked rice exchange (after Beck)	344
4.21	Marriott's Varna strategies	353
4.22	Scores in cooked rice transactions	362
4.23	Net ranks in V giving and receiving	382
4.24	REL to superiors and inferiors	385
4.25	Symmetrical exchange of REL	388
4.26	Ranks on linguistic and non-linguistic media	433
5.1	Basic kin terms: the right-hand model	450
5.2	Peculiarities of Brahman kin terms: the left-hand model	451
5.3	Extension of the term <u>camanti</u>	456
5.4	Extension of other affinal terms	456
5.5	Examples of assignments to cross/parallel by Beck's rules	472
5.6	Cross/parallel assignment algorithm	475
5.7	Relation of cross/parallel categories to patri- lineal descent groups	478
5.8	Relation of cross/parallel categories to patrimoieties	479
5.9	The function of the generational inversion of the cross/parallel assignment rules	481
5.10	Alliance relations between three hamlets: stage I	493
5.11	Alliance relations between three hamlets: stage II	494
5.12	Further possible alliance relations between hamlets	495

5.13	Genealogical connections and alliance relations	498
5.14	The domestic cycle and T/V usage: the changing position of women	514
5.15	The treatment of close cross kin compared to close parallel kin in caste 8	518
5.16	The special treatment of affines	522
5.17	An example of actual usage to kin by an ego in caste 8	531
5.18	Intra-caste T/V usage: schema for caste 8	532
5.19	Caste 1's intra-caste usage	538
5.20	Caste 2's intra-caste usage	539
5.21	Caste 3's intra-caste usage	540
5.22	Caste 4's intra-caste usage	541
5.23	Caste 5's intra-caste usage	542
5.24	Caste 6's intra-caste usage	543
5.25	Caste 7a's intra-caste usage	544
5.26	Caste 7b's intra-caste usage	545
5.27	Caste 8's intra-caste usage	546
5.28	Caste 9's intra-caste usage	547
5.29	Caste 10's intra-caste usage	548
5.30	Caste 11's intra-caste usage	549
5.31	Caste 13's intra-caste usage	550
5.32	Caste 14's intra-caste usage	551
5.33	Caste 16's intra-caste usage	552
5.34	Caste 17's intra-caste usage	553
5.35	Caste 18's intra-caste usage	554
5.36	The two dimensions of variation in intra-caste T/V usage	561
5.37	Class variants in caste 5	569

LIST OF TABLES

	Page No.
1.1 Inventory of castes	12
1.2 Caste, division membership and native language	27
1.3 Summary of linguistic features associated with division membership	35
2.1 Alternates for singular second person pronouns	70
2.2 Basic Tamil pronouns	89
2.3 Person-number-gender switches in Tamil pronoun usage	90
2.4 Some common titles of address in village Tamil	100
2.5 Some Tamil addressee honorifics	104
3.1 Key to assessment symbols	197
5.1 Key to symbols used in Figure 5.6	474
5.2 Usage to ego's father in different castes	557
5.3 A crude measure of amount of intra-caste V usage	562
5.4 Castes distinguishing cross from parallel kin in T/V usage	564

LIST OF MATRICES

	Page No.
Matrix I	Initial matrix 228
Matrix II	Rank as (most) T givers 268
Matrix III	Rank as (least) V givers 271
Matrix IV	Rank as (most) V receivers 274
Matrix V	Rank as (least) T receivers 276
Matrix VI	Thresholds for V giving 282
Matrix VII	Scoring thresholds for V giving 286
Matrix VIII	The basic matrix 291
Matrix IX	The usage of <u>ppaa</u> 298
Matrix X	The usage of <u>Taa/Teey</u> 304
Matrix XI	The usage of <u>naam</u> 309
Matrix XII	The usage of <u>saami</u> 313
Matrix XIII	The usage of <u>esamaanka</u> 318
Matrix XIV	Varna strategies: cooked rice (after Beck) 361
Matrix XV	Varna strategies: T/V 365
Matrix XVI	REL: symmetric and asymmetric usage 376
Matrix XVII	REL as T and V substitutes 384
Matrix XVIII	Symmetrical exchange in cooked rice (after Beck) 396
Matrix XIX	Symmetrical exchange in informal seating (after Beck) 397
Matrix XX	Symmetrical exchange in dishonorifics: <u>Taa</u> 398
Matrix XXI	Symmetrical exchange in dishonorifics: <u>ppaa</u> 399
Matrix XXII	Cross-caste usage of <u>aNNan/akkaa</u> 411
Matrix XXIII	Cross-caste usage of <u>appaa/ammaa</u> 412
Matrix XXIV	Cross-caste usage of <u>ayyaa/aattaa</u> 413
Matrix XXV	Cross-caste usage of <u>maamaa</u> 414
Matrix XXVI	T/V usage to and from <u>periya kavuNTars</u> 428

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The 'we' used throughout this thesis is a little more than purely editorial, episcopal or regal. It expresses the fact that I alone am not responsible for the verity of the contents. (Sometimes I generously accept the burden of an opinion with the first person singular; such slips are not Labovian variables randomly generated). Our debts extend to the entire population of a village, and a number of university departments and institutes. Let us single out a few individuals to whom I am more or less equally indebted in one way or another.

When I failed to find a village with the desired caste structure, Brenda Beck generously invited me to work in the village which is the focus of her own work. No one but an anthropologist would know to what extent that is a noble gesture, but it is indeed. Moreover she organized things so that I inherited in part at least the social contacts she had built up, including the now renowned O.K.Suntaram, research assistant in extraordinary. It was with his family that I stayed, helped by every member of it, and I doubt that I would have survived village life without that aid. Other informants were recruited from amongst his friends and contacts, and I mention in particular Baskaran, Balusubramaniam, and Gopal who did much transcribing for me. In addition we interviewed many of the families of oolappaaLaiyam who put up good-naturedly with a good deal of busy-bodying. And some of the great families of the region took a benevolent view of the proceedings, without which things would have been impossible.

As with Brenda Beck, I owe far more to E. Annamalai than can be acknowledged on each page, but insofar as I understand the finer points of Tamil grammar I owe that to the great amount of time I spent

with him. And in addition, to Dr Annamalai, Dr Pattannayak, and others I owe the comforts and convenience of the facilities of the Central Institute of Indian Languages at Mysore.

Old intellectual debts are to Professors C. Fillmore, R. Lakoff and J. Gumperz, who whether they like it or not have irredeemably influenced the course of this research. In fact it was Gumperz who suggested during writing up the delimitation (thank God) of a much broader original program to the present immodest proportions. Still further back I owe quite a bit to my first teachers of Tamil, J. Schubert and Dr N. Sanjeevi (the latter would still I fear tut-tut). And beyond that to Edmund Leach and S.J. Tambiah, who first interested me in India.

Although one prerequisite for writing this thesis was going to India, another was going to the United States. And that occurred in part because I was adopted by the Language Behaviour Research Laboratory at Berkeley. To Messrs Kay, Geoghegan, Berlin and especially Gumperz (and to many fellow students) I owe the intellectual atmosphere in which I became absorbed in matters pragmatic and sociolinguistic. An important influence too was the temporary tuition of G. Sankoff. And of course in the years 1970-1974, for linguistics there was nowhere more exciting to be than in Berkeley.

To P. Brown a diffuse debt, that includes much intellectual, is owed in a way that it can only be to a spouse. Some of the debt at least is signposted in the multifarious references to Brown and Levinson 1977, and about every sixth page it was really my turn to do the supper.

A few dedicated characters actually read and commented on parts of the manuscript viz., E. Annamalai, J. Gumperz, D. McGilvray,

P. Brown. A large number of corrections and clarifications resulted; even a few bright ideas which have been smuggled into the text without too much acknowledgment. I am though very grateful to them all.

The field research was done on a shoe-string budget. I took part of my Fellowship, generously and quite inexplicably given by the State of California, and changed it into rupees. And the air fare was most generously supplied by the subvention funds of the Department of Anthropology. Equipment was filched from the Language Behaviour Research Laboratory, but they got it back eventually. I still owe money to some very kind friends, but hope to be able to repay them on the sale of the film rights.

A note on the Tamil transcription

The Tamil transcription follows Schiffman (1971, Part II:2-4) in adopting a transcription which is very close to an abstract phonemic level while retaining a close relation to Tamil orthography. This unholy alliance between linguistic and orthographic conventions is not perhaps as unorthodox as it may seem, for Tamil orthography is extremely systematic and quite close to at least one adequate phonemic analysis. Where doubts arise though a solution consonant with the orthography has been adopted, as this helps to keep the spelling of terms and proper names in line with Beck 1972. It should be noted that a distant set of phonemes exists for handling loan words. Throughout, symbols have their common values except for the following major departures: (a) retroflex consonants are represented by upper-case versions of the standard symbols; (b) long vowels are represented by reduplicated vowel symbols; (c) the contrast between intervocalic voiced lax stops and their voiceless tense counterparts is represented by single versus reduplicated consonant symbols. Reduplication in the case of cc indicates a palatalized affricate.

Just a few proper names that are very familiar in their anglicized form are represented in the latter: thus we use 'Brahman' not piraamaNan which would be excessively obscure.

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

	Page No.
1.0 Introduction	2
1.1 Sociological background	8
1.2 Sociolinguistic background	20
1.2.1 Tamil	20
1.2.2 The language situation in the village	25

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This thesis deals with a very thin sliver of human behaviour. It is centrally concerned with the use of just two words in a South Indian village. The two words correspond closely to the familiar and the polite pronouns of address in many European languages. Why such a narrow theme is worth exploring in such depth needs a word of explanation, for the enterprise is to be read against a set of wider goals.

The first important point is that the usage of these two words can be taken as quite sensitive indices of the distribution of a great range of language strategies, or if one prefers, styles of speaking. The familiar pronoun, for example, can be used to express solidarity; but so can a host of features of language usage, from familiar address terms, through direct requests, to jokes and the use of in-group jargon. The polite pronoun, on the other hand, can be used to express deference; but again there are innumerable aspects of language usage that can effectively convey the same thing, from lofty titles, through the use of indirect language to avoid confrontation, to the prosodic devices of high pitch and low volume. The richness of these devices for conveying deference and solidarity, and their converses power and distance, is probably enormous in any speech community, but in the social context of the Indian village of this study the occasions for their use are omnipresent. And throughout this study we remain primarily interested in the pronouns of address, or other honorifics, simply as co-occurring features and indicators of these complex interactional packages of signals. (In fact a great deal of research was devoted to these more complex features of language use, and it was only because of difficulties in their analysis that we here retreat to these simpler facts, more

easily counted and observed.)

A second important point is that such strategies of language usage - of which our pronouns are indices - are extraordinarily sensitive to the nature and quality of social relationships. They do in fact provide us with a method for objectively describing and comparing such subjective qualities. Using this method we may describe the different kinds of social relationships that hold between specific categories of persons in a society. We can go further: we can describe the different kinds that hold between all the most significant categories of person in a society, so obtaining overall models of the distribution of different kinds of social relationship throughout an entire society.

So what? Quite a lot. If this program can be pushed home, then, we shall argue, sociolinguistics has a central role to play in sociology. For one perennial sociological (and anthropological) problem is this: societies are, in some sense, constituted by individual actions, and yet they also exhibit well-defined overall morphologies. Now actions are best explained in terms of intentions and perceived circumstances, that is, in terms of individual subjectivities, but it is not clear how overall social structures can be described in the same terms at all. There seems then to be an unhappy disjunction between two levels of sociological talk, and the disjunction leads to peculiar reifications and ontologies at the level of social structure.

Sociolinguistics promises to provide one answer to this problem. For language is both a more or less transparent vehicle of social intention and an overt measurable form of behaviour, instances of which can be collected to build up overall models of social behaviour. By studying the use of language in a social population, we can thus derive

an overall model of that society which retains a close connection to the way that members of the society themselves visualize it.

But to achieve this, sociolinguistics needs reworking. And the main point of this thesis is to argue, not by confrontation with other theories but by example, for a particular view of the sociolinguistic enterprise. In essence the view is a synthesis of two currently independent strands of sociolinguistic enquiry.

The two strands are these. On the one hand we have what we may call macro-sociolinguistics, of which the exemplar is the correlational school associated with Labov, where the prime aim is to construct maps of the differential distribution of social dialects or grammars throughout an entire social system. The items collected are aspects of the competence of individuals who are located in social space as instances of a class of persons. In contrast we have what we may call micro-sociolinguistics, and here Gumperz's work may serve as the exemplar, where social interaction is the basic datum of analysis, and the aim is to characterize the kinds of speech that occur within specific relationships. The items collected are not properties of individuals (though they must of course be in individuals' communicative repertoire), but properties of relationships, typically dyads.

Now both of these views have extreme limitations. Correlational (Labovian) sociolinguistics, on the one hand, with its focus on the individual speaker and his dialect, passes over an enormous area of sociolinguistic variation, namely the variation within an individual's speech dependent on who he is speaking to. (To some very limited extent this aspect of variation is captured in Labov's scheme by his notion of style.) But this is almost certainly the richest source of

socially significant variation in language, and to ignore it is to drastically impoverish the scope of sociolinguistics. For example, at most there are three distinguishable social dialects in the village of this study, partitioning twenty odd castes, so that on the properties of an individual's speech alone only the crudest rank assignment can be made. But if we study how members of each caste use language (for example pronominal alternates) to members of each other caste, we can make very fine rank distinctions indeed, and even discriminations within caste. But these aspects of language usage are not properties of individual grammars (for all members of the village have the same range of pronominal alternates), but are rather properties of particular kinds of relationship (asymmetrical rank between two parties, for example). The consequence of the failure of correlational sociolinguistics to adopt an interactional viewpoint is that its findings tend to be sociologically trivial. For example the fact that there are three distinguishable social dialects in the village tells us nothing that we would not know already from the most cursory glance at ethnographies of such Indian villages. The detailed description of these would be - sociologically speaking - a waste of time.

Interactional (micro-) sociolinguistics, on the other hand, has correctly presumed that language usage is most finely attuned to social relationships, and that the proper datum of sociolinguistic study is not the dialect or idiolect but properties of interacting dyads. The limitation in most studies of social interaction, however, is once again sociological triviality, but here of a different kind. For the sociologist the information that some individual A treats some other individual B in a particular way is useless, unless he knows that the

individuals in question are representative of some social group or significant category. And in fact most studies of social interaction tend to be case-by-case studies of social relationships with no attempt made to describe the systematic distribution of specific interaction patterns across a social population (or more properly across dyads drawn from a social population).

The view promoted here is a fusion of what seems best in both macro- and micro-sociolinguistics. From correlational (macro-) sociolinguistics we retain the basic insight that patterns of language usage are systematically distributed through an entire social population, and from interactional (micro-) sociolinguistics we take our basic datum to be the use of language between socially specified parties, and thus retain an essentially interactive viewpoint.

But this selective selection of elements from other sociolinguistic theories actually transforms the enterprise. For in taking the interactive use of language as our basic datum and object of enquiry, we are dealing with the verbal expression of kinds of social relationship. And then in mapping the distribution of specific patterns of language use between persons drawn from all the major categories of the society in question, we are in effect building up overall models of the distribution of social relationships. And, in one perspective, that is nothing other than a model of the society itself. In this way sociolinguistics is brought back into the mainstream of sociological concerns as a contributory rather than a parasitic discipline. And given the extraordinary subtlety with which language can express social relationships, that is surely where it belongs.

It is against these wider aims that the present enterprise should be considered. The general sociolinguistic program we have outlined would direct one to study the full range of language usage features that reflect different kinds of social relationship in a community. Such features come as packages that cross-cut all the levels of a grammar, and are perhaps best analyzed as rational choices aimed at maintaining certain kinds of social relationship. An enormous compendium of such choices can be found in Brown and Levinson (1977). And the overall program would also direct one to study who uses what sort of package to which sort of addressee, throughout the entire society. All of which is a tall order.

What we present here then is but an instance of a general program. And in selecting the usage of honorifics as our basic concomitant of types of social relationship, the aim is to minimize the linguistic difficulties in order to maximize the ease with which we can derive sociological insights. From pilot projects there can be little doubt that although such honorifics correlate well with certain stylistic packages of features of language usage, yet the social information encoded in the full range of such features of usage is very much richer. Nevertheless, we are able to push home our analysis of honorific usage so that it throws light on nearly every nook and cranny of the social order of a particular village. The details may well be uninteresting to the general reader, who may have no interest in Dravidian kinship or anything else to do with South Indian social structure for that matter. But in a sense they are the point of the whole study, not for what they are in themselves, but because in being able to derive them we demonstrate that linguistic material can be a tremendously rich and important

sociological resource. And we hope thereby to recommend the approach here pursued.

1.1 SOCIOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

As already mentioned, this study was conducted in the actual village which, with its environs, is the focus of an excellent full-scale ethnography, Peasant Society in Konku, by Brenda E.F. Beck (1972). The locus was specifically chosen to make it possible to concentrate on sociolinguistic research, while relying on Beck's work for sociological orientation. Clearly though, during research questions of a purely sociological nature arose from time to time, and it was a pleasure and a comfort to find Beck's analysis vindicated repeatedly. It is in fact a remarkably reliable text. My purpose here then is not to re-present or re-analyze her findings but simply to provide a skeletal background for those who wish to read the present text without referring to Beck 1972. I have tried to keep terms and notations (caste identification numbers, for instance) in line with hers, so that cross-reference is straightforward.

The present study focuses on a unit of local administration known as the revenue village of kannapuram kiraamam, which has a reported population of some 5,000 souls. It lies in the middle of a large dry and dusty plain, almost encircled by mountains, which forms the traditional region of konku and (in part) the modern Coimbatore District. The village is far from any industrial centre and retains remarkably traditional ways. The whole region is old-fashioned in one important respect especially: the dominant caste, the agricultural kavuNTaars, still have an almost absolute monopoly over land ownership, as they

have for the past one thousand years or more. As a consequence of this caste-based monopoly over land, which is by no means typical of modern India, the local caste structure preserves some of the well-defined interdependencies of earlier times.

To return to the revenue village (which we shall often refer to simply as the village), this exhibits nothing like the settlement pattern we fondly think of as a 'village'. Rather it is a collection of no less than fifty scattered hamlets, that is, sets of contiguous dwellings which are dispersed throughout the agricultural land. Nor are there any clear boundaries with the next door 'villages', except to those who can pick out certain ordinary-looking stones that function as ritual boundaries. There are two main kinds of hamlet: untouchable hamlets where members of the Harijan castes live (usually one caste per hamlet), and touchable hamlets where one usually finds an incomplete set of the touchable castes living together (but concentrated in caste-wards, or special neighbourhoods for each caste within the hamlet). Touchables do not go, if they can avoid it, to untouchable hamlets, although untouchables frequent the streets and compounds of the touchable hamlets where they provide necessary services.

It is surprisingly difficult to find out how many castes there are exactly within a single revenue village. Villagers themselves do not know, mainly because caste titles obscure subdivisions into a number of smaller endogamous kinship units. Even local officials are unable to distinguish all such units. Another problem is that quite a few castes are represented by single families, and these may come and go. And then there are real transients, gypsy-like castes, selling wild honey, salt, charms, stone mortars or telling fortunes. Beck (1972:5)

gives an inventory of eighteen castes who are stable and large enough to have a clearly determined rank at Brahman feasts. I know of at least nine others, including isolated families of naidus, konku ceTTiyaars, and products of recent miscegenation like moTavaaNTis. Somewhere between thirty and forty castes, counting transients, is probably a reasonable estimate.

In this study we shall restrict ourselves to a selection of these, some seventeen castes, sixteen of which are drawn from Beck's eighteen and one of which is added from elsewhere. (The two dropped are Beck's 12 and 15 who are treated by other castes in interaction in exactly the same way as 13 and 14, so little will be lost by their exclusion from this study.) The motivation for this selection is this: all those castes that had frequent and more or less daily interaction with members of one particular hamlet, oolappaalaiyam, fell into our net. For it seemed desirable to limit ourselves to the study of interactions that were routine. Besides, this hamlet was the place in which I stayed, and it was thus considerably easier to collect tapes of natural conversation and to interview in a relaxed fashion within it (where the inhabitants, too, were already inured to inquiries because Beck had also made her base there).

Table 1.1 introduces these seventeen castes. It is adapted from Beck (1972:5,58-9,113) and the identification numbers which precede each caste name are hers, based in part on the rank order in which castes would be seated at a Brahman feast. There is however one alteration: her caste 7 is here labelled 7a, to allow us to introduce a related sub-caste 7b. Associated with each caste in Table 1.1 is a figure that indicates the approximate percentage of the village population provided

by that caste (the figures are derived from Beck 1972 with some adjustment for recent changes). Caste names in the table have two parts: the second is the general name for the caste (usually associated with a particular occupation), while the first isolates the particular sub-caste or endogamous unit. There is, incidentally, some problem with the first name for 7b, which Beck attributes to 7a (Beck 1972:101, fn.79); I believe this to be a mistake. The occupations that are attributed in the table to each caste refer to traditional occupations; not all members are still so engaged, although in each case some still are. The significance of the three divisions of the table will be made clear below. The assignment of castes to divisions follows Beck except for the case of 7b which she does not assign; I assign it to the right-hand division because of its close connection to caste 5, its possession of various appropriate attributes, and the fact that it is sometimes referred to as konku mutaliyaar.

All of these castes are genuine endogamous commensal units containing no significant ritual subdivisions; that is, they correspond to the units often designated 'sub-castes' in Indian sociology. From the population figures it is immediately clear that the population is very unevenly distributed between the castes. Over half of the total village population belongs to the dominant land-owning caste 5, which is one reason for its continued hegemony. Another fifth of the total are maataaris (caste 18), Harijan leather-workers, who provide the bulk of the permanent labour force. The remaining quarter of the population is distributed between fifteen main, and several minor, other castes. (It may help to understand the figures if it is understood that 0.1% of the population of the village is roughly equivalent to one family.)

Table 1.1 Inventory of castes

LEFT DIVISION	NEUTRAL BLOC	RIGHT DIVISION
3: <u>coolI aacaari</u> 0.5% artisan	1: <u>aiyar piraamaNam</u> 0.3% priest and scholar, Brahman	5: <u>konku kavuNTar</u> 54.0% farmer, landlord
4: <u>koomuTTi ceTTiyaar</u> 0.2% merchant	2: <u>karuNiikar piLLai</u> 0.1% accountant and scribe	7b: <u>cenkuntam mutaliyaar</u> 0.5% temple musician & merchant
6: <u>konku aacaari</u> 0.5% artisan		8: <u>okaccaaNTi paNTaaram</u> 1.0% cook, local priest
7a: <u>kaikkoolar mutaliyaar</u> 1.5% weaver and mefchant		9: <u>konku uTaiyaar</u> 1.0% potter and builder
		10: <u>marameeri naaTaar</u> 7.0% palmyra-palm climber
11: <u>vaTuka naayakkar</u> 2.0% well-digger, builder		14: <u>konku naavitar</u> 2.0% barber
13: <u>vaTuka vaNNaar</u> 2.0% washerman		16: <u>konku paraiyar</u> 5.0% drummer, Harijan
17: <u>kuuTai kuravar</u> 0.5% basket-maker, Harijan		
18: <u>moracu maataari</u> 21.0% leatherworker & labourer, Harijan		


Before passing to a review of Beck's basic findings, it may be helpful to sketch some of the economic interdependencies of the various castes. Figure 1.1 provides such a sketch schematically. In the figure each circle represents a caste, identified by the code numbers which are those assigned in Table 1.1. The size of each circle is in approximate proportion to the population of the caste. The solid arrows indicate the major economic dependencies of each caste, that is, the source of the bulk of its income. There are some over-simplifications here: for example, castes 13 and 14 serve all the castes above them, and derive a significant income from connections other than those to caste 5, but still the latter are the most important. (Converting figures given in Beck 1972:194 for payment in kind into payment in cash, we can say a typical washerman earns 85% of his income from service to caste 5.) In addition, many castes have a few members employed as government servants or as labourers in government projects.

The major point that emerges from Fig. 1.1 is that at least nine castes depend economically primarily on service to those who own the bulk of the land (the basic form of rural capital), namely members of caste 5. (Only the few families in castes 1 and 2 also own significant amounts of land.) These castes are, significantly, mostly members of the right-hand division. The remaining seven castes, with the possible exception of caste 6, are less dependent on service to caste 5 than they are on various sources of urban income and connections, or at least on income from other rural areas. In short, they are not dependent on the local agricultural production system in the same way. Significantly they are mostly members of the left-hand division.

Finally, it should be pointed out that by no means all members of the dominant caste are wealthy or own land; according to Beck (1972:192) some 38% of households of caste 5 are too poor to be primarily engaged in working their own land at all, and a further 46% are subsistence farmers. The wealth is then concentrated in the hands of a few land-owning families, whose fields generate most of the agricultural income.

Just a few of the most wealthy of these kavuNTaars occupy a status not unlike the country gentry of Tudor England (Trevelyan 1967). While not themselves actually titled aristocrats, they are proud of connections to the paTTakaarar or traditional feudal lords who reside in distant villages and are themselves members of caste 5. They run manorial establishments with household servants, and have traditional rights over the labour of Harijans residing within their estates. They have managed to retain political control despite democratic processes in local government. Their traditional status is recognized and inherited by members of their families, while nouveau-riche members of the same caste are not (at least immediately) admitted to this status. All castes treat them with due respect, and most reserve the highly honorific title esamaanka for them, for their power is very considerable indeed. For these reasons, I have called them 'squires' or 'aristocrats', and they play an important role in the facts presented below. We emphasize the importance of these landlords because a description of the local power structure is one of the few areas not covered in detail in Beck (1972).

Besides land and traditional authority, other important sources of power are wealth, and more surprisingly, simple numbers or man-

Figure 1.1 Economic dependencies among castes

1 ———→ 2 = caste 1 (etc) largely dependent on 2 (etc)
 1 - - - -> 2 = caste 1 (etc) partially dependent on 2 (etc)

◁ = urban income and connections

Area of circles is in approximate proportion to population

power. The fact is that konku is an area of violent crimes with one of the highest rates of homicide in South India. And the more able-bodied men in one's own family, lineage and sub-caste in one's village, the safer one is, and the more able to impose one's wishes on members of other groups. From this one may correctly surmise that the caste with the lowest ritual status in the area, namely caste 18, as second largest caste in the village is by no means the least powerful local caste; while a high caste like 4 with only two families is extremely vulnerable. Further aspects of the local power structure will be touched upon as they concern us.

Let us turn now to the main substance of Beck's findings. After a great deal of study of the internal organization of each of eighteen castes, Beck found that every group has predictable internal customs and structure in relation to its place in the overall inter-caste system. In particular, she found that internal organization varied in relation to two dimensions of the overall system: the rank of the caste in the local caste hierarchy, and the membership of the caste in the left-hand, right-hand or neutral divisions. The caste hierarchy is what it sounds, namely a unidimensional ranking of local castes in a manner which will much concern us later on. But 'division-membership' is not a familiar concept in Indian studies. We might say that it was a sociological construct invented by Beck to deal with an added dimension of variation. But there is more to it than that. In the first place, historical documents make it clear that an explicit division of the castes into two political blocs named with the Tamil terms for 'left' and 'right' was an all-important feature of earlier South Indian politics (see Stein n.d.). In the second place, Beck

found a few elderly informants who could actually produce lists of such division membership. Thirdly, the distinction runs so deeply into the cultural life of castes, with ramifications from kinship structure to ritual to interactional style (Beck 1972:8-15), that it must have at least unconscious significance for villagers, a conclusion that this thesis vindicates.

Some of the main differences that Beck found between right-hand and left-hand castes are these. In social organization, right-hand castes exhibit an internal structure that is closely tied to territorial units via caste temples and caste functionaries. Left-hand organization, on the other hand, is de-territorialized. There are different emphases in kinship too: right-hand castes favour matrilineal cross-cousin marriage with the consequent potential for great alliance chains, while left-hand castes favour the patrilineal alternative facilitating the formation of closed small marriage circles. Right-hand castes have extensive and functionally important clans and lineages, while left-hand descent-group organization is minimal. The left-hand castes maintain the shastric ideals of joint families to a greater extent than the right. They stress education and urban advancement and the worship of gods of the 'great tradition', in contrast to the tendencies of right-hand castes. Finally, in life-style and style of interaction, right-hand castes tend to value instrumentality and power, meat and liquor, force and swagger, while left-hand castes favour Brahmanical detachment, non-involvement, vegetarianism, and interactional circumspection.

The differences as here related hold only for the high castes of each division; as one descends the hierarchy, the distinctions

become less marked. Indeed, in earlier work Beck suggested that a V-shaped model of the overall system could be constructed by assigning values to various traits as left- or right-hand characteristics, and summing them to derive the position of the caste in the overall V, (where height on the vertical axis represents caste rank, and position on the horizontal axis to left or to right represents degree of right- or left-handedness. See Beck 1968).

Beck suggests convincingly that these apparently heterogeneous traits typical of left- and right-hand castes become coherent and rival systems when one considers the two divisions to constitute alternative paths to social prestige. On the one hand we have the right-hand castes with their landed interests preoccupied with expressions of material power; on the other hand we have the left-hand castes with their wider-flung, often urban, connections concentrating on the prestige derivable from a Brahmanical way of life. The leader and model for the right-hand division is the dominant caste 5, while the model for the left-hand division is provided by the unaligned castes of Brahmans (and piLLai to a lesser extent). In short, although in the south of India the classical varna scheme is not a conscious frame of reference as it is in the north, we find here an expression of the Hindu theory of the balance and hierarchy of different powers: the Brahman at the top, the king at his right hand, balanced by the merchant at his left, with the peasants and service castes below.

This analysis of Beck's fits well with the historian Stein's analysis of the once overt bifurcation of South Indian society into 'right' and 'left'. Stein suggests that the opposition was essentially between those groups whose interests and powers were tied to the land,

and those groups whose influence and strength were based in the towns, and who historically probably arrived later than the original land-settlers, remaining to some extent 'outsiders' (Stein n.d.). The bifurcation still persists, we may surmise, because the underlying opposition of rural power structures and urban power structures does itself persist.

There is more, then, to the local caste system than merely a linear ranking of caste groups. Nevertheless, as we shall show, villagers do operate with the notion of an overall hierarchy. For those unfamiliar with Indian materials it is important to stress that such a hierarchy has a very tenuous relationship to economic clout: the groups at the top are by no means the most wealthy or powerful, and the groups at the bottom are by no means the most powerless or most impoverished. Beck (1972:181-196) assembles some economic data that should demolish once and for all any simple economic determinism applied to the understanding of caste hierarchy. The nature of the caste hierarchy remains then essentially mysterious, beyond the fact that it is a status system (in the Weberian sense) backed by an entire religion and cosmology (see Dumont 1972). We shall attempt below to throw some light on it from a new angle.

A final important point about the caste hierarchy in this region, not explicitly drawn out by Beck, is that there is considerable local variation in the rank order of castes. Some of this variation has already been noted, but has been treated largely as exceptional (see the case of the koomuTTi ceTTiyaars, fourth in line in one ritual ranking in our village, but near the bottom in a village twenty miles away: Beck 1972:166-7; Den Ouden 1969). But a sampling of opinions


in villages beyond ten miles or so that I unsystematically carried out suggests that the rank of many castes is subject to variation depending on the local numbers and powers it wields. The study of this variation might throw more light on the nature of the caste hierarchy than any other line of investigation, but it remains a largely unexplored field.

1.2 SOCIOLINGUISTIC BACKGROUND

The general properties of the Tamil language as a linguistic system will not concern us much, except in some special ways which may be adequately dealt with as we come to them. Here we may simply note that Tamil is an SOV language, that is, a language with (in some sense, difficult to define adequately) a basic word order of Subject-Object-Verb. And it exhibits all the properties that universal grammarians are now able to predict as likely on the basis of that word order. It is, for example, agglutinative, inflecting with suffixes; and above all it is left-branching. In fact a good idea of Tamil structure can be got from glancing at Kuno's (1973) excellent introduction to another SOV language, Japanese.

1.2.1 Tamil

Tamil provides the dialectologist and sociolinguist with a great web of cross-cutting social, geographical and functional variation. Shanmukam Pillai (1972) provides the following general picture:



where the high diglossic variant LT and the colloquial SST are more or less invariant, while each region has a distinct vernacular (R), which in turn has subvarieties (caste dialects) based on social groups (C's). Let us take these distinctions in turn.

Tamil is one of the classic cases of diglossia (Ferguson 1959), and the high variant (LT) derives apparently from an ancient vernacular based on Madurai (Zvelebil 1964:250), while the low variant can be any of the spoken forms - SST, an R or a C. LT itself exhibits degrees of archaicism corresponding to the various functions it performs, which range from speeches to puranic films to literary journals (Shanmukam Pillai 1960). It is almost invariably used in platform speeches, lectures, and any form of written prose that does not consist entirely of dialogue. The grammatical features are described in Shanmukam Pillai 1960 and elsewhere, and involve very considerable morphological, phonological and lexical divergences from any of the colloquial variants. A recent study carried out under my supervision shows, however, that the polarization into Literary Tamil and Colloquial Tamil is in fact more a product of analysis than of fact: working on (amongst other


sources) radio broadcasts, Herman (1976) showed that there are no hard and fast co-occurrence constraints to keep the two variants apart, and in many contexts admixtures abound. Herman's work suggests rather that there is one great continuum from the most parochial colloquial to the most puristic literary.¹

The standard colloquial SST is a rapidly evolving variety, putatively based originally on an Eastern dialect (Zvelebil 1964:250) from which regional and caste features are purged in favour of forms from LT. It serves increasingly as the basic vernacular for the urban middle classes, and hence the basic medium of (non-historical) films and the radio.

Turning now to geographical variation, Zvelebil, in a series of papers summarized in Zvelebil 1964, isolates four main Tamil regional dialects on the mainland. One of these, the Western dialect, covers the Konku region in which the village of this study is situated; it is demarcated by a relatively thick bundle of isoglosses. Further research in progress by Indian linguists will no doubt refine the picture.

We come now to the most difficult and contentious area, the caste dialects. The problems concern the nature and number of these. The earliest systematic observations, those by J. Bloch (1910), claimed that in the villages of Tamilnad villagers could generally assign each other to castes by the characteristics of their language, in a way that was not possible in the villages of the Deccan or Bengal. He went on to suggest that in fact the inhabitants can make only three basic distinctions: between Brahmans, Untouchables and the rest. But fifty years later, Zvelebil (1964:240;255,fn.31; but cf p.254) claimed that the "trichotomy Brahman - Non-Brahman - Harijan is more or less

wiped out", for the Harijans were no longer distinguishable by the way they spoke. According to Zvelebil we are left then with the Brahman(B) and Non-Brahman(NB) distinction only. He also notes that the NB dialects are heterogeneous, varying from region to region, while the B dialects retain their basic nature across regions. We would then have to modify Shanmukam Pillai's picture above to the following:



On this view there are then really no C's or caste dialects at all.

But Indian linguists do not agree. For example Pillai (1972:69) notes that "in Kanyakumari district one may notice four or five distinct caste dialects", and the same author shows that there are three main and two minor caste blocs isolated by kin-term isoglosses in a South Arcot village (however, the village contained some groups not normally found in rural Tamilnad, Muslims for example; S. Pillai (1965)). And Ramanujan lends his authority to the idea that each caste has a distinctive dialect of its own: "all B subcastes are distinguishable in speech from any NB subcaste, that is, subcastes like Iyer and Iyengar share overall speech features despite differences; NB subcastes (like Mudaliyar, Chettiyar, Vellala) also have recognizable overall features" (Ramanujan 1968:462). He also conducted a survey of Iyengar Brahman and mutaliyaar dialects in three widely separated cities in order to factor out regional aspects of dialect. He found (ibid.) systematic differences in phonology, inflection and lexicon,

always in the direction of more differentiation in Brahman forms, and more simplified systematicity in mutaliyaar forms. But we may note that his study did not in fact prove the existence of a mutaliyaar dialect, as opposed to a general NB dialect, and indeed he concludes that the NB dialect he studied was essentially organized around cross-caste communication (1968:472).²

Finally in a recent review of Dravidian sociolinguistics, Southworth (1975 186-7) claims that "South India appears to differ from the Northern areas primarily in having a greater number of social dialects with greater distinctiveness." Nevertheless he indicates that "... a tripartite division [between B, NB and Harijan] seems to be the general picture throughout South India" (1975:189), which is no more (and in fact somewhat less) finely-graded a distinction than that found by Gumperz (1958) in a northern village (although Brahman speech was not there isolated).

What all this amounts to is that the notion of caste dialect probably has very little application to South Indian (and perhaps in general to Indian) materials at all, except in one respect. For in most cases the dialect in question is spoken by a great bloc of castes, specifically the Non-Brahman touchables and the Untouchables, and is thus a property of an entire stratum of the society and not of individual castes. The one exception is of course the Tamil Brahman dialect, which is indeed a property of a group of sub-castes that collectively have a caste identity and which transcends regional differences. This is the one true caste dialect in Tamilnadu, we suspect. Of course there are at least some differences between the speech of each and every caste, for each caste has a slightly different kinship system

and a traditional occupation with its own technicalities, and this guarantees that there will be at least some lexical differences and peculiarities. But if by dialect we understand systematic differences at all grammatical levels, phonological, morphological, syntactic and semantic, then the differences between Non-Brahman castes will not amount to dialects except insofar as they display different regional origins or different exposures to SST as a result of differential education or urban contact.

In short, the study of Tamil dialects is not about to yield a bonanza of sociolinguistic insight into the caste hierarchy. The structure of the caste hierarchy is infinitely richer and more complex than the simple tripartite division into B, NB and Harijan strata which is the most that the study of caste dialects seems to be able to reveal.³ If we wish to gain insights into the nature of that hierarchy, we must turn to other aspects of language and more unorthodox procedures. But before we do that, there are some gross features of the language situation in the village of this study that we should describe.

1.2.2 The language situation in the village

An important initial observation is that Tamil is by no means the only language spoken in the village and in those around. A very few educated persons can speak English, but apart from that there are a number of castes whose native language is Telegu or Kannada; that is, members of these castes speak these languages at home and to other members of their castes. And one quite obvious but interesting thing is that those castes that have a native language other than Tamil invariably belong to the left-hand division. Table 1.2 shows how

native languages are distributed between the seventeen castes selected for this study. We may mention in addition that two other castes with just a few resident families have native languages other than Tamil: one is the naidus, who speak Telegu, and the other is a variety of maataari, closely affiliated to caste 18, who speak Kannada, and who provide the bulk of the maataari population in neighbouring villages. They may both be assigned to the left-hand division, and we include them in Table 1.2. There are some resident Brahmans (Iyengars) who speak Telegu, and some kuravars (possibly local) who speak Kannada.

The four castes included in this study who do not have Tamil as a native tongue, namely 4, 11, 13 and 18, all speak Telegu. But in two cases this is dying out: it is in fact no longer spoken in the homes of caste 13 members except amongst some elderly people, although members of the same sub-caste speak Telegu in the local towns. And the children in at least one home of caste 11 are no longer brought up speaking Telegu at all. So Telegu remains the basic domestic medium for only castes 4 and 18. The Telegu spoken by these castes is mutually intelligible although clearly different, but they strongly avoid speaking Telegu to each other, for as the domestic language it presumably carries (as always in cases of code-switching) the connotations of solidarity. Members of 18 do, however, speak Telegu to each other in front of Tamil speakers, in a way that members of 4 avoid.

The correlation of non-Tamil native language with the left-hand castes fits perfectly with the view of Stein's, mentioned above, that the left-hand castes were late-comers to the area and continue to be viewed as outsiders. Notice that in the case of caste 3, coolI aacaari, even though they speak Tamil they continue to bear the designation that

Table 1.2 Caste, division membership and native language

LEFT-HAND CASTES	NEUTRAL BLOC	RIGHT-HAND CASTES
3: <u>cooli aacaari:</u> Tamil	1: <u>piraamaNam (Brahman):</u> Tamil but there are members of another, Iyengar caste, who speak Telegu	
4: <u>koomuTTi ceTTiyaar:</u> Telegu	2: <u>piLLai:</u> Tamil	5: <u>kavuNTar:</u> Tamil
6: <u>konku aacaari:</u> Tamil		7b: <u>cenkuntam mutaliyaar:</u> Tamil
7a: <u>kaikkoolar mutaliyaar:</u> Tamil		8: <u>paNTaaram:</u> Tamil
		9: <u>uTaiyaar:</u> Tamil
		10: <u>naaTaar:</u> Tamil
11: <u>naayakkar:</u> Telegu		
13: <u>vaTuka vaNNaar:</u> Telegu		14: <u>konku naavitar:</u> Tamil
		16: <u>paraiyar:</u> Tamil
17: <u>kuuTai kuravar:</u> Tamil but related sub-castes speak Kannada*		
18: <u>moracu maataari:</u> Telegu but related sub-caste speaks Kannada		

* nari kuravar and uppu kuravar were both thought to have native languages
other than Tamil, but I was unable to locate them.

indicates they came from cooRa country to the East. In fact, they speak a dialect of Tamil that seems to contain less Western Region dialectal features. But this also is a general feature of left-hand caste speech.

Let us turn now to how the notion of caste dialect applies to the Tamil spoken in the village (recollect that Tamil is the language in which all intercaste interaction takes place). As a preliminary to a study of caste dialects, an informal version of the experiment used by McCormack (1960) was planned. McCormack played tapes of Kannada to native speakers and asked them to assign (amongst other things) the caste of the speaker on the tape. With some measure of success, listeners could assign speakers to the categories B, NB and Harijan (up to 87% correct recognition of Brahmans, but a maximum of only 25% for Harijans; McCormack 1960:80-81). McCormack used listeners from quite different locales within the region from which the speakers came; I used persons of the same or neighbouring revenue village who could not identify the speaker by voice. The results were no more definite than McCormack's. At the most, villagers seemed to be able to make five distinctions between classes of persons:

- (1) Brahmans, provided that they were speaking to other Brahmans; otherwise usually not identifiable,
- (2) members of the dominant caste of kavuNTaars could sometimes be identified by what informants called their "forcefulness",
- (3) members of castes whose native language is Telegu could sometimes be identified as Telegu-speakers by their "pronunciation" and intonation,
- (4) the rest of the touchable castes were identifiable by default,

- (5) the untouchable Harijan castes could usually be identified by their vocabulary and pronunciation.

In no cases, though, were these distinctions clear-cut. For example, Brahmans talking to Non-Brahmans were rarely identified. In the case of Harijans, it is only the maataaris that are clearly distinguishable, kuruvars apparently being easily mistaken for touchables (I could get no tapes of these speakers, and this is merely an informant's judgment), and paraiyars likewise being less distinct. And these were by far the clearest distinctions that could be made.

Now the fact that distinctions like this can be made to some extent is no proof of the existence of caste-dialects, for the listener to the tapes could make inferences from content, and above all from features of language usage like the forcefulness of expression, intonation patterns, and the use of honorifics. In addition, they could make inferences on the basis of regional dialect accentuation and traces of other mother tongues. And in fact, although no painstaking research has been done on this, it seems very likely indeed that these alone are the sources of most of the inferences. A tentative analysis of the basis of the distinctions is as follows:

- (1) Brahmans can indeed be recognized by well-known features of B dialect, but they are able to code-switch entirely into a local NB dialect, and do this except when speaking to Brahmans. For example, a sample of twenty minutes of speech between a member of caste 1 and a member of caste 8 revealed not a single Brahman marker. But the speech of the Brahman was notably less marked for Western Region features than the speech of the member of caste 8.

The picture is somewhat more complicated, however, because when

talking to familiar members of castes 2 and 3 a few Brahman markers crept into the same Brahman speaker's speech. It is probably significant that members of 2 and 3 are the highest left-hand members: for they are vegetarian, are neighbours, and in other respects are socially closer to caste 1 than are members of any other castes.

Although Brahman code-switching of this sort is reported from elsewhere to some limited extent (see e.g. Ramanujan 1968:470), the completeness found here suggests that either the region is remarkable or the discreteness of Brahman dialect has been exaggerated. In none of the tapes collected are the Brahmanical features very predominant.

(2) The identification of kavuNTaars is probably based on aspects of language usage that effectively convey power: for instance the absence of face-redressive strategies (see Brown and Levinson 1977), the use of dishonorifics, and the use of the prosodics of mastery. In addition an important clue is probably the fact that members of caste 5 have the strongest regional dialect (see below).

(3) The clues to Telegu mother tongue are presumably due to interference on various levels (especially prosodic and lexical) from Telegu. It may also be that such speakers tend to use less strongly regional Tamil, veering towards SST.

(4) The bulk of the touchable castes are identified by exclusion, i.e. by the absence of the features identifying the other groups.

(5) Harijans in general are identifiable by a few lexical stereotypes and, in addition, maataaris can be picked out by their Telegu prosodics, while paraiyars can be distinguished from kuruvars because the former have acquired a number of supra-regional SST forms from their extensive urban contacts and employment. Also there are many

aspects of language usage that effectively convey deference which are employed by all Harijans: high pitch, unfinished sentences, the use of super-honorifics.

Two additional important observations are relevant as potential sources of caste-attribution. One of these is that the features of the Western Regional dialect are unevenly spread across the speech of the different castes. It seems that caste 5 (kavuNTaars) employ by far the 'strongest' such dialect, and as a result can be almost unintelligible to an urban Southerner. But castes 8, 9 and 10 are very close behind, followed at some distance by caste 16. It is almost certainly significant that these are all right-hand castes. On the other hand, castes 1, 3, 11 and (I think) 7a, (in that order) use less regional features so that their speech is considerably closer to the supra-regional SST and consequently much more understandable and unmarked to a Southerner. These are all left-hand castes. We are not dealing here with absolute discontinuities but with articulatory gradations and frequencies of choices between one morpheme and another. Thus many speakers use both the Regional and the Standard modal terminations, respectively -ooNum and -aNum ('must', 'should'), but some use the regional form much more often. Moreover there are many individuals who, due to education or urban exposure, are exceptions to our generalizations: for example the President of the village, although a member of caste 5, has dropped many aspects of his regional dialect through a university education.

When asked about caste-dialects, villagers sometimes pointed to these degrees of regional dialect. Thus it was suggested that the SST termination -aNum above is a Brahmanical feature, because it rather than

the regional form is indeed used by Brahmins. But this would have as corollary that the President of the village (a man admirably un-Brahmanical) had picked up a Brahman dialect. The point is that the lack of regional accent is an important clue to caste identification, but cannot be equated with a 'caste dialect'. The clue operates through an association of castes with left or right division, an association of strong regional dialects with right division, and purer standard colloquial with left division, and finally with the idea that caste 5 is the model, the most exaggerated representative, for the right, and caste 1 the model for the left.

The second observation is complimentary. The speech of some castes is much freer from foreign loan-words, particularly English ones, than others', which may contain a great many. Now kavuNTaars try to keep their speech free of such loans, and they take offence if others speak to them using loan words freely. (A young serviceman back on leave told me how he had to pinch himself to avoid using them when paying social calls on fellow kavuNTaar who were seniors.) On superficial inspection, anyway, this restriction seems to apply in general to right-hand castes (though again, individuals with urban experience tend to violate it). Left-hand castes, on the other hand, tend to maintain urban contacts and to flaunt such loan words freely. So those who speak the strongest regional dialect seem to seek to maintain it against all alien incursions, whether from the supra-regional standard or from English; while the speakers whose dialect is closest to SST seem to be keen to adopt further markers of urban sophistication.

What we have argued here is that in general the case for the existence of caste-dialects other than Brahmanical is not strong. And

in our village in particular the most that could be claimed, it seems, is the identifiability of a Brahman and a Harijan dialect. While the former is, except for traces, not publicly employed in the village at all (and may not even be used privately to any great extent), the second would on close analysis most likely amount to little more than lexical and prosodic features. Rather, what we have are a number of clues, provided by strength of regional dialect and aspects of language usage, which point to the most likely bloc of castes that a speaker belongs to. We should mention though that there are without question a number of clearly caste-restricted lexical items: there are for example distinct words for ritual elements and for kinship terms.⁴ In addition, there are a few ordinary lexical items associated with the Brahman dialect that are used by some castes and not others; here again the division is into left- and right-hand castes. Thus castes 1, 2, 3 and 4 may say aaTTlee, 'in the home' while castes 5, 8, 9 and 10 would use uuTTlee; the former is a stereotypical Brahmanical form. But it takes more than a few lexical alternates to constitute a distinct dialect or group of dialects.

The study of caste dialects as such will not then, I believe, throw any great light on the sociological organization of our village.⁵ And from the general skepticism of villagers about the possibility of caste-diagnosis from speech, it seems highly unlikely that there are any less discrete markers of rank of the Labovian variety either. Compared to the ease with which an Englishman thinks he can locate other Englishmen in social space from a small sample of speech, caste-based variation in Tamil seems pretty minimal. But that is not surprising: the circumstances in which hierarchical societies are mirrored in

language variation are much more special than sociolinguists have assumed (they do not, for example, seem to occur in Russian, or more surprisingly in Spanish (Comrie p.c.)).

What does emerge though, are some systematic correlations with the left- and right-hand divisions, which we summarize here in Table 1.3.

Table 1.3: Summary of linguistic features associated with division membership

	<u>Left division</u>	<u>Right division</u>
<u>Native language:</u>	sometimes Telegu	always Tamil
<u>Regional dialect:</u>	negligibly or weakly Western regional; towards standard colloquial (SST)	strongly regional: Western Region features including lexicon
<u>'Purity'</u>	many English loans	avoidance of English loans
<u>Brahmanical lexicon:</u>	a few ritual elements, kin terms, and a few items of general vocabulary adopted by Non-Brahman castes	Non-Brahman alternates used instead

CHAPTER II: THE THEORY OF SOCIAL DEIXIS

	Page No.
2.0 Introductory remarks	37
2.1 Social deixis: general considerations	38
2.1.1 Deixis	38
2.1.2 Social deixis	41
2.1.3 The rational and strategic origins of honorifics	47
2.2 Grammar and social deixis	60
2.2.1 The semantics/pragmatics of social deixis	61
2.2.2 Syntax and social deixis: some problems	75
2.2.3 Social deixis in Tamil	86
2.2.3.1 Referent honorifics	88
2.2.3.2 Addressee honorifics	103
2.3 The usage of socially deictic items: honorifics	107
2.3.1 Geoghegan's theory	111
2.3.2 Brown and Gilman's theory	134
2.3.3 Steps towards a revised theory	146

2.0 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

This chapter is concerned with the proper treatment of honorifics in linguistic and sociolinguistic theory. We start off by arguing, after Fillmore, that honorifics are best considered part of the phenomena of deixis in natural languages. We pass on to a typology of the honorific systems of the world's languages (due in part to Comrie), and then to a discussion of the origin of honorifics. This last is an important area for diachronic linguistics, and also for functional approaches to language: it is claimed (following Brown and Levinson 1977) that fully grammaticized honorifics have origins in productive strategies of language usage, namely those of linguistic politeness. But synchronically honorifics also raise problems. In the first place they cause the kind of context-sensitive perturbations in syntax that can only be handled by rules of the 'transderivational constraint' sort, and are really knock-down evidence that syntax must be context sensitive. In the second place they raise difficult problems for semantico-pragmatic representation: what actually is the content of polite 'vous' for instance? A feature, or set of semantic components? A presupposition? A conventional implicature?

Our answer is that whatever the answer is (and some are suggested) honorifics do have a semantico-pragmatic valuation, and this is distinct from a sociolinguistic interpretation (contrary to suggestions by Geoghegan and Fillmore). The sociolinguistic interpretation is best seen as a set of detailed and complex algorithms for the use of items with specific semantico-pragmatic values. To show this, the theories of Geoghegan and of Brown and Gilman are reviewed at length, and aspects of each incorporated into a revised theory.

Throughout, reference is made to the Tamil honorifics that are the central concern of this study, and a section describes and introduces a number of these.

2.1 SOCIAL DEIXIS: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

2.1.1 Deixis

"Deixis is the name given to those formal properties of utterances which are determined by, and which are interpreted by knowing, certain aspects of the communication act in which the utterances in question have a role" (Fillmore 1971:219). That is, deictic items are linguistic items that are anchored in some aspect of the speech event. Thus words like "I", "you", "here", "now", "this", "tomorrow", "yonder" all seem to make reference to some person, place, or time defined in relation to persons, places and times in the speech event or the context of utterance. Indeed the traditional categories of deixis are just these: person, time and place; and the linguistic areas where these categories were most conspicuous to grammarians seem to have been pronominal systems, time adverbs and tense, demonstratives and place adverbs. But these areas are enough to ensure (thanks especially to tense) that there are almost no sentences in any natural language which are devoid of deictic categories (the putative exceptions are 'eternal sentences' like "two and two equals four").

Despite polite mention in grammatical works (e.g. Lyons 1968), there has been little serious attention given to deixis either descriptively or theoretically within linguistic theory. The main references seem to be Buhler 1934, Frei 1944, and Fillmore 1966. However in still unpublished work Fillmore (n.d., summarized in Fillmore 1971),

has provided an indication of the wide range and exotic nature of some deictic systems, and also some of the basic distinctions and frameworks necessary for their description. To the traditional categories of person, time and place, Fillmore adds discourse deixis and social deixis; in addition he makes an important distinction between deictic and non-deictic usages of deictic words, and more importantly between gestural and symbolic deictic usages. Thus the word 'this' can be used non-deictically as in the exchange: A: What did you do today? B: Oh, this and that; it can be used gesturally as in the phrase 'this finger' (where you have to look to see which one is meant); and it can be used symbolically as in the phrase 'this city', where no such audio-visual monitoring is required for interpretation.

Deixis has been of interest to logicians, however, for far longer. Under the rubrics of indexical signs (Peirce), egocentric particulars (Russell), token-reflexive words (Reichenbach), deixis has been discussed from the point of view of the 'defects' it introduces into a universal scientific language, ensuring that sentences in natural languages are true or false only in relation to a context of utterance.

Now since Morris (1938) proposed that semiotics be divided into the triad, syntax, semantics and pragmatics, and suggested that pragmatics should concern the relation of sentences to contexts, Bar-Hillel (1954) went on to suggest that pragmatics be identified with the study of deixis. From this there arose the philosophical interest in deixis represented by Montague 1972. Montague proposed that model-theoretic semantics for languages with deictic elements (pragmatic languages) be constructed by making the truth of sentences relative not only to possible worlds but also to facets of the context of utterance (pragmatic indices). This proposal has been rapidly adopted by Lewis (1972),

Lakoff (1975) and many others, into linguistic theory. With this adoption goes the general view however that this area belong properly to semantics, not pragmatics, which term should be retained to refer to more intractable areas like speech acts, presupposition and implicature.

However this absorption of deixis into semantics may well be premature, for the facts of deixis are by no means as simple as Montague, Lewis and Lakoff seem to have imagined. In the first place we have Fillmore's distinctions between non-deictic, symbolic and gestural usages of deictic words. Apart from the problem of distinguishing between these usages, the gestural usages in particular are the most unseemly kinds of things to have to incorporate within a model theoretic semantics. In order for the semantics to interpret sentences like those below:

- (1) You, you, but not you, fall out, the rest of you stand at ease.
- (2) Don't pull the trigger now, but NOW!
- (3) He spoke about this loud.

it would have to be endowed with pragmatic indices for the pointing of the index finger, for the intonationally indicated point in time, for the loudness of the speaker's voice, and so on, presumably indefinitely.

Secondly, there are aspects of discourse deixis which raise difficult problems, including the well known difficulty of self-reference (where the object language is also the metalanguage). And thirdly there are the gritty details of social deixis, to which we now turn. These and many other problems make it extremely unlikely that deixis in natural language can be adequately handled entirely within

a formal semantics, as it seems fashionable now to assume.

2.1.2 Social deixis

In lecture notes that he begs not to be quoted, Fillmore (n.d. Deixis II:7) gives the following characterization: "Social deixis, then, is the study of that aspect of sentences which reflect or establish or are determined by certain realities of the social situation in which the speech act occurs". He goes on to indicate that social deixis extends far beyond the categories of person deixis (to which Lyons 1968:280, for instance, seems to have assumed it was limited), to aspects of discourse deixis, and even aspects of speech acts. In certain respects his suggested extensions seem to go too far: it does not seem reasonable to consider that speech acts, simply because they are eo ipso social acts, should be considered to be aspects of social deixis by virtue of that alone. Nor simply because 'upsy-daisy', or 'there you go' typically accompany non-linguistic acts of certain kinds (like the presentatives French voilà, or Tamil intaanka), should they be considered socially deictic. Only in so far as such linguistic features are anchored to the social identities of participants and referents in the speech event should we consider them aspects of social deixis if we are to retain any definite content to the notion of deixis at all. And even then it might be reasonable to restrict the term social deixis to just those kinds of social anchorage that are reflected directly in language structure (rather than in typical styles of language usage, for instance). But we shall suggest some firmer constraints below.

Despite these difficulties, everyone would agree, we hope, that clear cases of social deixis are provided by honorifics, as these are

marked in the person-indicating inflectional paradigms (typically pronouns and verb endings), in names, titles and kin-terms, in the lexicon of languages with 'speech levels', in the terms used for summonses ('attention-getters') and so on. We shall use the term honorifics from time to time to refer to the encoding of social dimensions other than just the relative status of persons on the asymmetric transitive dimension of rank. Extensions will include the mutual deference that encodes the dimension of social distance, the humiliating forms that signal the speaker's low relative status (thus boosting the addressee's or referent's), and dishonorifics where the speaker's relative rank superiority is claimed.

The suggestion that honorifics are properly considered part of the deictic systems of natural languages has a number of distinct advantages. In the first place it predicts that distinctions like 'gestural' versus 'symbolic' usages of deictic terms ought to hold in the area of honorifics. A case in point might be Zwicky's distinction between 'calls' and 'addresses' in the use of vocative forms (Zwicky 1974): thus in Tamil there is a dishonorific -Taa and another Teey which are used to the same range of social alters, but differ in that Taa has symbolic uses in addresses, while Teey only has gestural uses in calls (as an attention-getter).

In the second place it suggests that the interpretation of sentences containing honorifics should be relative to aspects of the context of utterance. So just like the proposition expressed by the sentence "I am here" depends critically on who says it where and when (even though it will be always contingently true for all utterances other than those recorded or relayed), so a sentence containing the

Tamil V pronoun (the polite plural of address) will make a definite statement about the absolute rank of the addressee only relative to the rank of the speaker. A low-caste man will give V to a middle-caste man, who in turn will give V to a high-caste man; but it is only when we know that the speaker is say, a middle-caste man that we know that the addressee must belong to the highest castes.

Thirdly, and most importantly, the deictic interpretation of honorifics predicts precise limitations to the variety of potential honorific systems. For, according to this interpretation, every kind of honorific must be anchored to some particular aspect of the speech event - to speaker, addressee, other participants or bystanders, aspects of the physico-social setting and so on. This fits very well with Comrie's suggestion that there are three main types of honorific, categorizable in terms of the axes on which the systems are built (Comrie 1976):

- (i) the S-H axis: the relation of speaker to addressee,
- (ii) the S-R axis: the relation of speaker to things or persons referred to,
- (iii) the S-B axis, or H-B axis: the relation of speaker to bystanders (participants other than H), or the relation of the addressee to bystanders.

Systems built on the first axis are addressee honorifics proper; systems built on the second are referent honorifics; and systems built on the third are bystander honorifics. Examples of the first are the speech levels of Japanese and Javanese, Madurese and Korean (see respectively Miller 1967, Geertz 1960, Martin 1964, Stevens 1965 and references therein, and the discussion in Brown and Levinson 1977).

The most notable property of these systems is that honour and respect can be given without referring to the person or thing respected. Examples of the second kind of system, referent honorifics, are also to be found in Southeast Asian language. But more surprisingly Comrie points out that the familiar T/V alternation (as in French Tu and Vous) in European languages is in fact a case of referent honorifics and not as might be supposed a case of addressee honorifics; for in these systems it is not possible to express respect to the addressee without reference to him or her. He also points out that a great deal of confusion in traditional accounts of honorific systems has ensued from the failure to make this distinction (see for instance Geertz 1960, Garvin and Reisenberg 1952).

The distinction is neatly exemplified in Tamil, where the plurality of the T/V distinction (with polite plural to respected referents) carries over into the third person pronouns, and into the first person ones as well: clearly the V pronoun is a referent honorific that happens to refer to the addressee. On the other hand there are also some particles (nka, Taa, raa or Lii) which occur freely attached to the major constituents of a sentence, and refer to nothing at all; by using these the speaker can convey respect, or disrespect in some cases, to the addressee without any reference to him or his associates or belongings at all. These are true addressee honorifics.

Referent honorifics are by far the commonest type of system, addressee honorifics are relatively ^{rare}/(at least in a grammaticized form), but the third type, bystander honorifics, are probably the rarest of all. Comrie quotes Dyirbal mother-in-law language as a case (see Dixon 1972:32 and passim). However, as we shall see, the usage of language


in all cultures is probably sensitive to all three of these dimensions.

To Comrie's three dimensions we should now like to add a fourth: the relation of speaker to setting, or social context. For it seems probable that diglossic levels (see Ferguson 1964) are best seen as communicating a socially deictic relation between speakers and situations; or perhaps better, as communicating the social roles adopted by the speaker (and possibly by his audience too) as partially conditioned by setting and activity type (see Blom and Gumperz 1972 for a model of this type). Thus in Tamil any kind of platform speaking (speech making) is invariably carried on in the 'high language' of literary Tamil as far as the speaker is able. This morphologically, lexically and phonologically distinct diglossic variant of the language serves to ennoble the occasion; it 'frames' the setting apart, and endows it with a certain pomp. It seems correct then to think of this language level as conveying honour, respect, and importance to the social occasions in which it is used. Diglossic 'high' variants are then, in many cases anyway, setting honorifics.

Although other dimensions are theoretically conceivable, our suggestion is that these four axes, as diagrammed in Figure 2.1 below, are at least the main, and possibly the only, dimensions of social relationships that are signalled by honorifics in natural languages. We put this framework forward then as a descriptive apparatus more adequate than those suggested by Altmann and Riška (1966) and Neustupny (1968), the only others that have been proposed as far as we know. But it is only when we have far more data on the honorific systems of the world's languages that we will know to what extent

such a typology is adequate.

Figure 2.1: Axes of social deixis



Now insofar as what is grammatically encoded by the linguistic items in question is the relative rank of the referent, addressee, bystander or setting, the items are honorifics. But insofar as social dimensions other than rank are involved, as in, say, kinship terms, we enter other areas of social deixis. Provisionally then we may suggest that the axes in Figure 2.1 are the basic ones throughout systems of social deixes; the social dimensions or categories in which the relationships in each of these axes are assessed, however, may involve much more than simply rank. And often we shall have both rank and other social dimensions like sex and age-grade encoded together: for instance Tamil -Taa is an addressee-(dis-)honorific used only to male addressees.

The great numbers of ways in which each of the relationships on these axes may be measured or categorized is one source of complexity in systems of social deixis. The other major source of complexity is the interaction between these social dimensions and the functional linguistic systems in which they are encoded. Addressee honorifics can be encoded in just about any functional category (greetings, attention-getters, and so on) and just about any linguistic category (lexical, morphological, or items transformationally introduced). Referent

honorifics will be encoded only in those things, events, or actions given respect (or disrespect); typically these include persons (including participants in the speech event) and the things, belongings, productions, actions associated with them. Titles of address and reference, that is, titles referring to second or third persons (both referent honorifics) are probably the only universal form of grammatically encoded honorific.

Bystander and setting honorifics, on the other hand, like addressee honorifics but unlike referent honorifics, should be able to occur throughout the linguistic system.

2.1.3 The rational and strategic origins of honorifics

So far we have skirted the issues raised by our stipulation that honorifics, as opposed to deferential styles of language usage, are fully grammaticized aspects of language structure. The ghost raised is, of course, the distinction between language usage and language structure. Before passing on to the structural correlates of honorifics in the next two sections, some insight into the nature of the distinction can be gained by considering the sources from which honorifics come, as evidenced by their existing form. Essentially our claim will be that any precise watershed between structure and usage is untenable; nevertheless the distinction may label polar types of phenomena requiring different modes of description and explanation. Deference and the expression of rank relations may be conducted at either pole, and the emergence of honorifics is a move along the continuum from one pole to another. The argument here is drawn from earlier work, now published in Brown and Levison 1977.

Let us take as an initial example the T/V pronominal systems, that is, the use of the polite plural second person pronoun to respected singular addressees. The subject is germane since the bulk of this thesis is about the usage of the T/V pronouns in the Tamil of a particular village.

Now the remarkable thing about T/V pronominal systems is that they have a world-wide distribution in a vast number of unrelated languages and cultures. To cite just a few: French, German, Spanish, Italian, Yugoslavian, Gujarati, Afrikaans (Brown and Gilman 1960); Russian, Czech, Polish, Serbo-Croatian and Modern Greek (Comrie 1975); Yiddish (Slobin 1963); Hungarian (Hollo 1975); Swedish (Paulston 1975); Quechua (Lefebvre 1975); Welsh (Thorne 1976); Hindi (Jain 1969); Shona, Venda, Yoruba, Mande, Sukuma and many many other African languages (Gregersen 1974); and apparently in many Mexican Indian languages (as relayed by Fillmore n.d. Deixis II:9-10). As Gregersen on a careful consideration of the African and other data confirms; "We must certainly rule out a single origin for honorific pronouns and assume that the notions of plurality or third person are vivid enough in themselves in conveying the notion of social distance to permit multiple convergence in many parts of the world" (Gregersen 1974:54).

Now one interesting property of these systems is that the distinction between polite and familiar second person pronouns is hardly ever carried over into the plural; that is there tends to be only one pronoun for you plural. This should alert us to the possibility that it is as Gregersen suggests, the fact of plurality itself that is honorific. This is important because a universal association of

plurality and deference is not accounted for by any sociolinguistic or other theory. Still, it could be argued that this association arises simply because in the search for a polite alternate for a second person singular pronoun, the plural comes naturally to hand, and not because there is anything intrinsically honorific about the plural.

The facts about the history of the Tamil pronouns however makes clear that there is indeed such an intrinsic connection. Figure 2.2 shows the historical succession of second person pronominal systems over approximately the last two millenia. The details are due to E. Annamalai (personal communication), Shanmugan (1971:Chapter IV), and Zvelebil (1962); the latter suggests a slightly different succession that makes less sense but in any case does not affect the argument.⁶ Now what Figure 2.2 shows is that somewhere between Proto- and Old Tamil, the old plural niim dropped temporarily out of the language, to be replaced by the singular pronoun suffixed with -(y)ir, a regular plural morpheme. It was this form, niiyir, first just a plural, that became the first honorific singular second person pronoun too. For a while then there was a stable T/V system. But then because of the loss of a distinctively plural second person, the archaic niim was reintroduced; but to emphasize its plurality the regular plural morpheme now current, -kaL, was suffixed onto the already plural older form. By regular processes this became niinkaL, now colloquial niinka, and remains the current plural form. But meanwhile, after a period as a distinctive you-singular-honorific, the older plural niiyir has begun to atrophy. It is now almost extinct in colloquial village Tamil, and its place as a V pronoun of respect has been taken by the current plural.

Figure 2.2 Historical succession of second-person Tamil pronouns





Figure 2.3 Historical succession of third-person masculine Tamil pronouns



In short what seems to be going on is this: as soon as the current plural second person pronoun starts to become used as an honorific singular, a functional pressure seems to build up for the introduction of a true, unambiguous plural pronoun. But when this is introduced, either by adding a plural morpheme onto a singular 'you', or by reintroducing an archaic form, or both, interest in the distinctively honorific but singular V pronoun begins to wane. Instead the new plural begins to be used as the honorific singular form, and the old one atrophies and dies out. What this illustrates is it is not for lack of an honorific form that the plural becomes used as an honorific singular: Tamil actually rejected a possible three term system. It is the plurality itself that is the 'honorific' feature.⁷

Admittedly the details of the second person pronouns are somewhat complex. But the same pattern, here crystal clear, is also to be found in the succession of third-person pronouns, for Tamil carries the polite plural over into the third person category. Figure 2.3 presents the details, and speaks for itself. Note that in each case the singular-honorific form derives from the then current plural.

We must conclude I think that there is some intrinsic connection between plurality and respect. Very well, what is it? The answer suggested in Brown and Levinson (1977) is that this association is a natural outcome of certain productive strategies of language usage which are universal. The argument there is that, other things being equal, language usage is critically organised around the preservation of each participant's 'face' or self-esteem. Where the speaker wishes to communicate something that is intrinsically and at least potentially damaging to other participants' face (that is in our parlance, to

perform a face-threatening act or FTA), he will attempt to mollify it (so long as contrary desires do not over-ride a mutual face respect). Now one element of face seems to be a perennial desire to establish one's own priorities and not be imposed on by others. In doing an FTA then, one typically attempts to indicate one's respect for such elements of alter's face. Further, the greater the social status, or the greater the social distance of alter, the more imperative such indications are.

Now the use of a plural 'you' to a singular addressee can serve as just such an indication. For it does not pin down the addressee irrevocably as the subject of the clause. For instance, suppose the FTA in question is a request, then the speaker asks that the addressee and/or some others do the thing requested; or suppose the FTA is a criticism, then the speaker suggests that the addressee and/or some others did the bad thing in question.

Another rational source, probably complimentary, is that the use of a plural 'you' to a singular addressee can serve to refer to the group with which alter is identified, and thus to the social standing and support that derive from that membership. And in traditional societies in particular an individual's status tends to be predominantly derived from membership in particular groups. In such settings individuals are always representatives, and the motivation for a plural 'you' is the same as the motivation for the 'we' of corporations or corporations-sole (kings and bishops and such like).

These two motives would be little more than speculative origins for stabilized T/V systems, were it not for the fact that one can find existing systems where no stabilized pronominal honorifics exist but

where plurality in pronouns is productively and strategically used to satisfy just such motives.⁸ E.O. Keenan (1974:69-74) for instance, describes how in Malagasy, plural pronouns are used to avoid the singling out of persons in reference, and to embed persons referred to in groups to which they belong - facts that seem to support both of the possible motives above as plausible sources for more stabilized T/V systems scattered around the globe.

Tamil, too, provides clear cases of the motivation for respectful plurality deriving from the treatment of the individual as a member of a corporate group. Nouns which refer to groups or to group property (including members themselves) seldom take singular possessive pronouns. Thus 'my father' is enka appaa, 'our-exclusive father', 'my home town' is enka uuru 'our-exclusive place'. And if a speaker, who addresses a small boy with the T pronoun (nii), refers while speaking to the boy, to his father it would be onka appaa 'your-plural father', and to his house it would be onka viitu 'your-plural house'. Similarly, referring to the same boy's father while talking to someone else, the expression would be avaanka appaa, 'their father'.⁹

There are then intrinsic connections between plurality and respect. And in some cases we can actually see how productive strategies of language use select plural forms to convey such respect. What mechanisms are used to achieve this conveyance? The mechanisms of standard conversational implicature, whereby the union of the apparently inappropriate use of a plural form with a set of expectations about appropriate speech, yield a set of pragmatic inferences. For example, suppose I am addressed with a plural second person pronoun. I am alone (there are no co-addressees). The speaker seems

to have presumed that I am not alone, which is clearly false. Now on the assumption that the speaker is co-operating, then he will not tell me things that are (clearly) false. So he must mean something other than that he presumes that there are some co-addressees. What else could he mean, and intend me to understand? That I should treat his utterance as if I were not alone. And if I were not alone then, (a) I as opposed to my co-addressees would not be being singled out in any onerous way, and (b) my present vulnerability as a single individual would not be being referred to. But if the speaker is conveying this, then he is also conveying that he is attending to my present singular vulnerability. And to attend to and remedy my potential insecurities is to show ritual care for my 'face', and thus to convey respect. So the speaker must be trying to convey respect.

Such an inference schema perfectly fits Grice's specifications for conversational implicature (Grice 1975). And the important point about such inferences is that in no sense are they part of the meanings of the words that were said. Rather they arise (in this case) from a certain discrepancy between what was said and what was expected.

Now clearly conversational implicature is not the only means whereby respect can be conveyed in speech. Indeed, by honorifics one understands some much more direct communication, by means of the actual meaning or significance of the words employed. Cases in point in Tamil include the morphemes avaar and -nka. The word avaar, a third person singular male pronoun, figures in Figure 2.3 above: in old Tamil it was a plural epicene pronoun which then became used to refer also to singular respected referents (males only), and finally lost its plural sense altogether. Now, it simply means 'he-respected' (or to be more

precise denotes 'he' and conventionally implicates 'the referent is respected to a certain degree', an analysis to be justified below). Similarly the bound morpheme -nka as an honorific simply means 'the addressee is respected to a certain (specified) degree'.


The problem that we then face is this: what kinds of connection are there between the free usage of language in strategic ways to give rise to pragmatic inferences of respect-giving (as nicely observable in the Malagasy case) on the one hand, and on the other the existence of morphemes of the language with inbuilt respect-giving as part and parcel of their meanings? Or, in short, how do these aspects of language usage wind up in language structure?

The case of avaar, and equally (*mutatis mutandis*) the case of niir (in Figure 2.2), provides an obvious answer. Here a plural starts off as a plain plural. But the plain plural can be used to conversationally implicate respect to the referent. At first, we may speculate, such implicatures were 'particularized', as Grice (1975:56) distinguished those conversational inferences that depend on special features of a particular context. Later, through continued use, we may imagine that they became 'generalised', in the sense that in general whenever such a plural form was used to a singular addressee the implicature that the referent was respected would normally be made (again see Grice 1975:56 for the distinction). Slowly such extended usages of the plural forms to singular referents actually begin to acquire distinguishing structural correlates. For instance, when avaar refers to a singular honorific referent, nominal predicates no longer show plural agreement with the form of the subject pronoun. Instead when avaar is subject, such predicates agree with the real world singularity of the referent. Such grammatical correlates are discussed extensively

below, but the crucial point here is that as soon as such correlates are acquired, patterns of language usage have actually begun to become incorporated into the structure of the language itself. Then the honorific component is no longer a complex contextual inference: rather the structure of the language itself signals a certain respect-giving value. Such direct relations between language structure and context (here the social relation between speaker and referent) fall not into Grice's category of conversational implicatures, but rather into his category of 'conventional implicatures' (Grice 1975:44). Finally, in the case of avaar and niir, the original plural (non-honorific) meanings atrophy, and we are left with two pronouns that can only refer (in the local colloquial, anyway) to singular respected persons.

The speculative diachronic sequence then, involves a passage from language usage into language structure along the route indicated in Figure 2.4.

Figure 2.4 The evolution of honorifics



Some considerable support for this sequence in Figure 2.4 comes from the fact that one can find at any one point in time ways of con-

veying respect operating at all stages in between the poles, on the one hand, of inferences particular to situations and, on the other hand, of in-built honorific forms without other meanings. (Brown and Levinson 1977 document this at length.) And if this diachronic sequence is correct then we have here a simple but precise mechanism whereby functional pressures, here of a social sort, can impinge on and re-structure a language.

In almost every case the referent honorifics of all the languages that we have perused have turned out on close inspection to have fairly transparent rational origins. That is one can find preserved in their form traces of quite distinct literal meanings that have (in many cases) since atrophied, and these original meanings would have conversationally implicated the respect that is now conveyed conventionally and directly by the form in question. For example, the current Japanese pronouns are derived from circumlocutions that once literally meant things like 'slave' (for 'I'), 'king' (for 'you') and so on (Sansom 1928:78-80,305-6).


However, true addressee honorifics on the other hand generally have much less transparent rational origins. Nevertheless here too with a little bit of speculative archaeology we can unearth similar sources. In fact a number of clues in Tamil and Japanese, for instance, suggest that addressee honorifics (often at least) actually derive from referent honorifics. One clue is simply that in some cases a linguistic form may be both a referent and an addressee honorific (see Brown and Levinson, op.cit. for details). Another is that the form of a present addressee honorific seems likely to be derived from some similar referent honorific.

Consider, for example, the Tamil addressee honorific -nka. Like all addressee honorifics, without referring to him this particle allows the speaker to give respect to the addressee. Now the form -nka has a remarkable similarity to the plural morpheme (underlying -kaL) not as it occurs everywhere, but as it occurs after a nasal segment. Now the personal pronouns, and their associated verbal agreements, when pluralized have as their final three segments the form -nka. And plural pronouns used to singular addressees are referent honorifics. Could the addressee honorific -nka have derived then from the final segment of these referent honorifics, and if so how? A possible source is this. Referent honorifics can be used to give respect to the addressee indirectly even when not referring to him, by giving respect to the addressee's close associates or belongings. These are then, if one likes, inferentially derived addressee honorifics, and they may stabilize in the way that some Japanese referent honorifics have so that they may only be used in reference to the addressee's associates or belongings (see Yamanashi 1974:765, Kuno 1973:Chapter 9). From there it is but a small move to shift the respect from the referent to the addressee always associated with it. And so we end up with a true addressee honorific.

Returning to -nka, we may hypothesize that it evolved in the following way. At first we have the straightforward referent honorifics formed by using the plural pronouns or their associated verbal endings to singular addressees, for example avaanka ('they' for 'he/she honorific'), poonka ('you-plural go!' for 'you-honorific go!') and so on. Then since the persons referred to, when not the addressee himself, were associates of the addressee (members of his family, kin-

group or caste) – and this provided the motivation for the use of honorifics – then by using honorifics referring to such associates of the addressee the speaker by implication gave respect to the addressee himself. This implicature became generalized, and finally conventionalized. And at that point, when -nka came to conventionally implicate respect to the addressee irrespective of the form to which it was attached, it became syntactically liberated. For the respect given was not now respect towards whatever referent the word had to which -nka was attached; so there was no particular reason to attach -nka to any particular word. And that is the present state of play, with -nka being a particle that conventionally implicates respect to the addressee, and is freely attachable to any major constituent of a sentence.¹⁰ Figure 2.5 sums up this argument schematically.

Figure 2.5 The evolution of addressee honorifics from referent honorifics



What we have tried to do in this section is, firstly, establish that honorifics are not arbitrary in form, secondly, point out that their form indicates that they derive from frozen strategies of language usage, and thirdly, sketch the diachronic processes whereby aspects of language usage can become incorporated into the structure

of a language. A more thorough treatment may be found in the oft-cited Brown and Levinson (1977).

If the argument here is approximately correct then it has considerable importance beyond the study of honorifics. For if we can show that there are well-attested mechanisms whereby the way a language is used can feed back and be incorporated into the actual derivational machinery of that language, then functional theories of grammar have a solid foundation. And amongst the functions performed are social ones, as here evidenced, which suggests that anthropology and linguistics may have more in common than Chomsky, for instance, would allow.

Another important point that emerges is that conversational implicature, conventional implicature, and context-sensitive trans-derivational constraints – that is the mechanisms suggested in the diachronic processes above (and discussed below) – may play a very important part in language change.

2.2 GRAMMAR AND SOCIAL DEIXIS

We have argued that honorifics originate in deferential usages of language, which then pass by degrees into the structure of the language over time. In this section we return to a synchronic perspective, and consider how the facts of social deixis are to be accommodated within the theoretical frameworks provided by current linguistic theories. We have already argued that deixis is not so amenable to simple formal treatment within an indexical semantics as many philosophers and linguists have assumed (and Fillmore 1976 assembles many further difficulties). And we shall now find that

further difficulties arise with social deixis in particular. We shall conclude that, at the very least, the more outlandish items in the linguist's arsenal - transderivational constraints, conventional implicature - will have to be employed if current frameworks are to accommodate the facts.

Why bother to try and squeeze the facts about social deixis into frameworks that are still clearly inadequate for the description of natural languages? For two reasons: in the first place it is only by trying that the directions of inadequacy are shown up; and secondly social deixis is an important area for linguistic theory. It is important because it clearly demonstrates the necessity for the integration of pragmatics within linguistic theory.

2.2.1 The semantics/pragmatics of social deixis

It seems clear that, in some sense, honorifics have as part of their meaning their social significance. For example, we could say that part of the meaning of (1) below is (2):

(1) niinka vaattiyar.

You+honorific (are the) teacher.

(2) With respect to the speaker, the addressee is socially higher or socially distant.

Here the honorific is the Tamil V-pronoun, the plural second person pronoun used to a singular addressee (as shown by the singular noun vaattiyar). We may now ask exactly what the relation between (1) and (2) is. We could assume that (2) is just part of the (non-presuppositional) logical form of (1), but this is ruled out by the fact that the negation of (1), namely (3), still has (2) un-negated as part of its meaning:

(3) niinka vaattiyaar ille.

You+honorific are not (the/a) teacher.

For a logical form L_1 entails itself, but the negation of L_1 cannot entail part of itself. So if by analogy to the Russellian expansion of definite descriptions (2) was part of the logical form of (1), then (2) should not survive un-negated as part of the meaning of (3), which it appears to do.

What kind of meaning survives un-negated when a positive sentence is negated? Semantic presupposition of course. So (2) could be a semantic presupposition of (1). And by semantic presupposition we mean the following: assuming a non-bivalent semantics, A presupposes B iff A entails B and not-A entails B. However, negation is not the only sentential operator that fails to block the assumption of (2). Consider (4):

(4) niinka vaattiyaar nnu irukkulaam.

You-honorific (are the) teacher it may be.

It may be that you are the teacher.

Here (2) still holds, rather than the mere possibility that (2) is the case. So to capture this we would have to change our definition of semantic presupposition, as once suggested by Karttunen (1971), to the following: A presupposes B iff possibly-A entails B and possibly-not-A entails B (since A entails possibly-A this definition will still handle the non-modal cases). But in what is now a renowned proof Herzberger (1971) showed that no logical sense can be made of this.

So (2) cannot be a semantic presupposition of (1), if indeed the notion of semantic presupposition has any application to natural

language at all (as now seems very doubtful). But that is hardly surprising, for although we have represented (2) as a sentence, and the relation between (1) and (2) as a relation between two sentences, yet (2) clearly describes aspects of the context of utterance. So we have been in the wrong ball-park all along, for the linguistic component that described the systematic relations between sentences and contexts is not semantics but pragmatics.¹¹ Pragmatics, said Morris (1938) is the study of the relation of signs to users, and (2) makes explicit reference to users (speakers and addressees). Of course if our semantics is indexical, then speakers and addressees can be located and endowed with special properties within semantics; but as we have seen that will not help us, because there is no semantic relation (entailment, presupposition) between (1) and (2).

Very well, let us turn to pragmatic relations. How could (2) be related to (1)? A good guess is: by pragmatic presupposition. Indeed one of the few concrete suggestions for the treatment of the significance of honorifics suggests precisely this: Keenan (1971:51) mentions "...the French Tu es degoutant, in which it is (pragmatically) presupposed that the addressee is an animal, child socially inferior to the speaker, or personally intimate with the speaker."

Many definitions of pragmatic presupposition have been suggested. Gazdar (1976:162-174) has a useful summary and discussion of those due to Keenan, Karttunen, Thomason and Stalnaker. But in essence pragmatic presupposition for these authors consists of those beliefs and presumptions that have to be assumed in order for an utterance to be felicitous or appropriate. More particularly, if we think of a conversation as articulated on and augmenting a store of mutual

knowledge or beliefs, then an utterance will only be appropriate if its pragmatic presuppositions are already part of (or deducible from) the accumulated store of mutual knowledge.

As Gazdar (ibid) correctly points out, these definitions are at once too general (including for example what Searle 1970 calls "normal input/output conditions"), and too strong in that they rule out the possibility of augmenting mutual knowledge with some proposition A simply by presupposing A.

Let us return to the linguistic phenomenon that these definitions are attempting to account for. We may include all those inferences that were once thought to be examples of semantic presupposition, but which are defeasible in a manner that cannot be accounted for in terms of an invariant semantic relation (for example, the presuppositions of cleft sentences, factive verbs, iteratives). The inferences so gathered share the following important properties:

- (i) They are triggered by specific aspects of surface linguistic form such that it would in general be possible to find another sentence that had the same truth conditions but lacked the inferences in question.
- (ii) They are defeasible in the sense that they may be overtly denied ('Stephen doesn't regret doing linguistics because he never did') or suspended ('Stephen doesn't regret doing linguistics, if indeed he ever did'); or in the sense that they may be cancelled by the conversational context (see e.g. Thomason 1973, Gazdar 1976:172).
- (iii) Their preservation or cancellation in complex sentences is systematic but by no means easy to predict; the problem of

prediction is known as the projection problem for presuppositions and the only sophisticated attempts to solve it are due to Karttunen (1973a, 1973b, 1974a, 1974b) and Gazdar (1976).

Let us now ask whether the social significance of honorifics (for example the part of the meaning of (1) above expressed in (2)) can in fact be treated as pragmatic presuppositions. We may begin by considering whether the inferences from honorifics exhibit the three cardinal properties immediately above. Clearly the significance of honorifics, like pragmatic presuppositions, is triggered by aspects of sentential form; so criteria (i) above is met. But what about (ii)? Are the deferential aspects of honorifics cancellable by linguistic or non-linguistic context? Not it seems in the way that pragmatic presuppositions are. For a statement of (1) above conjoined with the denial of (2) would either be pragmatically bizarre or be understood in a different way. Thus

(5) niinka vaattiyaar aanaa mariyaate kuTukka maaTTeen.

You+honorific (are the) teacher but I will not give you respect.

does not cancel the honorific, but is simply understood to mean that respect will not be given in other (non-linguistic) ways (or possibly that the speaker, from strength of habit, has been unable to follow his announced policy). Similarly, I think, (6) below is not interpretable in the way that (7) is interpreted in English:

(6) niinka vaattiyaar, mariyaate kuTukkaNumnaataan.

You+honorific (are the) teacher, if indeed I should give (you) respect.

(7) I didn't meet any good taxidermists in Britain, if indeed there are any.

Nor does it seem to me to be the case that conversational contexts can cancel the significance of honorifics in the way that they can cancel presuppositions. Ironic or sarcastic usages of honorifics would of course be exceptions, but then irony can cancel just about every aspect of meaning including entailments.

So honorifics do not seem to meet criteria (ii), typical of pragmatic presuppositions. What about (iii), the particular mechanisms whereby the presuppositions of embedded sentences are preserved or cancelled in complex sentences? Do the inferences from honorifics behave in the same way? The answer I think is no. Consider (8):

(8) Hunt said that Nixon regretted 'wasting' Torrijos where the presupposition triggered by regret (Nixon did 'waste' Torrijos) is not inherited by the sentence as a whole because, in Karttunen (1973a)'s terms, the verb say is a 'plug' that cancels presuppositions of embedded clauses. Now compare (9):

(9) niinka vaattiyaar nnu raamu connaar.

You+honorific (are a) teacher, Ramu said.

Ramu said that you+honorific are a teacher.

This can be understood in two ways: one in which Ramu's actual words are reported in which he asserts that the speaker of (9) is a teacher ("You are a teacher" said Ramu); and another in which the pronouns are switched to the point of view of the present speech event, so that Ramu is asserting that the addressee of (9) is a teacher. But irrespective of whom the honorific pronoun refers to, it retains its honorific component, and on the second reading survives as a presumption of respect owed by the speaker to the hearer despite the embedding beneath a 'plug'.

The ambiguity in (9) illustrates that the 'projection problem' for honorifics is of an entirely different kind than that for pre-suppositions. In the case of honorifics the pragmatic inferences in question are not cancellable at all (except in ironies, jokes and other special usages), but the problem is to locate which speech event and which participant they are deictic with respect to.

So honorifics, and socially deictic items in general, fail to meet any but the first of the distinguishing criteria for pragmatic pre-suppositions. And to include them by fiat would only be to introduce unwarranted heterogeneity. What, then, can the significance of honorifics be? That is, what is the relation between, for instance, (1) and (2) above?

Gazdar (1976:183-185) noting this dilemma, suggests two possible solutions. In the one we resuscitate semantic presupposition, now with an indexical semantics, just to handle the non-defeasibility of inferences from honorifics. Alternatively we treat them as conventional implicatures. The first alternative is ruled out by the way in which such inferences are maintained in modal contexts (as discussed above with reference to example (4)). Gazdar's second solution must then by default be the correct one (or the nearest we can achieve at present) - for we have almost exhausted the resources of semantic and pragmatic relations.

Grice (1975:45) introduced the notion of conventional implicature briefly before passing on to conversational implicature. A conventional implicature is part of the meaning of a sentence which is not part of the truth conditions for that sentence, nor an inference "replaceable by an argument" (ibid:50). Grice's example is the conjunction

therefore, which on his analysis 'indicates' but does not entail that the second conjunct 'follows from' the first. Other examples that have been suggested are but (Grice 1961), even (Kempson 1975), and the "non-logical implications" of Wilson (1975) which include the difference between deprive and spare, and words like yet. Karttunen and Peters (1975) even suggest treating all pragmatic presuppositions as conventional implicatures in a Montague grammar, but, as Gazdar (1976: 74-77) convincingly argues, this is almost certainly the wrong treatment.

This then is the category to which we propose assimilating the meaning of socially deictic items. Incidentally, Grice's alternative category, conversational implicatures, is ruled out by their defining property of 'non-detachability', that is, the requirement that conversational implicatures are not carried by specific surface forms.

The key property of conventional implicatures is that they are direct unmediated relations between aspects of the context and linguistic form. There are no intermediate principles or generalizations that predict or control them. Consequently they are relatively easy to formalize, and this has been achieved by Gazdar and Klein (1976) by formalizing context-sensitive transderivational constraints. For what the latter are are simply rules for inserting (or equivalently, failing to filter out) linguistic items just in case the context meets certain conditions. So a conventional implicature is the contextual significance associated with any item so introduced.

But having come this far we now see how little we have gained. By definition socially deictic items have as a crucial part of their interpretation systematic relations with aspects of the social context. By treating these as conventional implicatures we now find that there

is nothing more to say about them, other than specifying for each item the conditions under which it may be inserted. So the categories of linguistic theory do not present us with any further insights into the phenomenon of social deixis, even if the phenomenon can be accommodated into existing frameworks (so long as we make use of the controversial notions of conventional implicature and context-sensitive trans-derivational constraint).

Before leaving the problem of the pragmatic interpretation of honorifics, let us return to consider the phenomenon itself. So far we have dealt only with the Tamil V-pronoun niinka, taking it as our paradigmatic case. We have argued, at least implicitly, that there are two components to the meaning of niinka: one component denotes the addressee, and so figures in the truth conditions for any sentence with niinka; the other component makes no difference to the truth conditions, and conventionally implicates that the addressee is socially higher than or socially distant from, the speaker. Now let us take some other Tamil honorifics. (We shall do no more than sample some here: some have already been mentioned and others will be introduced in the text below when they become relevant, while an overall sketch is provided in the following section).

We may begin by considering the alternates for niinka, that is all the linguistic items that function as second person singular pronouns. The six items in Table 2.1 below are all used in the village of the study.

As discussed in the preceding section these all have fairly clear rational origins. Nevertheless for grammatical purposes we must treat these as true second person pronouns when they are so used; syntactic

Table 2.1 Alternates for singular second-person pronoun

<u>Form</u>	<u>'Literal meaning'</u>
<u>nii</u>	you-singular
<u>atu</u>	it
<u>niir</u>	archaic you-plural
<u>niinka</u>	you-plural
<u>naam</u>	we-inclusive
<u>taankaL</u>	themselves

evidence forces us to this conclusion as reviewed below. So, ignoring their 'literal meanings' where these are not second-person singular pronouns (and by 'literal meaning' we mean the meaning they have in all other usages), we can consider each of them to have two meaning components just like niinka: one which denotes the addressee, and the other that conventionally implicates some dimensions of the social relationship between the speaker and the addressee. And what differs for the six items above is, clearly, the second component. In this case the conventional implicatures form a scale of deference: the conventional implicature of nii, at one pole, is that the addressee is socially close or inferior to the speaker, while the conventional implicature of taankaL at the other pole is that the addressee is very distant or (more likely) very much higher than the speaker in social prestige. The other forms have conventional implicatures between these points, in the order in which they appear in the table. We can show this because villagers can and do make detailed inferences about social status from observed usages, a point that will be exploited to the

full below.

In our glosses for the relevant conventional implicatures, we have referred to two social dimensions, a horizontal social distance and a vertical social distance - which we may identify with Brown and Gilman's solidarity and power respectively (1960). The scale of implicated deference above is vague or more likely ambiguous between these two dimensions. We suppose that the implicature of each form is actually ambiguous because, although no ambiguity tests would reveal this, usage in interaction disambiguates which dimension is operative in the following precise way. If any of the forms are symmetrically exchanged, they must implicate values on the horizontal social dimension; if the forms are asymmetrically exchanged (A uses form F to B, B uses form F to A) then they must implicate values on the vertical social dimension.

So to represent the social significance of each of the forms in the table we may associate with each form, as its conventional implicature, two values from 1-n. One value will represent the degree to which the addressee is socially distant from the speaker (say, value 1 for nii, 2 for atu, 3 for niir and so on). The other will represent the degree to which the addressee has a higher social status than the addressee (say, 1 for nii indicating that the addressee is actually lower in social status, 3 for niir indicating equality, 5 for naam indicating the great superiority of the addressee over the speaker, and so on).

If we now consider other kinds of socially deictic items in Tamil, we shall find that these two scales of values will handle the bulk of their conventional implicatures. For instance, summonses or hails


(attention-getters) come in a neatly ranked series, such that as the person to be addressed becomes more socially remote (either vertically or horizontally) choice shifts down the graded series. Similar observations can be made for titles of address and other functional categories. In these and other cases various other social dimensions, like sex or caste membership, may also be conventionally implicated.

It should not be thought that with the assignment of conventional implicatures to honorifics that their total pragmatic significance is fully captured. Rather we have assigned them a meaning, albeit of a rather special kind. Given this basic meaning, conversational implicatures of various sorts can be generated. For example there are ironic usages of honorifics. Further, honorifics may be used to trigger rather complex pragmatic inferences: for instance it is polite when making requests to up-scale one's basic level of respect-giving in order to communicate that one has no right to thus impose one's demands. And there is also a wide range of usages that trade on what we may call 'deictic triangulation'. The phenomenon may be illustrated by considering the range of titles and names that one may use in English in order to refer to third parties. For example referring to some academic who is called Professor Henry E. Bloggs, the following range of terms is available, to indicate but a few:

- (i) Professor Bloggs
- (ii) Dr Bloggs
- (iii) Bloggs
- (iv) Harry Bloggs
- (v) Harry

Now the crucial point is that the choice of one of these is determined

not only by the speaker's relation to Bloggs, but also his relation to the addressee, and even by the relation of the addressee to Bloggs. Three relations then are involved, as below:



For example if the speaker is a senior colleague of Bloggs and he is talking to an undergraduate, he may refer to Bloggs with either (i) or (ii). But if the addressee is also a colleague, then the term used is more likely to be (iv) or (v). If on the other hand both speaker and addressee are undergraduates, they may refer to Bloggs with (iii) or (iv); but if the addressee happens to be the nephew of Bloggs, then (i) or (ii) might be more appropriate.

Faced with this we could in despair conclude that the conventional implicatures of some mode of reference to persons are complex vector values derived from all three relationships. But it would be simpler to assume that each form encodes a certain basic relationship between the speaker and the referent only, and that the other two relationships are derived by inference from the usage of a particular form by a particular speaker to a particular referent in a particular context. Besides we have to allow for further contextual dependencies of the sort that ethnomethodologists call 'formulation' (see Schegloff 1972a): for example when referring to Bloggs' intellectual contributions form (iii) is probably the most appropriate, even though the same

speaker and addressee might refer to him in some other role of his as (ii) or (v). And things get complex when there are more than one addressee: in England one would then operate around the addressee who had the lowest or most distant status vis-a-vis the speaker and the referent; in the U.S.A. one would probably use the term most appropriate for the addressee who was closest to the speaker and the referent.

Hence we suggest that terms of reference like these, encode as conventional implicatures only the relationship of speaker to referent. And given that aspect of meaning, usages in particular contexts can give rise to a wide range of inferences. Notice that such inferences can be the source of language change: for the process illustrated in Figure 2.5 above revolves around an inference by 'deictic triangulation'.

Fortunately we shall not need to worry overmuch about the complexities introduced by deictic triangulation below, because we shall be especially concerned with referent honorifics used in address - that is, where the referent is the addressee. In these cases, though, similar three-way relationships emerge where a bystander influences the choice of address (for example the presence of a father can constrain a lower caste speaker to use a V pronoun to his son).

Deictic triangulation of the sort discussed above does however pervade the use of Tamil third person pronouns. For example Dr E. Annamalai points out (personal communication) that a friend of his who might refer to him without honorifics to a third friend, would use the honorific avaar to one of the referent's subordinates. Similarly Dr Annamalai might refer to his own wife with honorifics in speaking to his daughter (e.g. amma enke irukkaanka, 'where is-

honorific mother?), taking the daughter's point of view, a usage quite inappropriate from his point of view. It is because this kind of three-way relationship is nearly always involved that the usage of third person pronouns cannot be predicted on the basis of the social categories of speaker and referent alone. The sociological insights that can be extracted from such usage in a simple way are thus few, and it is for this reason that third person pronominal usage in the village is not reported fully in this thesis.

2.2.2 Syntax and social deixis: some problems

We have already indicated the basic kind of syntactic machinery required to control the distribution of linguistic items that carry conventional implicatures, namely context-sensitive transderivational constraints. The admission of these rules or constraints into syntactic theory has been objected to on sound methodological grounds by Sadock (1974, 1975). Nevertheless, honorifics provide a knock-down case for their necessity, and the consequent loss of a tightly-constrained syntax or 'semantax' will have to be repaired in other ways. And since Gazdar and Klein (1976) have shown that no necessary incoherence attaches to the formalization of such constraints, we shall suppose that this is indeed the correct way to handle the insertion (or filtering) of socially-deictic surface forms. Honorifics provide a case for the necessity of such rules because, as established in the previous section, even the simplest honorifics like V-pronouns cannot be presumed to have their deferential component in logical form; consequently they must be 'transformationally introduced' in relation to pragmatic features, as has been argued for the far more complex Japanese honorifics by Harada (1976).

There is however another possibility for the treatment of honorifics with clear rational sources (like the T/V pronouns): we could say that such honorifics have their literal meanings (in the case of T/V pronouns, a V-pronoun would then be simply plural), and their social significance is due to a separate level of pragmatic inference. Now for sentences like (10), we could actually maintain this position:

(10) niinka vantainka.

You-plural	} have come.
You-honorific	

for (10) is actually 'ambiguous' between the two readings glossed. However the third person pronouns offer honorific alternates that, although once productively plural in morphology, are now simply marked for the relationship between speaker and referent:

(11) avaan vantaan.

He came.

(12) avaar vantaar.

He-honorific came-honorific.

Here (11) gives no respect, but in (12) the speaker conveys respect to the necessarily singular male referent, and there is corresponding agreement in the verb. But (13) is again ambiguous:

(13) avaanka vantaanka.

They	} came.
He/she-honorific	

The lack of ambiguity in (12) makes a purely pragmatic treatment of honorifics (as say, conversational implicatures) quite impossible.

But apart from the fact that not all honorifics are ambiguous between an honorific and some other reading, even those honorifics

that are sometimes ambiguous are not always. Consider (1), repeated here as (14).

(14) niinka vaattiyaar.

You-honorific (are the) teacher.

Here only the honorific reading is possible, because the plural reading requires morphological agreement of the predicate, as in (15).

(15) niinka vaattiyaarkaL.

You-plural (are) teachers.

We have here then an important fact: agreement rules are pragmatically sensitive, distinguishing polite singular pronouns from real plural pronouns that are represented by the same morpheme.

Comrie (1975) has drawn attention to the widespread nature of this phenomenon with reference to an entirely different theoretical problem, the existence of a category 'squish'. What he found was that where predicates are finite verbs, the predicate is most likely to agree with the superficial number of the subject, even if this is a plural form that is in fact a polite singular. Nominal predicates, on the other hand, are most unlikely to agree with the superficial plurality of a polite pronoun. Hence the difference between (13) and (14) above. Other predicates formed with verbal participles or adjectives fall in between the verb-to-noun continuum.

In Tamil the facts seem to be these. Finite verbs agree with the superficial plural form of a polite pronoun, while nominal predicates do not. In between, relative participles agree like finite verbs:

(16) avaanka vantiruvaanka.

They are the ones who came.

He/she-honorific is the one who came.

thus retaining the ambiguity of (13). And there is a class of personal nouns formed from adjectives where such agreement is also found:

(17) *avaanka nallavanka.*

They are good (people).

He/she-honorific is a good (person).

but another class where the agreement stops for some kinds of subjects and not others. Thus third person pronouns agree with the adjectival form *keTTi* in:

(18) *avaanka keTTikaaranka* (not **avaanka keTTikaarar*).

They are clever (people).

He/she is a clever (person).

but second person pronouns do not necessarily, as (19) shows:

(19) *niinka keTTikaarar.*

You-honorific are a clever (fellow).

These facts show that the pressure for morphological agreement pushes superficial agreement with polite plurals pretty far towards the nominal end of the category 'squish' in Tamil. Note that until the agreement breaks down, the polite forms are ambiguous between polite singulars and straightforward plurals.

Some further facts about predicate agreement in Tamil are these. Where the subject of the clause is a singular noun rather than a pronoun, the predicate may still take plural endings to show respect, as will be illustrated below. Mostly these are optional, so that for instance one can say either (20) or (21):

(20) *saar colraar*

Sir says...

(21) saar colraanka

Sir says-plural (honorific) ...

But if the subject noun has an in-built honorific termination (as in the -ar of talaivar, 'headman', but not the -ar of saar which is merely a derivative from English 'sir', then the predicate ending must superficially agree at the same honorific level as the subject, as in:

(22) talaivar colraar (not *talaivar colraanka)

The headman says (not 'the headman says-plural').

In other words, in the losing battle against the intrusion of the irregularities introduced by honorifics, the morphology seems to cling to superficial regularities in agreement, thereby introducing further irregularities from a syntactic point of view.

Now let us consider the problems that such facts pose for a syntactic theory that makes no reference to pragmatics. What we have found is that plural-appearing polite pronouns with actually singular reference only sometimes trigger predicate agreement: such pronouns are plural for morphological processes just when the corresponding predicates are verbs or participles, or (sometimes) personal nouns derived from adjectives, but are singular when the predicates are nominal (as in example (14) above).

To handle precisely similar problems with the Russian V-pronoun, Corbett (1977) suggests that awkward rules like the following will be necessary. Let the V-pronoun be specified as both (+singular) and (+plural); then context-sensitive rewrite rules can cancel one of the features depending on the nature of the following predicate. If the predicate is a nominal, then (+singular) will be selected; if it is a finite verb, then only (+plural) will be retained, and so on.

Such rules could be adapted to the Tamil case, but note that they already require identification of the polite pronoun versus the true plural pronoun, since only the former will be specified as both (+singular) and (+plural). So the morphology must be informed of the origin of the pronoun and whether it derives from some item that has a representation in logical form or from some form that was introduced by context-sensitive transderivational rule.

But there are more problems. Some singular NPs take plural endings on verbal predicates, as in:

(23) periyammaa colraanka

'mother's elder sister' says-plural

where the plural ending indicates respect. But not all human singular NP's can trigger such plural verbal agreement: (24) would be bizarre to any Tamil.

(24) tampi colraanka

'younger-brother' says-plural

for in Tamil culture no one gives respect to their younger brothers, or at least not that much. In any case, (23) poses problems for the formal statement of agreement rules. As Comrie (1976:412 fn 9) notes for a precisely similar problem in Polish, "What this suggests is that plural agreement with the polite plural is triggered not so much by the feature (plural) on the subject noun phrase, but rather by a feature of politeness....Thus plural agreement may be triggered either by a strict (real-world) plural subject, or (in different degrees in different languages) by a subject noun phrase to whose referent the speaker wishes to indicate respect". In other words, to give Comrie's suggestion some formal flesh, a context-sensitive transderivational

rule would have to secure the insertion of a feature of deference to the referent before the application of rules for predicate agreement. And the feature would have to be inserted just in case the speaker has the intention of showing such respect.

Furthermore there are always a range of alternates expressing degrees of respect. For example, the following are ordered in increasing degrees of respect to the referent:

- (25) vaattiyar colraan
the teacher says (singular male ending)
- (26) vaattiyar colratu
the teacher says (neuter singular ending)
- (27) vaattiyar colraar
the teacher says (singular male honorific)
- (28) vaattiyar colraanka
the teacher says (singular very honorific ending)

Consequently, the feature of politeness to be associated with the subject NP must distinguish at least three degrees of respect (taking (25) to be the grammatically basic agreement). Note that as (26) shows, it is not only person and number switches (and special inflections as in (27)) that can be utilized to show respect: gender switches to a neuter form allow a level of what Annamalai and Ramanujan (n.d.) call 'neutral honorifics'.

Before leaving referent honorifics, let us just indicate a range of further syntactic problems. The full range of person-number switches in the use of Tamil pronouns will be sketched below, and it should be borne in mind that each of these introduce particular syntactic problems. For example:

(29) naamtaan esamaanka.

literally: We inclusive are the Lord.

with a singular nominal predicated of the necessarily plural first person inclusive, is well formed on the interpretation that the we-inclusive is the 'plural of majesty' ('royal we'), a colloquial usage by important persons in rural Tamilnad. Other difficulties arise from the use of titles in address: as Corbett (1977) documented for Russian and other languages, one tends to find vacillation between second and third person verb agreement in such circumstances. For example:

(30) esamaanka colraanka

the Lord says (plural agreement)

could be used to inform the addressee (of high station) that he said such-and-such; but such third person titles also sometimes take second person verbal agreement as in:

(31) iruntaa, esamaanka kuTunka.

If there is (any), You-plural Lord give.

Indeed (30) could be expressed as:

(32) esamaanka colroom

the Lord we-inclusive say

where the first person inclusive is understood standardly as implicating second person super-respected.

However, an entirely different set of problems emerges with addressee honorifics (as defined above), where respect (or disrespect) is conveyed directly to the addressee in any sentence without necessarily referring to him or his possessions. For example one can say:

(33) nalla caappaaTunka.

(It is a) good meal.

where the underlined particle -nka serves to give respect to the addressee. Now this particle refers to nothing (has no denotatum) and can have no representation in logical form. The interesting questions then are when in a derivation and how it is introduced, and what kind of relations it enters into (syntactically) with other items in surface structure.

Relevant to the location of -nka insertion in derivational sequences are observations like the following. Insertion precedes various morpho-phonemic operations like those that realize underlying representations of word-final /-L/ just in case a following bound morpheme has an initial vowel. Thus (34) with the honorific -nka added in final position is realized as (35):

(34) "veLiyee naTa"(e)nkaraanka.

"Walk out" they said.

(35) "veLiyee naTa"(e)nkaraankaLunka.

In addition, -nka insertion must precede yes-no question formation, for the question-marking post-fix always comes after -nka if they are both adjoined to the same word (Tamil has no infixes so we infer that the rightmost post-fix is latest adjoined). For example, (36) is the positive declarative for which (37) is the corresponding yes-no question marked by -aa (both have final-word -nka insertion):

(36) muttee inke vantaanunka.

Muttu came here.

(37) muttee inke vantaanunkaLaa.

Incidentally, this shows that -nka has the underlying form -nkaL, thus

further confirming its historical derivation from the plural marker -ka(L). But if -nka insertion precedes yes-no question formation, it follows WH-question formation, as shown by (38):

- (38) naan koRantiinka kunciiink kuuTTikiTTu enkiinka saami
pooveenunko?

Where will I take my fledgling children and go Lord?

In this sentence there are no less than three -nka's, but the one that interests us is the final three segments on enkiink, a word formed of the question word enke ('where') with final -nka. Now since nka is a bound morpheme, it requires the presence of enke prior to insertion.

So this at least we know: -nka must be introduced at some intermediate (non-final) level of syntactic derivation. Consequently we cannot treat it as some mere phonological increment, pragmatically conditioned. But if -nka insertion is a true syntactic process, we are left with the embarrassment that -nka cannot sensibly be assigned to any grammatical category nor sensibly bracketed with (or adjoined to) any unit of surface structure.

To see the force of these remarks we must consider the syntactic distribution of -nka. In brief, -nka can be post-fixed to almost any word in a sentence that is not a modifier; and in any one sentence it may occur in a number of such slots simultaneously (at least in the Western dialect - but in standard Tamil it seems to occur only once per sentence). To illustrate, -nka may occur in all or any of the slots marked () in the following sentence:

- (39) naan() matraasukku() pooratanaale(), nalla taksi()
veeNum().

In order for me to go to Madras, a good taxi is needed.

As indicated, it may not occur between the adjective nalla ('good') and the noun it modifies; similarly it may not be postfixed to the relative participle before a head noun as in:

- (40) *naan paattavunka payan
the boy whom I saw-nka

Nor may it be attached to an adverb where there is a following verb, so (41) is not acceptable:¹²

- (41) *cikaramunka pooreen
quickly-unka I go

although the elliptical sentence (or sentence fragment) with the adverb alone does allow post-fixed -nka:

- (42) cikaramunka.
Quickly-nka.

There are in addition some further restrictions that appear to be similar to Ross Constraints. Thus co-ordinate structures seem to be inviolable to -nka insertion, as (43) illustrates:

- (43) *mutteyumunka ramum
Muttu-nka and Ramu

Now while all these constraints must refer to a labelled bracketing of constituents, demonstrating that -nka insertion is indeed a syntactic process, nevertheless, as (39) shows, -nka occurs promiscuously. Too promiscuously for -nka to be assigned any grammatical category (as an adjective or adverb for example). Of course we can call it a 'pragmatic particle', but that is to label the phenomenon rather than to explain it. And as far as the understanding of a sentence goes, the syntactic location of -nka is almost entirely irrelevant.¹³ Hence so far as the output of the syntactic component is concerned we may

consider -nka to be present in surface structure, and yet to have no relation to the labelled bracketing that has been taken to structure that grammatical level. Facts like these suggest that it is questionable that surface structure is adequately represented by labelled bracketings or trees.

This is just a sample of the grammatical difficulties that honorifics pose. It can plausibly be claimed that such linguistic items are hardly the core of the still largely mysterious apparatus whereby propositions receive a representation in sound, and that linguistic theory in its infancy would be best advised to steer clear of troublesome but superficial complexities of this sort. But, equally plausibly, it can be claimed that the general shape of linguistic theory must be determined by the full range of linguistic phenomena,¹⁴ and that the systematic relation between language and context is part of that range. Social deixis is by no means the most complex aspect of that systematic relation, and a good area to test current theories against.

2.2.3 Social deixis in Tamil

It may be thought from the fact that this thesis is devoted to social deixis in Tamil that Tamil is particularly rich in honorifics or other socially deictic items. However, that is not the case. In fact it is in this respect rather poorly endowed, especially when one considers the hierarchical nature of the social structures within which the language is primarily employed. Which presents the macro-sociolinguist with a major problem: what kinds of correlation are there between social structures and elaborate honorific systems, such as are common in the Southeast Asian languages? Specifically, what are the sociological preconditions for such systems? For one would be

hard put to find a more static, elaborately graded status or prestige system than that found in traditional South Indian society where Tamil is largely spoken. Quite possibly an important precondition for really elaborate honorific systems like those found in Java or Japan is a traditional royal court which can act as the focus for the elaboration and standardization of linguistic etiquette. And certainly the Tamil country has for long been under the domination of rulers who used other tongues. But this is no more than a guess, and the question would repay study but here would take us too far afield.

In this section we shall simply present a small part of the inventory of Tamil honorifics available to a villager. The sample will indicate the sorts of honorifics that exist (for the most part quite familiar from parallels in European languages) and introduce those that will be extensively relied upon in the sociological inferences that follow in other chapters.

We shall restrict ourselves to those socially deictic items that can most properly be called honorifics, that is, to those that (at least) conventionally implicate the relative social rank of speaker and addressee or speaker and referent. Not all aspects of language usage that have rank implications will come under this rubric: we shall deal specifically with those that have grammatical reflexes. For example, if the V-pronoun in Tamil always triggered plural predicate agreement and was thus always interpretable as a true plural, we could treat its rank implications as a conversational rather than a conventional implicature. The sociolinguistic implications could then be treated purely within a theory of usage, an independent pragmatics. But since in fact the V-pronoun has grammatical differences, being

distinguished from the true plural by the morphology, we can say that it forms a true grammaticized honorific. All the forms discussed below have some such grammatical reflexes.

2.2.3.1 Referent honorifics

Pronouns. To appreciate the honorific usages of Tamil pronouns we must first outline the basic set of pronouns provided by the language, as distinguished by the traditional categories of person, number and gender. Table 2.2 contains this basic set of pronouns.

This table presents the sort of information that one might find in a good traditional grammar of Tamil, except that the forms given are the colloquial ones (not the pronouns used in the high diglossic variety) and variants (often current options for a single speaker) are noted. Also in traditional grammars can be found a few notes about honorific usage: the second person plural can be used to a singular referent to show respect, as can the archaic plurals niir (once 'you-plural'), avaar (once 'they-masculine') (see for example Andronov 1969:100-102). Begging all sorts of questions, let us dub the glosses given in Table 2.2 (in terms of the traditional categories of person number and gender) the 'literal meanings' of the forms in question. We can then compare the actual use to which each form is put in contrast to the 'literal meaning' we have assigned it. If by means of elicitation and tape recordings we collect actual usages, we obtain the facts in Table 2.3.

From Table 2.3 it can be seen that the relation between actual usage and what we have called 'literal meaning' is very far from a 1:1 correspondence. Rather, for each referent identified on the traditional categories of person, number, and gender we have a range of at

Table 2.2 Basic Tamil pronouns

<u>SINGULAR</u>		<u>OBLIQUE BASE</u> (where different)
First person	<u>naan</u>	<u>en</u>
Second person	<u>nii</u>	<u>on</u>
Third person: male	<u>avaan</u>	
female	<u>ava(L)</u>	
neuter	<u>atu</u>	
 <u>PLURAL</u>		
First person: inclusive	<u>naam</u>	<u>namma</u>
exclusive	<u>naanka</u>	<u>enka</u>
Second person	<u>niinka</u>	<u>onka</u>
Third person: male and female	{ <u>avaanka</u> <u>aviika</u>	
neuter	<u>atu</u>	

also available variants for third person plural pronouns are:

Third person: male	<u>avanuka</u>
female	<u>avaLuka</u>
neuter	<u>ave</u>

Table 2.3 Person-number-gender switches in Tamil pronoun usage

<u>Actual (singular) referent</u>	<u>Forms used</u>	<u>'Literal meaning'</u>
Speaker (first person singular)	<u>naan</u>	I
	<u>atu</u>	it (distal)
	<u>naam</u>	we-inclusive
	<u>naanka</u>	we-exclusive
Addressee (second person singular)	<u>nii</u>	you-singular
	<u>atu</u>	it (distal)
	<u>niir</u>	archaic you-plural; now you-singular with connotations of respectful equality
	<u>niinka</u>	you-plural
	<u>naam</u>	we-inclusive
	<u>taankaL</u>	themselves
Third person male singular	<u>avaan</u>	he-singular
	<u>atu</u>	it (distal)
	<u>avaar</u>	archaic they; now he-singular plus respect
	<u>avaanka/aviika</u>	they
Third person female singular	<u>ava</u>	she
	<u>atu</u>	it (distal)
	<u>avaanka/aviika</u>	they

least three forms. And each of these forms are themselves pronouns with literal meanings (except the first item in each set) different from the usage here considered. Within the sets of alternates, the items in Table 2.3 are ordered such that the first (top) item is the least respectful, the last item the most respectful. Table 2.3 only includes pronominal usages to singular referents; for plural referents usage alternates exist also, but these are fewer for the simple reason that one major source of the alternates in Table 2.3 is the re-use of forms that have as 'literal meanings' plural referents.

The discrepancy between Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 is at first sight bewildering. Pronouns appear to be used without reference to their 'literal meanings'; and complex person and number switches are involved in the use of 'we-inclusive' to mean 'you-singular', and person and gender switches in the use of 'it' to mean the same, for example. But as intimated above, there are a number of pragmatic principles that predict the observed switches. These principles preserve the intuition that, in some sense, the usages in the prior Table 2.2 are indeed basic, at least from a diachronic point of view.

The first of these principles, much discussed above, is simply that respect can be conveyed by a switch from singular to plural address forms. A second principle is needed to account for the switches from first and second person to third person (from naan to atu, and nii to atu and taankaL, respectively). At least for the second person usage (of 'they' or 'he' for 'you') this principle is widespread (operating in German, Spanish, Ponapean for example), and appears to convey respect by distancing the speaker from the present speech event by speaking as if the addressee was not present. In the case

of the use of the third person neuter atu for second person singular, an additional factor may simply be the need for some form intermediate in social significance between the T and V pronouns, nii and niinka; nevertheless the impersonalization afforded by atu provides an explanation of the choice of this rather than some other substitute. A third principle is required to explain the usage of naam (we-inclusive) as a second person super-respectful form. Precisely parallel usages are reported from Quechua (Lefebvre 1975) and Malagasy (Keenan 1974a), so some rational source seems required. Two possible sources are these. In village usage this is the pronoun used by lower status persons to higher caste persons. In such a dyad the higher status person is likely to refer to himself with the 'royal we', that is, with naam. So the use of the same pronoun to refer to the same referent by a different (low-caste) speaker can be seen as a dramatic adoption of the higher person's point of view (or deictic anchorage). Another possible source is the idiom of ownership: the master owns his servants and they possess him as their master. So to address the master as 'you and I' is to convey the absorption of the inferior in the superior's domain. Both sources are consistent, and can constitute our third principle.

These three principles are sufficient to account for the person-number-gender switches in Table 2.3. These three principles can in turn be derived from a more general scheme in the ways in which politeness and respect can be conveyed in speech. But we leave the subject here as the ground is covered in Brown and Levinson 1977.

Since on the face of it some of these usages seem rather outlandish, a few examples of the sentences in which they occur may be helpful. We

cannot give systematic examples of all the usages here and the following must suffice. They are all taken from actual tape recordings of natural conversation in the village of the study unless otherwise indicated.

Here is an example of the use of the 'royal we', by an aristocratic landlord to a Harijan labourer:

(44) eenTaa naamoo colratu arttatt-ooTa taan colluvoom.

Why-dishonorific, that which we-inclusive say we-inclusive say with meaning.

(i.e. I don't say what I don't mean.)

The following is an example of the use of the third person neuter pronoun itu (the proximal deictic alternate for distal atu, it-there):

(45) itukku ceenttee oru naalancu peeru, alleyoo?

To it have joined some four or five people, isn't that so?

(i.e. To you there are allied some four or five people, aren't there?)

The context here is this: the Panchayat president, a local administrative official, is trying to mediate a case in which the addressee's husband, a poor woman of the dominant caste, has been victimized. Although the speaker is the same caste as the addressee, he (the speaker) is very wealthy and powerful, and the status disparity is great. Nevertheless he clearly does not feel able to address the older woman by the disrespectful nii pronoun (dative parallel to itukku would be onukku), nor willing to give the respect that would be conveyed by the V-pronoun niinka. The intermediate atu/itu form is thus appropriate, especially as the third person form carries connotations of distance, and thus impartiality.

As an example of the use of the form naam ('we-inclusive') to mean 'you', we may take a sentence used by the same woman when speaking to the president:

(46) namma-kiTTee poy colli nammanaale muTiyaatunka.

To us-inclusive lies cannot be told by us-inclusive.

(i.e. to you lies cannot be told by me)

The first naam here refers to the addressee; this is a very respectful form of speech and co-occurs naturally with the addressee honorific nka, which occurs here as the last morpheme of the sentence. The second naam (oblique namma with instrumental suffix aale) actually refers to the speaker, but it is not here a 'royal we' but a 'rural-female we', a stereotype associated in my village anyway (I am not sure how justly) with uneducated women. (Incidentally its use here does something to undermine the politeness of the first naam.)

Since we have already given examples of the use of niinka (you-plural) for you-singular, and since the form niir is hardly used except in ambivalent relationships in our village, we are left with the form taankaL, the reflexive third person plural pronoun, literally meaning 'themselves'. Although this is a familiar usage in literary Tamil, being de rigeur in letters, it is more surprising to find it used in colloquial speech.¹⁵ The example in (47) is the kind of usage that occurs in letters:

(47) taankaL kaTitam kiTaittatu.

Themselves' letter has arrived.

(i.e. your letter has arrived)

while example (48) comes from a tape where a vaNNaan boy (a boy of the lowly washerman caste) speaks to his traditional employer of

the dominant kavuNTar caste:

(48) ceerink, mattiyaanom taankaL kuTuttaankanaa, pootunka
(=pokatunka).

O.K.-honorific, if they themselves give (it) at noon,
it's enough-honorific.

(i.e. if you give it at noon, it's good enough)

Few usages of this kind occur on my tapes, but they are reported also by Andronov (1969:110): "The pronoun taankaL 'oneselves' is also regularly used in the sense of a honorific form of the second or (less frequently) third person, expressing the highest degree of courtesy."

Turning to third person referents, deference-encoding person-number-gender switches occur only with human referents. For male referents the most usual mode of respectful reference is perhaps avaar, an archaic plural now only understood as a singular honorific. However in village Tamil, to the surprise of some urban Tamilians, the plural avaanka is freely used to refer to important and prestigious single male referents (in urban colloquial Tamil this form is more often reserved for female respected referents only). The following is an example where the washerboy (the speaker of (48) above, refers to one of the local aristocratic landlords - a man who would be referred to thus by speakers of most castes in most company:

(49) avaanka taNNi poottu irukkaanko.

They had drunk 'water'.

(i.e. he was drunk (on spirits))

For female referents the choice is somewhat smaller, but the neuter form atu as well as the form just discussed are both much used.

Despite our emphasis here on the conventional implicatures of vertical social distance, it is well to remember that all these forms are equally signals of social distance on a horizontal dimension. Thus we have not only usages like (50), but also those like (51) below:

(50) anta ammaataan kuTuttataa?

That particular 'mother' did it give?

(i.e. that Lady did she give?)

Here the president mentioned above refers to a prominent and wealthy woman with whom he has no sympathies. The verbal ending -atu co-occurs with the (here absent) neuter pronoun atu. The president thus avoids overt disrespect (as would be signalled by the use of ava and its appropriate verbal ending -a) while avoiding giving the positive respect encoded by avaanka. The next example, on the other hand, involves the horizontal social dimension in a non-straightforward way. Here a Harijan worker refers to his own daughter in the presence of a very powerful landlord who employs him:

(51) veeNTaamnu peN collucci.

(I) don't want (it) the girl said.

The verb here has an ending encoding agreement with the neuter pronoun atu again. But one thing the speaker is definitely not doing is giving respect to his daughter (that would be culturally bizarre): rather he refrains from referring to her with a kin term (and uses the word for 'girl' instead) and uses a neuter ending to distance himself from the referent. For there appears to be a rule of deferential speech that one does not explicitly refer to one's own objects and associates, for that is to draw attention to oneself in a situation where deference demands self-minimization. And this is an example of the way in which what I have called 'deictic triangulation' works - here, by avoiding

a reference of a certain kind to a third party, respect can be given to the addressee.

In the last two examples we have relied on the encoding of the pronominal choice in the verbal ending even where no pronoun exists in surface structure. We can do this for finite verbs only, for, as we established above, other sorts of predicates do not always agree with the superficial form of the pronoun, and it is in this way that the person-number-gender switches detailed here come to have some grammatical correlates. These grammatical correlates do not always have to do with predicate agreement, however; consider the following (in the higher diglossic variant) that might occur in the meeting of a local political or literary group:

(52) kopalsaami avaarkaL periya kaviinyaar.

Gopalswaami they (is) a great poet.

Here a singular male identified by name has as honorific epithet a plural pronoun. (Similarly, a grammar written in colonial days notes that "Colloquially turai, Western gentleman, is frequently turaiyavaarkaL" i.e. 'western gentleman-they' cf. Arden (1891) 1942:102.) So an overtly singular NP can have an associated (perhaps here pleonastic) plural pronoun that denotes the same referent.

In the bulk of what follows we shall be especially concerned only with a few of the usages in Table 2.3. Indeed we shall restrict ourselves for the most part to the forms used to refer to the addressee, and even there to only two of the six listed alternates. This restriction is, we shall argue, not entirely arbitrary. In the first place the usage of second person referent honorifics is much more strictly constrained than say, third person pronouns, by the presence

of the addressee in the speech event. Hence we can get more sociological mileage out of the usage of second person pronouns. And in the second place we can constrain ourselves to just two forms, nii and niinka, because it is one or other of these that forms the basic unmarked usage between members of different caste groups, in a way to be explained below.

Titles of address. By title we understand some form that may be used in reference or address to refer to some person who meets certain social criteria: in other words a form that refers to, or is used in address to, members of a social category. Titles are probably the one kind of honorific that is universal (in the strong sense). In village Tamil there are many titles that are used in reference to third parties. These are based on caste names, or the name of the place from which the ancestors of the referent originally came, or on the name of some field that is or was owned by the referent or his ancestors, to name but a few. For example:

(53) periya kavuNTicci

'big kavuNTar-female' i.e. the elder lady in a family of the kavuNTar caste

(54) attaampaaLayattar

'Attaam Fort's man' i.e. the man from Attaam Fort

(55) aattikkaaTTayyan

'aatti-dry field's grandfather' i.e. the old man who owns the field called 'aatti'.

Or a person may be referred to by his present place of residence ('North Street's man') if the context makes clear who is intended. Most of these forms carry honorific or dishonorific implicatures.

But compared to the bewildering complexities of the ways of referring to third parties, the titles that are actually used in address are very much more restricted. Caste-titles are so used on occasion in the corpus of tape recordings. Normally these are used to members of higher castes. Thus, for example, a member of caste 10 (naaTaar) addresses a man of caste 5 (kavuNTar) as 'cinna kavuNTaree' ('little kavuNTar man' i.e. younger male of a kavuNTar household) with a final -ee marking the vocative case. Just as titles in English used vocatively have extremely free syntactic distribution, so do those in Tamil, and in this respect titles are similar to the addressee honorifics to be discussed below. But they are distinguished in that their insertion intra-sententially is marked by a break in the intonation contour that indicates their parenthetical nature. Tamil, like Latin and many languages, has a true vocative case (see, for example, Andronov 1969:83), and as in all such languages, this provides an area of morphology and movement rules difficult to deal with in a pragmatics-free generative grammar. For the vocative is clearly a functional category.


Further titles of address in Tamil are shown below in Table 2.4.

Apart from the first three items in Table 2.4, the common titles of address derive from kinship terms. It is important to distinguish (within address) various distinct usages of kinship titles. In the first place we have their literal usage to persons standing in the correct category from ego's point of view (see Chapter V below for the algorithms that assign such categories). Opposed to that, we have various kinds of 'fictive' or extended usages. One of these is an adopted usage, where the speaker in addressing the hearer uses a

Table 2.4 Some common titles of address in village Tamil

<u>Form</u>	<u>'Literal meaning'</u>	<u>Usage</u>
<u>raaja</u>	king	to titled aristocrats (<u>paTTakkaarar</u>) only
<u>caami</u> (or <u>saami</u>)	God, a Brahman	to Brahmins; to other high caste men by lower castes
<u>esamaanka</u>	a master, lord	to landlords ('squire' families) of caste 5; also to members of 2 by lowest castes
<u>ayyaa</u>	'grandfather' category	to elder and respected men
<u>aattaa</u>	'grandmother' category	to elder and respected women
<u>appaa</u>	'father' category	to somewhat elder and respected men
<u>ammaa</u>	'mother' category	to somewhat elder and respected women
<u>aNNan</u>	'elder brother' category	to somewhat elder but equal men
<u>akkaa</u>	'elder sister' category	to somewhat elder but equal women
<u>tampi</u>	'younger brother' category	to younger males not too widely separated in caste rank

term that some close associate of the speaker's could have used in the literal fashion. In contrast to the adopted usage are two kinds of direct usage, one metaphorical wherein the connotations of **the** relevant kinship category are conveyed, and another we may call the generic address usage, where only the mildest connotations are conveyed, usually having to do with degrees of respect. The distinction between these last two may not be theoretically clear, but it is in practice, and it corresponds to native intuitions. Schematically then we have the following distinctions:



The non-kinship based titles do not show these elaborate distinctions in kinds of usage: the first three items in Table 2.4 really have only a literal and a generic address usage. However they display a wider range of conversational functions than the kin titles. For example caami, like the kin titles, can be used as a call or summons, but it can also be used to signal agreement or the speaker's continuing attention, in a way that kin-titles cannot. One suspects that there are some as yet undiscovered distinctions in the category of vocative forms that should predict these sorts of different usages. There is clearly a lacuna in linguistic theory here (but see Zwicky 1974).

The titles listed are by no means the only forms in use in the village as general forms of address, but they are probably the most

prominent of those that can be used to address alters as categorized predominantly by the degree of respect that should be shown to them. That is to say they have generic address usages, and in that respect are closer to English 'sir', 'madam', 'mate', 'Mac' and so on, than to English 'grandfather', 'doctor', 'professor' and such like where the addressee must meet certain strict social criteria in order to be so addressed appropriately. And because of this they can provide interesting insight into the subjective status assessments that villagers make in interacting with other villagers. Consequently we shall study the distribution of their usage in order to extract sociological information in the chapters below.

It should be noted however that not all titles of address have such generic address usages: for example there are a host of further kin terms, but with the exception of one other (maamaa), no others are used in this particular way. All these other kin-terms may be used to address kin of the appropriate category, and more complexly, of certain other categories according to principles well described in Beck (1972:290-292). Incidentally, titles of address have a special place in Tamil culture because of the thorough-going taboo on the use of personal names to superiors of any kind (whether these be elder siblings, a younger caste superior, or whatever).

Just as the pronouns in Table 2.3 are ordered with respect to increasing respect given to the referent, so the titles of address in Table 2.4 are ordered in the same way, except that the paired male/female terms convey approximately the same level of deference. To both sets of pronouns and sets of titles we could, then, assign values on the horizontal and vertical social dimensions of power and solidarity.

These values would be our representation of the social significance of the terms, encoded as conventional implicatures as argued above in section 2.2.1.

2.2.3.2 Addressee honorifics

Honorific and dishonorific particles The defining property of addressee honorifics, the reader will recollect, is that they are linguistic elements that allow the speaker to encode respect to the addressee without actually referring to him. In this respect they are clearly distinct from V-pronouns like niinka. Likewise they are distinct from titles, which whether used in address or reference, still clearly give respect to the referent they denote. In contrast, addressee honorifics may have no reference at all, and if they do it will (by definition) be to some entity other than that to which respect is being given.

Tamil, like most languages, has but a few true addressee honorifics, unlike the languages of Southeast Asia which are replete with them. Most languages probably convey this information (degrees of respect to the addressee irrespective of the semantic content of what is said) prosodically, in intonation, rhythm and stress, and also in complex patterns of language use. Now it seems to be the case that what may be conveyed on those levels may also be conveyed in one particular aspect of surface syntax especially, namely particles (see for example Schubiger 1972; R. Lakoff 1972). And the addressee honorifics in Tamil are all particles.

Table 2.5 introduces some of these honorifics in Tamil. They are particles in the sense that they have no reference at all. And this

despite the fact that some of them are clearly derived from some of the kin-titles described above as being used as generic titles of respectful address. For example -yaar, -ppaa, -maa clearly derive from the kin-titles ayyaa, appaa and ammaa respectively.

Table 2.5: Some Tamil addressee honorifics

<u>Form</u>	<u>Usage</u>
<u>-yaa</u>	to superior and senior addressees, male only
<u>-nka</u>	to superior addressees, male or female
<u>-ppaa</u>	to addressees who are moderately but not greatly interior, males only
<u>-maa</u>	ditto, females only
<u>-Taa/-raa</u>	to distinct inferiors, males only
<u>Teey</u> (free morpheme)	to same addressees as <u>-Taa</u> , but gestural usages only as attention-getter
<u>-Tii/rii</u>	to distinct inferiors, females only (potentially offensive sexual connotations)
<u>leey</u>	to same addressees as <u>-Tii</u> , but gestural usages only

Why not then just treat them as phonological contractions of the respective kin-titles? For these reasons: (a) they can never be used to refer to third parties; (b) on the assumption that like titles used in address they refer to the addressee, they should mean the same thing as the titles they are allegedly contracted versions of, but they do not; (c) their syntactic properties and distributions are quite distinct from the corresponding titles. Amplifying (b), we may note that the titles ammaa and appaa in their generic address usage are

honorific, while the derivative particles -maa and -paa are actually (mildly) dishonorific. Further, since titles of address actually refer, they can be the subjects of clauses and take agreeing predicates. But the corresponding particles cannot be subjects (or objects, or stand in any other case relation), which is clear evidence that they do not refer at all.

Amplifying (c), we may note that whereas titles of address are inserted in relatively restricted slots in sentences, and are marked intonationally as parentheticals, addressee honorifics can occur after almost any major constituent of a sentence and do not disrupt the major intonational contour. Titles are free morphemes; the corresponding addressee honorifics are bound morphemes; hence only the former can occur sentence-initially.

Despite certain similarities in form and function, then, these particles in Table 2.5 are distinct from titles of address. That they share similarities in some cases is merely evidence of our general thesis that addressee honorifics derive diachronically from referent honorifics. Thus for example the particle -ppaa almost certainly derives diachronically from the title appaa, but it is now synchronically distinct.

Note that the forms in the table are ranked in the order of decreasing respect shown to the speaker. Once again we can capture the social significance of these particles in terms of our two social dimensions, horizontal and vertical social distance. We can associate with each particle as its conventional implicature a value on these dimensions: thus for example -yaa would have high values on both dimensions, and in addition the implicature that the addressee

is male. It could be claimed that the distinctly dishonorific forms do not have the ambiguity between social hierarchy and social (horizontal) distance that our other honorific forms have displayed. And although they may be used jokingly towards friends, that could be interpreted as an exploitation of their basic dishonorific meaning. This seems correct, and if so justifies our retention of two social dimensions rather than a single general one.

One should note that the forms -Taa and Teey, and -Tii and leey, respectively, are paired by function: the first form is the general particle, and the second the allomorph that occurs in calls or attention-getting summonses. In terms of Fillmore's frameworks for the description of deixis, the first form is a 'symbolic usage' and the second a 'gestural usage', in the sense that the location of the addressee must be ascertained before the summons can be complied with (see Fillmore n.d. 1971, 1976). The syntactic properties of the gestural usage-forms are much closer to titles of address, but they still do not refer, and cannot function as NPs.

It may be noted that there are rather few addressee honorifics, and rather a lot of addressee dishonorifics. With referent honorifics, and titles of address in particular, the reverse was the case. In part this is attributable to the dishonorific nature of the use of personal names: there is thus no need for dishonorific titles.

These brief remarks will suffice, as the honorifics will be further described as they become relevant.

Let us sum up our conclusions so far in this chapter. We have argued that honorifics are properly treated as aspects of deixis, and that frameworks for their study are best constructed with the nature

of deixis in mind. We have argued that the social significance of honorifics should be represented as conventional implicatures, assigning values on (at least) two basic social dimensions which seem to have a linear scale. We have also seen that even the simplest honorifics have syntactic correlates of a sort that raise serious problems for a pragmatically insensitive syntax. To handle these within ordinary derivational treatments of syntactic processes, context-sensitive transderivational rules would be required. Finally, we have introduced some of the honorifics in Tamil upon which the bulk of this study concentrates. And with this we conclude our remarks on the implications of such linguistic devices for linguistic theory, and turn now to the implications for sociolinguistic theory.

2.3 THE USAGE OF SOCIALLY DEICTIC ITEMS: HONORIFICS

So far we have reviewed two problems. The first was the proper treatment of social deixis within linguistics theory: not only do honorifics require a semantico-pragmatico representation, but this must be available to syntactic rules however those are defined. The second problem was the diachronic source of such items: we produced evidence to suggest rather strongly that the sources lay in productive strategies of language use (rational means selected towards specific ends). Our solutions to both these problems will constrain our theorizing here, but the problem now to be addressed is conceptually distinct.

We ask here how linguistic items are brought into line so that their usage correlates with highly specific social categories. What actual mechanisms, in the way of cognitive processes, lie behind the patterns of usage which are tied to the social world in such an

immediate and precise way that we recognise the items as 'honorifics'? Here we review two theories about the nature of the mechanisms lying behind the usage of honorifics, and find genuine insights but also a number of lacunae in both. Two issues in particular arise here, in the first place the question of how abstract a social classification of alters generally is, and secondly how this is related to actual usage. We shall conclude that an adequate theory of honorific usage would in fact be much more complex than has hitherto been thought, and the most we can do in the present context is sketch the conditions it must meet, the range of phenomena it must handle, and consequently the general overall shape it must have. Our discussion will be lamentably general and informal.

One general question that will dog us in the following discussion is what the goals of a theory of honorific usage should be (and by extension the goals of a general theory of language usage). Ideally, the goal should perhaps be to predict which honorific will be used between any two social parties. But as will become clear this goal is far beyond our current reach, and the important question is then how far we should retreat from it.

One solution, now part of the dogma of Cognitive Anthropology, runs along these lines: "... it is not the ethnographer's task to predict behaviour per se, but rather to state rules of culturally appropriate behaviour.... the model of an ethnographic statement is not: 'if a person is confronted with stimulus X, he will do Y', but 'if a person is in situation X, performance Y will be judged appropriate by native actors'" (Frake 1964:133; quoted and adopted by Geoghegan 1971:4). This is held to be similar to the linguist's claim that his

aim is not to predict what people will say, but rather what will be taken to be grammatical or acceptable in a language.

This solution, which claims that the basic aim is to pair actions (including utterances) with the situations in which they are culturally appropriate, can easily be shown to be too weak a goal for a theory of language usage. Take the following illustration for example: Tamil mothers use the T (or intimate) pronoun to their toddlers most of the time, but every now and then they can be heard to use the V (or polite) pronoun in playful irony. Following the above schema for ethnographic statements all we could say is 'if a mother is playing with a child, either a T or a V pronoun will be judged culturally appropriate'. Which is of course to miss the point that T is used unless the mother intends to convey ironic politeness.

The example shows that what we need is a pairing of behaviours in definable situations with communicative intents, for it is only relative to these that a performance can be judged appropriate. And the correct form of ethnographic statements would then be 'if a person does/utters Y in situation X, then he will be held to have intended Z'.

Now there is a parallel statement, apparently much stronger, namely - 'if a person has the communicative intent Z, and no other intents or circumstances intervene, then he will do/utter Y in situation X'. But there are only two additional premisses here, the trivially amendable one that Y is the only available expression of Z, and another which all of us can be shown to subscribe to, namely an assumption of rationality. That is, we assume that if people intend to do something, and they can do it, then they will do it, unless they

have further motives for not doing so. This statement then is hardly much stronger than the preceding one.

Yet the second kind of statement is actually (weakly) predictive; it is only weakly predictive because it relies on an unobservable input, namely a specific communicative intent. But we can to some extent empirically check such statements by asking the utterer of Y what in fact he intended. Moreover in just some circumstances we can actually predict communicative intents. For example suppose a low caste man approaches a powerful high caste man in our village, then we can be pretty sure that one of his subsidiary motives will be to avoid giving offence to his superior, and this can be achieved in part by communicating deference, which in turn can be achieved in part by the selection of an honorific form of address. Here then we have a prediction, right through from social motives, to communicative intents, and thus to an aspect of language usage. We can make such a prediction with a fair degree of confidence because social relationships typically constrain communicative intents, and because at least in some domains the ways of expressing intents are limited.

There is a distinct attraction in this move towards stronger theoretical goals because the weak goals formulated by Fraake above do not allow us to escape from the orbit of the informants' statements about what people do. Optimistically such statements allow the construction of models of cognition in some domain; but they do not take us out of the realm of the mind into the realm of action. Thus what people actually do cannot be used to empirically validate or invalidate such models. But if we construct models of the way in which cognitive processes select actions, and thus conditional predictions of those

actions, then the observable facts about what people actually do can (at least in some happy cases) actually be used to confirm or dismiss our models. And certainly it would be strange if a theory of language usage had nothing to do with a theory of action.

We thus suggest that the proper goal of a theory of honorific usage, and perhaps of a theory of language usage in general, is to predict certain aspects of the use of language in particular situations, given actors' communicative intents. Consequently, models of language usage can, at least in certain domains, be dynamic and predictive.

It is against the background of these considerations that the following critical comments on two theories of honorific usage should be read.

2.3.1 Geoghegan's theory

Geoghegan, first in a detailed article (Geoghegan 1971) and then in a monograph (Geoghegan 1973) developed the theory of 'code rules'. This theory was to be supplemented with a formal theory of 'marking rules', for which Geoghegan provides an informal description (Geoghegan 1970) and the first steps in a formal theory (Geoghegan 1973:266-334). Code rules were developed for general ethnographic applications to decision making (for some optimistic claims re their universal applicability see Roger M. Keesing, 1971, and more soberly, Geoghegan 1969a), but marking rules have specifically 'semantic' application (i.e. application to the pragmatics of language). In any case the two together were intended to capture the essential cognitive processes that lie behind the usage of socially deictic items, specifically address forms.

We may say at once that the theory has an admirable formal precision, and at the same time captures a great deal of the processes

that are intuitively involved in the use of socially deictic items. But it has been sadly neglected in the sociolinguistic literature, where it has potential application to code-switching (as studied by Gumperz and Blom 1972, Gumperz 1975), pronouns of address (as studied by Friedrich 1972) honorific language levels (as studied by Geertz 1960, and others) and other areas; while one informal application has been the source of a number of misunderstandings (Ervin-Tripp 1972:219 states, contrary to Geoghegan 1973:1, that the theory models 'competence' and not 'performance'). The reasons for the neglect are undoubtedly the formidable mathematical development and the lack of wide ethnographic application to be found in Geoghegan's work. Here we provide an informal and inevitably loose summary of a fully formal set-theoretic treatment.

Geoghegan (1971) builds up the theory of code rules in the following manner. He defines an axiomatic system whose primitives refer essentially to (i) entities to be classified, (ii) classificatory categories (k_{pq} , k_{pr} , ...) which are mutually exclusive elements within a set, namely (iii) the categorization k_p , (iv) relations between entities and categories (correspondences), and (v) relations between entities and categorizations (assessments). He takes just two axioms: one which states that categories within a categorization must contrast (be mutually exclusive), while the other constrains the set of categories within the categorization to a finite number greater than one.

With just this apparatus he then builds up the notion of a code segment. A code segment is essentially a mapping of one set of possible states of affairs onto another set. The possible states of affairs are of course the correspondences which the classified entities have

to categories within all the available categorizations. For instance if the entity is the addressee, then he might be classified as being in the male, senior, cross-kin categories provided by the sex, age, and kinship categorizations. This information is the code segment's input. It is mapped onto the segment's output, which is itself a set of categories: for instance, a set of address terms appropriate to the addressee. Viewed in this way, a code segment is a mapping from one body of information onto another: a classification, or reclassification. It has essentially the properties of a non-distinctive (redundant) feature-analysis (as in phonology or componential analysis). An illustration may make this clear. Suppose the code segment has as input two categorizations, K_1 and K_2 (say, sex and moiety) each with two categories, and as output (K_3) a single categorization (as is perhaps always the case: Geoghegan 1971:12, fn 6) containing three categorizations (k_{31} , k_{32} , k_{33}) which are, say, terms of address. Then we might have a mapping that provided the following correspondences:

$$k_{11}, k_{21} \longrightarrow k_{31}$$

$$k_{12}, k_{21} \longrightarrow k_{31}$$

$$k_{11}, k_{22} \longrightarrow k_{32}$$

$$k_{12}, k_{22} \longrightarrow k_{33}$$

Figure 2.6

But such a mapping allows redundancies of a sort that it is reasonable to expect cognitive systems to avoid. For although the definition of a code segment eliminates any categorizations that are not required to distinguish possible input situations (parallel to restricting the

dimensions in a componential analysis to a non-redundant set), it does not remove the possibility of redundant feature specification. Geoghegan therefore defines a more constrained notion, a simple code rule, which eliminates these redundancies. This is done by replacing the domain of the mapping function (which in a code segment is the set of all possible evaluations on the dimensions provided by the categorizations) with the minimal set of evaluations ('correspondences') necessary to determine each output. At this point, as Geoghegan notes, what we have is equivalent to a distinctive feature analysis. Taking our previous example, features k_{11} and k_{12} are redundant when combined with k_{21} : the latter alone is enough to determine the output (image) as k_{31} . A simple code rule would then provide the following mapping:

$$\begin{array}{lll} k_{21} & \longrightarrow & k_{31} \\ k_{11}, k_{22} & \longrightarrow & k_{32} \\ k_{12}, k_{22} & \longrightarrow & k_{33} \end{array} \quad \text{Figure 2.7}$$

So far we have just a different way of talking about feature analysis. But the mode of description is designed for the next step: further restrictions, designed to impose an ordering in the sequence in which semantic dimensions or categorizations are to be processed, are then imposed to define an ordered code rule. Once again this is achieved by further constraining the domain of the mapping function, now to a set of ordered sequences of evaluations. Further constraints ensure that, starting from one initial assessment, the rest of the categorizations are traversed such that there are no 'dead ends' (blind

alleys) no branching of paths outside an assessment, and no unnecessary categorizations or categories (i.e. each must sustain a minimal path to an output).

An ordered code rule is something quite different from the kind of classificatory system based simply on unordered sets of features (as in componential analysis); it has an added component or restriction: linearity, or the ordering of the semantic dimensions involved. (However, part of the interest of ordered code rules is the fact that they are more constrained than, but otherwise formally equivalent to, a componential analysis, in the sense that they specify the same mapping: they seem to promise a way out of the 'indeterminacy' of componential analyses.) Now the natural cognitive interpretation of the formal theory is of course to equate logical ordering with temporal (real time processing) sequence. Such an equation is made in computer programs, and indeed a natural representation of ordered code rules (as Geoghegan notes) is in terms of flow chart conventions. Returning to our example, a flow chart that embodied the ordered code rule assumptions would look like the one in Figure 2.8:




Figure 2.8

(Other orderings of these assessments are of course possible.) Notice that this kind of flow chart, and ordered code rules, have a special

property, there is no need to carry the baggage of prior decisions (decision-history) to the next decision to be made, for prior decisions determine a unique route to some next decision. This contrasts both with some kinds of more complex ordered algorithms, and with unordered sets of features in feature analyses which must be simultaneously assessed on a number of dimensions. It seems plausible that this partitioning of the classificatory task is a more accurate representation of complex cognitive classification processes than an instantaneous gestalt feature-flash on n-dimensions.

However, despite the increasing constraints Geoghegan has successfully imposed on the formal system, we still seem to be far from plausible cognitive systems (or indeed from intuitive notions of flow chart design). For no-one trying to construct a simple flow chart for our example would be likely to represent it as in Figure 2.9:




Figure 2.9

Here intuitive concepts of flow chart design tell us that this is much more clumsy than Figure 2.8; the intuition is of course based on the duplication of the assessment K2. Yet as Geoghegan points out (these examples are adapted from his own discussion), his formal theory permits either representation (that is, both that in Figure 2.8 and in Figure 2.9) and their underlying sequences of assessment.

Some further constraints seem called for, and Geoghegan presents an algorithm (outside the formal theory of code rules itself) that will convert any simple code rule into an efficiently ordered code rule. He sets up an efficiency constraint that requires that the assessment at any given node is chosen so as to minimize the number of assessments that emanate from that point. Then taking the set of (simple) paths in a simple code rule, an efficiently ordered code rule can be constructed by successively selecting each assessment in a simple path in such a way that the least number of assessments are required to complete it. Thus the ordering represented in Figure 2.9 will be rejected by the efficiency requirement, because the selection of K1 as initial assessment leads to an additional assessment in each of the two branches.

It is unfortunate that Geoghegan ceases the formal development of the theory before the discussion of efficiently ordered rules. One suspects that the axiomatic approach, here at least, proves cumbersome. In fact the whole class of problems from ordered to efficiently ordered rules of various types falls naturally into the mathematical theory of directed graphs. Graph theory, which traces its origins back to Euler, is now a large and well-developed branch of mathematics which explores the formal properties of points (vertices) interconnected by lines (edges). In this theory algorithms for constructing minimal routes through a set of vertices exist, which cover the specific type of directed graph corresponding to Geoghegan's code rules. In addition, methods exist for 'shortest path' analysis which allow particular assessments to be interpreted as requiring more, or less, cognitive work. and which takes this into account. Thus with each path we can then associate a particular processing time (or a relative measure of it),

and still solve this more complex maximally efficient ordering problem. For an introductory treatment of shortest path analysis see Bellman, Cooke and Lockett 1970, for a survey see Dreyfus 1967; for general reviews of graph theory see Ore 1962, Harary 1960. We shall not develop Geoghegan's theory in terms of graph theory here, for in the empirical applications difficulties arise that throw doubt on the adequacy of any such formalism for the problem at hand. For in some directions the theory of code rules seems under-constrained, particularly in the area of efficiency constraints which could proceed in many directions.¹⁶ But in other respects Geoghegan's theory seems far too constrained already; as Geoghegan notes it is founded on certain assumptions about how people think, assumptions that have been called into question by recent work in psychology and related disciplines. In addition, the empirical evidence from our particular domain raises some fundamental problems with respect to the application of such models to processes of human communication. We shall return to these problems below.

Let us now turn to the second part of Geoghegan's theory, the theory of marking rules (Geoghegan 1970; 1973). Just like 'conversational postulates' (Gordon and Lakoff 1971) were dreamt up to rescue the performative hypothesis by showing that sentences might have derived illocutionary forces different from the ones that determine the bulk of their surface structure, so marking rules are a necessary addendum to any theory like that of code rules. For if code rules are used to determine, for example, what address form is appropriate to a given classified addressee, it is nevertheless observable that that address form is not necessarily actually used. Instead, speakers can exploit

the knowledge represented by code rules to convey insult, flattery or anger and so on, by selecting some unexpected output other than that generated by the code rule.

To account for such exploitative usages, we need in the first place a determination of an expected unmarked usage relative to which the exploitative usage takes its significance. This determination could be provided by habitual usage (to a particular addressee in the case of address terms), or more interestingly by a code rule, in which case the output of the code rule would be the input to the marking rule (a case of the 'recoding' hypothesized by Miller, Galanter and Pribram 1960). We shall talk as if the latter was always the case (the habitual usage may be treated simply as the stored results of some prior application of the relevant code rule).

In the second place what we need is some process which, given the output of a code rule, will encode some extra information by shoving us from that unmarked output (the output determined by, and thus expectable in, the situation) to some other member of the output set in a highly principled fashion. Just like flow charts provide a natural representation of code rules, so directed graphs provide a natural representation of marking rules (and although Geoghegan uses both, these are for him informal representations of systems formalized in set theory). To pursue our earlier example, suppose the outputs of Figure 2.8 above referred to the name-type (abstract classes of names) to be selected in the following way:

k_{31} = PN or Pet Name (example: "Snooks")

k_{32} = NN or Nick Name (example: "Simmy")

k_{33} = TN or True Name (example: "Simon")

Then there might be a marking rule represented by the following directed graph:




Figure 2.10

where a is the marking operator, or function, that given output NN as unmarked, shunts one to PN; and b is the marking operator which given unmarked output NN shifts the output to TN. Now each marking operator is associated with one or more cues, which are the items of information that can be encoded by the associated marking operations. For instance, in our example the cues associated with the operators a and b might be 'affection' and 'anger', respectively. Thus if I normally call Simon 'Simmy', I can encode anger by calling him 'Simon', and affection by calling him 'Snooks'. This is the sort of information-encoding that a marking rule is specifically designed to achieve.

Now in fact marking rules may be much more complex than that represented in Figure 2.10; Figure 2.11 reproduces one constructed by Geoghegan (1973:442) on the basis of empirical Samal data:




Figure 2.11

where PN' is a proname corresponding to PN (and so on for NN', TN')
 T is a specially intimate proname, and the marking operators are associated with the following cues: +a = positive affect; -a = negative affect; x = anger; d = deference; n = name (of addressee) not known. Here PN, NN or TN may each be unmarked inputs.

The formal theory must take into account such naturally occurring complexities. The description of a marking rule must then consist of the set of outputs (including the inputs), the subset of outputs that can be unmarked, the set of marking operators, and the set of permissible sequences of applications of those operators. Outside the formal theory an 'interpretation' of it will assign cues to each marking operator, and understand each sequence of marking operators to correspond to a real-time cognitive processing sequence. The most important restriction that the formal theory places on marking rules is that there should be no cycles such that repetitive application of the marking operators could lead to a return to the initial starting point (this is one of the axioms of the theory; the other is that all sub-sequences of

a permissible marking sequence must themselves be permissible). So one cannot go from TN to NN via +a in Figure 2.11 and then return to TN via -a, for instance.

An important question is how marking rules are to be recognized and distinguished from code rules. For exactly the same operations could be represented as a code rule: Figure 2.12 is such a code-rule version of the marking rule in Figure 2.10.




Figure 2.12

There must then be some criteria for deciding between the two representations of the cognitive process involved. Geoghegan (1973:275-281) suggests one key distinguishing feature, from which the others mostly follow. This is that, whereas the correspondences (between entities and categories in each assessment) in a code rule are 'subjectively equi-probable', the cues in a marking rule have a 'very low probability of occurrence' (ibid.:322-3). The expectation is that cues will not be applicable in most cases. The contrast between the two kinds of system is then that, on the one hand, a code rule is a specification of a 'deliberate search' for pieces of information (ibid.:278), where the absence of one correspondence implies the other by contrast and thus involves sustained cognitive effort; whereas marking rules on the other hand, are systems where nothing is done (except returning the unmarked output) until a cue presents itself, and even here there is choice (in a way there is not in the deterministic routine of a code

rule) in the matter of whether any or which cue is to be recognized and utilized by the speaker. A glance at Figures 2.10 and 2.12 should make it clear why Geoghegan thinks that marking rules are adapted to the processing of rarely occurring bits of information, while code rules are adapted to routine search operations. For, the unmarked output NN in the marking rule is simply returned when no cues are encoded, while in Figure 2.12 the identification of the unmarked output as the output to be returned requires two assessments of the absence of two items of information.

This then is Geoghegan's theory of the cognitive processes that underlie the usage of socially deictic items. Working in tandem, code rules specify the expected unmarked output as determined by the situation, and this output is then the input to marking rules which allow further attitudinal information to be conveyed by the choice of some other, marked, output.

We may say at once that this division of the cognitive task into two parts, a basic classificatory operation followed by a secondary operation that potentially shifts the unmarked output to some other marked output, seems to capture an essential fact about the ways such socially deictic forms are used, and is an insight that we must be careful to retain. It is possible to re-analyze many sociolinguistic accounts in terms of such tandem processes, with a great deal of resultant clarity. Three cases that I have applied this method to in too much detail to report here are nevertheless worth mentioning. Gumperz and Blom (1972) describe two basic kinds of code switching in a Norwegian setting; if we identify their situational switching with switches determined by code rule (which may be constructed from

the details the authors provide), and their metaphorical switching as marking rule operations, a very succinct and complete re-analysis result. Another case is the Russian pronominal usage reported by Friedrich (1972), where the failure to distinguish between the two kinds of processes results in an essentially confused account which can be rapidly disentangled in terms of a marking and a code rule component. A third case is the choice between Javanese 'language levels' (addressee honorifics), where Geertz's (1960) account of three social 'dialects' can be more precisely captured in terms of three slightly different code rules which differ in both output sets and assessments used to determine outputs.

However, despite these demonstrated utilities, we have some strong reservations about the adequacy of Geoghegan's formulations. Some of these will emerge below, but a few are worth drawing attention to here. Taking code rules first, there are the following difficulties:

(1) There is no easy way within the code rule format to handle new types of addressee, situation or other entities to be classified. For each such new entity a new assessment will have to be added to the rule by a mode of plan-augmentation quite different from the plan itself. In short there is limited extendability, whereas it can easily be shown that in fact such extensions are routinely handled (probably by mechanisms discussed below).

(2) There is no general constraint on the relationship of input to output, which suggests that outputs are essentially arbitrary. But in fact, as we have seen, honorific forms do not seem to be arbitrary but rather seem to have rational strategic origins; for instance in many independent cultures all over the world there is a polite pronoun

of address, and it is plural and never the other way around (for example, a singular pronoun to plural addressees is never polite). We can treat honorifics as frozen usage-strategies, but we cannot rule out the possibility that strategic assessments of the sort described in Brown and Levinson 1977 are still involved.

(3) More decisively, code rules are too task-specific to be plausible candidates for efficient cognitive processes. They map social classifications directly onto, say, address forms (at least in Geoghegan's applications). But in the Indian situation at any rate, the social classification for pronominal usage would be largely identical with and wholly subsumed within the social classification for the usage of address forms (titles, kin-terms, names). In fact the same general social classification will be involved in a host of interactional and expressive behaviour; thus the cross importance of cross/ the/parallel kin distinction is such that every time ego meets "a new member of his kin network he must ascertain this fundamental detail in order to determine whether joking and flirtation...or a reserved and respectful demeanour...will constitute the correct way to behave in his or her presence". (Beck 1972:216). If then for every linguistic form, kinesic and prosodic detail, element of discourse style, and so on, a repetitive code rule is required, then there would be a massive amount of redundancy in the set of requisite rules. Far more plausible is that there is some one single detailed social classification of alters which is the input to some possibly code-rule-like process, which has as output some very abstract minimal specification of attributes which are sufficient to be the basis for the usage of all these different modes of expression. The empirical task is then to

identify these minimal attributes, which we shall equate in part with those proposed by Brown and Gilman (1960).

(4) A related problem is that due to the fact that code rules map social classifications directly onto, say, address forms with no intermediate step (as proposed in (3)), there is no abstract value or feature to be associated with socially deictic items (in the lexicon or elsewhere) to which linguistic rules may refer. We would have then what Fillmore (1973) has called a direct 'sociolinguistic interpretation'. But we have seen that linguistic rules do seem to refer to some abstract pragmatic significance associated with socially deictic items, (presumably conventional implicature). Either these significances are absolutely irrelevant to the usage of these items (that being determined by code rule), which seems implausible, or there is some intermediate process wherein some abstract output of a social classification (as proposed in (3)) is matched with an appropriate pragmatic significance associated with a linguistic item.¹⁷ It is this last solution that we prefer.

Turning now to Geoghegan's theory of marking rules, the following difficulties emerge:

(1) The crucial criterion for distinguishing naturally occurring marking rules from code rules was, as we have seen, the low subjective probability of the application of marking operators to encode cues. The problem with this criterion is that it seems to cut the natural phenomena the wrong way. For in any but the simplest code rules there are going to be paths through the classificatory process that are used more frequently than others. We could then decide that these rarely-used pathways were better treated as marking rules applied after the

code rule in question. But in that case they would lose their 'deliberate search' characteristics that led us to think of them as code rule pathways in the first place. Furthermore, some processes that have the formal properties of marking rules (for example, that the inputs are drawn from the set of outputs) do not seem necessarily to be rarely applied; cases in point might be 'metaphorical' switches in code-switching data, and the use of the super-polite pronoun of address naam in my own data.

It would seem preferable then to use as distinguishing criteria either the different kinds of information that seem empirically to be associated with cues and assessments (attitudinal versus attributional features, say) or some formal criteria. The first solution pre-supposes an intuitive grasp of the distinction in any case, while Geoghegan's formulation as it stands makes the second impossible. For a given marking rule can always be modelled by an identical task-performing code rule. But suppose we restrict marking rules so that no marking rule can have an output that is not also a potential input (i.e. all vertices in a directed graph representation can potentially be the unmarked initial starting point; or more simply, all address forms must be able to be used in an unmarked way). We can then identify marked outputs against the background of the expected usage predicted by the code rule input. For there would be no linguistic items that did not have such associated code-rule predictions of their usage. (This would contrast with, for instance, the way in which the outputs T, PN', NN', TN' are introduced for the first time by the marking rule in Figure 2.11 above; these would now have to be introduced as outputs of a code rule, and this solution need not I think be artificial.)

Since this formal restriction is compatible with the data in hand, when we come to include a marking-rule-like component it is this solution that we will adopt.

(2) A second difficulty with the theory of marking rules is this. Geoghegan introduces the 'semantic' items or cues in an essentially arbitrary way. In the first place, both the fact that all the cues associated with a marking operator are consistent (or even "essentially synonymous" (Geoghegan 1973:294)), and the fact that a cycle through a marking rule would involve a contradiction between cues (ibid.:192), are seen as essentially contingent (accidental) facts. Clearly these constraints emanate from restrictions imposed by criteria of communicational efficiency, and they suggest that models of such processes should be geared at least as much to communicational efficiency as to cognitive efficiency.

Secondly, the cues associated with outputs by marking operators do not seem to be arbitrary with respect to the code rule that also generates those outputs (if we allow the restriction suggested in (1) immediately above, then all marking rule outputs would also be code-rule outputs, and have the non-arbitrary association in question). Take for instance the fragment of a marking rule in Figure 2.10, here given NN (e.g. 'Simmy') as unmarked input, the use of PN (e.g. 'Snooks') encodes the cue of 'affection' associated with a, while the use of TN (e.g. 'Simon') encodes the cue of (say) 'anger' associated with marking operator b. Now the point is that the situations in which NN would be unmarked (that is, where its (potential) use would be specified by a code rule) would have a non-arbitrary relationship to 'affection', for they would be situations of intimacy. Similarly the situations in

which TN would be unmarked would be those in which some social distance between speaker and addressee obtained, and it seems in general to be the case that one way of expressing anger is to withdraw affection and assume a social distance.

A clearer case, perhaps, of this non-arbitrary association is provided by the re-analysis mentioned above of the Norwegian code-switching data presented by Blom and Gumperz (1972). For if 'metaphorical switching' is indeed a case of marking rule application, then the cues it carries (as the term 'metaphorical' suggests) are derived from the situations in which each code is unmarked, and this basic usage ('situational switching' as the authors have it) is appropriately specified by code rule. Further cases of the non-arbitrary relationship between code rules and marking rules that share outputs can be found in Friedrich (1972), and in the data to be presented below.

We may now turn to some general difficulties that hold for both code and marking rules. The first of these is that there are some cases of output selection that do not seem to fit either format. For instance there are cases in my data where A addresses B with honorific h in the presence of a wide class of bystanders, call them C. But in the absence of C, A does not use h but rather g, a lesser honorific. Both circumstances (with or without C) could be equi-probable. Now the problem with describing the process of switching (when, say, C walks away) as a code-rule re-assessment is that for nearly all code-rule outputs like h, there is a corresponding lesser honorific like g, and the same switch as from g to h in the absence of C occurs in each of these cases too. So we would have to encumber the code rule with an oft-repeated assessment, whereas what we formally want is something

much more like a marking rule that will shove us straight from one code-rule output to another in certain circumstances. But the switch does not seem quite like a marking process either; specifically, no 'marked' form results and no special extra information or cues are encoded. For intuitively what is going on is a routine relaxation of deference in circumstances where it is not enforced. This and other similar processes that are observable suggest that there are devices which are formally similar to marking rules (as we have restricted them) but which perform different communicational functions.

A second general problem is that, as Geoghegan notes, his formulation presupposes a "basic commitment to certain ideas about how people think" (1971:29). He lists itemization ("i.e. the cognitive representation of information as discrete units and not as continuously varying magnitudes"), sequential processing, efficiency, recoding, and contrast. We have already seen that there are difficulties with the interpretation of efficiency as applied to code and marking rules; there is communicational efficiency as a sine qua non before cognitive efficiency, and there are many different possible interpretations of the latter. But it is the first presupposition, itemization, that is most likely to render the whole enterprise truth-valueless. For there is now a growing body of evidence that information may indeed be processed in terms of continuously varying magnitudes. Most of this research stems from initial work by Rosch (1971) and from the now renowned anti-relativism tract by Berlin and Kay (1969). A great deal of experimentation on the formation and internal structure of categories is summarised in Rosch (1976): this suggests that categories are organized in terms of focal members or prototypes, and then by

degrees of deviation from such prototypes along a number of dimensions or attributes. An important extension is the claim that this sort of organisation also holds for domains of concrete objects (and not just for domains of abstract properties like colour). G. Lakoff (1972) assembles linguistic evidence in favour of the representation of lexical semantics in terms of fuzzy sets (as developed by Zadeh (1971)), and draws the conclusion that "algebraic functions play a role in natural language semantics" (1972:206) and "perceptual finiteness depends on an underlying continuum of values" (1972:215). Fillmore (1975) endorses the same general idea. Kay and McDaniel (1975) attempt a formalization of colour categories in terms of fuzzy sets. Finally, Kay (1975) notes that algebraic models may be better suited to domains like ours, namely the categorization of social alters, than models of lexical items in terms of sets of necessary and sufficient conditions. Examining Tahitian words for race and class, Kay found that the explicit (elicitable) criteria of assignment, which were based on sets of discrete features, predicted areas of conceptual space that would be unlabelled; but the prediction was wrong. Assignments seemed rather to be in actual fact calculated on the "weighted average of values" (1975:19) on various dimensions. Furthermore, such basic assignments were subject to contextual reclassification whereby to distinguish two members of the same category, for example, the category boundaries were shifted to fall between them. Kay suggests (in close agreement with Fillmore 1975) that the following basic components and processes are involved in the use of such words:

- (a) schema for organising objects in terms of weighted values
on various continuous dimensions

- (b) a set of lexical items
- (c) a set of rules for applying (b) to (a):
 - (i) an absolute range of values for each lexical item,
 - such that the lexical items partition the set of values
 - (ii) functions on the values that allow a pragmatic re-classification in order to establish a contrast.

We may note here that we find again a basic classification followed by a contextual reclassification, as achieved by the pair of Geoghegan's processes, code rules followed by marking rules.

In what follows we shall find that the facts about the usage of the Tamil items sensitive to social deixis do indeed suggest that numerical values on various dimensions are the output of the basic social classification we suggested above. But they also suggest the application of a successive division (in the manner of branching paths in a code rule), of the conceptual space of social alters. Below we shall make some suggestions for the resolution of these two facets of the phenomena.

A final general problem with Geoghegan's theory concerns its theoretical status vis-a-vis actual behaviour. Quinn (1974) in a review of Geoghegan 1973 interprets the latter's use of the term 'performance' (which code and marking rules are supposed to be models of) as having the same ambiguity (or just plain vagueness?) associated with Chomsky's use of the word. That is, a performance model is at once a model of real-time processing and of actual observable behaviour. Quinn therefore hails Geoghegan's theory as the vanguard of the "Second generation practitioners of the new ethnography". For the first generation (composed of Frake, Goodenough, Lounsbury, Conklin, and

others) were preoccupied with specifying the conditions under it which it was culturally appropriate to act in certain ways, and explicitly eschewed any attempt to predict behaviour. "But the failure of such descriptions to predict what members of a society will do has come to be regarded, by Geoghegan and others, as a theoretical shortcoming" (Quinn 1974:244-5). And Geoghegan does encourage this interpretation, in places, when he contrasts "the native actor's competence to make culturally appropriate decisions" with "the performance routines used by the actor to realize this competence in his actual behaviour" (Geoghegan 1973:1). Yet it is clear to Geoghegan that the outputs of his rules are not, by virtue of that fact alone, behavioural outputs: the arrows in the flow charts and the directed graphs never cross the line from thought to action. He thus retreats in fact to 'first generation' goals as far as prediction is concerned, and in fact 'appropriateness' is an important implicit primitive in his theories: "Even though a classification rule may be used to determine the activity appropriate to a given situation, we should emphasize that the output of the rule is not overt behaviour in any form; it is information concerning the classification of one or more entities (i.e., a situation)" (Geoghegan 1971:7; see also 1973 passim). Working as he does on the basis of elicitations only, this retreat hardly seems problematic; native exegesis allows the ethnographer 'to get inside his subjects' heads'. But there is no guarantee that such exegesis is not a highly distorting mirror on the mind (the assumption of discrete information may be an example of such a distortion). Methodologically it is highly desirable, if not necessary, to check models constructed on the basis of elicitation with the actual observable recordable facts of behaviour

in the relevant domain. But we can only do this if they make predictions (if only predictions of appropriateness). The corollary of this methodological principle is that we can only check models if they are relatively complete and contain some component that takes us over the borderline from thought to action. Otherwise the failure of a model to match the behavioural facts can always be put down to some missing component, or the 'exercise of the will'. Admittedly we are far from being able to produce such models at present, but if we are to integrate thought and action, what our informants say they do and what they do in fact do, then no other goals are going to achieve this. In what follows we shall attempt to sketch the full range of processes that are involved in the use of Tamil pronouns of address, even though we are unable to give much substantial content to the processes themselves. And we shall use as evidence both elicited and behavioural facts.

We have dwelt on Geoghegan's theory at some length because it is by far the best-developed model of the cognitive processes that underlie the usage of socially deictic items. And despite the fact that we have assembled a number of serious problems for his account, we shall be unable to replace it with anything as generally useful or precise; and indeed when it comes to describing the data in detail will fall back on it for the lack of anything else adequate to the task.

2.3.2 Brown and Gilman's theory

In a highly influential and elegant paper, Brown and Gilman (1960) suggested a rather different approach to the description of 'honorific' usage, here the T/V (as in French tu/vous) alternation in European languages. This was followed up by a study of address forms (titles and names) in American English (Brown and Ford 1961)

along very similar lines; but since it is the T/V alternation that is of special interest to us, our comments will be restricted to the earlier paper. Their perspective is social psychological and more concerned with attitudes than with cognitive processes, and their presentation, though well researched, is entirely informal. But the crucial difference between their theory and Geoghegan's is that they assume that alternates like T/V pronouns and address forms differ 'semantically'. They begin by defining 'semantics' as "the covariation between the pronoun used and the objective relationship existing between speaker and addressee" (Brown and Gilman 1960:252), a definition that renders Geoghegan's system equally a 'semantically' based process. However, they then promptly ignore this definition and proceed in a quite different manner. They identify two 'semantics' or abstract social dimensions operative behind historically observable T/V alternation systems. The one is the 'power semantic' and is associated with the asymmetric use of T downwards in the social hierarchy, and V upwards. The other is the 'solidarity semantic' which is associated with reciprocal use of T. These 'semantics' refer to social dimensions. We may think of these as vertical and horizontal social distance respectively, "two dimensions fundamental to the analysis of all social life" (ibid.:252). The authors assume a Weberian definition of power ("one person may be said to have power over another in the degree that he is able to control the behaviour of others" (ibid.:255), and they note that there are many quite different sources of power, and that power is always an asymmetric relation. Solidarity, on the other hand, is perceived social similarity: "the similarities that matter seem to be those that make for like-mindedness or similar behaviour dispositions" (ibid.:258), and

solidarity can (but may not) be produced by frequent contact. Solidarity and non-solidarity are opposite poles on the dimension of horizontal social distance (we shall sometimes refer to this simply as 'distance'), and all degrees of social distance are symmetric relations. There is thus an almost iconic relation between asymmetrical T/V usage and the expression of power, and symmetric T or V usage and the expression of solidarity or distance.

Brown and Gilman then argue that what lies behind historical shifts in the usage of the T/V pronouns in European languages is a basic shift in importance from an earlier system where the power semantic dominated to a later one in which the solidarity semantic dominates, a transition that had to overcome some internal inconsistency and was only fully effected during the last one hundred years. Each 'semantic' encodes two types of relationship: the power semantic encodes that the speaker (henceforth S) is higher than the addressee (henceforth H for hearer), or that S is lower than H; while the solidarity semantic encodes either that S is solidary with H or that S is non-solidary with H. We have then two basic kinds of systems (where > indicates 'is superior to') as schematized in I and II of Figure 2.13. Clearly in system I, when S and H are equal in 'power' (S = H) some resolution principle is called for (at least in two term systems), as some pronoun must be used; Brown and Gilman suggest that in the Middle Ages when system I is thought to have operated, upper classes (for purely historical reasons) resolved the problem by reciprocal V usage to equals, while lower classes resolved it in favour of reciprocal T usage (ibid.:256). Slowly, however, system II was superimposed on system I in just this status-equals slot; thus where power was neutral-




Figure 2.13

ized the T/V alternation was re-used to signal solidarity or its absence, and we thus had system III. Brown and Gilman note that this system was stable and survived for a long time (ibid.:258): it is, moreover, the system which corresponds to the Indian data to be presented here, which has probably had this abstract shape for a millenium or so. But eventually in nineteenth-century Europe, the solidarity dimension began to expand upwards and downwards in the social hierarchy and to be applicable beyond status equals. This produces conflict in just two areas: in the top left-hand corner of III solidarity enjoins a T, while power enjoins V; in the bottom right-hand corner non-solidarity enjoins a V, while power enjoins T. In the twentieth century we finally find resolution in favour of the solidarity

dimension. with the top-left V in III becoming T, and the bottom-right T becoming V, so that the power dimension is entirely overriden with a column of T's under solidarity and a column of V's under non-solidarity. And this historical progression does lend some support to Brown and Gilman's thesis.

On the basis of the progression they claim that there is a causal relation from kinds of social structure to patterns of T/V usage, but the causal relation is indirect and mediated by kinds of ideology. The static feudal society of mediaeval Europe is said to have been associated with an 'estates of Man' ideology and this with a system like I in Figure 2.13. Urban growth then led to a swelling group of middle classes internally unranked, with a consequent area of solidary ideology, reflected in system III. And finally, revolutionary changes in nineteenth-century government and society produced the ideological conditions for the predominance of the solidarity semantic that Fillmore (nd Deixis II:10) calls 'stratification masking'.

Brown and Gilman make various other observations: that there are different cultural bases for the assessment of 'power' and 'solidarity' which distinguish cultures as close as French, German and Italian; that similar sources for class differences in usage exist; and that it is on the basis of the association of T/V patterns with the two 'semantics' that it is possible to "express transient moods and attitudes".

It is this last point that is worth emphasizing. What the authors claim is that what Geoghegan has since called marking rules are in fact parasitic on the 'semantics' of the basic usages determined by power and solidarity: "the major expressive meanings are derived from the

major semantic rules" (ibid.:253). Specifically, "breaking the norms of power generally has the meaning that a speaker regards an addressee as his inferior, superior or equal, although by usual criteria, and according to the speaker's own customary usage, the addressee is not what the pronoun implies. Breaking the norms of solidarity generally means that the speaker temporarily thinks of the other as an outsider or as an intimate; it means that sympathy is extended or withdrawn" (ibid.:277). And this is precisely the point also made, in the context of code-switching, by Gumperz and Blom (1972): 'metaphorical switching' is a marking operation that draws its values (cues) from the situations in which each code is standardly used. In both cases the process seems to be 'semantically' based, and indeed metaphorical.

Turning to critical comment, there are a number of places where the Brown and Gilman account seems inadequate. In the first place, the alleged historical origins of the polite plural pronoun of address in the mode of address adopted to the twin fourth-century Roman emperors, and the subsequent percolation of this usage downwards in the society, seems dubious in the extreme (admittedly Brown and Gilman do not commit themselves to this interpretation: cf 1960:254). No particularistic historical origins are going to explain the world-wide occurrence of precisely such a T/V alternation; for this, something along the lines of the account in terms of strategic language usage offered above seems inevitable (two possible sources we suggested were reference to the addressee's power basis in a group and the strategic escape provided by what could be interpreted as 'you or someone').

In the second place, given such strategic origins, it may not be the case that the 'power semantic' is historically prior to the

'solidarity semantic' as Brown and Gilman suggest (the use of V as a recognition of power differences was extended, they say, to other kinds of differences, including symmetric ones; *ibid.*:257). Specifically, it is possible to doubt that system I ever existed historically. Rather system II may have been prior, and then by the implicatures of a one-way extension of intimacy to inferiors, may have given rise to system III. Certainly system III as it now exists in the Indian village of this study is correlated with a still highly static hierarchy and its corresponding ideology, states of affairs that were supposed to be determinative of system I. It is also doubtful that the mediaeval use of symmetric V among high class equals, and symmetric T among low class equals, is due to the alleged historical fact that "reverential V was always introduced into a society at the top" (Brown and Gilman 1860:256). For these same patterns are found in the Indian data to be described here, and there are strong symbolic reasons for these associations between high social rank and gracious formality and deference.

But the major criticism of the Brown and Gilman framework must be that these very general social dimensions, power and solidarity, with which asymmetric and symmetric T/V usages are correlated, do not tell us how the pronouns are used in concrete social circumstances. As the authors note, the two dimensions subsume a host of specific, culturally variant dimensions of assessment. Without knowing these cultural dimensions, the abstract knowledge that, say, asymmetric T/V usage is associated with a dyad of unequals would be of little use to the language learner. A specification of 'communicative competence' in a T/V-using culture must then include the knowledge of all these dimensions and the manner in which they are applied to determine the

various usages. But that was precisely what Geoghegan's code rules were designed to achieve.

It is possible in addition to complain that the concepts 'power' and 'solidarity' as defined by Brown and Gilman are far too vague. But this need not be so. If we link them to an exact specification of the assessments that must go into assigning such dimensions to dyads, we thereby give them a firm interpretation. Insofar as generalizations can be made across the multitude of underlying dimensions, these can be added to the specifications of power and solidarity, and some further substantive and formal content can be assigned to them.

We have repeated the substance of Brown and Gilman's framework here because in a number of important respects it conflicts with Geoghegan's theory. To summarize and recapitulate, the differences are these. In the first place Brown and Gilman identify two dimensions "fundamental to the analysis of all social life", and then are able in terms of these to give an account of an historical 'semantic' clash in T/V usage systems and its resolution. But Geoghegan's theory has no place for such general social dimensions: code rules map social criteria on many different dimensions directly onto appropriate address forms (compare for example, Ervin-Tripp's (1972) informal flow chart for nineteenth century Russian pronominal usage with Brown and Gilman's system III above, to which it corresponds). In other words, code rules do not refer to any general social significance that their outputs may have independent of their inputs; rather, the classificatory attributes of the addressee directly determine his reclassification in terms of appropriate address forms. In contrast, Brown and Gilman's analysis suggests implicitly that usage is based on the social signif-

icance that the linguistic forms have; the 'semantics' of a form will then determine the classes of social alters to which the form may appropriately be used.

What we have here in microcosm, and perhaps only in close analogy, is a clash between usage-based and concept-based theories of semantics. Geoghegan's theory is essentially a usage theory: what a form 'means' (in social terms) is equated with the set of circumstances in which it is used appropriately (compare Searle 1969, or better perhaps Winograd 1972). Brown and Gilman's theory, on the other hand, assumes that abstract significances are associated with forms, which are in part at least independent of all the detail of the contexts in which they are used. Now although usage theories may not be in the ascendant, it does seem plausible that at least some aspects of language are best handled in this way as plans for action or use (such plan-interpreted items include morphemes like 'well' that function primarily as markers of conversational structure, for instance). What we should ask then is whether there are any empirical consequences that might decide between the two approaches. Some substantial differences are the following. Brown and Gilman's analysis suggests that members should be able to handle new types of addressee (who do not meet existing classificatory criteria) with ease simply by locating their positions on two dimensions, power and solidarity. Geoghegan's analysis suggests that a restructuring of code rules would be required. In fact such exposure to new types of addressees is frequent in a changing and more mobile social world, and speakers in my data treat them swiftly and routinely with systematic allocations to different address forms (the treatment of the ethnographer was a case in point). In order to account

for the extendability of usage, there seems to be a clear advantage in having a distinct and separate 'semantic' level attached to the forms directly.

Another piece of evidence in favour of the Brown and Gilman position is that, in my experience, informants can volunteer a consistent exegesis of T/V alternations in terms of general dimensions ('higher' and 'lower', 'close' and 'distant') directly equatable with the poles of 'power' and 'solidarity'. This is fairly persuasive evidence in favour of their playing a direct role in usage (see Paulston 1975, Hollos 1975, for independent confirmation in Swedish and Hungarian, respectively).

A third piece of evidence is Brown and Gilman's 'metaphorical' interpretation of marking phenomena. In Geoghegan's theory, recollect, in order to account for the exploitative usages observed, 'semantics' have to be brought into the theory in any case in the description of marking rules. For a marking rule shifts one from one output of a code rule to another, but not to no effect. Hence we have to introduce some 'semantic' dimensions to capture the intended effects. But consider what would happen if the code rule outputs already had associated 'semantics'. Then no special introduction of significances would be required for marking rule operations, for the shift from one code rule output to another would be a shift from one 'meaning' to another. (This assumes, as argued above, that marking rules may be restricted to having as outputs only forms that are inputs). At first sight this appears merely to be an equivalent way of doing things. But, in fact, having to import arbitrary 'semantics' for marking rules from nowhere and non-arbitrarily relate them to code rule outputs, is a positive

embarrassment to Geoghegan's theory. Moreover the Brown and Gilman theory makes a significant generalization and prediction about the non-arbitrary links between code-rule assessments and marking cues; further, given the semantic associations that code rule outputs have, the formal description of marking rules can be simplified: 'cycles' are ruled out on a semantic basis as contradictions, while cues associated with a single marking operator must be semantically compatible, so no formal restrictions need be imposed. It may be argued that nothing is left to the notion of marking rule in this case, beyond a special application of the concept of metaphor. But if so, this is a welcome result. However, since very little is known about the processes involved in metaphor beyond what is sketched in Grice 1975, we would do well to develop the notion of marking rules independently at present.

One aspect of Brown and Gilman's analysis that we have not yet taken into account has rather profound implications. This is the fact that the social significances attached to the T or V forms only take on definite values in an interactional context. Suppose we know that an individual A gives T to an individual B. What we do not know is whether this signifies solidarity, or A's superiority. If we find that B returns T, then we know that A's T was solidary; but if B uses V as the reciprocal, then A's T was an expression of power. We could say that this is only a case of post-hoc ambiguity. But in fact this is a problem for members too if they have no consolidated usage or are changing it. In such circumstances they resort to interactive reasoning: each must make an assessment of what the other will give in order to determine what his optimal usage is. Such reasoning has much more in common with the kinds of thinking explored in the theory of games

than it has with the sort of simple device for processing routine information that code rules describe. It introduces an element of a quite different kind into the underlying cognitive processes, and constitutes an insuperable objection to Geoghegan's theory as a complete map of such processes.

A final point of difference between the two theories we have reviewed is that they use different kinds of evidence as data. Geoghegan's enterprise starts out initially as an attempt to find an adequate descriptive format for a set of lexical items, address forms in Samal, and he naturally turns to elicitations from a few informants to settle the issues involved. Brown and Gilman, on the other hand, use a hodge-podge of historical sources (instances of usage, contemporary comments on usage, and so on) together with their own questionnaire data, in order to establish broad historical trends. The important point is that neither theory is based on, nor has any immediate application to, the much more variable facts observable in transcribed tapes of natural conversation (the sorts of facts collected in this study of an Indian village). If we want a theory to be testable against those facts, then it must also provide an account of variations in usage in spoken contexts, so that there is a strong correspondence between the theory and the facts on the ground.

It should be clear from our discussion that there are aspects of both theories that seem essentially correct, and aspects of both that seem inadequate. The task to which we now turn is to accommodate the substantially correct aspects of both in a more general scheme.

2.3.3 Steps towards a revised theory

As we have warned, the most that we can do here is make some suggestions about the overall organization of the cognitive processes that are involved in the uses of socially deictic items, and assemble a list of conditions that an adequate theory must meet.

From our discussion so far we can abstract some of these conditions, especially those aspects of the two theories reviewed above that seem essentially correct. These are the following:

(1) There is a division between two essential kinds of components, a basic classification process (corresponding to code rules) and a reclassification process (including marking rules). The aspect of the classification process is the input to the reclassification process.

(2) The basic classification process (used in the selection of socially deictic items) must offer a general classification of social alters so that the knowledge required for a vast range of appropriate styles and media of interaction need not be redundantly specified. It follows that the outputs of the general social classification cannot be in terms of specific behavioural items (pronouns, for instance). Rather, taking as input detailed information on many dimensions, the process must output values on some very abstract highly general social dimensions - but not too abstract to provide a basis for behavioural choices in many media.

(3) The reclassification component should be restricted to shunting from one output or value of the classificatory process to another. In this way 'marking'-like phenomena can be identified against the background expectations produced by the code-rule-like

classificatory processes. In addition, other kinds of reclassification may be involved, as illustrated above in the discussion of Kay (1975) and in the case of the audience-sensitivity of Tamil honorifics.

(4) The information required by these processes may be discrete, or it may be organized in terms of continuously varying quantities; both kinds of information might be utilized, discrete inputs with algebraic values as outputs or vice-versa for instance. There is some evidence that the classificatory process does operate in terms of successively finer discriminations, and this suggests perhaps a discrete input.


(5) The linguistic (behavioural) outputs of the system as a whole have associated social significance ('semantics', as we have sometimes inaccurately called them). These are partially retained, as in metaphor generally, in marked usages. They are also the items to which linguistic rules refer, and in a linguistic framework we should think of them as conventional implicatures, as argued above. In the case of polite pronouns of address, at least, these significances are certain values on the horizontal and vertical social dimensions of 'power' and 'solidarity'.

(6) Once we have an overall set of components involved in underlying information assessment, we still require some final component that transfers thought into action; specifically, it should transfer a desire to say something (in the absence of any contrary desires) into the act of saying it. That is, a component that will take intents as input, weigh their relative desirability, and output the chosen actions.

To meet these overall conditions, the relevant cognitive processes should have, it seems to me, the general shape indicated in Figure 2.14. One should note that this is an abstract model of an individual's cognitive processes, and while the general shape of such processes may be presumed to be common to members of a society, evidence will be presented below to demonstrate that considerable intra-cultural variation exists in details.

Figure 2.14 should be read in this way. Component (1) operates perhaps on code-rule-like principles, taking as input all the culturally relevant dimensions of the assessment of the social nature of alter (for second person Tamil pronouns or address forms this alter is the addressee of course). It returns values on just two subjective dimensions of social assessment corresponding to Brown and Gilman's 'power' and 'solidarity' (P and S in Figure 2.14), values that are constructed out of the more detailed social assessments.¹⁸ For third person pronouns and address forms other classification details may be required (specifically, sex, caste membership, generation, cross- or parallel-kin category, in the Tamil case), and these must be available to component (3) when so required; but for second person pronouns no such information is required, nor for many other honorific forms, kinesic displays, and so on. Component (2) takes the P and S values returned by component (1), and passes them on with or without a re-assessment. One source of reassessment is the communicative intent to encode marking cues of one kind or another; this can be done by functions on the P and S values which will then return different values. Note that no other classificatory facts can be reassessed other than P and S values; this is because aspects like sex, generation,

Figure 2.14 The information processing underlying T/V usage: first approximation



cross- or parallel-kin category do not seem to be used metaphorically or markedly in the Indian data (although generation is sometimes so used to signal high P values, or low S values; a further exception is the very occasional joking use of low caste titles). Component (3) takes as main inputs both communicative intent that has determined some semantic selection (for instance a second person pronoun, or a vocative title), and the reassessed P and S values from component (2). Its job is to match these two inputs with an appropriate socially deictic linguistic item, which will serve as output. The matching device can be simple: it surveys the set of alternates appropriate to the communicative intent (e.g. pronouns of address) and selects that item which has^{as} conventional implicatures that P and S value matches the input P and S value. The component then returns as output the chosen linguistic item.

The last component takes us over the borderline from thought to action. All models of human action must proceed at least implicitly by making certain assumptions about the relation of thought to action, specifically that actors are rational in the sense that, given a desire and intent to do something, and no reasons to not do it, a rational actor will perform that action. Without this assumption virtually nothing could be said about human action at all (Watkins 1970). But there turns out to be a specific mode of reasoning involved in the transition from goal or intent to means that will achieve this intent. It is this mode of reasoning that is applied in component (4). A model of it is provided in the model-theoretically-interpreted calculus presented in Atlas and Levinson 1973. What is special about the system is that it will allow other goals to override some particular goal

just in particular circumstances. It thus provides a prediction of the circumstances in which predictions made by the rest of the components fail. By incorporating such a component, not only do we turn predictions about cognitive processes into predictions about action (where they can be readily falsified), but we refine the predictions made by the other components.

It may be objected that talk in terms of prediction is simply meaningless when the predictive mechanisms involved have as crucial inputs data that are not predicted, here input from 'communicative intents'. This is true just so long as it is in principle impossible to intercept that input which can only be ascertained from the output of the model one is constructing. And on the face of it this is the case with language. But in fact it is possible to arrange empirical tests of such models: what we need to do is feed in fully specified communicative intents and observe the output (to check the system at the initial stage we shall need members' judgments of correct match between input and output). Such a model exists in the translation program run by Wilks (1973), constructed in the artificial intelligence paradigm, which takes an English input and produces a (remarkably successful) French output. In our field a simple test can be arranged: tape recordings of natural conversation are transcribed, and all pronouns of address are deleted (the information is retained, and native judgments of communicative intent are obtained). The task is to predict the actual usage in each instance, given whatever sociological information is required and any special ('marked') communicative intents involved. More informally one may simply go through transcripts of natural conversation with informants and ask why each

usage is the way it is, and use this information to construct a model and to verify it. In a different context, such procedures have been used with great success by Gumperz (1977) in studies of miscommunication, and elsewhere in studies of code switching. This is one method that was employed in the field in this study, to complement and check data from extensive elicitation.

So far our suggestions are, hopefully, of rather general application. They are constructed to deal with the use of socially deictic items of various kinds in different languages. Moreover, a strong motivation for assuming that cognitive processes are organized in this way comes from a rather different source: the organization of polite language usage as detailed for three independent cultures, by Brown and Levinson (1977). The important results there were that, given some universal wants and the system of practical reasoning mentioned above, virtually all the strategic polite usages in (presumably) all languages can be formally derived. Moreover, the choice of the level of politeness was shown to depend crucially on just three factors: horizontal and vertical social distance (corresponding to Brown and Gilman's 'solidarity' and 'power'), and the cultural weighting of impositions. These three factors were combined to give a single value (subject to contextual reclassifications) which in turn were determinative of strategy selection (independent confirmation of the relevance of the same factors comes from Grimshaw 1976). We have been careful here to keep our model roughly in line with those findings, which could be accommodated as follows: component (1) outputs the relevant P and S values, component (2) will have to take into account the weighting of the imposition involved in the speech act, together with any relevant

contextual reclassifications, while component (3) would have to be more complex, involving the derivation of appropriate strategies by practical inference, but would retain a basic matching function that would ensure that the chosen strategy had the correct associated P and S values.

We now wish, however, to take into account all the special factors relevant to the selection of T/V alternates in the Tamil of the village of this study. Some of these special factors may have general relevance, but we will not know this until there are studies of equal detail in many languages. A point that should be emphasized is that these special factors only emerge from a detailed study of the use of honorifics in natural conversation (and hence are mostly absent from Geoghegan's and Brown and Gilman's accounts).

The major revision we have to make in order to deal with the Tamil case is to split the proposed reclassification device into two devices that achieve rather different ends. The first, which we shall argue must in fact be ordered second, deals with the kinds of situational reclassification that we are already familiar with through marking rules (which are a special case). The second is a finer-grained social classification of alters, which we shall argue is nevertheless not a part of component (1).

Taking the first component first, which we shall dub the strategic reclassification, this must handle a wide range of different kinds of contextual reclassification observable in the Tamil T/V materials, examples of which follow. These are reassessments that are situational, attitudinal, specifically motivated, and have in common that they are essentially ephemeral.

(i) Situational reassessments

(a) arena: One remarkable thing about caste in South India is that concern about it is physically restricted. There is a local area, which I call the caste 'arena' where all interaction is caste dominated, for this is the area in which interaction establishes a caste's rank. Outside this area, restricted to the villages within a radius of ten miles or so, members of known and widely different ranked castes can interact as equals. Two examples: a young man of caste 9 (Potters) will always use T to a man of any age in caste 14 (Barbers) in the local arena. In the case of one informant, at any rate, this would extend to the local market town six miles away, where going into a barber's shop he would address the Barber as T. However beyond this arena he would use V, even to younger Barbers. The same pattern holds for his usage to 'hotel boys' (waiters in restaurants). More surprisingly, if our young Potter was to meet outside the arena a man or woman of the Barber caste who belongs to his very own village, then V not T, would be used. (A case of this was reported by both parties questioned independently.) Another case concerns a member of the dominant caste (caste 5), a young man of about thirty-five who had married a woman from our village but lived some ten miles away. When visiting his wife's village and talking to members of castes 7b, 8, 9 and 10, he used V to them (even though some of them were younger than him). He knew them and their caste membership from prior visits, and in his own village would definitely have used T to them all. But he felt outside his own local arena.

(b) activity: Just like Westerner's standards of appropriate garb are relaxed in the context of beach activities, so T/V usage in

the village was very occasionally relaxed in certain circumstances. One such was walking along the road together, where a man of caste 13 or 11 might (for instance) feel free to address a boy of caste 5 as T. This factor may be reducible to those in (c) and (d) below, but I am not sure.

(c) ephemeral social relations: Sometimes linked to (b), special relations of solidarity or power may temporarily emerge between persons. An actual case of the first kind involved a group of young men of castes 7b, 8, 9, 5, 10 and 13 (and others), who played cards together for illegal odds. Despite contrary normal usage, they used mutual T together, but only in that context. Co-drinkers of illegal spirits were also said to indulge in such familiarity. Some examples of the second kind of relation, involve an asymmetric power situation based on the extension of a loan from a member of one caste to another. Where he normally gives T a debtor may find it expedient to give V till the loan is repaid.

(d) audience sensitivity: We have already indicated the nature of this reassessment. The point is that usage is stabilized by the presence of certain kinds of audience, especially members of the addressee's group. Ordinarily in the village usage is held consistent by the presence of interested parties, members of the speaker's caste, the addressee's caste, or castes who have a vested interest in the dignity of either of those two castes. Conversations between a lone dyad are rare. Even in the absence of bystanders, non-respectful T/V usage is reportable and sanctionable in a way that insolent kinesics or prosodics are not. Nevertheless T/V usage does occasionally relax in the absence of a stabilizing audience. One case involves the card players mentioned above; their mutual T would revert to V if others

walked in. Another case was this: a man of caste 10 visited a family of caste 5, and while in the kavuNTar house-compound addressed a fifteen-year-old boy of the family as V. Later, the boy visited the compound of the man of caste 10, who in that context gave him T. Such switches were said to be standard between members of many castes, even though the opportunities for them were relatively rare.

(ii) Strategic manipulations

(a) reassessment in relation to impositions: In the paper by Brown and Levinson (1977) mentioned above, it was argued that a universal feature of the polite use of language involves a shift to a higher level of politeness when the impositions being made in the other's preserve are greater. Thus requests for a five-dollar loan are made in a more polite fashion than requests for a dime, between the same participants. In the same way and for the same reason, shifts occur between pronouns of address in village Tamil. The only circumstances, though, where such a shift takes place from a T to a V pronoun are where the status differential is not great. Thus it might occur between members of castes that exchange 'relative age T/V' (that is, T to juniors and V to seniors), where the junior is adult and not a 'generation' younger. (Similarly in the urban Tamil of radio plays, E. Annamalai tells me, such switching might occur in the usage of a middle class boy to an office messenger). More common, though, is the switch from V to super-V (naam) for requests, favours, apologies and other 'face-threatening acts' as defined in Brown and Levinson 1977. For instance, a member of caste 14 who routinely uses V to a member of caste 8, approached the latter to ask the loan of a travelling bag: he switched to naam (super-V) to make the request. Similarly, switches away from T

to the 'neutral honorific' formed by the use of the verbal noun (see Annamalai and Ramanujan, nd) occur for the purposes of mollifying affronts. Cases of T/V alternation also occur within the family: for instance a child who normally used T to his grandmother, when accused of stealing some sweets, switched to V to protest his innocence.

(b) manipulative flattery: Low caste members talked freely of using V and super-V and other forms of exaggerated deference to humour more powerful persons, or persons whose aid they required. This was the explanation for various cases on tape where, for instance, a member of caste 11, traditional well-diggers, was soliciting a contract to re-excavate a well from a member of caste 5. He also used such exaggerated titles that he caused a great deal of mirth, but he got the contract!

(c) interactive reasoning: This complex aspect of T/V usage, which we mentioned above in the context of Brown and Gilman's theory, involves the crucial fact that it takes an interaction, that is, two interactive acts, to establish a pattern of T/V usage that specifies the nature of the social relationship. Thus if A gives T to B, the exact significance of that is not established till B reciprocates: if B gives T back then it turns out that all along A's T was the T of solidarity. Alternatively if B gives V back, then it turns out that A's T was the T of power. The thesis that 'meaning' is interactively established is a favourite and not always clear dogma of symbolic interactionists, ethnomethodologists and others: but this case at least is crystal clear. It happens to be devastating to any would-be simple analysis of the cognitive processes involved in the use of

social deixis. For it implies that in order to assess which pronoun to use (or address form; Brown and Ford 1961 point out that the same holds in that domain) one must assess how one is likely to be addressed in return. But that requires that ego have a model of alter's system for addressing others; and in a plural society like our Indian village that implies at least seventeen such models (on the assumption that usage is primarily caste-based, which is the case). Worse than this, alter's system will contain a model of ego's system which contains a model of alter's system which contains a model of ego's system.... and infinite regress threatens. As it happens, humans can operate in such inferential contexts with gay aplomb, as a special branch of the theory of games has demonstrated (Schelling 1960, Lewis 1969), but we know next to nothing about how they do this.

Such reasoning seems to be employed in cases of competitive T/V behaviour, examples of which are discussed below in Chapter IV. One case involves a member of 7a who gives T to a member of 9 as 7a's higher caste warrants; members of 9, though, standardly return V only if the addressed member of 7a is senior in years, and in this case he isn't. But this member of 7a wants V: so the member of 9 refuses either T or V, pronominally boycotting 7a. This leaves 7a in a dilemma; if he continues to give T to the member of 9, then he seems to accept the position, while if he boycotts 9 in return he establishes no status ranking. Given that such situations can arise, where some individual addresses another between whom no stable usage is established and where an element of uncertainty exists as to the expected usage, what pronoun he chooses must be assessed in relation to what he is likely to get back. He may by inclination wish to establish a relation of mutual

respect by giving V and hoping to receive it in return, but the addressee can then take advantage of this by returning T and thereby signalling his superiority. Cultural rules, however detailed, cannot specify all contingencies, (especially those involving change) and when two individuals find themselves in such an unspecified situation, interactive reasoning of the most complex kind comes into play.

(iii) Discourse progression

Gumperz (in various seminars) has drawn attention to what may be called 'onset phenomena'. In these, some level of social relations, deference, mutual agreement, and so on is established during conversation by various sociolinguistic signalling devices including prosodics, kinesics, code-switching, and the use of in-group jargon or linguistic variables. But once the level in question is established, the signalling devices can be relaxed and conversation proceeds without them (although they may indeed then be re-used to signal other kinds of information). Tapes collected for this study show that similar 'onset' usage and relaxation occurs in honorific usage, so far (but the data is not fully analyzed for this) only as regards honorifics other than the T/V alternation, including super-V, addressee honorific nka, third person pronouns, and various titles of address.

(iv) Marking phenomena

Marked usages of the T/V alternation do occur to signal various attitudes. Thus we have cases of ironic politeness to naughty children: for instance a man to his baby nephew who was demanding to be carried said vaanka cinna raja, 'come-V, O little rajah', thereby indulgently mocking the child. And between cross-relatives who stand in a joking

relationship, V may be replaced by T, with joking abuse such as low caste titles. Other cases of marked usage that accompany face-threatening acts have already been mentioned above in (iia).

This is a fairly exhaustive list of the kinds of reclassification that we imagine to be handled by the strategic reclassification component. Each of these reassessments (with the exception of interactive reasoning) can formally be handled rather simply by functions that return shifted values of P and S.

We turn now to the other proposed reclassification component, which we shall dub the personal rank reclassification. The information that we imagine to be processed here concerns the enduring, relatively stable, social attributes of individuals that are achieved rather than ascribed. In general one would imagine that such information would be handled by the code rule-like component, but in this Indian case there are a number of reasons why this is an unattractive proposition. Before reviewing these, let us just give an indication of the sorts of information involved. In the village, as reported elsewhere in India, caste is paramount in establishing the overall status that individuals bear. But beneath this, the relative rank of members of the same caste can be quite divergent. The sources of esteem are many: character, wealth, class, sex, age, morals and customs, office, marital status, number of children, and so on. Sources of low rank are the inverses of these; indigence, sloth, weak character, poverty, degrading labour, and so on. Not all of these are strictly achieved attributes, and there are status-bearing units beneath the caste but above the individual, namely clan, lineage, locally resident caste segment, and above all the kuTumpum or household, where group assets (including for instance, numbers of

stalwart fighting men) are to be reckoned. In any case individuals potentially derive their status from all these sources of rank, which are relatively stable attributes.

We may ask how the personal ranks that individuals gain interact with their caste ranks. An answer is provided by a detailed study by Hiebert (1969) which investigated just this in a village in Andhra Pradesh; the results extend intuitively to our village. Hiebert's study was based on opinion polls of both castes and individuals. His conclusion was that a man's overall personal rank, which would correspond to his influence in the village, was "in some way a sum of his caste and non-caste statuses" (1969:446) and was best visualised in terms of the vector model presented in Figure 2.15.

Overall Status




Figure 2.15

Here a man's overall rank is the sum of the two vectors, caste and non-caste status. Thus the low caste man A can be equal overall with the high caste man B, if A is personally influential and B personally dis-

reputable. The 'angle of tilt' determines the relative importance attached to each of the two vectors, and is probably restricted to the particular village or local arena. The important point that emerges is that caste sets limits on overall personal rank, but that individual qualities and attributes can nevertheless be important in the assessment of overall rank. My guess is that this is essentially correct for oolappaalaiyam too, but that the 'angle of tilt' is very large, reducing the role of non-caste attributes.

It may also be that there are some relatively stable solidarity attributes that dyads of individuals have which bind them together within or across castes. Two of these at least appear to be of importance to T/V usage: cross-caste relaxations of deference occur between adults who were classmates at (primary) school and established a strong bond then; and non-coevals who grew up in the same compound and because of that do not express the seniority of one of them, but exchange T. Such cases were pointed out to me as exceptions, and these two factors offered as explanations. However, in general, friendships seemed to be transitory (as reported for Northern India by Carstairs 1967), and T/V usage unaffected by their coming and going. We shall therefore have no more to say about reassessments based on enduring solidary relations.

We now return to our reasons for considering that such information should be handled by some component other than the primary classification process.

Let us try and treat information about personal rank as assessments within the basic social classification. On the assumption that this is a code-rule-like device, we could place these assessments in the decision pathways after the assessments about caste rank. We could

then potentially capture the vector effect whereby caste membership puts limits on the boost that personal (achieved) rank can make to an individual's overall rank. For each aspect of positive personal rank could boost the P ('power') value that the basic classification outputs by a fixed increment, although the value incremented would be established on the basis of caste.

But there are severe problems with this solution. In the first place, each personal rank assessment would have to be duplicated in each and every pathway emanating from a caste-based assessment. Since there are many such pathways this would be an encumbrance. In the second place there are many such personal rank assessments, say twenty, that would have to figure in each pathway, and we then have something more than an encumbrance; the code rule would be vastly more complex. Thirdly, since not all castes have equal opportunities for personal advancement, these congeries of assessment would have to be different for different such pathways; worse, castes that could otherwise be lumped together as more or less status equals (e.g. 13 and 14) would now have to be distinguished because different personal rank assessments are relevant to them (e.g. some members of 14 are influential astrologers). Fourthly, there seem to be indefinite extensions to the ways in which individuals can gain rank, prestige, or esteem. For instance, there have recently emerged two new 'statuses': members of the village with a university education, and truck-owning hauliers. Others will arise, while some such attributes disappear (e.g. arrack-dealers whose businesses were recently shut down by prohibition). All this is in contrast to caste, which provides an enduring framework. Fifthly, again in contrast to caste, there are wide individual

differences in the awareness of and estimation of such attributes.

Sixthly, although Hiebert's vector model may give the impression that personal rank attributes are always taken into account, this is not so, at least as far as they are determinants of T/V usage. The fact is that these attributes are rarely relevant to T/V usage at all, for by and large that usage is determined by caste membership. There are only a small number of attributes held by just a few persons that can overwhelm such status determinations by caste, but even here these are only relevant (on the whole) when speaker and addressee belong to castes that are not widely separate in the caste hierarchy. These judgments are thus not pertinent to the great bulk of T/V usage. Given this, it would make sense to treat this information by what is called in artificial intelligence a default system: assume that no such information applies to alter unless such information is actually presented. But this, recollect, was the essential character of Geoghegan's marking rules. If here we treat this information as a sequence of assessments, given that they will fall into pathways that include the most travelled ones, we will require that positive absence of each attribute of personal rank is assessed in order to discover (mostly) that none are relevant.

It is for these reasons taken together that assessments of personal rank seem best considered in this Indian case to be handled by a secondary reclassification component, and not by the primary classification component itself. Formally a default system will have much in common with rules of the marking type. For given an output of the basic classification in terms of P and S values, the personal rank reclassification will simply shift the P values a set number of degrees in either


direction (towards higher or lower values). Since the input P value will depend on the caste rank of alter, this will achieve the vector effect whereby caste ranks set limitations on overall individual ranks.

Before turning to some subsidiary difficulties, let us list some concrete cases of the kinds of attributes relevant to personal rank reclassification, at least as it effects T/V usage. Some examples follow.

(a) office: There are a number of village posts that carry enough prestige to influence T/V usage. In the revenue village as a whole (a cluster of actual villages or 'hamlets') the two chief executive officers are the President of the village panchayat and the Village Munsif (or V.M. as he is colloquially known). These are held by members of the same extremely powerful squire family (of caste 5): since T/V usage to that family is very deferential in any case, office here only makes a marginal difference. Nevertheless there are elder persons of other castes or the same caste who by caste rank are entitled to T these two men, but do not do so because they hold these influential offices.

In the actual hamlet of oolappaalaiyam, the most important residing official is the village accountant or karNam, who keeps the land register; he is a figure of considerable power (Beck 1972:127), and by tradition always a member of caste 2. There are a number of castes who exchange relative age T/V with caste 2, including members of caste 4. Up until 1964 one member of caste 4 (call him B) addressed with T a member of caste 2 (call him A) who was heir to the post of karNam; and A gave V to B. For B was elder than A by almost twenty years. But in 1964 A's father died, and he became karNam. From then on B

used V to A, so that mutual V was exchanged. Thus:



Similarly, within his own familial network, A was treated differently. Before 1964 A's elder brother-in-law gave him T, after 1964 he gave him V (this actually by demand).

Other local officers are teachers. When these are higher caste (two for instance were members of 7b), those whose caste-based usage would be T based on age-superiority may sometimes use V to them. But there are a number of Harijan teachers (local members of 16) in the revenue village who are treated just like all the other Harijans by higher castes.¹⁹ But again, among Harijans of other castes who exchange relative age T/V with members of 16, the position of teacher may boost an age-based T to a V of respect. (Note that such effects are predicted by the application of a fixed reassessment function operating on the output of the basic caste-based classification). One point about such officers is that the arena effect mentioned above operates here: a Harijan teacher from outside the local caste-jostling arena, despite the exact knowledge of his caste background and providing that he maintains a distance from local Harijans, will be treated almost exactly like the 7b teachers just mentioned. This suggests that, if alter falls outside the local arena, and providing that he does not arrive in the arena in a caste capacity (to visit relatives, or carry on traditional occupations), the basic classification assigns to him

a middle-to-high P value (and of course a value indicating large social distance, non-solidarity); but we can expect differences here depending on ego's (the classifier's) caste. Other offices, similar in status to the teacher, are the government veterinary surgeon and the local malarial officer.

Somewhat lower is the 'lineman', or government electrician. In the village this man was known to be of Harijan origin, but being from outside the local area no difficulties were placed on his access to high-caste houses when this was necessary.²⁰ He has in fact considerable power, as the irrigation systems now work by electric power and middle class families expect electric light, and to fail to produce a bonus for him at festival time could ruin a crop or plunge a family into darkness. Other relatively lowly posts held by Harijans include the village messenger-constables, or taleyaari: the kuruvar (caste 17) holder of one such post received the V pronoun from elder members of caste 18, who would otherwise have given him T. But no higher castes would modify their usage to local Harijans by virtue of the latter's personal rank attributes.

It should be noted that visiting high officials from centres of government, whatever their caste backgrounds, are treated with great respect even by the local squire families. In one episode, a Tahsildar with a name revealing Harijan origins, arrived in the village to redistribute land confiscated under the land ceiling acts. He treated all members of the village, from highest to lowest, with unmitigated abuse and fury (partly deserved by their own obstructionism). But they felt obliged to maintain their extreme deference to him.

(b) wealth and class: In an Indian village caste and class (understood in Weberian terms) are not by any means isomorphic, as Beteille (1965) has demonstrated in detail for a Tanjore village. In our village, differences in personal wealth can be dramatic, and in castes with more than a few resident families one can usually find the extremes of wealth and poverty within it. Beck (1972:183-5) provides detailed facts in two tables, which should astonish all those who imagine that the caste hierarchy is just a thinly-disguised ranking based on economic oppression. Apart from castes 1 and 2 (represented by a single resident household each), there are no castes that do not have households which have less than 1000 rupees in capital assets (the value of three cows, two carts, or one small mud-built house: Beck 1972:286). While only castes 1, 2 and 5 may own any land (there are some few exceptions; but the dominant caste 5 still maintains a virtual monopoly), two other castes (7a and 10) have average assets just over 5,000 rupees. But the rest of the entire caste hierarchy is not significantly distinguished by differential capital assets, and some upper castes (especially 3 and 4) have actually less than the lowest castes of all. Yearly earnings reveal the same sort of picture, only here the levelling is almost complete: only members of caste 2 earn above the average for all other castes, which lies between 1000 and 2000 rupees a year. And there are members of the dominant caste who earn less than any members of castes 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12.

Class then is independent of caste, and we can expect personal wealth to boost an individual's overall rank. Important symbolic statements of wealth are made by the splendour of marriages celebrated by the family, and these are matters of endless gossip and comment, as

my tapes reveal. Examples of the influence of wealth on T/V usage can readily be provided. One case involves a member of 7a who is attempting to persuade members of 4, 6 and 9 to use V to him even if they are junior in age (which is contrary to established usage); he is having mixed success, as will be described below. Another case involves a wealthy and hard-working blacksmith of caste 6, whose work is so much more capable than that of others (partly because of a superior workshop) that he has a certain hold over landlords and hauliers who depend on his tools and wheels. I have heard an elder member of caste 3 (who by age seniority would normally give T to members of 6) actually use V to this blacksmith, even though he uses T to younger Brahmans! A third case involves the differential treatment of wealthy and poor members of 7b by members of the caste 5. Caste 7b turns out to be on the border of an important distinction between higher and lower castes (as revealed by patterns of verbal interaction to be discussed in Chapter 4), and this is reflected in the fact that, to the influential and wealthy families of 7b, members of caste 5 use strict relative-age T/V, but to the families of 7b that depend upon coolie labour and dues as temple musicians, members of 5 will tend to use T whatever their age.

As was mentioned in Chapter I, there is one class of persons who are of an entirely different order of power, influence and privilege from all other persons in the revenue village. This is the squire class, the class of titled aristocrats and untitled gentry, all members of caste 5, who wield tremendous local powers with traditional authority. As it happens there are individual families wealthier than them, nouveau-riche members of caste 5 for instance,


who have acquired large amounts of land through trading and money-lending (and defaulted mortgages). But wealth in rural India is easily dissipated; big families come and go, and the ruins of palatial dwellings once occupied by the wealthy dot the landscape. The squire families, however, seem to be different: for generations they have held vast estates, and have established strong bonds with particular groups of Harijans and naaTaars who loyally work their land. The children of such families are treated like adults by other castes, in contrast to the children of the nouveau-riche. Something more than individual status is then involved. And indeed, the way that members of this class use the pronouns of address is entirely different from other members of caste 5. Moreover, there are titles of address that are more or less reserved for them. In short they form such a distinct category, to whom address is so automatically deferential, that it seems correct to treat them as distinct in the basic classification component itself. That component would then handle one non-caste assessment, but one that is in other respects commensurate, for it refers to group membership, rather than individually-acquired aspects of status, in the same way that caste assessments do.

Let us now consider how this split reclassification process can be re-integrated back into the overall structure of the information-processing system for socially deictic items represented above in Figure 2.14.. That was a first approximation to what is needed in order to handle the Tamil T/V alternation, but as a basic schema was hopefully of general application to the usage of socially deictic items in many languages. Figure 2.16 now presents a specialization designed to handle the Tamil facts in particular. For the Tamil T/V

alternation, no direct information other than P and S values (measures of generalized vertical and horizontal social distance) is required by component (4), the matching device. But we allow direct flow from components (1) and (2) to (4) to handle sex, generation and other specifics involved in third person pronouns, titles of address, and other kinds of Tamil honorific and social deixis.

To run through Figure 2.16, what we have is first a basic social classification which assigns P and S values to alter (relative to ego) on the basis of caste membership and one non-caste group membership (gentry of caste 5). Or, if alter is in the same caste as ego, it assigns vertical or horizontal social distance on the basis of kinship relation to ego. The output of this process, which has sorted alter into one of the major social blocs, is the input to the second component which will simply pass the P and S values along to component (3) unless alter has some distinctive individual traits. These traits are attributes like office, wealth and power, and assign to alter a more or less stable, community-wide personal rank. As far as T/V usage is concerned there are a handful of such attributes that can boost rank, and presumably a number that can lower it, and perhaps some that reassess solidarity values too. Thus what the first two components together achieve is the overall assessment of an individual's basic generally accepted status or personal rank, both as a member of a status-bearing group and as a potential acquirer of attributes that enhance an individual's standing. This overall status of an individual determines a basic expectation of an 'unmarked' usage by ego to him. It is against these basic expectations of usage by ego to alter that the strategic reclassifications of component (3) may take place.

Figure 2.16 The information processing underlying T/V usage: second approximation



These may produce 'marked' outputs in Geoghegan's sense of encoding extra communicative intents, or they may involve adjustments to locality, activity, discourse location, and so on, where little extra information (other than a certain view of the situation) is encoded. In any case, though, the information processed here has to do with particular situational factors or strategic intents, and the ephemeral nature of these factors (and their ties to particular moments in particular speech episodes) is in sharp contrast to the nature of the information processed in components (1) and (2), where the stable characteristics of social alters are considered. Finally, component (3) outputs (potentially) reassessed P and S values which are matched with the relevant linguistic item in component (4), and potentially issued forth as behaviour via component (5).

How adequate is this view? And does the proposed segmentation of cognitive processes matter anyway? Taking the last question first, we can say that in the present context it does matter to some extent. For our goals are to extract socially significant behaviour, significant in terms of basic social categories, and then to use these facts to build up a truly verstehen map of the society that the village represents. But we can not do this unless we can filter out underlying regularities from the mass of variation that is introduced into actual behaviour by phenomena of the marking and reclassification type. On the other hand, if we can conceptually and methodologically isolate the basic classification, component (1), then (it will be argued) we can identify a level of orderly, determinate and socially revealing behaviour. (Not that reclassification behaviour is not socially revealing, but only on a much finer-grained level of analysis, and

even then only if we can filter out behaviour based on the basic social classification.)

This is not meant to imply that if we simply counted T and V usage and then correlated the counts with major social categories (ignoring distinctions between behaviour based on classification versus that based on reclassification), only chaos would be apparent. Far from it. On the basis of some preliminary counts it seems that no more than about 10% of usages of the T/V pronouns involve any kind of reclassification. That is to say that, if we were to treat the entire material in the variationist paradigm (as formulated by Labov 1972), we would come out with substantially the same results. The only reason that we do not do that is that it would gloss over a distinction (between classification and reclassification) that is important to members, that would in one or two areas lead to total obscurity (due to small peculiar samples of groups resident in the village), and would impose on us a peculiar view of human mental abilities. Given the facts, it seems reasonable to presume that these behaviours are determinate, rather than stochastically produced, even if as yet we do not fully understand them. Further, if we take this stronger hypothesis we are led to explore (rather than ignore) the areas in which (as in reclassification) they do not superficially appear to be determinate.

There is just one respect, then, in which our analysis really matters in view of what follows, and that is that component (1) is isolable and handles a particular kind of information, along the lines indicated.

Let us return to the question of the adequacy of the overall schema. First we have constructed it on purely a priori grounds,

taking no account of whatever relevant results there are in cognitive psychology, while implicitly presupposing certain assumptions about 'plausible' cognitive processes. For instance we have assumed that there is a 'flow' of information, and thus of command (Miller, Galanter and Pribram 1960:27-9). But the system could be organized in quite other ways, for example 'heterarchically', as is currently being explored in artificial intelligence. Figure 2.16 simply represents an austere possibility, and none of the concepts utilized in higher-level programming languages (as in Elson 1973) can be definitely ruled out of court at this stage. After all, what is involved is a program.

In the second place, even if the overall schema is correct, little has been said. For the mysteries are what happens inside the components. There is some informal evidence (in terms of how informants spoke about matters or responded during elicitation) that component (1) operates in terms of a successive partitioning of the domain of social alters. Suggestions for component (5), practical reasoning, have been made; but these are still importantly deficient. Otherwise all is blank. If we assume that P and S values are represented as a small set of output values, then Geoghegan's proposed formalisms for code rules and marking rules might be relevant representations of the classification and reclassification components respectively. Otherwise, some more algebraic solution would be relevant. The fact that socially deictic items in Tamil can be arranged in a long implicational scale in respect to P values does not decide between these solutions. Nor should we forget that marking-type operations are probably just special cases of irony and metaphor and may turn out to have all the complex properties of such 'figures of speech'. In addition it looks as if an almost totally

mysterious form of inference, interactive reasoning, may be involved in some reclassification processes.

If we end on a limp note, then, the reason for this should be clear. It does not look as if there is any bounded well-defined cognitive process specialized to the usage of socially deictic items, for which some simple overall solution in terms of a unified formal account can be given. Rather such usage seems to involve some of the most complex sorts of reasoning that humans employ, the successful analysis of which lies far beyond our analytical powers at present: namely, interactive inference, practical reasoning, strategic reasoning, and plans for generating plans (as required for the acquisition and modification of such processing systems). Furthermore, we have implicitly assumed the primacy of a production rather than a reception model. And it seems unlikely that a reception model will simply be a backward-run production model, or an analysis by synthesis (as Geoghegan 1973: 410-433 assumed). For there is a massive amount of ambiguity involved; after all a vast amount of social information of many different kinds can be superimposed to determine just one of two outputs (T or V). Faced with that output, it is likely that the recipient will use all the contextual information available to him to zero in on a plausible inductive or interactive inference (as suggested by Searle 1975 and Grice 1975, respectively). Natural language understanding programs that attempt to model natural disambiguating processes utilize massive quantities of contextual information (e.g. Charniak 1972).

Let us address one final problem. What sociological use is an individual 'cognitive map' of some domain in any case? The answer, I think, is none unless it can be shown to be representative of some

significant segment of a social population. Now one reason that the findings of cognitive anthropology (as for instance in Tyler 1969) have been largely ignored or treated with disdain by European sociologists is that that discipline seems to make the enormously simplistic assumption of cultural and cognitive homogeneity within a single society. For European sociology since Durkheim, Marx, and Weber has been preoccupied with heterogeneity and pluralism within society, and, never faced with a lone surviving Americal Indian, would find the idea of the mental encapsulation of a whole culture in the mind of one individual almost laughable. And in fact in a society with a division of labour as complex as India's, for any cultural 'trait' we can find variations by caste, class, local group, social category (like sex), and eventually by individual. Systematic variation on some few themes is at the heart of Indian culture (Yalman 1967, Beck 1972, Dumont 1972, and a host of others), and it is caste that above all co-varies.

Now our problem is this. Unless we can find some way of organising this diversity so that we can make valid generalizations across it, a collection of reconstructed individuals' 'cognitive maps' for T/V usage will be of no sociological use.²¹ For the purposes of generalization we shall either have too few or too many such 'maps'. The problem can be neutralised if we can find an area of core similarity which is shared by at least some definable segment of the social population. And it will be my basic claim that the core system in question is not just an average, or the lowest common denominator shared by heterogeneous individual systems, but rather a distinct isolable component of the relevant thinking of each and every member of a particular social group. The core system will be identified with component (1), the

basic classification, for components (2) and (3) involve situational variables to which members have been differentially exposed. And the definable segment of the population that shares each such core system will be identified as the local sub-caste group.

In other words, we can turn our observations about individuals' cognitive processes to sociological use by taking a sample of individuals from each of the most significant social groups in a community. We shall end up, then, with a map of the way in which distinct kinds of models for honorific usage are distributed through a social system. In the next chapter we present details of the differences between the basic T/V usage systems of individuals drawn from different castes. And in the following chapters we show that the way in which such systems of usage are differentially distributed through the social population of the village allows us to make significant sociological inferences.

CHAPTER III: THE BASIC DATA: T/V USAGE IN THE VILLAGE

	Page No.
3.0 Narrowing the focus	180
3.1 Methods and limitations in the collection of the data	183
3.2 The data in code rule format	193

3.0 NARROWING THE FOCUS

As we made clear at the end of the last chapter, the aspect of the usage of honorifics that we will concentrate on is that basic usage determined at the level of the 'basic classification' (component (1) in Figure 2.16 in the preceding section). That is, we shall attempt to describe the basic unmarked usage ascertained (by members) on the basis of major social categories to which the referent or addressee belongs before any reclassification processes (if relevant) have applied.

But in this chapter we apply further restrictions. In the first place we shall consider only second person pronouns. As we have indicated above there are many other honorifics, and although we ignore them in this chapter they will be introduced again from time to time in other chapters to back up evidence derived from the second person pronouns. Nevertheless throughout the thesis it is the latter that will constitute the basic evidence for the sociological inferences to be made. Hence the restriction here.

It is, however, worth explaining why we give the second person pronouns pride of place. There are two complementary reasons. The first is that of all honorifics that conventionally implicate the social standing of the addressee, they have the broadest usage. Other such honorifics do not perform the same essential referential function and consequently a choice between them is not forced upon the speaker in the same way: after all it is almost, but not quite, impossible to avoid using a second person pronoun altogether. In addition, when other such honorifics are used they will be used to a smaller range of addressees. So when it comes to partitioning a speaker's entire

social universe there is nothing quite so precise as alternate second person pronouns.

The second reason is that all the remaining honorifics, that is those that conventionally implicate some aspects of the social standing of the speaker or of some referred-to third parties, do not exhibit the firm regularities in usage that second person pronouns do. One might wonder, for example, why we make so little use of the third person pronouns, despite the fact that there is an interesting set of alternates each with a precise conventional implicature indicating the status of the referent. The answer is that usage re third parties oscillates very freely. Not only does one find that a speaker A will use different pronouns to refer to some same third party B on different occasions in different circumstances, but also within the very same conversation (or even utterance) usage may shift. There are two outstanding reasons for this variability. The first, accounting for the first kind of shift, is that the choice of third person pronouns is extremely audience-sensitive. Suppose S is talking to H about C, then if H is of significantly higher caste than S and C is a relation of H's, S will almost certainly feel obliged to refer to C with some degree of deference. But when H goes away, S may well feel free to refer to C with some less honorific alternate. Bystanders may likewise influence usage systematically but drastically. The second reason for variability, accounting for at least part of the variability within a conversation, are the 'onset phenomena' mentioned above: having established a certain level of deference giving and clearly signalled it, it is possible to relax the overt expression of deference without giving offence. Given these and other sources of variability, it is

not for example possible to predict how a speaker will refer to someone on the basis of how he addresses him (as some informants initially suggested).

The point of course is this: second person pronoun usage is rigidified by the fact that the referent is always present. And we may assume that he has a direct interest in maintaining any level of deference that exists. This essential constraint is absent in third person reference.

These then are the reasons for focussing on second person pronouns. But beyond this we will constrain the investigation still further. As indicates in Table 2 of Chapter II, there are no less than six alternates that function as second person pronouns. But here we shall focus on only two of them, nii and niinka. Admittedly two of the other four forms are used only rarely. But why exclude the other two common forms, atu (literally 'it') and naam (literally 'we-inclusive')?

Our reason for selecting nii and niinka, which we shall henceforth call the T and V pronouns respectively, is that in the local caste arena anyway, they are the basic unmarked forms. That is, these are the only forms that would be selected on the basis of the 'basic classification' alone. (Component (1) of Figure 9 in 2.3.3 above). Or, in other words, villagers when talking to other locals would use one of these two forms unless they wished to apply any of the reclassification processes described above (i.e. unless they wished to take into account some personal attribute of the addressee, or wished to make any of the strategic reassessments that are possible). Thus the bulk of second person pronoun usage utilizes the T and the V pronoun only. And there are no social groups between the members of which the basic unmarked

usage is neither T nor V (there did originally appear to be one exception to this, in that Harijan speakers claimed to use only naam, or super-V as we shall refer to it, to those members of caste 5 who belonged to the squire class; but tape recordings show that this is not always the case). In the language of our model then, the basic classificatory component which sorts social alters into the major social categories of caste and kinship, will yield for any speaker and any addressee P and S values that if unreclassified, will be matched to nii and niinka, the T and V pronouns.

It is important for what follows that this exclusion of the other pronouns of address is not ad hoc. For in making our sociological inference we shall rely on the fact that nii and niinka are at this level (of basic unmarked usage) exclusive and complementary, the absence of the one implying the presence of the other.²²

To recapitulate, we have now narrowed down our focus to the T/V pronouns only, as used within the local caste arena (i.e. between those who consider themselves locals), on the basis of the basic classificatory social dimensions of caste, kinship and membership in the squire class of caste 5. And this chapter will retain this narrow focus, although other honorifics will be reintroduced below.

3.1 METHODS AND LIMITATIONS IN THE COLLECTION OF THE DATA

In constructing models of how individuals choose between a T and a V pronoun, two basic kinds of data were used: what people said they did (or would do), and what people actually did. Both of these kinds of facts were refracted through the particular ways in which they were collected. Since much below will depend on our interpretation of the

facts, it is only proper to indicate here how they were in fact collected so that the reader may draw his own conclusions about the limitations they are subject to.

What people said they did was collected partly through innumerable casual conversations on the topic of T/V usage, but mainly by systematic elicitation. From time to time taking a trusted informant I visited households of various families in the village; often we hoped to find some particular individual who my principal informants felt was especially articulate and co-operative, but on many occasions had to make do with whoever was at home. Elicitation then proceeded on more or less casual lines. First I simply asked them to offer some generalizations about who they said T or V to, and although the data thus collected was mostly rejected before the session was out, it allowed the informant to volunteer social categories that were thought to determine T/V usage. These questions also threw up whatever ideal normative usages informants felt they should follow, despite the fact that I took pains initially to convey that what was wanted was actual usage not ideal normative usage. Once we had got the most coherent picture that the informant could volunteer off the top of his head, we took an entirely different tack. We elicited an extensive genealogy of the informant's kin of all kinds, and then armed with this asked how each actual individual on that genealogy addressed each other individual. Here we were asking for case-by-case reports on actual usage, and we paid special attention to self-reports. Having thus collected a host of material on intra-caste usage, we then located some friend or well-known figure in each other caste, and then asked our informant to construct a partial genealogy around that figure.

Then we asked how the informant and specific members of his kin addressed specific persons in the genealogies of other caste individuals. All these questions were asking for concrete cases of usage between familiar individuals, and informants had little difficulty with them. In many cases our sessions soon drew a little audience, and corrections and exceptional cases were freely offered by others, and the presence of a critical audience provided a useful check on wishful thinking or imagination.

As time went on, the information from these interviews was used to construct a tentative code rule for each caste's usage of T/V, so that the next interviews could be used to test the hypotheses and could consequently be swifter and more precise and exhaustive. In this way all of the information collected was rapidly checked with other informants. As the hypotheses about the underlying decisions became sharper test questions could be devised: for example when it was unclear whether a man's MB was addressed with V because he was actually older in years, or because he belonged to a senior generation (facts usually but in no way necessarily coincident), we asked the informant to imagine that he had a MB who was younger than him, and to predict what T/V usage he would then use. The better informants handled these kinds of questions with aplomb, and their answers were generally consistent. Finally a few questions were asked about variabilities in usage, and about usage to outsiders.

Let us turn now to our second basic source of information: what people actually did. One method of collecting actual usage was simply to keep one's ears open, and a lot of elicited information was checked in this way. But there were difficulties in using this as a prime

source, as it was necessary to follow conversations very closely because villagers are in the habit of reporting speech (complete with the original honorifics) without attributive bracketings of the "he said" sort. The use of the honorifics appropriate between the reported speaker and his addressee in fact serves to identify for participants who the speaker and addressee in the story are. But they could easily be mistaken for the honorifics appropriate between the actual speaker and addressee. Another difficulty was that one wanted to be sure that the observed usage was the basic unmarked usage between participants; so some reasonable sample of observations over a stretch of conversation was desirable.

For all of these reasons, the analysis of tape recordings proved a better method. Hundreds of hours of tape recordings were collected between hundreds of dyads of individuals. The recordings were made in various ways not for the most part surreptitious but inconspicuous. On the whole they were made by the ethnographer who simply hung around (a culturally appropriate thing to do) until his presence was more or less forgotten, or at least had to be ignored for practical purposes. Surreptitiousness entered to some extent willy-nilly: villagers simply had no idea what a tape recorder was. And to preserve any confidential material reaching a wider audience than intended, tapes were never re-played in public. Nevertheless villagers did eventually learn what was involved, which raises questions about the possible extent of the "observer effect". For two reasons this seems to be a minimal problem: in the first place honorific usage is based on stable expectations, where the appropriate giving of deference is strongly sanctioned (strictly, giving too little deference is sanctioned by potential

ostracism, pressures or violence from the addressee, and giving too much is against the speaker's own interests and those of his group).

Secondly, from the fact that confidential material did appear on tapes even when speakers understood that they were being taped indicates that interaction soon relaxed into normal patterns despite the presence of the observer. Ethnographer or no ethnographer, life has to go on. The honorific usage collected on extended tape recordings is then evidence which is about as solid as could ever be collected.

One overwhelming problem with tape recordings though was that their collection and analysis was extremely laborious. If one was to proceed along the lines of the survey methods used by Labov, Fishman and others, whereby a random sample of individuals are recorded, and then a bunch of demographic variables are run through to locate correlations, the task would be beyond the capabilities of a single researcher. For given seventeen major local castes, and a number of others, together with variables like age, sex, personal rank and so on, the sample would have had to have been enormous. Moreover, as we have made clear, such a focus on the individual's usage would be quite inappropriate to the use of honorifics that depend crucially on the social relationship of the speaker to another party. So if we have, say, 50 cultural categories of person, then to cover all the combinations of a speaker of one category and an addressee of another we would need 2,450 recordings, allowing for no proper sampling of each combination (for which multiply by, say, ten). The solution to this problem was simply to allow members themselves to suggest (during elicitation) the cultural categories that were most determinative of usage. And caste, relative age, and kinship category were undoubtedly the most important such categories,

with class and office important secondary determinants. This still left too many combinations for adequate coverage by recording, and in the end tape recordings were collected either where it just happened to be easy to do so, or where, though extremely difficult to collect, usage between certain categories of person was felt to be crucially important. For example tape recordings were made of conversations between Brahmins and very wealthy landlords because usage in those dyads could be crucial evidence on the priority of ritual over secular rank. But they were made only with extreme difficulty, because such conversations were rare, and advance notice impossible to get. Other crucial dyads simply could not be taped because the observer's presence among, for example, Harijans would have ensured a cessation of the on-going interaction. Essentially then tape recordings only provided a check on the bulk of the data which came from elicitation.

A final source of information on actual usage was information provided by relatively disinterested third parties. Clearly such information had to be carefully sifted; but where the informant was known to be highly reliable some weight could be given to them. This proved to be an important source of facts about intra-caste usage; for a member of another caste who had played as a child or worked as a domestic servant in the house of a different caste, proved to be more likely to report actual usage than members of the observed caste itself who during elicitation claimed prestigious patterns of usage, particularly in the highest castes.

To summarize the sources of information, our basic method was to (i) elicit conscious models of usage; (ii) elicit reports, especially self-reports, on usages between actual persons; (iii) observe;

(iv) tape record selected dyads; (v) gather reports of actual usage from disinterested third parties. From all these sources a composite picture was put together which reflected as near as could be ascertained the actual basic pattern of usage between different categories of person.

A fundamental objection could be raised to this method. It could be claimed that it confuses and collapses what are in fact two distinct levels of human action, namely, the normative and the normal (or statistically actual). The force of the objection is that elicitation would tap the normative, morally enjoined aspect of usage, while recordings and observation would tap the normal, the actual outcome of choices. And clearly people feel often enough that they ought to do something, and yet do something entirely different. So one cannot infer from what people do that that is what they think they ought to do. Consequently a sophisticated model of human action keeps apart the 'ought' and the 'is', while the above proposal takes both normative reports and observed normalities as evidence on the same level, and for the same mental process.


Our answer to that objection is this. We already have in our model of the relevant mental processes analogues of the distinction between the normative and the normal. The normal is the output of our whole set of cognitive processes, as quantified over individuals and occasions of speaking. Normative usage on the other hand is that generated by the basic classification component before (or without) strategic reclassifications. And what elicitation seems to tap is just such usage; that is, if one asks how someone addresses someone else what we obtain is a response that indicates the basic unmarked

usage. It is a very much more difficult task to elicit contextual variations in usage. But when we take tape recordings of actual usage such variations will appear.


How then can we conflate the two sources of information? Because our model suggests that other things being equal persons will behave normatively; when on the other hand there are other communicational intents, these can override normative expectations. Consequently to each non-normative usage there should be correlated one of these extra communicative intents. So in going through the tape recordings with informants (sometimes participants) such special usages could be isolated, and disregarded in the construction of models of the basic underlying classificatory component. And this was the procedure adopted. So the normal was reduced to the normative in a principled fashion by locating all the sources of disjunction between the two levels. Or at least, in so far as our model is successful, this is what it achieves by virtue of its three layers or components of processing.

A further problem is this. We are now about to present in informal code-rule format a set of charts representing the basic classificatory component utilized by a number of individuals to produce appropriate T/V behaviour. But if we are to achieve sociological inferences these individuals must be representative of entire social groups or categories. We have already discussed the problems of adequate sampling with respect to tape recording, and concluded that we had to fall back on members' assertions that the most determinative social categories were caste, relative age and kinship category. Now T/V usage is an essentially interactive affair, depending on the social category of both speaker and addressee (at the basic classificatory level, on these

alone). Each category of speaker will have a range of types of alters he systematically addresses, thus:



but also each category of addressee will have a range of different categories of speaker who will address him:



What we now ask is: if we are to construct models of individuals' processing systems, which social categories should these individuals be representative of? Let us take the speakers' point of view; then how many production models, for category S_1 , S_2 , etc., should we consider?

If we accept that caste, relative age and kinship categories are the most determinative of usage, then it may seem that we should produce models for speakers of combinations of all three categories. But that is not the case. For two of the categories, relative age and kinship link, are relational; that is, to state which of these categories the addressee belongs is to imply which category the speaker belongs to (if H_2 is older than S_1 , then S_1 is younger than H_2 ; if H_2 is mother's

brother to S_1 , then S_1 is sister's son to H_2). Consequently it is enough to consider just one speaker, and see how he addresses persons in these relational categories.

We are left then with caste as the single most important category to which speakers can belong. So we shall produce code rules for speakers of each caste, or at least for each of the seventeen main castes which we shall consider. And our claim is that all members of the particular caste will use a sorting procedure, of the kind to be illustrated, as a basic classification of social alters for many kinds of interactional purposes.

To what extent is this an idealization? For example, it makes the claim that persons of the same caste, whatever their personal rank or class or sex, will operate the same basic classification of social alters. But that does not entail that a woman's T/V usage will be the same as a man's from the same caste. In fact it is demonstrably not: in the few cases where women could be interviewed intensively, it turned out that they systematically made finer distinctions between social alters than men.²³ But if our claim of caste-homogeneity with respect to the basic classification is to be retained then differentiation by sex will have to be handled by the reclassificatory components. And in fact that seems reasonable because this finer discrimination made by women only seems to be made with respect to male addressees. So sex can be an aspect of personal rank, but only it seems when the speaker is female and the addressee male. (To capture this we would have to introduce a special relation in the personal rank reclassificatory component.) Similar objections, we hope, could be handled in the same way.

We are now in a position to present the data in code-rule format, which we do in the next section.

3.2 THE DATA IN CODE RULE FORMAT

This section presents the basic data to be used in the chapters below. The facts are succinctly represented in the form of seventeen flow diagrams, each of which purports to model the basic (unreclassified) usage of the T/V pronouns current within a particular caste in our village.

In essential respects this mode of representation is a reversion to that advocated in Geoghegan's theory, as reviewed in 2.3.1 above. For example, as outputs we have the T and V pronouns themselves, rather than an abstract valuation on two underlying social dimensions (Brown and Gilman's 'power' and 'solidarity'), although we argued above that in this respect Geoghegan's model is incorrect. The reason is that in this respect as in others, we will here sacrifice psychological plausibility for heuristic clarity:²⁴ our purpose here is not to model the cognitive processes involved precisely, but rather to record the facts about how each caste's members use the pronouns of address in the simplest situations (where no special effects are intended, and the addressee has no unusual personal attributes). And Geoghegan's code rules are for this an adequate format.

Other simplifications for purposes of clarity have led, though, to some departures from Geoghegan's efficiently ordered code rules. For example, we have re-used some assessments (choices at particular nodes) more than once in a diagram; in some cases this could have been avoided but would have made the flow charts much harder to read. In

the same way, to avoid a tangle of arrows, what is in fact a single output labelled with the T pronoun is represented as two identical outputs. Thirdly, for no reasons other than perspicuity we have limited all assessments to binary choices, so that each diamond in the diagram can be thought of as a simple yes-no question. No theoretical claims are intended.

Another set of simplifications is introduced simply by the demands of space. The most important of these are the following:

(i) The usage between husbands and wives, which would mostly require another assessment in each diagram, is not properly covered. Thus although we introduce assessments of alter as a member of the category of ego's affines, or of ego's cross kin, (in both of which categories spouses would fall), these should not be read as accurately predicting husband-wife usage.

In fact usage between spouses is mostly predictable by the simple rule: husbands give T to wives, and wives V to husbands. But in two castes, 13 and 18, wives give T to their husbands (at least in the families investigated); and in some other castes the same usage can be found in poverty stricken families. The details will be discussed in Chapter V.

A related aspect of usage is also not covered, namely the use of T by a man to his wife's younger brother, a practice general throughout all the castes. In part, as argued below, this is a reflex of the T given to the wife.

(ii) Another simplification is the systematic omission of various fine-grained thresholds for T/V usage. Thus for example members of caste 8 give V to nearly all members of caste 5, but there is in fact

a cut-off point - a child under five or so will be addressed with T. In this and similar cases we have represented this as unconditional V usage. We have retained though the two most important such thresholds, relative age of speaker and hearer, and whether or not the addressee is socially mature. The details of the finer discriminations have not been lost, and will be reintroduced in Chapter IV (section 4.3.2.2).

(iii) Some castes have a domestic language other than Tamil; in such cases the usage represented is in the domestic language. But they may also on occasion speak to their kin in Tamil, and in that language their T/V system may not be the same. Of the castes that come into our net, only 4 and 18 maintain a main domestic language other than Tamil (in this case Telegu); castes 11 and 13 used to use Telegu, but now mostly use Tamil. For castes 4 and 18 we have given the Telegu usage (Telegu having exactly parallel T/V pronouns), for castes 11 and 13 the Tamil usage, these being the predominant ones. Caste 4's Tamil system of T/V usage will be described below in Chapter V.

These simplifications apart, the flow diagrams are relatively complete records of the basic pattern of T/V usage for each caste, as reconstructed from the evidence described in the prior section. The charts are to be read in the following way. Following the initial arrow that marks the entrance to the system, a series of assessments is passed through as a result of decisions along the way. Each assessment is without exception a decision about whether or not the addressee has some particular attribute - is younger than the addressee, or is in the cross kin category relative to ego, is a member of caste 5, and so on. (All the other kinds of decisions that determine pronominal choice are handled in the reclassification components). A sequence of

decisions determines an output, either T or V, as the basic unmarked usage of a speaker of the caste in question with an addressee who meets the definition formed by that sequence of assessments.

The actual conventions used in the diagram are the following. Entrance to the system is marked by a block arrow, assessments occur within diamonds and outputs within parallelograms, the flow of information or control is marked by arrows, and where these cross over each other without contact the cross-over points are marked by a hump. Within each assessment a symbol appears which is a mnemonic for the criteria listed in Table 3.1. Each of these criteria should be understood as occurring in the slot in the question frame: 'Is the addressee (a member of)———?' A plus sign indicates a 'yes' answer, and a minus sign a 'no' answer.

In any representation of this kind, most of the real information is in the content of the assessments; without understanding these in detail a quite illusory sense of adequacy can be conveyed. In Table 3.1 we provided glosses for the mnemonics that are used in the charts. These are not themselves adequate descriptions of the assessments which they label, and the more important of these will receive considerable discussion in the chapters below (the categories of kinship particularly will be thoroughly examined in Chapter V). A number of general points and a few specific ones are, though, in order here.

Some of the social categories to which the assessments refer are proper subsets of other such categories. For instance, the periya kavuNTars or members of the squire class, are all members of caste 5. In the flow diagrams for some castes' usage we have to pick out the subset, but for other castes' usage we may not need to, and the

Table 3.1 Key to assessment symbols

Each of the following symbols is to be understood as occurring within the question frame: 'Is the addressee (a member of) _____ ?'

K	= potential kin i.e. is the addressee a member of ego's caste?
aff	= affine of ego's (with the specific exclusion of a ego's wife, or his wife's younger brother). For a definition of affine see Chapter V, sections 5.1.1 and 5.2.
d	= distant kin; see Chapter V, section 5.2.
X	= cross kin to ego; see Chapter V, section 5.1.
//	= parallel kin to ego; see Chapter V, sections 5.2 and 5.3.
own clan	= member of ego's named exogamous patriclan, an assessment only relevant to caste 5. See Chapter V, sections 5.1.1 and 5.3.
kT	= member of ego's <u>kuTumpum</u> or household; see Chapter V, section 5.2. Where 'not F, eB' follows 'kT', this specifically excludes ego's father, elder brother and any other kin types indicated from the assessment. Classificatory 'fathers' and 'elder brothers' in the <u>kuTumpum</u> will also then be excluded.
y	= younger than ego.
sm	= socially mature; see Chapter IV, section 4.3.2.2 and Chapter V, section 5.2.
pk	= <u>periya kavuNTar</u> , a member of the squire class of caste 5; see Chapter I and Chapter IV, section 4.5.
1,2,3 etc.	= castes 1, 2, 3 (and so on).
1 thru' 7b etc.	= castes 1 through 7b inclusive (and so on) in strict numerical order, but excluding ego's caste.

members of the subset can be treated in the same way as the members of the larger including set. So the presence or absence of sets like these in the flow charts is determined by the nature of the particular caste's usage.

All the diagrams begin with a basic distinction: is the addressee a member of ego's caste or one of the other sixteen castes considered? Since, as will be argued in Chapter V, the domain of one's caste is held to be equivalent to the domain of one's (potential) kinship, we can rephrase this decision in terms of whether the addressee is or is not a potential kinsman. If he is a kinsman, then further assessments are of a quite different kind than if he is not; and this is undoubtedly the major fork in the decision process.


Turning to specific points, usage dependent on the relative age of speaker and addressee is handled by the assessment labelled 'y' - a mnemonic for 'is the addressee younger than ego?'. We use the concept 'younger than' rather than 'older than' for non-arbitrary reasons: for the most part co-evals are handled in the same way as elders, and the 'y' assessment captures this. Here as elsewhere the concepts involved in the assessments have been carefully selected.


The assessments labelled 'd', and 'sm', each receive discussion in the chapters below (as do all the other categories involved), but we may say in advance that 'd' (for distant kin) indicates a category of presumptive kin where connections are not precisely established, and that the threshold 'sm' (for social maturity) is not precise and exhibits variation across castes. Any married person must be treated as socially mature, and in general a male of twenty or so, and a slightly younger female will be so treated. For males though, in some

cases the threshold may rise as far as the late twenties.


Finally, the assessment 'kT' refers to membership in ego's kuTumpum or household, a unit that will be discussed in Chapter V. But we should note here that households in the village may contain quite an extended set of kin. The motivation for inclusion of this assessment in the flow charts is that T/V usage is relaxed somewhat among those we can call familiarly close. Mothers are thus typically given T by their children. Fathers, though, and to some extent elder brothers more often receive V, so these kin are marked (wherever appropriate) as exceptions to the extended familiarity within the household. Usage here depends both on caste and on class (household prosperity and influence). Again the details will be found in Chapter V.


It should now be clear that the details of the criteria on which the assessments are made cannot be given in advance, before a full scale discussion of the relevant social categories is launched. The reader must therefore be willing to postpone full understanding till later chapters are read. But from the remarks here it should be possible to grasp the general outline of the flow charts that now follow.








Caste 3
c.aacaari

































Caste 13
v.vaNNaar





Caste 17
k.kuravar





CHAPTER IV: INTER-CASTE USAGE: SOCIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS I

	Page No.
4.0 Introductory remarks	218
4.1 Explanation of matrix manipulations	220
4.2 Initial matrix: informal observations	225
4.3 The inference of rank relations	233
4.3.1 The valuation of media and moves within them	234
4.3.2 Scaling	250
4.3.2.1 Scaling as a members activity	251
4.3.2.2 Two media and four scales	264
4.3.2.3 Some additional media: honorifics and dishonorifics	293
4.3.3 Further inferences from overall patterns	321
4.3.3.0 Introductory remarks	321
4.3.3.1 T/V behaviour: passive score board or competitive game	322
4.3.3.2 Consensus on hierarchy	345
4.3.3.3 Dissensus on ranking	348
4.4 The inference of alliance relations	372
4.4.1 REL: patterns of exchange and blocs of allies	374
4.4.2 Symmetrical exchange in other media	394
4.4.3 Additional media: 'fictitious kin terms'	400
4.5 Power and class: the case of the <u>periya kavuNTars</u>	425
4.6 Some conclusions	430

4.0 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

In the preceding chapter we presented, with some theoretical caveats, the usage of the nii/niinka alternates for singular addressees as code rules for egos in each caste. In this chapter we assemble all these ego-centred facts about T/V usage into an overall map of the pronominal usage from each to every other caste. We shall then step back and ask why the overall map has the particular features it demonstrably has. In doing this we may seem to depart from a strict verstehen stance: we shall be taking a bird's eye view of a set of ego viewpoints. But if it seems to be a departure, my claim will be that it is only a slight one: for informants can and do see the overall map too, even if their information and analysis is not quite as complete and systematic.

Indeed our main claim will be that there is considerable sociological interest in inter-caste T/V usage primarily because it yields important insight into native views of Indian society. Specifically, it throws light on a problematic area: the nature of the relationships between castes. For there is a persistent problem for Indologists, namely that although there is general agreement that caste society is an holistic system with specific properties, it is not at all clear how the system is to be objectively determined on the ground. Take for example the basic fact that there is assumed to be a more or less unilinear ranking or hierarchy of castes in any locality: how is this to be discovered? If we ask people, we will find that they will disagree or be uncertain in many crucial cases. If we measure the wealth, or the life-style, or any other attributes of castes, we will obtain no clear overall ranking. How then are we to determine what the local hierarchy is? And how do the inhabitants themselves, who claim that

there is such a ranking, know what it is? (See Marriott 1959, 1968, for a discussion of these problems).

What we want is a method for finding out how members of the society perceive it, given that they are unable to verbalize a consistent or complete model of it. The problem can be put in a quite general way: how is the sociologist to build overall models of a social system that retain the perspective of its members? If he doesn't retain that, he jettisons the basic insight that at the core of any social system is a body of ideas around which actions are oriented.

The answer we offer here is one such method for constructing Verstehen models of society. Specifically, we shall attempt to determine the ranking of local castes as subjectively agreed upon by members, and to discover further principles that organize inter-caste relations. We shall do this by studying systematically the use of certain value-laden exchanges between castes. The method is not original, and is owed in most part to the work of Marriott. However, the application to linguistic materials is novel²⁵ and this extension we shall argue is important. For linguistic interaction has a number of special properties: it is universal (occurs between all castes), it is public, it is indefinitely replicated, its social valuation is precise and independently testable, and it is the most frequent form of exchange. Consequently we can derive from it attitudes and opinions that reflect the unpremeditated viewpoints of actors, with a confidence we can gain from no other source.

As a preliminary to this method what we wish to do here is to extract from our code rules the pronominal usage to be found between each and every caste. Given that we have studied 17 castes, for each

caste we must ask how it addresses the sixteen others: there are therefore $17 \times 16 = 272$ distinct pairs of different castes to be examined. This is a fairly formidable number of dyadic pairs and we need a technique to represent the pairs in a readily comprehensible way. The obvious format is the two-dimensional matrix, which with labelled columns and rows of 17 cells each will give us 289 cells including self-reciprocal ones.

However there is a further benefit of matrix representation. For we can manipulate it to produce a scaled matrix, or scalogram (Guttman scale) which will allow us to infer any inherent ranking in the data. Scaled matrices, introduced originally into caste studies by Marriott (1959) and Mahar (1959), are now standardly used to represent caste ranking by transactions in S. Asian studies (see Dumont 1966, Mathur 1964, Orenstein 1965, Hiebert 1971, McGilvray 1974 and many others). The only element of novelty here is the treatment of linguistic data as just another medium of interaction wherein ranks are expressed. For those unfamiliar with the techniques, a simple explanation follows.

4.1 EXPLANATION OF MATRIX MANIPULATIONS

A matrix is constructed with a row and a column for each caste in the local interaction arena. Thus if there were three castes we would have a nine cell matrix thus, where the castes are arbitrarily labelled 1, 2, 3:

	1	2	3
1	0		
2		0	
3			0

For each medium in which transactions or interactions take place, a separate matrix will be required. In each matrix we assign (by my preferred convention) the columns to the givers or doers in the transaction, and the rows to the recipients of the goods or actions. Self-reciprocal cells, simply for ease of reading, will contain a zero: they may or may not be relevant to the analysis of inter-caste interactions as we shall see.

Now suppose that we are looking at the exchanges of cooked rice between castes: we might obtain the following data, where + = column's food is received by row, - = column's food is not received by row.

		Givers		
		3	1	2
Receivers	3	0	+	+
	1	-	0	-
	2	-	+	0

This matrix concisely states that, in this medium, caste 3's offers of food will not be accepted by 1 and 2, whereas 1's offers will be accepted by both 3 and 2, and 2's by 3 but not 1.

Now given the cultural fact that in India the group whose food is most acceptable - and therefore received by most - is higher in ritual rank than those groups whose food is not accepted by so many, we can determine the ritual ranking of castes 3, 2, and 1 from this matrix. In due course we shall examine in just what circumstances such an inference is valid, but accepting for now this measure of rank we can say that 3's offers are clearly least acceptable, 1's most, and 2's

intermediate. Therefore the rank order established is: 1, 2, 3. But we can derive this mechanically by manipulating the matrix so that the columns are ordered such that those with the most +'s are ranged to the left, and those with the least progressively to the right. We then obtain the following matrix with an ordered step-like regression of + cells:

	1	2	3
1	0	-	-
2	+	0	-
3	+	+	0

and we can read off the rank of the castes, namely 1-2-3, along the top of the matrix. In this way given an unordered matrix which is simply an extremely concise representation of the outcome of dyadic interactions between n parties, we may manipulate it to produce a scaled matrix from which a ranking of participating parties may be inferred.

Now in all interactional media that do not have an enjoined or inherent pattern of symmetrical exchange (such as might be found in greeting systems, patrilateral cross-cousin marriage systems and so on), there are two potentially independent measures of rank: rank as givers, and rank as receivers. For instance in Hindu cooked food transactions the giver to most others is highest on the giving dimension, the receiver from least others is highest on the receiving dimension, and the highest ranking giver is not necessarily the highest ranking receiver. We can still capture two such independent measures on a single matrix, but only by giving up the alignment of self-reciprocal cells along the main left-right diagonal. What we do is sort the

columns from left to right to establish rank as givers, as above.

Then we sort the rows in a precisely similar fashion to obtain even receding steps. This now provides a measure of rank on the receiving dimension. The order of the labelled columns along the top of the matrix may then no longer coincide with the order of labelled rows along the side of the matrix.

For instance in the matrix above the rows are ordered on the dimension of least-receiving, and this order coincides with the order of most-giving. But suppose the data were a little different:

	1	2	3	4
1	0	-	-	-
2	+	0	+	+
3	+	+	0	-
4	+	+	+	0

Here as the most successful givers (those with most outgoings) we have 1, followed equally by 2 and 3, and then by 4. But as most successful receivers, that is those with least receipts in Hindu food transactions, we have 1 with no receipts, followed by 3 with two receipts, and finally by 2 and 4 in equal place with three receipts. Consequently to record both dimensions of ranking (giving and receiving) on the same matrix we should re-order the horizontal axis (the rows) to accord with 3's higher rank as a least-receiver than 2:

	1	2	3	4
1	0	-	-	-
3	+	+	0	-
2	+	0	+	+
4	+	+	+	0

The same result may be achieved by mechanical manipulation of the matrix rather than counts of outgoings and receipts, in the following way.

The row with the shortest strong of '+' cells is ranged at the top, the next shortest next, and so on down. Then a line is drawn to mark the edges of the step-like regression bearing one rule in mind: whenever the self-reciprocal cells fall within the area marked by the line, one cell must be deducted from the length of row or column to allow for this, and the line be drawn inside that cell. We have then for the receiving dimension (giving and receiving must here be treated separately):

	1	2	3	4
1	0			
3	+	+	0	
2	+	0	+	+
4	+	+	+	0

We can do the same for the giving dimension. Ranks on both dimensions are now recorded in the one matrix, and the order along the top axis records rank as givers, the order along the vertical axis records rank as receivers, with the possibility that adjacent parties may be equal in rank (in which case they will share a step in the ordered regression).

The applicability of such methods and further refinements of them will be treated as we proceed.

4.2 INITIAL MATRIX: INFORMAL OBSERVATIONS

We are now ready to present the data, and this will be done in successively finer detail. We may start by taking an unscaled matrix that simply represents the kind of T/V usage that holds between each and every caste dyad. It should be remembered that this represents an 'idealized' usage, or rather a conditional usage where the conditions are fulfilled; and further that it is claimed that this represents a distinct level of information for users.

Now we could simply produce a matrix with randomly ordered axes. However since we have the benefit of the ranking of these castes on quite independent ethnographic criteria as analyzed by Beck 1972, we may as well use one such ranking scale along both vertical and horizontal axes rather than simply jumble up the castes. Since Beck uses rank at a Brahman feast (as ascertained by the order in which castes are sat down and feasted) as a basic rank order on the basis of which to assign numbers as labels for each caste (number labels that we have retained), this will provide a useful if arbitrary reference point for our discussion also.

We now need for diagrammatic and analytical purposes a classification of T/V usage into a finite number of distinct types. The code rules themselves suggest the partition into three major kinds of mutually exclusive T/V usage: categorical T usage, categorical V usage, and either T or V usage depending on the relative age of speaker to addressee, henceforth relative age T/V. We define these as follows:

.

(1) Categorical T usage (or simply T in the diagrams).

If caste A gives categorical T to caste B, then every member of A uses nii to each and every member of B irrespective of age, sex, or any other attributes of speaker or hearer except their caste-memberships - unless specific reclassification operations take place (as discussed in Chapter II).

(2) Categorical V usage (or simply V in the diagrams).

If caste A gives categorical V to caste B, then every member of A uses niinka to every member of B irrespective of age, sex, or any other attributes of speaker or hearer except their caste memberships (or membership in the squire class) - unless specific reclassification operations take place.

(3) Relative age T/V (or simply REL in the diagram).

If caste A gives relative age T/V to caste B, then every member of A uses nii to every member of B that is younger in years than the speaker, and niinka to every member of B that is older than the speaker. If the speaker and hearer (addressee) are equal in age to the nearest year or so, then usage is very sensitive to other factors (social closeness or solidarity being the most important). But the unmarked usage would generally be V to co-evals as to elders. Note that many individuals do not know their own, let alone others', exact age, and the greater the age the less likelihood of precise knowledge. Nevertheless it is an estimation of actual age in years and not social age grade that is conceptually relevant, even if that estimation may in part be based on behaviour indicative of social age-grade.

We are now ready to present the data in matrix form. The initial matrix (Matrix I) simply represents the facts about inter-caste T/V

usage as encapsulated in the body of collected code rules (in Chapter III) mapped onto an independent rank order. The order derives from the ranking of guests at a Brahmin feast (see Beck 1972:159-60;173;178); we have though omitted the castes 13 and 14, and added caste 7b.

Now there is in fact an enormous amount of information in this matrix and we shall spend the rest of this chapter in its interpretation. But before we begin an analytical dissection, let us informally note that a few dominant patterns are especially striking:

- (1) Starting at the top left of the matrix, we see that a large bloc of castes (with a core of 2 through 7b) symmetrically exchange relative age T/V. These represent over a third of the castes in the village who are, if we accept our single independent criteria of rank, at the top end of the local hierarchy.
- (2) Beneath them is a large bloc of castes (in the bottom left hand corner) who receive categorical T from the bloc of relative age T/V exchangers in (1) above.
- (3) To the right of the REL-exchangers is a large bloc of castes, very roughly the same castes as those in (2), who give categorical V to a large group of upper castes - mostly those in (1).

Hence although the patterns on the giving and receiving dimensions are not quite the same, we have an immediate impression of a basic caesura between what we may call (still on the basis of only one criteria or rank) the upper castes (1 through 7b) and the lower castes (8 through 18) - although one should note that a somewhat intermediate status seems claimed by 8, 9, 10 on the giving dimension.

One further set of informal observations can profitably be made before we move to finer grained analysis, and this is the different kind of patterns of usage for egos of different castes. Returning then to an ego-centred analysis momentarily, if we take columns from mid points of either the category of upper castes or that of the lower castes, we get a distinctly different pattern of usage for each. Thus taking column 3, which represents caste 3's usage to castes 1 through 18, we see that an ego in the upper category lives in a social world which is divided (as far as inter-caste relations are concerned) into just two important areas: those (inferior) groups one gives categorical T to, and those (superior or equal) groups one gives either T or V to, according to their relative age to oneself (seniors getting V, juniors T). On the other hand taking a column, say 16, from the lower category, we see that for ego's of this category the social world divides into two rather different important areas: those (rather few) equals or inferiors one gives either T or V to according to relative age, and those groups (the great majority) whose superiority warrants V irrespective of age (or any other non-caste) considerations.

Using a casual term dropped by Friedrich (1972) in a similar context, the discussion of Russian pronominal usage, we may talk of two distinct 'universes' for egos in these upper and lower categories. Upper category egos live in a 'universe' divided between relative age T/V giving and categorical T giving; lower category egos live in what is predominantly a V universe (as far as intercaste relations go), with a small set of relative age T/V exchanging groups equal or beneath.

If we look more systematically at the giving dimension in this way, we can see that columns 3 and 16 are just two extreme patterns out of five major types. The three that lie between the two extremes are the patterns of T/V giving by castes 5, 6, 4 and 7b, by castes 8, 9, 10, and by castes 13 and 14. The rest of the castes follow our upper caste pattern (1, 2, 7a are like 3), or our lower caste pattern (17, 18 are like 16) - except 11 that is closely similar to the pattern shared by 13 and 14 but is slightly anomalous.

We can then identify five major 'universes', or patterns of T/V giving from an egocentric point of view. We extract in Figure 1 typical columns for each universe from Matrix I, and informally discuss their significance here. In the figure the sequence of caste identification numbers on the left is a rank order based on implications of T and V receiving, derived in a way to be explained below. Each column represents the spectrum of the T and V giving that each caste of a particular group indulges in. One caste in the group is taken as ego for illustrative purposes, and heads the column, while the others are in brackets. The relative position of the caste chosen as ego with respect to all the other castes is indicated by the side of the column; in this way an approximate indication is given of the way in which members of the focal caste treat members of castes above and below it in the caste hierarchy (as measured in one dimension). In this way we can extract five 'universes':

Universe I is as previously described, dichotomized into those social others one treats similarly to one's own caste members (giving REL), and those inferiors one gives categorical T to.

Especially noteworthy is the locus of ego within REL: essentially ego treats those below him as far down as 7b with downward gener-

osity, by extending to them the same usage as he uses within his own caste.

Universe II is essentially the same except that a new element is introduced - some castes whom one categorically V's. The caste world is here trichotomized into superiors (V-receivers), approximate equals (REL-receivers), and inferiors (T-receivers).


Universe III shares II's basic features: the new elements here are an expanded V-area and an abrupt cessation of the downward generosity noticed in I.

Universe IV shares all the basic elements of III: the new elements here are simply a drastic shrinkage of the REL area, and its replacement by a large expanse of categorical V giving.

Universe V is as previously described: the low extreme. Here T giving has shrunk to nil, and V giving expanded to include all but the bottom three (untouchable) castes.

This talk in terms of universes is merely an informal exposition that suggests the sort of observations that may be made. In fact we can distinguish more than just five categories of T/V givers, and in addition different categories of receivers. We must then pass on to a more rigorous analysis. Besides we have so far simply begged the most interesting questions: we have been relying on an imported ranking dimension which may not tally with any hierarchical order that inheres in the T/V data (or alternatively with a rank order derived from the latter in unspecified ways); further we have been drawing on an intuitive valuation of T versus V giving, the principles of which must be made explicit. We wish now to leave the orbit of general remarks based in part on wider contextual knowledge, and restrict ourselves

Figure 4.1: T/V universes; the five major types.



to a purely internal analysis of the patterns emergent from T/V usage. In this way we shall get some idea of just how far linguistic data will take us in the understanding of an alien society.

4.3 THE INFERENCE OF RANK RELATIONS

In sections 4.3 and 4.4 we leave the orbit of informal observations and explanations made against an implicit bank of background knowledge about Indian society in general, and oolappaalLaiyam hamlet in particular. We wish instead to establish some axiomatic principles that lie behind some particular area of social behaviour, in this case pronominal usage, and then give an interpretation of the actually observable patterns in this behaviour in terms of those principles. Given the principles, and the observable patterns, the analysis should be internal. If the principles do not account for the patterns, then they must be wrong or incomplete, and we must emend or add to them (as we do in 4.4). Moreover if possible we should independently justify these principles, to avoid charges of circularity (as we attempt to do in 4.3.1 and 4.3.2.1). Since our aim is to build up a Verstehen sociology of the village, that is, an account of overall behaviour patterns in terms of individual actors' goals and understanding of the conditions in which they act, the explanatory principles we seek should assign 'subjective meanings' (Weber's Sinn, which encompasses both what analytic philosophers would call intentions and appraisals of the conditions for action: see Weber 1947:88-112, and e.g. Rescher 1966) to the atomic types of act that build up the overall patterns.

We are not aiming here at any fashionable 'presuppositionless sociology' (which, strictly, could never exist), but simply at the

presentation of an account that lays its presuppositions out explicitly on the table. It is only in this way that the sociologist can purge his theorizing of presuppositions that are irrelevant, unsupported, clearly ethnocentric, or just plain false. But nothing could be more exacting, and we shall only succeed in declaring some of the implicit cards. Nevertheless we shall try to argue internally on the basis of declared principles, and not by reference to (supposedly) analogous behaviour outside our domain, or to standard sociological principles like economic determinism, the assumption of functional institutions and so on.

One payoff of such internal argumentation is this: we can see just how far we can get in the understanding of some social system on the basis of just one behavioural slice (in this case pronominal usage) and the principles that give that species of behaviour 'meaning' for actors.

4.3.1 The valuation of media and moves within them

Marriott in a series of important papers (Marriott 1959, 1968, 1974) has drawn attention to the extremely systematic patterning of Hindu transactions in food and services, and to the cultural presuppositions that lie beneath that patterning. Here we look at these presuppositions.

On the basis of informants' remarks of the sort:

"Barbers are lower than Watermen because the Barber takes inferior bread from the Waterman's house after shaving him"

"Barbers, Watermen, Goatsherd and Jat cultivators are all equal because they all take each other's feasts"

"The Leatherworker is very low because he is everyone's
servant - he eats from every house"

Marriott (1968:141-146) formulates the underlying rules of Hindu food and services transactions. (To be sure the principles are inherent in much thought and comment on the caste system but Marriott seems to have been the first to state them so explicitly.) The rules are these:

For cooked food transfers

- (1) If A gives to B, and B does not give to A, then A is higher than B.

Diagrammatically:



- (2) If A gives to B, and B gives back to A, then A is equal to B.


Diagrammatically:



- (3) If A gives to B (and B does not give to A), and B gives to C (again without reciprocation), then A is higher than C. In short the relation 'higher than' is transitive. Diagrammatically:



- (4) If A gives one way to C, and B does not, then A is higher than B. Or, if A gives to C (without reciprocation), and A gives to D (again without return), and B gives only to D and not to C, then A is higher than C. The relation 'higher than' is thus arithmetically scored, or diagrammatically:



Marriott does not indicate how he derived this rule of arithmetic scoring, although it is crucial to his (and our) methods. We postpone our justification to the end of this section, and further evidence that this is a rule of valuation used by villagers will be presented in the following section.

To these rules of Marriott's we may add another:

- (5) The relation higher than (as intuition tells us) is asymmetric as well as transitive: thus there will be NO situation where the relation is maintained and where A gives (asymmetrically) to B, B to C, and C to A.

The reader will probably want to know exactly what plane of measurement the relation higher than refers to: power, prestige, ritual or sacred rank? But there is no straightforward answer - indeed the matter is contentious. For while the intake of food is avowedly related to the Hindu metaphysics of purity as Dumont 1966 insists, the provision of food is also an expression of the largesse of the powerful, and being fed a sign of subordination, as Marriott's villagers insist (Marriott 1968:143). Similarly defiling services (the collection of soiled eating leaves, the removal of faeces) while clearly polluting by the same metaphysics, are also part of a broader spectrum of services that 'contribute to the refinement, aristocracy, good fortune and commanding appearance of the employer' (Marriott 1968:144). Further Beck argues

that different particular media of interaction may establish rankings on quite different scales: some to do with 'master-servant relations', some to do with 'dietary and ritual ideals' (Beck 1972:162). All in all it seems that, as in the further ranges of physics, so in social life, we must turn to an examination of the measurement system itself in order to find out what exactly it is that we are measuring.

As Marriott notes (1968:142), 'the logic for deriving rank from service is the exact inverse of the logic for deriving rank from food transfers'. The rules are these:

For the provision of services


- (1') If A provides services to B, and B does not reciprocate, then A is lower than B: diagrammatically



- (2') If A provides for B, and B provides for A, then A is equal to B: diagrammatically




- (3') If A provides for B, and B provides for C, and neither B nor C reciprocate, then A is lower than C:



In short the relation lower than is transitive.

- (4') A provides asymmetrically for C, but B does not provide services for C, then A is lower than B; if A provides asymmetrically for C, and C for D, but B only provides for D, then A is lower than B. Schematically:



The relation lower than is thus arithmetically scored:

A serves 2, B only serves 1, therefore A is lower than B.

Further justifications for this will be given below.


(5') The relation 'lower than' is asymmetric.

Now let us turn to linguistic media, and in particular the giving and receiving of honorifics. As we have reviewed in detail, Brown and Gilman (1960) suggest that the 'semantics', that is the social valuation, of the European T/V systems should be interpreted in relation to two dimensions: 'power' and 'solidarity' or as we prefer, vertical and horizontal social distance. The valuation was this: a symmetrical exchange of T marked solidary relations, a symmetrical exchange of V marked relations of social distance. An asymmetrical use of T indicated that the speaker was higher than the addressee, while an asymmetrical use of V indicated that the speaker was lower than the addressee. Or schematically:




Now we concluded that Brown and Gilman's insight was basically correct and had direct application to the South Indian material also. The reciprocal use of V is rather rare, but far from non-existent in a Tamil village, and further complications are introduced by the fact that there are more pronominal options in village Tamil than the European systems, at least as standardly described (but see Laberge 1976). Nevertheless the valuation seems essentially correct. A special note is required for relative age T/V. This is the pattern where the senior

in years gives T and receives V, a pattern that conforms to shastric familial ideals. Where this usage occurs symmetrically across castes, this then implies that caste is neutralized, is of less importance than relative age in determining the norms of interaction. It thereby implies a status equality, or near equality, in caste rank. It also connotes a sort of pseudo-familial inclusion, and it is worth noting that many of the castes who symmetrically use this pattern of pronominal usage also exchange kin terms ('fictitious' of course) as described below (4.4.3). Another way of looking at the symmetrical exchange of REL is that it is really a symmetrical usage from a group's rather than an individual's point of view. Like patrilateral cross cousin marriage alternates brides every generation, so REL is symmetrical exchange over a time dimension or from a group point of view, as the figure illustrates:



Nevertheless REL also occurs asymmetrically, from one group to another without reciprocation. The observable patterns in our data are reciprocations with categorical T or V. In these cases it still seems that the valuation of REL, with its inherent implications of the neutralization of caste in favour of age distinctions, must be claims (apparently not reciprocally felt) to some measure of equal caste status.

Now the remarkable but obvious fact is that the valuation of T-giving exactly parallels the valuation of food transfers, while the valuation of V-giving exactly parallels the valuation of service-provision. For schematically:



In other words, reciprocal exchange in both the material and linguistic media implies equality; while asymmetrical exchange implies inequality. In the media of food and T-usage, asymmetrical exchange implies that the giver is higher than the receiver. In the media of service provision and V-usage the reverse valuation holds. The parallelism between T and food, and V and services is thus precise.

At first sight though, there is a difference between the material and linguistic media in that symmetrical T-exchange and symmetrical V-exchange, while both implying equality, have different social valuations in another dimension - the first establishes social proximity, the second social distance. But symmetrical food and service exchange do not seem to contrast in this way, for symmetric food exchange would not be inconsistent with some mutual provision of services (e.g. eating-leaf removal). However we can in fact ignore this point of potential difference between the linguistic and material media of interaction because in practice in inter-caste interaction neither symmetrical

V-exchange nor symmetrical service-provision (see Beck 1972: Figures 4.10 and 4.11) occur as patterns of stable usage between groups as a whole. Moreover, on the smaller scale of interaction between families of the same caste, there is after all an inconsistency between the reciprocal provision of food and services - as will be explained immediately below. This potential point of difference, then, fades on close examination.

The parallelism between the valuations of the linguistic and non-linguistic media are then remarkably thorough to the point of identity: all the rules (1) through (5) above for food transfer hold equally for T-giving, and all the rules (1') through (5') above for service provision hold equally for V-giving.

But this is a fundamentally interesting equation. Why should T-giving pattern like food-giving, and V-giving like service provision in two dimensions of valuation, rank and equality? Let us begin by asking what there is that is similar in food transfer and the giving of T. One possible line of explanation may go like this.

Food - especially in an Indian context - is intimate stuff: the most intimate, closed unit in village society is the kuTumpum - the household as defined by the sharing of a common hearth. More than one kuTumpum may live under the same roof, share the same sources of production - but unless they share the same food cooked at the same hearth, co-residents belong to different kuTumpum (see Beck 1972: ch.V). If food sharing is intimate behaviour, so is reciprocal T-exchange: this is the universal (pan-caste) language of mother-child relations, indeed of familial relations in general in non-hierarchized families (but see Chapter V for caste and class variations

here). Mutual T exchange is also the language of intimate friends (but not the language of spouses). In short wherever we find islands of intimacy, where rank does not intrude from the highly hierarchized orders that structure most transactions in this society, we find mutual T-exchange.

Now if we in this way take the valuation on the horizontal social dimension as basic, we can put our question this way: why should giving asymmetrical intimacy be an expression of superiority? And why should the giving of asymmetric distance (V - and possibly services too) be an expression of inferiority?

The answer lies, I believe, in certain very general principles of social interaction: persons who are deemed to have high social rank have the right of access to the personal lives of social inferiors who relate to them, but the inferiors do not have the reciprocal right of access to the lives of their superiors. This seems to be a universal principle. In England, for instance, a doctor or a vicar or a boss or a professor may politely enquire after the health or doings of a young addressee's family, but for the addressee to reciprocally enquire would be to claim social equality. Again, in Russian novels paternalistic nobles busy themselves with the personal lives of their serfs and dependents, but not vice-versa. Similarly in our Indian village a young man visiting an old woman of superior status is subject to detailed questioning about his family's activities and plans, but makes no reciprocal enquiries (Tape IIIA). Similar intuitive observations have been made by Geertz on Javanese data: the higher the rank of the interactant the more 'walls' of alus or prestigious inaccessibility seem to be erected (Geertz 1960). The principle seems to be that as rank increases, access to personal preserves decreases. For an elab-

orate theory of why this should be the case, see Brown and Levinson 1977 where an account is given in terms of the notion of 'face'.

We have stressed the parallels between food transfers and T-giving, service provision and V-giving because they hold out encouragement for some general theory of transactions that would encompass material and communicative transfers. For the rules adduced do not seem to be restricted entirely to Hindu culture, but seem to have natural applications to transactions in all cultures. Indeed the rule-bound patterns of commensality, and the restricted patterns of T/V usage reported from all over the world seem consistent with our rules.

However there are inherent differences between linguistic and material media that cannot be ignored. Perhaps the most important of these are the following:

(i) Material exchanges (e.g. food-transfers) require two independent acts by different parties in order for a transfer to take place: an act of giving and an act of receiving; linguistic exchanges on the other hand can be delivered without the acquiescence of the other party. Thus a transfer of cooked rice at a feast requires that one party presents the rice, and the other takes and consumes it, while if one party addresses another with a T pronoun the other party - unless it feigns hard-of-hearing - can hardly avoid having received it. Of course these differences inhere not so much in the media themselves as in the rules that guide their usage: thus there are cases reported from Melanesia where food transfers occur against the will of the recipient, and the food is simply dumped on his threshold (as reported for example by Malinowski); and on the other hand hearing what is spoken to you is not so much automatic as the product of powerful norms of

attention (see Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974; and Reisman 1976 for a case where such norms are claimed to be partially non-operative). Nevertheless given these cultural ground rules, if that is what they are, we can see that food transfers involve a larger measure of consensus by both parties to the transaction than a particular pattern of T or V giving.

(ii) One area of difference between the particular linguistic and food and service media here considered is that, whereas asymmetric food and service transfers, like T and V giving, empirically never flow in the same direction because of their inconsistent valuations, symmetric food transfers can co-occur with symmetric service provision. Thus every household of a caste will theoretically be willing to dine with every other household of the caste, and also to remove the eating leaves of every other member-household (as indicated by the self-reciprocal cells in Beck's Figures 4.8 and 4.10). And on the face of it it looks as if symmetric T and V giving cannot so easily co-occur, because the two usages carry inconsistent messages about the horizontal social distance between speaker and addressee. But in fact it is not clear that this is a true contrast, for we have had to phrase the co-occurrence of symmetric food and service transfer as obtaining between not individuals but households (kuTumpum) within a caste. For no man will eat with a woman, nor will a man clear away the eating leaves of women: men rank higher than women and the asymmetric rules for such transactions operate within the household also. Similarly it is the most junior competent woman who will clear away the eating leaves, and eat last. So it is only between commensal units - households - that an overall symmetrical exchange obtains in food and services. But in that case,

taking the same unit, symmetric T and V giving can be seen to co-occur: particular members of each household will give asymmetric T or V (and possibly symmetric T or V) to particular members of other households. If we then sum the transfers of T and V, equal numbers of each kind of T and V transfer will flow between households (at least households of the same demographic make-up). We can probably conclude therefore that this difference between the media is more apparent than real.

We now have in hand a valuation for T and V giving: Rules (1) through (5) hold for T-giving, and Rules (1') through (5') hold for V-giving. It is important for the argument that follows that this valuation is seen to be at least potentially arrived at by a method independent from the observation of inter-caste behaviour. Otherwise the inferences made below would be circular. But we can in fact produce independent empirical or theoretical sources for these rules and valuations:

(i) We have already predicted (in Chapter II), on the basis of a theory of strategic language use oriented around face-preservation (as in Brown and Levinson 1977), that plural pronouns will be used to express deference to singular addressees. The same theory predicts that reciprocal use of such plural second person pronouns would indicate social distance on a horizontal dimension; and that asymmetrical and symmetrical usages of T would have the values they do.

(ii) Similarly on the basis of Brown and Gilman's theory one would expect the same valuation, and that theory intuitively extends to the Tamil data.

(iii) The valuation may be independently checked against data from another domain: intra-caste behaviour. Here we find that the

same rules apply, although the rank thereby established has to do with hierarchical relations between kin (seniors, affines, cross-kin) rather than between castes.

(iv) The rules have an independent existence in informants' minds, and can be elicited from them. Similarly, on the basis of participant-observation the ethnographer intuitively built up the same rules, which were accessible to introspection.

The arguments that follow then can, I believe, be made on solidly independent grounds.

One point that should be borne in mind, and was already made in Chapter II, is that these valuations are inherently interactional. If A says T to B, then the valuation of T depends crucially on what B says back to A.


A note on Rules 4 and 4': Arithmetic Computation of Rank

As promised above, we return here to the rationale behind rules 4 and 4'. It is not at first obvious that this rule, formulated by Marriott, is necessary. For instance suppose we have a matrix of results like the following:

	1	2	3	4	5
1					
2	T				
3	T	T			
4	T	T	T		
5	T	T	T	T	


It is clear that these transactions establish a rank by means of rules (1), (2) and (3) alone. For expressing the relations between parties by a directed graph, we can see that all transivities are

fully expressed and that this provides a unique linear ranking:




Here a score, reckoned by the number of T's given and received, would establish the same rank, as the reader may verify for himself. Even where a completely linear ranking cannot be established, arithmetic scores may yield the same ranking as an assessment of transitive relations in a directed graph:

	1	2	3	4	5
1					
2					
3	T	T			
4	T	T	T		
5	T	T	T	T	
Scores→	3	3	2	1	0



Here parties 1 and 2 are equal by score, and also tie by an assessment of transitivity. But sometimes transitivity are not fully expressed and no approximation to a linear rank can be established by rules (1), (2) and (3) alone. Take for instance the following matrix and its associated directed graph:

	1	2	3	4	5
1			V	V	V
2				V	V
3					V
4					
5					



Given rules (1'), (2') and (3'), we can infer the following rank orders:

- 1 > 3 > 5
- 2 > 4
- 2 > 5
- 1 > 4

But we cannot collapse these into a single rank order because there is no expressed transitive relation between 3 and 4, 1 and 2, 3 and 4, etc. On the other hand arithmetic scoring of receipts will yield two linear ranks, one by scores of (positively valued) receipts, one by scores of (negatively valued) outgoings:

	<u>V-receipts</u>	<u>V-outgoings</u>
party 1:	+3	0
2:	+2	0
3:	+1	-1
4:	0	-2
5:	0	-3

Here the two linear ranks are consistent, although this will not always be the case. Essentially, if the interactions cannot be expressed as a

fully linear directed graph with a unique beginner and no branchings, then we cannot be sure that ranks by giving and by receiving will be identical (although, as here, they may be).

This shows that if arithmetic scoring can be established as a mode of reckoning that members of the society actually use, it will play an important part in ranking groups by their interactional behaviour. And although on the face of it, it may seem that such reckoning is too sophisticated or mathematical for naive villagers to use, that is not really the case. For rule (4) simply boils down to the notion that the guy who gives most disvalued elements is tops, and rule (4') to the notion that the guy who gets most valued elements is also tops. Given that the scoring is between caste units, of which there are 17, scores could never exceed 16.

In any case it seems to be a fact that villagers do think like this. If you present them with facts like those in the matrix immediately above, they will not infer the set of non-collapsed relative rank orders that can be inferred from just rules (1'), (2') and (3'). Rather they will say simply that 1 is clearly better than 2, and 2 than 3 (more V-receipts), and 4 than 5 (less V-outgoings). Such questions were only asked informally in the context of how members, if they moved, would know how to address members of another village with different castes resident, or different rankings of familiar castes, and in any case no members of their own caste whose usage could be imitated; and the answers implied that a relative positioning of castes in the alien structure was established by arithmetic scoring, and then ego transferred his own relative positioning in his home village to the new one. Such problems for members are not frequent (unless ego's caste is small

or not locally distributed - like castes 4, 7b, 2 and 8 - any local village is likely to have some own caste families); nevertheless members are sensitive to them and a full investigation of the more conscious methods they employ in such situations would I believe establish that arithmetic scoring is actually used.

In any case it is clear from the fact that members read a linear rank from the matrix immediately above that rules (1) through (3), and (1') through (3'), must be augmented by a procedure that achieves this. Arithmetic ranking seems to be the simplest such procedure, and we shall assume that members do operate with it.

4.3.2 Scaling

In this section we at last get down to the actual business of inferring caste rank from behaviour. To do this we shall use methods long utilized in caste studies, namely the construction of scaled matrices as already briefly described in section 4.1, and as refined by Beck 1972 and Marriott 1968 and 1974. But many of those who have used this method seem to have been interested in the question "is there any objective method for determining caste ranks" (Hiebert 1969:434, see also Freed 1963), and seem to have seen in the scalogram an answer to that question that has plagued all those, administrators or social commentators, who have ever thought about caste society. Our aim is different: for us the question is: "is there any subjective method, used by members to determine their rank vis-a-vis others?" Scaling may not seem a likely subjective method, but in fact it only represents a determination of ranking on the basis of a simple set of numerical scores.

4.3.2.1 Scaling as a members' activity In order to maintain a potentially subjective viewpoint, we must be careful to observe the following principles:

- (i) The behaviour which is included within the behavioural outcomes to be scaled must be accessible to public observation and knowledge. Indeed if it is to be assumed that subjective rank assessments are inter-subjectively available (as appears from behaviour we shall later call 'retaliative'), then all the relevant behavioural outcomes must be mutually known (in the sense of Schiffer 1972:30-35).
- (ii) The valuation of the atomic behaviour types must be shown to be subscribed to by members on independent grounds. In short the valuation must be subjective. Moreover the subjective valuation must be consonant with the preconditions for meaningful scaling: in short it must be phrased - intuitively for members - in terms of some asymmetric transitive relation (in the sense employed in finite mathematics).

We must now establish that each of these conditions is met. We will take them in order.

- (i) Public knowledge of the behavioural outcomes As we pointed out above, one overwhelming problem with the 'attributional' theory of caste ranking (Marriott 1959, Stevenson 1954) is simply that members of the society (in this case the village) simply do not have a detailed knowledge of these attributes and their distribution. For instance the Village Accountant, a reasonably intelligent man with administrative responsibilities, did not know that the two distinct castes of aacaari (craftsmen: castes 3 and 6) were distinguished by the following culturally important attribute: members of 3 are caiva, that is vegetarian, while members of 6 are acaiva, non-vegetarian. And this

despite the fact that the Accountant belonged to caste 2, a left-hand vegetarian caste like 3. Castes 3, 2, 4 and 1 were the only vegetarian castes in the village. Admittedly most persons of these castes did know this: but such knowledge of attributes does not seem to be a sine qua non for understanding and operating in village society. Only a full survey of the extent of such knowledge of attributes throughout the village would fully establish this point, but I believe that it would put paid to any attributional theory of ranking once and for all. That is, so long as it is agreed that the aim of such theories of ranking is to establish the methods employed by members to order their social world, and not to obtain some 'objective', etic, culture independent assignment of ranks by sociologists, which are necessarily arbitrary and theory-relative.

Compared to the public availability of attributional criteria (which are often private prescriptions of ritual), interactional facts are necessarily public, and matters of daily experience. Potentially, and I believe empirically, every adult member of the village will witness the interaction, at least occasionally, between members drawn from each and every caste. This is especially true for linguistic and kinesic interaction: for even those castes that would by preference avoid each other (e.g. Brahman and Christian Paraiyars) are drawn together by mutual duties, of a ritual, official or commercial kind. (For instance, Brahman children are taught by a Paraiyar teacher, and at temple festivals Paraiyars still do their traditional service as musicians - and of course all such arrangements involve talk of one kind or another .

But if the knowledge of such interactional facts is potentially obtainable, and the facts are indeed witnessed, it doesn't follow that

such knowledge is actually attained and retained. Nevertheless my questioning of informants indicates that it is. For instance my principal informant was able to predict accurately some 260 out of 272 cells in the initial matrix; the only areas of uncertainty for him were interactions between Harijan groups, and between various other groups (like 13 and 14) who have special relations to one another. Admittedly he is an intelligent and very observant man, and moreover belongs to a caste that occupies a median position in the hierarchy, and is thus in a favourable position to know about routine interactions between groups both above and below. It may well be that both Harijans and Brahmans do not have this detailed knowledge, for they have little interest in it, defining as they do the fixed poles of the Indian ranking systems. But for the majority of castes in between, the subject is of vital and daily interest, and I would expect that competent adult members of castes between 2 and 14 inclusive would have accurate knowledge of at least 200 out of the 272 cells in the initial matrix, with perhaps a slight attrition of detailed knowledge at either end of the hierarchy. But I have no evidence, other than unretrievably conversational sources, for this.

One thing that did emerge clearly from those conversations though, was that although members could retrieve from memory actual dyadic encounters to substantiate such cells, this was not the way they chose to think about it. Rather they had a powerful shorthand device that could generate all the cells in the matrix (not always with absolute correctness). This device seemed to have the following properties:


(a) A hierarchical ordering of a set of major caste groups or blocs.

For instance, middle caste informants spoke as if the following sort

For number sequence only.

54

of ranked blocs could be assumed:




- (b) A set of familiar salient interactions within inter-caste dyads (thought of in terms of concrete individuals as representatives of their groups), such dyads linking each of the above blocs at least to its immediate neighbours. In these dyads expectable unmarked T/V usage is known.
- (c) A set of rules that given the well known salient dyads, will generate the expectable usage between every other dyad. But the rules are very simple and involve essentially only the knowledge that asymmetric T and V giving behaviours scale almost perfectly, that is that they tap an underlying single dimension that is an asymmetric transitive relation, and that REL, symmetrically

exchanged, taps a symmetric transitive relation. In addition members know the valuation of such behaviours, as discussed below in (iii).


- (d) A set of well known exceptions, that is inter-caste dyads whose behaviour is not asymmetric T/V giving, the relative position of parties in the dyad being established by the valuations of the behaviour within it.

Taking just (a), (b) and (c) let us see how this can generate a predictive fully specified matrix. Suppose for ego, the particular salient facts in (b) that are known to him are the following, as mapped onto (a) the ranking of caste blocs:



Now there are just seven facts about categorical T giving and V giving here: three about T giving, and four about V giving. But if ego knows just these seven facts, given that asymmetric T and V are organized around an asymmetric transitive relation, ego can infer that any case of A's giving T asymmetrically to B, will also hold for C where C is in a lower bloc than B; similarly, if C gives V to B, and B is in a lower bloc than A, then ego can infer that C gives V to A also. The seven facts then rapidly swell. Now if ego makes a further strong assumption, namely that each member of a bloc behaves and is treated like every other member, then ego can generate over 150 further facts from the initial seven. (Alternatively, if instead of the assumption of the homogeneity of behaviour between blocs, ego made the stronger assumption that there was a single linear order of castes known to him - then he could generate even more facts. But this assumption doesn't in fact seem to be made, although it may perhaps be made in portions of the hierarchy). We can show this by drawing a matrix in which the seven facts are recorded as cells labelled with T or V, and then indicating the vertical and horizontal extensions of this T or V giving that can be inferred (i) on the basis of the assumption that the behaviours scale, (ii) on the basis of the assumption that caste-bloc is homogeneous. The extent of these inferences is indicated in the matrix in Figure 4.2, by the boundary line around the areas marked T and V. There are just 172 predicted (inferred) cells.

A consideration of this matrix will show that not all facts would be so predictively useful as the seven we have chosen: but nor are these seven the optimal predictors. It will also show that such generative methods based on the assumption of bloc homogeneity and



scalability will get some facts wrong: e.g. it is wrongly predicted in the matrix, on the basis of bloc homogeneity, that castes 2, 3, and 7a will V caste 1 (in fact they give Brahmins REL). Of course the blocs suggested as a likely basis for inference are very likely not quite these: but even if we subdivide the second bloc we will still get some facts wrong (or at least we will lose some generalizations, e.g. those made in the matrix where on the basis of 3's giving T to 8 we infer that 5, 6, 7a and 4 also T 8). It is here that the knowledge of certain exceptions (like the fact that 2, 3 and 7a give REL to 1 and that 11 gives T to 8, 9 and 10, whereas 9 and 10 give REL to 8 and receive T in exchange) - our (d) above - comes into play. Even here it is not the facts that need to be known: these can be inferred given the knowledge of certain special relations between castes (but the most salient clue of these relations will in fact be the kind of honorifics used between parties).²⁶

We omit a discussion of the way that further REL behaviour may be inferred given some key instances of it, but it will rely crucially on the assumption of bloc homogeneity and some instances of REL within it.

What this discussion shows it that given an initial ranking of castes in a small set of blocs, and the two assumptions of scalability and homogeneity of blocs, from a very small set of salient facts (easily retrieved or frequently witnessed) a large proportion of the set of facts about T/V usage in intercaste dyads can be generated with only a small degree of error (minimized by the knowledge of exceptions between castes with special relations). And from the way informants spoke this is the way I think that they actually thought.

For instance asking a member of caste 8 about the pronominal usage of members of 9, I asked whether members of 9 used T to members of 11, I was told yes, and I then asked if members of 9 used T to members of 16. This caused laughter: even the children saw it as an absurd question: obviously if 9 gives T to 11, it will give T to anyone lower down, and more besides - members of 9 will use actual dishonorifics to seniors in 16. "They'll say 'vaTaa, pooTaa' (come-Taa, go-Taa)" (see section 4.3.2.3 on dishonorifics). I quickly learnt not to ask such dumb questions, and to scale behaviour as members do.

Now it may seem that to claim that members bring to bear to their thought about T/V usage a ready-made hierarchy of caste-blocs, is to undermine any claim that caste ranking is actually constructed on the basis (at least in part) of observed pronominal usage. But these are not in fact inconsistent claims and I shall stick to both of them. For the hierarchy of caste-blocs is exactly the kind of ranking that can be inferred from T/V usage, represents most of the important social information that can be obtained from it, and would be a convenient way to store that information. It would then be subject to change, given further hitherto unassimilated knowledge, or changing patterns of T/V usage.

(ii) Members' knowledge of the valuation of patterns of T/V giving and receiving We have already argued in 4.3.1 that the valuation

there described can be established on grounds independent from inter-caste T/V usage as observed. One of these grounds was that the valuation may be directly elicited from members, and another was that it operates in another arena, namely intra-caste behaviour. Of behaviour in that arena members say:

"We give maamaa (MB category) matippu (respect): we say vaanka maamaa (come-V MB)". But he says vaappaa, pooppaa (come-T + dishonorific, go-T + dishonorific) because we are just young people".

For them V-giving maps the direction of respect, T-giving maps the direction of disrespect. Similarly:

"One thing is important: to maamiyar and maaminar (parents-in-law) respect must be given. It is better for the groom to say nothing: but if he must speak then he must say 'vaanka maamiyar' (come-V father-in-law). But maamiyar must also say vaanka, vaanka to the groom. They must give each other respect."

Thus, for members, reciprocal V exchange establishes mutual respect. In the same way mutual T-giving establishes or expresses intimacy, or close friendship:

"They are good friends, nothing will part them. When they see each other they say vaaTaa, pooTaa (come-T + dishonorific, go-T + dishonorific). A pair of rascals mind you!"

These then are the ways members express the valuation rules (1) and (2), and (1') and (2') above. But what are the emic correlates of rules (3) and (4), and (3') and (4')? Rules (3) and (3') require the asymmetric transitivity of the valuation, rules (4) and (4') allow rank to be arithmetically computed in terms, for instance, of the number of T's given and received between castes (treated as units of course).

Taking asymmetric transitivity first, what evidence is there that members make inferences based on the assumption that such a relation obtains? First and foremost is the fact that informants found it

hilarious that the ethnographer did not find it obvious that T/V usage was based on such a relation, as instanced by the episode described immediately above, where if caste 9 gives T to 11, then caste 11 obviously gives T to caste 16. It is obvious because everyone knows that 11 gives T to 16, so there is a chain of T givings from 9 to 11 and 11 to 16, and on the assumption of transitivity, 9 must therefore give T to 16. What if 9 gave V to 16? The grave answer was cosmological chaos: it simply couldn't happen.

It is clear that the asymmetric transitive relation that underlies T/V usage is "socially higher (more respected) than", and/or "socially lower (less respected) than". Further evidence for the strict asymmetry and transitivity of the underlying relation is provided by the fact that honorifics and dishonorifics can themselves be scaled by members. For instance the following implicational scales were elicited, and correspond to all the facts that were collected:

Scale of honorifics

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{caami} \\ \text{esamaanka} \end{array} \right\} > \text{naam} > \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{nka} \\ \text{ayya} \end{array} \right\} > \text{categorical V} > \text{name-taboo}$$

Scale of dishonorifics

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{li**} \\ \text{Ti**} \end{array} \right\} > \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Taa*} \\ \text{Teey} \end{array} \right\} > \text{use of name} > \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{-ppaa} \\ \text{-mmaa} \end{array} \right\} > \text{categorical T}$$

** used only to women, but ruder than

* form used only to men

That is, forms to the left imply the possibility of the usage of all forms to the right, to the same addressee. Thus if A uses 'caami' to B, then A may on occasion use naam, nka, V and will never use B's name to B. (Further details about these forms will be presented later). But one cannot infer from the fact that A uses V to B that A may on occasion use caami to B; i.e. one cannot make inferences from right to left. This shows that whatever underlies the usage of honorifics is a strictly asymmetric and transitive relation. Similarly for dishonorifics: one can infer from the rudest that the least rude may be used to the same addressee, but not vice-versa.²⁷

Let us turn now to rules (4) and (4') of the valuation. These assert that there is an arithmetic computation of rank: the more numbers of positively valued receipts (V's) and the less numbers of negatively valued receipts (T's) the higher the rank of the receiver (again treating castes as the units of giving and receiving). Informants spoke this way too:

"We Washermen, Barbers and all say vaanka to the Brahmans:

everybody does. They are the highest caste compared to all."

They also spoke in terms of rank estimates by least giving of valued outgoings (V):

"We cooLi aacaari do not have to say V to Brahmans: I for instance say vaayaar (come-T Brahman) to the Gurukkul. But the konku aacaari they have to say vaankaayyaar (come-V Brahman). cooLi aacaari are a high caste."

In away the point of arithmetic scoring is that it takes into account not only the rank relations established by asymmetric exchanges, and thus by the inferring of the asymmetric transitive relation of rank,

but also the notable absence of such exchanges between particular parties. Now rules (1) through (3) simply attach no valuation to the non-occurrence of some particular exchange: no rank is thus established, nothing is said. But for villagers this is patently not the case: if caste 7b does not give V to caste 2, and neither does 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7a, then clearly castes 3 through 7b do not think 2 worthy of categorical V (that this is confirmed by the alternative employed does not diminish the validity of this mode of thinking in terms of negative occurrences of V). So members keep tabs on such non-occurrences: for instance a member of 9 pointed out that there is a big difference between members of 10 and 11, for 11 V's all the 'upper castes', while 10 V's only the top three. So 11 admits to more relations of social asymmetry, and this directly implies that it is lower in rank. Since this judgement can only be made on the basis of counting occurrences versus non-occurrences of the behaviour in question it does imply that arithmetic computation is involved. It may not take the fully specified form that our computations here will take, but it seems that it must follow at least some approximate analogue of those.

4.3.2.2 Two media and four scales We have now established a cultural valuation of particular patterns of pronominal exchange. We have also presented, in 4.2 the basic set of facts about T/V usage between castes. We then went on to argue that both the facts and the rules of valuation were part of members' knowledge of their own society. We now ask, given this knowledge, what patterns of rank are inherent in the data; and since this knowledge is members' knowledge this amounts to asking what social inferences (to do with rank) can members make from the overall patterns of pronominal usage accessible to them ?

We here consider two media: (categorical) T usage and (categorical) V usage. These are independent media, for there is a third major option REL (considered below in 4.4) that precludes the possibility of inferring T usage from the non-usage of V. Nor as the results will show, are the inherent patterns established in one medium totally consistent with those established in the other.

Within each medium the rules of valuation establish two potentially independent scales of rank: rank as givers, and rank as receivers. As was explained in 4.2, these scales are also not inter-inferable. Consequently we shall take each dimension of evaluation one at a time, in the following order:

1. Rank as (most) T givers
2. Rank as (least) V givers
3. Rank as (most) V receivers
4. Rank as (least) T receivers

In each case we shall construct a scaled matrix or scalogram, in the way described above (4.1), and from this infer the rank order of castes in that dimension. The entire previous discussion in this chapter has legitimated this procedure, or so we hope.

One point of method though does need to be explained. In the discussion of the valuation of the T/V media it was noted that values can only be assigned to behaviour on the basis of reciprocal behaviour in a dyad. Thus reciprocal T carries a quite different value than T in one direction only. It is this fundamentally interactive mode of valuation that caused us such theoretical trouble in Chapter II. Nevertheless we here effectively ignore reciprocals in our computation of ranks inherent in the data. Our justification for this is twofold:

(a) In the first place reciprocal usage of a form never reverses the valuation that would be established by an asymmetrical usage, rather it can only neutralize the rank implications. In any case such reciprocal usages will turn up in the matrix for each medium in such a way that when the two dimensions of giving and receiving are considered together rank-implications incorrectly assigned will cancel themselves out thus achieving the correct result.


(b) In the second place, considering only the two media T and V, there are almost no cases of symmetrical usage of a medium in inter-caste usage (the single exception is caste 11's exchange of T with 8, 9 and 10), as the reader may check by scanning the basic matrix (VIII). There are no cases at all of symmetrical V exchange, and only the mentioned case of reciprocal T exchange. Hence virtually all usage is asymmetrical, and we may proceed using the valuations established for such asymmetrical usages, counting V receipts as positive measures of rank, and T receipts as measures of lower rank.

This treatment is, it is true, an idealization in the following respect. Asymmetrical use of V implies the use of T or REL in return, while asymmetrical use of T implies the use of V or REL in return. In our valuation of asymmetrical T and V we shall ignore the difference between a T or V and a REL return. This is an idealization which we make amends for in section 4.4. It is not a serious idealization for the following reason: if A gives V to B, and B gives back to A either T or REL, A is still unambiguously inferior to B; and similarly if A gives T to B, and B gives back to A either V or REL, then A is either way unambiguously superior to B. Given that virtually no cases of symmetrical exchange in one medium are attested, this ignoring of the

exact nature of the reciprocal form used in each dyad will not lead to serious misrepresentations. In any case attention is given to the problem in section 4.4 below.

So passing straight away to our first dimensions of evaluation, rank as (most) T givers, we have Matrix II (as overleaf). Here the castes that give most T are those with the longest columns in the space labelled T, namely castes 1 through 7b along the top of the matrix. These castes each give T to nine other castes, while castes 11 and 8 both give to eight others, caste 9 to seven others, 10 to six others, and so on, till castes 16 and 18 give categorical T to nil others. Let us call the count of T-recipients for each T giver that T giver's positive score. (For, by the valuation rules to give T and not to receive it back is to establish the giver's higher rank; and even if it is received back giver's rank cannot be lower than receiver's.)

All castes with identical positive scores form one undifferentiated bloc as far as each medium is concerned. Thus there are seven blocs, ranked from one to seven by the highest score. Without tabulating scores, exactly the same results emerge visually from the scaled matrix, with the highest ranking (longest) columns shuffled to the left, the horizontal edge of each step indicating rank equals, and vertical edges indicating distinctions of rank receding downwards. So we can simply draw lines vertically from each corner of a step up to the horizontal axis and where the lines segment the axis, there we have blocs of castes of equal rank on this measurement. It should be noted that such geometrical methods are exactly equivalent to ranking based on numerical scores, as the reader may verify from the matrix (but there are media where we must fall back on the numerical method alone, as we shall see).²⁸



For a shorthand, we can represent the rank that emerges from Matrix II as a vertical linear array of castes (labelled by numbers) from top rank at the top, to bottom rank at the bottom, where bars divide the ranked blocs and ordering within bars is arbitrary (as used by Marriott 1968:157, Beck 1972): we do this in Figure 4.3.

Figure 4.3 Rank by T-giving

<u>Highest rank</u>	1
	2
	3
Bloc 1	7a
	5
	6
	4
	<u>7b</u>
Bloc 2	11
	<u>8</u>
Bloc 3	<u>9</u>
Bloc 4	<u>10</u>
Bloc 5	13
	<u>14</u>
Bloc 6	<u>17</u>
Bloc 7	16
<u>Lowest rank</u>	18

It is clear from Figure 4.3 that maximal T giving does not distinguish among what we have called the upper castes (1 through 7b) at all, while it distinguishes six levels of rank among the lower castes (8 through 18). We may judge from this that success in maximal T giving is of much more importance to individual castes of

the lower category. We shall need some explanation of this.

Let us now turn to the second dimension of evaluation: rank as (least) V givers. By the valuation, just as giving T is valued, so giving V is disvalued. Thus scores for V giving are negative: the more recipients of V a caste has the less its rank on this dimension.

The facts are as in Matrix III. Here all self-reciprocal cells lie outside the V area, so there are no compensations required to preserve geometrical perspicuity. Castes 1, 2, 3, 7a form the top rank bloc with no (categorical) V givings at all. Their score is zero (maximum on this dimension). There follows Bloc 2 composed of 5, 6, 4 and 7b, who give categorical V to Brahmans (caste 1) and thereby lower their rank by a score of 1 (hence they score -1). Then comes Bloc 3 (castes 8, 9, 10) who give categorical V to 1, 2 and 5 (hence they score -3). And so on till Bloc 6 (17, 16, 18), members of which give V to no less than 14 castes (hence a score of -14). Once again we can easily extract a linear representation of rank, as in Figure 4.4.

Here we see that minimal V giving makes one important cut in the array of upper castes, distinguishing Bloc 1 from 2. We must ask how this comes about and what it signifies. We may merely note here that its significance depends crucially on the usage that castes 2, 3 and 7a substitute for the V that Bloc 2 members give to Brahmans. Since that usage did not appear on Matrix II, nor on III, by exclusion we know that it must be REL, and we shall answer this question when we come to deal with REL (section 4.4). Note that again the lower castes (8 through 18) are finely distinguished into four grades of V givers.

Matrix III: Rank as (least) V givers.




Figure 4.4 Rank by V-giving

<u>Highest rank</u>		1
	Bloc 1	2
		3
		<u>7a</u>
		5
	Bloc 2	6
		4
		<u>7b</u>
		8
	Bloc 3	9
		<u>10</u>
	Bloc 4	<u>11</u>
		13
	Bloc 5	<u>14</u>
		17
	Bloc 6	16
<u>Lowest rank</u>		<u>18</u>

Now let us turn to the receiving dimensions. Here we have two, V receiving positively valued by the valuation, and T receiving, negatively valued by the valuation. Starting with the positive measure of rank, V receiving, we may score castes by the number of V receipts, and once again equal scorers will constitute one rank bloc.

The facts are as in the scaled matrix, Matrix IV. This matrix is essentially identical to Matrix III, as we had already scaled both giving and receiving dimensions, shuffling best-givers to the left-most columns and best-receivers to the topmost rows. Now however we are interested only in the receiving dimension, and thus the rows, and their top-to-bottom scaling.


Turning to Matrix IV we see that Bloc 1, the topmost rank, has only one member caste, the Brahmins, and that Brahmins rank highest as receivers with a score of 13 categorical V receipts from 13 other castes. Next comes Bloc 2, composed of castes 2 and 5, each with 9 V receipts; then Bloc 3, composed of castes 3 through 7b with equal scores of 5 receipts - and so on. The linear rank order thus established is then as in Figure 4.5.

Figure 4.5 Rank by V-receiving

<u>Highest rank</u>	Bloc 1	1
		<hr/>
	Bloc 2	2
		5
		<hr/>
		3
		6
	Bloc 3	4
		7a
		7b
		<hr/>
		8
	Bloc 4	9
		10
		11
		<hr/>
	Bloc 5	13
		14
		<hr/>
		17
	Bloc 6	16
<u>Lowest rank</u>		18

Note that V receiving cuts the upper castes into as many blocs as the lower castes. This is important: upper castes do not seem to attempt to distinguish between themselves very finely on giving dimensions, but somewhat finer distinctions emerge in their treatment by

Matrix IV: Rank as (most) V receivers.




others. Also noteworthy is the position of caste 5, the dominant caste, on this dimension: it here ranks second only to the Brahman caste, sharing this rank with caste 2.

We come finally to T receiving: a disvalued medium where scores will be negative. Matrix V repeats the facts in Matrix II, but now we are interested in the rows, scaled from top to bottom. We see that, when compensation is made for the internal self-reciprocal cell 11/11 as done in Matrix II, there are seven ranks. Bloc 1, composed of row-castes 1 through 7b, has a score of zero. But Bloc 2 (caste 8 alone) acquires immediately, and dramatically, a score of -9, while Bloc 3 has -10, Bloc 4 has -11, Bloc 5 has -12, Bloc 6 has -14, and Bloc 7 has -15. In terms of our linear representation, we have the situation in Figure 4.6.

Figure 4.6 Rank by T-receiving

<u>Highest rank</u>		1
		2
		5
	Bloc 1	3
		6
		4
		7a
		<u>7b</u>
	Bloc 2	<u>8</u>
	Bloc 3	<u>9</u>
	Bloc 4	10
		<u>11</u>
	Bloc 5	13
		<u>14</u>
	Bloc 6	17
		<u>16</u>
<u>Lowest rank</u>	Bloc 7	18

Matrix V: Rank as (least) T receivers.



The pattern here is very similar to that derived from Matrix II: in both the upper castes are given a single rank, and the lower castes divided into six ranks. However as we shall see the rank order of castes on these two dimensions, giving and receiving, is not exactly the same. The dimensions make slightly different cuts in the linear ordering of castes, and one caste (11) has very different ranks in the two media. This will call for explanation.

Let us now compare the rank orders that we have obtained so far. We can do this easily by comparing the linear representation of ranks, which are brought together in Figure 4.7. Here we compare the ranks established within the two dimensions of giving and receiving. Diagonal linking lines point to rank reversals. We can see immediately that there is only one such reversal, the relatively high rank that caste 11 has as a T giver, is lost in the V giving sweepstakes; that is to say that whereas 11 manages to give a lot of T, it is not able to minimize its V outlays. But apart from caste 11's reversals, we can see that within the dimensions of giving and receiving, ranks established are absolutely compatible and consistent. That does not mean that ranks on V and T giving and receiving redundantly express the same hierarchical distinctions: for the ranks established in the two media (T or V) cut the hierarchy of castes at different locations. Thus V giving makes five cuts establishing six rank-blocs, to which T giving adds two differently located cuts, establishing eight rank-blocs in toto. Similarly, V receiving cuts the hierarchy five times, distinguishing six blocs, to which T receiving adds three different distinctions, establishing in toto nine rank-blocs on the receiving dimensions. For a set of local castes only seventeen in

Figure 4.7 Rank on two dimensions compared

<u>Rank as givers</u>		<u>Rank as receivers</u>	
T-giving	V-giving	V-receiving	T-receiving
1	1	<u>1</u>	1
2	2	2	2
3	3	<u>5</u>	5
7a	<u>7a</u>	3	3
5	5	6	6
6	6	4	4
4	4	7a	7a
<u>7b</u>	<u>7b</u>	<u>7b</u>	<u>7b</u>
11	8	8	<u>8</u>
8	9	9	<u>9</u>
<u>9</u>	<u>10</u>	10	10
<u>10</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>11</u>
13	13	13	13
<u>14</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>14</u>
<u>17</u>	17	17	17
16	16	16	<u>16</u>
18	18	18	18

number these are very fine distinctions of rank.

If we now turn to compare ranks across the dimensions of giving and receiving, far more intransitivities and inconsistencies appear. Figure 4.8 reassembles the linear representations of rank to make this visually apparent. Comparing first T giving and T receiving, we find that caste 11 slips from a position at the top of the lower castes by T giving, to a position in the third rank down from the upper-caste/lower caste boundary as judged by V giving. Comparing V giving and V receiving, a further case of rank reversal emerges, with 3 and 7a

Figure 4.8 Giving and receiving compared

T-giving	T-receiving	V-giving	V-receiving	<u>Summed rank distinctions</u>	
				Giving	Receiving
1	1	1	<u>1</u>		<u>1</u>
2	2	2	2		2
3	5	3	<u>5</u>	3	<u>5</u>
7a	3	<u>7a</u>	3	<u>7a</u>	3
5	6	5	6	5	6
6	4	6	4	6	4
4	7a	4	7a	4	7a
<u>7b</u>	<u>7b</u>	<u>7b</u>	<u>7b</u>	<u>7b</u>	<u>7b</u>
11	<u>8</u>	8	8	11	<u>8</u>
<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>	9	9	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>
<u>9</u>	10	<u>10</u>	10	<u>9</u>	10
<u>10</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>11</u>
13	13	13	13		13
<u>14</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>14</u>	
<u>17</u>	17	17	17	<u>17</u>	
16	<u>16</u>	16	16	<u>16</u>	
18	18	18	18		18

above 5 in V giving, but 5 above 3 and 7a in V receiving. We must seek explanations for these reversals: why is there this disjunction between ranks established as givers and those established as receivers? This is a question that will occupy us for a number of pages below. But before we turn to the analysis of these materials let us complete the harvest, and look at one of the media in more detail, and some others in addition.

If we take V giving and examine it in detail we soon find that we have been oversimplifying. Categorical V giving as we have treated it so far, is not in fact V giving absolutely irrespective of the age

of the addressee. Some high caste children are in fact addressed as T by some categories of lower caste adults. Note that this is not a matter of relative age between speaker and addressee: it is strictly a question of the addressee's absolute age in years. When a certain age threshold is reached, T address ceases, and V begins; the speaker may still be fifty years or more older than the addressee. What then is interesting is at what age addressees of certain castes pass the threshold into V giving for speakers of different castes. And this turns out to be a systematic variable dependent on the caste of speaker and addressee.

After a good deal of eliciting six basic thresholds were isolated. These were:

- (i) 0-V: A gives V to B if B is 0 age (i.e. from birth)
- (ii) 5-V: A gives V to B if B is 5 years old and over
- (iii) 15-V: A gives V to B if B is 15 and over
- (iv) 25-V: A gives V to B if B is 25 or over
- (v) P-V: A gives V to B (where B is a Brahman), only if B has been initiated into the priesthood (anywhere from age 12 to 25)
- (vi) M-V: A gives V to B if B is married

Now P-V and M-V are clearly social age grades while the other thresholds are phrased in terms of absolute age, regardless of social grade. This distinction may well be artificial, that is, it could be that in all cases what is really involved is some measures of social maturity of which age is a cardinal determinant. This is further suggested by the fact that there was some variation from informant to informant, so that while one member of a caste, in response to the question 'when do you begin to call a boy of caste X niinka?' would respond with 'at the age of five', another might reply 'at the age of seven'. In all

cases though, the relationship between the different categories of addressees remained constant, and so did the number of distinctions. It may well be (I think it likely) that 5-V really corresponds to the social age grade of viLeyaaTa piLLai (literally 'playing child', that is a dependent child), 15-V with puberty, 25-V with manhood (the period after which a male can no longer be called a paiyan, boy). This last social threshold is associated with marriage (although the threshold would be passed by a bachelor after about thirty in any case), and would clearly be different for girls who marry many years earlier than boys: unfortunately all my questions about these thresholds were phrased only in terms of male addressees, and I do not know how they extend to female addressees. However it should be stressed that my informants did not speak in terms of social grades, except in the cases of P-V and M-V, but rather spoke consistently in terms of actual age, and it should also be remembered that actual age is definitely utilized in our third T/V medium REL and cannot be ruled out here. Consequently we shall continue to use the idiom that informants do. The only substantial difference that the reduction of age grades to social grades would make it that M-V might then be equivalent to 25-V, and (more problematically) P-V to 15-V. But in fact this would have no substantial bearing on the analysis that follows, and rank orders would not be changed.

How are we to treat these six thresholds? As defining six distinct media? Or as a single medium with a sliding valuation? The second must be the correct treatment, for to treat each threshold-V separately would be to ignore the transitive patterning between them. For if we turn to Matrix VI we see that these different thresh-

Matrix VI: Thresholds for V giving.

	1	2	3	7a	5	6	4	7b	8	9	10	11	13	14	17	16	18
[M] column gives V to row if latter is married					M	M	M	P	5	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2								5	5	5	5	0	0	0	0	0
	5								5	5	5	5	0	0	0	0	0
[P] column gives V to row if latter is a priest	3										25	15	0	0	0	0	0
	6										25	15	0	0	0	0	0
	4										25	15	0	0	0	0	0
[O] column gives V to row from latter's birth (zero years)	7a										25	15	0	0	0	0	0
	7b										25	15	0	0	0	0	0
	8											15	15	0	0	0	0
[5] column gives V to row from 5 years old	9											15	15	0	0	0	0
	10												15	15	0	0	0
[15] column gives V to row from 15 years old	11												15	15	0	0	0
	13														0	0	0
	14															0	0
	17																
[25] column gives V to row from 25 years old	16																
	18																

olds are extremely systematically distributed. The basic pattern is that the lower the caste, not only the more V is used in general, but also the lower the age thresholds for V use become. And this corresponds with the intuition that derives from the valuation of V: since to give V is to admit inferiority of caste rank by giving V to all members of another caste, to withhold V till the addressee is 5, 15 or 25 is to progressively diminish the respect in which the other caste is held. Conversely, the more unconditional the use of V (culminating in 0-V) the more respect is given.

On these grounds then it seems plausible that, in the eyes of members, the lower the age threshold at which caste A begins to V members of B, the higher the rank of B. We can then rank the values of the six kinds of V giving, in order already presented from (i) (vi). We place P-V after 25-V because this social threshold can be achieved as late as 25, but in addition need not ever be achieved at all (although in the great majority of cases it is). Similarly M-V is a social threshold that can occur well after the age of 25: indeed males often seem to marry in the years immediately after that (cf. Beck 1972:230). We place M-V after P-V because in general for Brahmins, marriage would occur after the passage into priesthood: it thus seems to represent a lower threshold. Let us assign decreasing unit-scores as values for each of these ranked types of V:

0-V	6 units
5-V	5 units
15-V	4 units
25-V	3 units
P-V	2 units
M-V	1 unit

In this way we can reflect the fact that receiving 0-V is more highly valued than receiving 5-V, 5-V than 15-V, and so on. What we have done in fact is discover that there are degrees of categorical V from absolute (0-V) to adults-only (25-V), and beyond to social maturity (M-V). It might be that a yet finer grained analysis would break down our six types of V still further, suggesting an ordered continuum of V types matching an underlying continuum of rank. However, if these six types are all anchored in fact to social age grades, as I suspect, then there will in fact be a small set of distinct types.

It is worth mentioning here that my attempts to break down T giving in a similar way were unsuccessful: informants were on the whole insistent that if one gave seniors of another caste T then one gave even very much older persons of that caste T too. There were though just some exceptions to this on the upper-caste/lower-caste borderline. Thus not all members of caste 7b received strict REL from members of five; those members of 7b who were poor and uninfluential might receive T from junior members of five until these members of 7b reached the dignified age of sixty or so. Here then is a cell that is claimed to be in general REL in the initial matrix, but on closer examination seems to be REL for the upper class members of 7b only, and Under-sixty-T for lower class members of 7b. We shall treat this phenomenon as a reclassification of REL in relation to the personal achieved attributes of members of 7b (here negative attributes: dependence, sloth, etc.) but we admit that this obscures some similarity between varying thresholds for T usage and varying thresholds for V usage.

This breakdown into thresholds for usage may suggest that categorical V is really a 'sociolinguistic variable' in the sense of

Labov (1972). From the point of view of a population of users V would indeed have a statistical distribution, members of say caste 8 using V to a particular child of actual age five with say probability 0.8. But from the point of view of an individual speaker, the perspective we here espouse, the addressee would receive V or T just 100% of the time providing contextual reclassifications of the kind detailed in Chapter II are not called into play. This suggests that the Labovian framework arises out of a basic confusion of the two viewpoints, and consequently a conflation of generalizations across populations with generalizations across instances of a single speaker's usage. Methodologically these are quite distinct kinds of generalization, and one cannot make certain inferences from usage by a population to the criteria of usage for individuals. Inferences in the reverse direction may however be made, as we have just done.

To return to the analysis Matrix VII assigns scores to each cell in the area of each distinct type of V usage, on the basis of the ranked unit-scores above. A caste's score as a receiver is here a sum of the unit-scores for each cell in its row, while a caste's score as a giver is the sum of the unit-scores for each cell in its column. So for instance caste 1 (Brahmans) has a receiving score of

$$(1 \times 3) + (2 \times 1) + (5 \times 3) + (6 \times 6) = +56$$

and a giving score of zero.

From the summed scores we may extract the following linear representations of rank for giving and receiving as in Figure 4.9:

Matrix VII: Scored thresholds for V giving.

positive receiving scores

	1	2	3	7a	5	6	4	7b	8	9	10	11	13	14	17	16	18	
1 M-V, assigned unit score 1 per cell					1	1	1	2	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	56
2 P-V, assigned unit score 2 per cell									5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	50
3 25-V, assigned unit score 3 per cell									5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	50
4 15-V, assigned unit score 4 per cell												3	4	6	6	6	6	31
5 5-V, assigned unit score 5 per cell												3	4	6	6	6	6	31
6 0-V, assigned unit score 6 per cell												3	4	6	6	6	6	31
negative giving scores	0	0	0	0	0	-1	-1	-2	-15	-15	-15	-31	-54	-64	-84	-84	-84	

Figure 4.9 Ranks by thresholds for V-usage

<u>Rank as receivers</u>			<u>Rank as givers</u>	
caste	score	<u>highest rank</u>	caste	score
1	+56		1	0
—			2	0
2	+50		3	0
5	+50		7a	0
—			—	
3	+31		5	-1
6	+31		6	-1
4	+31		4	-1
7a	+31		—	
7b	+31		7b	-2
—			—	
8	+26		8	-15
9	+26		9	-15
10	+26		10	-15
11	+26		—	
—			11	-31
13	+18		—	
14	+18		13	-54
—			—	
17	0		14	-64
16	0		—	
18	0	<u>lowest rank</u>	17	-84
			16	-84
			18	-86

Note that the rank orders established in Figure 4.9 on the two dimensions of giving and receiving are not consistent with each other. On the other hand each is completely consistent with the rank orders already established on its own dimension (giving or receiving), as we shall see in a moment. Note too that visually from the matrices one may observe that the diminishing thresholds are entirely consistent

with the rank established on the basis of the first gross (unbroken-down) analysis of V.

Let us now gather together all the evidence on caste ranking that has been collected here. Figure 4.10 provides a simple visual array of the data. We can see that threshold-V distinctions add two differently located cuts on the giving dimension, but none on the receiving. Since within each dimension ranks established are overwhelmingly consistent, we may add the distinctions together to achieve an overall ranking that slices the caste hierarchy finely into 11 blocs of rank-status on the summed giving dimensions, and 9 blocs on the summed receiving dimensions.

We may note in passing that such a fine discrimination of ranks within the caste hierarchy in oolappaalaiyam is not achieved by the analysis of food transactions. For instance, curd-giving chops the hierarchy into 9 blocs, summing the distinctions in curd and rice giving achieves no further discriminations, while ranks as receivers of curd and rice together only sum to 8 distinctions (Beck 1972, Figure 4.8 and 4.9). It may be noted that the maximum number of discriminations in any one transactional medium (excluding therefore ranks by opinion poll) reported from Indian material seems to be nine, a figure reached by Marriott's pakka food transactions (Marriott 1967), and Beck's curd transactions (Beck 1972). (Marriott though sums his food transaction discriminations to reach twelve distinctions among 24 castes.) It appears from this that linguistic media are finer discriminators than any other media. Nevertheless there does seem to be some limit to the number of rank blocs that are discriminated in any one medium, and it may be that this represents some basic cognitive limit on routine

Figure 4.10 Summary of derived ranks


<u>Rank as givers</u>			<u>Rank as receivers</u>		
T	V	Threshold-V	T	V	Threshold-V
1	1	1	1	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
2	2	2	2	2	2
3	3	3	5	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>
7a	<u>7a</u>	<u>7a</u>	3	3	3
5	5	5	6	6	6
6	6	6	4	4	4
4	4	<u>4</u>	7a	7a	7a
<u>7b</u>	<u>7b</u>	<u>7b</u>	<u>7b</u>	<u>7b</u>	<u>7b</u>
11	8	8	<u>8</u>	8	8
<u>8</u>	9	9	<u>9</u>	9	9
<u>9</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>10</u>	10	10	10
<u>10</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>11</u>
13	13	<u>13</u>	13	13	13
<u>14</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>14</u>
<u>17</u>	17	17	17	17	17
16	16	16	<u>16</u>	16	16
18	18	18	18	18	18
Summed rank distinctions			Summed rank distinctions		
	1			<u>1</u>	
	2			2	
	3			<u>5</u>	
	<u>7a</u>			3	
	5			6	
	6			4	
	<u>4</u>	<u>Overall rank</u>		7a	<u>Overall rank</u>
	<u>7b</u>	<u>as givers</u>		<u>7b</u>	<u>as receivers</u>
	<u>8</u> (11)			<u>8</u>	
	<u>9</u>			<u>9</u>	
	<u>10</u>			10	
	<u>11</u>			<u>11</u>	
	<u>13</u>			13	
	<u>14</u>			<u>14</u>	
	<u>17</u>			17	
	16			<u>16</u>	
	18			18	

perceptual discriminations along the lines of Miller's 'magical number 7+2' (Miller 1956).

We are now in a position to reassemble all our data on intercaste T/V usage into a single, largely scaled, matrix. From Figure 4.10 we know that all the derived rank scales as receivers are consistent and establish an overall hierarchy in the receiving dimension. We also know that all the scales as givers are in agreement, except for the ambiguous position of 11 in the giving dimension. So we can take these two overall ranks as our axes for a combined matrix that will scale perfectly on the two distinct dimensions except for caste 11's transactions. The combined matrix is presented as Matrix VIII, and it encapsulates all our information on inter-caste T/V usage. Note that we know that REL (relative age T/V) must scale appropriately because being the residual option it has to fill the geometrical space between T and V usage. Simply for readability we will omit the facts about V-threshold variability from this matrix, which we will now designate the basic matrix.

We are able to combine all these facts into a single almost-scaled matrix in part because of the two dimensional matrix format introduced by Marriott(1974), which utilizes both axes (here giving and receiving dimensions) to establish independent scales. We cannot use Beck's 1972 double-matrix format here, designed to retain geometrical representations of rank, as this requires that allowances are made for self-reciprocal cells in each medium (which would then impinge into the other media represented on the same matrix). In using Marriott's 1974 format we therefore fall back implicitly on a scoring rather than a geometrical method, but in any case the two are inherently linked. Note that now

Matrix VIII: The basic matrix



the self-reciprocal cells are somewhat displaced from the diagonal - and following Marriott (1974) we shall make some capital out of this very displacement.

But the major reason that we are able to combine all these facts into a single almost-scaled matrix is that there is an overwhelming consistency and agreement between the different ranking scales. This need not have been the case: T giving and V giving though mutually exclusive could have established grossly inconsistent ranking scales, because the existence of the third basic option (REL) ensures that the scales are not inter-inferable. Not only are the bulk of transactions in all media consistent and/or redundant, but where intransitivities of rank in different scales do occur, they occur together consistently on the giving versus the receiving dimension. And this can be accommodated in our two dimensional matrix. There is only one set of anomalous facts, namely caste 11's column which will not scale with the rest, to remind us that we are really dealing with potentially independent media. It is caste 11's behaviour that requires that the qualification 'almost-scaled' be used to describe the basic matrix.

Let us now summarize our results. We find that no media are totally redundant, but are rather additive of rank discriminations. Taking all media and the scales extracted from them together, we find that there is a very high level of agreement between these independent measures of rank: the details - which constitute our major results - are these:

- (i) all rank orders established on the basis of receiving are absolutely consistent

(ii) all rank orders established on the basis of giving are consistent - with the exception of the ambiguous position of caste 11

(iii) giving scales are NOT consistent with receiving scales.

The source of the disagreement between the receiving and giving dimensions is essentially an ambiguity about the relative ranking of castes 3 and 7a vis-a-vis caste 5. For on the giving dimension 3 and 7a rank higher than 5, whereas on the receiving dimension 5 ranks higher than 3 and 7a. In addition in the T medium, but only there, caste 11's rank as a giver places it in the third rank-bloc above 13, while 11's rank as a receiver places it only one rank-bloc immediately above 13.

Given the very high degree of consistency in rank between media, these inconsistencies take on an importance. Why do these particular ones exist? What is it that while capable of generating such a remarkably uniform recognition of hierarchy fails to regiment these particular castes? An investigation into these key cases may illuminate the nature of inter-caste relations in general. Before proceeding to an analysis of these rank disjunctions and inconsistencies, let us see to what extent these patterns are discernible in other kinds of data.

4.3.2.3 Some additional media: honorifics and dishonorifics In this section we look at some further data, namely five socially deictic linguistic elements not yet considered (except in theoretical terms in Chapter II). These elements are not all the same sort of linguistic item at all: two of them are negatively valued addressee-honorifics (in the strict sense used in Chapter II), one of them is a super-honorific V pronoun formed by a person-number switch in the pronominal

paradigm, and two of them are honorific titles of address. These classes obviously have very different roles in the linguistic system, and different syntactic and semantic properties, and very distinct pragmatic functions. Some details follow. (Further largely consonant remarks on some of these forms can be found in Beck 1972:292).

(i) ppaa

This particle is clearly (informants agreed) derived from the word for the kinship category that includes father, father's brothers etc., namely appaa. Now appaa is also used as a generic title of address, where it can be mildly honorific (see section 4.4 below). But the contracted form ppaa has definite dishonorific functions, and behaves differently syntactically. For example consider the following:

(1) appaa vaanka

'father' come-V

(2) *ppaa vaanka

(3) *ppaa vaa

Here (1) is grammatical and socially comprehensible: it might be used to a somewhat older respected member of one's own caste or one close in rank. On the other hand (2) is ungrammatical and makes no social sense: for the contracted form, ppaa, is dishonorific and pragmatically contradicts the V-honorific. But it is also ungrammatical as (3) shows, where vaa (come-T) removes the pragmatic contradiction, but is unacceptable (without internal pause) because ppaa is not a free form with sentence initial potentiality except as a summons or call.

Unlike appaa which is a basic noun with vocative usages, ppaa is not an NP at all, but rather a particle like nka which does not belong to any of the major syntactic categories (and in current terms is almost

certainly not represented in 'deep structure' at all but is rather transformationally introduced by a context sensitive rule). Particle ppaa typically occurs in syntactic slots like the following:

- (4) vaappaa
come-T ppaa
- (5) eenppaa
why-ppaa
- (6) illeppa
no-ppaa
- (7) nii poo jaakariteppaa!
you go carefully-ppaa!

where it favours second position and last position in a sentence; but like nka it is not restricted to these and is extremely freely distributed. Its socially deictic content (which is the only content that it has) conventionally implicates that the addressee is in a distinctly socially inferior role or rank than the speaker, but not in the lowest such social rank: it carries connotations of condescending paternalistic speaker-superiority. In intra-caste usage it is typically used to youths by older men, being sex-linked by virtue of its derivation from a male kin term. The parallel female kin term ammaa (M, MZ, etc.) gives rise to the particle mmaa which is used by female speakers to female addressees in much the same way that males use ppaa to one another. But whereas women in positions of power or prestige use ppaa in much the same way as their husbands, mmaa is very guardedly used by men: there are very strict constraints on the use of dishonorifics by men to women of an interesting sort. These constraints may somehow be related to the asymmetry already observed in reference honorifics

(Chapter II) where avaanka (they) used of a singular woman is less honorific than when used of a singular man. In any case here, and in the case of the female version of Taa below, the dishonorific mmaa is considerably more rude and presupposes a greater social rank disparity between speaker and addressee than dishonorific ppaa (possibly because there is an implied intimacy - the condescension mentioned above - with potential sexual connotations). Because of these differences, we consider only the male-addressee particle ppaa here.

Turning to the distribution of inter-caste usage of ppaa, Matrix IX provides the details. In the matrix, following informants, we distinguish four grades of ppaa giving:

- (i) 'categorical' ppaa: where all members of caste A can give ppaa to all members of caste B, irrespective of the age (or other personal attributes) of the addressee
- (ii) REL-ppaa: where all members of caste A can give ppaa to all members of caste B provided that the speaker is older in years than the addressee
- (iii) (Under) 15-ppaa: where all members of caste A can give ppaa to all members of caste B who are under the age of fifteen
- (iv) zero-ppaa: where under no circumstances can a member of caste A give ppaa to a member of caste B.


These are differently valued and ranked in value just as was the case with threshold-V giving: to capture this we may differentially score them as follows:

	<u>Giving</u>	<u>Receiving</u>
(i) 'categorical' <u>ppaa</u>	+3	-3
(ii) REL- <u>ppaa</u>	+2	-2
(iii) 15- <u>ppaa</u>	+1	-1
(iv) zero- <u>ppaa</u>	0	0

This valuation (as a relative scale) is readily elicited from members, and accounts for inferences about rank that members are able to make on the basis of observed ppaa usage. The scores computed on the basis of this numerical assignment are indicated in Matrix IX, while the derived ranks on the two dimensions of giving and receiving are presented in Figure 4.11.

Figure 4.11 Ranks derived from ppaa usage

As givers	As receivers
<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
5	<u>5</u>
<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>
<u>4</u>	3
<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>
7a	7a
<u>7b</u>	<u>7b</u>
<u>8</u>	8
9	<u>9</u>
<u>10</u>	<u>10</u>
<u>11</u>	<u>11</u>
13	13
<u>14</u>	<u>14</u>
<u>17</u>	<u>17</u>
16	16
18	18



(ii) Taa and Teey

We consider these two particles together because they have the same social distribution, and syntactically may plausibly be considered suppletive forms in complimentary distribution. For Taa has a syntactic distribution similar to ppaa, but unlike ppaa does not double as a summons or call form. The complimentary call form, which we may gloss roughly as 'hey boy!' is Teey. Taa typically occurs in syntactic slots like the following:

(8) vaaTaa!

come-T-Taa

(9) eenTaa

why-Taa

(10) enke-Taa pooree?

where-Taa are you going?

but not

(11) *Taavaa

Taa come-T

(12) *nii poo jaakariteTaa

you go carefully-Taa

(13) *ille-Taa

no-Taa

The distribution of Taa is similar then to ppaa but more restricted. (It would be nice if it could be shown that these restrictions follow from differences in pragmatic function, but I am unable to do this at present.)

The communicative significance of Taa is absolutely limited to its socially deictic elements. It does not have any clear etymological

source, unlike ppaa, but given that Tamil has a developed sound-symbolism (in reduplications, echo-words, onomatopoeic forms - see Sangster 1968) and that Taa and Teey are the only non-loan words violating the morpheme structure condition proscribing initial retroflex consonants, it seems likely that these forms are chosen for the natural symbolism of their 'hard', 'sharp' phonetic qualities. It would not be purely figurative to say that on a still day in harvest time, when labour is being extensively dragooned, one can stand at a great distance from the fields and hear only two words wafting over the thorn hedges: Taa and Teey. In any case these sharp phonetic qualities are entirely in line with the conventional implicatures: the speaker is implicated to be in a superior social rank to the addressee, the status-differential is implicated to be great - to the point that S has extreme power over H and his present actions. There is a further connotation of Taa and Teey, which does not always hold, that the speaker is angry or irritated with, or despises, the addressee. It is this typical connotation that makes this form potentially extremely rude. Nevertheless it can be used (although less standardly) with neutral effect simply as a call or emphatic particle, presuming a great status-differential. The reason for the connotation of hostile or negative affect is probably this: since these forms are (like titles of address) never syntactically obligatory in a sentence (and have no conceptual rule to play in logical form), any sentence with them will be equally well formed without them, and since not all (or even very many) sentences that could (by virtue of the special contexts of their utterance) appropriately have these forms within them do so have them, when a sentence does include

them it becomes a matter of pragmatic relevance why it does. Asking why this particular utterance now has a reminder of social inferiority in it leads to the recipient's search for a motive for such a reminder, and since one good motive for putting someone down is that you are angry with them, that is a possible source for this particular occurrence. Speakers can predictively replicate this interactive reasoning, and so effectively communicate their negative attitudes. However where some other motive of a functional communicative sort can be reasonably inferred then this seems to take precedence: for instance there is only a small set of summons forms and Teey may be the only socially appropriate form in some context, or between two or more potential addressees of different rank Taa can be used to single out the lower status one as the recipient of some particular message. In such cases the forms will be read as affect-neutral.

As with ppaa, there is a parallel form Tii or rii used exclusively to female addressees. When used by a female speaker to a female addressee, the properties (both social and linguistic) of Tii/rii closely parallel Taa as used between males. Thus it occurs between a mother and her non-mature daughter, but not I think as freely as between a man and his son. On the other hand use by a male to a female addressee implicates a much greater power differential and is much more likely to be highly offensive. Consequently cross-caste usage is extremely restricted, and the only cases collected were between a squire-class member of caste 5 and some errant Harijan girls who were supposed to be doing agricultural labour for him. The restrictions on usage seem to derive from the fact that Tii carries definite sexual overtones (much clearer than those possibly involved in constraints on the use

of mmaa). In the case of a dyad formed by a male caste 5 member and a female Harijan such sexual overtones are perhaps not altogether inappropriate: villagers maintain that members of the squire class assert seigniorial rights over nubile Harijan girls who work on their estates.

The matrix that follows provides the details of inter-caste usage of Taa/Teey. Apart from a complete taboo on usage between some dyads, and a one-way general usage in others, there was also a third distinct pattern of usage to juniors only - in this case boys under fifteen or so. The three patterns then are these:

- (i) zero-Taa: where members of caste A never say Taa to members of caste B (and there is a sanctioned taboo on such usage)
- (ii) 15-Taa: where members of caste A give Taa to junior members of caste B only, and members cease to be junior at the age of fifteen
- (iii) 'categorical' Taa; where members of caste A can give Taa to members of caste B irrespective of the age (or other personal characteristics of the addressee).

To capture the different values of these usages, we can provide the following differential scoring:

	<u>Giving</u>	<u>Receiving</u>
(i) zero- <u>Taa</u> :	0	0
(ii) 15- <u>Taa</u> :	+1	-1
(iii) categorical <u>Taa</u> :	+2	-2

All these scorings represent is that giving categorical-Taa is rank maximizing, receiving ^{it} rank minimizing; that ^{it} is better to give categorical Taa than 15-Taa, and 15-Taa than zero-Taa, from the point of view

of rank minimization, and so on.

The overall scores for each caste's givings and receivings are indicated on the axes of the matrix, and the derived ranks in Figure 4.12. Note that ranks on the giving and the receiving dimension do not agree exactly.


Figure 4.12 Ranks derived from Taa usage

<u>Givers</u>	<u>Receivers</u>
1	<u>1</u>
<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>
<u>3</u>	4
7a	7a
6	<u>7b</u>
4	3
<u>7b</u>	<u>6</u>
8	8
<u>9</u>	9
<u>10</u>	10
<u>11</u>	<u>11</u>
13	13
<u>14</u>	<u>14</u>
<u>17</u>	<u>17</u>
16	16
18	18

(iii) naam

This form, with oblique case stem namn and genitive namma, is the first person plural inclusive personal pronoun. But (as discussed in Chapter II) it is also used as a second person singular pronoun to very elevated addressees. It is this special usage that we are inter-

Matrix X: The usage of Taa/Teey.



ested in here. We have already explored its rational origins, and described its linguistic properties. Syntactically it behaves like any polite plural pronoun, commanding the agreement of verbal but not nominal predicates: the agreeing suffixes take the first person plural inclusive form even when the referent is second person singular.

Polite usages are pragmatically disambiguated readily enough, as in

(14) *namukku talevaleyunkaLaa?*

to us-inclusive is there a headache sir?

or simply by virtue of the social context.

The use of naam confers considerably more respect and honour on the addressee than the use of niinka the standard V pronoun. There are some persons in high office (the paTTakaararkaL) who are only addressed in this way. During elicitation some members of low (Harijan) castes claimed to use naam and never niinka to all members of three high castes (1, 2 and 5) but this fact did not enter our consideration of basic T/V usage (where three exhaustive options were claimed to operate) because tape recordings revealed it to be false. Nevertheless naam usage in certain inter-caste dyads is extremely frequent and general. But in these dyads it still seems to be an outcome of one of the re-classification processes described in Chapter II: in Harijan highest castes dyads the reclassification tends to be based on the relatively stable personal rank-attributes of the high caste addressees, while in dyads with less extreme status differentials redress for impositions and the like (FTA's in the parlance of Brown and Levinson 1977) is a more common source of niinka to naam switching. (To illustrate the last point: a member of caste 14 volunteered that he only used naam to members of caste 8 when asking for a favour or apologizing for a

mistake.) Nevertheless despite these variabilities and various triggers for usage, the social distribution of naam usage is extremely systematic: for an ego there are some castes to whom he would never use naam, and other castes to whose exceptionally powerful or influential members he would always use naam; in addition there may be some other castes whose members may very generally receive naam, and some other castes whose members will receive naam only if ego has perforce to do an FTA to them. These different usages provide the basis for the classification used in the matrix below.

Patterns of inter-caste naam usage are considerably different on fine analysis from patterns of, say, V (niinka) usage. The T and V forms form a basic set of alternates from which one or the other must be routinely usable to a particular addressee. The criteria for use consist of caste membership alone or caste membership and relative age (and on the finer analysis of V thresholds, of caste membership and absolute age of addressee). But the criteria for naam use are quite different: first a basic V usage to the addressee is a necessary but not sufficient condition for usability; secondly the criteria that makes up sufficiency are personal (rather than group) attributes of the addressee, or ephemeral conversational intentions: naam is essentially a mode of address that is switched into from the more basic niinka. Different patterns of naam usage then, beyond the simple dichotomy 'sometimes used by A to B'/'never used by A to B', have to do with different criteria for switching from niinka to naam. The following basic patterns were observed:

- (i) zero-use: if A never gives naam to B (where A and B are caste-groups) then A positively avoids granting that B is highly superior to A

- (ii) use to powerful only: if members of A give naam only to some particular members of B, namely those who hold high power, then A does not grant that all members of B are superior to members of A
- (iii) FTA use: if members of A may all on some particular occasion give naam to any member of B, typically for the purposes of softening a 'face threatening act' (FTA), but do not routinely use naam to members of B outside FTA contexts, then A does admit the qualified high superiority of B
- (iv) standard use: if members of A routinely use naam to members of B, not necessarily within FTA contexts, and although the particular choice may be based on the personal rank-attributes of the addressee most adult members of B fall into the category with such rank attributes, then A fully grants the great rank-superiority of B over A.

Although the distinction here between (ii) and (iv) is not perhaps theoretically clear it is very clear in practice. For the kind of rank-attributes involved in (ii) are positions of extreme dominance: household heads of the squire class have the power of petty rajas, and monopolize the offices of governmental executive power; while the household head of the single family of caste 2 in oolappaaLaiyam holds by tradition the office of village accountant, which wins him the power backing of those with vested interests in land. These are in fact the only two rank-attributes relevant to type (ii) naam usage. Type (iv), 'standard use' of naam, is the very general use to adult competent addressees of some particular caste who are respectable, industrious and economically well founded individuals. Thus in

maataari-kavuNTaar dyads, (where members of caste 18 are speaking to members of 5) I would estimate that perhaps 50% of the higher caste individual adult males would expect a stable naam usage from the lower caste persons. In FTA contexts this expectation might increase to perhaps 80% of the upper caste men. But the point really is simply that very ordinary kinds of persons can expect type (iv) naam usage, but only the holders of traditional high authority can expect type (ii) usage.

Given these distinctions we may differentially value them in proportion to the extent to which their receipt measures the addressee's superiority over the speaker. Assigning some arbitrary numerical values:

	<u>Giving</u>	<u>Receiving</u>
(i) <u>zero-use</u>	0	0
(ii) <u>powerful only</u>	-1	+1
(iii) <u>FTA use</u>	-2	+2
(iv) <u>standard use</u>	-3	+3

On this basis we can represent the distribution of usage as in Matrix XI, and we can compute the scores for each caste on the two dimensions (giving and receiving) and derive ranks as in Figure 4.13.




Figure 4.13 Ranks derived from naam usage

As givers	As receivers
1	<u>5</u>
2	<u>1</u>
3	<u>2</u>
7a	3
<u>5</u>	6
8	4
<u>4</u>	7a
7b	7b
8	<u>8</u>
<u>9</u>	9
<u>10</u>	10
<u>11</u>	11
13	13
<u>14</u>	<u>14</u>
17	17
16	16
18	18

(iv) saami

saami is the most used generic word for God. It is also a term used in reference to Brahmins. Thus the sentence saamikki pooyTTeen, 'I went to saami', could mean equally 'I went to (see) the Brahman' and 'I went to (worship) the God'. But in the village Tamil at any rate these are the only two usages as terms of third party reference, except as an affectionate irony about a child.

However it is also used as a title of address, and here its image is potentially much broader. For it is used not only to address Gods and Brahmins, but also by low caste members to address members of various

other higher castes. As with all titles of address, their usage is not obligatory in all utterances even when in some particular dyad they are potentially usable or indeed expected. The occurrence of saami in some particular utterance then becomes pragmatically significant; given that it has certain discourse functions, where these are clearly being served those functions will be understood to be the motives for its use. For instance saami functions as a (polite, but not necessarily optional) summons form and attention-getter, so that when occurring exchange-initially that will be understood to be the reason for its usage. Similarly, where in English we use 'yes' to signal agreeing or understanding while monitoring the other's talk in conversation, in village Tamil one uses a title of address to high rank superiors amongst other devices. A respect-ordering of these would go roughly:

saami

seerink (roughly, 'O.K. sir')

seeri (roughly, 'O.K.')

mm (nasal grunt: informal)

where saami is the most respectful, mm the least, and usage is based mostly on relatively enduring aspects of alter's status, namely caste, class and office.

However where saami occurs in a locus where it does not clearly fulfil any of these communicative (discourse organizing) functions, it will be read as a prelude to, or a redressive signal about, some FTA. Thus it occurs typically in requests, excuses, interruption-sequences, pleas, protestations of innocence and such like in the tapes collected.

Nevertheless these complications in usage need not concern us here, because for members the important fact is whether some particular caste ever in any circumstances uses saami to some other particular caste. For except in its use to Brahmans where the religious connotations are perhaps still dominant, its usage is a marker of extreme abasement. A member of caste 7a would not be caught dead saying it to a member of caste 3, or members of 11 to those of 8. But significantly Harijans are obliged to use it to the very lowest touchable castes.²⁹

Turning to the social distribution of saami, there is little significant patterning in inter-caste usage beyond the simple dichotomy (a) members of caste A may on occasion give saami to members of B or (b) members of caste A never give saami to members of A. For only two inter-caste dyads did I collect any further discriminations: members of caste 11 claim to give saami only to authority-endowed members of 5 and 2, but in actual fact their usage is broader than this. For the purposes of matrix presentation we may restrict ourselves to the 'do give'/'don't give' dichotomy without much loss of precision. We may score these behaviours as follows to capture the different values of giving and not-giving saami (although with such binary values scoring has little point, ranks being readily determined geometrically):

	<u>Giving</u>	<u>Receiving</u>
(i) use of <u>saami</u>	-1	+1
(ii) zero use of <u>saami</u>	0	0

The full range of inter-caste usage is displayed in the matrix that follows, and the derivable ranks are listed in Figure 4.14. Note that these derived ranks do not show the very different sorts of scores that

underlie rank-bloc divisions: for instance (and especially) castes 17, 16, 18 receive massive deficit scores as givers, and caste 1 receives a massive and unique positive score as a receiver.

Figure 4.14 Ranks derived from saami usage

As givers	As receivers
<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
2	2
3	<u>2</u>
7a	3
5	6
6	4
4	7a
7b	7b
8	8
9	9
<u>10</u>	10
11	11
13	13
<u>14</u>	<u>14</u>
17	17
16	16
18	18

(v) esamaanka

The term esamaanka is composed of esamaan or ejamaan plus honorific nka: since esamaanka is used both in address and reference nka either has two distinct sources (as is possible) as a third person plural respect marker, and the now distinct addressee honorific nka, or as is more likely, the form is simply frozen. The stem ejamaan is of Sanskrit origin, and is presumably the same root as the Hindi

term jajmaan, which refers to the recipient of traditional caste-based service relations (see Mandelbaum 1970 Vol.I:161-4). Just as in the North jajmaan typically refers to the members of the landed dominant castes that can afford to purchase these enduring service relations, so in the South esamaanka is a term generally restricted in use to or about landed members of the dominant caste. In oolappaaLaiyam this restricts usage to the squire class of the land monopolizing caste 5, with some extensions to non-squire landed members of 5, and a final extension by some speakers to members of 2, the other caste whose power is based on land - in this case by the traditional control of land taxes.

Linguistically esamaanka behaves very similarly to saami. We are interested here only in its role as a title of address, and not as a term of reference to third persons where it behaves like any NP. Possibly some of the conversational functions of esamaanka are more restricted than those of saami, but this does not concern us here.

The inter-caste usage of esamaanka is restricted to addressees of caste 5 and caste 2. The interesting patterns are then whether caste A gives esamaanka to both or only one, and under what circumstances a particular member of caste 5 or 2 is considered worthy of the title. Taking caste 5 first, there are here I think, three basic kinds of usage: potential usage to all male adults (more or less) of caste 5, usage to very powerful landed members of caste 5 only (usually only the traditional local squire families), and usage to the supreme titled aristocracy of caste 5 only (the paTTakaararkaL of konku naaTu see Beck 1972:40 ff). About the first kind of usage (potential usage to all members of caste 5): informants here varied as describing this as a possible usage to any respectable member of caste 5 or only to

some member of caste 5 who in some respect or other had actual power over the speaker in some tangible way. In fact the latter is probably the criteria for usage in all cases, but there do seem to be some consistent differences in the readiness with which members of a particular caste will give esamaanka to members of caste 5. These differences however seem to correlate more with intangibles like the self-image a caste espouses than with assessments of rank: thus for instance caste 16 (Paraiyar) gives (or claims to give) esamaanka more freely than 18 (Maataari), and this seems to reflect their projection of an image like the proverbial English butler's - competent dignified knowledgeable servants who know their place (in contrast to 18's image that is more close to the proverbial English apprentice's: happy-go-lucky characters who exploit their own rank-degradation). We include therefore this information in the Matrix XIII even if its value for rank inferences is not clearly relevant: 'G' marks the greater readiness to give, and a 'P' marks usage that claims to be only to those in positions of power over the speaker. These remarks hold equally for caste 2, although since only a single family is involved in oolappaaLaiyam 'P' here designates the family-head, office holder of the village accountancy. This is a position of considerable influence.

To represent these usages and their differential valuation, we may score them as follows:

	<u>Givers</u>	<u>Receivers</u>
(i) zero usage	0	0
(ii) only to <u>paTTakaarar</u>	-1	+1
(iii) only to squire class	-2	+2
(iv) general usage (P and G)	-3	+3

The scoring is designed to reflect^{that} the fact that the titled aristocrats of caste 5 receive esamaanka from other high castes boosts the status of caste 5 as a whole; but when more ordinary members of case 5 also receive the title (as in (iii) but even more in (iv)) then the status of caste 5 is boosted even more. Conversely the 'cost' of giving the title increases in the same direction: all castes give the title to the paTTakaarar, so that does not lower the relative status of givers except vis-a-vis caste 5, most castes give the title to the squire class of 5, but this does not lower the giver's status vis-a-vis those who do not give, while only the lowest castes give the title more generally thus lowering their status vis-a-vis the majority who do not use esamaanka in this fashion.

On this basis ranks can be extracted from Matrix XIII as displayed in Figure 4.15.

Figure 4.15 Ranks derived from esamaanka usage

As givers	As receivers
<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>
1	<u>2</u>
<u>2</u>	1
3	3
7a	7a
6	6
4	4
7b	7b
8	8
<u>9</u>	9
10	10
<u>11</u>	11
13	13
14	14
17	17
16	16
18	18

In Figure 4.16 we collect together all the rank orders established for the purposes of comparison. Data on these particular honorifics were collected partly just because they were very evident in daily interaction, but partly because some of them seemed to tap very different sources or dimensions of rank than food transactions or the basic T/V usage described above. I had originally the hunch that all five of these honorifics and dishonorifics had the special property of tapping a power dimension rather than a dimension of ritual status, or a more generalized overall social esteem.

Looking at Figure 4.16 I think one can see that as far as the dishonorifics ppaa and Taa are concerned I was just wrong: for no assessment of relative power or influence on 'objective' grounds (political office, economic clout, client-gang control) would produce the rank-scales that these two dishonorifics did. Rather the same sort of generalized esteem that probably lies behind T/V usage seems to operate with these. Unlike the T/V facts, though, there are no dramatic rank-reversals across the dimensions of giving and receiving. (The fortunes of caste 3 though show interesting ups and downs.) But in naam usage for the first time we find a scale that places caste 5, the dominant landed caste, in a position at the very top of the hierarchy. Here power as a determinant is clearly coming into play. This is even clearer in the case of esamaanka: not only is it a power-specialized title of address (only castes 5 and 2 receiving it) but caste 5 comes out top on the giving dimension too. saami is less clear: perhaps we have here really two senses of usage: literal application as a title of address to holy persons, and thus to Brahmins, and a metaphorical extension by lower caste speakers first to those castes with

Figure 4.16 Summary of derived ranks in additional media

<u>ppaa</u>		<u>Taa/Teey</u>		<u>naam</u>		<u>saami</u>		<u>esamaanka</u>	
Givers	Receivers	Givers	Receivers	Givers	Receivers	Givers	Receivers	Givers	Receivers
<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>
<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>
<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>
<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>7a</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>7a</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>
<u>4</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>7a</u>	<u>7a</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>
<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7b</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>
<u>7a</u>	<u>7a</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>7a</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>7a</u>	<u>7a</u>	<u>7a</u>
(<u>7b</u>)	<u>7b</u>	(<u>7b</u>)	<u>6</u>	<u>7b</u>	<u>7b</u>	<u>7b</u>	<u>7b</u>	<u>7b</u>	<u>7b</u>
<u>8</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>8</u>
<u>9</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>9</u>
<u>10</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>10</u>
<u>11</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>11</u>
<u>13</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>13</u>
<u>14</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>14</u>
<u>17</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>17</u>
<u>16</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>16</u>
<u>18</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>18</u>

a power base (2 and 5), and then to all the higher castes on the basis of touchable status. It could I think be cogently argued that scaled matrix representation is not appropriate for these specialized titles, but at least it draws out interesting facts about their social distribution.

4.3.3 Further inferences from overall patterns

4.3.3.0 Introductory remarks Let us review what we have done so far in this chapter. We have been arguing that given:

- (i) a set of facts about some specific kinds of behaviour between participants in an exhaustive set of dyads
- (ii) a valuation of the atomic components of such behaviour
- (iii) members' knowledge of the facts (i) and the valuation (ii)

then not only can we derive:

- (iv) a set of scales of rank

but also we know that

- (v) these scales are, at least potentially, inferred by members.

That is our argument to date. Our substantial results have been (iv) above, a derived set of caste-rankings. At the end of section 4.3.2.2, reviewing the results of the analysis of the T/V data, we concluded three major things: (a) there was an absolute consistency accross the two media on ranks established on the basis of receiving; (b) there was almost absolute consistency established on the giving dimension; (c) there were definite elements of disjunction between ranks established on receiving and those established on giving;

Now here, restricting ourselves initially to the T/V data, we ask: what futher inferences about the nature of this kind of behaviour, and

therefore about the nature of intercaste relationships, can we make on more-or-less purely internal grounds? As explained at the outset of this chapter, we are interested in pursuing an internal analysis (i.e. restricting the data, from which inferences are to be drawn, to the initial set of facts) partly simply because we wish to see how far we can get in the understanding of one society from a set of 272 simple facts, partly because it is a way of clamping down on the smuggling in of untested sociological presuppositions, and partly because it may help to reveal how important such linguistic media actually are in social life.

In this section we tackle three major questions:

- (1) Is T/V behaviour a competitive game, and the ranks obtained scores within that game, or is it rather a passive score board that simply reflects or symbolizes ranks obtained elsewhere (in say, ritual or politico-economic spheres)?
- (2) To what extent do the observable patterns of T/V behaviour indicate consensus about the caste hierarchy?
- (3) In so far as there is dissensus about ranking, why is there and what are its sources?

We take these questions in turn in each of the following sub-sections. We shall find that an answer to (3) cannot be found totally within an account of inter-caste relations concerned only with relative rank, and this will lead us on to the consideration of an entirely different dimension of inter-caste relations in section 4.4 below.

4.3.3.1 T/V behaviour: passive score board or competitive game? The patterns that we have collected could reflect one of two things: either they are determined essentially outside this linguistic arena altogether

For number sequence only.

3
2
1

and then simply reflect the ranks obtained in those other areas of social life (the 'score-board' interpretation), or they could represent the outcomes of a rank-maximizing competition that is actually played with T and V tokens to establish a rank-order of winners/losers within this linguistic arena (the 'competitive game' interpretation).

The leading proponent, and perhaps the originator, of the 'competitive game' interpretation is Marriott (1959, 1968, 1974). He talks about "inter-caste transactions in any kind of food in Kishan Garhi as a kind of tournament among the twenty-four teams which make up this village's society" (Marriott 1968:154) and of 'game-like scorings', 'victories and defeats' (ibid:155); and although he now combines a Schneiderian interpretation of the Hindi metaphysics of transactions, he still maintains that "the tournament-like 'total-prestational' models of exchange suggested by Mauss...and systematized by Homans...and Blau..... can all be shown to depict part of such Indian talk and action about rank fairly well" (Marriott 1974:7).

But this is not the only interpretation of inter-caste relations. Leach (1960:5-7) for instance, puts forward the thesis that one major distinction between class and caste systems is that whereas in class-systems competition is endemic, in caste systems it is - by definition - rigorously excluded; for the caste society is a system of inter-dependent units each of which is guaranteed exclusive monopolies. Much of what Dumont says may also be read as claiming that hierarchy is ascribed by the Hindu cultural tradition, not competitively derived, and that in so far as competition exists it occurs in a specially isolated arena of power relations - the Kshatriya varna, the domain of artha (Dumont 1972 (1966) but see also p.382). And his discussion

of Marriott (1959) indicates that at least in part he favours the 'score-board' interpretation (Dumont 1972:131). The issue then is live.

How can we decide between these two interpretations? Let us ask ourselves what consequences one would expect if indeed T/V or other transactional media like food-exchanges were truly competitive games. What game-like properties are there in the patterns that we have collected?

Informally, we may observe that there are some patterns of T/V behaviour that do seem indicative of the competitive orientation of caste-groups and of individuals. In the first case we have what we may call counter-moves, including retaliations and boycotts. A clear case of retaliative behaviour is provided by the T-exchanging patterns between caste 11 and the caste bloc formed of 8, 9 and 10. If we refer back to Matrix II, we can see that 8, 9 and 10 give T to 11, and 11 also gives T back to 8, 9 and 10. The anomalous character of this bold usage by 11 shows up clearly in the basic matrix (Matrix VIII), where it is the only set of facts that obstruct a fully scaled two dimensional composite matrix of all the types of T/V usage together. We have also noted that it is the only source of non-consistency in the giving dimensions (Figure 4.10). Not yet remarked upon is that it is also the only set of facts in the data that represent reciprocal T exchange. By the valuation in section 4.3.1, reciprocal T exchange establishes (more or less) equal rank. It might then indicate an island of inter-caste solidarity. However it is only in this T-giving that equality is asserted: on the other measures 8 and 9 at least are distinctly higher in rank than 11. Now given that the valuation

of T/V outcomes depends on a dyadic interaction, if caste A gives T to B, expecting to secure a V in exchange and thereby to assert A's superiority over B it is in fact open to B to frustrate this assertion simply by returning T instead of the hoped-for V. And given that 8 and 9, and to a lesser extent 10, are recognised to be higher than 11 (see their respective receiving scores in Figure 4.10), it seems that 8, 9 and 10 would have little or no motive for claiming solidarity, and thus a measure of equality from 11. In that case in giving T, they must have hoped for V, and our interpretation in terms of a plan by 11 to frustrate this assertion of relative rank seems justified. (The careful reader may spot an element of circularity in this argument - we seem to be presupposing competition in order to prove that this is an instance of competitive behaviour. If that is so, if we allow a momentary departure from our restriction to internal analysis we can readily show that 8, 9 and 10 do indeed consider 11 uppish, and 11 does indeed think it is as good or better than 8, 9 and 10: both parties openly express their indignation.) In short 11 is here acting competitively towards the other three castes: if they give T then 11 will give T back; if they extend the courtesy of REL, then 11 would probably reciprocate.

Absolute boycotts are not to be found in the T/V data. But boycotts in food-exchange media are widely reported, and are found in oolappaal-aiyam where Beck reports that the coolI aacaari (caste 3) and the koomuTTi ceTTiyaar (caste 4) are blacklisted so that as Givers they rank almost as low as untouchables: this in return for minimal (rank-maximizing) receiving (Beck 1972:164-167). Thus those who claim too high a rank can be effectively boycotted. In the T/V media as one can readily imagine this is more impractical: it would amount to avoiding

any second person pronouns in the verbal interaction that for one practical reason or another would be impossible to escape. Nevertheless, although no groups systematically maintain such pronominal boycotts, I know of at least three individual inter-caste dyads where precisely such non-usage is maintained. These have arisen in response to perceived violations of REL usage, or V usage or T usage. One case for instance concerns a fifty-five year old man of caste 9 (call him K.U.), and a forty-five year old man of caste 7a (call him O.S.S.). Referring to the basic matrix (Matrix VIII) one sees that the general expectation is that members of 7a give members of 9 T irrespective of their age, while members of 9 give 7a REL, that is T or V in relation to the relative age of speaker or addressee. By these norms K.U. can expect T from O.S.S., and O.S.S. can expect the same back, for he is younger than K.U. But as informants commented, O.S.S. doesn't want T back. O.S.S. is a successful merchant: he has the best cloth stall in the line of shops (kaTe viiti) along the trunk road outside oolappaaLaiyam, and in addition lends money at interest to many local farmers. He has also been the banker for some commercial ventures of various local squires (periya kavuNTaar families). In one way and another, without being especially popular, he has considerable influence in village affairs. Clearly O.S.S. has visions of social advancement, and since all other members of his caste in the hamlet are closely related to him, his visions extend to them as a body. In advancing himself he hopes to advance them. He remains obsequious to the dominant caste 5 - their patronage is the source of his influence - but he would like to detach himself (or so his behaviour seems to indicate) from those castes that straddle the upper-caste/lower-caste borderline,

namely 8, 9 and 10. If he could get these castes to give him V he would have gained their acknowledgment of his superiority.

In contrast K.U. is simply an industrious respected member of caste 9 who carries on the traditional trades of his caste with a small margin of profit, and maintains a tough self-respect. Although O.S.S. has let it be known that he expects more respect from K.U., K.U. will not bow to the pressures. He refuses to give V. But rather than give T (which might in any case risk measures from O.S.S.), K.U. as a measure of protest boycotts O.S.S. in pronominal usage: he uses neither T nor V nor any other second person form.

Faced with this protest by avoidance, O.S.S. has two rational strategies open to him: he may continue to T K.U., or he may likewise protest by avoidance. The only problem with continuing to T is that it would seem to be an acceptance of a situation that O.S.S. does not in fact accept: the usage might stabilize with K.U. giving zero pronouns, and O.S.S. giving T. The only problem with boycotting K.U. reciprocally is that it would establish a symmetrical usage of zero pronouns with the accompanying presupposition of rank-equality. Faced with the decision between these two equally unsatisfactory solutions, O.S.S. oscillates from one to the other. The whole affair is a matter of common knowledge and amusement to villagers (but I have the facts about the protagonist's attitudes from closer sources: K.U.'s son and O.S.S.'s nephew).

Despite pronominal boycott, there can be no boycott on verbal interaction: village affairs bring the two men together, and then the mechanics of second-person pronoun avoidance are of interest. Instead of saying:

(1) enkeyoo pooyiTTu vaariinka?

where have you-V returned from?

one says

(2) enkeyoo pooyiTTu vaaraappale irukkutaa?

is there as if there has been a going and coming?

or instead of

(3) santekki pooyiTTu vantiTTiinkaLaa?

have you-V returned from market?

one says

(4) santikki pooyiTTu vantaaccaa?

has there been a returning from the market?

and so on. The point is that impersonal phrasing makes T/V avoidance possible.

We have strayed from our self-imposed restrictions to internal analysis, but hope to have established the point that there are patterns visible both in the basic matrix and in the finer analysis of individual usage that are best interpreted as rational counter-moves, either retaliations or boycotts, to rank-maximizing moves by others in what is potentially a competitive game. When we turn to external evidence these interpretations can be shown to be substantiated.

Let us mention one other piece of evidence, external to the data in the matrices but already mentioned in Chapter II, that indicates a measure of competitive rank-maximization. This is the fact that there are situational variabilities, particularly in relation to the composition of the audience. Where such variations occur they most often occur in the direction of speaker-rank-maximization. For instance take a case where a male adult member of caste 8 is addressing a ten year old

boy of caste 5: the expectation here (as recorded in Matrix VII) is that the man will address the boy as V. And that expectation will be fulfilled wherever the audience includes persons who have a vested interest in the rank of caste 5 as a whole (e.g. the boy's parents, members of castes closely allied to 5, members of the other two highest castes, traditional servants of the boy's family, etc.). But outside those contexts, in the absence of any audience at all, or in the presence of members of caste 8 only, the man may feel free to use T to the boy. The interesting question then is why the man bothers to make his usage inconsistent, and one is inclined to the view that he would say T wherever he could and get away with it. Many other observations support such a view. No-one seems to be inclined to give more respect than they can get away with: they attempt to maximize their rank vis-a-vis others.


Returning now to the facts internal to the matrices, two general facts about them lend some support to the competitive view of caste relations. One of these is the basic asymmetry between ranks derived from success on giving dimensions and ranks derived from success on receiving dimensions. For one possible source of this asymmetry might turn out to be that the rank that any one caste claims (by a certain pattern of giving) is not necessarily accepted by the set of all the other castes with which it must transact (this acceptance being reflected in a certain pattern of receipts). Since we examine possible sources for this dissensus below (4.3.3.3) in detail, we may simply say here that if such a system of competitive claims is one possible source it cannot be the only one. For instance it might explain that whereas castes 3 and 7a do better than 5 as givers in

T/V media, when it comes to receipts there is a high level of consensus that 5 is higher than 3 and 7a (see Figure 4.10). However the assumption of competitive behaviour then makes 5's actions difficult to understand: why does it not challenge 3 and 7a on the giving dimension too? Other solutions are explored below.

The other general fact about the matrices that may lend credence to the 'competitive game' interpretation of inter-caste behaviour is the fact that the ranks, and especially the distinctions between rank blocs, are established with an apparent degree of independence in each medium. If all these behaviours were simply symbolic ratifications of a rank order established in some other medium, ritual, political or economic, then there seems no reason why they should be such erratic representations. In short, if these media are 'score-boards', why are they such poor ones? Not only are there discrepancies within T/V media (Figure 4.10), and within the other honorifics reviewed (Figure 4.16), but also between the facts in both arrays (compare Figures 4.10 and 4.16). Moreover, if we allow ourselves another glance outside our domain, such discrepancies occur in the local food transactions too: Figure 4.17 (derived from Beck 1972: Chapter IV) lines up linear representations of rank-orders derived from scaled matrices of food and service transactions. Lines connect castes with the most erratic fortunes across different media.

It is clear that if these media are score-boards of rank attained elsewhere, then they are not score-boards of the same external game. They must either be games within themselves, or be representations of rank in quite different social dimensions. It is this last interpretation that seems to be accepted by Beck; she argues that whereas the

Figure 4.17 Ranks on a variety of non-linguistic media (after Beck 1972)



ranks that are derivable from transactions in food "are heavily influenced by dietary and ritual ideals", the rank derivable from the offering of seats on informal occasions "comes as close as is possible to a scale of the relative power and dependence of the various sub-castes... on the kavuNTaar community" (Beck 1972:162). Two external dimensions then underlie the symbolic expressions in transactions: purity and power. Since there are more than two rank-scales symbolically expressed, one must then assume that these others are derived from such partial fusion, or algebraic combination, of positions established in the two basic external social dimensions. This at least allows for the fact that there might be competitive claims about which basic social dimension (purity or power) was most relevant to some particular symbolic display.

This interpretation of the transactional patterns is not easy to substantiate nor easy to falsify. One would like to be able to independently derive two ranking scales corresponding directly to the social dimensions of power and purity, and then see whether all observed transactional rankings can reasonably be viewed as lying somewhere in between these two ideal types, as partial compromises in various degrees to both. But in fact there is only one clear way that Indians measure purity, namely by transactional discrimination, Hindu actors having (as has been argued by Marriott 1974) as moral substance the sum of their dealings with the world. Even objective power, on a detailed search and survey, tends to evaporate into a large number of diffuse and different sources: political allegiances, connections to urban power structures, numbers of mobilizable kinsmen and retainers, economic clout, land control, etc. When we then ask

which of these criteria of power assessment are actually important to members, and which castes are actually generally judged to have power (thus actually acquiring it of course), we find ourselves inevitably turning back to look at behaviour in transactional media. And there is every indication that members also turn back: 'he's powerful (I know because) everyone bows low before him' is the sort of reasoning presented. In short there is some way in which at least in part ranks in transactional media must be more than a mapping of ranks established in more substantial domains into a passive symbolic representation. For social dimensions like purity and power are not independent of the actions that ratify them. There are real stakes in these transactional games themselves.

So far we have argued informally that there are at least some elements in transactional inter-caste behaviour that favour the 'competitive game' interpretation. But in fact there is a formal theory of competitive behaviour, namely the mathematical theory of games. Let us ask whether T/V usage falls within the compass of that theory, and if so what predictions the theory would make. If we can find some of these predictions in the behaviour then the competitive game interpretation would receive very strong support indeed.

It is sometimes thought that the theory of games has only normative applications that is that it seeks to prescribe rational optimal behaviour in competitive contexts. But it is also of course descriptive and does not assume optimal behaviour but rather attempts to empirically determine this (Morgenstern 1968:62). The theory does make certain assumptions about the nature of the game and the participants: amongst these are that the game has a definite form that defines a set of altern-


ative moves for each player, that each player has a consistent pattern of preferences among the possible outcomes of the game, knows the other player's pattern of preferences, and seeks to maximize his own (Luce and Raiffa 1957). Games can be classified usefully in various ways: they may include elements of chance (mixed strategies) or exclude them (pure strategies); they may have 'saddle points' in which case they are called 'specially strictly determined'; they may be strictly competitive so that players' utility functions sum to zero, in which case they are called 'zero-sum games'; they may have 2 or more players, and may be described in that way; they may be so arranged that coalitions will benefit players ('essential games') or provide no benefit ('inessential games') - and so on.

Now one thing worth trying is to take Marriott at his word, and interpret inter-caste relations as a particular kind of competitive game. The most straightforward model would be that T/V usage and food transactions constitute zero-sum n-person strictly-determined games with pure strategies, that may or may not be essential. The rules of the game together with the nature of the outcomes is stated by the valuation of atomic dyads in section 4.3.1, and the utility functions of all players are a simple maximization of rank. Examination will show that utilities are zero-sum, and there are saddle-points in such a game. Now let us ask how players would behave. To make the simple point that we wish to make here no formal development is necessary. Indeed we can operate with highly scaled down mini-matrices with just four players.

Taking food transactions first let us ask what each player's best strategy is, given that (a) giving food raises a player's rank while

receiving it lowers it, (b) each player prefers the outcome that maximizes his own rank. The answer clearly is that the best strategy is to give as much as possible and receive as little as possible. Now let us suppose that all players chose best strategy. Then we have the total game outcome in mini-matrix (1) in Figure 4.18. Here none of the four players receives, but as a consequence none manages to give! All acts are abstentions: nothing takes place. However if we allow pre-game bargaining, there is another best strategy: one player can agree to agree to receive from another, just so long as the other promises to receive from him. Then each partner in the coalition will succeed in giving - but only at the cost of some receiving. If all four players join in this coalition, agreeing to receive each other's food just so long as the others' agree to receive theirs, then we have the total game outcome in mini-matrix (2) in Figure 4.18. In this outcome, each player has three successful gifts but these are weighed against three costly receipts: the net gain is zero, just as it was in mini-matrix (1) when without coalitions each player had no gains and no losses. Thus although a player can do just as well by successful coalition, he can do no better than he would have done with the other strategy and no coalition. Therefore these games are inessential: there are no benefits to be derived from coalition. But nevertheless there are two minimax strategies (strategies that will guarantee the minimal loss): the one is total abstention - which we may call the minimal strategy - which is best in the absence of a coalition; the other is the maximal strategy of securing maximum gifts - but at the cost of maximum receipts, and this is only a minimax strategy in a coalition context.

Figure 4.18: Game outcomes with minimax strategists.



If we now turn to the linguistic medium of T giving we find a very similar pattern. This is not surprising because T transactions have the same valuation as food transactions. However as we noted in 4.3.1 there are some differences between material and linguistic media; in particular it takes two separate acts for a food transfer to occur - an act of giving and an act of receiving - whereas for a linguistic transfer receiving is largely beyond actor's control. From this it follows that whereas for food the best strategy in the absence of a coalition was abstention (no one being willing to receive), for T exchange best strategy is on the contrary maximal: all players have no choice but to receive, so each player can maximize his giving. The outcome, if all players follow best strategy, is minimatrix (3) in Figure 4.18. But here, just as in (2), maximal strategy has the unfortunate consequence that for each player his three gains (successful gifts) are neutralized by three losses (his receipts). Once again in a context without coalitions, best strategy can only yield zero-gains and zero-losses net. If coalitions are allowed then each player can bargain to reduce his losses (T receipts), but only at the cost of giving up a corresponding number of gains (T-gifts). If all players joined in such a coalition then mini-matrix (4) would be the result. Once again net gains for each player are zero. So apart from the fact that maximal strategies and minimal strategies are best in different coalition contexts, food and T transfers offer the same basic game to players. A game in which, if all players play best strategy, all players must come out with equal scores. And in which there is no advantage in coalitions.

If we now turn to the media with the inverse valuation, service provision and V exchange, we can see whether they constitute the same kind of game with the same basic formal properties. Taking services first, we can see that given that (a) each giving of service lowers a player's rank, while each receiving raises it, and (b) each player prefers the outcome that maximizes his rank, each player will abstain from giving. But if none give, then none can receive, and the outcome is as in mini-matrix (5). This is best strategy in the absence of a coalition: we may call it minimal strategy because the minimum (zero) is exchanged. If we allow coalitions, then another minimax strategy emerges: a player can bargain to receive services, but only at the cost of promising to give them. If all four players join the coalition, and each plays maximal strategy (that is gives to every other and receives from every other) then the outcome is as in mini-matrix (6). Once again for each player losses = gains, and net outcome is zero-gains. Each player would have done exactly as well playing minimal strategy without a coalition.

Turning to V this seems to provide a precisely similar game. In the absence of a coalition minimal strategy is best (as in mini-matrix (7)) - for although as with T each player could force the other player to receive (unlike with services where an act of receiving is required), this would require him to give V which he should not wish to do. On the other hand, with a coalition maximal strategy is also a minimax solution, as with services: a player can buy valued receipts but only at the cost of costly gifts (as in mini-matrix (8)). So the games posed by service provision and V transfer are exactly parallel, unlike food and T transfer where optimal strategies are differently

related to the absence or presence of a coalition.

But what about a mixture of coalitions and non-coalitions: perhaps in this context the subset of players who form a coalition can do better for themselves. Increasing the players to six, and restricting ourselves to T and V transfer, we can represent the outcome of a particular game with a coalition between some players only as in the mini-matrix in Figure 4.19. Here half the players, the three numbered, 1, 2 and 3, have made a bargain such that each will receive the benefit of V but only at the cost of giving it back. The other three players have made no such bargain: they are playing best strategy in the absence of a coalition, which for V specified total abstention and for T specified maximal giving. The total outcome then is as in Figure 4.19. Now if we give T and V numerical and comparable utilities, we can see which players have done best. On the assumption that a T win is as good as a V win, and a T loss as bad as a V loss, we can assign the following values to each dyadic outcome:

Giving V	= -1
Receiving V	= +1
Giving T	= +1
Receiving T	= -1

Then each player makes the losses and gains indicated along the axes of the mini-matrix; at the bottom are scores as Givers, and along the side scores as Receivers. But in each player's case, as the table beneath the matrix in Figure 4.19 indicates, losses exactly cancel out gains and the net score is zero. So in this game too those players who made coalitions did no better than those who did not.


What can we show by all this? First and foremost we can show that the patterns that emerge in the empirical T/V data (as encapsulated in the basic matrix) do not even approximate to the game-outcomes that we have generated on the assumption that players are free to pursue minmax strategies. For if they were free to do so then, with or without coalitions, they would all do equally as well. In short, hierarchy would never be generated. And the remarkable thing about the empirical data is that it scales so very well to reveal clear blocs of ranked castes. This is the most distinctive pattern in the empirical matrices, but there is not a trace of scaled behaviour in the mini-matrices. We can conclude that T/V exchange and food and service transfers cannot constitute strictly competitive games. The hierarchy must come from somewhere: there must be strong constraints on players outside the game, so that game outcomes are at least partially a passive score board of ranks achieved in other arenas. (Of course we made various specific restrictions in our mini-matrices that may have been the wrong ones to make: but whichever ones are made I see no way in which ranking scales could emerge from the outcomes of play by minimax strategists without these scales being in fact imposed before the game begins.) Marriott's 'tournament' then is one where fates are at least partially already decided before the tournament begins.

How can we reconcile this conclusion with the evidence of competitive behaviour that we adduced earlier, namely the existence of retaliatory counter-moves (retaliations and boycotts), the asymmetry between claims to rank and general recognition of it, and the fact that ranks established in diverse media do not match?

The obvious, and I think necessary, solution is to admit the possibility that each medium constitutes in part a truly competitive game and in part a reaffirmation of ranks derived elsewhere. Each medium would then be in part a passive score-board and in part an arena of actual competition.

If we now look more carefully at the empirical outcomes in the actual media, we can readily discover areas of the matrices which do indeed approximate to the models generated on the assumption of minimax strategists operating freely. Taking just food and T transfers for instance, we can find examples of restricted areas in the matrices that exactly parallel the behaviour in mini-matrices (1) through (4). Figure 4.20 is drawn directly from Beck's Figure 4.8 which represents the pattern of cooked rice exchanges on informal occasions between each and every caste in the local arena (Beck 1972:163). Looking carefully at this figure one can detect an area of maximal strategy: 5, 7a and 8 give and receive cooked rice from each other. No other castes exchange this food reciprocally. This must in fact represent an area of coalition: each agrees to accept if the other takes, just as in mini-matrix (2) in Figure 4.17. We can also detect an area of minimal strategy: castes 4 and 3 receive from only one and two others respectively (thus minimizing their gains). This is the pattern in mini-matrix (1) in Figure 4.17. There is admittedly another factor here in that caste 4 and caste 3's failure to give even to the lowest castes (in contrast to, say, caste 9's relative success) is not based on the failure to receive directly from those lowest castes (caste 9 does not; it would in fact be culturally unthinkable). Rather there appears to be a coalition between other upper castes (like 5 and 9)

Figure 4.20: Cooked rice exchange.
(after Beck, 1972)



1

2

4

3

5

7

8

9

6

10

12

14

11

13

15

16

17

18

1

2

4

3

5

7

8

9

6

10

12

14

11

13

15

16

17

18

and the lowest castes such that failure to take from 5 and 9 can trigger a boycott by the lowest castes. Whatever payoff the lower castes get for such a coalition does not appear within this medium itself. (For further details see Beck 1972:164-70.) Perhaps a full-blown game theoretic analysis considering all payoffs in all media might in fact make a lot of sense of such areas of competitive behaviour.

Turning to T usage, we have already found the real-life analogue of competitive game (3) in Figure 4.18. This is where in the absence of a coalition, each player maximally gives (and perforce receives) T. The empirical instance is the retaliatory T usage of castes 8, 9 and 10 to 11, and vice-versa, to be found in Matrix II and already discussed in this section. Are there also any instances of mini-matrix (4), where by means of coalition, T is mutually avoided? Of course if T is avoided, given the awkwardness of perpetual pronominal avoidance between whole groups, some substitute must be found. REL could be such a substitute, and areas of REL usage in the basic matrix (Matrix VIII above) may in fact represent precisely such coalitions over T avoidance. Since we discuss REL below in section 4.4 exhaustively, we omit detailed consideration here.

We must conclude then I think that there are areas of truly competitive game-like behaviour in the patterns of transactional exchange between castes in various media. But there must also be some external determination of rank by sanctions or payoffs in other media. This is probably true for all media.

4.3.3.2 Consensus on hierarchy

In the study of verbally expressed opinions on caste hierarchy, where a sort of opinion poll is systematically taken within a village,

rather precise measures of the degree of consensus on caste ranks can be obtained. For instance Marriott is able to produce the following figures: 93% of 6,463 opinions (given by twenty-four informants) about the relative rank of two castes chosen from the local hierarchy were in agreement in a particular North Indian village (Marriott 1968: 138). Can we produce similar measures from our data?

It is not obvious that we can. Is it appropriate at all to talk of consensus in behaviour rather than in opinion? Only in this sense: the behaviour we are examining is symbolic - its 'meaning' is clearly stated in the rules of valuation. The valuation states that different modes of treating others will have different social values; and moreover that the value that an individual's act has depends critically on how the recipient acts back. If A gives a V to B, then only if B does not give V back is A higher than B. Indeed the procedures we have used in this chapter, whereby each medium is treated separately and reciprocals not specifically taken into account for each dyad, might seem to be entirely misplaced if the data happened to be different from the way it is.³⁰ Happily (with the single exception of 11's use of T to 8, 9 and 10) there are no such symmetrical usages. But this is itself a fact of interest: it means that both parties for each dyadic pattern of exchange concur in the valuation of it. We may say then that each case of V giving records an agreement between the giver and the receiver that the giver is lower than the receiver. Similarly each case of T giving (with the single exception mentioned above) records an agreement that the giver is higher than the receiver.

Everything that we have examined so far then is a massive set of agreements about the relative ranks of parties in particular dyads taken

one at a time. But unlike opinion-poll data these judgments of relative rank are all egocentric: we cannot extract from the T/V data one caste's judgments about the relative rank of every other pair of castes. The most we can directly get is one caste's judgments about its own rank relative to every other caste. The maximum such judgments among 17 castes can only be 16 for each ego, whereas opinions could total 272 for each ego. So we cannot produce the same kinds of measures of relative rank as studies of local opinion.

What we can produce is just what we have already produced, namely collections of facts about how each caste treats each other caste (the columns in our matrices) and about how each caste is treated by all the others (the rows in our matrices). Now clearly ranks derived from receiving scores (rows) represent the collective agreement about the rank of the receiver in this medium - each caste has contributed to that overall assessment. The status of each caste's giving score is rather different: a column in one of our matrices represents that caste's view of itself, its own behavioural estimation of its rank. But note that whereas the T's it gives are simply claims to higher status, the V's it gives are admissions of lower status - and as such are likely to be concurrences in a consensus that the giver is lower than the receiver.

Receiving scores do then represent a general opinion about the receiving caste's rank. In so far as giving scores are isomorphic with receiving scores they represent the receiving caste's acceptance of the general opinion about its rank. We have already seen in Figure 4.10 that ranks as receivers in T and V (and threshold V) were totally consistent. The 17 castes are only cut up into 9 rank-

blocs, far less than the discriminations achieved in opinion polls (see for example, Marriott 1968:Table 2; Beck 1972:Figure 4.15), but the consistency is absolute (unlike the opinion polls). It may be argued that we have here a truer picture of a consensus about rank than those derived from variable individual opinions. And the level of consensus is impressive.

4.3.3.3 Dissensus in ranking One source of non-consensus, non-agreement and non-transitivity in the data has already been described. This was the phenomenon of counter-moves, and we saw that the behaviour of caste 11 towards 8, 9 and 10 in the T medium was best understood as an instance of competitive retaliation. But the major locus of dissensus, the only thing that stops the entire T/V data reflecting one single uniform scale of rank, is in the fact that ranks as givers are not consistent with ranks as receivers. And given the generally overwhelming pattern of consistency, this particular area of non-agreement takes on a special importance. Why does it exist, what are its sources? In this section we shall review a series of sometimes ingenious explanations in terms of rank-oriented behaviour, but despite their ingenuity we shall finally have to admit that they do not necessarily provide the correct explanation.

Let us start with the simplest of the possible explanations. We have already hinted that one reason that rank as givers is not equivalent to rank as receivers is that they are different kinds of thing. A caste's receiving scores represent the sum of other castes' opinion about its rank, whereas its giving scores represent its own view of its rank. If there is an element of competitive behaviour in transactional

media then it is not surprising that there should be some discrepancy. Each caste might project a somewhat rosier image than it knows itself to actually have in the hope that others might eventually buy the rosier image.

However there are overwhelming problems with such a simple explanation. In the first place it will not work for all media. For in food transactions, for instance, in order to successfully give one must persuade the other party to accept. So no caste can simply project an optimistic image in food transactions, for others must concur in the rank claims made in order for them to take place. Yet nevertheless there are dramatic reversals of rank in food media (see Figure 4.17). So an account that only had application to the linguistic data and not to precisely parallel facts in the non-linguistic data would not be particularly appealing.

A second reason for rejecting this solution is that it provides no explanation for those parts of the discrepancy in ranks that come about because the receiving rank is higher than the giving rank. Where the discrepancy is the other way around (giving rank exceeds receiving) we can plausibly claim that a caste manipulates that rank (giving) that lies partially within its control. However there are discrepancies of the first sort also. For instance caste 5 does much better as a receiver of V than as a giver. (Admittedly these rankings are positional so that as 5 goes down in one dimension, other castes rise to fill the vacated position, so that one could explain 5's fall in terms of the others' (3 and 7a's) rise; but the question would still remain why 5 allowed its rank to lose one position downward.) Now to explain caste 5's fall in the medium it can manipulate one would have to resort

to some assumption of caste 5's modesty. But the whole theory only works on the contrary assumption that all castes attempt to maximize their rank. If we drop that postulate, the attempted solution only amounts to the claim that random fluctuations exist in the giving dimension. But that is what we are trying to explain.

We may now turn to the second explanation. This is Marriott's elaborate and very appealing theory of Varna strategies (Marriott 1974). It is attractive because it promises to integrate such diverse aspects of differences between castes as ideology, personality and transactional behaviour, all as concomitants of a single basic principle: the choice of an adaptive strategy in a hierarchical partly competitive context. The basic idea is that groups operating within a set of groups, all of whom abide by the evaluations of transactions set down in our rules of valuation, have open to them a set of just four basic adaptive strategies. For a medium where giving is positively valued, like food, the strategies are these:

- (a) the group can maximize status by giving only and not receiving
- (b) it can assure itself of a median status by both giving and receiving
- (c) it can assure itself of a median status by neither giving nor receiving
- (d) it can minimize status (and perhaps maximise material benefits) by receiving only and not giving

We can then go on to identify these strategies with the ancient Varna categories. Schematically:

	<u>Givers</u>	<u>Receivers</u>
(a) Brahman	+	-
(b) Kshatriya	+	+
(c) Vaishya	-	-
(d) Sudra	-	+

The Varna categories then are simply labels for an exhaustive set of inherently constrained adaptive strategies.

Now these patterns despite their abstraction are indeed realized (so Marriott claims) empirically in village interaction. To illustrate for our village we can refer back to Figure 4.20, the matrix of cooked rice exchange derived from Beck 1972:163. Here the castes most typically associated with each strategy are (read + as maximal, - as minimal):

<u>Caste</u>	<u>Givers</u>	<u>Receivers</u>
(a) 1 and 2	+	-
(b) 5, 7, 8	+	+
(c) 3, 4	-	-
(d) 16, 17, 18	-	+


Now in the South, as is well known, the Varna categories are incomplete: there are no true Kshatriyas by tradition, and even paradigmatic Vaishyas are not clearly identified. Nevertheless it is clear from folklore, behaviour, ethics, language usage and social structural traits that in the South the 'dominant' land-owning castes, where these are not Brahmans (as they are in Tanjore), are Kshatriya-like (Beck 1972,1973). And these rural-based power groups were in the past distinguished from their urban counterparts by the ancient terminology "right-hand castes" versus "left-hand castes" (Stein 1968).

I propose to identify these as the South Indian correlates of Kshatriya Varna and Vaishya Varna respectively (although since 'left-hand' can be a term of abuse in India, it is the opposition rather than the labels that are correlated).


Now Marriott points out that if we adopt the kind of matrix that we have in fact adopted, then which 'Varna-strategy' (my term) each caste is playing is directly inferrable from the matrix. The relevant property of our matrix convention is the distinction between hierarchical ranks as givers and receivers, their separate representation along the two axes, and the consequent abandonment of the necessary alignment of self-reciprocal cells along the main left-right diagonal.

To illustrate the ways in which these inferences can be made, let us take some diminutive models and experiment. Our extended argument here follows Marriott 1974 as closely as possible (the article is concise to the point of obscurity). First let us ask, in a matrix for just five players, what all the possible moves might be, bearing in mind our special interest, namely distinctive quantitative patterns in giving and receiving. Taking a valued-giving/disvalued-receiving medium like food or T, we can label the axes of the matrix with scales of the maximal scores on each dimension. If each gift is valued as +1, and each receipt is valued as -1, then the rank by giving runs from a maximum of +4 to 0, and rank by receiving runs from a maximum of 0 to -5, as in mini-matrix (1) in Figure 4.21. Within each cell we have then entered the sum of transactions entered into - the number of givings plus the number of receivings - which is simply derived by adding the figures (irrespective of their +'s and -'s) on the two axes which intersect in some particular cell and


Figure 4.21: Marriott's Varna strategies.




1. Array of strategies




4. Payoffs of strategies



2. Play-out with first strategy assignment



5. Play-out with third strategy assignment



3. Play-out with second strategy assignment

- ☒ column gives food to row
- ☐ column does not give food to row
- ☒ self-reciprocal cell; n= number of total interactions

then entering that figure in the cell. Note that (as we interpret Marriott) this kind of matrix has a special relation to the matrices we have so far employed where it is castes not scores that label the axes. The relation is this: a particular player (caste) must here choose a column and a row out of which to compound a strategy; so we can assign to each caste label an ordered pair of digits where the first represents a chosen giving score and the second a chosen receiving score. Our five players might then end up with the following strategy assignments:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{player 1} &= (+4, 0) \\ 2 &= (+3, -1) \\ 3 &= (+2, -2) \\ 4 &= (+1, -3) \\ 5 &= (0, -4)\end{aligned}$$

in which case the outcome of the play would be as in mini-matrix (2).

Now note that in this case giving scores and receiving scores are consistent. Note also that the net number of transactions that each caste (player) enters into is, as the numbers in the self-reciprocal cells show, exactly four. Further it is clearly because the rank by giving is identical to the rank by receiving that the self-reciprocal cells all lie along the main diagonal. Now Marriott's point is precisely that these three properties are intrinsically linked: the top-left/bottom-right diagonal alignment of self-reciprocals, equal ranks as givers and receivers, and the same number of net transactions. For suppose the assignment of the strategies available in mini-matrix (1) had been radically different, say:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{player 1} &= (+3, -3) \\ 2 &= (+2, -2) \\ 3 &= (+2, -2) \\ 4 &= (+1, -1) \\ 5 &= (0, 0)\end{aligned}$$

then the outcome would be as in mini-matrix (3) where ranks for giving and receiving are inversely related. Now note that the self-reciprocals run along the other diagonal, that giving and receiving scores do not match, and that the sums of net transactions (the figures in the self-reciprocals) are not the same. While mini-matrix (2) matches a choice of strategies as along the left-right diagonal of mini-matrix (1), mini-matrix (3) approximates to a choice along the right-left diagonal in (1). Of course the special thing about mini-matrix (3) is that ranks as givers and ranks as receivers are inversely related: whichever player is best giver is worst receiver, and vice-versa. That is why the self-reciprocals lie along the other diagonal. And given that in all the media we are examining outgoings and receipts are inversely valued, it must be the case here that the player who has the most outgoings has the most receipts, and the one that has the least outgoings the least receipts so that gains and losses cancel each other out. If we assign +1 to each gift, and -1 to each receipt then we can compute the giving and receiving scores as follows, where (if we allow overall scores to be the sum of giving and receiving scores) net scores are all zero.

Player	Giving	Receiving		Net
1	+3	-3	=	0
2	+2	-2	=	0
3	+2	-2	=	0
4	+1	-1	=	0
5	0	0	=	0

Now the fact is that what one empirically finds in full-blown matrices of inter-caste transactions is something that lies in between the pattern in (2) and in (3), or perhaps more accurately a pattern

predominantly like (2) but with areas that include patterns like (3). It is this that we are trying to account for.

Turning back to mini-matrix (1), if we view it so that the main left-hand diagonal is vertical we see that all vertically aligned scores have identical total transactional scores. The informative variation lies across the matrix, and here we find a variation from 0 to 8 in total transactional scores. What this means is that in order to achieve a total score of 8, one must be a maximal giver (here, give to four others) and a maximal receiver (here receive from four others). On the other hand in order to achieve a total score of 0, one must be a minimal giver and a minimal receiver (here abstain from giving and receiving altogether). Following Marriott we will think of these as strategies and call them maximal and minimal respectively. It is these that Marriott identifies with the two middle Varnas: maximal exchange is king-like Kshatriya behaviour, minimal exchange is merchant-like Vaishya behaviour. For the rural South, maximal exchange is a right hand trait, minimal exchange is a left hand trait.

Why are these strategies? Let us reintroduce the vertical dimension of rank that is obscured by simply adding scores (regardless of +'s and -'s) on the giving and receiving dimensions. In positively-valued-giving media like food and T, giving scores are positive, receiving scores are negative (and vice-versa for services and V). One reasonable approximation to an overall status ranking (Marriott 1968 argues, Beck 1972 disagrees) emerges from subtracting the receiving scores (negative) from the giving scores (positive). If we do this for each row and column in mini-matrix (1), our array of possible moves for five players, we will obtain an array of overall

payoffs for each of those moves – as in mini-matrix (4). Whereas in (1) the vertical dimension was lost, here in (4) the horizontal one is lost (when viewed with the main diagonal vertical); that is the distinction between maximal strategists (with most incomings and outgoings) is neutralized in favour of the overall ranks obtainable by each strategy. If we now mentally superimpose mini-matrix (4) on (1), we see that maximal giving-and-receiving, and minimal giving-and-receiving are assigned equal rank (here 0, lying between highest rank 4 and lowest rank -4).

To repeat and clarify: mini-matrix (1) in Figure 4.21 is an array of the numbers of transactions (rank enhancing and decreasing) each player will enter into if he has a certain rank as a giver and a certain rank as a receiver. Mini-matrix (4), on the other hand, is an array of net ranks achieved by the array of numbers of transactions in (1), where net ranks are compounded out of giving and receiving ranks. Superimposing (1) on (4) shows that the player with maximal transactions and the player with minimal transactions both achieve exactly the same rank. And experimentation will soon convince that using either maximal strategy or minimal strategy will guarantee mid-level status. They are thus rival but equally viable strategies for achieving that rank. Of course one does better, as mini-matrix (2) illustrates, to give to maximal others and receive from minimal others: this is Marriott's 'optimal strategy' as approximated to by Brahman patterns of interaction. Finally one does worse (as far as rank is concerned) by simply receiving and not giving at all: the 'pessimal strategy' approximated to by Harijan interaction patterns.

If we now construct a mini-matrix with six players, each with the following strategy sets

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{player 1} &= (+5, 0) \\
 2 &= (+3, -3) \\
 3 &= (+1, -1) \\
 4 &= (+3, -3) \\
 5 &= (+3, -3) \\
 6 &= (0, 6)
 \end{aligned}$$

then we have a payout as in mini-matrix (5) in Figure 4.21. This represents the sort of patterns associated with each Varna category: player 1 plays Brahman strategy, players 2, 4 and 5 play Kshatriya strategy, player 3 plays Vaishya strategy, and player 6 plays Sudra strategy. Scores are as follows:

Player	Giving	Receiving		Net
1	+5	0	=	+5
2	+3	-3	=	0
3	+2	-2	=	0
4	+3	-3	=	0
5	+3	-3	=	0
6	0	-5	=	-5

And the outcome in (5) really does approximate to empirical patterns observable. Now note that these patterns show up in a matrix on visual inspection: Brahman ('optimal') strategy achieves a location of the self-reciprocal cell of the optimal player at the top left of the main (left-right) diagonal, while Sudra strategy ('pessimal') achieves a location of the self-reciprocal cell in bottom left of the diagonal. For location along this diagonal indicates overall rank on both giving and receiving dimensions (as indicated in mini-matrix (4)). But geometrical deviation of self-reciprocal cells from this main diagonal

is a direct measure of the use by players of the strategies associated with the two middle Varnas. For as mini-matrix (1) indicates, the use of maximal (Kshatriya) strategy will cause deviation to left of the main diagonal, while the use of minimal (Vaishya) strategy will cause deviation to the right of the main diagonal. So the use of particular strategies may be inferred directly from a visual appraisal of a transactional matrix. In addition, of course, one may simply count total transactions that players are involved in (as entered here in the self-reciprocal cells) in order to derive an assessment of minimal or maximal strategy use.

Having laboriously recounted Marriott's theory in his own terms (more or less), we may now put it more simply in the game theoretic terms we arrived at in 4.3.3.1 above. We may say that Marriott's theory amounts to the following: there are two distinct kinds of transactional behaviour (the differences between which Marriott underplays),³¹ namely -

(a) rank-reflecting behaviour - the acquiescence of asymmetrical scores on the basis of external determinants

(b) competitive zero-sum behaviour, where there are always two equally good minimax strategies (provided that necessary coalitions can be arranged) - what we have called maximal and minimal.


The type (a) is associated with the top and bottom Varnas, and type (b) with the two middle Varnas, where each takes a distinctive choice of the two options - options that are the only minimax strategies available in a caste system.

But to describe it as succinctly as this is not to belittle Marriott's theory which has far reaching implications for understanding

the distinctive styles of these traditional paths to Hindu prestige; it throws light on the distinctive ideologies of the Kshatriya/Vaishya opposition as well as the associated distinctive behaviour, and even makes sense of the personality-types that are associated with these two different paths (as Carstairs 1967 found, Kshatriya are 'extrovert', instrumental exchanges, Vaishya are 'introvert' and minimize their dealings with the outside world; see also informal remarks in Beck 1972:10-11). But in this context the important point is that Marriott's theory provides an account of why apparent anomalies in the caste hierarchy - areas of apparent dissensus - arise: ranks as givers and ranks as receivers are often discrepant because there are highly principled strategies that castes adopt (along with the adoption of a characteristic lifestyle) which generate these discrepancies as a natural consequence.

Let us now turn to the empirical material in which these abstract patterns are embodied. Marriott stresses that castes tend to use elements from all four of these patterns (Varna-strategies) but that nevertheless emphases towards one or another tend to emerge empirically: he presents data from seven villages, including oolappaalLaiyam (after Beck 1972:163). Taking the full data from the last source for exchanges of cooked rice, we have the following matrix (Matrix XIV: the same basic data has already been presented in Figure 4.20). From this matrix derived directly from Beck's Figure 4.8 (Beck 1972:163) we may extract scores by counting the number of successful gifts to other castes that each caste accumulates (positive scores), and the number of receipts received by each caste (its negative score). These scores may be added to produce a series of net scores (a la Marriott 1968),

Matrix XIV: Varna strategies, cooked rice.



as in Figure 4.22, reflecting overall rank (as in mini-matrix (4) in Figure 4.21).

Figure 4.22 Scores in cooked rice transactions

Castes*	Giving scores(G)	Receiving Scores(R)	Net(G plus R)
1	17	0	17
2	16	-1	15
4	2	-2	0
3	0	-3	-3
5	14	-4	10
7a	13	-4	9
8	13	-4	9
9	10	-5	5
6	9	-6	3
10	6	-7	-1
12	3	-7	-5
14	3	-7	-5
11	5	-8	-3
13	3	-9	-6
15	2	-9	-7
16	0	-12	-12
17	0	-14	-14
18	0	-14	-14

*Castes are here ordered by their rank on the receiving dimension.

The scores may also be added disregarding the negative signs to produce totals of dyadic transactions (more strictly numbers of inter-caste dyads between which the transaction in question may take place from time to time) which each caste enters in to; these totals are

here entered into the self-reciprocal cells for each caste in the matrix for handy reference.

Viewing Matrix XIV diagonally (so that the main top-left/bottom right diagonal is vertical), we see that castes deviate somewhat from the central ranking line formed by the main diagonal. Vertical position on this indicates approximate overall rank (on giving and receiving dimensions) however far to the left or right of it castes may be. Two castes (3 and 4) stand way out of line as minimal givers and minimal receivers, that is as minimal strategists. Beck describes these two castes as belonging to the left-hand bloc, but castes 7a and 6 also belong by the same criteria. Nevertheless here 3 and 4 display the classic strategy of their Vaishya-like category, while 6 and 7a happily align with right-hand castes 5, 8 and 10. Note that their net scores are 0 and -3, comparable with the rank of 10 and 11, but their total transactions (as noted within the self-reciprocals) only sum to 4 and 3 (compared to caste 10 and 11's total of 13 transactions). It is interesting to note that as Marriott also found (Marriott 1974:27), minimizers stand out more than maximizers. Note though that had we displaced caste 5 to the bottom of its rank bloc, its maximizing role would have been diagrammatically emphasized to tell us what its total transaction sum tells us, namely that it is the greatest maximizer of all the castes. Thus in this empirical case maximizers, and to an even greater extent minimizers are clearly locatable - and these castes correspond correctly to the Varna-like categories 'left' and 'right' as predicted by Marriott's theory.

Let us now turn back to the linguistic media, and look just at the medium of V-giving and receiving. Recollect that V-giving is

disvalued and corresponds to food-receiving, so the polarity of the scoring will be reversed to continue to reflect rank. If we now look at Matrix XV (the basic facts here were presented in Matrix II and III above) and view it with the main (left-right) diagonal vertical, we find that most castes line up approximately on the now vertical diagonal that measures rank. Some castes though lie markedly to one side (a pattern we have emphasized by moving them to the end of their rank-blocs): caste 5 lies to the right with a total of ten transactions (as marked in its self-reciprocal cell) while castes 3 and 7a lie to the left of the diagonal with the smallest numbers of transactions in this medium, a total of six (composed of zero-givings and six receipts). Referring back to the similar matrix for cooked rice exchanges (Matrix XIV) we see that there 3 and 4 were in a precisely similar position to that in which 3 and 7a find themselves here in the linguistic medium; while caste 5 was there too a maximal transactor.

We now have a possible answer to our original question: why are the ranks as givers of T/V not congruent with the ranks as receivers? The possible answer is: because some castes make differential use of the two dimensions in their strategies to establish the overall rank they desire. One viable strategy is minimal use of both dimensions: since minimal use on one dimension will yield low scores, while minimal use on the other will yield high scores, this will guarantee a median place in the hierarchy. Another viable strategy is maximal use of both dimensions, which will yield high scores on one dimension and low ones on the other - again guaranteeing a median position. In V giving 3 and 7a use minimal strategy, 5 uses maximal strategy; in food (cooked-

rice) 3 and 4 use the minimal strategy and 5 uses maximal strategy.

Let us deal at once with one puzzlement. We have suggested that the use of the minimal strategy is associated with the values of the left-hand bloc. Indeed there seem to be intrinsic connections between the minimal strategy and the socio-cultural traits associated with left hand bloc membership: left-handers have relatively closed small marriage circles (associated with the patrilateral cross-cousin marriage preference in ideology) which serve to minimize the numbers of social units that are transacted with; in matters of daily interaction they are aloof and minimize their interactions with others. There is a consistent pattern here (Beck 1972: Introduction) of which Marriott's minimal strategy seems to be the core; while the other consistent ideological and organizational pattern (the right hand model) has maximal strategy as a core. Nevertheless of the relatively high caste left-handers only castes 3, 7a and 4 seem to embrace thorough-going minimal strategy in interactional media. The others, castes 6 and 7b (and 4 in the linguistic media), align with the right hand caste patterns quite closely. Why? Does this invalidate the correspondence between strategy and Varna-like category?

If we turn to ethnographic observations the reasons for the 'treachery' of 6 and 7b, and sometimes 4, are fairly evident. Members of caste 6 in oolappaalLaiyam are the prosperous dependable carpenters and smiths for the dominant caste 5; they contrast in this with caste 3, also traditional castes and smiths, who do not work solidly to service village agricultural needs at all. Members of 3 tend to work on special jobs, house-building and so on, travelling far, often into urban centres. Members of 6 have large well-equipped workshops in the

village and clients go to them rather than summon them. In short members of caste 6 are integrated into the rural economy and the set of village service interdependencies: their major clients are kavuNTars (caste 5) whose interactional strategies (strong touch speech with local konku forms) they tend to emulate. As for members of 7b, kavuNTar blood actually runs in their veins (as all acknowledge): they are compromised left-handers if anyone is. Their ideals and interactional strategies seem kavuNTar-like throughout. Caste 4 on the other hand has different reasons for not rigidly maintaining left hand ideals in linguistic media: it is represented by a single family not well established in the village (and expelled only eight years ago from another) - its members simply cannot afford to make claims to rank that might be opposed. So among the higher castes only 3 and 7a are economically and ideologically free to pursue a left-hand strategy that will isolate them from the central right-hand patterns that are buttressed by the interdependence of the rural economy.

But perhaps looking at the left-hand category as a strategy should banish the puzzlement in any case. It is simply not a bloc of castes at all, not a club with a set membership. Rather it is a path, or Varna, one of the four basic ones that the ranking system offers of which only one other offers competitive advantages. Castes can use this path or strategy if conditions make it attractive: otherwise they can choose another. And indeed ancient lists of right and left hand castes display a flux hardly intelligible on any other view (see B. Stein nd). In so far as castes are intrinsically urban based or rural based by the nature of their traditional occupations, there will be a tendency for these castes to provide relatively stable

foci for left hand and right hand blocs (ceTTiyaar and mutaliyaar for the left, kavuNTar and naaTaar for the right perhaps). But other castes may fluctuate from one strategy to another as the demands of a particular local ranking arena (urban or rural) make appropriate.

We seem then to have arrived at a satisfactory solution to the problem of discrepancies in ranks on the two dimensions, giving and receiving. We need (on this account) to appeal to no other basic principles regulating inter-caste affairs other than a concern with establishing rank. Then in terms of two aspects of this concern, namely (a) the symbolic expression of ranks established on the basis of external affairs, and (b) competitive rank-minimization, we seem to be able to account for the observable patterns in the matrices.

However our success is not complete. Various doubts and alternative explanations arise. In the first place the equivalent nature of linguistic and material media is open to question: there are no abstentions from T/V media altogether on a caste-wide scale, therefore talk of 'minimal strategy' may be here misplaced. In the second place we underplay the source and significance of coalitions, for if we turn to media other than food or V, to T in particular, we see that large scale coalitions are involved. In the third place, the dissensus which we are trying to explain involves only a few crucial cells. In linguistic media these are only 3 and 7a's non-giving of V to 1 (in contrast to 5's giving of V to 1). If 3 and 7a gave V to 1 then they would rank equally with 5, 6, 4 and 7b, and all inconsistency in the giving and receiving of T and V (other than 11's retaliative T giving) would be dissolved. But if we can find alternative sources for the usages in these cells Marriott's elaborate theory need not be called

into play - at least not for the linguistic media.

These three points of doubt converge in the following argument. The application of Marriott's theory to the linguistic data assumes the comparability of material and linguistic media in a number of important respects. But as noted in 4.3.1 there are differences; here the relevant difference is that whereas in a specific food medium total withdrawal from all transactions is possible, there cannot be (or perhaps just contingently is not) any such total withdrawal by a whole caste from the T/V media as a whole. Communication must go on, and pronominal avoidance, although possible (and practised) on an individual to individual basis (as we saw in 4.3.3.1), would be cumbersome in the extreme as a caste-wide practice. But whatever the sources, it is a fact that non-use of T implies use of V or REL, non-use of V implies use of T or REL, and non-use of REL implies use of T or V. It follows that minimal strategists cannot minimize their dealings in all three of these media simultaneously: in minimizing total transactions in one medium they will end up maximizing them in another.

It does not necessarily follow from this that castes 3 and 7's non-use of V cannot be seen as an application of minimal strategy, just that it need not. For it could be viewed as an application of the strategy in the more important of the two media. In other words 3 and 7a could be willing to increase their use (be indeed maximal transactors) in the more neutral medium of REL in order to maintain minimal strategy in the strongly valued V medium. However due to the necessary (or at least empirical) interdependence of T, V and REL this is not the only possible interpretation. The other is that 3 and

7a do not use V to 1 because they positively wish to use the alternative they do in fact use, namely REL.

If we turn back to Matrix VIII (the basic matrix) we find that 1, 2, 3 and 7a symmetrically (reciprocally) exchange REL. Now we know from our discussion of the valuation of symmetrical usages in 4.3,1 above that these are potential expressions of solidarity or even intimacy. It could then be that what underlies these few crucial cells which are the source of the dissensus, is that 3 and 7a have some special relationship, some form of coalition, with castes 1 and 2. And the general importance of such coalitions may be gauged by referring again to the facts about T giving. In the basic matrix (Matrix VIII) we see that T giving does not fill a triangular area in the matrix in the way that V giving does. For there is an area that extends all the way down to 7b in the receiving axis, where no T's are given at all; in fact we may say (given our definition of the 'upper castes' as the bloc from 1 through 7b) that no upper castes give T to any other upper castes. Now referring back to Figure 4.17, we know that a pattern of reciprocal T avoidance will not emerge in a competitive ranking game without a coalition (whereas reciprocal usage of T would emerge in the same context without a coalition). If the area in question was not a competitive area, but rather a rank-ascribed area, then we would expect a pattern of T usage from superiors to inferiors; and indeed in other media, like V, the 'upper castes' are cut up into two or three rank-blocs. Nevertheless what we in fact have here is an area of T avoidance. We conclude then that some sort of coalition or alliance must underlie this abstention from T usage among all the upper castes (and moreover that this will not readily be explained in terms

of bargains made within the game - the T medium - itself).

Now if such alliance relationships exist in any case, they would then provide an independent and alternative account of how the dissensus in giving and receiving arises. For although some slightly higher castes may make pacts with slightly lower ones (as judged by behaviour in other media), castes outside the pack may not accord the lower-rank members of the pack equal treatment with the higher ones; moreover high ranking castes outside the pact may do less well on the giving dimension than those within it (who may have secured favourable terms), although when it comes to the mass of opinion reflected in receiving scores they will remain higher in rank than some members of the pact. Thus a special pact between 3 and 7a on the one hand and 1 and 2 on the other will not necessarily prevent other castes from distinguishing between them, which in fact they do, judging 5 higher than 3 and 7a (but lower than 1 and equal to 2).

There is then the possibility of a rival explanation for the discrepancy in giving and receiving ranks in the T/V media, along the lines that the few troublesome cells involved arise not from a concern with caste ranking within the V medium but rather from a positive preference for REL (with consequent inpingements on V patterns) in accordance with quite different concerns. Let us now turn to explore these concerns. And although we will (to anticipate) there find reasons to find this alternative explanation convincing, we should remember that we have not ruled Marriott's theory out as a possible additional and supplementary explanation. Moreover for those media like food transactions where abstentions from one medium do not automatically imply usage of another, Marriott's theory has no rival of the sort we are proposing for the T/V

media. It remains then the more general theory.

4.4 THE INFERENCE OF ALLIANCE RELATIONS

So far we have operated as if there was only one principle that regulated inter-caste affairs, namely a concern with relative rank. But even within that framework we have seen that the possibility of an alternative account of dissensus in ranking presents itself, which presupposes reference to another dimension of inter-caste relations, namely alliance as the source of particular coalitions. We here turn to explore this second principle regulating inter-caste relations, find that its operation in the linguistic media can be shown to exist, and indicate that its importance in other media in other village studies has been under-estimated or entirely overlooked. A side benefit of the analysis is the alternative account of dissensus in caste-ranking (along the lines already outlined above).

A few remarks of clarification will be useful at the outset. We understand the notion 'alliance relations' in such a way that it is reciprocal exchange in media that is their basic expression. This is of course a more restricted sense of the phrase than that associated with Levi-Strauss's theory of kinship and marriage (Levi-Strauss 1949), where asymmetric exchanges are also specifically included. It is also not always equatable with the notion of a coalition in Game Theory although it is so in the particular games we have looked at. The extra constraint that we incorporate into the notion of 'alliance relations' is that these should constitute relations of solidarity and rank-equalization. In our area of interest at any rate, this rules out asymmetrical exchange relations and coalitions with differential pay-

offs to members.

Now given our definition of 'alliance relations' as those relationships of solidarity and rank-equalization expressed in symmetrical exchange, we can say at once that in the T/V media it is only in REL usage that 'alliance relations' manifest themselves. For we have already seen that there is no symmetrical V exchange at all (inter-caste), and only a few cells of reciprocal T usage (from 11 to 8, 9 and 10) which we explained (on the basis of external ethnographic evidence) in terms of retaliation in a competitive area of T usage. REL then will be the focus of this section although non-verbal and other verbal media will be considered. It should be remembered though that symmetrical exchange in a medium cannot necessarily be assumed to express solidarity or a caste neutralization: it may reflect a policy of retaliation, or it may indicate a wary admission of equality without solidarity.

A second important point to bear in mind during the following analysis is that alliance relationships as here defined will be an automatic reflex of maximal strategy. For if a player maximizes gifts and receipts then he will find himself in a situation of symmetrical exchange with other players playing the same strategy. On the other hand, alliance relations can only be purchased at a cost by minimal strategists who are trying to cut down on both outgoings and receipts. It follows from this that if only maximal strategists were to form alliance relations together, then the additional principle here being introduced would be redundant. But if erstwhile minimal strategists are to be found in the empirical materials engaging in alliance relations, then an independent principle is necessary to the analysis,




and this turns out to be the case.

4.4.1 REL: patterns of exchange and blocs of allies

So far we have given short shrift to the third basic option in T/V usage: the use of both T and V to members of other castes depending upon the relative age of speaker and addressee. The basic pattern is that elder addressees get V, younger ones get T, and there is a certain range of usage one way or the other for near coevals, although V is generally preferred.

Hitherto we have treated this pattern as simply the residual category of usage, predictable from the non-usage of both categorical T and categorical V. But as we remarked earlier (4.3.1) this usage has more than merely residual social-semantic content: it is the basic ideal intra caste usage, and indeed the ideal intra-familial usage (but see details in Chapter V), and its use across castes is likely to carry the connotations of these other usages. Certainly to use REL (relative age T/V) is to imply that caste as a determinant of interaction is here neutralized, in favour of seniority by age. As pointed out in the discussion of REL's valuation (section 4.3.1) where REL is reciprocally exchanged between castes it amounts to a purely symmetrical usage between caste-groups rather than between individuals.

However we must emphasize that despite this intrinsically caste-neutralizing, solidarity-claiming valuation, REL is not necessarily reciprocally exchanged. There are a number of cases of REL in one direction, within a dyad, and T or V given in return. There are in fact three observable configurations:



where in (i) A apparently gives REL downwards, and receives V in exchange, in (ii) B apparently gives REL upwards and receives T in return, and in (iii) A and B reciprocally (symmetrically) exchange REL. In other words if REL intrinsically neutralizes caste in one direction, a consideration of both dimensions (the reciprocals used) may reinstate caste-rank distinctions. However it remains true that the great majority (55 cases out of 77) of REL givings are reciprocated with REL. Let us analyze the facts in detail.

Retaining the ranks established on the basis of T and V giving as in the basic matrix, Matrix XVI presents the facts about REL usage, distinguishing between symmetrical exchange of REL and asymmetrical usages of REL. We can see that there are seven distinct areas or blocs in the matrix, of which five are composed entirely of symmetrical REL exchange, and two show REL being given in one direction only within a dyad.



Taking these two blocs of asymmetrical REL usage first, we have Bloc 2 where caste 1 (Brahmans) use REL to castes 5, 6, 4 and 7b who reciprocate with V (as can be ascertained from the basic matrix); in short Bloc 2 constitutes an area where our configuration (i) above

Matrix XVI: REL; symmetric and asymmetric usage.


Givers

**symmetric (reciprocal)
usage**

☒ asymmetric usage;
column gives to row
and not vice versa



bloc 2



prevails. The other asymmetrically exchanging REL bloc is Bloc 4, where we find the use of REL by 8, 9 and 10 to 3, 6, 4, 7a and 7b - in this case reciprocated with T as in the configuration (ii) above. We may speculate immediately that there are fundamentally different sources for these two kinds of asymmetrical REL usages: in the case of Bloc 2 it occurs because castes 5, 6, 4 and 7b feel obliged to express respect to caste 1, the Brahmins. In the case of Bloc 4 the asymmetry occurs because 8, 9 and 10 claim a neutralization of caste rank in favour of age - i.e. a measure of equality - a claim addressed to 3, 4, 6, 7a and 7b; this claim is roundly denied by the REL recipients who reply with categorical T.

Turning to the symmetric blocs (where REL is reciprocated between members of each dyad), we have had to extract Bloc 1 from the matrix and reassemble it to the right because the disjunction between ranks as givers and receivers (derived from the basic matrix) disperses it (note that if we here gathered them together in the matrix we would disperse Bloc 4). What we find here (in Bloc 1) is a very significant pattern of caste-neutralization among the strategic leaders of the left-hand division. What marks this bloc off from Bloc 2 is the participation of the Brahmins; or rather, the symmetric claims of caste-neutralization and solidarity that include Brahmin participation.

If we allow ourselves to refer to external ethnographic facts we can confirm that this usage in Bloc 1 is not just a reflection of accidents of propinquity and familiarity between the particular families who represent these castes in the village (or rather the hamlet oolappaalaiyam). For instance a Brahmin who spends most of his time

in an urban Agrahaaram but returns to dwell in the village when his temple morai becomes due, told me the following facts (temple morai are the rights and duties of temple service inherited patrilineally and shared by rotation). Brahmans in the Kangayam area like other castes, but unlike Brahmans in other areas of Tamilnadu, distinguish their viiTTu-paase (house-language, here Brahman caste dialect) from the language they speak outside (standard local colloquial). I have played tapes of Brahmans speaking to non-Brahmans in this local colloquial to a number of persons unfamiliar with the individuals concerned. They were unable to distinguish Brahman speakers; and listeners from outside konku naaTu were astonished by the loss of Brahmanical features. (Dr. E. Annamalai suggests to me that this code-switching - astonishing in the cultural context of South India - is a direct expression of the relatively marginal status of Brahmans in this territory). The viiTTu-paase, the language of the Agraharam, on the other hand has all the features of the Brahmanical dialect of Tamil as used elsewhere in Tamilnadu (see Bright and Ramanujan 1964; Ramanujan 1968; Zvelebil 1964). Now piLLais (caste 2) and coolI aacaaris (caste 3) and vaishya ceTTiyaars (not represented on oolappaaLaiyam) are regular visitors to the Agrahaaram according to the Brahman informant, and when there they adopt the Brahmanical dialect - or at least some lexical and morphological markers of it, so that the Brahmans do not feel constrained to code-switch into non-Brahmanical standard konku colloquial. The informant claimed moreover (and I have proof of this on many a tape) that Brahmans exchange kin-words in extended usage to both caste 3 and caste 2 who both reciprocate (although they do not use such metaphorical kin-words to each other: see below 4.4.3 for details). Daily

interaction in oolappaLaiyam between these three castes is very close; members of 2 and 3 can often be found seated on the tiNNai of members of caste 1 (see Beck 1972:158-161), while the women of caste 3 do the household work (other than cooking of course) for visiting Brahman priests.

These ethnographic facts then do indeed suggest that the pattern in Bloc 1 in Matrix XVI is highly significant: members of the left-hand division, or those whom we may now call the more extreme minimal strategists, here celebrate their solidarity with the top member of the hierarchy by means of a symmetrical exchange of REL. This suggests that Obeyesekere's critique of Beck's interpretation of the role that Brahman and Pillai play as models for the left-hand division is ill-founded: the fact is that the top-most castes and the left-hand castes are allied, and in this Beck is correct (see Obeyesekere 1975).

Now note that it is in a sense because of this alliance, which grants 2, 3 and 7a the privilege of REL rather than V to Brahmans, that 3 and 7a achieve their high ratings as givers of V. Whereas kavuNTars (caste 5) give V to Brahmans and thereby lower their net scores on this medium, castes 3 and 7a exploit their privilege to rank higher than kavuNTars in this medium. But this will gain 3 and 7a little on the receiving scale. And so we end up with that disjunction between giving and receiving ranks that occupied so much of our attention above. There we explained the disjunction as a direct outcome of 3 and 7a's use of minimal strategy in the V medium. Now we are offering an explanation in terms of a special option open to 3 and 7a in the REL medium, which happens to have a reflex in the V medium (by virtue of the fact that the three linguistic media are alternates).

Now these two explanations can be complementary. In the first place they are non-contradictory and compatible so that they can both be correct simultaneously (with the caveat noted immediately below). Secondly, the inter-dependence of the media requires an inter-dependent explanation along the following lines. Castes 3 and 7a refuse to give V where even the dominant caste (5) cannot refuse. But how can they dare to do this? because they have neutralized the only groups with a primary right to object, namely the recipients (castes 1 and 2). Therefore by allying in one medium one can buy rank scores in another.

There is it is true a potential element of contradiction between the two explanations. For, as noted above, alliance relations (as we are using the term) are expressed by means of symmetrical exchange. But symmetrical exchange is an outcome of maximal strategy, not minimal strategy. Nevertheless 3 and 7a are claimed to be minimal strategy users. How is this to be resolved? By noting of course that since the T/V media are an inter-dependent set of alternates, minimizing in one medium necessarily involves maximizing in at least one other. Thus 3 and 7a in choosing to apply minimal strategy in the V medium, would have to fill the lacuna with REL or T. There is then no actual incompatibility between the two explanations of rank dissensus, and we can continue to maintain them both.

Let us turn now to the second bloc of symmetric exchange in Matrix XVI. Bloc 3 is a much wider bloc than Bloc 1 and incorporates erstwhile maximal and minimal strategists in one great bloc of relative equality counterposed to the excluded lower castes 8 through 18. Here we have to face the fact that the motives lying behind this symmetrical usage may be different for different castes, rather than a solid bloc

generated by uniform maximal strategies in this area. To see this we have to bear in mind the related facts about categorical T and V usage.

What we want to know is to what extent our newly introduced relationship of alliance is operating, and to what extent this area of symmetrical exchange is rather than just an outcome of maximal strategy oriented once again to rank minimization. Now if we accept that the scales extracted from the T and V media do indeed represent social ranks, we can show that this body of symmetric REL exchange simply cannot emerge from coalitions in a competitive ranking game (or maximal strategy without coalitions). To see this let us map onto our REL usage the rankings emergent from the T and V media. Relative to this independent (or partially independent) ranking scale (immanent in the known interactional facts), we may then roughly estimate which castes are giving REL to superiors and which to inferiors. This is significant because to give REL to a superior is to cheat him of a V, while to give REL to an inferior is to extend downward generosity of an intriguing kind.

Let us take as an approximate overall index of rank on T/V criteria the net scores for giving and receiving V (this is simply for convenience - no fine points will be made that depend crucially on this). The scores were as follows (see Matrices III and IV above):

Figure 4.23 Net ranks by V-giving and receiving

Caste	V-giving(G)	V-receiving(R)	Net(R+G)	Net rank order
1	0	13	13	<u>1</u>
2	0	9	9	<u>2</u>
3	0	6	6	<u>5</u>
7a	0	6	6	3
5	-1	9	8	<u>7a</u>
6	-1	6	5	6
4	-1	6	5	4
7b	-1	6	5	<u>7b</u>
8	-3	5	2	<u>8</u>
9	-3	5	2	<u>9</u>
10	-3	5	2	<u>10</u>
11	-8	5	-3	<u>11</u>
13	-12	3	-9	13
14	-12	3	-9	<u>14</u>
17	-14	0	-14	<u>17</u>
16	-14	0	-14	<u>16</u>
18	-14	0	-14	18

Here scores for giving are added to scores for receiving to yield net scores which in turn are expressed in the linear ranking line to the right. If we add rank-cuts between 8, 9 and 10 and between 17, 16 and 18 we approximate an overall ranking with the maximum number of cuts attested in the linguistic media (actually Threshold V usage adds some more). We add these additional rank-cuts as dotted lines.

So if we now map this rank-order onto the central area of REL usage we can get an idea of who is giving REL upwards and who downwards. This is visually represented in Matrix XVII, where the order of castes on the vertical axis is the net rank-order in Figure 4.23, and where REL cells are distinguished according to whether they are

- (a) 'V-substitutes': i.e. REL given to superiors
- (b) 'T-substitutes': i.e. REL given to inferiors
- (c) 'REL to equals': i.e. REL given to those ranked equal in
V medium

It is immediately evident from Matrix XVII that while all three kinds of cells are present the majority are not cases of REL to equals, but are rather 'T-substitutes' or 'V-substitutes'. We may in fact count the number of superior castes to whom each caste gives REL, and the number of inferior castes to whom each caste gives REL. Giving REL to superior castes is to claim upward solidarity (and to cheat upper castes of a V); giving REL to inferior castes is to generously extend downward solidarity to them (and to abstain from giving a T). The number of castes that do each are listed below in Table 4.24.

Concentrating on the castes involved in the symmetrical exchange of REL in Bloc 3 of Matrix XVI, on the basis of the table in Figure 4.24 we can say this:

(i) the castes at the top of the hierarchy display a remarkable amount of downward generosity, as indicated by the large numbers of inferior castes they give REL to

(ii) just below them this downward generosity ceases abruptly (where it ceases exactly will depend on the external ranking system used to judge which castes are inferior and superior, but by any of the available scales by 7b generosity has ceased absolutely. In our ranking system it ceases at 7a, before 6, 4 and 7b)

(iii) as downward generosity declines, upward claims to equality increase, as indicated by the large numbers of superiors to whom REL is given. The lower the caste within our Bloc 3 of REL exchanges

net rank
by V

Matrix XVII: REL as T and V substitutes.




Figure 4.24 REL to superiors and inferiors

Castes in net rank order	Total inferior castes given REL	Total of rank equals given REL	Total superior castes given REL
<u>1</u>	7		0
<u>2</u>	6		1
<u>5</u>	5		1
3	3	1	3
<u>7a</u>	3	1	3
6	0	2	4
4	0	2	4
<u>7b</u>	0	2	4
8	0		5
<u>9</u>	0		6
<u>10</u>	0		7
<u>11</u>	0		0
13	0	1	0
<u>14</u>	0	1	0
<u>17</u>	1		1
<u>16</u>	1		1
18	0		2

the more castes that receive REL as a V-substitute from it. This trend continues into Bloc 4 (an area of asymmetric REL usage) and all the way down to caste 10 where it abruptly ceases. Thus REL as a V-substitute accounts for about half of the usages in Bloc 3 and all the usages in Bloc 4 as Matrix XVI makes clear.

What are we to make of this? Two of our three patterns of usage, namely REL to equals and REL as a V-substitute, seem readily understandable. Given the valuation of REL, REL to equals is the natural expression and recognition of social equality. REL as a V-substitute is easily understood in terms of rank-maximizing motives. But REL as a T-substitute is a different story. Whereas theories of caste ranking prepare us for upward claims to rank, they do not in any way explain the downward generosity evinced by the use of REL to inferior castes. The question is what is it that leads all the upper castes to stand together and exchange REL, in contra-distinction to the lower castes? For referring back to Matrix XVI there is a remarkable caesura between the castes 1 through 7b on the one hand and 8 through 18 on the other. It is this solid use of REL within the upper castes that is responsible for the strangely truncated, table-topped matrix for T usage that we analyzed in section 4.3.2.2.

It does seem then that the study of inter-caste relations is in need of some complementary principle to rank: a principle we may call alliance. The principle must, like ranking, provide a motivation for behaviour and thus a set of predictable outcomes in a particular situation. But instead of upward claims to equality and downward expression of superiority, it must predict downward extensions of solidarity - not in all circumstances for then rank and alliance would be

diametrically opposed (and what the one did the other would undo). And indeed in our data downward solidarity has rapid and abrupt boundaries.

We will return to the nature and distribution of alliance relations. Let us now complete the survey of the distant blocs of usage ascertainable in Matrix XVI. Bloc 5 is the symmetrical exchange of REL between washerman and barber castes (caste 13 and 14 respectively). The two cells involved are also instances of REL to equals (note though that threshold V did make some rank distinction between 13 and 14). The alliance of barber and washerman is expressed also in their exchange of kin-terms (see below). For most purposes they form, in the eyes of villagers, a single unit of ritual and social rank, and this perhaps ensures that they form a coalition and a solidary unit as far as the linguistic media are concerned.

The last area of REL usage, Bloc 6, is composed of interaction between Harijans. In a way this area constitutes a microcosm of the larger whole: we find here both patterns of downward generosity and upward claims as we found in Bloc 2. In Figure 4.24 this same resurgence of patterns found higher up in the hierarchy can be seen, after a gap (between 10 and 17) wherein little REL usage takes place. Here both caste 17 and 16 display downward generosity to the immediate caste below. Whatever explanation will do for this phenomena higher up in the hierarchy will do here also, and indeed will be required.

Let us look at the facts implicit in Matrix XVII in a slightly different way: let us ask what role each caste plays in the generation of the REL patterns, and let us also make some assessment of the distribution of solidary alliance relations. We can get some measure of

the 'popularity' of each caste (as far as being a desirable ally is concerned) by counting the number of REL receipts it gets, and similarly some measure of each caste's 'outgoingness' by counting the number of REL's it gives; and then we may count those REL's that are symmetrically exchanged to get some idea of 'alliance success'. The table below (Figure 4.25) provides this information:

Figure 4.25 Symmetrical exchange of REL

Caste	REL receipts	REL outgoings	Number of castes exchanging symmetrical REL
1	3	7	3
2	7	7	7
5	7	6	6
3	10	7	7
7a	10	7	7
6	10	6	6
4	10	6	6
7b	10	6	6
8	2	5	0
9	1	6	0
10	0	7	0
11	0	0	0
13	1	1	1
14	1	1	1
17	2	1	1
16	2	2	2
18	1	2	1

Looking at the columns for REL outgoings and receipts, we see that caste 1 gives more REL than it receives, but that this pattern is already reversed by caste 5, to receiving more than it gives. Clearly

at the top of the hierarchy one can extend REL generously without fear of exploitation: recipients will continue to give V in return. But castes further down have to be more judicious for they are likely to be swamped by receipts from those below. And those below, like 8, 9 and 10, are busy exploiting REL possibilities even though they receive few in return. So we end up with caste 10's massive outgoings without a single return. In short although a distinct alliance principle is operative in the REL medium, it is also true that the other principle, the principle of rank or hierarchy, reimposes itself in this 'caste-neutral' medium as pressures to exploit the equality implications of REL in order to maximize rank.

A remarkable feature of Figure 4.25 is the position of caste 11, which stands absolutely outside all alliance claims, neither giving nor receiving a single REL. This fits with other ethnographic facts about caste 11; these are the vaTuka naayakkar, a left-hand caste of traditional well-diggers and house-builders. Despite having a traditional occupation no more ritually polluting than that of agriculture, they rank consistently in this local interaction arena as just one step above (and sometimes even equal to) washerman and barber, which are polluting occupations (for interactional ranks in many media see Beck: 1972:171,175,178 and Figure 4.17 above). Yet, as informants reported, there are other local interaction arenas about thirty miles away where members of 11 enjoy a rank close to caste 5; indeed there were even reported to be areas where some sub-caste of naayakkar were the dominant caste. Given this it is easy to see why local naayakkars do not accept the superiority of castes 8, 9 and 10, a fact that showed up in the retaliative T usage described above.

Less clear is how 8, 9 and 10 are able to maintain their superiority. The answer does seem to lie in the fact that 8, 9 and 10 are right-hand division members along with 5; and 8, 9 and 10 are bound by traditional service relations to the dominant caste 5 in a way that naayakkars, whose traditional skills are required only occasionally and can be imported for a particular task, are not. Even though this privileged position of 8, 9 and 10 is not reflected in the solidary extension of REL to them, they do nevertheless feel free to use REL to most upper castes. And 11 cannot do this. Indeed it is very noticeable in daily interaction that members of 11 give much more kinesic and linguistic deference to the upper castes in general than do members of 8, 9 and 10. In short members of 11 are 'outsiders' as far as this local area is concerned, and it is their isolation from solidary relations to any other castes that shows dramatically in their zero-REL usage.

Turning to the last column of Figure 4.25, note that it is not constructed simply by taking the minimum of the set of figures for REL receipts and REL outgoings, for these receipts and outgoings may come from and go to quite different castes while the final column tabulates the number of other castes each caste symmetrically (reciprocally) exchanges REL with. From this final column we see that the only castes that achieve a massive level of solidarity-expression are castes 2, 5, 3, 7a, 7b, 6 and 4. And although this pattern could in part be seen as upward claims to near-equal rank by the lower members of the upper castes, there still remains the irreducible and astonishing fact of the downward generosity of 2 and 5, and to a lesser extent 3 and 7a.

The crucial and irreducible finding of this section is then that there are some castes, especially 1, 2 and 5, who are downwardly

generous in REL. In addition we see that these three leaders in downward generosity include the models for both left and right hand divisions, and this rules out an interpretation in terms of left hand solidarity even though the majority of solidarity-expressors are members of the left-hand division. But the fact that left-hand members are deeply involved also rules out an interpretation of the REL patterns as the automatic reflexes of massive use of maximal strategy, for that is a pattern associated with the right-hand castes. We must conclude then that the creation of solidary inter-caste relations is an important motive in the conduct of inter-caste affairs and that consequently these will never be understood without an appeal to a principle like alliance that runs alongside the much better documented principle of rank or hierarchy.

A problem however remains. Why is there the dramatic cessation of REL usage at the point in the hierarchy formed by the 7b/8 boundary? One might argue, pointing to the absence of this particular boundary in many other media (see Figure 4.17), that this is of no great significance. Yet other media do not have the daily repetition of transactions and the caste-wide and population-wide participation that the linguistic media do; moreover there is (as mentioned) a keen interest and awareness of what goes on in the linguistic media. We cannot then dismiss it lightly. One should though recall that the boundary may be a little less abrupt than here described in that (as discussed above) there is some minor variation in thresholds for REL usage to castes like 7b so that patterns of interaction can move towards full categorical T usage by degrees. However these are only marginal effects: the fact is that members of the top eight castes volunteered consistently

that T usage begins with caste 8 and not before.

One possible explanation for this abrupt boundary and for the downward generosity evinced by the higher castes is that what underlies the great blocs of symmetrical REL exchange is a concern felt by all the higher castes to erect an insurmountable barrier between the upper and lower castes. In order to effect this, the topmost castes are willing to extend their REL usage downwards to include all those they wish to detach from the lower castes, while the latter are to be thus symbolically excluded from the brotherhood of the upper-castes. Less metaphorically, this interpretation would amount to claiming that our alliance principle is nothing other than the familiar fact of coalition in a ranking game, but that the nature of the game is here a little different. In this game the topmost castes have some vested interest in the relative rank orders of those below them. This could have various sources: one might be a policy of 'divide and rule'. (Another might be a concern with stability, and a desire to stop the steady upward creep of some ambitious and able group). In such a game context the topmost castes would be willing to barter downward REL in exchange for an agreement to consistently T players still further down. Having then obtained the help of the middle castes in holding down the lowest, the topmost castes can then reassert their superiority over the middle castes in another medium (e.g. V receiving).

Although such a scenario is not totally implausible, my informants never spoke that way nor I suspect ever would. I have then no way to seriously assess it. Another explanation of the caesura between upper and lower castes which suffers from the same sort of assessment problem has been given to me by Edmund Leach (personal communication). This

explanation proceeds in the 'structuralist' vein, that is by assuming that there is a kind of cultural logic that guides performances, which consists of simple operations on binary sets. The argument goes like this. Dumont points out that the notion of hierarchy (at least as employed in Hindu materials) combines two separable ideas: rank as serial order, and the concept of serial dichotomous segmentation (where A 'encompasses' B + C, and B 'encompasses' E + F ... etc). The classical Varna scheme is organized in terms of the second concept. The sequence of segmentations is:

- (a) Twice Born versus Sudra
- (b) Within Twice Born: Brahmins versus the rest
- (c) Within 'the rest': Kshatriya versus Vaishya

We need one other cultural presupposition: that Kshatriya alone are also somehow opposite in kind to Brahmins. Then since both Vaishya and Brahmins are opposites of Kshatriya, in a cultural 'logic' based on operations on binary sets, they must be similar to each other. Now if we introduce a caste category that is socially defined as opposite to Brahmin, and opposite to Kshatriya, and is not like Brahmin (therefore not Vaishya) it must be Sudra. Suppose we now identify caste 1 as Brahmin, caste 5 as Kshatriya, caste 7 (both 7a and 7b) as Vaishya, then caste 8 is neither Brahmin nor Kshatriya. But being assimilated to the Kshatriya style (right-hand division) it is not like Brahmin. Therefore it must be Sudra. Hence the caesura in the hierarchy at the 7b/8 boundary coincides with the first and fundamental Twice Born versus Sudra dichotomy (a) above. And that is why the abrupt cessation of REL exists.

Although the 'cultural logic' deployed in this argument may be a

pretty wonky logic (failing to distinguish oppositions at various levels - hence the equation of Vaishya = Like-Brahman), that does not definitely argue against it: that could be the way it works. The attractive aspect of it is this: Vaishya is really merely a residual category of castes who are neither Brahman nor Kshatriya but are nevertheless respectable. But they are like Brahmins. There is therefore no category for respectable castes who are Kshatriya-like: they have to be Sudra (unrespectable). Consequently there can be no high ranking 'right-hand' castes other than the leader of the division itself (here caste 5). And this is empirically the case: 8, 9 and 10 are the next highest right-handers and they fall far behind the left-hand castes 3, 4, 6, 7a and 7b. On the face of it this is curious: how does it come about that the caste with the key command of patronage (caste 5) is unable to reward its loyal followers (8, 9 and 10) more adequately? Some explanation, perhaps along these lines of Leach's, does seem required.


4.4.2 Symmetrical exchange in other media

Here we briefly describe patterns of symmetrical exchange in other media. Our purpose here is simply to point out that the principle we have dubbed alliance plays a role in inter-caste affairs that has been overlooked or under-estimated, and we do this by showing that symmetrical exchange can be found in many media. Of course, as pointed out, symmetrical exchange can have a number of different sources, of which the most obvious are the expression of equality (plus or minus solidarity) and retaliative abuse. The last is clearly not possible in media that require a separate act of acceptance in order for a transaction to take place, that is in material transfers. There are other


problems of interpretation that we shall touch upon as we proceed.



Mayer seems to have been the first to encounter and describe relations of symmetrical transactional exchange: he distinguished a set of 'allied castes', grouped around the dominant caste in a Malwa village, who exchanged kacca food together (Mayer 1960:33-40). Dumont hailed this, and the high rank gained by the allied castes, as 'unique' (Dumont 1972:128). But in fact an over concern with ranking has led to an underestimate of the very general role that this other dimension plays in inter-caste relations. Matrix representation can help to obscure it too. For instance Beck (1972) provides matrices for cooked rice and curd exchange that hide within them a crucial area or bloc of symmetrical exchangers - our castes 5, 7a and 8. The redrawn matrix in XVIII illustrates this for cooked rice exchange - curd exchange exhibits an almost identical pattern. Another of her interactional media, informal seating on the veranda of a house, shows symmetrical reciprocity on a much larger scale. This is illustrated in Matrix XIX drawn from her Figure 4.7 (Beck 1972:161), where each superimposed square is a bloc of symmetrical exchange.

Passing on to linguistic media, Matrices XX and XXI display some blocs of symmetrical exchange in two dishonorific media. There is, perhaps not surprisingly, no symmetrical exchange of the super-honorific naam and saami; but here in the dishonorifics we find fairly extensive symmetrical exchange blocs. There are no facts that occasion surprise given our earlier findings about T/V, but there are a number that independently support those findings and are worth pointing out. Note that, in Matrix XX, caste 3 is able to reciprocally exchange the dishonorific Taa with castes 1 and 2 (provided for all castes the addressee is under fifteen or so in years). We see here a facet of



Matrix XIX: Symmetrical exchange in informal seating. Givers
(after Beck, 1972: fig 4.7) 1 2 5 7 3 6 4 8 9 10 11 12 13





	seats given and received
	self-reciprocal cell


Broad line indicates
areas of symmetrical
exchange


Receivers

Matrix XX: Symmetrical exchange in dishonorities, Taa.




Additional bloc of
symmetrical exchange

 self-reciprocal cell

 giver can use Taa
to boy of receiving
caste up to 15 years
old

(Broad line surrounds blocs
of symmetrical exchange)



that familiarity and caste-neutralizing solidarity between caste 1 and 3 which was one source of the dissensus on giving and receiving dimensions in the T/V data. Another repeated pattern is the retaliative symmetrical usage of Taa by caste 11 to 8, 9 and 10, just as in the T medium. A pattern that is distinctly different from that found in the T/V data is the partial inclusion of 8 and 9 into a group of upper castes (3, 4, 6, 7a, 7b) in the matter of reciprocal under-fifteen Taa usage. In Matrix XXI, ppaa usage also displays some partial blurring of the 7b/8 boundary between the upper and lower castes that we were concerned with in the previous section. But this is still more apparent in the food transfers in XVIII (where 5, 8 and 7a symmetrically exchange).

Since the interpretation of these facts would take us too far afield, we leave them here. But we hope to have shown that symmetrical exchange is a far more prevalent pattern in inter-caste interactions than seems to have been realized.

4.4.3 Additional media: 'fictitious kin terms'

In this section we examine the use of kinship terms across caste boundaries, where almost by definition real (social) kinship relations cannot exist (the exception would be the special case of members of the ex-teevataasi caste). The use of such terms must then be 'metaphorical' in some sense, and I considered that a study of their usage might throw considerable light on the nature and distribution of solidary alliance-based cross-caste relations. However the facts turn out to be somewhat complex, and no simple correlations of the use of kinship words with the existence of alliance relations between the users can be maintained. Nevertheless we can find here confirmation

of the importance and the distribution of such relations, so that the data is worth presenting in detail.

Early on during field-work I came to the conclusion that some castes were paired with others in special relationships of closeness and solidarity. The evidence that led me to this consisted of events like the following. Word came that the entire extended family of the karNam (village accountant), that is the hamlet's total set of representatives of caste 2, had gone together with the Brahman pucaari's family (members of caste 1) to a remote shrine of kumaar at tirumankaaTu, in order to pray for much needed rain. We arrived to find them alone on the hill and busy in the ritual. These families are neighbours but I had had no chance to watch them mobilized in interaction. What was striking was that they interacted as if they were one family. Their use of the T/V pronouns was the same within each family as it was across the castes. In addition the karNam addressed the Brahman (a man five years or so his senior) as aNNan (elder brother) and the Brahman's elderly mother as ammaa (mother), while the Brahman's younger brother was addressed as tampi (younger brother). In reciprocation the Brahman used tampi to the karNam and his younger brother, while the Brahman's mother used forms like "eppaa raaja" (literally: 'why dad rajah'), a mixture of dishonorifics (ppaa) and affectionate ironic honorifics (raaja) such as a mother typically uses to a child, but here to a middle aged man (the karNam). This elderly Brahman woman also called the younger piLLai women by name plus a kinship word: ummaa akkaa (ummaa elder sister). Further the karNam's wife's father (his maamanar) was also present: he was addressed as maamaa (cross-uncle) by the Brahman, which would be the correct kin term for the karNam's aNNan to have used (the role the

Brahman seems to have taken). In return the karNam's maamanar uses the term maapiLLai to the Brahman, which means literally bride-groom but is appropriately used as a term of address to cross-kin: it is thus the appropriate reciprocal to the Brahman's usage. In short what we find here is that not only are the kin-words of the immediate family used across castes, but one family may adopt the further kin of a family of another caste as if the two families were one. (Date from tape series 1:no.4,side a).

Other such special relationships between castes soon became apparent from similar episodes and linguistic usages. The more obvious of these were between castes 1 and 3, castes 7a and 7b, castes 13 and 14, and between 8, 9 and 10 together.

However the collection and presentation of such data is not as straightforward as it may seem, for there are a number of usages of these particular terms which are for members distinct (see Chapter II, section 2.2.3.1). The first distinction is between what I shall call direct usage and what I shall call adopted usage. By direct usage is meant the use of a kin term for addressing a member of another caste who falls into the correct generation (or respect) and sex category. This is a metaphorical usage in the sense that (as in 'John is a tiger') the defining features of the lexical item are contextually cancelled and the incidental or secondary criteria are alone conveyed (see Lakoff 1972 for the linguistic basis for these distinctions). In the kin terms, the genealogical or affinal semantic criteria are cancelled in the inter-caste usage, and the generational, sex and especially respectful and familiar features or connotations are conveyed. The adopted usage is different in that what is here involved is simply a metaphorical

adoption of the other's point of view. What is presupposed here is the special identification of the speaker with one specific individual of another caste such that the speaker can use the kin terms that that specific other uses to third parties when the speaker is addressing them.

An example should make the distinction clear: members of caste 7b can (and do) address any elderly respected member of 7a with the term maamaa (defining characteristics: + male, + parental generation, + cross category). This is an instance of the direct usage. But this member of 7b cannot call any elderly respected member of caste 5 maamaa even though he may use other kin terms), although he may use the term in the adopted fashion: for instance if the 7b-member has a special relationship with a man X who has a relative Y who meets the defining characteristics of maamaa, then the 7b-member may take X's role and address Y as maamaa. This process of role-adoption is not (so far as I could determine) systematically distributed across the social population, but seems rather to be a function of close personal ties between two individuals. In any case, in what follows we restrict ourselves to the direct usages only, and when we say that 7a uses maamaa to 7b we mean that members of 7a may and do use the direct usage (in general the adopted usage is much more general; a case of widespread adopted usage throughout a North Indian village is reported by Freed 1963a).

A second important distinction between usages is this. The kin terms form a set of words from which a set of generic terms of address are selected. These are words that function like 'mate', 'mac', 'sir', 'madam' and so on in English (see also Beck 1972:292). Not all kin terms in Tamil are used this way, but some are regularly and in partic-

ular the following:

ammaa: category including mother

appaa: category including father

aattaa: category including grandmother

ayyaa: category including grandfather

The generic use of appaa does not seem to occur in my inter-caste (as opposed to intra-caste) data, but the other three terms are used in this way. Other generic address forms derived from kinship words are in such general use that they provide little insight into special relations between castes beyond ranking considerations: these are tampi, the category including younger brother (+ male, + same generation, + younger, + parallel), and the dishonorifics ppaa and maa (as described above).

This usage contrasts, for informants, with the direct metaphorical usage described above. They are sontam vaartte maatiri, appear to be like kinship terms, but in some way have a life of their own as generic address terms. Theoretically these two usages are not clearly distinguished at all: both are extended metaphorical usages. But the distinction I think is the extent to which the specifically kinship-oriented connotations (solidarity, familiarity, etc.) are understood to be conveyed: in the generic-address usage these are at a minimum, in the direct metaphorical usage at a maximum (in both cases degrees of respect are conveyed). However the disambiguation of these two usages cannot be made on grounds other than members' intuition except where no generic usage of the word in question exists. I shall therefore retain the data for both kinds of usage in the analysis below, but I shall respect my informants' distinction and indicate which usage, in their judgment,

was involved in each case.

The main kinship terms employed in cross-caste interaction are the following, where componential definitions are given in brackets (but turn to Chapter V for the definition of components):

- (i) aNNan category including elder brother (+ male, + elder, + same generation, + parallel)
akkaa generation including elder sister (+ female, + elder, + same generation, + parallel)
- (ii) appaa category including father (+ male, + parental generation, + parallel)
ammaa category including mother (+ female, + parental generation, + parallel)
- (iii) ayyaa category including male grandparents (+ male, + parents' parents' generation)
aattaa category including female grandparents (+ female, + parents' parents' generation)
- (iv) maamaa category including mother's brother (+ male, + parental generation, + cross)

Except for the last term these are paired as male and female terms for what is otherwise the same category. The only other terms employed in cross-caste interaction that I collected were tampi (a form with wide-spread generic-address usage as discussed above), aNNi (wife of aNNan) which is used in just a few cases where aNNan is used to the husband, maappiLai ('bridegroom': address form used by maamaa to marumakan) which is sometimes used as the reciprocal to (iv) above (maamaa) but not I think very often, and in addition other terms used in the adopted manner distinguished above (maccaan in particular was used in this way to the brother-in-law of a friend of another caste).

In the direct metaphorical usage some at least of the definitional features are retained. Sex distinctions are always maintained. Generational features, being by definition tied to genealogical criteria, cannot themselves be conveyed but the approximate correlate of social age-grade (which is also closely associated with the English word 'generation') can and is conveyed by the use of the kin terms. Thus in the direct metaphorical usage a woman of another caste will never be addressed as ammaa or aattaa unless she is older than the speaker. (This contrasts with the generic-address form usage where the speaker may be older than the addressee in some such cases I believe).

But there are metaphorically conveyed 'meanings' beyond these. The problem though is to identify what they are. For as in all metaphor, the statement of a categorical falsehood (as in 'John's an eel') while cancelling at least some definitional features leaves open a vast range of incidental or connotational features (John could be slippery, thin and long, or he could love offal, or swim fast). Which particular features are conveyed in a metaphorical usage depends critically of course on the context, cultural and conversational. I select below some of the potential pan-Indian or Dravidian associations attached to particular kinship dyads on the assumption that some of these may be conveyed in the direct metaphorical usage of the kin terms across castes (these associations may be found documented in Carstairs 1967, Mandelbaum 1970: Vol.1:58-95, Gough 1956, Dumont 1957b, Beck 1974):

(i) Brother- sister dyad (associations potentially involved in use of aNNan and akkaa) one of the strongest, least ambivalent kinship bonds, where brother owes unrequited gifts to sister; especially important in Dravidian kinship systems both structurally (Yalman 1967) and ideologically (Beck 1974).

Brother-brother and sister-sister dyads (associations potentially involved in the use of aNNan and akkaa): more ambivalent relationships where solidarity and altruism co-occur with rivalry and differential authority. Elder siblings have a measure of the parental authority over their younger siblings, especially of the same sex.

(ii) Mother-child dyad (associations potentially involved in the use of ammaa) like the brother-sister dyad, a focal point of kinship altruism; a "strong, tender unchanging and dependable bond" (Mandelbaum 1970 Vol.I:62). But unlike the brother-sister bond there is here an element of authority, vested in the mother.

Father-child dyad (associations potentially involved in the use of appaa) here the element of duty and respect to the father is most important, particularly in father-son dyads.

(iii) Grandparent-grandchild dyad (associations potentially involved in the use of ayyaa and aattaa) potentially relations of affection where grandparents are less stern and demanding than parents (especially the father), but where nevertheless grandchildren owe great respect by virtue of the Hindu positive evaluation of age: "indulgence on the part of the grandparent and affection mingled with respect on the part of the grandchild" (Beck 1972:216).

(iv) Mother's brother-sister's son/daughter dyad (associations potentially involved in the use of maamaa). This is the single cross-category rather than parallel relationship term routinely used in inter-caste interaction (other than in adopted usages; see below, Chapter V, for details of the cross/parallel distinction). In the relationships above there is an element of "mutual restraint and respect", while here "a relationship of mutual gift-giving and reci-

procuity sets the standard for interaction with these persons" (Beck 1972:213), compatible with joking and flirtation (Beck 1972:216).

These then are the 'customary attitudes' associated with the intra-familial instantiations of the category relationships associated with the terms, and it is the intra-familial associations that are the strongest and most culturally salient ones (in terms of rights and duties, and myth and folklore). These associations are then prime candidates for the connotational transfer that is involved in the metaphorical usages of the terms. One important caveat though must be made: it is well known that the kinship systems of different castes may be quite diverse, and consequently the 'customary attitudes' associated with particular dyads may also differ, in which case the connotational features conveyed in the metaphorical usage of kin terms may be different for speakers from different castes. Gough (1956) mentions quite extreme differences between Brahman and non-Brahman 'customary attitudes' in a Tanjore village; Beck notes for our village that castes of the left-hand division place more emphasis on "harmony with close kin and on respect for elders" (Beck 1972:212). Nevertheless the associations listed above are probably general enough to be understood to be metaphorically conveyed by all members of the village. However that these are in fact the connotations conveyed is nothing more than a good guess on my part. Moreover I do not think that anything more than a very faint flavour of these is conveyed in the generic-address usages, where features of respect rather than solidarity are perhaps selected.

To complete our 'valuation' of these usages we should note the different significance of symmetric (reciprocal) and asymmetric (one

way) usage. Due to the general preference for the use of personal names rather than kinship terms ('real' or 'fictitious') to juniors and inferiors, and to the fact that no kin terms are neutral in respect to relative status, it will in general be the case that within a cross-caste dyad a kin-term will be used only in one direction, namely to the member of the dyad who is senior, or in other respects superior. Thus when we talk of reciprocal or symmetric usage we are talking (as was the case with REL) about symmetrical usage from the point of view of the caste group rather than from the point of view of an individual within one dyad. Asymmetric or non-reciprocal usage then involves some members of caste A giving some particular term to some members of caste B, and no members of B ever giving that same term back to members of A.

We have now two distinctions between types of usage yielding a four-fold classification:

- (a) direct symmetric
- (b) direct asymmetric
- (c) generic-address symmetric
- (d) generic-address asymmetric

and I suggest that the following respective valuations hold for each of these:

- (a) direct symmetric: mutual claims and recognition of intimacy and solidarity (the extent of which is reflected by the terms employed);
- (b) direct asymmetric: claims by one party (the givers) that there exists/should exist a relationship of solidarity and intimacy based on near equality; claims that are not mutually recognized by the other party;

- (c) generic-address symmetric: mutual expression and recognition of near-equality and hence of the respect that should be given to seniors irrespective of caste-membership in the one or other of the two groups;
- (d) generic-address asymmetric: either the one-way claim to (c), or simply a mode of respect giving and hence an expression of differential rank between the two groups.

In fact the great majority of usages fall into categories (a) and (d). The extent to which what particular term is chosen is important is perhaps best gauged by looking at the actual facts about the usage of the terms, to which we now turn.

The data is presented in the following four matrices (Matrix XXII through Matrix XXV). In the first three matrices terms that differ semantically only in the feature of sex are taken together, and in each cell is indicated whether column caste gives the female term, the male term or both (see attached keys) to row caste. In the fourth matrix only the male term maamaa figures, no doubt because the use of a cross-category term to a woman might carry sexual connotations (wholly out of place in public inter-caste interaction of course), and therefore never occurs.

In the matrices both the direct metaphorical and the generic-address form usages are entered together but are clearly distinguished by the symbols used (the same throughout these four matrices). The reader will probably find it helpful to scan these two usages one at a time. Note that in each matrix we have retained the rank-ordering on giving and receiving dimensions as established by the T/V media and as represented in the basic matrix. Note also that reciprocal

Matrix XXII: Cross-caste usage of aNnan/akkaa

'direct usage' of male term (<u>aNnan</u>)																		
'direct usage' of female term (<u>akkaa</u>)																		
'direct usage' of both male and female terms																		
'generic address' usage of male term																		
'generic address' usage of female term																		
'generic address' usage of both male and female terms																		
reciprocal (symmetrical) usage of associated term																		
zero usage																		


Matrix XXIII: Cross-caste usage of appaa/ammaa.

Givers

1 2 3 7a 5 6 4 7b 8 9 10 11 13 14 17 16 18

1																	
2																	
5																	
3																	
6																	
4																	
7a																	
7b																	
8																	
9																	
10																	
11																	
13																	
14																	
17																	
16																	
18																	

- 'direct usage' of male term (appaa)
- 'direct usage of both male and female terms
- 'generic address' usage of female term (ammaa)
- reciprocal usage of associated term
- zero usage
- Receivers



Matrix XXV: Cross-caste usage of maamaa.

☒ use of the male term maamaa

☒ reciprocal use of maamaa

☐ zero usage

Receivers

		Givers																	
		1	2	3	7a	5	6	4	7b	8	9	10	11	13	14	17	16	18	
1	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>																
2	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>																
5				<input type="checkbox"/>															
3	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>																
6					<input type="checkbox"/>														
4						<input type="checkbox"/>													
7a				<input type="checkbox"/>					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>										
7b				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>					<input type="checkbox"/>										
8									<input type="checkbox"/>										
9										<input type="checkbox"/>									
10											<input type="checkbox"/>								
11												<input type="checkbox"/>							
13													<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>					
14													<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>				
17															<input type="checkbox"/>				
16																<input type="checkbox"/>			
18																	<input type="checkbox"/>		

usages (that is terms that are symmetrically exchanged from one caste-group to another taken as a whole) are marked with a symbol in both cells that represent this usage: such usages are of course ascertainable from the matrix without such visual aids.

Finally it is important to realise that each matrix encodes all the different kinds of usage of that particular term, so that the absence of information about a particular form of usage can be taken firmly to indicate the non-occurrence of that term in that usage. Thus for example in Matrix XXIII there is no coding for the direct usage of ammaa nor for the generic-address usage of appaa: this indicates that there are no such usages observable in inter-caste interaction.

Let us take the matrices one by one, and point out the salient features of the usage of each pair of terms. In Matrix XXII we have the inter-caste usage of the terms that include elder siblings, aNNan (colloquial aNNaa) the male term, and akkaa the term referring to females of the category. We may observe at once that there is no generic-address usage here at all: all inter-caste usage (as far as my data goes) is direct metaphorical usage. We may observe too that the great mass of the area is blank: this signifies positive knowledge of non-usage between the relevant column and row castes. Out of 272 cells just 41 record usages of these terms. These 41 are of two kinds: 33 are reciprocally exchanged, and only 8 cells are asymmetrical usages. We suggested above that the connotations conveyed by the metaphorical usages of these terms are those of strong bonds, with an element of authority granted to the recipient of the term in same-sex dyads, and of devotion and altruism in cross-sex dyads. The reciprocal usage of these terms is a mutual recognition of a relation-

ship of strong solidarity, while the asymmetric usage is a one-way claim on the part of the giver to such a solidary relationship.

The distribution of usages should then provide a map of solidary cross-caste relations. Symmetrical usages occur between the following sets of castes:

- (i) 1,2,3
- (ii) 7a,7b,8,9
- (iii) 8,9,10
- (iv) 13,14
- (v) 16,18
- (vi) 3,5
- (vii) 9,11

The first five sets here are not unexpected. The first set were symmetrical REL exchangers, as were the fourth and fifth, and in this respect we have already observed expressions of solidarity between them. As for the third set, although they did not exchange REL they did maintain almost exactly parallel roles in the T/V media, and it is perhaps not surprising to see them here finding an element of solidarity in their similarity. The second set is more of a surprise: here is a solidarity-expressing group that straddles the 'upper caste/lower caste' boundary that was so rigid in the T/V media. But we have noted that this boundary was crossed in the symmetrical exchange blocs in other media (cooked rice, for example, in Matrix XVIII above). Still more surprising are the last two sets of symmetrical exchangers. In no other media (including the terms that follow immediately in this section) do these pairs of castes express solidarity, and these cells do seem out of keeping with findings elsewhere. One possible

explanation is that castes 3 and 11 initiated usages with 5 and 9 respectively which were at first not returned (as can be found elsewhere), and that there exists some pressure to establish symmetrical usages.

However, there are stable asymmetrical usages, to which we may now turn. These are:

- (i) from 7b to 5,3,6
- (ii) from 9,10 to 7b
- (iii) from 11 to 8,10
- (iv) from 3 to 4

Note that, accepting the ranks established by the T/V data, the first three sets here involve claims to solidarity with higher castes made by lower castes. An attempt to maximize rank in a medium basically about solidarity seems a reasonable interpretation here. The fourth case is a little harder to understand: in many media caste 4 seems to be very reticent about joining the left-hand minimal strategist bloc (castes 1, 2, 3 and sometimes 7a) despite overtures. Perhaps the non-reciprocation here is playing minimal strategy to the hilt, or perhaps it reflects the insecure basis of the single family of this caste in the hamlet.

Matrix XXIII provides the facts for the use of appaa (category including father) and ammaa (category including mother). Here the direct metaphorical usage is very restricted: it is confined almost entirely to symmetrical usage within the bloc of castes 1, 2 and 3. A single cell of appaa usage asymmetrically from 16 to 17 is also recorded: this is placed here on the basis of observed usage between two individuals only, one of whom (the recipient) held the office of

taleyaari or village constable, and it may not be significant.

But there is another phenomenon here: the widespread generic-address usage of the term ammaa within and to the upper castes. Note that there is not a single instance of the generic-address usage of appaa. Essentially what we have is an area of usage of ammaa (to women only of course) to castes 1, 2, 3, 6, 4 (all left-hand castes) from castes 4 and 5 and downward. On the whole these usages occur only to castes superior, or less often, equal in rank, as judged again by the T/V rank scales recorded on the axes of the matrices. (An exception is provided by the usage from 1 and 2 to 4). This dominant pattern is consistent with what one would predict given our valuation of the generic-address usage of the form as a vehicle of respect rather than solidarity claims.

Two points though do deserve further notice: one is the total zero-usage of generic-address ammaa to caste 5, the dominant caste. Another is the fact that Brahmans alone get ammaa from the untouchables (16, 17, 18). The reason for both these facts is that, as we shall see, the term aattaa (category including grandmother) pre-empts the term ammaa to the women of caste 5, and to the women of all the higher castes except Brahmans when addressed by untouchables. The curious fact remains this last exception: why do the untouchables use ammaa to Brahmans but to no other high castes? If we turn to the use of aattaa we may find the answer to this question.

Matrix XXIV records the cross-caste usage of the term ayyaa (category including grandfather) and aattaa (category including grandmother). Once again we find that the direct metaphorical usage of these is highly restricted, though a little less so than the previous

terms. There are just three blocs of symmetrical usage of the terms (in their direct usage):

(i) between 1,2,3

(ii) 7a,7b

(iii) 13,14

Taking our valuation, this suggests that these are relations of mutually recognized solidarity with connotations of affection and respect. And this is no surprise given our other information about the interactional behaviour of these castes. There is just a little asymmetric direct usage:

(i) from 3 to 5

(ii) from 9,10,11 to 8

We have already noted a strange case of symmetric use of aNNan and akkaa between 3 and 5, and suggested that perhaps this arises from 3's rank maximizing activities: this is a clearer interpretation here where 5 does not reciprocate. The usage in (ii) is also explainable in terms of one way claims to solidarity with a higher caste.

The generic-address usages of ayyaa and aattaa present complex patterns. In the first case we have the marked preference of the form aattaa over ammaa in addressing members of the dominant caste 5. Low castes are clearly the main users of aattaa to castes other than 5. These facts suggest that aattaa is a term that carries greater connotations of respect (in its generic usage at any rate) than ammaa. It would be nice to be able to derive this fact from our valuation, that is from an application of the metaphorical process to the dominant associations of each term as listed above. It may for instance be suggested that the great respect for age is what underlies the greater

respect conveyed metaphorically by aattaa than by ammaa. Moreover in an extended household aattaa may have clear authority over a child's ammaa. This leaves us with the problem of why the very lowest castes (16, 17, 18) should choose ammaa over aattaa in addressing the very highest caste (1). It could be that we are dealing here with a reflex of the very different 'customary attitudes' found in the kinship systems of the lowest castes. Or it may be that the more highly valued relationship to the mother, even if less respectful, is still the more appropriate metaphor to the highest group in the Hindu scheme. Or it may simply be that the distance and respect conveyed in aattaa is more appropriate to the more instrumental power-dominated relations that untouchables have with other castes.

Again on the basis of distribution across the hierarchy established in other media, we may suggest that the use of the female term and the male term have the following relative valuations (in the generic usages):

- (a) aattaa only: most respectful
- (b) aattaa and ayyaa: medium respect
- (c) ayyaa alone: least respectful

Why this should be I do not know. The bulk of the usage fits: from a general usage of aattaa by lower castes to higher castes, via a transition (to castes 8 and 9) where both terms are used, to an area where lower castes use ayyaa to other lower castes. The one set of facts that don't fit are the usages to caste 3 from 17, 16, 18. Here it may be recalled that in food media the untouchable castes also treat 3 lightly, there by boycott (Beck 1972:167). Note finally that there is just one case of symmetrical exchange of the generic-

address usage: 16 and 18 exchange ayyaa, as they do REL, and direct-usage aNNan.

We come finally to the cross-caste use of maamaa (category including Mother's Brother). The facts are as in Matrix XXV. We may note immediately that the facts are relatively simple. In the first place there is no generic-address usage whatsoever; all use of maamaa was judged by informants to be the metaphorical usage of a 'real' kinship term. Secondly there are only a few cells involved: there are three symmetrical exchange blocs

- (i) between 1,2,3
- (ii) 7a and 7b
- (iii) 13 and 14

We have met each of these before. The interpretation, based on the metaphorical evaluation, in terms of an expression of solidarity is consistent with those other facts. In addition this term, the single cross-category term employed routinely in cross-caste interaction in other than adopted usages, may reasonably be supposed to carry the cross-category associations of "mutual gift-giving and reciprocity" with minimum elements of respectful restraint. This suggests that the reciprocal usage of maamaa marks what are amongst the very closest inter-caste relationships.

There is just one cell of asymmetrical usage: and again this goes from caste 3 to 5, the dominant caste, which does not reciprocate.

Let us summarize our argument in this section. We turned to the media of 'fictitious' kin term usage across castes in the hope that we might find here some further evidence of the nature and distribution of inter-caste relations of solidarity and alliance. At first sight

the data is rather confusing. But if we distinguish between the generic-address usage (where informants judged that the terms were homophonous, but not synonymous, with 'real kin terms') and the direct metaphorical usage, clear patterns begin to emerge. We have also, recollect, disregarded the adopted usage of a member of another caste's kin terms; these are simply omitted from the analysis, although highly significant patterns may perhaps be found here too (as were found for a Delhi village by Freed 1963a).

Turning first to the direct metaphorical usages, we were able to predict the 'meanings' conveyed by these. We did this by assuming a simple theory of metaphor, which operates in terms of the transfer of incidental and connotational features of lexical items, and by isolating some culturally salient associations of the terms in question. These associations were then assumed to be conveyed by the direct metaphorical usage. And these connotations were combinations of familiarity, altruism, solidarity and respect and authority.

Those castes that exchanged direct usages reciprocally may then reasonably be seen (on the grounds that, given mutual knowledge of the metaphorical process, all members will so see them) as mutually recognizing strong bonds of particular sorts between them. In all four media (or pairs of terms) the alliance bloc 1, 2, 3 expressed solidarity; in three media (counting out appaa/ammaa usage, which was highly restricted) the following blocs also expressed solidarity: 7a and 7b; 13 and 14. In one medium (aNNan/akkaa, the least restricted medium) 8, 9, 10 and other blocs of symmetrical exchangers emerged. Now we must admit that the reasons or motives for these mutual displays of solidarity may be quite diverse: thus 1, 2, 3 may be expressing a

left-hand alliance bloc, while 13 and 14 have an alliance relationship based on their almost identical and complementary roles in inter-caste affairs. On the other hand the 7a/7b alliance may be a mutual recognition of their membership of a common caste category (mutaliyaar), and perhaps of their common putative ancestry (by the process of generation through mixed unions as in Tambiah 1973). We may introduce a further piece of evidence for that in the similar mutual solidarity expression that exists between caste 18 and another sub-caste of maataari (Telugu speakers, not represented in the village) who together exchange the Telugu equivalent of aNNan and maamaa. The use of the cross term maamaa may be especially appropriate in such circumstances.

There were also a number of cases of asymmetrical direct usages. These must be understood, we claimed, as one-way claims to solidarity. Again there may be very different underlying motives here. On the whole, we ascribed a motive of rank maximization in the cases above because they occurred mostly from lower castes to higher ones. By claiming solidarity, one implies near status equality. However other motives may actually be involved here: for instance 7b uses kin terms to 5 which are not reciprocated. But here, because 7b once served as teevataasis mostly for 5's benefit, there may be something more than just an element of 'metaphor' here: 7b may be insisting that 5 recognize the actual blood links it has to 7b.

In the direct metaphorical usages then we find patterns very similar in both valuation and distribution to the patterns found in our analysis of REL usage. And we can derive some support for that analysis from the fact that the patterns are repeated here in independent media.

But when we turn to the generic-address usages we are dealing with something quite different. Here the specifically kinship-associated connotations (familiarity, solidarity, altruism) are lost, or at least eclipsed by the connotations of respect and authority. Thus by a different contextual selection of associations from the large set that accompanies each term, metaphorical processes here convey deference. Hence these usages have a similar valuation to that of the categorical V usage (in contrast to the direct metaphorical usage's similarity to REL valuation). That is to say that, as with V usage, symmetrical exchange conveys respectful distance, while asymmetrical exchange conveys that the giver is lower than the receiver. It is for this reason that, if one maps all the asymmetrical usages of these generic-address forms (namely ayyaa, aattaa, ammaa) into a single matrix one obtains a triangular area at the top right-hand corner of the matrix just as in categorical V pronoun usage.

We may conclude by noting that the method employed in this section is precisely parallel to that employed in the T/V media. First we assign to the forms in question a valuation within symmetrical and within asymmetrical usages. We must do this in a way that members do in order to retain Verstehen relevance: here we do this on the basis of a simple metaphorical process which members can be shown to use in other circumstances. Then we apply this valuation to a collection of facts, the usage of each form between dyads drawn from each and every caste. From this application we may derive in a precise and replicable way which members themselves can employ, a detailed picture of the overall local social system. A picture that is constructable and interpretable by members, and made up of the symbolic actions

of significant classes of individuals.

4.5 POWER AND CLASS: THE CASE OF THE periya kavuNTars

So far in this chapter we have almost entirely ignored the effect on honorific usage of sources of rank other than those based on caste. For the most part this was legitimated by the decisions taken in Chapter II, where we came to the conclusion that assessments based on caste membership were basic for members, while other sources of rank (wealth and office, for instance) were secondary though not unimportant. We argued that this distinction probably corresponds to two levels of cognitive processing, and in subsequent chapters have been concerned with the primary classification of social alters based on caste, and the inferences that we can make from the nature of such classifications. One important motivation for treating non-caste sources of rank as secondary is that they are attributes of individuals, and exceptional in the sense that most individuals do not have any such attributes.

But one non-caste based source of rank simply cannot be dismissed in this way as secondary (as we noted in 2.3.3). This source is membership in the periya kuTumpum ('big families') of caste 5, that is membership in what we have called the 'Squire Class' as described in section 1.1 and elsewhere. In the first place membership in this class of wealthy landlords is not an individual attribute, but seems rather to be an attribute of a lineage segment that is handed down through the generations. Thus the children of periya kavuNTars ('big kavuNTars') are not treated like the children of a self-made wealthy landlord, but rather as the heirs to an inheritable authority. Member-

ship is then technically inclusion in what Weber calls a status group rather than an (economic) class. And it appears to be a well defined and closed group.

Moreover the squire class form a cohesive unit from an interactional point of view. Members are treated in a very special way by all other members of the village regardless of their caste. For example, if one such aristocrat is positioned by the side of a road, all passers-by must dismount and give a formal and respectful greeting. Conversely, when such aristocrats approach others, they may do so with an arrogance and boldness that takes no cognizance of higher caste rank.

Honorific usage fits this picture neatly; indeed one could pick out the class of aristocrats on those grounds alone. We have already mentioned some of these facts in passing (see especially 4.3.2.3). Thus in discussing the use of naam or 'super-V', members of the squire class of caste 5 came out as the highest ranking group on the receiving scale: castes, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7a (i.e. all the highest castes) give naam to such aristocrats without reciprocation. Also one caste (11) claimed to give saami (title meaning literally Lord-God) only to Brahmins, aristocrats and the incumbent karNam of the piLLai caste. But most clearly there was one title of address, esamaanka, almost (but not quite) reserved for members of the squire class. Brahmins and piLLai would only use this to the highest titled members of this class, but others would use it to all male members of the squire class. Members of lowly castes (13 to 18) extend this usage to ordinary non-aristocratic members of caste 5, but even here the recipients would either be 'squires' or lesser landlord patrons (Jajmans), for the most part.

However we have in the sections above ignored the effect of such aristocrats on standard T/V usage, and taking this into account now will yield a radical revision. The facts are given in Matrix XXVI.

The startling thing about Matrix XXVI is that the ritual superiority of castes 1 and 2 (in particular) is here superseded by the secular power of the great families of caste 5: both Brahmins and piLLai give the members of these families categorical V (the threshold here seems to be low: the addressee may be no more than fifteen years old). It is true that in turn the Brahmins receive a similar treatment from those of the squire class, but that this is a courtesy is shown by the fact that there have been aristocrats who chose not to extend it (thus the elder brother, now dead, of the head of one of the leading families is consistently said to have used T to adult Brahmins). In any case piLLai (caste 2) cannot expect V from aristocratic kavuNTars, although the karNam (village accountant, hereditary office held by head of the local family of caste 2) does seem to receive V.

The picture then is that everyone of all castes gives V (or super-V) to members of the squire class providing that they are fifteen years old or so (the lower the caste of the giver the lower the age of the threshold of transition from T to V). In turn members of the squire class give T to all other castes with the single exception of the Brahmins (and they also appear to make exceptions of influential office holders like the karNam).

There are only three families of this order in the revenue village, but if we take them into account we must make an important revision to the description of inter-caste T/V usage described in the sections above. Essentially, we must superimpose on that earlier

Matrix XXVI: T/V usage to and from periya kavuNTars.

Givers

1 2 3 7a 5* 6 4 7b 8 9 10 11 13 14 17 16 18

1					V											
2					T											
5*	V	V	V	V	○	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V
3					T											
6					T											
4					T											
7a					T											
7b					T											
8					T											
9					T											
10					T											
11					T											
13					T											
14					T											
17					T											
16					T											
18					T											

Receivers

5* members of squire class

V = categorical V

T = categorical T

○ = self-reciprocal cell

picture another one, where landed power backed by traditional authority achieves a standing that is second to none and equal with the Brahmins.

A final point of some importance is the relationship of these great families to the lesser families of their own caste (caste 5). In the matrix we have not specified the T/V usage exchanged by 5* (the squires) and 5 (ordinary kavuNTars), because this cannot be so simply described. Typical would be the following tape-recorded usages, where a woman aged twenty-three and married to a squire (aged fifty-five) addressed (i) a forty-five year old member of caste 3 by T, receiving V, (ii) a fifty year old member of her own caste 5 with T, receiving V, (iii) another forty-five year old male member of her own caste with T, receiving V. In the case of (iii), the addressee was employed as a bailiff, and had no land of his own, while in the case of (ii) he was a poor man with a little land, temporarily employed. Both were therefore employees with little capital of their own.

However there is another side to the picture: members of the squire families will not use T to elder men of substance of their own caste, at least not generally. To some extent this is attributable to the real or potential kinship connections between the squire families and other men of substance: the twenty-three year old woman mentioned above was herself, for example, from a prestigious but decayed family that is no longer of clearly squire status. And that takes us into the discussion of intra-caste relations that we shall postpone till the next chapter.

4.6 SOME CONCLUSIONS

Let us briefly summarize what we have achieved in this chapter. We started with an initial problem that has beset the analysts of Indian society: members of the society clearly believe that in a local situation there is a well defined caste hierarchy, but how the sociologist is to isolate this turns out to be problematic. This is also a more general sociological problem: how is the sociologist to build overall models of a social system while retaining the perspective of its members (which after all is a predominant factor in the system being the way it is)?

Our answer has been this. First locate some media in which all members of the society transact. Then see what social valuations are attached to particular configurations of these transactions by participants. Next exhaustively collect which configurations occur between each and every distinct category of persons in the society. Finally make inferences from this distributional map and from the valuations, to the value attached to each category of persons by each other category.

In our case the application of this method yielded some positive results. In the first case we found that the distribution of honorifics (as used across castes) provided a very fine-scale ranking of castes, thus providing an answer to our initial problem. The rank orders can be shown to be implicit in the materials and thus available to members, and is much more discriminating than any ranking that can be derived from caste dialects. This suggests that the emphasis on the individual speaker's dialect in current sociolinguistic theory is misplaced: far more sociological information resides in patterns of usage between individuals.

We were aided in our inferences by the very substantial consensus about caste rank that emerged from the materials. But the consensus was not absolute, and in seeking an explanation for divergences we were led to further inferences. We were able, for example, to explore to what extent active competition for status underlies the patterns we found, and to conclude that (contrary to some views of Indian society) competition is not at all a prevalent feature. But more importantly we located an entirely different principle of inter-caste organization, alliance, which seems to have been ignored in most of the literature. Inter-caste relations are visibly structured on more dimensions than just that of rank.

Finally, attention to honorifics allowed us to isolate a distinct principle of power and authority that picked out a clearly defined category, the periya kavuNTars, or squire families of caste 5. This principle cross-cuts caste rank, and indeed supersedes it, and the results indicate that these families have an importance that has not been appreciated in the ethnography of the region.

All these inferences derived from the usage of honorifics amount to some substantial sociological results. Many of them could no doubt have been obtained in a more traditional manner by careful general ethnography. But an approach through language usage is at once more direct and simple, and has the great advantage of providing us insight that conforms to members' views. This verstehen perspective seems to be the most important contribution that sociolinguistics can make to sociology.

However language is not the only area that provides important verstehen insights. Marriott, working with other media of transactional exchange (food and services), had already seen the importance of inter-

actional materials to problems in Indian sociology, and indeed we have utilized a great deal of his method here.

So it remains for us now to clarify the relation of linguistic to non-linguistic media of interaction. The relation is important because the results on different media are not entirely coincident. Fortunately, Beck (1972:154-181) provides much data for interaction patterns in the same village on non-linguistic media, some of which is summarized in Figure 4.26. With reference to the figure, the linguistic media of T/V usage provide the first column, with the top column representing ranks by giving and the bottom column representing ranks by receiving, and the non-linguistic media follow. 'Seating' here indicates rank determined by the willingness to offer and accept a seat on the veranda of a house belonging to a member of another caste; 'eating leaves' represents the rank determined by willingness to 'give' the service of disposal of leaf-plates to another caste, and by the number of castes willing to do this service for each caste (determining its 'receiving' rank); 'curds' represents ranks by the giving and receiving of milk products; 'rice' by the giving and receiving of cooked rice on informal occasions. The first two non-linguistic media (seating and leaf-removal) have the same valuation as V-exchange, while the second two (rice and curds) have the same valuation as T-exchange. A point of difference between Beck's ranks and ours is the different inventory of castes: she includes castes 12 and 15 excluded in our discussion, and does not distinguish 7b; but comparison is not seriously affected.

Now the most remarkable thing about behaviour in these different transactional media is the fundamental similarity in the rules of

Figure 4.26 Ranks on linguistic and non-linguistic media

	T/V	Seating	Eating leaves	Curds	Rice
Giving ranks	1	1	1	1	<u>1</u>
	2	<u>2</u>	2	2	<u>2</u>
	3	5	3	5	5
	<u>7a</u>	<u>7a</u>	4	7a	7a
	5	3	<u>6</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>8</u>
	6	<u>6</u>	<u>5</u>	9	<u>9</u>
	<u>4</u>	4	<u>7a</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>
	<u>7b</u>	8	<u>8</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>10</u>
	<u>8</u>	9	<u>9</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>12</u>
	<u>9</u>	10	10	14	14
	<u>10</u>	<u>11</u>	12	11	<u>11</u>
	<u>11</u>	12	<u>14</u>	13	13
	<u>13</u>	13	11	<u>15</u>	<u>15</u>
	<u>14</u>	14	13	4	<u>4</u>
	<u>17</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>
	<u>16</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>16</u>
	18	17	17	17	17
		18	18	18	18
Receiving ranks	<u>1</u>	1	1	1	<u>1</u>
	<u>2</u>	2	<u>2</u>	2	<u>2</u>
	<u>5</u>	5	<u>5</u>	5	<u>4</u>
	3	7a	<u>7a</u>	7a	<u>3</u>
	6	3	<u>8</u>	<u>8</u>	5
	4	6	9	9	7a
	7a	<u>4</u>	<u>6</u>	6	<u>8</u>
	<u>7b</u>	<u>8</u>	10	4	<u>9</u>
	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>6</u>
	<u>9</u>	10	4	<u>10</u>	10
	10	<u>11</u>	12	<u>12</u>	12
	<u>11</u>	12	14	14	<u>14</u>
	13	13	11	11	11
	<u>14</u>	14	13	13	13
	<u>17</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>15</u>
	16	<u>16</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>16</u>
	18	17	17	17	17
		18	18	18	18

valuation and the patterns of ranking that emerge. These results hold out great promise for some general theory of transactions, or principles of interaction. We have already hazarded some guesses at why the principles should be the way they appear to be, and concluded that, pace Marriott (1968, 1974), the reasons to not appear to be peculiarities of Hindu culture but rather general properties of interaction systems. Specifically, we suggested that the valuations have a natural source along the following lines. Taking the reciprocal exchange of intimate material (food, T pronoun) as a basic and natural symbol of solidarity, the one way transfer of intimate material can be shown to have a natural interpretation as a symbol of asymmetric rank. The universal principle seems to be that the higher one's rank the more privacy, the greater the inviolability of one's preserve, while the lower one's rank the greater access others have to one's preserve. So one-way intimacy establishes a rank disparity. And this explains the universal facts about the use of T as both a pronoun of solidarity and of superiority, and the use of food both as a symbol of equality (commensality) and as a symbol of dominance (the feast provided for the servants).³²

However differences of rank on the different media do emerge and these need to be explained. Beck suggests two theories. One somewhat lame, but no doubt in part correct, is that different media measure different criteria of rank: so for example, behaviour in offering and receiving seating is essentially about power and material status, while the exchange of cooked rice is essentially about ritual status (Beck 1972:162). The other theory, which I shall call the conversion theory is adumbrated thus:

"it is my impression that when changes in ranking occur, they occur first in informal seating arrangements and only later in the realm of informal food exchange. Once these informal changes become generally accepted, they will be ratified at a formal feast. Thus we see a possible ordered progression of any particular innovation through several contexts and media" (Beck 1972:172).

In other words, actual rank is first established and recognized in everyday interactional media, and this rank then slowly passes through more ritualized, conscious and carefully guarded media. For a caste trying to maximize its rank then, the optimal strategy is to convert rank recognized on the highly unstable and ephemeral media of everyday interaction to the stabilized ritual media resistant to change. In this way it can gain a measure of security for its achieved rank. Covert in this theory is the Durkheimian view of ritual as a celebration of existing social structures, and the notion that some media of interaction are more ritualized than others. Both of these premises seem well founded in this context.

In relation to these two theories the linguistic media play a special role. With respect to the first theory the special property of the linguistic media is that they are not tied to any particular dimensions of social rank. We can show this by demonstrating, as we have above, that honorifics are sensitive both to overall caste rank, alliances between castes in the ranking arena, and to rank based on traditional power and authority. The linguistic media seem to be sensitive to virtually all social dimensions at once.

With respect to the conversion theory, the linguistic media again play a special role. For they are par excellence the media of everyday ordinary interaction. Linguistic media are one of the few areas where it is not possible in practice to abstain, with the result that we have universal exchange between all parties. Moreover nearly all parties are

aware of the details of this exchange, which contrasts with the details in other media. This follows from the public and endlessly replicated transactions in linguistic media. It seems likely then that the linguistic media are the primary arena in which actual overall caste ranks are achieved and recognized. Other daily interactional media like kinesic display, seating and touching (during delousing sessions, which occur across castes) would also have a primary significance, but they occur less often, less universally between all parties, or have less clear rank implications (valuations), and would thus be of less interest both to members and ethnographers.

If the conversion theory was correct in essentials, we would expect there to be lag in the recognition in ritual media of ranks newly achieved in the everyday media. Some confirmation of this can be gained from charting the fortunes of castes 3 and 4. Returning to Figure 4.26, these castes have a high rank in the linguistic media, and also in the other everyday medium of seating. Their rank begins to be less certain in the more pollution/purity sensitive medium of eating-leaf removal, and has a positive fall in curd exchange transactions. And this low rank does not rise significantly in informal rice exchange, perhaps the most sensitive ritual medium. A reasonable interpretation of this is that castes 3 and 4 have in fact established a high overall rank for themselves in everyday interaction, but are now experiencing the built-in resistance and lag in the ritual or purity-related media where acceptance of high rank would be more permanent. And certainly caste 4 does seem to be in general in the region attempting to systematically up-grade its status.

We may conclude this chapter with the observation that the

linguistic media, as represented by our honorifics, do seem to provide the most direct access to indigenous views of the over-all general rank of local castes. They do so because they are media unattached to any particular social dimensions (secular or religious rank, for instance), and constitute everyday de facto recognition of the actual state of affairs. They are moreover media in which all parties exchange, with usages that are generally known to all parties, and where the valuations are particularly clear and can be non-circularly assigned. In short the study of language usage between castes seems to be amongst the very most important sources of information on the nature of the caste system.

CHAPTER V: INTRA-CASTE USAGE: SOCIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS II

	Page No.
5.0 Introductory remarks	439
5.1 The Tamil kin terms	443
5.1.0 General remarks	444
5.1.1 The terminologies of the village	449
5.1.1.1 Superficial syntax and logical form	450
5.1.1.2 Semantic (and/or pragmatic) interpretation of the logical form	462
5.2 Kinship categories and pronominal usage: details for one caste	503
5.3 Castes compared: variation in intra-caste T/V usage	534
5.4 Emergent patterns and their implications	555
5.4.1 Some emergent patterns	555
5.4.2 Explanations and implications	565
5.4.2.1 T/V usage and caste hierarchy: an instance of a sociolinguistic universal	565
5.4.2.2 T/V usage and the left-right division	584
5.5 Conclusions	589

5.0 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

In this chapter we move to a finer focus: a consideration of what happens within each self-reciprocal cell in our inter-caste matrices. That is, we describe the ways in which the T/V pronouns are used within caste. But as soon as we step inside caste in South India, we are in the kinship domain, for "kinship...and caste...are complementary concepts. Kinship stops at the boundary of caste" (Yalman 1962:550) and the "boundaries of caste...coincide with those of closed and systematic kinship terminologies" (Yalman 1967:221).

Unfortunately Dravidian kinship studies are an area of unresolved controversy. Skirting the polemical issues wherever possible (but we cannot avoid them all), in section 5.1 we extract from the kin terminologies in use in the village those basic social categorizations that are implicit in them. Some of these results are surprising and controversial.

In the next section (5.2), partly guided by these basic categories, we examine the usage of the T/V pronouns within a single caste and develop a simple visual representation for comparative purposes. The following section (5.3) then collects the data for all the castes, and presents and compares T/V usage within them. Sources of intra-caste variation are also explored. The last section (5.4) draws some conclusions from the overall patterns of usage in the village that emerge, and raises some fundamental questions about hierarchy and internalized rank and ideology. For there are systematic relations between the internal treatment of kin (which T/V usage indexes) and the external relations of a caste group.

But apart from simply extending our knowledge of pronominal usage and its vagaries, what motives are there for bothering with such details? We have two. In the first place there is a point of general anthropological interest. This is, to put it crudely, that kinship and respect (or deference) seem to have some intrinsic connection. Anthropologists have for long associated kinship relations with the 'customary attitudes' that are enjoined within them. Indeed the founder of modern structural kinship studies, Radcliffe-Brown, held that "In studying a kinship system it is possible to distinguish the different relatives by reference to the kind and degree of respect that is paid to them" (1952:95). He went on to elaborate his famous 'tetrad' (Fortes' term) of joking, familiarity, respect and avoidance, which were seen as atomic elements of kinship relations (see the discussion in Fortes 1970:42-59); it was these that were borrowed by Levi-Strauss to construct the structural opposition of attitudes that gives flesh to his basic 'kinship atom'. And although British structural studies of kinship claim to have gone beyond this, discovering that "the critical factor...is the jural status of the parties in relation to one another, not the sentiments and attitudes in which it is expressed" (Fortes 1970:48), in the last resort the irreducible element of kinship is held to be "inescapable moral claims and obligations" (Fortes 1970:242). But when these obligations are toted up they turn out to contain as an important element and respect (see for example Goodenough 1965:11-16). Indeed we have reason to think that deference and the expression of solidarity are basic building blocs, out of which all social relations are constructed (not without other ingredients of course), as discussed in Brown and Levinson 1977. But in kinship at least such dimensions

seem to play an 'irreducible' role, as those who assume ethological sources agree (e.g. Tiger and Fox 1971). In short such attitudes are not far from the bedrock that constitutes kinship itself. Consequently the study here of their place in a kinship system may throw light on the general nature of kinship as well as the particular nature of Dravidian kinship.

A second reason for attending carefully to intra-caste T/V usage is the hope that it will give some insight into the sorts of patterned oppositions and alignments between groups that emerge in complex, hierarchically organized societies. A point of general interest and contention is why groups will accept and symbolically ratify their own degradation. Lowly groups do this, for instance, in the way they talk (as we know intuitively as members of such societies). Some theorists see this as an outcome of profound mental blinkering and conditioning (e.g. Bernstein), others simply as a result of human limitations on the ability to change conditions on rule application once these are acquired in a natal group that has a distinctive dialect for historical reasons (as argued by Labov). But neither theory pays any attention to the inherent symbolic and non-arbitrary nature of the language variants. For particular patterns of language usage can carry inherent implications for the nature of the social relationships within which they are used, as Brown and Levinson 1977 have argued at length.

The possibility then emerges that a lowly group maintains patterns of language use that are sources of external social stigma because the values and social relationships expressed by those patterns are internally highly valued within the group. For kinds of customary social relationships are not the kinds of things discarded as readily as

language habits. And that explains why language habits are after all not easily discardable. Since patterns of T/V usage have a readily identified valuation, with implications for the nature of the social relationships within which they are to be found, and since moreover it is generally agreed that some patterns are more prestigious than others in the kinship domain, intra-caste T/V usage can provide some very useful insight here.

Of course even if the possibility above is substantiated, the question still remains why stigmatized types of social relationship (which the language patterns merely express) are valued and maintained. In this chapter we try to provide an answer to this important question from our case materials. We argue that the reason that such patterns of language use are maintained within a group even when they are sharply stigmatized is that the social relationships they express are functions of the type of social network characteristic of that group; and the type of network is in turn a function of socio-ecological realities like demography, and the degree of formation of class divisions within a group. Drawing on the work of Bott and Gumperz in particular, we thus isolate social network as a key intervening variable in the relation of language to society.

5.1 THE TAMIL KIN TERMS

We turn here to the kinship terminologies used in the village in order to extract the major dimensions of intra-caste organization. But the Dravidian terminology has been the focus of anthropological interest and controversy for a long time. Ever since Morgan appreciated its coherence, there have been attempts to describe its under-

lying structure and its associated functions in rather different ways. The literature is now too extensive to review here in detail without taking us too far afield. Some swift remarks must suffice before we concentrate on the particular facts as they are for our village.

5.1.0 General remarks

In talking about terminological systems, I find it useful to think in terms of three distinct formal levels, and a fourth level of sociological interpretation. The formal properties of a system seem to me to be facts distinct from the forces that cause or caused them to be that way. The three formal levels are:

- (1) Superficial syntax: the particular morphemes, productive suffixes, the potential adjunction of modifiers, and so on, and the syntactic constraints that follow from these.
- (2) Logical form: the sets of componential features, or primitive predicates (Kay 1976 after Atkins forthcoming), associated with a kin term.
- (3) Semantic (and/or pragmatic) interpretation: the functions that take logical forms into truth values.

From this it can be seen that I take the view that the assignment of a componential (or similar) 'definition' to a term is not a semantical assignment at all, rather the relation of a term to its componential 'definition' is precisely parallel to the relation of a sentence to its logical form. Just as logical form has then to be interpreted, so do the components or associated predicates. (For a similar view see Kempson 1976:35-36, drawing on Montague 1974³³, Lewis 1972 and others.) The cognitive representation of this interpretation function may in many cases be a complex algorithm. Finally we have a distinct

set of problems:

- (4) Sociological interpretation: the historical causes of the social functions of the fully interpreted formal system.

Now anthropologists have often assumed that questions at all these levels are related to the point of being almost indistinguishable. For instance they assume that answers to the questions raised by (4) can throw light on levels (2) and (3) (in Dravidian studies see for example Dumont 1953, Yalman 1962). In addition they overlook the fact that systems may be identical at level (2) but differ significantly at level (3). That is, on one structural level (corresponding to a particular partition of a componential space) it is possible to identify (as did Morgan 1870) a general 'Punaluan' (or Dravidian-Seneca-Iroquois-Dakota) system, which on another level (apart from assigning actual cross-cousins to the same category) will have a great range of interpretations in terms of which particular social alters will be quite differently assigned to categories that they can be said to be truly members of. Formal equivalence or similarity at one level is no guarantee of formal similarity at another. But social functions can only be attributed to fully interpreted systems (otherwise though similar, they may be used for quite different purposes), consequently it is implausible to assume the same social function for term systems from different cultures, or sub-cultures, unless they are more or less identical at all levels. No one social function is ever going to explain the 'Punaluan' family of systems. The failure to distinguish levels (1) to (4) only then engenders confusion.

Since in what follows we do not directly address the issue of the prime functional source of the Dravidian terminological systems,

let us briefly review some of the main sociological interpretations. The arguments here are about what kind of social context the term systems are primarily adapted to. In the first place we have the long recognized fact that the Dravidian system would be ideally suited to a moiety organization and operates "as if the entire society consisted only of two inter-marrying exogamous, patrilineal groups" (Leach 1960b). As Beck (1972:215) notes it is only in a moiety context that the Tamil terminology would cease to have a completely egocentric quality. But in the great majority of contexts where the system is employed no moiety organization exists; in our village there is surprisingly one exception, the moiety organization of the Harijan caste 18 (moracu maataari), as described in Beck 1972:75-77, 102-9. In view of the rarity of such organizations functional arguments based on them would have to be founded on the unprovable past prevalence of such systems.

An entirely different functional source that has been argued for is that the system is primarily adapted to a dual descent organization with exogamous matrilineages and patrilineages. Emeneau (1937) reports such an organization for the Todas. This would explain the fact, so central and problematic for functional explanations, that both matrilineal and patrilineal parallel cousins are unmarriagable. Apart again from the rarity of such dual descent systems (and Yalman's critique 1962:561-3 of Emeneau's findings), there is the problem that the semantic interpretation (that is, level (3) above) of the system as used by Tamils clearly has nothing to do with unilineal descent reckoning at all (as we shall see). In view of this fact, Gough's (1956) 'Africanist' interpretation in terms of Radcliffe-Brownian

lineage solidarity and particularistic sentiments to affines, is likewise untenable.

The same fact also weakens Dumont's interpretation of the terms as adapted to a social system where both descent and alliance (enduring relations created between descent groups by marriage) are transmitted from generation to generation (Dumont 1953, 1957a). For insofar as this interpretation rests on the fact that members of ego's unilineal descent group are coextensive with his parallel kin, which is (at least for our village) demonstrably not the case, Dumont's theory has little application. For given that these sets of kin are not coextensive, there is no close fit between the Dravidian terminology (at least as interpreted by Konku peasants) and social systems built on enduring descent and alliance relations.

Yalman's functional account (1961, 1967) is both more acceptable and more vague. His claim is that the terminological system is really adapted to the workings of the endogamous caste or micro-caste, and has as a core the reciprocal claims of brother and sister on each other's offspring. These claims, operating within a bilateral kindred, set up a potentially closed (but flexible) group within which each ego's potential sexual and marital relations are strictly prescribed to one particular category of the terminological system ('cross-cousin of opposite sex'). However there are a number of problems with this explanatory scheme. In the first place, as pointed out by David (1973: 527), the reciprocal claims of brother and sister on each other's offspring will only explain the inclusion of actual MBD and FZD (for a male ego) in the 'marriagable' (cross-cousin) category, and not any others of the kintypes found in that category. Secondly small bilateral

kindreds of the almost-closed 'micro-caste' variety found in Ceylon, are much less prominent in South India and sometimes not identifiable at all (for instance, in our village an average of 60% of marriages are contracted with non-relatives, with some castes reaching 80% and over, and this does not suggest the kind of social organization that Yalman had in mind. See Beck 1972:254 for details). In circumstances where the appropriate social organization is not to be found, Yalman must then fall back on historical or cultural explanations. Finally, in accordance with his scheme Yalman stresses that "...there are no in-laws in such a regime, for it assumed that everyone is already related..." (1962:553), and "The reason why there are no formalities in the union of two close kinsmen is because, structurally speaking, nothing happens...A correct union between the right categories of kin changes nothing." (1962:565). This is not true for India. Moreover in our local case the terminological system distinguishes actual affines from potential ones (a point so far apparently overlooked in the analysis of Dravidian systems).

Clearly the difficulties that confront a unified account of the Dravidian terminology in terms of the basic social functions it performs are enormous, given the variety of social systems that it operates in. It is not surprising then that attempts have recently been made to give a cultural, rather than a social, account. For instance, David 1973 articulates a now fashionable Schneiderian analysis, in terms of native notions of bodily substance and the degree to which it is shared. Unfortunately at the critical point, explaining why MZD is not a potential spouse, the account becomes vague, as apparently do the natives (David 1973:524). In any case the account has no general

application: even other Tamil groups in Ceylon do not appear to think like this (McGilvray 1976), while David's rejection of the centrality of the brother-sister tie (David:1973:527) simply does not accord with the cultural facts in South India (see e.g. Beck 1972:252, 1974).

My own feeling is that apart from a widely attested association with cross-cousin marriage (i.e. with a category that includes actual FZD and MBD), there are few social or cultural forms intrinsically associated with the Dravidian terminology viewed generally and abstractly. That is, on the abstract plane of levels (1) and (2) above (syntax and logical form), the system is simply general enough to be compatible with diverse cultural and social forms. It is only when we specify the exact semantic content of the categories (that is, add level (3) to our analysis), that the system begins to take on the specificity that we can expect to be correlated closely with particular forms of social organization. It is critical then to find out in each case how the terms are actually applied (for there are many different interpretations of the Dravidian terms that would assign MBD and FZD to the 'female cross cousin' category MMD and FBD to the 'female parallel cousin' category, but differ in other important respects. They cannot simply be assumed to be identical).

5.1.1. The terminologies in the village

Let us now turn to the structure of the terminologies actually used in oolappaalaiyam. We shall restrict ourselves to the set of reference terms and their use in reference rather than in address (except where some confusion needs clarification). Beck (1972:290-2, but see also p.227) has a useful discussion of the usage of the terms in address, which I believe to be correct in all essentials. We may

begin with an analysis at levels (1) and (2) above, which is relatively straightforward.

5.1.1.1 Superficial syntax and logical form We shall assume (probably counter-factually) that the logical form of each term is adequately represented by a componential definition. To represent this assignment visually we may use the traditional box-diagram format, as in Figure 5.1. The central bloc of this diagram is a 'semantic' space cut by three main dimensions, namely sex, generation, and what we will call the cross/parallel distinction. It is this which is the essentially shared structure behind all the Dravidian terminologies, and which all the functional explanatory schemas described above have tried to explain. The set of terms, or lexical items, that are mapped onto this space are of course known to vary from language to language, area to area and caste to caste (see Pillai 1965, Yalman 1967, Tyler 1966 for instance). To this basic structure there tends to be added a dimension of relative seniority/juniority in years to ego, which cuts through ego's generation. So much is generally agreed to hold for all the Dravidian terminologies.

The lexical sets and their structure, as used in oolappaalLaiyam, are displayed in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. Each caste group seems in fact to maintain a slightly different system of its own, but there are nevertheless two major types of structure, that associated with caste 5 and its right-hand followers, and that associated with castes 1 and 2, and more partially with 3, 7a and 4 - the core of the left-hand division including its model and leader. We give therefore two box diagrams, one for the kavuNTar system (Figure 5.1) and one for the Brahman system (Figure 5.2). The facts here are derived almost entirely from

Figure 5.1 Basic kin terms: the right hand model





Figure 5.2 Peculiarities of Brahman kin terms: the left hand model



Beck's account, except that we have corrected some address/reference confusions, identified a set of taxonomically superordinate options, and most importantly a set of affinal terms, the existence of which seems to have been systematically ignored in virtually all theoretical accounts of the Dravidian terminologies.

In the central part of the box diagrams, since there are three major dimensions to represent in a two-dimensional plane, we use slant lines to represent the third dimension of sex (top left triangle for male, bottom right for female), retaining the vertical dimension for generation, and the horizontal for the cross/parallel distinction. The componential definitions may then be read straightforwardly from these box diagrams by a concatenation of the values on all dimensions. Thus in Figure 5.1 paaTTan = + cross, + 3 generation, + male, and aNNan = - cross (parallel), 0 generation, + elder than ego. (Note that we can - as noted by Dumont 1953 - view the dimension of age relative to ego as a sub-division of generation: there are difficulties with this though as will be seen below). Since these definitions are readily obtainable from the diagrams we shall not bother to list them here.

This is all that is needed to understand the central part of Figure 5.1. On the left of the central block there is an optional variant for terms for the + 2 generation, which collapses the cross-parallel distinction there. That is to say these two terms are taxonomically super-ordinate, so that ayyaa subsumes both appicci and appaaru, and aattaa subsumes ammaayi and appattaa (contra Beck 1972: 287). They are in fact the terms more commonly used.

On the right of the central block are a set of much more problematic terms, those specific to affines. Since it has generally been held that the distinctive feature of the Dravidian terminologies is that the affines are classified identically to cross relatives (Dumont 1953, Yalman 1962, 1967), the fact that these are a set of affinal terms distinct from those for cross relatives is something of a bomb-shell. Unfortunately while in the field I was still influenced by the general dogma (that no affinal terms exist) to make a special study of them. Nevertheless the following occur in Beck's account, my notes or transcripts of tapes. The interesting thing about them is that some of them seem to be kin-type specific (not 'category words'), and they do not all refer, while some do, to cross relatives. That is, there is no possibility of defining them in terms of the abstract dimensions so far introduced (as, say, a special sub-type of cross relatives, or as a category defined as not-cross-nor-parallel).

The terms in question are the following:

(1) maamanaar and maamiyaar: these refer primarily to the actual father-in-law and actual mother-in-law, but have some lateral extension. Immediately it will be objected that these are in fact just honorific forms of the terms for cross-relatives of +1 generation. But I do not think they can be so easily reduced in that way, even though that is undoubtedly their etymological origin. This for two reasons:

(a) the honorific suffix-aar is archaic and is no longer freely used productively to generate honorific forms of personal nouns in colloquial Tamil.³⁴ (Thus the current honorific form of TakTaar, 'doctor', would be TakTaar avarkaL not Taktaaraar

(b) even if maamanaar can be reduced to an honorific form of maamaa, we are still left with maamiyaa. This would have to be derived from maami, referring to MBW, and so on. But this word is not used by any group in the village to refer to that category (according to my notes, or Beck's tables (1972:Appendix F), although there is a lacunae in the last source for Brahman usage to MBW, FZ, which Beck records as being covered by two different terms: 1972:228). The term in general use to cover the appropriate cross category is attai (caste 4 has attammaa for MBW, caste 18 akkaa for MBW and FZ, according to Beck, but the latter is probably an address usage only). Nevertheless all groups refer to the actual mother-in-law as maamiyaar. Of course again the etymological origin is assuredly from maami, which is recorded as being used for MBW by a Brahman group in Tanjore (Gough 1956:851). But etymological origins can be distinct from current usages, and at the very least these terms as used in oolappaaLaiyam pick out a very special kind of maamaa and attai, highly respected, namely ego's spouse's actual parents with some extensions to their siblings. (I have for instance a case of WFB being referred to as "cinna maamanaar").

(2) cammanti. This is a curious category. Beck lists the following kin types to which it refers (1972:288, term number 13): SWM, SWF, DHM, DHF, BDHF, BDHM, BSWF, BSWM. I do not know whether this is an exhaustive list or not (in general Beck's lists are not, and cannot be, given the infinite lateral extensions for many terms). It is a curious collection because the term clearly covers certain persons of both sexes (unlike any other term) of O-generation, including some cross relatives

and some parallel relatives. To see the latter point, the reader will have to take on faith the cross-parallel assignment procedure to be discussed below, which assigns those categories as indicated in Figure 5.3. This figure indicates the genealogical connections of all the listed cammanti to ego. From the figure, it seems as if the correct assignment of features to cammanti would be 0-generation, \pm male, \pm cross, and a link by one marriage in -1 generation. The last is of course the truly affinal feature. We may note in passing that Gough recorded the term for her Tanjore village (she notes only the extensions for SWF, DHF, SWM, DHM, for both male and female speakers: Gough 1956:852), and also that it may be found in good dictionaries defined as 'one connected by marriage, affinity', and derived from sampantam 'connection, affinity', and (oh what foresight!) 'marriage alliance' (Beisenherz 1910:276).

There can be little doubt then that we have here at least a genuine Dravidian affinal term.

(3) cakalai, koRuntanaar, naattanaar (with other forms cakalan, koRuntaar, naatti respectively). I lump these together mostly because I know little about them, but they do apparently shade the fact that unlike the previous category they refer to affines created by marriage in 0-generation (not one in -1 generation as above). The kin-types I have associated with these in my data are: cakalai WZH, koRuntanaar HyB, naattanaar HeZ, yBW. To be honest I must admit that the data allow some other interpretations, but these ones are consistent with Gough's list (1956:850,852) and with dictionary definitions (Beisenherz 1910).³⁵ I should also add that these terms seem rarely used. This would be explained if, as I think is the case, they refer to relatively few kin-

Figure 5.3 Extension of the term cammanti





Figure 5.4 Extensions of other affinal terms



types and have restricted lateral extensions. One should note also that they are reference terms only and are not used in address.

Figure 5.4 shows the relation of these terms to the cross-parallel distinction. From this figure we can see that (as far as the evidence goes) the features associated with each term are the following:

cakalai: +male, 0-generation, +parallel, related directly to ego by two marriages in 0-generation (male ego only?).

koRuntanaar: +male, 0-generation, +cross, related directly to ego by one marriage in 0-generation, younger than spouse, (female ego only?).

naattanaar: +female, 0-generation, +cross, related directly to ego by one marriage in 0-generation (female ego only?).

For lack of space only some of these features are indicated in the block diagram in Figure 5.1.

We have now reviewed the major features of Figure 5.1. A few minor details worth drawing attention to, though, are these. I believe that the terms maccaan and maapiLLai are used in address to elder and younger addressees respectively, and that only maittunan is the proper reference form (forms only used in reference are marked with an asterisk). The terms marked with a dagger or plus sign, if used without modification are likely to pick out the 'prototype' kin; for instance if ego refers to makan it will (ceteris paribus) be assumed that he is referring to his own actual son. If he wishes to indicate another member of that category, it is more appropriate to say makan morai 'in the relation of son'. This presumably operates by conversational implicature as described in Grice 1975. Informants emphasized that either usage was correct, but that failure to supply morai when the more

distant relation was meant would be positively misleading. (Compare the infelicity of 'I went to the office today' meaning your office not mine). The theoretical interest is that this does suggest an 'extensionist' viewpoint; that is, members seem to have proto-typical members of category words even though they are indeed categorical (compare Fillmore 1975, Rosch 1976, Kay 1975).

One area of superficial syntax that is interesting from the same point of view is the use of the modifiers cinna 'small' and periya 'big'. These like the terms in O-generation indicate the relative age of the referent, but unlike the O-generation terms this age is not relative to ego's own age. For the modifiers combine only with the +1 and +2 generation terms, and indicate age relative to the proto-typical member of that generation and category. Thus if ego refers to someone as periyappaa (i.e. senior appaa) then this picks out some member of the category appaa who is elder in years than ego's actual father (the prototypical member of appaa). Similarly with periyayyaa, which picks out some referent elder than ego's actual FF or MF. The operation of such modifiers is then theoretically interesting as clues to the internal organization of categories.

Turning back to Figure 5.2, the block diagram here shows the differences, both lexical and structural, between the kavuNTar (caste 5) terminology in Figure 5.1 and the Brahman one here. Blank spaces indicate areas identical to the system in Figure 5.1. There are just two areas of difference. The first is the abolition of the distinction cross/parallel in +2 generation, which loss is optionally supplied to the kavuNTar system by the superordinate terms ayyaa and aattaa. Note also the consequent loss of the distinction between +2 and +3 gener-

ation. The second is much more interesting: the division of the cross-categories into matrilateral-cross and patrilateral-cross. Thus maammaa which in the system in Figure 5.1 covers both MB and FZH here covers only FZH, MB being designated by ammaan according to Beck (1972:289). She does not give the terms for MBW and FZ but does indicate that they are not the same (1972:228): if we supply these from Gough's Tanjore Brahman usage we would have maami and attai respectively (Gough 1956:851, and 849). Nor does she give any indication of any lateral extension. But clearly this could systematically exist, partitioning the parental generation into matrilateral-cross versus patrilateral-cross kin (Gough ibid gives an extension of maami to MFBSW, and of attimpeer, presumably the local equivalent of our caste 1's maamaa, to FFBDH).

But when we find that the matrilateral-cross/patrilateral-cross distinction is also applied to ego's own generation the whole affair becomes much more puzzling. For not all cross relatives of ego's generation are cross relatives by virtue of genealogical links through ego's mother or father. For instance how can we assign ego's ZHZH or SWFF to patrilateral-cross or matrilateral-cross? Clearly we cannot. And if we think about it we see that this is also a problem for the assignment of members of +1 generation who are related to ego by marriage in generations below that.

There seem to be two ways in which such a system could work. One is that the distinction matrilateral-cross/patrilateral-cross applies only to prototypical kinsmen of the appropriate categories. We would then simply have a set of terms that make this distinction only for a few special kin-types, and this would be superimposed on a general

back-up system of the sort described in Figure 5.1.


Another possibility, the one assumed by Gough 1956 and the subject of much criticism (e.g. in Yalman 1967:348, 1962:561), is that Brahmans make a systematic distinction between consanguineal and affinal kin. For if they used affinal terms systematically to all those related by marriage in 0-generation and below then there would be no difficulty applying the matrilateral-cross/patrilateral-cross distinction to consanguines.

The truth is that I do not know which of these is correct. But the reason is instructive in itself. Although I have hours of tape of local Brahmans talking to members of many castes, Brahmans in this area adopt the kinship reckoning of the right-hand castes (as in Figure 5.1 above) except when speaking to familiar members of castes 2 and 3 alone. That is to say they code-switch from their own kinship system into the dominant one for most external interactions. (This is also true of other features, lexical and morphological and prosodic, of Brahman dialect.)

Perhaps the ease with which they do this is evidence that the first solution is correct. Another possible line of support for that solution is the functional argument adduced by Beck to explain the distinction between MB and MBS on the one hand versus FZH and FZS on the other. The argument is that "... the Brahman and Pillai custom of distinguishing the wife-giving relatives (MB and MBS) from the wife-taking relatives (FZH and FZS) corresponds to their special concern with the bride's father as a dowry-provider. The use of sperate terms enables these groups to give the 'takers' more respect and the 'givers' less" (Beck 1972:229; a footnote adds "informants...say that the FZH

should be given extra respect, while the MB is ever so slightly inferior"). Further "all three factors - dowry, the distinction between wife-givers and wife-takers by using kinterms which imply inferiority and superiority respectively, and the importance attached to FZD marriage - fit together." (1972:255). Now given that Brahmans here have a FZD ritual preference (1972:238), if followed this will lead to a delayed exchange relationship, as shown by Levi-Strauss 1947, which will invert every generation the roles of giver and taker between two exchanging groups. Now clearly these groups cannot invert their matrilineal-cross patrilineal-cross distinction each generation if it partitions the entire set of consanguines; thus they could not keep their respect-giving in line with their wife-giving. Therefore it is rather the first solution in terms of the distinction's application only to a few actual kin-types that seems to be the correct one.

Unfortunately I am not sure that the argument goes through. In the first place in fact for Brahmans actual MBD marriage (14.3%) is twice as frequent as the ritually preferred FZD marriage (7.1%: Beck 1972:254). In the second place it is not clear that the direction of respect giving is in fact in line with the ritual FZD preference. For consider the following set of hypergamous exchanges:



Here if MB and MBS are the givers (and the less respected), then what ego gets is a MBD not a FZD. In the same way he gives a sister to FZS, who receives a MBD from an inferior. So this pattern of respect giving would seem to go with a MBD, not a FZD preference. In view of the fact that in other respects Beck's functional argument seems culturally appropriate (compare Gough 1956:843) I am at a loss to provide explanations of these details. We review them because they will be relevant to facts described below.

Note that aspects of the Brahman system are shared by other core left-hand castes, as indicated in Figure 5.2 (details from Beck 1972: 289-90, 228). What is shared though is the underlying structure, not necessarily the lexical items, which illustrates the need for an isolable level of logical form.

5.1.1.2 Semantic (and/or pragmatic) interpretation of the logical form

Our discussion of the Brahman terms has already indicated how little one knows about how a terminology actually works given just a box diagram of the sort in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. Of course if one was also given very long lists of the kin-types subsumed in each category part of the ignorance would be dissolved. But we would still not know how this assignment is achieved, and thus how yet further kin-types would be partitioned.

Given then a componential analysis of a set of terms, there are two further things we would like to know:

(a) the abstract semantic interpretation of each component, that is, the associated function that will take possible worlds into truth values (see e.g. Lewis 1972)

(b) the actual algorithm used by members to perform this same mapping.

In short, we want to know what +1 generation, cross and so on actually mean in terms of (a) the circumstances in which it would be true to say of someone that he had those attributes, and (b) the rules members use for deciding whether he has those attributes.

A proper study of these would be a thesis in itself. My purpose here is simply to report some informal observations that indicate the general ways in which such components are actually interpreted. The set of dimensions that underlie the structure of the box-diagrams are the following:

- (1) sex
- (2) age relative to ego
- (3) generation
- (4) cross/parallel
- (5) matrilineal cross/patrilineal cross

and associated with the affinal terms:

- (6) direct relationship by marriage in 0-generation/-1 generation and possibly some others like 'younger/elder than spouse', 'female/male speaker'. Now we will not consider all of these here. In the first place the first three dimensions may well be assumed to have universal and straightforward interpretations. This does though presume that generation has a strict genealogical measurement, which in turn presumes that the terminology is organized on a socio-biological basis and not on a purely social one in terms of significant groups and categories as argued by Leach (1958) for the Trobriand terminology. But as we shall see this presumption is not always correct, and that on those occasions a Leachian analysis is actually the right one. In fact generation must be given two interpretations in accordance with

two quite different usages to which the terminology is put, one in terms of genealogical generation as universally understood, but another in terms of social age grade, and the locus of the referent in an age grade relative to ego. This will become clear when we discuss the nature of the cross-parallel distinction.

Secondly, since we have already discussed the difficulty of the interpretation of matrilineal-cross/patrilineal-cross in relation to the Brahman terminology (where alone it is relevant), we shall have no more to say about it. Similarly since the facts about the affinal terms are almost certainly incomplete, we shall not investigate the associated components here. Clearly though we would have to give an exact specification of 'person connected by a direct relationship by marriage'. If the affinal terms refer only to the specific kin-types mentioned above, then the correct interpretation may be 'a referent joined to any member of, or offspring of a member of, ego's natal family (excluding members of +1 generation) by a marriage in a specified generation'. If on the other hand general lateral extensions exist, then we would have to add to the condition something like 'or a relative of that referent's who stands to him in the 0-generation, +parallel, same sex, category (i.e. is classified as a 'brother' or 'sister' by that referent)'. This last is probably the correct interpretation.

We are left then with the problem of the interpretation of the cross-parallel distinction. This will require a lengthy discussion as the issues are both complex and controversial. Lowie was apparently the first to generalize the distinction beyond ego's generation:

"If the parent of A through whom he is related to an uncle (aunt) is of the uncle's (aunt's) sex, we speak of a 'parallel uncle (aunt)'; if of the opposite sex, we speak of a 'cross uncle (aunt)'. The children of A's parallel uncles (or aunts)

are his 'parallel cousins'; they usually figure as siblings in native nomenclature. The children of 'cross uncles (aunts)' are 'cross-cousins'; they commonly figure in native terminology as 'cousins', i.e. under a term indicating a relationship less close than that of a sibling" (Lowie:1948:62, quoted in Tyler 1966:418).

The underlying idea here is that the children of classificatory 'siblings' of the same sex are parallel cousins, while children of 'siblings' of different sex are 'cross-cousins'. But as Tyler points out which kin-types are assigned to cross and which to parallel will then depend crucially on the definition of classificatory 'sibling' (Tyler 1966:418-9). Kay 1965 then attempted to provide a precise definition that would partition all consanguines into the two categories. This was aimed at accounting for terminologies organized around lineal exogamy, where all members of a lineage are parallel, and all others cross. But the definition operated in a different way, assigning cross to all those related by an odd number of female links (in a patrilineal context), and parallel to all those related through an even number of female links; in a matrilineal context, the significant links were male rather than female (Kay 1965:30). However Tyler showed that "the designation 'same lineage, different lineage' has no necessary relation to the sex of constituent links in a (genealogical) string" (1966:421). The only circumstances where there would be an inherent connection between cross/parallel thus defined and lineage membership would be where the relationship was traced through only one significant link (then alter must be in some descent group other than ego's) or where there were only two such groups (i.e. exogamous moieties). But we need not conclude from this that Kay's definition is of no use, but rather that it will not in fact apply

to terminologies organized around lineage exogamy.

In fact in Tyler's very useful survey (1966) of some terminologies that make a cross-parallel distinction, he concludes that the systems which incorporate the distinction fall into at least three incommensurable types (1966:430), one of which is Kay's. The first is a system that assigns cross/parallel on the basis of unilineal descent group membership alone, a type exemplified by the Koya (Dravidian speakers of Andhra Pradesh); the second is a system that uses Kay's odd/even count of 'significant' links in a string, which is claimed to work for another Dravidian system, that of Telegu Brahmans; and the third is a system that is based on the sameness of sex of two specified links in a string (ego, first linking relative, or last linking relative), as exemplified by the Iroquois. Tyler correctly concludes that despite superficial similarities (specifically the assignment of MBD, FZD to one category and MZD and FBD to another) these systems differ fundamentally in their assignments of kin to cross/parallel and therefore in their functional adaptations to social systems.

One point worth emphasizing is that Tyler found two Dravidian systems exemplifying quite different types of system. Yet all Dravidian systems are almost identical (at least at core) to that in Figure 5.1 above. Indeed it is quite likely that there are groups in South India that use terminologies that have identical lexicon, and identical logical form, but different semantic interpretations. Intra-cultural variation can take place independently at all the levels we isolated above.

The crucial question then is: what type of interpretation is actually employed by the members of our village? And the somewhat

bewildering answer is none of the types above, and more than one type simultaneously! For the material demonstrates that the cross-parallel distinction as used in the village has two quite independent sources.

The two sources are:

- (i) an assignment to categories based on the nature of specific kin links between ego and alter in paths traced in ego's genealogical net
- (ii) an assignment to categories based on the membership of ego and alter in particular social groups.


The first mode of assignment is genealogical, and a kinship mode in the strict sense of being anchored to socio-biological ties. But the second mode operates in terms of socially significant groups or categories in a manner precisely similar to Leach's analysis of the Trobriand terms (Leach 1958). The remarkable thing is that these two entirely different systems of categorization seem both to be used by members of many groups, and are in practice meshed to achieve a high measure of consistency. Let us take them in turn and show how they work.

(a) Genealogical cross/parallel

That the Tamil kin terms are assigned on the basis of genealogical kin types in at least one mode of reckoning does not seem to have been doubted by any who have done field work in Tamilnad.³⁶ But the circumstances in which such reckoning is explicitly used are few and far between. Nevertheless informants in teaching me the use of the kin terms naturally resorted to locutions of the form:

- (1) namma appaa-ooTiya appaa-ooTiya tampi maka(L), attai-taan 'our father's father's younger brother's daughter is a cross-aunt' where nuclear family kin-types (here F,B,D) are used to construct strings which can be assigned to category terms by the native speaker.

Such statements of equivalence can be heard spoken not only to the ethnographer, but to others in a learning situation, namely children. But once the kin terms are known and understood, there is little occasion for the use of such expansions in terms of elementary kin-types: one can much more efficiently pick out persons on a genealogy by proceeding in the leaps and bounds afforded by the collapsed kin-type strings that the terms are equivalent to. Thus given that the relationship in (1) can be diagrammed as



with different degrees of collapsing one could refer to alter as

- (2) paaTTan-ooTiya tampi maka(L)
 grandfather's younger brother's daughter

which can be further collapsed to

- (3) paaTTan-maka(L)
 grandfather's daughter

and finally to

- (4) attai
 cross-aunt

But to this it may be objected that such equivalences prove nothing about an inherent genealogical base, but rather simply reflect a complex series of logical equivalences (stated say in meaning postulates) that hold between category words. Yet it can hardly be a coincidence that such equivalences can be exactly paralleled by equivalences stated in terms of kin-type strings (in the way that we can say that the kin-types

in (1) and (2) and (3) can all be assigned to (4)). The problem with a purely social interpretation (as in Leach 1958) of the categories is that it cannot explain the absolutely systematic and exceptionless assignment of socio-biological relationships to those categories.

However there is also some slightly more positive evidence provided by the way in which there seem to be prototypical members of each category who are in each case the referents specified by the shortest string of kin-types that is subsumed within the category (where two such strings are of equal length, then there are dual prototypes, as in the case of FZS and MBS as prototypes of male cross-cousin). We have already pointed out that such prototypes are picked out or referred to by the presence or absence of certain modifiers. Thus cittappaa, 'little father', picks out a member of the 'father' category who is younger than ego's actual father. And the terms for persons in lower generations will generally be understood to refer to the prototypical kintypes only, unless the modifier -morai (by relationship) is added. Thus I was told that it would be misleading to refer to a male cross relative of -1 generation by the only term for this category, marumakan, unless a marriage in his own (marumakan's) generation links him to ego's parallel relations. That is to say the prototype seems to be a male affine of ego's parallel females of the generation below, specifically perhaps the husband (or his brother) of ego's actual daughter (or BD). (Note that we here find the expected affinal element in the ordinary cross terms). Other modifiers that serve to pick out the prototype kin-type include taay- (mother) as in taay-maamaa ('mother cross-uncle') which will ordinarily refer only to actual MB. Then again, the way that we know that the string of kin-types in (1) above

refers to prototype members of categories and not lateral extensions is that the string is prefixed with namma (our-inclusive). For namma appaa (our-inclusive father) tends in context to force the implicature that the 'father' in question is ego's actual father and not some more distant member of the category. If one wishes to indicate that the referent is not a core member of the category one can use modifiers like duura- distant (as in duura-maamaa, a distant cross-uncle). That particular kin-types are category-cores is also illustrated by the small range of extension of the affinal terms discussed above, limiting cases of which are purucan, husband, and manaivi, wife, which have of course no lateral extensions at all.³⁷

The evidence then suggests that not only are genealogies mapped systematically onto kin term categories, but that those categories have as core proto-types particular kin-types as defined in the universal 'algebra' of strings of nuclear family relationships (M,F,Z,B,H,W).

Let us now ask what principles assign genealogical strings to the membership of the cross or parallel categories. Here nearly all the work has been done for us by Peck's concise and explicit statement of the rules involved in applying the distinction (1972:215). If all discussions of Dravidian kinship had been carried on at this level of detail and understanding many of the controversies of the past would have been resolved before they had begun. Her rules are these:

"(1) Rules for classifying relatives who are of the two generations immediately above ego(...):

- (a) Marriage joins people of the same category.
- (b) Males are classified in the same category as their fathers; females in the category opposite to their fathers.

- (c) Opposite-sex siblings always belong to opposite categories, and same-sex siblings to the same category.
- (2) Rules for classifying relatives who are of the same generation as ego, or of the first one below (...):
 - (a) Marriage joins two people of opposite categories.
 - (b) Children are classified in the same category as that parent who bears the same sex as ego.
 - (c) All children in a sibling set belong to the same category."


To make these rules of Beck's fully explicit we shall need one further rule to handle the transition from the generations where rule (1) applies to the generations where rule (2) applies. We can formulate it thus:

- (3) Across the +generation/0-generation line, children are always of the same category as both their parents.

Beck emphasizes that the most salient characteristic of these principles is that "the relatives who belong to that generation which is immediately above ego's own are classified according to the inverse of the logic used to classify relatives in ego's own generation and in the one just below it" (1972:213). To see this consider the genealogy in Figure 5.5 (adapted from Beck 1972:214) which shows some of the assignments that an adequate formulation of the rules must account for. Note that in ego's generation and below the sex of ego changes the assignments: we provide a portion of the genealogy (within dotted lines) from the point of view of an ego of either sex.

As a demonstration that Beck's rules are indeed fully adequate (with the addition of (3) above) we can construct an algorithm on their

Figure 5.5 Examples of assignments to cross/parallel by Beck's rules



basis which will make the correct assignments. The task is to assign cross or parallel to the referent specified by kin-type strings of the sort FZSSW. One possible such algorithm is presented in Figure 5.6, but there may be simpler solutions. There are a few fudges here.³⁸ One merit though of this mode of representation is that it makes explicit the kind of information required at each step. From this we can see that, contra Beck, the principles utilized in O-generation and below are not the exact inverse of those used in senior generations, for the principles utilized in O-generation and below (and only those) sometimes require information about the sex of ego. The basic kind of operations involved also stand out: the algorithm scans not just the nature of the links themselves, but also on occasion the relation of the link in hand to the immediately preceding link. It therefore requires input of two adjacent links at a time, in addition to an initial assignment of cross or parallel to the first link. Although this could be arranged differently, the way the particular algorithm in Figure 5.6 works is by searching for links that make no category change; when one of these is located the process skips to next link. If a category change is required, the two-state category store flips to the other category, and then proceeds to next link. When there are no next links the system returns the current state of the category store.

We can see at a glance that this assignment procedure is very much more complex than Kay's (1965) procedure which simply counted links of the opposite sex to the sex utilized in unilineal descent reckoning (apparently operative amongst Telegu Brahmans). It is also of course considerably more complex than the assignation of parallel to ego's


Table 5.1 Key to symbols used in Figure 5.6

All assessments should be read as yes/no questions, where a plus signifies a yes answer, a minus a no answer. Apart from two clear exceptions, the assessments ask whether the specified kin-link is of the indicated category. The sign '=' should be read as 'is' or 'is a member of' as appropriate.

Assessment symbols

G1	= the generation above <u>ego</u> (<u>not</u> above the preceding kin-link)
G1+	= any of the generations above ego
G0	= ego's (zero) generation
2	= link of kin-type string being currently processed
1	= link immediately prior to link being currently processed
H	= husband (to prior kin-link)
W	= wife (to prior kin-link)
H/W	= spouse (to prior kin-link)
F	= father (to prior kin-link)
M	= mother (to prior kin-link)
F/M	= parents (to prior kin-link)
B	= brother (to prior kin-link)
Z	= sister (to prior kin-link)
B/Z	= sibling (to prior kin-link)
opp.sib.	= opposite sex sibling (to prior kin-link)
S	= son (to prior kin-link)
D	= daughter (to prior kin-link)
m	= masculine (to prior kin-link)
f	= feminine (to prior kin-link)
CAT	= cross or parallel category
EGO	= the individual from whose point of view the referent is to be assigned the initial link being a member of his nuclear family.

Figure 5.6 Cross/parallel assignment algorithm



unilineal descent group (or moiety) and cross to all other such groups (as reported for the Koya by Tyler 1966). It thus represents yet a third different interpretation of the shared logical structure of Dravidian terminology. (Note that it is also more exacting than Lounsbury's rules (1964:1077-83) for cross-parallel assignment among the Seneca which required ascertaining the sex of just two specific links in any string; here the whole string must be processed from first link to last).

But of course it doesn't follow that because an algorithm is different the actual assignments that have to be made are different. But we can satisfy ourselves rapidly that the assignments made by Beck's rules really are different from those made by any other principles reported in the literature. For instance, taking Kay's algorithm first, since the Tamil terms are here used in a patrilineal context the significant links in a string would be female, and an even count would assign parallel to the last element, while an odd count would assign cross. The extensions given for the term attai by Beck are as follows, with the count of significant links in the second column:


FZ	1
MBW	2
BWM	2
ZHM	2
FFBD	1
FMZD	3
MFZD	3
MMBD	3
MBWF	2
MZHZ	3
BWMZ	3
ZHMZ	3
SWFM	2
DHFM	3
WM	2
WMZ	3
WFBW	2

since there are both odd and even assignments of numbers of significant links, Kay's algorithm clearly does not predict that all these kin-types would be assigned by members to the cross category attai. (Surprisingly Kay's algorithm does rather well on the kin-types assigned to a few terms, e.g. appaa; but clearly it must fail in 0-generation and below where assignments depend sometimes on the sex of ego.)

On the other hand, unlike the Koya system the Tamil assignment of cross/parallel as used in our village, is not predictable on the basis of lineage or clan membership either, except in those cases where it is associated with a moiety system. Cross-assignments and lineage membership simply cross-cut. This can be seen at a glance in Figure 5.7 where a genealogy with cross/parallel assignments is mapped onto a set of patrilineages. There is simply no correlation here between lineage membership and parallel category. However that such a correlation can exist between moieties and the cross/parallel assignment rules as formulated for our village, is illustrated by Figure 5.8. And in fact (as mentioned above) just one caste in the village, number 18, does maintain a moiety system (Beck 1972:75-6). In just this one case then the genealogical cross-parallel assignment falls almost exactly into line with a sociological division of the population.³⁹

We may ask why the interpretation rules for cross/parallel work in this complex way. Why in particular is there this total change of the principles used in the senior generations to a partially inverse set of rules for junior generations? One answer seems to be that given the particular principles used in the senior generations, we can see that to meet the conditions that kinship systems universally do there


Figure 5.7 The relation of cross/parallel categories to patrilineal descent groups



Note that Ego's Z would have a different assignment; her ZD for example would be parallel.

- * = parallel women commonly married by kavuNTar egos
- + = parallel women occasionally married by kavuNTar egos

Figure 5.8 The relation of cross/parallel categories to patrimoieties




must be some change of principles in the generation below. For if Beck's rule (1)(a) 'Marriage joins two people of the same category' was to apply also in 0-generation, then since by rule (1)(b) a son is the same category as his mother, it would follow that wives would be of the same category as mothers. Figure 5.9(a) shows how this hypothetical extension of the senior generation rules to junior generations would partition close kin. Obviously such a scheme could no longer be associated with the regulation of marriage as it would fail to rule out mother-son incest. Similarly if the rules for junior generations were extended to senior ones, as in 5.9(b), marriage would join individuals of different categories, and once again a son would class his wife and his mother in the same category. A concern with incest then seems to be at the heart of the inversion of rules across the +1 generation/0-generation boundary.

The other strange feature of the system is the way in which the rules utilized in the junior generations are relative to the sex of ego. Again a reason for this seems to be a concern with incest in the nuclear family. Here the danger is that a parent will be classified in the same category as the opposite sex offspring. But the rules ensure that for a male, his daughters are of the same category as himself; while for a female, her sons are also the same category as herself. Yet husband and wife must be of different categories. Figure 5.9(c) shows how Beck's rule 2(b) achieves this.

It seems then that given that the categories assign the licit partners in sex and marriage, and given any portion of the rules as formulated by Beck, the rest of the rules must follow if incest within the nuclear family is to be prevented (or at least not encouraged by

Figure 5.9 The function of the generational inversion of the cross/parallel assignment rules



the terminology).


Now we turn to a different topic: the resolution of conflicting genealogical ties to alter. It has been argued on the basis of Sinhalese materials that the Dravidian terminology with its freely bilateral organization affords special opportunities for the selective activation of particular kin links rather than others (Leach 1961, Tambiah 1965, Yalman 1962, 1967). But clearly this is only so if there are no subsidiary rules that state which particular pathway through a genealogy to some specific alter is to be utilised, and which other potential pathways are to be ignored. But Beck (1972:223-226) points out that in our village such detailed rules do in fact exist. She gives the following rules of priority:

Parallel grandparental term	Other parallel term	Cross term by ego's marriage	Cross term by another marriage in ego's gener- ation or below	Cross term by a marriage in a senior generation
0	1	2	3	4

where, if the genealogy permits, one always chooses a term further to the left in preference to one towards the right. What these preference rules prescribe is that, first, one will never overlook a parallel connection in favour of a cross one (with implications of avoiding inadvertent incest); and secondly that, if one can only establish a cross relationship, one will never ignore the closest of the relationships established by marriage.


An interesting question is whether these resolution rules form part of the formal interpretation of the logical structure. If so it may be possible to considerably simplify some assignment algorithms by restricting their application to pre-selected paths (Tylor's (1966:421)

critique of Kay could then be circumvented). But there is some evidence that Beck's rules are not hard and fast (or perhaps their formulation is not quite correct). Two cases that reverse her priorities follow:



Here V is both maittunar (brother-in-law) and marumakan to O.S.S., and O.S.S. is both maittunar and maamaa (cross-uncle) to V. But the relationship that V activates towards O.S.S. is maamaa, thus reversing Beck's prediction that type 3 terms (in her schema above) precede type 4. I do not know whether this priority is general practice, but I would not be surprised. For O.S.S. is a generation senior and such persons should be shown respect, and the way to do this is to address and refer to him as a senior.

A second case is:



Here prior to B's marriage to C (indicated by the arrow) A treated B with the scant respect (including address with the T pronoun) typically shown to WyB. But this relationship (WyB) is the only affinal relationship that is not marked by a high degree of reserve and respect. Therefore when B married C, he became A's marumakan or son-in-law, and

because this relationship then eclipsed the prior one A had to show a new respect for B (including the usage of the V pronoun). This then is a reverse of Beck's order of priorities between her type 2 and 3 relationships above. It is moreover an oft repeated pattern in my data.


On the basis of these and similar examples I would argue that priority between different potential genealogical links are in part established in a way that will retain a proper giving of respect (a theme also emphasized by Yalman 1967). Beck (1972:225) also indicates that this is the basis of choice within her categories above. But our cases seem to show that because all affines, with the exception of WyB (for reasons discussed below), are treated with extraordinary respect, close relationships by marriage take priority over those cross relationships established in other ways. In (a) the affinal connection is the one non-respect relation (WyB), so the affinal priority lapses; in (b) the respect-requiring affinal relationship takes priority over the non-respect requiring one. We therefore suggest that affines form an important category that according to my informants over-rides many and perhaps all of Beck's priorities above. A further case will be presented below.

Given that so much anthropological theorizing has turned around the hypothetical ways people use kin terms, it is rather surprising that there have been no published studies of recordings of the natural conversations in which kin reckoning naturally occurs. From the details of such talk, the actual methods members employ would almost certainly emerge in a way that would leave little to the theorist's imagination. This was hardly the main subject of this research, and

no attempt was made to collect such conversations in a systematic way (for example, during marriage deliberations), nevertheless a number of interesting snippets occurred on tapes gathered for other purposes. We present one example of such a snippet here, which will serve the purpose of illustrating many of the aspects of genealogical reckoning discussed above (statements of equivalence in terms of kin-types, the picking out of individual members of a category, the resolution of conflicting assignments by rules of priority, and so on).

A visit to relatives at tankacciyammaampaTTi

Participants: members of caste 8; the visiting family (1) pays a visit to the family (3), to whom they are linked via Sa and her family (2) (so Sa is parallel kin to (3), the rest of (1) are cross). Their kin links are as below:



Speakers in this excerpt:

Ku and her daughter R; Sa and her mother-in-law Pa.

A word for word translation follows. Some sections, indicated (....), are omitted. Obscurities are clarified in brackets beneath. Only

kin terms are underlined; other Tamil words are proper names.

Text I

1. Sa: did you know of the accident that happened to citti's payan?
(son of little father's wife)
2. Ku: to who?
3. Sa: to vaLLiyammaa-citti's payan
(woman's name)
4. Ku: yes yes (....) on that day S (Ku's son) went and saw him
5. Sa: yesterday she (the boy's mother) came to the marriage
6. Ku: what?
7. Sa: annakkoTi-akkaa's koRuntanaar's marriage, right?
(female name + elder sister + husband's younger brother's...)
8. Ku: which annakoTi?
9. Sa: our-inclusive annakkoTi-akkaa's koRuntanaar
10. Ku: oh was there still one more boy unmarried?
11. Sa: yes, tankaveel
12. Ku: oh
13. Sa: there was another boy, wasn't there? The girl (came from)
valeyapaaLaiyam near kunattu
14. Su to Sa: those people (Ku and family) didn't get an invitation?
15. Sa: didn't an invitation come here?
16. Ku: it didn't come here
17. Sa: they said they posted it
(.....)
18. Ku: so there was another boy? (....) two boys then?
19. Sa: (....) four boys
(.....)
20. Sa: then citti came to the marriage
21. Ku: ah right
22. R: do you call her citti?
23. Sa: (laughs)
24. Ku to R: the man (=citti's husband) is younger than her (Sa's
periyayyaa (=periyappaa, 'little father'), so...

25. Sa: yes. cittappaa's wife, by kinship she would be aNNi,
attai-makaL (=nankaya, cross-aunt's daughter)
26. Pa: since she married your cittappaa, she's citti
27. Sa: since she married my cittappaa, she's citti (laughs)

We can make the following points with reference to this transcript:

- (1) The referents of category terms can be disambiguated by introducing other social coordinates, like place of residence or personal names.

In line 3 and again in 7, a particular member of a category is picked out by the use of that referent's personal name prefixed to the category.


- (2) Nevertheless because categories collapse indefinite numbers of genealogical strings which may be subsumed within them, a high degree of ambiguity (actually, vagueness) may remain. This can be avoided by spelling out the genealogical string in terms of category words, the referents of which are restricted to prototypes by various modifiers, or are understood to be prototypes by conversational implicature (as in Grice 1975).⁴⁰ Thus in line 9, the referent could be referred to with the category word maittunar. Instead we have the string namma annakkoTi-akkaa koRuntanaar (our-inclusive annakkoTi-elder sister's husband's younger brother). Here the namma picks out the actual akkaa (i.e. actual rather than classificatory elder sister), while the affinal term koRuntanaar only refers to specific kin-types.

- (3) Similarly, to make oneself clear one sometimes states both the concise category word and its equivalent kin-type string. Thus in line 25, we have cittappaa samsaram, moraikku aNNiyaakutu, attaimaka, 'younger father's wife, by kinship she would be aNNi (female, cross relation of 0-generation), cross-aunt's daughter'.⁴¹ This states, in juxtaposition to line 22, the equivalences: citti = cittappaa samsaram,

but also, by a different mode of reckoning, aNNi = attai-makaL. The last equation spells out the actual relationship: by implicature here (in the context of explaining to R why Sa calls aNNi in fact citti), attai refers to the prototype members of the category, namely FZ or MBW, and here in fact F_2^1Z . So Sa here states that aNNi = FZD (or MBWD).

(4) Finally, we have an instance of an assignment of priority between two different genealogical strings connecting ego and alter.

The relationships are in fact as follows:



Here there are two routes that ego (= Sa) can trace to B (= the vaLLiyammaa of line 3). One of them goes through ego's FF to A, and then to A's wife, B. The other goes through ego's father's half sister, whose daughter was B. Thus there are two claims:

- (a) B = ego's FFBSW; therefore a wife of a man in the appaa category, therefore citti, and therefore a parallel female of +1 generation
- (b) B = F_2^1ZD ; therefore attai-makaL, therefore aNNi, and therefore a cross female of 0-generation.

The last six lines of the conversation are concerned with these rival claims. In line 22 R expresses surprise that Sa would call B citti. In line 24, Ku interprets R's doubt as about the choice between citti (= wife of 'father's younger brother') and periyamma (= wife of 'father's elder brother'), i.e. about the choice within the relationship (a) above. So she explains that since the 'appaa' in question is younger than Sa's FeB (and, implied, younger than Sa's F), therefore periyamma would be the wrong term, and citti is the correct one. In line 25, Sa reinterprets R's doubt as about the choice between relationship (a) and (b) above. She admits that (b) is also an existing link. In line 26, Pa (the older woman and authoritative mother-in-law) explains that the link via (b) is irrelevant. The marriage relationship setting up (a) takes precedence over (b).

Note that the conflict occurs because of the cross generational marriage between A and B, where A belongs to the generation above B. For the rules for assigning cross/parallel change (as we have seen) from those employed in senior generations to those employed in ego's and below. If B had married A's son no conflict would have arisen, for in 0-generation spouses should be in different categories (cross or parallel), while in senior generations they should be in the same category.

Now there are a number of ways that the theorist could account for the preference that here is accorded to relationship (a) over relationship (b). The first is simply that this priority is what Beck's rules of precedence predict. Parallel relationships must never be passed over in favour of cross ones; citti is a parallel relationship, aNNi a cross one, therefore citti is preferred. But

this seems a bit lame because citti is only parallel because her husband is the wrong generation (otherwise she would be aNNi anyway). Another theoretical line might be: husbands and wives must form a consistent couple, that is, belong to the appropriate category and generation. Then, since one can't lower cittappaa's category to aNNan (0-generation) without being disrespectful, aNNi had better be raised to his generation. But then, because the assignment rules change, she will be parallel category, and properly called citti.

However in deciding why priority is accorded to relationship (a) we would do better to attend to the way the participants talk. For in line 26 Sa seems to contrast relationships by marriage to relationships moraiyukki, by kinship. And the authoritative reason for the priority is delivered by Pa (the mother-in-law) thus, in line 26: onka cittappaave kaTTunutanaale citti, 'since she married your cittappaa, she's citti'. It seems then, that for participants, relations by marriage supersede relations by other sources. A genuine concern then with the proper treatment of affines seems to be visible here again. Yalman's claim then that one of the special properties of the Dravidian kinship system is that "...in the union of two close kinsmen...structurally speaking, nothing happens..." (1962:565), does not seem to be true here. Connections set up by marriage take precedence over prior ones 'by kinship'. And this is in accordance with the very special treatment of affines with great respect, as will be discussed below.

(b) 'Sociological' (non-genealogical) cross/parallel

We have discussed at length the rather elaborate procedures used to assign the categories cross or parallel to referents on the basis

of the nature of the genealogical string linking ego and alter. But this is not the only way that informants assigned the distinction. There was another procedure that assigned categories to local groups on the basis of roles in marriage alliances. That is to say there is a distinct mode of reckoning that operated very much along the lines of Leach's analysis of Trobriand kinship terms (Leach 1958). Once again the best way to obtain insight into the process is to consider how informants talk about it verbatim. An example follows. We shall then return to the question of how, if two such totally different procedures are used to assign the same distinction, the two different modes of assignment can be consistently used side by side.

In the course of enquiry into the ways in which kavuNTars, who have especially strong clan organization, assign marriageability and respect (for instance the use of T or V pronouns) on the basis of clan membership rather than genealogical cross-parallel assignment, my principal informant K. sundaram paNTaaram claimed that his caste (8) really operated in the same way (see Beck 1972:221-223 for the background to this). He gave an example of how changes of alliance relationship between local groups can lead to changes in their cross/parallel categorization (underlining is again restricted to kin terms and brackets contain my added explanations):

TEXT II

"All the paNTaarams (caste 8) in paccaapaalaiyam and reTTivalasu (two local villages) are pankaaLi (parallel relations, especially agnatic ones) to our family here in oolappaaLaiyam. But all other paNTaarams in all other villages are true maaman-maittunar to us (= cross relations: this use of two kin-terms is the standard designator for this unnamed category, see also Beck 1972:220). We use


niinka (the V pronoun) to all of them. For instance all the paNTaaram in the nearby village called kumaraaNTi saavaTi are our true maaman-maittunar. But after my marriage they all became aNNan-tampi (parallel kin, again designated by two conjoined parallel terms), because my wife Sarasu's ammaa ('mother' category) joined there (to marry). In this way all paNTaaram in kumaraaNTi saavaTi are (my wife) sarasu's maaman-maittunar (cross-kin). But aren't the people who are my wife's maaman-maittunar, my aNNan-tampi? (Of course they are: a rhetorical question). So Sarasu's elder sister was married to one of Sarasu's maamaa (cross-uncles) resident in kumaraaNTi saavaTi. So now he is my cakalai, my wife's sister's husband. I say 'vaanka aNNan' and give respect. Before my marriage if I had thought about my relations (morai) to the people in kumaraaNTi saavaTi, Sarasu (ego's wife) would have been my tankacci ('younger sister' category). In this way, in the way in which one makes a marriage, distant aNNan-tampi (parallel) relations can change into maaman-maittunar (cross) relations. And maaman-maittunar of distant connection (tuuratta uravinarkaL) can change into aNNan-tampi. In this way at the time of changing, we may make some changes in our use of nii and niinka (T and V pronouns), won't we?"

The argument is this (I merely paraphrase the logic). Prior to marriage ego had participated in the following generalized relations (Figure 5.10) between three groups identified by locality (residence in three clusters of hamlets). Since residence in this caste is overwhelmingly patrilocal (85%, with 15% neolocal, and 0% uxori-local: Beck 1972:235) we may think of these groups as groups of co-residential agnates.

The arrows in Figure 5.10 indicate the exchange (or at least one way flow of women) between I and III, and (at least potentially) between II (ego's village) and III. In other words, prior to ego's marriage III was a group of cross-relations to both I and II. Consequently, if III was cross to both I and II, and I and II play identical alliance roles to III, then I and II must be parallel to each other

(the 'must' is the force of the rhetorical question in the text above.


Figure 5.10



Now however, ego (the informant) from village II marries a girl (Sarasu) from village I. This is permitted because I and II are only parallel by default, via the link through III, not being linked directly by any known marital relations. But now, to retain the partition of the three villages into the two categories, the relations must be changed. The significant links are now as in Figure 5.11.

In Figure 5.11 the arrow (a) represents the alliance relationship set up by ego's acquisition of a bride from I, while the arrow (b) represents the earlier alliance relationship set up by Group III's acquisition of women from I, including ego's wife's classificatory 'mother' and ego's wife's elder sister. So now the dominant pattern is that Group I is the wife giver to both II and III. Therefore Group I is maaman-maittunar, that is cross relatives, to both II and III. And II and III are aNNan-tampi, that is parallel relatives, to each other.

Figure 5.11



This then is an entirely different way of assigning the distinction cross/parallel. And from the way in which informants talk about it (as in the excerpt above) one may extract the following principles;

- (1) cross/parallel categories are presumptively assigned to groups, here groups of agnatically linked members of a sub-caste resident in a village, on the basis of roles in marriage alliances.
- (2) If there is a known agnatic link between members of two hamlets, all members of them are presumed parallel to one another (this is what underlies the statement in the first sentence of the excerpt that all paNTaarams in oolappaaLaiyam, reTTivalasu and paccaappaaLaiyam are parallel kin to one another).
- (3) If there is no known agnatic link and no known alliances between two local groups, they are presumed to be cross relations to each other, therefore marriageable. (Note that in this mode of reckoning cross and parallel are always symmetric relations).

(4) If there is a known marital link between two hamlets, all members of each are cross to members of the other.

(5) If two hamlets have independent cross relations (by marriage) with a third hamlet, then members of the initial two hamlets are parallel to each other. This is a second-order assignment by presumption. The 'logic' is this: givers of women (or receivers) to ego's hamlet are cross. Givers to ego's givers are parallel (second-order assignment). Givers to the givers of ego's givers are cross (third-order assignment). And so on. Odd-order assignments are cross, even order assignments are parallel, as if all exchanging groups were organized into exogamous moieties.

(6) Such presumptive parallel assignments can be changed by the establishment of an actual marriage link. We then have a first order cross assignment that is not mutable in the same way. Thus the second-order presumptive parallel relation between I and II in Figure 5.10 becomes a first order cross relation in Figure 5.11.

(7) Extending the logic, presumably if ego can identify the group that gives to the group that gives to his own group, that group (I) would be presumptively (third-order) cross, as below:




Figure 5.12

But if ego now established an actual marital tie to Group V, and Group V already had an actual marital tie to Group I, then this closer more direct link would take precedence and ego would consider Group I to be parallel (second-order givers).

These then are the rules, or some of them, used to assign cross/parallel on the basis of alliance relations. Notice that in such a mode of usage, the rest of the terminological distinctions must also be applied on non-genealogical grounds. Thus 'generation' must here refer to age-grade, not tallies of links through parents or children.

But all this should be surprising. We have already seen that the genealogical mode of reckoning cross/parallel will not consistently assign the categories in such a way that they run along patrilineal lines. That is genealogical cross/parallel and lineage membership are not coincident. But here, in this other non-genealogical mode of assignment, we have entire local groups being assigned to one category or the other, and these groups are members of a sub-caste whose males are agnatically linked (on the whole, at least). So it must be the case that genealogically assigned cross/parallel will fail to mesh exactly with those reckoned on the basis of alliance between hamlets. How do members make sense of the contradictions thrown up by these conflicting modes of reckoning?


Or is there some mistake here? Is there some way in which the contradictions are avoided and never arise? No. The same informant produces an example of such a contradiction in assignment. I had asked him about the ways in which kavuNTars sometimes marry their parallel cousins, for instance their own MZD, (discussed by Beck 1972: 221-223), and to this he said:

Text III

"This doesn't happen just in the kavuNTar caste; it can happen in the paNTaaram (ego's) caste too. For example, my mother's younger sister was given in marriage to a paNTaaram in the hamlet of maTaviLaakam near here. All the paNTaarams in maTaviLaakam are true maaman-maittunar to us. In this way a marriage with mother's younger sister's daughter might come about. Actually mother's sister's daughter's marriage didn't come about, though out of my mother's sister's kuTumpum (household, here extended family), true pankaaLi (parallel relations), my father's elder brother and my father's younger brother married. Then my father's younger brother's son married a girl from my mother's sister's viiTu (house, here extended family). The maTaviLaakam paNTaarams are all maaman-maittunar relations to us. In this way we can marry our mother's younger sister's daughter as well. Isn't this the same as with the kavuNTars (members of caste 5)? If I now go to maTaviLaakam, everyone, except my mother's younger sister's kuTumpum (family), will call to me with 'vaanka maapiLLai' ('come-V younger-cross-cousin') if they are older, and 'vaanka maamaa' ('come-V older-cross-cousin, literally 'cross-uncle') if they are younger. In the same way I say maamaa to elders and maapiLLai to juniors (in reciprocation). There will be joking and play between us. For example my mother's younger sister's husband's father's brother's son (MyZHFBS:in Tamil cinnammaavin kanavanin tanteyin sakootaraarin makan) still addresses me with 'vaanka maapiLLai'."

The situation the informant reports as the following:

Figure 5.13



Here FyB marries a girl classified as a 'daughter' by the genealogical method of categorization, and FyBS marries a 'sister'. And they can marry these parallel relatives because the hamlets have an alliance relation that over-rules categorization by the genealogical method. Nor does the presence of MyZ in the hamlet of maTaviLaakam establish a parallel linkage that can over-rule the long standing cross-relation between hamlets. Thus MyZHFBS who is parallel to ego by genealogical assignment (as indicated in the diagram) is addressed by cross-terms and given all the respect and mild joking appropriate with cross-relatives.

But all this is still puzzling. How can two such distinct modes of reckoning what is supposed to be the same distinction subsist together? The answer seems simply to be that they can, just so long as there is a system for establishing priorities of one mode over

the other in every case where a conflict of classification arises.

The resolution rules seem to be the following:

- (1) Genealogical ties through a female linking relative can be over-ruled by an assignment on the basis of alliance relations between two groups.
- (2) Genealogical ties of agnatic descent can never be over-ruled by an alliance relation between two groups. Thus Beck states that in marriage arrangements "...usually the inquiry is carried further on the father's side than on the mother's. Furthermore since the place where ego's FF resided is generally known, the most important question is usually whether the girl's FF, or indeed any of her direct male ancestors, have come from the same village. If the answer is 'yes' a parallel relationship will be suspected. Any suspicion of a parallel relationship, unless contradicted by concrete evidence, will most usually rule out the prospects of a marriage contract" (Beck 1972:220). Note that even these genealogical ties are inferred on the basis of locality.

The same informant as above, in a letter, provides a cultural 'explanation' of the differential importance attached to parallel connections traced agnatically and those traced via women:⁴²

"There is an old proverb about the konku custom: taay moreyoo, naay moreyoo (the mother's relations are like the dog's relations). The explanation of this saying is: a female dog will give birth to a male puppy and then later turn around and join (copulate) with it. In the same way, human beings don't have particular concern for the importance of the maternal line (taay vaRi). Yet they do ask regarding the people in the paternal line (tantai vaRi) 'what is the relationship

of these other people to us?' and behave according to that relationship. If you ask what is the important thing in this (latter concern), (the answer is that) if the people of the paternal kulam, kuuTTam, koottiram or naaTu (all names, preferred by different castes, for patriclan) are in disagreement amongst themselves, then one's maaman and maittunan will come to know of it."

While the last sentence is somewhat obscure, the gist seems to be that patriclan exogamy cannot be forgotten, because that would breed quarrels within the patriclan, and then the loss of prestige would ruin one's alliance relations (affinal relations at any rate).

To bring this discussion to a close, there does then seem to be an entirely different mode of cross-parallel assignment, on the basis of alliance relations between agnatic groups. It may well be that not all castes operate such an alliance mode of reckoning in addition to the genealogical one. But informants indicated that the rules discussed in this section hold essentially for castes 8, 7a, 9, 10 and 5. This group includes all the most important members of the right-hand division, and one somewhat ambivalent member of the left-hand, namely 7a (see Beck 1972:101). There may be some differences between these castes in the nature of the social groups that are visualized as alliance units. In the paNTaaram case, these units are clearly locality groups. In the kavuNTar case (caste 5), and probably the naaTaar (caste 10) case too, and to a lesser extent the uTaiyar case (caste 9), agnatic clans are substituted for locality-groups as the partners in alliance relations. This nothing more than a difference in emphasis in fact, since in the first place paNTaaram local groups are essentially agnatically constituted by virilocalism, and in the second place,

kavuNTar clans are in fact heavily localized (this is thoroughly documented in Beck 1972:78-97, 186-190). Nevertheless it is significant that where paNTaaram talk in terms of hamlets, kavuNTars talk in terms of their clan names.⁴³

I should emphasize that there is nothing in this discovery of an alternate mode of reckoning cross-parallel that contradicts the basic kinship findings in Beck 1972. All that it does is show how the various 'wrong' marriages, as reckoned by the genealogical assignment, which Beck herself drew attention to, are in fact (in many cases at least) not viewed as damaging exceptions to the social order. For they are legitimated by the other, non-genealogical mode of reckoning described here.⁴⁴

We have dwelt at length on the Dravidian kinship terminology. And although this discussion may seem at first sight peripheral to our main theme, namely the tracing of the actual usage of the main pronominal alternates through all the major areas of village life, this is not in fact the case. In the first place, the terminological system is of course a prime example of social deixis itself. For of course what a kin term is is a relational description, relative to the social locus of ego and alter. "Alan is my uncle" is a deictically anchored expression, the truth or falsity of which can only be assessed in relation to a context of utterance: it all depends who the speaker is, who Alan is, and what socio-biological ties are recognized to exist between the two. Of course, ego need not be the speaker (as in "Alan is John's uncle"), just as alter need not be the addressee. But this does not dissolve the fact that kin-terms work (perhaps paradigmatically) deictically, any more than the fact that performative verbs also

figure in reports of performative acts provides the key to the semantic interpretation of performatives (contra G. Lakoff 1975; see e.g. Gazdar 1976). One still needs to account for the deictic usages of "Uncle Alan", in both address and reference. Given such an account one might then be able to reduce non-deictic usages (where neither ego nor alter are part of the communication event) to the same kind of parasitic point of view operations that classically deictic words like 'this', 'here', 'come' and 'now' are subject to in narrative discourse (Fillmore 1974).

But the main reason for our long digression from the theme of pronominal usage is this. The categories into which the Tamil divides his own caste world (largely on an egocentric basis as we have seen) lie in the interpretation that he gives the Dravidian terminological system. And it is upon the basis of these categories that he adjusts the minutiae of his behaviour to other members of his own sub-caste.

By far the most important of these categories, from the point of view of the interactional concomitants, is the distinction between cross and parallel relatives. Hence our concentration on that issue. As Beck put it (1972:216, quoted in part above):

"This exercise in logic, which any Tamil speaker now and then performs, is not just academic. Ego must discover, upon meeting a distant kinsman, whether he belongs to the cross or parallel category in order to ascertain how to act in his presence. Each time he meets a new member of his kin network, he must ascertain this fundamental detail in order to determine whether joking and flirtation, appropriate with cross-relatives, will constitute the correct way to behave in his or her presence."

But other categories, age relative to ego, and especially affines, are also important determinants of appropriate behaviour. In the next two sections we examine the use of the T/V alternates as they reflect and structure these categories in the kinship domain. Once again we may

view them as crude but useful indices of the complex packages of interactional concomitants of these social categories.

5.2 KINSHIP CATEGORIES AND PRONOMINAL USAGE: DETAILS FOR ONE CASTE

In this section we examine the use of the T/V pronouns within just a single caste of median rank, in order to establish a basis of comparison. We explore the relation of this usage to the categories that emerged from the study of the kinship terminology.

But before we begin a few points of method are worth emphasizing. Although we have presented the analysis of the terminology before the analysis of the pronominal usage, the order in which insight into members' categories was gained was in fact often the reverse. For the analysis of an explicit set of terms for some domain is not the only way into the classification of another culture's world. In the first place the logical structure of the terms themselves may tell us very little, as we have seen. When we asked how these were actually interpreted, we obtained highly complex algorithms for their usage. Yet the distinctions that these algorithms established are not identified by any native terms. As Beck (1972:217) pointed out, there is no Tamil lexical realization of nor even a precise circumlocution for, the all important cross/parallel distinction (Beck suggests maccaan and pankaali respectively, my informants favoured conjoined kin-terms maamaa-maittunar and aNNan-tampi as partial ostensive definitions). Nor is there any single word for affine. But we know that these distinctions exist because of the role they play in the logical form of the terminology, and we know what their content is when we can specify exactly how they are used.

But there is another way of getting at members' categories. And that is to notice how they systematically treat different classes of things. For instance an alien ethnographer could grasp our distinction between 'reference books' and other kinds of books, by observing the different ways in which they are used. In the same sort of way, one can obtain insight into a ego's classification of social alters by carefully observing the ways in which those alters are differentially treated, whether with respect, civil inattention, familiarity or whatever. If in this way we start to collect the facts about pronominal usage to various addressees in our village, we soon find that for any one ego such addressees are partitioned into a series of significant categories which are treated differently. Even though the T/V alternation only has two states, different patterns of usage (symmetric, asymmetric) and different thresholds and criteria for usage allow the employment of this simple pronominal distinction to distinguish just about every important social category utilized in the village (from structural ones like caste, to personal attributes like personal esteem). Of course this is no behaviouristic discovery procedure: we need members' comments to identify different criteria for usage. Nevertheless the procedure guides our questions so that we end up only with categories that make a difference in members' usage of the pronouns.

If we utilize this procedure to find the significant categories for an ego within his own caste, we obtain the same results as those obtained by the analysis of the kinship terminology. And in fact in this case it was the rather dramatic facts of pronominal usage that led me to look for a category of affines in the terminology, a category that had been systematically underplayed in the literature. It was

clearly an awareness of such behavioural correlates that led Beck to study the cross/parallel distinction so carefully (Beck 1972:216). To the extent then that anthropologists operate such procedures implicitly in any case, our method is nothing more than an explicit (and therefore replicable) version of traditional or common-sensical modes of investigation. When students of kinship find determinate logical structures in terminological systems, despite formal indeterminacy, they do so because they have in mind categories that make behavioural or inter-actional differences.

Let us now take one caste and ask in detail how the usage of the T/V alternates systematically varies across different categories of same-caste alters. I choose here the caste I know most about, the okaccaaNti paNTaaram (caste 8), the caste with whose members I stayed and ate. It should be appreciated that in an Indian village equal access can never be had to all castes. Nevertheless on the basis of this one account in detail, we can with some confidence extrapolate to other castes the details that fill out general parameters of usage derived from elicitation, reports of usage, and occasional tape-recordings.

Let us start at the most intimate level and work outwards to more distant categories of kin. Pronominal usage directs us first to a sometimes exclusive island of intimacy, where reciprocal T usage predominates. This is the basic unit of family life, the kuTumpum, composed of those who habitually eat from the same hearth. This need not, and often does not, coincide with any physical unit (as for instance suggested by the English word 'household'). For eaters from different hearths may sleep under the same roof or at least share a

compound. Nor of course does the kuTumpum necessarily denote a 'nuclear family': it often contains members of three generations, or pairs of married brothers, for instance (for an excellent discussion, see Beck 1972:203-213).

Now the giving of respect, or familiarity, within the kuTumpum is an extremely important variable tied especially to caste, but also to 'class' as we shall see. In our chosen caste the facts are these: (1) children enjoy a great deal of intimacy with their mothers; and as in most castes, this mutual exchange of T persists on into the relation between an adult and his or her mother. However in some cases an elder man may feel awkward exhibiting the intimacy of childhood, and avoid either T or V in favour of the third person neuter verb ending and pronoun. Thus instead of ammaa, enna colrii? (mother, what did you-T say?), one may find ammaa, enaa colratu? (mother, what did it say?).

(2) Siblings do not show respect to one another: they exchange T. However in some upper castes, V is given asymmetrically to elder siblings, especially those at considerable age-remove. But here in caste 8, even in adult life, a younger brother T's an elder one, and receives T back.

(3) In some families of this caste children give V to their fathers. This is what one would expect from the widely known Hindu scriptural ideals of respect to elders, especially the head of one's family (the texts in question are the Dharma Saastras; see Beck 1972:212). The wife of my principal informant came from such a family of this caste. However, in the village, all members of this sub-caste use not V but T to their fathers. This is really quite surprising in an Indian

context: one only has to read Carstairs 1967 or Gough 1956 to get an idea of the extent to which this would be disrespectful to the point of total abuse, indeed unrequitable sin, in many Indian castes. It is a practice that assimilates our caste to those below it, but there is also an element of class-bound variation here (my small sample of variation indicates that in families with a solid economic underpinning V usage is standard to fathers. Better evidence from other castes will be discussed below).

(4) In one key relationship an asymmetrical use of T/V always prevails: the wife always gives V to her husband, and receives T in exchange. (There were actually some reported exceptions for some members of this caste, where stronger wives were said to use T in anger. I never witnessed this, but in some lower castes wives always T their husbands, as discussed below.)

These are the four basic relations in what we call the 'nuclear family'. But a kuTumpum may contain more kinds of relations than these. For instance, in an extended family it may contain the father's brother and his family. In that case we might have the following added relations within the kuTumpum:


(5) Parallel cousins, the children of two brothers. They would be classificatory 'siblings' and would treat each other as siblings. Hence in this caste they would exchange T.

(6) The relation of parallel uncle to his nephews and nieces (FB to BS and BD). If FB is the younger brother of father, then he will certainly be given T if father is. If he is elder, then V is a possibility, but in this village all cases were cases of mutual T, even if FB is not a member of ego's kuTumpum.

(7) The relation of a wife of one brother to the wife of another (BW to BW). The wives of the brothers may be roughly equal in age, or one rather older than the other. Only in the latter case is any usage other than mutual T likely to emerge, and then only initially when the younger woman is married in. However in the cases I have, such women apparently feel solidary, and exchange T from the beginning. The position of wives in a predominantly virilocal society is an important issue to which we will return.

(8) The relation of a wife to her husband's brother (BW to HB). The wife of a brother will give respect to her husband's brother. This is one of the basic affinal relations to which we will return below. The wife therefore gives V to HB and receives T in exchange. Possibly if HB was very much younger than ego's own husband mutual T might occur, but only if the male was a child I suspect (in any case I have no such case).

Thus for this caste the usage within the kuTumpum that we have so far, would be as indicated in the following (hypothetical) genealogy:



Units of this sort, true extended families, provide only 11% of local kuTumpum in this caste (but almost a third of kuTumpum in the

Brahman caste). A slightly larger percentage, 18%, are constructed of a nuclear family supplemented by one or more relations with no surviving spouse (see Beck 1972:210 for details). Suppose we have the widowed mother of the head of the kuTumpum added to a nuclear family. Then we would have the following additional relationships:

(9) Grandmother to grandchildren: Beck (1972:216) characterizes this as "indulgence on the part of the grandparent and affection mingled with respect on the part of the grandchild." But this need not be the case, for it is culturally appropriate that the widowed mother be a powerful figure who in many respects controls the household. In this case Radcliffe-Brown's general principle of the mutual affection and indulgence of alternate generations will be replaced by an authority relationship. In such cases, grandchildren give V and receive T.

(10) Husband's mother to son's wife: the Indian mother-in-law is consistently reported as a figure of absolute, and often harsh, authority over her sons' wives. And this is the case here too. Consequently the wife gives V to her mother-in-law and receives T in exchange.

The kuTumpum then defines one key area of respect and intimacy. In all castes it stands out as an area where the solidarity and intimacy indicated by reciprocal T exchange, over-rides (at least to some extent) the tendency to require respect (and therefore V) to seniors in age and generation. For an ego at any one point in time it is a well defined unit: but we have seen that it may contain a range of different kin. These variations are partly determined by the way in which the kuTumpum passes through the patterned domestic cycle of

the sort first elucidated by Fortes 1949. Persons flow in and out of the kuTumpum over time: sisters depart, wives arrive, the kuTumpum splits, acquires widowed members of prior kuTumpums and so on. Since the bonds created within a kuTumpum tend to retain the same quality for a lifetime, it is of little surprise that the patterns of respect and intimacy found within it, are also to be found outside it. In many cases, where exceptions to expected patterns of respect-giving occurred in my genealogies the explanation was that the two persons had once belonged to the same kuTumpum. For instance to cite an instance from caste 7b, an unexpected usage of T had the explanation that that particular mother's sister was married to ego's FB, and was once a member of the same kuTumpum as ego, and was therefore treated with the same intimacy as ego's mother. In nearly all castes then the kuTumpum defines an area where an unparalleled degree of intimacy supersedes otherwise dominant cross-generational respect and cross-age asymmetric relations: in all castes there are probably at least some families where the mother is T'd, and in most castes elder siblings are also T'd, and in a surprisingly large number the father-child relation is also one of mutual T.

From a male ego's point of view (or an immature female ego's), the next most salient kinship area is one composed of ego's close parallel kin. For in many castes this is another area of relatively relaxed respect, as expressed in the freer use of reciprocal T. Some of these parallel kin, the close parallel males and their families, are likely to be co-resident members of the hamlet, indeed to be right next door, if not in the same compound or even in the same kuTumpum. This follows of course from the preference for patrilocalism, a

preference achieved in 80% of all cases (on an average for all castes; Beck 1972:235), and 87% of the households in this caste. It is perhaps natural that such proximity (together with the facts of past membership of joint families) will tend to blend and blur the attitudes of intimacy and respect shown within the family with those shown to close parallel kin. But in some castes at least where respect to elders is more thoroughly enjoined than it is in caste 8, there will still be important differences like the fact that although children may T their mothers and even sometimes their fathers, they may not be allowed to T their FB or FBW.

In our caste (caste 8) however, the free use of T within the family carries over into close parallel relations, so that we have ego giving T to FB, FBS (even if senior in years) and MZ. This solidary T-exchanging extends to close non-resident parallel relations also, particularly to those residents of surrounding hamlets who are pankaali (sharers, parallel kin) by virtue of forming one alliance unit in marriage exchanges. One can find individual exceptions to such free T usage, but these clearly arise from the sort of personal status reclassification that we have already examined in the context of inter-caste usage. For instance, because my principal informant has gained skills, well-paid work and status as a successful assistant to anthropologists, not all close parallel kin feel free to T him any longer. While he gives T to his FBS, his own BS and BD give him (their FBS) the respectful V. These reclassification principles hold also for those who hold office of various kinds in many castes.

This is the point to interpolate a remark about the differences between male and female egos. For while male egos are likely to spend

their lives among their close parallel male kin, female egos will spend a large part of their lives among male cross kin. The crucial distinction is based of course on the fact that women in nearly all cases leave their natal hamlet to marry. There is an 'informal rule' of village exogamy that tends to ensure this (see above, and Beck 1972: 220), unless (as is very rare in most castes) marriage leads to uxori-local residence. Consequently a newly married woman finds herself amongst an entirely different set of persons (in an average of some 60% of cases these will be with persons who are not known to be related in any specific way, and are thus likely to be strangers; Beck 1972: 254); these will be predominantly her husband's parallel male kin (at least as reckoned from the alliance-unit point of view) and their families, that is her cross relatives and affines. Leaving a social world where much mutual T expressed intimacy and solidarity, the new wife moves to a social world where many are strangers (alone enough to enjoin V giving) and in addition in categories (cross relatives and affines) that must be respected. In short she moves into a world of V giving. (Recollect that from the point of view of inter-caste relations, the newly married-in wife finds herself in a similar position unless she is from a neighbouring hamlet. In her natal hamlet she is familiar with the particular hierarchy established there, and she knows whom she may T and whom she must V. In her new, husband's hamlet, she is a stranger, and gives and gets to a large degree the mutual V which strangers gracefully give to one another despite known hierarchical differences.) But in time the new wife has children and acquires a more central status. A specific domestic cycle revolves: she becomes manager of a family and is involved in

the marrying of her children, whose spouses will give her great respect. Her married sons' wives will come under her command, especially if they live with her, and she may in any case return to boss them after her husband dies. Correlated with this cycle are changes in the use of the terminology, as noted by Beck (1972:216-19). In brief, when a woman first marries into a group of her caste resident in some hamlet, the members of her caste around her will be predominantly cross relatives (although other wives of her generation will therefore be parallel). But as she, and her cohort of co-wives, have children, these will form a growing body of parallel relatives around her. (Precisely the opposite is true for men: young men will tend to live in a local group of parallel women, old men in a group with predominantly cross women.)

A female ego's usage of the T/V alternates therefore undergoes radical changes in relation to the domestic cycle, first as a child in her natal hamlet, then as a young woman married into a hamlet of cross relatives and their families, and finally as an old woman surrounded by the parallel offspring of her own and of other married-in women. In the first stage, a female child's usage is the same as her male siblings. But the second two stages are best illustrated by some actual examples. Figure 5.14 below shows the usage for two different egos (a young wife and an old mother) in the same genealogy (a genealogy clipped around the edges to yield co-resident kin). There are three co-resident kuTumpums here, each surrounded by a dotted line; the two kuTumpum units to the left share a compound, onto which the compound of the third unit backs. Arrows marked with a T and a V indicate which pronoun ego uses to the indicated kinsman. Ages of recipients are indicated by the numbers beneath the circles (women)

and triangles (men). Note that cross/parallel assignments are very different for the two egos. As is immediately clear, the major pattern that emerges is that the young wife does almost nothing but V, while the old mother does nothing but T.

It should be stressed that the rules for T/V usage do not change significantly over the period of the domestic cycle (bar the initial settling-in of the new wife). What does change in the number and kind of co-resident alters, and this is enough to produce a sea-change from a situation where a new wife lives in a largely V-giving universe to the situation where an old woman lives in a largely T-giving universe.⁴⁵

Nevertheless, although she almost never lives with them, a woman has the same basic relations (along with habits of T/V giving) to the parallel kin of her natal hamlet as her brothers do. And it is these that constitute, in our focal caste, an area of relatively relaxed behaviour with little asymmetrical V-giving. This feature (of relaxed familiarity with parallel kin) is though an important variable across different castes as we shall see.

The next significant area of inter-caste relations that emerges from differences in pronominal usage is that of close cross kin. Compared to parallel kin, this is almost invariably an area of increased respect. As a member of caste 8 put it:

"If you ask what the most important thing about the saying of nii (T) or niinka (V) to parallel (pankaaLi) or cross (maaman-maittunar) relatives is, it is that common to all the Tamil people is the custom of giving respect to those who are (both) cross relatives and seniors. Parallel kin on the other hand are called nii or niinka according to habit or (particular) caste (jaati) custom."

That is, different castes treat parallel kin differently, but all treat cross kin with respect (as we shall see caste 18, and perhaps 13 also, do seem to be exceptions to this as regards T/V usage at any rate). In our chosen caste (caste 8) usage to close parallel kin was intimate: T was used symmetrically as we have seen. This contrasts sharply with usage to cross kin for this caste, for even familiar MB and their wives, and for a female ego her own BS, must be treated with respect. At the very least, if older in years than ego they are invariably given V.

Now for an adult male ego there will be two distinct kinds of cross kin: those to whom one is linked by inherited bonds (by the genealogical mode of reckoning cross these will be cross relatives linked by a string that includes ego's F or M) and on the other hand those to whom one is linked by marriages forged in one's own generation or below. These two kinds of cross kin are treated so differently that we can only follow informants and distinguish the last as a special category, which I have called affines. Now although there is a special subset of cross kin who are affines, not all affines are cross kin (see our discussion of the terms cammanti and cakalai above). We shall then deal with affines separately. Here let us return to cross kin that are so by virtue of inherited bonds.

What we find in our caste is that respect is given to all these inherited cross kin if they are older in years to ego. If they are junior they will be given T, if senior in years they will receive V. As an example we can take part of the same genealogy as before (Figure 5.14), and look at a male ego's usage to close cross versus close parallel kin which will illustrate the very real nature of the distinction: the facts are as in Figure 5.15. Here we can see that


while FB gets T, MB gets V. But a MBS younger^{than}/ego might get T. However in many other castes, especially those higher than caste 8, the distinction between cross and parallel kin is even greater. In those castes the same MBS after the age of twenty or so, or after the social maturity signalled by marriage, would be given V even by a considerably older ego who would T a parallel relative (e.g. FBS) of the same age.

Other aspects of the interactional quality associated with ordinary cross kin are best discussed in contrast to the behaviour oriented to affines, to which we now turn.

We come now to a fourth important category recognizable by particular patterns of T/V usage, namely the category of affines. From among available cross kin, persons in ego's generation, or the generations below, choose spouses. Before marriage they were ordinary cross kin, but after marriage these spouses enter into special relations with those who have chosen them. First and foremost this is a relation between the two kuTumpum that are the sources of the bride and groom, although these special affinal relations do extend somewhat beyond this. And it is characterized by an extreme respect bordering very close to avoidance. Indeed both parties speak as if total avoidance would be desirable, were it not for the obligations that each has for the other (for instance periodic ritual feastings of the groom by the bride's relations must be observed, at least in caste 8).

The difference in interactional pattern between these affines and other cross (or parallel) kin has to be seen to be appreciated. Amongst ordinary cross kin, that is those connected through ego's mother or father, joking and horseplay are dominant themes; compared to the treatment of close parallel kin respect is given, it is true,

Figure 5.15 The treatment of close cross kin compared to close parallel kin in caste 8



but it is a familiar and joking respect, not an extreme deference. The quality of this joking-respect would be best conveyed through a transcript of a tape, but that would take us too far afield: we will rely instead on an informant's characterization (a member of caste 8 again):

"Even with maamaa-maittunar (cross kin) of distant connection one can joke and play. In this there will be some difference according to age. Two men of the same age will joke freely. A young man will speak a little less jokes (i.e. jokily) and he will give respect."

Indeed for many castes if a MB was younger than ego (which in a land of large families is not so great a demographic freak) he would be given no respect at all and receive T. In many castes it is the components of cross categorization plus relative age that lie behind the respect given to cross-kin, not the cross categorization alone.

To this the treatment of affines is indeed a contrast. When I first announced my intention to study respect giving in the village, and also to urban Tamil intellectuals, the first thing that came to informants' minds was the respect given to affines. The most culturally significant dyads are probably the relation of a man to his WF and WM. It is in these dyads that reciprocal respect reaches the point of near avoidance (see Brown and Levinson 1977 for an account of why these two modes of interaction - respect and avoidance - may properly be seen to be points on a continuum, as Radcliffe-Brown suggested). For instance when a newly married paNTaaram man went to his wife's natal home for a customary visit, I was witness to the fact that the wife's father uttered only one word to his new son-in-law in two whole

days. And that one word was vaanka (come-V, a way of welcoming) on our arrival. After that the father-in-law got up early and was out of the house before his son-in-law was astir; he only returned for hasty and separate meals. The mother-in-law who had to prepare the requisite elaborate food could not avoid the house to the same extent, but she hurried past her guest (who leapt to his feet as she did so), and avoided all unnecessary talk. Mutual V giving occurred whenever words were necessarily exchanged.


Now this contrast between the kind and degree of respect shown to ordinary cross-kin and that shown to affines can be shown to be based on different conceptual categories whenever a man marries a woman already closely related to him as a (classificatory) cross-cousin. For then, as illustrated above in the discussion of resolutions of priorities between multiple kin-links, the interactional behaviour appropriate to affines takes precedence over that thought proper to cross-kin in general. For instance if ego's MBSS marries ego's BD, the joking familiarity and T usage to the boy must turn abruptly to formal deference and V giving. The remarkable thing about such affinal relations is that (for many castes at least) they are the only kinship relations where a senior perhaps many years older than the young affine must give great respect to a junior. It is because of this change in the threshold of T/V giving that our simple two-state index of degrees and kinds of respect (our two pronouns) can still manage to helpfully distinguish respect given to cross-kin from that given to affines. For cross-kin, in this and many other castes, the threshold for changing from T usage to V usage is that the addressee be older than the speaker; for affines the threshold for passing to V

is simply a direct link to the addressee via a marriage of the addressee to a member of ego's natal kuTumpum (other than his parents), or to offspring of those members, regardless of relative age (with exceptions to be noted below).

As the last formulation indicates, this extreme respect is in fact not restricted just to interactions between the two natal kuTumpums from which the spouses come. It extends for instance to close parallel kin of the wife's family. Thus the same newly married young man whose visit to his wife's parents was described above, had occasion to go far away to a place we can call K, where it happened that his WFB lived. He stayed there, and the same avoidance, minimization of talk, jumping to the feet in the presence of each other which had occurred at his WF's occurred here too, though to a slightly lesser extent. Mutual V giving was of course the rule. The WFBS and WFBD could talk to the new affine, while his mother could talk to his WFBW, but with great respect (part of the conversation was in fact reproduced above in Text I as an illustration of the ways in which kin-terms are used on a genealogical basis). The patterns of T/V usage that occurred are recorded in the genealogy in Figure 5.16. Also included are the usages to the young man's wife's natal kuTumpum. Notice that ego uses V to his WZH, for this man is his cakalai, an affine deserving of respect.


One very interesting thing emerges from Figure 5.16. In an arena of almost pure V exchange, ego uses T to his wife's younger brother. This is not simply a case of REL (relative age T/V) to a younger alter, for ego gives V to other affines of his who are younger than ego, for instance the WFBS in Figure 5.16. Nor is this a lone instance.

Figure 5.16 The special treatment of affines




Consistently again and again, in caste after caste, the absolute rule of respect to affines finds this one glaring exception: T to WyB.

This caused me some puzzlement. At first I arrived at an explanation along these lines, an explanation I found later seems to have been held by Gough(1956:843). A husband always gives T to his wife and receives V (in this caste at any rate; there are some castes, reviewed below, where this does not seem to be the case). Now his wife always gives T to a younger brother (and in just a few upper class families in a few high castes would expect V back). So we have a structure like this:



Now if rank is assumed to be transitive (and we accumulated evidence that this is so in the preceding chapter) then if A is higher than B, and B is higher than C, then A must be higher than C. Then if respect (V) is given to those higher in rank, and non-respect (T) to those lower, then to maintain these assumptions A must give T to C. Thus:



This explanation is then an application of some theory of cognitive dissonance: affines may be high in rank, indeed deserving of great respect bordering on avoidance, and yet the particular affine WyB is


subordinate to the person who in all the world is most subordinate to the husband (namely his wife). Therefore an exception is made of him.

The theory has some application in that it would partition the wife's siblings into those older and those younger than the wife, and only those younger (who are subordinate to the wife) should receive T from the husband (see for example Figure 5.16). And in many cases this correctly predicts that those siblings of the wife who are younger than ego but older than ego's wife, are given V by ego and not T.

But there are some difficulties with this explanation. First, informants expressed no embarrassment at the supposed conflict between the duty to give respect to affines, and the concern to keep the wife's status unambiguously and transitively lower than the husband's. On the contrary, they delighted in the fact that WyB was subordinate to the husband, and this was a fact consistently volunteered to me. Secondly in many castes the relative age of siblings does not have strong interactional concomitants. It is true that the kinship terminology does distinguish between elder and younger siblings (and the modifiers periya and cinna, elder and younger, are almost obligatorily used to distinguish elder and younger siblings of the parents). And in some castes, but not in the paNTaaram families here considered, while names are used (rather than kin terms) to younger siblings, the use of them to elder siblings is taboo. Yet despite this in most castes all siblings exchange T. Therefore sibling-rank by age would not seem to be a powerful motive for the differential use of T and V to younger and elder siblings (respectively) of ego's wife.


In any case there is a rival explanation, quite possibly just complementary to the first. As discussed above, the Brahmins, piLLai and possibly a few other groups, make a distinction between patrilineal and matrilineal cross kin. What underlies this distinction in these castes' terminologies, or so informants told Beck (1972:229 and n.35) is that wife-givers are inferior to wife-takers, in particular MB and MBS to FZH and FZS. This superiority of the wife-receiver (where the giving of a woman is parallel to the giving of V or ritual services) is a widespread Brahmanical feature apparently associated with the belief that begetting a daughter is a sin and that taking her off the hands of her father is an act of ritual generosity (Gough 1956:841). Despite the apparently inconsistent fact that Brahmins (and ceTTiyaars of caste 4) express a preference for FZD marriage in ritual (Beck 1972:72,238-249, and our discussion above), this relative devaluing of MB seems to pre-suppose MBD marriage.

In the light of all this a quite plausible explanation for the special treatment of WyB is that he is a junior wife-giver. As the giver of his sister, he is inferior to the receiver, the husband, and this is expressed thus:



Now this explanation does capture the fact that the fundamental contrast in the treatment of affines is between the treatment of one's wife's (younger) brother on the one hand and one's sister's husband or daughter's husband on the other. That is, in relationship I below,

ego often gives T, while in relationships II below (which seem to be assimilated to each other) ego never gives T, but always V:



And if one asks why just one person from the wife-giving kuTumpum is selected for this expression of the inferior status of givers, we may say that what is involved is a ritual expression that will be satisfied by one relationship in which it is freely expressed. And indeed in some cases, where the wife has two or more younger brothers often only one (the youngest) is given T.

There is though a problem with this explanation. It fits perfectly with the details of what Beck has outlined as a left-hand ideal: ideological inequality, anisogamy, Brahmanical beliefs about daughters as described above, and the associated dowry. But this treatment of the WyB is to be found in all castes, contrasting to the otherwise invariable respect given to affines. It therefore occurs in right-hand castes with an ideological equality, and bride-price (paricam) rather than dowry, features that do not mesh with this explanation in terms of hypergamy. We are left then with a puzzle: do we have here a Brahmanical trait that has somehow crept through the customs of all the castes (not a particularly plausible hypothesis with respect to the right hand castes) disembodied from its cultural context; or was the

first explanation the right one after all?⁴⁶

We may leave this pattern here. What it illustrates is the way in which patterns of T/V usage are extraordinarily sensitive to the finest cultural points. Usage both within and across castes is extremely consistent in these areas, and we can expect an explanation to throw considerable light on the general ways in which Tamil conceptualize their relations to their affines, an area we still know very little about.

We come now to the borders of kinship, an area beyond the categories of kuTumpum, parallel, cross and affine that we have reviewed so far. But we started this chapter by pointing out that the boundaries of kinship are the boundaries of caste. And there should be nobody who is a kinsman and not a member of one of the categories we have already described. Yet there is one more category for kinsmen, a sort of limbo for persons with whom ego presumes some connection but does not yet know which category they fall in; or if ego does know which category they fall in by presumption, he does not yet know that there is no closer connection. Let us call these persons 'distant kinsmen'. For there is a presumption that if alter is a member of one's own caste, then he must be related to one somehow, and assignable to either parallel or cross, if only ego can find out. While in this limbo, persons must be treated with a good deal of respect simply because one does not know into which category (and therefore category of respect) they will finally fall. As an informant put it: "when I meet a man for the first time, (I must think) is he in my caste (jaati), a kinsman, or in another? If he is connected, in what way am I connected to him? Before discovering all this, it is important to observe the use

of niinka (the V pronoun). Even if he is younger than me I will not say nii (T). Perhaps he may (turn out to be) related as maaman-maittunar or otherwise close to us... So whosoever the man I've newly met is, before discovering about him I say niinka (V)...If he's seventeen or eighteen or so, or older than that, then I shall say niinka to him."

However even when a classification into cross or parallel category is known, alter may be treated in this same way. And the mutual V exchange that then ensues is clearly the symmetrical V of non-solidarity or social distance. Just exactly when a cross or parallel kinsman is considered to be tuuratta uravu morai (related by a distant connection) is not entirely clear to me, and also seems variable across castes. But it seems to be the case that generally only those to whom ego stands in a cross or parallel category by virtue of presumed but unknown genealogical connection (e.g. ego's cross relative X uses a cross-term to Y, therefore ego assumes Y is parallel), or higher order presumptive alliance links, will be considered distant enough to escape the net of prescribed familiarity, amity and respect associated with cross and parallel kin.

In any case if interaction with these distant kinsmen continues, they rapidly become shifted into the sets of behavioural values associated with closer cross or parallel kin. For instance if an ego of caste 8 meets a stranger at a marriage, and then ascertains that he is a distant parallel relation, even if alter is younger than ego, ego will continue to use V to him. But if during the marriage they talk closely, then a closer relationship is set up, so that "after close acquaintance (nerunki paRakiya pinnar) if he is younger than me, I may call him nii (T)." Social distance then is here related to the frequency of inter-

action, as suggested by Brown and Gilman (1960).⁴⁷

The category 'distant kinsmen' may then (especially across castes) contain a rather heterogeneous collection of alters: those to whom no actual relationship is be traced as yet, those who are presumed to be of one category or another but between whom there is a social distance that prescribes mutual V whatever the usages associated with the relevant category actually are.

The important point about such distant kinsmen is that they are treated in the same way as socially distant persons of almost any kind: they are given V (and give V back) so long as they are perceived to be socially mature (usually over twenty years old or so). This is exactly how one treats persons of different castes from different caste-interaction 'arenas', or persons of unknown caste-origin in a town. And although superficially in many castes the same mutual V exchange is found here as is found between affines, the sources in those two kinds of cases are entirely different. Affines are persons with whom one must have rather a high degree of interaction, and with whom one may have had very relaxed relations before marriage, but persons whom one must nevertheless now treat with a high degree of respect. Distant kinsmen get mutual V simply because they are distant. Perhaps one could argue that affines are kinsmen made distant in order to avoid the frictions that in-laws universally seem to experience, but in any case the sources for this treatment are quite different.⁴⁸

One note is in order on this threshold of 'social maturity' for V giving to distant kin: an informant of caste 8 pointed out that the perception of this was something that varied somewhat with the age of the assessor. Thus for a thirty year old man, a man of eighteen may

be judged mature enough to warrant V, but for a seventy or eighty year old man other males less than thirty might still get T, and no offence be taken.

Let us now summarize the facts as they are for members of caste 8. We can do this by means of an actual genealogy, showing the usage that an ego gives to the closer kin in the genealogy. And we can superimpose our five distinct categories of kin, distinct in terms of the kind of T/V usage that can be found within each category, onto the genealogy so that each alter is shown within the correct category. Figure 5.17 presents the facts of T/V usage for one individual within this framework. The usage shown by arrows is from ego to alters only unless the usage is symmetrical, as indicated by a double-headed arrow.

Although visually complex, the overall patterns in Figure 5.17 are in fact very simple. We now need to abstract them, and present them in a clearer form. For we want to develop a mode of representation that will allow easy visual comparison with the patterns of usage in other castes.

Figure 5.18 is an abstract representation of Figure 5.17, which accurately records the very systematic patterns in the earlier figure. The only substantive difference is that we have added a category of distant kin, that naturally plays no role in the restricted genealogy of Figure 5.17. It is to be read this way: the legend along the top of the boxes indicates the categories of kin that are distinguishable by different kinds of T/V usage as described in this section:

- (1) Distant = distant kin
- (2) Affines = those related directly by a marriage in a junior generation (ego's or below) as described above





Figure 5.17 An example of actual usage to kin by an ego in caste 8

Figure 5.18 Intra-caste T/V usage: schema for caste 8



Note: schema is organized as though ego were thirty years or so old. Where ego is himself socially immature, the threshold here marked sm will be replaced by a threshold of relative age.

- (3) Cross = the closer cross kin with whom one behaves in the customarily respectful way, with an element of joking between co-evals
- (4) Parallel = closer parallel kin, pankaaLi, with whom relations may be reserved or relaxed, depending especially on caste
- (5) kuTumpum = the co-eaters from a common hearth, the basic familial unit, and generally an island of close intimacy.

Only the first and the last are categories not also built into the kinship terminology. Our remarks about the interpretation of the three middle categories that were made in that context hold here also.

On the left hand margin are labels for the horizontal divisions of the box diagram. The first main division is made by ego's age: those above ego's age line are in the category marked 'e', that is elder than ego; those below the line are marked 'y', those alters younger than ego. A second main division is between those who are socially mature, and those alters that are still considered to be children or youths/maidens. There is a line marked 's.m.' (for 'socially mature') above which alters are assumed to be socially mature (usually about 20 years old or over), and below which they are assumed to be immature, non-adult.

These two horizontal divisions are organized in the diagram as if ego was some thirty years old or over, so that the set of non-mature alters are distinctly younger than him. But of course while the threshold for social maturity is absolute, age-relative to ego varies in relation to the age of ego, so that when ego is under twenty or so the line of ego's age will come below the line that demarcates

socially mature alters from those not yet adults. In that case just in those categories where the threshold for V is shown as alter's social maturity (as with distant kin and affines in Figure 5.18) the threshold will be fact be relative age (at least for children old enough to handle these distinctions). That is, where in the diagrams social maturity is shown as the threshold, relative age may supersede, according to whichever is the lowest threshold.

With this mode of representation established we may now proceed to an overview of the different practices of T/V usage that are to be found in different castes.

5.3 CASTES COMPARED: VARIATION IN INTRA-CASTE T/V USAGE

In the next two major sections we examine the differences in intra-caste usage in the seventeen castes. In this section we simply examine the facts; in the next we ask why they are the way they are.

There are very real problems of access to familial settings in different castes in an Indian village. For these are areas that are mostly closed to members of other castes, and the ethnographer soon becomes identified with the caste that he associates most closely with. The general methods used in the collection of facts were described above in connection with the general data base. But here we relied heavily on our genealogical method; informants were asked to help construct genealogies based on themselves as ego, and then were closely questioned about the kind of pronominal usage between different persons in the genealogy. The informants' own generalizations were also collected. Where members of one caste lived in close proximity to members of other castes, or where they worked as household servants

in houses of other castes, or played as children there, they were able to provide less biased reports of the usage that took place in particular families. And in just a few castes (8, 9, 10 and 5) I persuaded members of castes to borrow my tape-recorder and record conversations between their kin. But despite all this, the sample is often rather poor, and the checks on elicited statements about behaviour not as good as one would wish.

What we describe here is the relatively stable core of usage: what corresponds to the basic classification component, and not to the marked usages introduced by the reclassification processes described above in Chapter II. In going through the genealogies, where usage seemed irregular, informants were questioned further: the most common sources of reclassified usage were the social influence of some particular alter, or the proximity of households. But one of the most regular sources of irregularity was the fact that prior members of the same kuTumpum retain the intimacy that they had learned there, even if they now live quite separately and perhaps far away. Since we are trying to describe the basic core patterns of usage, once we were satisfied that some particular usage was essentially a reclassification, we passed over it in search of more standard usages.

We now present the facts as a series of seventeen box-diagrams of the sort introduced at the end of the last section. A certain spurious over-simplification will be introduced if we mistakenly refer to exactly the same distinctions in each caste. In fact labels like 'social maturity' are interpreted slightly differently in different castes: in some marriage is a key threshold, in others physical maturity and so on (and there is some idiosyncratic variation

here). The category 'distant kin' may include closer relatives in some castes than in others; and in some castes once it is decided that alter belongs to cross or parallel, behaviour towards him is rapidly shifted to that appropriate to that category, while in other castes such modification is slower. Those that are counted as 'affines' may also vary (but I do not know): certainly though there is a common core of WF, WM, WeB, DH, ZH, WZH, SWF and SWM; note that the usage indicated under 'affines' specifically and always excludes that to WyB (to whom T is used). But by far the most important and significant variation here is in the interpretation that each caste gives 'cross' and 'parallel'. All the evidence suggests that only castes 5, 7a, 8, 9, 10, 18 (and possibly 7b) give these categories an additional interpretation beyond the genealogical one. That additional interpretation is the one in terms of alliance relations between clan-based or locality-based units. Only members of caste 5 actually substitute talk in terms of clans for talk in terms of 'cross' and 'parallel', and that only on occasions; but we have substituted 'other clan' and 'own clan' respectively for 'cross' and 'parallel' in their case only to remind us of these difficulties.

Where it may be helpful, or surprising, we have inserted the kin-types to whom the usage in question would extend. One should note in this regard that relative age in nearly all cases over-rides genealogical generation as a reason for respect. Thus there is a member of caste 10 whose MyB is actually slightly younger than him, and as a result gets T not the V usually associated with MB in that caste. Finally one should note that the kin types to be found in the kuTumpum can vary quite widely, and in relation to the specific kinds of

commensal unit favoured systematically by the caste in question (see Beck 1972:210). Note that unless indicated to the contrary (as in castes 11 and 13) wives never give T to their husbands, or BW to HB, within the kuTumpum.

With these caveats, the following diagrams present the facts.

Figure 5.19 Caste 1 Brahman intra-caste usage (left hand model)

	Distant	affines	cross	parallel	kuTumpum
e y sm		V	MB FZ		F
					M eB, eZ
				T	

Notes:
There are only two kuTumpum of this caste represented in oolappaalLaiyam, A and B, and no others in nearby hamlets. A is resident in the hamlet, but B is primarily resident in an urban agrahaaram. The usage in B seems much more typical of Brahman usage in this area, for A (although aware of shastric ideals) uses much more T among parallel kin than is usual. The family A is in fact extremely cut off from the main stream of Brahmanical mores, and this is reflected in their lack of Brahman dialect features. For these reasons I have taken the usage of members of the more cosmopolitan family B as representative. The head of A when asked to formulate the rules of usage claimed to use this same pattern, though elder siblings and mother were also said to be given V. Actual usage in A though was rather different, and more T usage prevailed.

Figure 5.20 Caste 2 k.piLLai intra-caste usage (left hand model)

	distant	affines	cross	parallel	kuTumpum
e y sm		V	MB FZ	FB	F, M, eB, eZ
					eB
		ZH DH		T	
		WyB			

Notes:

Again a very small sample: only one family (kuTumpum) resident in oolappaalaiyam or indeed nearby. Details were checked with the affines of this family. Note that usage is very much in line with the shastric ideals of respect to elders: this is the one caste where ego habitually uses V to his or her mother. V is also used to brothers who are considerably older than ego, but T may be used to siblings only a little older.

Figure 5.21 Caste 3 c.aacaari intra-caste usage (left hand)



	distant	affines	cross	parallel	kuTumpum
e y sm		V			F
					M eB, eZ
				T	

Notes:



When asked to formulate the rules of usage, the shastric ideals of respect to elders throughout were presented (including V to M and elder siblings). In fact, apart from usage to F and H, T is given throughout the family, as indicated here.

Figure 5.22 Caste 4 k. ceTTiyaar intra-caste usage (left hand)

A: Telegu

	distant	affines	cross	parallel	kuTumpum
e			MB	FB 	F, M
y					
sm					

B: Tamil

	distant	affines	cross	parallel	kuTumpum
e			MB	FB	F <div>M eB, eZ</div>
y					
sm					

Notes:

Telegu is the language spoken at home; there the system in A would be used. But in a group containing one or more non-Telegu speakers (and members of other Telegu speaking castes) the system in B would be used. The latter would thus be likely to be used at a wedding: not only might there be guests from other castes, but also not all members of caste 4 still retain Telegu as a mother tongue. The fact that the two systems are so different has a theoretical importance discussed below.⁴⁹

Figure 5.23 Caste 5 kavuNTar intra-caste usage (right hand)

	distant	affines	other clans	own clan	kuTumpum
e y sm			MZ, MMZDD V	FZ	F eB
					M close eB
		DH			T

Notes: Here 'own clan' is substituted for 'parallel', 'other clan' for 'cross'. Where cross and parallel are reckoned genealogically these are not isomorphic substitutes; where cross and parallel are reckoned in terms of alliance units they probably are isomorphic. This caste seems to be the one that systematically minimizes genealogical cross-parallel reckoning to the greatest extent, but castes 7a, 8, 9, 10 and 18 also on occasion reckon in terms of alliance units.

Figure 5.24 Caste 6 k.aacaari intra-caste usage (left hand)

	distant	affines	cross	parallel	kuTumpum
e y sm		V	FZS		F eB
					M
				T	

Figure 5.25 Caste 7a kk.mutaliyaar intra-caste usage (left hand)





	distant	affines	cross	parallel	kuTumpum
e y sm					F eB
		DH			M, eZ
		WyB			



Figure 5.26 Caste 7b k.mutaliyaar intra-caste usage (right hand?)

	distant	affines	cross	parallel	kuTumpum
e y sm					F*
					M eB, eZ
			MBS MeZDS		

*class variants

Notes:
This caste is not directly described by Beck (1972). There are a number of strong grounds for supposing that the caste belongs to the right hand division, both because of the details of its internal organization and because of its close traditional ties to caste 5.

Figure 5.27 Caste 8 paNTaaram intra-caste usage (right hand)

	distant	affines	cross	parallel	kuTumpum
e			MB, FZH MBW	FB MeZ	F*, M eB, eZ
y		WeZHB yZH, DH			
sm					

*class variants

Figure 5.28 Caste 9 uTaiyaar intra-caste usage (right hand)






	distant	affine	cross	parallel	kuTumpum
e y sm			MB FZ	FB MZ	F
		DH			

Figure 5.29 Caste 10 naaTaar intra-caste usage (right hand)

	distant	affines	cross	parallel	kuTumpum
e			MFBS MeB	FFBS	MZ FB F eB
y		ZH DH	MyB		
sm					

Notes:

It seems to be only very close parallel kin that are given T irrespective of age (in one case FeB was even given V, while FyB was given T). This diagram, based on resident families, perhaps over-estimates the amount of T to parallel kin generally given in this caste. But in any case what we have here is a pattern very similar to that for caste 5, except that the thresholds for V giving are systematically higher.



Figure 5.30 Caste 11 naayakkar intra-caste usage (left hand)

	distant	affines	cross	parallel	kuTumpum
e		V	MB	FB MZ	F H
y			MBS	T	
sm					

Notes:

This is the pattern of T/V usage in Tamil. Although the members of this caste were originally Telegu speakers, Telegu is rapidly dying out and there are only a few families who still use it within the home.

Figure 5.31 Caste 13 v. vaNNaar intra-caste usage (left hand)

	distant	affines	cross	parallel	kuTumpum
e			MB FZ	FB, MZ 	H F
y		DH WeB			
sm		WyB			

Notes:
These were originally Telegu speakers; now only Tamil is spoken in the home. The system displayed is therefore the Tamil system. Note that not only is father given T by his children, but even husbands by their wives.

Figure 5.32 Caste 14 k. naavitar intra-caste usage (right hand)






	distant	affines	cross	parallel	kuTumpum
e			MB MBS		F, M eB, eZ
y					
sm					




Figure 5.33 Caste 16 paraiyar intra-caste usage (right hand)

	distant	affines	cross	parallel	kuTumpum
e y sm			FZ, FZH MB	FB	H, F
					M eB
			MBS, FZS		

Notes:

This caste, despite its low ritual status (and unlike caste 18), has availed itself of the avenues to self-advancement offered by education and urban employment (cf. Beck 1972:130-9); my genealogies reveal far-flung relations. The caste's general self-presentation in local affairs is in terms of dignified-service to caste 5. And the pattern of usage above is remarkably close to the patterns found in the highest right hand castes, and very different from other low-ranking groups' usage.

Figure 5.34 Caste 17 k. kuravar intra-caste usage (left hand)

	distant	affines	cross	parallel	kuTumpum
e			MBS, FZS	MZH FB,MZ MZS	F
y					
sm					

Notes:
Most parallel kin seem to receive T; MZH is an exception.
The data on this caste is too skimpy to say what exact principles are involved here.

Figure 5.35 Caste 18 m. maataari intra-caste usage (left hand)

	distant	affines	cross	parallel	kuTumpum
e	T	WF eZH		T	F H eB
y		yZH			
sm					

Notes:

The pattern displayed here is T/V usage in Telegu, the mother tongue of this caste. Unlike caste 4, caste 18 does not systematically operate another T/V system in Tamil within the caste, since Telegu is the only form of intra-caste communication and there are no signs of this giving way to Tamil.

5.4 EMERGENT PATTERNS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

We here examine the patterns described above, and try to extract trends and generalizations, and give some account of them. In the first section we simply present some of these emergent patterns, and in the second we seek explanations for the two most important features.

5.4.1 Some emergent patterns

The following is a list of the more important generalizations that can be made.

Suppose that we assume that the basic unmarked usage would be T to all kinsmen (see Brown and Levinson 1977, for an argument that polite forms are always 'marked' in the sense that they encode extra information). Then we can make the following generalization:

(a) The category affines is always determinative of V usage. In fact the only practice common to all the castes is that V is invariably given to affines other than WyB, provided they are socially mature. The categories of affine and social maturity then, together determine a social category to whose members V is always given, and this (alone) is true of usage in all castes. It is for this reason that we stressed in earlier discussions the existence and importance of this affinal category, and spent some time trying to find an explanation for the single exception to the 'give respect to mature affines' rule, namely the T customarily given to WyB.

(b) the category distant kin is next in rank as the category most generally determinative of respect. There is one single but important exception: members of caste 18 do not give T (in their native Telegu) to stranger members of their caste or to known distant kin. This is presumably because their moiety organization allows the cross-parallel assignment to be entirely sociocentric, not egocentric as it is for most castes (see Beck 1972:104 and 215). And since members of this sub-caste treat cross and parallel kin identically (T is given throughout except to affines), a stranger caste-member may be assumed immediately to be cross or parallel and it doesn't matter which (from the point of view of T/V usage: actually the presumption is always parallel, and the correct address term the Telegu equivalent of cittappaa for most male alters until known to be cross).

(c) the distinction 'elder/younger than ego' plays a role in the usage of all castes except two (numbers 11 and 18), in conjunction with the categories cross and parallel. So most castes, both right and left, respect the shastric ideal of deference to elders in at least some category of their kinsmen. The distinction of T to juniors and V to elders will mostly coincide (but not always) with other aspects of asymmetrical status: the taboo of the use of names to seniors, the use of dishonorifics (like taa, teey discussed above in relation to inter-caste usage), the giving of direct commands, and so on.

(d) the category cross is determinative of some V usage in all castes except caste 4 when speaking Telegu (system A in Figure 5.22 above), and castes 13 and 18. It may be significant that all these exceptions are, or rather were, Telegu speakers (members of 13 in many cases are now Tamil monoglots). However, since members of 13 now speak Tamil,

and members of 18 have a brother sub-caste who are Tamil speakers (konku maataari) and are said to have the same T/V system as 18, I think it is unlikely that there is simply some different Telegu culture represented here. Rather there seem to be more general reasons for these patterns, to be discussed below.

With the exception of these castes, or viewed over all the seventeen castes, the category cross clearly is an important determinant of T/V usage. In conjunction with relative age or social maturity, it usually defines an area where V is always given. Clearly it is important in understanding this that the category of cross is the category (together with those distant kin who turn out to be cross) from which ego will select his most immediate and important affines. (And even though some affines are parallel, as we have shown, these come about through the construction of affinal links to cross kin). Members of cross are potential affines, and affines are treated with enormous respect; and even though when one marries a close cross kinsman one's interactional patterns with the new spouse's close parallel kin undergo radical changes, they would do so even more if cross kin were not routinely given some special respect.

(e) The category parallel is much less generally determinative of V usage than cross. In this respect the informant's remark (quoted above in 5.2) to the effect that in all castes cross-kin are treated with respect, while the treatment of parallel kin is more variable and subject to caste-variation, is on the whole borne out. For in the following castes the parallel category is not determinative of V at all: 8,9,11,13,14 and 18. And in castes 10 and 17 it is only determinative of V to more distant (but still relatively close) parallel kin, and in

caste 4 only when speaking Telegu, not Tamil. But in the rest of the castes, together with the relative-age distinction, it determines V usage to elder parallel kin.

(f) The extent to which elder members of the kuTumpum get V is also very variable across castes. In fact we have the two extremes: in caste 2 nearly all elder members of the kuTumpum get V (an exception is siblings not much elder than ego), including ego's mother (a very rare pattern). On the other hand, we have in castes 13 and 18 families where all members of the kuTumpum receive and give T, including the wife to the husband (an almost equally rare pattern).

Other castes lie between these two extremes; no other castes generally give V to mothers, or T to husbands. But an interesting variable is T to father. The following are the facts:

Table 5.2 Usage to ego's father in different castes

<u>Castes that give</u> <u>T to father</u>	<u>Castes that give</u> <u>V to father</u>
	1
	2
	3
4(Telegu)	4(Tamil)
	5
	6
	7a
	7b*
8*	
9*	
10	
11	
13	
14	16
18	17

It is clear that there is a generalization here: higher castes ('upper castes' exactly as they divided in inter-caste interaction in the T/V medium: namely from 1 to 7b) without exception (unless one

counts the Telegu usage of caste 4) use the respectful V to fathers. Lower castes (from 8 to 18) use the familiar T to fathers, with the notable exception of 16 and 17.

One point though must be emphasised: usage within the family is (unlike usage outside) relatively susceptible to class variation within caste. This is hardly surprising when one considers that while the sub-caste is the bearer of caste status, it is the family, the kuTumpum, that is the bearer of class status (it is primarily to families that people attribute vasam, power, celvaaku influence, and celvam wealth). In the table above, those castes marked with an asterisk are known to exhibit class variants in usage (to be discussed below).

Despite all this variation, all these facts do seem to fit into an implicational scale, as below:

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{V to} \\ \text{eB} \end{array} \right\} \left. \begin{array}{l} \text{V to} \\ \text{M} \end{array} \right\} \left. \begin{array}{l} \text{V to} \\ \text{F} \end{array} \right\} \left. \begin{array}{l} \text{V to parallel} \\ \text{e kin} \end{array} \right\} \left. \begin{array}{l} \text{V to e} \\ \text{cross} \\ \text{kin} \end{array} \right\} \left. \begin{array}{l} \text{V to} \\ \text{distant} \\ \text{kin(sm)} \end{array} \right\} \left. \begin{array}{l} \text{V to} \\ \text{affines} \\ \text{(sm)} \end{array} \right\}$$

That is to say if one can find an instance of behaviour to the left, then one may assume that all the usages to the right of it also obtain. The significance of this is that although each caste has a different usage, yet all seem to agree that the most important thing is to give respect to affines, then to distant kin, then to cross, then to parallel, and only then within the family. So the order in which each category is respected relative to all the other categories seem to be constant even if no single caste makes a distinction between the treatment of each and every category. Beneath the surface heterogeneity there is then a basic 'culture' or set of kinship values common to all the castes.

Granted that there is a basic commonality of values expressed by all the variations, are the variations themselves random or are they in accord with other social parameters? The answer is that we can find here the overall two-dimensional variation that Beck found for other cultural or socio-structural attributes of the seventeen castes (see Beck 1972, but especially Beck 1968b).

Consider a two-dimensional space, where the vertical axis represents the hierarchical rank of a caste group (determined by interaction in various media as described in chapter IV), and the horizontal axis is formed by a continuum between two poles: the left-hand division model and the right-hand division model (understand 'ideal type' for model). Quite how the latter axis is measured is problematical, but perhaps by a summation of traits as suggested by Beck (1968). But for the moment we can do simply with a dichotomy, left-hand and right-hand, set up by the two model castes (castes 1 and 5 respectively). Then we may simply informally judge to what extent the cultural traits of one particular caste approximate to one or other of these ideal types represented by the model castes.

Now if we look at the patterns of T/V usage in terms of such a model then we find that the two-dimensional space or plane is not randomly filled by points representing castes. Rather there are two vertical and independent (indeed parallel) arcs along which the points seem to fall. And in this respect we have here a pattern somewhat different from that found by Beck (1968b) for other cultural traits, where differences between left and right hand customs gradually converged towards the bottom of the caste hierarchy (yielding a V shaped graph). Here the differences seem to be maintained on the whole.

Figure 5.36 displays this patterned variation in relation to the two social dimensions of hierarchy and left/right-hand division ideals. The representation is schematic in terms of the four poles between which all the variation lies.

The significant patterns here are very simple. They are these:

- (1) the one systematic variable in relation to caste hierarchy is the overall extent of T versus V giving. The higher^{the} caste, the less T and the more V there tends to be in each significant kinship area. The lower the caste the less V and the more T usage to kin.
- (2) the one systematic variable in relation to the left-hand/right-hand division is that right-hand castes make a systematic distinction between cross and parallel kin by treating cross-kin with greater respect than parallel kin. Left-hand castes on the other hand treat cross and parallel kin in just the same way (with or without respect, according to hierarchical locus).

There are some exceptions to this otherwise rather strong patterning. These are brought out in the following tables. Table 5.3 shows the amount of V that each caste gives calculated in a very crude way. The basis for the count was this: for each unit in the box-diagrams for each caste (presented above) where V was given, a score was assigned. A score of one was given for each category that was given V if elder than ego, and a score of one and a half was assigned if the category was given V if alter was socially mature. Inside the family each kin-type that was given V was counted as one-quarter. This provides a very rough measure indeed of the overall extent to which kin are given respect in that particular caste.

Figure 5.36 The two dimensions of variation in intra-caste T/V usage




Table 5.3 A crude measure of amounts of intra-caste V usage

Left hand castes		Right hand castes	
caste	score	caste	score
1	5	5	6
2	5	6	$5\frac{1}{2}$
3	4	7b	5
4	5		
7a	5		
		8	4
		9	4
		10	4
11	$4\frac{1}{2}$		
13	$2\frac{1}{2}$		
		14	$3\frac{1}{2}$
		*16	*5
*17	*4		
18	$1\frac{1}{2}$		

We have had to split the hierarchy into left and right hand castes because the second dimension of variation ensures that the amount of V giving that right hand castes do will be somewhat higher than their equal ranking left hand pairs (because the former always give more respect to cross than parallel kin). The only two exceptions to our generalization that the lower the caste the more T and the less V is used within it, are marked with asterisks. These are both untouchable castes. While I find it easy to explain why caste 16 is an exception, I know virtually nothing about caste 17 other than the T/V details collected (nor is it well described in Beck 1972), and so cannot be sure that the same explanation will suffice. The explanation for caste 16's high use of V is simply the general program of self-advancement it has adopted in many spheres (see Beck 1972:130-9).

The system of T/V usage to kin that this caste uses is almost identical to that used by caste 5, the model for advancement that 16 emulates, as inspection of Figures 5.23 and 5.33 will verify (the only difference is that elder brothers sometimes receive V in the higher caste). No other caste comes so close to perfect emulation of the right-hand model. Many members of this caste are now teachers and urban workers, and, in all this self-improvement, contrast sharply with all the other low castes (this advancement has come about in large part through conversion and missionary aid). The fact that this caste emulates caste 5 so carefully is an important suggestion that particular patterns of T/V usage are seen by at least some members as a status attribute worth adopting precisely.

Table 5.4 shows the degree to which our second generalization actually holds: the generalization is that for left-hand castes T/V usage is identical for both cross and parallel relatives, while for right hand castes cross-kin are treated with more respect (more V). Castes are identified again by number and have in brackets to their right their traditional divisional membership, (L) for left-hand, (R) for right-hand. There is only one caste whose traditional membership is not assigned by Beck 1972, namely caste 7b which I assign on cultural and structural grounds to the right hand division.

Once again there are two (different) exceptions here to the rule that only right-hand division members give more respect to cross kin than left-hand members. For both castes 11 and 17, marked with asterisks, are traditionally assigned to the left division. Again I can provide some explanation for 11, but not for 17 (although on other hazy grounds I wonder whether the traditional attribution of 17

Table 5.4 Castes distinguishing cross from parallel kin in T/V usage

Usage identical for cross and parallel	More respect given to cross than to parallel
1(L)	5(R)
2(L)	7b(R?)
3(L)	8(R)
4(L)	9(R)
6(L)	10(R)
7a(L)	*11(L)
13(L)	14(R)
18(L)	16(R)
	*17(L)

to the left hand division is secure). The explanation for 11 is simply that it does in fact participate in the rural territorially-tied occupational structure dominated otherwise by the right hand castes. For members of this caste are traditional well-diggers, almost solely employed by members of 5. In addition in some areas they are said to actually constitute the landed dominant caste. If this is so, their emulation of right hand traits may be seen as an attempt to gain recognition in the right hand division. In this respect it is interesting that their claims are threatening to and strongly rejected by castes 8, 9 and 10 in the T/V media of inter-caste interaction reviewed above in Chapter IV.

The two social dimensions of hierarchy and left/right divisional membership do then seem to correlate with a great deal of the variation. Note that the distinction between left and right hand patterns holds interestingly true for such castes as 13 (left) and 14 (right), who are in other respects so very similar by virtue of their similar

service roles and their inter-caste alliance with one another (as indicated by the inter-caste usages described above). It also holds good for the two lowest castes, 16 and 18, despite very great differences in usage. There are though enough complications and exceptions to make the correlation of T/V pattern and these two social dimensions less than 100% perfect.

5.4.2 Explanations and implications

We turn first to ask why it is that we find this pattern of increasing T-usage in groups towards the bottom of the hierarchy. We then turn to the second social dimension that seems to determine the variation, namely the left/right divisional membership, and ask why that has the influence that it seems to have.

5.4.2.1 T/V usage and caste hierarchy: an instance of the socio-linguistic universal. Our answer to the first problem is simply this: one finds more V usage towards the top of the caste hierarchy because V-giving is an attribute of social status. How can we show this to be the case? By showing that in circumstances where persons are trying to maximize their status they maximize their intra-caste V usage, but otherwise not. The four kinds of evidence that we can use to show this are the following:

(a) Castes that are known on independent grounds to be seeking self-advancement choose to emulate various aspects of the behaviour of their betters. Amongst these aspects there is intra-caste T/V usage. A case of this, the adoption of caste 5's system by caste 16, has been discussed in the prior section.

(b) During elicitation, my first questions were aimed at getting informants to formulate their own rules for T/V usage. Despite being told that I wanted their actual usage, not what informants thought their usage ought to be like, members of most castes produced generalizations that claimed far more V-usage than actually occurred. It was only by collecting genealogies and asking about usage between specific alters that the real facts (as confirmed by reports, tapes, observations) emerged. Some embarrassment ensued when the contradiction between actual and claimed usage emerged, and questions about V to fathers, and especially husbands, were positively touchy. All castes seemed to be aware that there existed general ideals that require respect to all persons who are senior in years to ego, including father and mother and elder siblings. Left-hand upper castes (especially 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7a) were especially aware of these ideals and consequently greater discrepancies emerged in their schedules between ideal and real behaviour. This is directly corroborative of some of Beck's observations (1972:212). But even low ranking right-hand castes like 16 (admittedly an unusually literate group) were aware of the ideals: initially juniors were stated to always V all types of seniors (and some informants would go no further: it was not always easy to collect information about actual usage).

(c) Strong additional evidence that T/V usage with a lot of V is a status attribute and comes from class variation.⁵⁰ We have already indicated above that usage within the family is especially susceptible to class variation. We have noted that in only two castes (13 and 18) is T generally given to husbands by their wives, and it is perhaps significant that no members of these castes appear to have anything

but the lowest earnings and assets (see also Beck 1972:183, 185). Such usage (though unconfirmed) was reported to occur in very poor families of castes 8 and 9. At any rate T giving to fathers is definitely subject to class variation. Table 5.2 above indicated that while castes 8 and 9 normally gave T to fathers, and caste 7b normally gave V, yet variations occurred. Without exception the patterns found were these: in wealthier families of 8 and 9, children gave V to their fathers, while in poorer families they gave T; similarly only in poorer families of 7b did children give T to fathers. Thus although the normal usage in 8 and 9 on the one hand and 7b on the other hand was reversed, in both cases in wealthier families fathers got V, and in poorer families fathers got T. The actual breakdown for the caste 7b sample is as follows: out of 15 kuTumpum in the revenue village, 6 used T to father and 9 used V to father. In all of the 6 families, the household head was a low wage earner in one of the following categories: temple musicians (traditional occupation of lowly status), day-labourers (kuulikaaran), tailors, hawkers. In the other 9 families there was some inherited wealth and influence, and household heads were engaged in teaching, running shops, and trading and transport businesses, bringing in reasonable 'middle class' (naTa tara) earnings.

Now since only wealthier mode 'middle class' families use V to fathers in these castes, it seems to be the case that increased V-usage within the family is an expression of the higher social status (here measured partly in economic terms) of those families. In short there seems to be evidence that higher levels of V usage are status attributes in a ranking system conceptually independent of caste and ritual hierarchy, namely class status within caste. So we have here independent

confirmation from another area of social relations.


But perhaps this is something special about the treatment of fathers? We can introduce other evidence to show that the influence of class is felt throughout the family. If we turn to caste 5, the dominant land-holding caste, we can find enormous disparities of wealth within a single caste. We may take the usage of an ordinary middle-class kavuNTar family (call it A) to be representative of general usage throughout the caste: the details are presented in Figure 5.37 (A). This is an actual domestic unit (or kuTumpum) owning about 15 acres of dry land.

We may describe the members of this family as hard-working thrifty peasants who make ends meet enough to satisfy the economic demands of social obligations (marriages especially), but no more. Note that T is used throughout the family, from children to mother, brother to elder brother, except from ego to F and FB.


Now contrast the family B in Figure 5.37. This family belongs to the 'squire class', the gentry of caste 5, and are actually related as pankaali to the titles aristocrat, the paTTakaarar, of the local area.⁵¹ Their assets can be measured in hundreds and hundreds of acres of heavy-cropping wet land. Their power through the support of retainers and loyal untouchable workers is enormous, and backed by traditional authority. Consider now the T/V usage here: we find V throughout the family. Children give not only their fathers but also their mothers V, and even brothers and sisters exchange V. The only use of T within such a family is downwards, from parents to children, elders to juniors. I have also included an affine, not of course resident in the kuTumpum, married to one of the women (aged forty-three) of the family: note

Figure 5.37 Class variants in caste 5

A: An ordinary middle-class kavuNTar family



B: A kavuNTar family of the squire class



that he follows the strong custom of giving T to his wife's younger brother (as discussed above) despite the high general level of V giving.

There does seem to be a very strong case then that increased V-usage is assumed to be a status-attribute, and is adopted by higher class families to symbolize their rank.

(d) A final and startling piece of evidence (that high levels of V usage are status attributes) comes from the dual systems of T/V usage maintained by caste 4. Referring back to the box-diagrams for caste 4 we find that there are two distinct patterns employed, one in Tamil and the other in Telegu. The Telegu system is employed in the privacy of the home, or in meetings of predominantly same caste members as at marriages or domestic rituals. At such meetings members of other castes may in fact appear by invitation (at marriages they certainly will), but apart from members of 18 and some members of 13, these non-caste members will not speak or understand a word of Telegu. Consequently they will have no opportunity to notice that the Telegu T/V system is one with a high level of T usage, far too high to escape stigma in Tamil speaking castes.

But when members of caste 4 switch to Tamil, which they do when speaking to, or in the presence of, all non-caste members (including incidentally all Telegu speaking castes), they use a different T/V system. In this, the public system put on general display to other castes, there is an ideally high level of V using. In fact the Tamil system is identical to that used by the Tamil-speaking Brahmans, the model for left-hand caste behaviour (to which division caste 4 belongs).

These four kinds of evidence each seem to confirm that high levels of V usage within the caste are recognized by members of prob-

ably all castes to be attributes of high status. Relevant here is Marriott's well known distinction between "interactional and attributional theories of caste ranking" (Marriott 1959), which Dumont (1966: 130) summarizes succinctly thus: "For Marriott the theory of attribution is that a caste's rank derives from the characteristics of its way of life, high or low according to the criteria of relative purity ...Marriott contrasts it with the theory of interaction, which is his own, whereby 'castes are ranked according to the structure of interaction within them' (Marriott 1959:96)".

Now it should be transparent that the behaviour we discussed above as inter-caste interaction in the T/V and related media fits Marriott's interactional theory of caste ranking very well indeed. And that is not surprising because after all such pronominal usage is an aspect of interaction. But here on the other hand, in intra-caste behaviour, the same interactional features are playing a different role. Here they function as status-attributes, just as vegetarianism, pure occupations, the non-remarriage of widows, and others of Stevenson's (1954) criteria of evaluation do. So here we find that the details of interaction, deference and comportment, are just as subject to evaluation as attributes of rank as the more tangible and codifiable customs and rituals that are usually assumed to be the core of such attributes.

There are those who argue that the status attributes of groups in stratified societies are relatively arbitrary signals (bowler hats, fur coats) that function essentially by contrast. Behavioural attributes of status have also been claimed to have an essentially trivial, simple marker character: a case in point is provided by the phonological variables that Labov (1972) and associates have isolated

in Western cities. The incidence of such variables, when prestigious, rises sharply in settings where speakers are self-conscious enough to be maximizing or guarding their social status. Apart from historical connections to prestigious groups, such linguistic variables have no intrinsic relation to high status (or for stigmatized variables, low status), a point well illustrated by the fortunes of the New York inter-vocalic /r/, which has oscillated from being prestigious to stigmatized at least three times over the last 200 years (Labov 1972:290).

Although such theories may have correct application in their domain (some aspects of phonology), they should not blind us to the fact that far deeper less arbitrary relations of social strata to language usage may very well exist (as Bernstein (1973 and elsewhere) has argued strongly in a not very coherent way). Here for instance in the Indian data we find important correlations between caste hierarchy and intra-caste usage. Moreover this pronominal usage reflects a whole package of features of deference and solidarity that accompanies a particular pronominal pattern (a package made up of the strategies of language usage described in Brown and Levinson 1977). Now although it may be true that this particular usage for a caste may have been chosen with a view to how it will look to outsiders, the fact remains that a choice like this effects the most fundamental and important relationships an individual ever enters into. For T/V usage within the family and within one's immediate kin deeply structure the affectual world that individuals grow up in. Giving V to one's own mother even in childhood is not consistent with the freely affectionate and relaxed kind of motherhood found in lower castes where T is invariably exchanged, and so on for other relationships. Given what we know about

the facts of human ontogenesis, the particular shape that an affectual structure of a particular kinship system has cannot but be fundamental both to character and to social structure. Unlike bowler hats or (perhaps) phonological variables, these status-carrying patterns of language usage are not easily donned nor easily set aside. They are less 'trivial' in that they play some more intrinsic part in the different mores, norms, and social structures of different social strata.

But there is also a clear way in which such patterns of language usage are less arbitrary than Labovian variables. We have already noted that there appear to be some universal facts about the usage of T/V systems. In the first place there is the astounding fact that they independently exist in many of the world's languages, a fact that we tried to account for in terms of the intrinsic strategic potentialities of the plural in address. Secondly there is the fact that it is always V (the plural) that is deferential, T that is dishonoric when used asymmetrically; while symmetrical V is an expression of social distance, and symmetrical T an expression of solidarity.

Now I suggest that, thirdly, it is also universally the case that in stratified societies where T/V systems are employed, it will always be the case that lower ranking groups tend to exchange T amongst themselves, and higher ranking groups tend to exchange V. We must treat this only as an hypothesis, but there is some evidence that can be adduced. First of course there is the data presented immediately above. I have it on good authority that this is also true for urban populations in South India, and specifically for Madras. Secondly, Friedrich (1972) reports that in contrast to peasant usage, aristocratic T/V usage in nineteenth century Russia was predominantly

reciprocal V usage even within the family. Thirdly Paulston (1975: 15-16) reports the use of reciprocal V in Swedish as an upper class trait. Fourthly, the same pattern seems (though not clearly stated) to be implied by Garvin and Reisenberg's (1952, see p.216) account of honorifics in Ponapean. Fifthly, Brown and Gilman (1960) cite many instances in the history of European pronouns where reciprocal V patterns were associated with the aristocracy and courtly circles: they argue that this was due to the fact that V-usage was initially introduced from the top in the first place, and although we have already shown the weaknesses in this account, the association is indubitably there. (They claim "that the use of V because of its entry at the top of a society and its diffusion was always interpreted as a mark of good breeding" 1960:272). They also cite other evidence of class associations, in which upper class is always associated with mutual V while lower class is associated with mutual T: "our informants assure us that V and T still function as indications of class membership. The Yugoslavians have a saying that a peasant would say T to a king. By contrast, a French nobleman who turned up in our net told us that he had said T to no one in the world except the old woman who was his nurse in childhood" (Brown and Gilman 1960:272, and see also 273-6).

Our argument then is that unlike Labovian variables, which like New York /r/ can be prestigious in one generation and stigmatized the next, these aspects of language usage have some intrinsic connection to upper and lower social strata. Specifically I would hypothesize that there will never be found a society in which mutual V is associated with lower ranking groups and mutual T with higher ranking ones.

Perhaps some further insight can be gained into the phenomenon by submerging in a broader context. For it also seems to be generally true that in stratified societies speech styles tend to polarize into two or more kinds, associated with different strata, and that in such circumstances it is always the case that the language usage of the higher strata is more elaborate, baroque, rhetorical, and honorific than that used in lower strata. Thus Geertz (1960) describes how in Javanese there are three 'dialects' associated with the aristocracy, townspeople and peasants, where these 'dialects' are actually made up of the addition of two independent systems of reference-honorifics and addressee-honorifics (see Comrie 1976) added to the basic language in different combinations. He provides enough information to construct code rules for the choice of each combination for an ego from each of the three classes. Not only are the outputs of the three code rules different sets of honorifics, but also the inputs (the decision structures) have fundamentally different shapes. And what is clear is that aristocrats mostly use highly honorific language to each other, while peasants mostly use the basic unadorned Javanese to one another. And this is of course exactly the same pattern found with the reference-honorifics T and V in so many languages and cultures. Similar remarks and observations can be found in much of the literature on African oratory and speech styles: see especially Albert (1964) on the Burundi, Irvine (1975) on the Wolof, Bloch (1975) and Keenan (1974b) on the Malagasis. And finally one suspects that this is what Bernstein (1973) is trying to describe in the differences in language usage associated with the class society in England. We see then that we have here something of a more general problem than simply an association of certain

patterns of T/V usage with certain loci in a system of social stratification. It is because the association is in the first place pan-cultural, and in the second place part of a more general problem (language style in complex societies), that Brown and Gilman's (1960) historical account of why V-usage is upper class will not do.

Returning to T/V systems proper, the non-arbitrary (and widely attested) patterns that have to be explained are then the following:

- (1) T goes downward through the social hierarchy, V goes up
- (2) at all or most levels or social strata, T is symmetrically exchanged with solidary equals, V with more distant rank-equals
- (3) despite (2), there is a strong tendency for symmetrical T to be more generally used within lower strata, and symmetrical V within higher strata.

We have already suggested some explanations for (1) and (2). The first was that the widely reported deferential use of V derives from the strategic use of the plural both to avoid potentially offensive specificity and to refer respectfully to alter's social backing or group support. The best evidence for this comes from Keenan's account of a T/V system that is still strategically rather than conventionally employed (Keenan 1974). The second suggestion was that contrary to Brown and Gilman (1960), the solidary and non-solidary symmetrical usage of T and V respectively are prior, and their asymmetrical usages secondary. For if that was the case, then the one-way giving of T (like the one-way giving of food) would constitute a one-way giving of familiarity. And it does in general seem to be the case that ease of access (in many social spheres) is inversely correlated to high social rank. Doctors, professors and bosses can enquire about their subordinates' private

lives, family health and so on, in a way that cannot be reciprocated without claiming a measure of equality. The more renowned and elevated a superior the more diffidence inferiors experience when seeking contact or favours. The systematic basis and expression of this is discussed at length in Brown and Levinson (1977) with material from non-western cultures too. We suggest then that the origin of the pan-cultural association of asymmetric T-giving with the superiority of the giver, and conversely asymmetric V-giving with the inferiority of the giver, lies in the implications of the extension of one-way intimacy. The alternative, that symmetrical usages of T or V are metaphorical extensions from asymmetric ones, has two weaknesses: it provides no account of why the latter should be valued in the way they universally seem to be, and it will not easily extend to other media like food transactions which seem to obey the same sort of rules.

Our two suggestions are compatible if we assume that the first one gives an account of why symmetrical V is used to non-solidary (and potentially dangerous) alters. We shall have to divorce the notion of deference (as employed in the paragraph above) then from the asymmetric notion of rank or power. The two suggestions together then provide a *prima facie* account of why the patterns described in (1) and (2) above should be found widely in unrelated cultures and languages.

We are still left with the problem of (3), the association of symmetrical T with lower strata and symmetrical V with higher strata. But the solution to problems (1) and (2) also provides a straightforward solution here: if symmetrical T is solidary and symmetrical V non-solidary (communicative of social distance), then the pattern emerges because members of lower strata are relatively solidary with one another,

while members of higher strata are relatively distant and non-solidary with one another. That is to say, we may simply assume that the patterns of usage have the significance that we know them to have by virtue of the valuation attributed to them. In other words "the world of the upper and middle groups is constructed in a stern and cold architecture of social distance, asymmetry, and the resentment of impositions, while the world of the lower groups is built on social closeness, symmetrical solidarity, and reciprocity" (Brown and Levinson 1977:247).⁵²

Turning back now to our particular case, it may be objected that not all the increased V-usage among the upper castes that we have noted is symmetrical V exchange. Basically we can say that whenever we have V given to some category of kin who are socially mature (as is always the case with affines), we have adults exchanging V with one another. But when the threshold is relative age, not social maturity, we shall on the whole have asymmetrical T/V usage, with V to seniors and T to juniors and some symmetrical T or V to coevals. For many castes this is the form of usage that holds between most categories of kin. It is therefore important to recollect that REL, that is T/V usage based on relative age, can be seen to be symmetrically exchanged from the point of view of a group rather than an individual. So from the point of view of two kuTumpums, or alliance units of a larger size, if all members give REL, the net exchange will be an approximately symmetrical exchange of T and V and a precisely symmetrical exchange of REL. However we value symmetrical REL, it must be seen to lie somewhere between the solidarity of symmetrical T, and the distance of symmetrical V, while being an unequivocal acknowledgment of a measure of rank

equality between exchanging groups. So in our Indian case, if no total V exchange ever emerges within castes, we nevertheless get approximations to it most thoroughly in V based on social maturity, and next in V based on relative age. And with this modification of degree, our case fits well into the above discussion.

We suggest then on the basis of this evidence, and the other cases cited, that there is an interesting universal feature of stratified societies. This is that lower ranking groups will tend to express, and presumably in some sense to have, solidarity within themselves, while higher ranking groups are considerably less solidary, and express distance between their own members.

If this is so, why should it be? The most hopeful line of enquiry is perhaps network analysis. For this could provide ties between the numbers and kinds of relations between members of a group and larger-scale social forces. For instance Bott (1971) was able to tie degrees of 'role-segregation' between husband and wife to kinds of social network (dense or loose-knit) and this in turn to class membership. The importance of the finding (originally published in 1957) was that it linked small scale facts about intra-familial organization to large scale social phenomena like class in a determinate and relatively precise way. Since then various more precise formulations have been offered, notably by Barnes (1969), and these promise to be of fundamental importance to the growth of a sociolinguistics that is interested in more than mere correlation. But so far only Gumperz (1958, Blom and Gumperz 1972, and in unpublished work) seems to have recognized the importance of these ideas for relating details of language usage to larger scale social phenomena.

Bott's basic findings (in this context) in a study of English families was that upper class families were embedded in loose-knit networks (that is, the family's kin, friends and work-contacts stretched in many different directions and did not have any independent contact with one another), while lower-class families tended to be embedded in close-knit, 'dense' (Barnes 1969) networks (where all of a family's contacts were likely to know each other on independent grounds).

Now although no empirical work has been done to test this, it seems possible that similar differences lie behind the increasing V-usage in upper caste kin groups and the increasing T-usage in lower caste kin groups. One rational behind this would be that it is only among the upper castes that one can find any significant disparity in wealth between families: according to Beck's survey (1972:183) only castes 1, 2, 5, 6, 7a and 10 have families with any substantial assets. (Other higher castes are represented by only a few families see Beck 1972:113). That is to say it is only in the higher castes that we can expect to find any significant class differences. And I suspect that where and only where wealthy families emerge are we likely to find attempts to reduce and cut oneself off from the dense networks of kin that surround one.

The idea then is that the details of Bott's analysis may very well apply not to a crude substitution of caste for English class, but to class differences within caste. Since there is some correlation between caste-hierarchy and the likelihood of class-differentiation within caste, there will also be some overall association between caste rank and at least the range of network type. This also suggests

that there should be some class differences within caste, lower class families having closer-knit networks than wealthier families. All of which does seem to fit the T/V facts above: higher level of V usage in higher castes, and still higher levels within wealthy families within these castes.

One possible reason then for the fragmentation of dense networks in higher strata is the formation of internal class divisions, resulting in the attrition of connections in some directions and the extension of connections further afield in the search for acceptable rank equals.

Another potential source for the expression of non-solidarity among upper castes is the relative lack of what Gluckman called 'multiplex relations', that is, a network of reciprocal multi-functional relationships. For example in a lowly caste like our caste 18 all specialist services (ritual and technical) must be provided by members of the caste itself as no higher castes will service it. The result is that members of one's immediate network may be called upon to serve in any number of roles, from kinsman, priest, medic, carpenter, astrologist, to construction expert; they may indeed all be the same person, and may require like services reciprocated by oneself. In a high caste like 5 on the other hand, experts of various kinds are drawn from different castes - priests from castes 1 and 8, funeral specialists from caste 14, astrologists from caste 13, construction experts of different kinds from castes 3, 6, 9 and 11, and so on. Consequently high caste families are central nodes in star-like complex networks of single-stranded (specialized) relations between individual families drawn from many other castes. This is of course the jajmani system, the network of rural interdependencies between

families and across castes. The point is that higher castes all share in this system to some extent (although only the dominant caste, and perhaps also castes 1 and 2, can command the full range of services) as central nodes in such stars of service provision. The lower the caste the less service it can command and the more it must be able to provide specialists from its own numbers. Consequently the lower the caste the more multiplex relations there will be within it. In such dense networks diffuse debts are repayable in kind, the asymmetrical implications of one-way service provision do not arise, and solidary relations ensue.

Although these facts are particular aspects of Indian rural social structure one can discern close parallels in Western societies. For example Gumperz (personal communication) suggests that lower strata or groups tend to be organized into internally undifferentiated groups - 'local teams' which draw strong boundaries between in and out-group relations (see Blom and Gumperz 1972 for a report of a Norwegian case). And studies of social networks in London for example, by Bott (1971), Young and Wilmott (1967) and so on, tend to support the view that in-turned bounded social networks with dense multiplex relations are recurrent features of the social organization of lower classes in Western cities.

If this is a general feature of stratified societies then we have an explanation for our fact (3) above, that there is a strong tendency for symmetrical T to be more generally used in lower strata and symmetrical V in higher strata. And although in our case we do not have the solid evidence that would tie details of language usage to network types by empirical demonstration, the facts that we do have fit well enough to make a strong case for the role of network types as one of

the crucial intervening variables between social structure and language usage.

It is a speculation moreover that provides an answer to what is otherwise a rather difficult and very important question: if high levels of V-usage are such a prestige feature, and known to be so at probably all levels of the caste hierarchy, why don't lower status groups simply adopt this status attribute to enhance their rank?

Questions like this are important and too little asked. Why doesn't everyone in New York constrict their /r/'s if this is a prestige feature? Labov sometimes argues that there is some psychological impediment to changing subtle conditions on rule applications (Labov 1972: 103-5), and sometimes that there are covert counter-norms which invert the valuation of such variables (Labov 1972:286,313). Only the last would seem to have application to our T/V data: we would have to assume that lower castes use more intra-caste T because there is a norm that favours this. But put thus, we see how very uninformative such talk of 'counter-norms' is; we label an observed regularity a 'norm' and then claim that that 'norm' explains the regularity. It amounts to little more than saying that the natives use more T because they must have motives for using more T. The crucial question of course is in fact what these motives are.

In the T/V case we are lucky in that the symmetrical use of T has a straightforward social valuation in terms of solidarity and low social distance. We could therefore say that the lower castes use more symmetrical T internally because they favour solidarity, or because solidarity is an ideological goal. Even this is something of an advance on 'they say more T because they value T by virtue of a counter-norm'.

But we can clearly go much further if we can relate this favouring of the ideology of solidarity to the particular networks that reinforce it.

And if we can relate patterns of T/V usage to the particulars of the network type in which they are embedded, then we can provide a reasonable answer to the otherwise difficult question of why lower status groups do not simply adopt the patterns of usage that are known to be status-attributes. For then to adopt another pattern of T/V usage would be to adopt another kind of network. And dense networks with their supportive and co-operative structure are clearly things not given up without a great deal of pain and re-adjustment, as Young and Wilmott's (1957) study of change in London documents.

Sociolinguistics will have come of age when significant generalizations across societies and cultures have been collected, and on the basis of them sociolinguistic universals can be posited, predictions made from them and explanations for them given. The universals in linguistic politeness described by Brown and Levinson (1977) seem to be some such sociolinguistic universals. Here we suggest that the three generalizations about T/V systems above are also such sociolinguistic universals (probably particularizations of the ones described in Brown and Levinson 1977), and that the explanation of the patterns found in stratified societies will most likely be found in the properties of networks at different levels of the society. Much work on social networks and language usage remains to be done.

5.4.2.2 T/V usage and the left-right division Our second problem is to provide some account of why T/V usage within castes should be sensitive to the membership of each caste within the archaic categories

left and right, categories that only the oldest and best informed informants knew anything about.

We have in fact two things to account for. In the first place we have the differences in respect giving noted above: whereas most left hand castes have an identical usage for parallel kin and cross kin, right hand castes invariably give greater respect to cross kin and less to parallel kin. In the second place we have the fact, mentioned in various places above, that the constitution of the categories cross and parallel are understood in different ways (at least in many cases) by right hand and by left hand castes. For although both right and left castes may use the genealogical method of assignment on occasions, it is (almost) only the right hand castes who in addition use the 'sociological' alliance-based mode of assignment. These castes are (as far as is known) numbers 5,8,9,10 (the core of the right hand castes) and one somewhat ambivalent member of the left-hand division, 7a (see Beck 1972:101). An important point to grasp here is that the left-hand favoured genealogical mode of assignment is entirely egocentric (unless combined with a moiety organization as in the case of 18), while the right-hand favoured alliance-based mode of assignment is sociocentric. That is, it is only the right-hand mode that will assign a large set of alters to the same category (cross or parallel) for a large set of egos. This suggests that the two modes of assignment may have very different usages for the purposes of social organization.

One should note that the differences are focussed on the cross category, the class of potential affines, not on the class of actual affines. Both right and left castes at all levels of the hierarchy treat actual affines in exactly the same way.

Equally though, the differences are focussed on the category that contrasts with cross, namely parallel. And focussing on the different treatment of parallel kin by left and right castes provides a ready solution to why the differences exist. In a nut-shell, kinship fulfills different functions for left and right hand castes. For right hand castes kinship organizes relatively large populations in a local territory. In large local groups one cannot trace genealogical links to all alters: consequently one operates a system of presumptive kinship, and in particular presumptive parallel category membership based on locality group or clan. For if cross/parallel assignment is the basic determinant of behaviour (including T/V usage) to come caste alters, then one must have some ready method of making that assignment even when the genealogical method is impractical. And the sociocentric alliance-based mode of reckoning provides the method. For left hand castes on the other hand kinship organizes scattered and often isolated families dotted over large areas both rural and urban who maintain kinship ties across great distances and even across language boundaries.

Beck (1972) throughout stresses the territorially-based nature of the internal organization of right hand castes. But she might also have stressed the role that demographic variables play in favouring certain kinds of internal organization. For the only groups who muster more than 5% of the local population are castes 5 (with 54%), 10 (with 7%), 16 (with 5%), who are all right hand castes, and caste 18 (with 21%) which is left hand (figures from Beck 1972:113). All of these castes employ sociocentric group-based attributions of cross and parallel. Castes 5 and 10 reckon parallel kin by membership in the same clan as ego, while 16 appears to operate a locality-based system of attribution like caste

8 and probably caste 9 (which may run a more strictly clan-based system though, as suggested in Beck 1972:96 with respect to another problem). And caste 18 is the exception that proves the rule: although it is a left hand caste, it operates a sociocentric system (more complete than any) based on moiety organization (as described by Beck 1972:104-9). Large local populations do then seem to correlate with kinship systems that are interpreted in such a way that they organize total social groups rather than just egocentred fields into coherent categories which are associated with particular forms of interactional behaviour.

This then provides some account of the fact that the favoured constitution of the categories cross/parallel is different for left and right hand castes. We would have to assume that castes 8 and 9 simply follow the right hand model in this regard although their local populations seem always to be small. And caste 7a, the uncertain and ambivalent member of the left hand division here follows the right hand pattern; it is perhaps relevant that it is the fifth most populous caste in the revenue village (just over 2% of the population).

We must now wonder why left hand castes make no distinction between cross and parallel relatives in the matter of respect, while right hand castes do. This feature is probably related to the same differences in the functions that kinship performs for the two divisions. For insofar as right hand castes treat own-clan members or own-locality groups as equivalent to parallel kin, they thereby label as parallel, effective groups which if not quite corporate are nevertheless important social units. Ego's own social unit then stands in contrast to the set of all other such units, who are not effective groups for ego, and are labelled cross. In such circumstances cross

and parallel kin play entirely different roles in ego's life, and it is natural to treat them differently.

For right hand castes parallel kin, reckoned by social group, are very likely to have vested local interests, whether these are rights to territorial control (in the case of kavuNTar clans) or rights to service-monopolies (in the case of castes 8, 9 and lower service castes). Such local interests include everything from the first claims on certain labour pools by certain clans of and families of caste 5, to claims to the sap of certain stands of palmyra or toddy palms held by members of caste 10, to claims to the takings of certain festivals in certain temples (caste 8 and 1) and so on. All castes that provide any kind of service to others have some such local vested interests, but it is right hand castes that seem to have the stronger ones (as argued by Beck 1972). In any case it is the (at least partial) identification of co-sharers in these local interests and co-members of one's alliance unit as parallel kin that gives that category a more solidary character than the category of cross kin (made up of all other such units). And it seems to be the extent to which such interests are divisive and valuable enough to produce class differentiation that determines the particular kind of T/V treatment that parallel kin in the right hand castes receive.

For right hand castes parallel kin then can be interpreted as equivalent to social groups important not only for marriage but also for local interests. But for left-hand castes operating the cross/parallel distinction in strict genealogical terms, parallel kin are an egocentred category who have no overall local or quasi-corporate identity. And in this respect they are just like cross-kin. Of course

some small subset of parallel kin may have shared vested interests, or a local identity, but other subsets will not. Therefore parallel kin as a whole, reckoned genealogically, will be given the same level of respect that cross kin are. Finer details of interactional demeanour may still vary, for cross-kin are potential affines, but as far as T/V usage is concerned cross-kin will receive no special treatment.

The archaic distinction of castes into left and right correlates then with the fine details of interactional behaviour in the present because such details are tied to the organizational structures within each caste. These structures are in turn tied to the contrast urban/rural, and within the rural society to the contrast between dense local territorial organization versus dispersed settlement, and 'insiders' versus 'outsiders', all contrasts that underlay the ancient overt rivalries between named left and right divisions. The structural correlates that Beck found for members of each division are not then fossil customs from some prior era: the interactional differences would soon have faded if that were so. Rather the correlates, along with T/V usage, reflect present differences in the roles that division members play in the rural society.

5.5 CONCLUSIONS

In the first part of this chapter we turned to an analysis of the Tamil kin terms to provide us with some initial insight into the way that Tamils categorize their kin. We found that systematic variations in Dravidian terminologies require that an abstract semantic level (the level of componential definitions) at which all these terminologies are the same be distinguished from a finer level of semantic

interpretation. We even found that the same groups operate a single system with two distinct interpretations for the components 'cross' and 'parallel' - one in terms of genealogical connections and another in terms of alliance relations. A further discovery was one that contrary to received opinions, a systematic distinction is in fact made between affines and cross-kin in the local Dravidian terminology. Our attention was drawn to these findings partly by a careful analysis of kin-reckoning in natural conversation, and partly by the differential treatment accorded different categories of kin in the usage of other socially deictic items, and especially the T/V pronouns.

We then picked up the search for systematic patterns of T/V usage within caste, and found that (maximally) five categories of kin are carefully distinguished by such usage, while (for nearly all cases) each caste's pattern of internal T/V usage is distinct. The distribution of these patterns of internal usage throughout the caste hierarchy turns out to be extremely systematic.

The patterns of internal T/V usage we have found not only correlate with the two major sociological dimensions of caste-hierarchy and left/right division membership, but they do so for discernible reasons. On the one hand high levels of V-usage within the caste are status-attributes not just because they are shastric ideals, but because they are indicative of certain kinds of social network that in turn reflect class differentiation within caste. Such high levels of V-usage reflect then something as substantial as the kinds of social network that individuals participate in. And that is why such V-usage is more easily admired than emulated: it requires a change in the network pattern of an entire subcaste, towards a network type that will support

the kind of non-solidary relationships that the pronoun usage symbolizes. It is important to note in this regard that one low caste that has an upper caste pattern of V-usage, namely caste 16, has precisely the class differentiation and wider flung networks of the higher castes, features gained through modern opportunities for self-advancement.

On the other hand the reasons for the correlation of left/right division membership with different patterns of intra-caste T/V usage, are to be found in the different functions that kinship categorizations seem to perform for the two divisions. For the left hand castes (excepting 7a and 18) the cross/parallel categories provide egocentric categorizations of kin traced through a genealogical net; such categorizations are primarily of importance only with respect to potential marriage. For right hand castes the categories provide sociocentric assignments, so that parallel coincides with a unit of marriage alliance and potentially with localized interest groups. Here the categorization serves to organize relatively large local populations into the two categories on a presumptive basis, to which particular modes of interaction and deference can then be assigned. Hence although the T/V treatment of parallel kin varies in relation to the extent of local interests and the growth of class differentiation, and hence approximately to hierarchical caste-status, nevertheless right hand castes always treat parallel kin differently from cross kin.

We have drawn attention to two particular interests of these findings. One was the suggestion that an important sociolinguistic universal is that language usage in stratified societies displays the following pattern: lower ranking groups use language that stresses solidarity and familiarity, higher ranking groups use language that

emphasizes social distance (facets of language use other than T/V usage that display this are discussed at length by Brown and Levinson 1977). The other particular interest was that archaic social groupings, long forgotten by the majority of members, can continue to play a living role in the determination of the minutiae of interaction, so long as the organizational basis for the social groupings remains at least in part intact.

From the point of view of the sociology of India, however, the interest of these findings is this. Once again we see that the caste system is so much more than just an agglomeration of groups with slightly different social customs. Rather we find that the internal organization of each caste is attuned to the patterned oppositions of high and low in the hierarchical scheme and left and right in the South Indian correlates of the Varna scheme. In fact as Beck also documented, the kinship organization of each caste is a function of its locus in the overall caste system. And the nature of the wider system pervades the details of each caste's ritual and structural organizations. What is perhaps the most intimate of all such details, namely the particular structure of affectual attitudes within a kinship system, turns out also to be a function of a caste's locus in the overall system; and it is this which is the particular contribution of the present study. For the T/V facts do indeed reflect the 'customary attitudes' that are such an important part of any particular kinship system, whether analyzed in the tradition of Radcliffe-Brown or the style of Levi-Strauss.

If this is so, then it is misleading to generalize over the kinship system of a local set of castes, let alone all the castes of India,

and extract common patterns of behaviour between kinship dyads, as Mandelbaum (1970) has attempted to do. Mandelbaum's generalizations (for instance those about father-son relationships (1970:58-61)) are true for some sub-castes in our village and simply false for others. But it is not simply that he has got the generalizations wrong (they may indeed be as good as can be got). It is rather that such a view obscures the patterned oppositions between the kinship systems operated by castes in systematically different loci in the overall caste system.

The important methodological utility of such sociolinguistic indices as T/V pronouns is that they allow us to describe and compare with relative precision things as ephemeral and subjective - and yet as important - as the 'customary attitudes' associated with particular kinship systems. If such sociolinguistic indices were extensively applied to the study of the distribution of Radcliffe-Brown's tetrad of joking, familiarity, respect and avoidance (see Fortes 1970:42-60) the study of kinship systems might enter a new phase.

CHAPTER VI: THE USES OF LINGUISTIC DATA IN SOCIOLOGY

	Page No.
6.0 Introductory remarks	594
6.1 Summary of the study	594
6.2 Implications for sociolinguistics	600
6.3 The role of sociolinguistics in sociology	604

6.0 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

In this short chapter the whole study is briefly summarized and then the implications that the study has for sociolinguistics are drawn out. In the first section we review our methods and findings chapter by chapter. With this summary in hand we are then in a position to ask what particular implications the study has for sociolinguistic theory (section 6.2), and finally (6.3) argue that sociolinguistics should play a more central role in sociology.

6.1 SUMMARY OF THE STUDY

The major aims and findings of each chapter have already been outlined in the introductions and conclusions to it. In this short summary there will therefore inevitably be a considerable amount of redundancy with what has gone before, and the aim here is simply to bring all the main points together in one place in a concise form.

Chapter I provided some necessary background to the study. Details of the sociological background were drawn largely from Beck's (1972) study of the same village and its environs. The discussion of the sociolinguistic background had the main point that the notion of 'caste dialect' (which figures largely in sociolinguistic surveys of India) is misleading; dialectical differences (with a few exceptions) are not closely related to the caste hierarchy at all, certainly not in any degree of interesting detail. If we wish to learn a substantial amount about the nature of a society from the ways in which its members speak, then we must turn to the much more sensitive facts about language usage within particular kinds of social relationship - and here specifically to social deixis.

In Chapter II an attempt was made to settle questions about the proper theoretical treatment of social deixis (and honorifics in particular) in both linguistic and sociolinguistic theory, as a necessary preliminary to our case study. It was concluded that honorifics are properly considered aspects of the deictic organization of language (as Fillmore had suggested) and that this treatment predicts constraints on the kinds of social significance directly encoded in language structure. We went on to argue that honorifics derive historically from frozen strategies of language usage, and that this illustrates an important route whereby aspects of language usage can become incorporated into language structure under functional pressures.

It was also established that a distinction must be made between the meaning and use of socially deictic items (despite their pragmatic nature), and thus two distinct kinds of descriptive apparatus are required. One of these is required to capture the meaning of such items and within current frameworks the appropriate theoretical notion seems to be conventional implicature. The other descriptive method is required to describe the speaker's abstract knowledge of the way in which such items are used. Having partially rejected both Geoghegan's theory (largely because it makes no reference to the meaning of the items) and Brown and Gilman's (for different reasons), a revised theory was proposed that draws attention to the complexity of the cognitive processes involved.

These discussions provide the necessary linguistic and sociolinguistic background for the sociological inferences that follow in later chapters. Finally at the end of the chapter we introduced a handful of Tamil honorifics that play an important role in those socio-

logical inferences.

Chapter III presented the facts about the usage of just two of these socially deictic items, the Tamil T/V pronouns, and described the methods and limitations involved in the collection of the data.

Chapter IV presented the first half of the sociological findings, concentrating on the relations between the 17 main castes in the village. To avoid prejudging these relations, a strict method was followed that aimed to build a model of these relations from the point of view of participants. First we asked what the use of honorifics means to participants, and showed that a particular pattern of (for instance) T- and V-pronoun giving has a specific valuation for members, that is, it allows the inference of the relative social status of the parties to the exchange. Secondly we collected all the usages that members of one significant social category (here caste) use to members of each other such category; and we showed that members know most of these facts. Given all this we were able to derive an overall social hierarchy or ranking of the castes in a way that, at least potentially, members themselves can infer. We did this by adapting the scaling technique used by Marriott on other Indian materials. An objective overall model of the society was thus obtained which still fits the Verstehen bill - that is, a model that retains a close connection to the way members see things. Although deep parallels between verbal and non-verbal media of interaction hold out promise for a general theory of transactions, yet the linguistic media provide surer sociological insights. The linguistic facts provide a more precise, a more general and a more detailed Verstehen model than can be constructed from any non-linguistic evidence.

However problems arose. Despite enormous consensus across individuals, there is not total agreement on the overall ranking of castes. There are slightly different results for different socially deictic items. More importantly, some castes rank relatively high as givers of honorifics, relatively low as receivers, and vice-versa. These elements of dissensus proved to be more than just troublesome inconsistencies. They allowed some further complex inferences about the nature of the society. For example we were able to show that there is an element, but only a small element, of competition between castes, by a simple application of game theory. Further we showed that there is more to a caste hierarchy than just concern for relative rank among its constituents; for to explain the derived inconsistencies we had to invoke a further principle, that of alliance between castes. Some additional aspects of honorific usage were shown to support this. All of these conclusions have some importance to Indian studies, where there has been much controversy over the nature of inter-caste relations and the proper way to study them.

We then turned to the second half of the sociological findings. Chapter 5 covers the relations within castes. In South India, intra-caste relations are more or less co-extensive with the range of kinship. To obtain the Verstehen categories that underlie the use of honorifics to certain categories of kinsmen we thus turned naturally enough to the Tamil kinship terminology. Besides, kin terms come within the purview of social deixis. While accepting many points from prior analyses of the Dravidian kinship terminologies, we pointed to two fundamental deficiencies. The one is the fact that there exists a set of affinal terms distinct from terms for cross-kin, a fact system-

atically overlooked. The second is that, to account for variations within Dravidian terminologies used by different castes, or in different regions, we must allow three distinct levels of analysis: surface syntax, logical form, and semantic interpretation, where sets of lexical items belong to the first level, componential analyses to the second, and the precise interpretation of the components themselves to the third. Variation occurs at all three levels. And most surprisingly two distinct systems of semantic interpretation are used simultaneously by members of some castes: one system operates in terms of the socio-biological links in a genealogy; but another operates in terms of purely sociological units, namely alliance links between territorial units. Taped conversations were used as evidence of this. The results suggest that in the controversy over the Trobriand case, both Leach and Lounsbury could have been correct: systems exist which work both ways simultaneously.

With the help of the Verstehen categories abstracted from the study of the kin terminology, we then turned to an analysis of the usage of honorifics, and in particular the T/V pronouns, to kinsmen. We first explored in detail the usage within one caste. It was clear from this that there is another way of obtaining Verstehen categories, namely by observing how members systematically treat different classes of things and persons. We were then able to show that these methods of analysis are extremely sensitive to cultural minutiae, and can throw considerable light on the ways in which Tamils conceptualize their relations to various of their kin.

From our analysis of kinship within a particular caste a grid was extracted for comparing the usage of honorifics to kinsmen in

different castes. We then proceeded to analyze the data for all the castes. It was found that while each caste has its own pattern of internal T/V usage, that pattern is (at least in part) predictable from the position of the caste in the overall village society. Two dimensions of that overall structure are relevant. The first is the caste's rank in the caste hierarchy, for the higher the caste the more likely it is that members will treat their kin with greater deference. The second is the division of the hierarchy into two sections, 'left-hand' and 'right-hand', for left-hand castes treat both their parallel and cross-kin in the same way, while right-hand castes are always more deferential to their cross-kin. This last was given a culture-specific explanation.

We pointed out that patterns of the first kind, greater use of deferential language within the highest strata of stratified societies, is probably a sociolinguistic universal. If so, these kinds of linguistic variables are not arbitrarily prestigious, as Labov has argued for other kinds. Rather there seems to be an intrinsic connection between hierarchical rank and group-internal language usage. We suggested that the connection is provided by the nature of interpersonal networks, along the lines argued for by Bott: lower groups have dense networks with multiplex relations, higher ones have dispersed loose-knit networks. Sociolinguistics of this sort may then help to establish sociological universals of an important kind. And from the point of view of Indian sociology we see that it makes little sense to study the kinship system of a caste in isolation, or to generalize about the kinship systems of a set of castes in a local area. Rather what we find is a system of patterned oppositions between the kinship systems

operated by castes in systematically different loci in the overall caste system.

A crucial point of the chapter was that an important component of kinship systems is the associated set of 'customary attitudes' or affectual system. Sociolinguistic indices like honorifics provide an objective means of studying the distribution of such ephemeral and subjective elements, like Radcliffe-Brown's tetrad of familiarity, respect, joking and avoidance.

6.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIOLINGUISTICS

In the two central chapters, IV and V, what we have tried to do is demonstrate by means of an extended case study the detail and depth of sociological insight that can be gained from sociolinguistic materials. To achieve this we have used a somewhat novel sociolinguistic method. And the point of the case study is to demonstrate the power of the method, and argue for new directions in sociolinguistic research.

As we noted in the Introduction (in Chapter I), current sociolinguistic research can be assigned to two main branches, correlational sociolinguistics on the one hand in the style of Labov together with his critics, Bailey, Bickerton and others, and the much more heterogeneous interactional sociolinguistics that is concerned with the study of social episodes. Now we have a general misgiving about both of these branches of the discipline, namely that neither contributes significantly (or at least not as much as it could) to our understanding of society. For correlational sociolinguistics is essentially parasitic on prior sociological categorizations, while interactional sociolinguistics rarely transcends the study of the organization and processes involved in particular interactional episodes. But we leave

aside here these failings from a sociological point of view, which are the subject of the next section.

What concerns us here is rather the inadequacy of either branch of sociolinguistics to deal properly with its subject matter, the facts about language usage in a community. Interactional sociolinguistics (and one may include here ethnomethodology and the ethnography of speaking) with its case by case study of episodes, fails to give us an overall picture of the systematic variation in language across segments of the society. Correlational sociolinguistics on the other hand fails to deal with a great deal of socially significant phenomena in speech for more fundamental reasons. For it takes its basic goal, following grammatical theory, to be the description of the (socially identified) individual's linguistic competence. The reason for the failure to adequately describe many socially significant aspects of language use is that these turn out to be anchored not to the individual but rather to the relationship between interlocutors.

Let us take a simple but key example from our study that will firmly illustrate how the correlational school's focus on the individual's competence fails to do justice to the facts about language usage. The social valuation of T and V, the reader will recollect, turns out to be inherently interactional. If A gives T to B, we don't know what social significance it has unless we know what B is expected to give back to A; if B returns T then (ceteris paribus) A's T was solidary, if B gives back V, then A's T was an expression of superiority. If here then, we ignore the interactional nature of the facts, and instead focus on the individual's competence, we may ask (as might Labov) why this individual A uses T on some occasions and V on others. We

could easily then conclude that (i) A's use of T and V is stochastic, (ii) in order to finely predict the probabilities of A's use of T, we need to know the social identity of A, and yet (iii) however much we know about the identity of A, we will still only be able to talk about the probability of his producing a certain proportion of T's. All this would, in a sense, be true, and as such would be characteristic of the 'linguistic variables' studied by Labov and his associates. But clearly such observations would only be an epiphenomenon of something much more precise, namely the facts that (i) A has, as a member of a subcultural unit (a caste), a precise set of rules for the use of T and V; (ii) the nature of those rules is in large part predictable from the rank and division membership of the unit (caste) A belongs to; and (iii) A's rules for the use of T and V are crucially organized around the social identity of the other party, the addressee. The T/V materials neatly illustrate then that only an interactional viewpoint, organized around the social identities of both speaker and addressee, can handle some types of sociolinguistic material.

Now T/V systems are not exceptional in relying thus on the social properties of dyads rather than individuals. Indeed it seems to us that most of the socially significant aspects of language use are precisely of this sort, as argued at length in Brown and Levinson (1977). Even the phonological facts which are most amenable to a Labovian treatment are almost certainly not immune to the influence of the social identity of the addressee (nor is the influence so un-specific as to be appropriately subsumed under the notion of 'style' or an 'attention to speech'). The point is simply that the kind of language that an individual uses is crucially dependent on his percept-

ion of the person he is speaking to (as simply illustrated by baby talk, or the facts about code switching).

We argue therefore that sociolinguistics should be reconstructed, drawing selectively from both current branches of the discipline. From interactional sociolinguistics we should take the notion that the basic datum is the pattern of language usage observable between socially specified participants. From correlational sociolinguistics we should draw the commitment to a full sampling of language usage throughout a speech community. The kind of sociolinguistics that results is the kind exemplified in this thesis: it involves the study of those aspects of language usage that are sensitive to different kinds of social relationships, and it pursues those features right through the range of significant social relationships in a society.

In this thesis we have followed this program in a particular way. We have taken features of language usage (honorifics) that are easily identifiable and whose social significance is relatively very straightforward, and we have examined in detail their usage in a complex range of social relationships. In this way we have minimized the linguistic analysis while maximizing the sociological payoffs. A reverse strategy would be to take some simple range of relationships, and examine the kind of language use at all levels that is associated with them. Such a strategy was used in part by R. Lakoff's (1975) study of sex-roles and English usage (although she did not take a thorough-going interactional approach, and so failed to distinguish systematically between male-male, female-female, and male-female interactions and their associated patterns of language use).

We justified our particular choice of strategy on the basis of a pilot project that showed that T/V usage was a very crude but nevertheless useful index that co-occurs with many other socially significant features of language usage. But there can be little doubt that if a broader study of such features were undertaken it would yield not only more interesting facts about the ways in which social relationships influence the use of language, but also finer grained sociological insights. Such a full scale investigation would transfer nicely to different research locales, for instance to the use of language in the class-based structures of Western cities. The sociolinguistic program that we have argued for should then have general applicability.

6.3 THE ROLE OF SOCIOLINGUISTICS IN SOCIOLOGY

In the previous section we have argued for a redirection of sociolinguistic research on internal grounds, that is on the basis of the nature of the subject matter. Here we argue for a redirection on external grounds, namely on the basis that sociolinguistics should be so structured that it contributes significantly to sociology.

The two main branches of sociolinguistic research fail to contribute significantly to sociology in rather different ways. Correlational sociolinguistics is typically parasitic on prior sociological work, for its basic technique is to sort samples of speech into categories based on some sociologist's prior classification of the social identities of speakers, and then to try and find correlations between features of the speech and aspects of the social identities of speakers. If the correlations turn up the sociologist's classification achieves perhaps some measure of ratification, but features that do not correlate

are simply ignored. And so, despite many such studies, the sociological insights provided have been minimal.

Interactional sociolinguistics on the other hand tends towards sociological triviality for different reasons. In the first place there is a favouring of the case-by-case study of episodes, with little generalization beyond them, so no arguments can be made from the studies to some general property of some social system. This is due in part simply to the small amount of work that has been done. But secondly, there tends to be an emphasis on the study of interactional process to the exclusion of the way in which such processes are tied to social identities and relationships. And the notion of a systematic sampling of interaction throughout a social system is conspicuously absent. What these studies tell us it is indeed necessary to know, but if they are to contribute to the central concerns of sociology, especially to overall models of social systems, then these further systematically sampled facts must be collected.

In contrast to work in these two directions, the sociolinguistic approach we have argued for would contribute directly to mainstream sociological concerns. Specifically, in contrast to correlational sociolinguistics it would contribute to our understanding of how the members of a society perceive it themselves, that is to *Verstehen* sociology; secondly language usage seems to be so much more sensitive to speaker-hearer relationships than to speaker identities that our approach can yield much finer sociological distinctions than the correlational approach; and thirdly, our approach will yield inferences about the overall nature of a society that are in principle not derivable from the random study of episodes. Let us take these points

one by one, and illustrate the force of the remarks with examples taken from the body of the text.

The correlational strategy has been to let sociologists identify the significant groups, while sociolinguists investigate how members of these groups speak. Our strategy is the reverse, namely to find out what the significant groups and their relations are by finding out how members speak. The change of strategy is important because language is in fact the best available means of discovering the social categories and relations that members of a society operate with. In short, the study of language is the major tool of Verstehen sociology, that is the study of society that is premised on the assumption that the behaviour of social actors is only understandable in relation to their perception of the circumstances under which they act.

To illustrate this point from our study, it has been the received view that an important feature of Dravidian kinship systems is that there is no category of affines, those related by marriage being subsumed within the cross category of kin as if persons always married their classificatory cross cousins. This analysis is suggested by study of the core words for kinsmen in Dravidian languages. But in fact by studying patterns of verbal interaction we found that contrary to the doctrine members do in fact distinguish a conceptual category of affines. We can show this by demonstrating that Tamils systematically treat their affines with maximal respect, as reflected in their honorific usage, and this treatment over-rides any other kinship connections. Looking back at the terminology with a new scrutiny we can then in fact discern a number of special kin words designating affines. The point is that even where cultural concepts are not

lexicalized, interaction may be so organized around them that we can readily identify them. In either case (with or without lexicalized concepts) language provides key access to the way members see their own society, and a sociologically useful sociolinguistics should exploit this.

Our second point was that interactional materials seem to provide much richer sociological information than the study of individuals' competences, or social dialects. Again we can illustrate this from our study. Suppose that instead of investigating honorifics, we had turned to the more traditional study of say, phonological variables. We would then have collected for a number of individuals drawn from different castes, age groups, etc., their range of usage of such variables, and constructed grammars that modelled this. Surveying these facts we could then ask what we have learned about the society from which the speakers are drawn. But if we did this for our village what we would learn is pitifully little. For as we argued in Chapter I (1.2.2) the phonological variables that members perceive would only distinguish Brahman from Non-Brahman touchable (and only then if the Brahman was speaking to another Brahman), and touchables from untouchables, together with some hints of different regional origin which would not themselves convey important social information. Members are unable to make any finer discriminations even if analysts might. And these particular three distinctions are so obvious on other ethnographic grounds, being redundantly expressed in dress, habitation and general bearing for example, that nothing new would have been learnt sociologically.

On the other hand if we move the focus, from the individual's internalized range of usage, to the usage of language from one individual to a specified other, we can reap a rich sociological harvest. For by studying patterns of language use within dyads, we are in effect studying reflexes of social relationships. And social relationships are in turn partially determined by (and determinative of) the larger scale social orders, which we can thereby study at one remove. In this way the T/V facts gave us far greater insight into village society than a study of village dialects would. For instance, whereas the study of dialects would establish a hierarchical ranking between only the three major segments of the society mentioned above, the study of T/V usage alone distinguishes over eleven levels of rank. And if we add other honorifics we can make finer and finer discriminations in many dimensions of social life. Socially significant aspects of language simply seem to tell us more about relationships between speakers and addressees than about speaker-identities established absolutely. We argue therefore that a sociolinguistics that takes as its basic datum the use of language within social relationships will yield more interesting sociological results than a sociolinguistics essentially concerned with describing the grammatical range of categories of individuals.

Finally, our third point was that our favoured sociolinguistic approach can yield inferences about the overall nature of a society in a way that the case by case study of episodes typical of interactional sociolinguistics cannot. For the study of random episodes gives one no basis for generalization and no adequate sampling of patterned variation. But if such a sample is taken and the inter-

action between members drawn from each and every major social category is scrutinized, important inferences about the overall nature of the society can be made in a precise and accountable manner. To take a final example from our study, we were concerned in Chapter IV with the problem (amongst others) of how the analyst can arrive objectively at a ranking of castes in an Indian village. The problem is that although members maintain that there is such a (more or less) unilinear ranking, when questioned, they do not agree about it, or even about the criteria on which it is based. Indeed doubts arise as to whether it is not a cultural fiction hiding a large mass of inconsistent perceptions. Nevertheless, if we study language usage we see that each caste isolates a set of castes to whom it is deferential, and a set to whom it is not. Collating these different views of the situation, we in fact find that in everyday unreflecting interaction members behave as if they all more or less agreed upon a single rank order which is determinable from their language use. But we were only able to make these inferences because we had a complete sampling of one particular aspect of language usage (T/V pronouns and other honorifics) in all combinations of inter-caste dyads. It was those 272 basic facts, in turn based on thousands of observations, that made the inference from quality of interaction to the nature of social structure possible.

Why should the particular sociolinguistic program we espouse yield so much more sociological information than the others? There seem to be two basic reasons. The first is that we have tied the study of language use to the study of social relationships simply by taking our datum to be the use of language between specified parties. And

social relationships seem to be the basic building blocks of social systems (analysts often talk, instead, of statuses, but when spelled out these turn out to be relational specifications of rights and duties between two or more individuals). Now there simply is no finer discriminator between social relationships (or even between the degrees and shades within them) than the kind of language used within them. This is a resource that has scarcely been utilized in a systematic manner in social psychology, interactional psychiatry, social anthropology or all the other disciplines with a vested interest in the quality of social relationships.

The second basic reason for the promise of the method is that it so happens that larger scale social dimensions of society can often be abstracted from a pattern of social relationships. For example, suppose we have the following set of relationships,



where C gives deference (one way, unreciprocated) to B and B to A.

Then we can abstract an overall hierarchy that transcends each relationship. Similarly, if A and B are solidary, and so are C and D, but A and B are each non-solidary rivals to C and D, then we can abstract a larger scale set of relations, namely two blocks or alliance groups counter-posed to one another. We can make this leap from relationships between individuals to relationships between segments of a society just because the principles that construct the lower level units (relationships) seem to be identical to those that construct higher level ones.

Thus rank is a relation that holds equally between individuals and between groups of individuals, and so is alliance. And so we can derive relationships between groups from relationships between their members, and thus make inferences about larger scale social orders.

It is because our sociolinguistic method yields essentially a map of the distribution of social relationships throughout a society that it has the sociological utility that it does. And it is our belief that sociolinguistics is far too promising a resource for sociology to be allowed to be parasitic or non-contributory in the way that historically it largely has. The sociolinguistic program that we have here outlined is designed to exploit this resource in what seems at present to be the most profitable way.

FOOTNOTES

1. Incidentally there is still a great deal to be done before we understand the circumstances in which various levels between these poles are considered appropriate. Some of the determinants are situational, others have to do with style, intention, purpose and persuasion. And some admixtures are very different from others: for example a rural astrologist uses one distinct blend, a preacher in a temple another.
2. And on sociological grounds we may doubt that the 'Mudaliyars' he studied in the three cities really had anything at all in common, this being a caste title adopted by many sub-castes of diverse origins on the road to self-improvement.
3. Since I wrote these critical remarks on the notion of 'caste dialect' Dr. E. Annamalai has pointed out to me that a number of Indian scholars including himself have recently come to very similar conclusions, as recorded in the discussion in the International Journal of Dravidian Linguistics Vol.IV, Nos.1 and 2, and Vol.V, No.1. This unscholarly omission of mine has at least given us the opportunity of independent confirmation of the same basic findings.
4. These would not necessarily prove good clues to caste-attribution, since members of one caste are not necessarily familiar with the ritual and kinship terms of another.
5. One possibility that still exists is that, like the Brahmans, all castes code-switch between a dialect used in the home and a dialect used in inter-caste communication. Informants denied this. And a few tapes that were collected by lending a tape-recorder to an informant to conceal in his home did not show any such switching. But these were right-hand caste homes, and possibly left-hand caste homes would prove to be different. E. Annamalai (p.c.) reports that such code-switching can be found in homes of his Ramnad Non-Brahman caste, but there it is from the strong regional forms into a more standard colloquial for external transactions.
6. A great deal of Tamil scholarship could no doubt be brought to bear on the details of this evolution, an almost unique opportunity afforded by the two millenia of literary tradition in Tamil. For instance Dr. E. Annamalai points out (personal communication) that the uncertain beginnings of the T/V system can be pin-pointed in early Tamil literature; thus the ancient grammarian Tolkappiyar states in sutra 17 that the V pronoun is used in speech but is not a usage of grammatical tradition; and in the early love poems one can find inconsistent use of what was then perhaps a new fashion. The latter is documented in M. Shanmugam Pillai, tamiR illakkiyak kooTpaaTakaL (Personal Pronouns and Love Poems), Muthu Publishers, Madurai, 1974. For instance in one poem, kuruntokai, the heroine

6. (contd.) refers to the hero with a T pronoun once, with a V pronoun twice, with a third person singular pronoun 61 times and a plural third person pronoun 82 times, while using only the singular forms for her father and brothers. The heroine's girl friend addresses the hero 30 times with a T and 9 times with a V pronoun, and refers to him 49 times with a third person singular and 36 times with a plural pronoun. This extraordinary vacillation may in fact be due (at least in part) to the switching phenomena described also for nineteenth century Russian lovers by Friedrich (1972). I am much indebted to E. Annamalai for all these details.
7. Dr. E. Annamalai points out (personal communication) that there is an element of this argument that is not sufficiently emphasized. Consider that now for instance that niinka is firmly established as an honorific singular second person, a new plural form niinka ellaam, 'you all', is tending to emerge. Thus to explain the historical sequences reported we must also assume that there is a functional pressure in favour of clarity that seeks to disambiguate 'you-plural' from 'you-singular-honorific'. Politeness and clarity are then functional pressures working in opposite directions here as elsewhere in language in general.
8. Dr. E. Annamalai points out that our hypothetical sources for T/V systems would also be reinforced by demonstrating that there are existing synchronic links between V-usage and FTA contexts. This can in fact be shown in Tamil, and is documented in various sections below; but to take an example for present purposes, one member of the humble barber caste 14 maintained that he switched from the V to the super-V pronoun naam when he was requesting something from or placating his higher caste customers.
9. Dr. E. Annamalai notes that these usages are not very stabilized and thus are by implication perhaps less likely historical sources of the honorific plural; for instance on tampi ('your-T younger brother') is possible in spoken Tamil, and although on appaa ('your-T father') is not possible in spoken Tamil, the corresponding un tantai is possible in written Tamil. But instability does not necessarily imply that the forces of change are themselves of recent origin.
10. A nice piece of evidence in favour of this diachronic derivation of -nka from the plural marking morpheme is that both can be shown to have the same underlying form /-kaL/. See below.
11. Of course intuitive considerations should already have convinced us of that. For, assuming a truth-conditional semantics, the sentence 'You-V are Napoleon' and the sentence 'You-T are Napoleon' (where You-V stands for the honorific pronoun and You-T for the familiar one) are each true when the other is. Thus if the use of you-T and you-V makes no difference to the truth conditions for the sentence, the distinction cannot be semantic.

12. Dr Annamalai points out that nka can be postfixed to adverbs just in case there is some other suffix already present, for example the question suffix -aa or particle taan. Thus cikaramataan-unka vanteen 'I came definitely quickly sir' is grammatical. Since -taan and -aa give focus to the constituents to which they are added, -nka insertion seems to be in part conditioned by thematic factors.
13. An exception is the role -nka plays in reported speech, where -nka may (but may not) signify respect given by the reported speaker to the addressee in the reported speech event.
14. Even if the range of relevant linguistic phenomena is restricted to universal aspects of language, social deixis will still inescapably be part of the subject matter for which linguistic theory must account.
15. E. Annamalai suggests (personal communication) that there is some 'interference here from formal Tamil', i.e. that this is perhaps an isolated case of a whimsical use of a literary form. Either way, some further investigation would be required to establish the facts.
16. Quinn 1974, in a review of Geoghegan 1973, argues for an information theoretic efficiency in terms of uncertainty reduction. This could be better formalized in terms of model-theoretic informativeness as proposed by Carnap and Bar-Hillel (1952).
17. The pragmatic significance of these linguistic items need not be (indeed cannot be) as vague and uninformative as the traditional glosses 'formal', 'polite' and so on, against which Fillmore (n.d. Deixis II:10) has correctly inveighed. But it does not follow that there is no intermediate value assigned to such forms beyond a complete specification of the situations in which they are used.
18. Brown and Gilman used their dimensions of power and solidarity to account for community-wide generalizations about T/V usage. We re-use them here in an entirely different explanatory context, as dimensions of an individual's subjective assessment of alter's social status relative to himself, this assessment being part of the individual's cognitive processing involved in the use of address terms. We hope no confusion results - the model here is a model of individual cognition, not a model of community usages (the latter, we assume, can be based upon a representative sample of the former).
There is in fact considerable evidence that these two dimensions are involved in the subjective assessment of social others: see the detailed arguments in Brown and Levinson 1977, where the dimensions are called 'power' and 'social distance' (P and D for short).

19. In school these Harijan teachers would exchange V with their touchable pupils, while their higher caste colleagues would use T to all pupils and receive V.
20. His status should be contrasted to that of another Harijan 'lineman' who comes from the Harijan community within the local caste arena. When he comes to high caste homes in the hamlet of kannapuram to read the meters, he is not allowed to enter the houses, and the local teacher (a member of 7b) has to be summoned to call out the numbers to the Harijan outside. Whatever power this man may derive from his office is effectively negated by his location at the bottom of the local caste hierarchy.
21. Paul Kay points out (personal communication) that there is some hyperbole here. The point is that I am here maneuvering to select one segment or core of the cognitive processing as basic to the sociological inferences to be made in the chapters below, which belong it is true to only one kind of sociology. To quote Kay: "I would suggest that in one sense the core is just what you say it is - this is the core of interest to institutional sociology. But there is another core that is of interest to interactional sociology and this is the first core plus the knowledge that it is only part of a structure such as that shown in Figure 2.16... that is, all users know that each other's T/V behavior is influenced not only by the relevant caste and class info [sic] but also by situational factors...it is the common knowledge of the factors that go into producing these behaviors that guarantees that members of the culture can always produce a coherent account, judged by other members, of why A gave, say, T to B on occasion X."

The study of the interactional handling of honorifics would be a fascinating but entirely different project from the one that is described in the following chapters. I hope some day to publish the details collected.
22. This analysis raises a problem with the model suggested in the last chapter which we should dispose of. We suggested there that a restriction should be placed on marking-type rules such that no marking rule can have as output what is not a possible input (in Geoghegan's terms; in our terms such a reclassification device should not determine a P and S value that could not be achieved in other ways). This restriction would make all marking rules essentially metaphorical in nature. For clearly one cannot have metaphors where one does not have corresponding 'literal usages'. But given this restriction, if we now say that the other second person pronominal alternates like naam and atu are not determined by the values issued by the basic classificatory component, nor by marking-type reclassifications, where and how are they determined so that the system ever outputs them? There are two ways in which we can provide for these other alternates, so that their determining P and S values can be arrived at independently of the marking-type reclassifications that can boost such values. In the first place we can allow the basic classificatory component to


22. (contd.) assign the corresponding values to referents or social alters outside the local caste arena. In the second place we can allow the other reclassificatory operations, especially those in component (2) (of Figure 2.16 in 2.3.3) that take into account personal attributes, to boost P and S values as required. Both of these solutions are intuitively correct.
23. This fact seems to be in line with everything else that is known about sociolinguistic characteristics of women's speech: see for example Trudgill 1974.
24. The reader should simply think of the output T or V as the values on the 'power' and 'solidarity' dimensions which, if no reclassification intervenes, determine the choice of the corresponding pronoun.
25. At the same time that this research was being written up J.H.B. Den Ouden was independently working on similar materials also gathered in Coimbatore District. Unfortunately my attention was not drawn to his work till after this chapter was completed, or more comparison to his materials might have been made. His treatment is however very sketchy, and according to our interpretation, mistaken in a number of ways. But he concurs in the importance of linguistic materials in the study of caste systems. Results are published in Dutch in Den Ouden 1975.
26. What this amounts to in the vocabulary to be developed below is that given a broad knowledge of T/V giving and receiving, an actor can infer the rank blocs of the sort utilized here. If he then retains the knowledge of these blocs he can predict the whole range of usage provided he takes into account one other factor especially - namely alliances between particular castes that lead to inconsistencies in ranking behaviour. Less importantly he may need to know which castes are in a state of sustained rivalry, this also producing perturbations in the expectable T/V usages.
27. Members also sometimes spoke as if third person referent honorifics (i.e. referring expressions for persons) were inferrable from the mode of address to the same referent. For instance they volunteered that if they said 'nii' (T) to B, then they would refer to him as avaan (he-singular-non-honorific), but if they said 'niinka' (V) then they would refer to him as avaar (he-singular-honorific). However such neat correspondences between modes of address and reference did not empirically exist; for the situation of address puts clear constraints on usage, namely any sanctions that the addressee can bring to bear, that are simply absent from - or rather not necessarily present in - the situation of reference. Honorifics are audience-sensitive, and the special thing about honorifics of address is that the referent (or deictically indicated target in strict addressee honorifics like nka) is necessarily a member of the audience.

28. The reader may be puzzled by the two cells column 11/row 8, column 10/row 11, which although they represent positive T giving lie outside the area of the stepped line. This is just an artefact of our matrix conventions (that follow Marriott 1974), where identical ordering on horizontal and vertical axes have been abandoned, with the consequence that a self-reciprocal cell may lie inside the area where inter-caste interactions occur. But if we then draw the stepped line around the boundary of the area we shall be giving the caste with the self-reciprocal cell an extra score of 1 on both dimensions. So we must compensate for this self-reciprocal (here 11/11) by drawing the line one cell in on both giving and receiving dimensions (for column 11 and row 11). In this way we retain the usefulness of the matrix as a geometrical representation of the rank also represented by positive scores. The reader can check the geometric representation by counting scores.
29. One episode on tape leads me to modify the above statements: in dire extremity it may be used to persons in supreme power where in more normal circumstances it would not be so used. The episode concerns a woman of caste 5, of a poor labourer family, who dispossessed of hearth and home and whose husband was thrown into jail on a trumped up charge by an avaricious landlord, came to beg the intercession of another member of caste 5, the President of the village and scion of a noble family. Her usage of saami was a topic of comment from the audience, from which one may infer that it broke normal expectations of usage.
30. This is an exaggeration. Even if symmetric usages occurred freely our methods would still have validity for two reasons. In the first place reciprocal (symmetric) usage cannot reverse the meaning of an individual act - it can only neutralize it. For example if A gives T to B, and B returns T to A, while A has failed to express superiority over B, A has nevertheless blocked B's expression of superiority over A. The positive evaluation of T giving as a rank maximizing action is thus still valid. Secondly our methods involve isolating ranks on both giving and receiving dimensions. Symmetric usages would thus involve both parties in a dyad gaining points on one dimension only to equally lose them on the other. So when A and B exchange T, A (and B also) gains +1 (say) for T-giving, but -1 for T-receiving; the two dimensions cancel one another out. In other words treating the two dimensions separately and then bringing them together achieves the right result: A and B are equal in rank.
31. To be more precise, what Marriott underplays is the importance of rank-reflecting behaviour. As we saw in section 4.3.3.1, fully competitive behaviour simply cannot generate hierarchy. Marriott's emphasis on competitive behaviour (as in Marriott 1959, 1968) throughout the hierarchy is thus misplaced, and his use of the terms 'optional strategy', 'pessimist strategy' (Marriott 1974) misleading because these are not viable strategies within a single competitive medium (the first requires others' acquiescence, the second requires the player's own desire for defeat).

31. (contd.) On the other hand, Marriott's minimal and maximal strategies are truly viable strategies, and it is this aspect of Marriott's theory that is the important contribution. The implication is that only the representatives of the Kshatriya and Vaishya Varnas systematically treat transactional media as competitive games.
32. For example, an English country gentleman will feast his tenants on rent day or when there is a wedding in the family, but this will never be reciprocated.
33. Montague (1974) treats common nouns as the intersection of sets of properties. Consequently such properties may be straightforwardly identified as 'semantic components'. But in Montague's analysis the story does not stop there: each component can be defined model theoretically.
34. It is true, as E. Annamalai points out to me, that the -aar suffix is still productive in the high diglossic variant of Tamil as a suffix on personal nouns ending in -an. That still leaves maamiyaar unaccounted for. D. McGilvray tells me that the -aar suffix is still productive in colloquial Tamil in Ceylon, although very formal. My contention remains that at the very least the term maamanaar by generalized conversational implicature (see Grice 1975) picks out an affinal subset of members of the category maaman (cross-uncle). But if the semantics/pragmatics of the terms maamiyaar and maamanaar are parallel (as seems likely) then the affinal reference must be achieved by conventional rather than conversational implicature, because there is no colloquial term maami in the village (see text).
 Another possibility, raised by E. Annamalai, is that maamanaar and maamiyaar are the reference terms for the address terms maaman and maami respectively. This is simply not the case for the Tamil used in oolappaalaiyam, where the respective reference terms are maaman and attai.
35. Beck (1872:288, term number 18) has a slightly different interpretation of koRuntanaar as HB older than ego rather than younger than H. She has another term maccaanTaar for HB younger than ego. My evidence is based on translations of transcripts rather than systematic eliciting, and she may well be right. However I shall stick to the interpretation I have evidence for. Further systematic work in the area of affinal terms is clearly called for.
36. "Disputes over Radcliffe-Brown's use of the term 'extension' to the contrary informants do clearly reason about distant relatives by this kind of 'algebra'." Beck 1968:209.
37. One should also note the existence of a distinct set of terms which have unique kin type referents, or at least a highly delimited set, with no category extensions. These terms which exist independently and parallel to the basic terms discussed in the text, never seem to be mentioned in studies of Dravidian kinship;

37. (contd.) they include terms like taay (mother, genetrix), takappan or tante (father, genitor), cakootaran (brother), cakootari (sister). Some like the last two are sanskrit in origin, but others are purely Dravidian. Although these terms sometimes have a slightly literary quality, they are all colloquially in use even among the illiterate. They constitute further evidence that kinship reckoning in terms of actual socio-biological ties is part of Dravidian culture.
38. The fudges in the algorithm are these. In order to make the necessary assessments concerning the generation and sex of the link being processed, we would have to include an explicit generation tracking system, and a mode of determining the sex of a link. The latter could simply be a list of kin-types with their sex assigned; but the former would require a small processing system of its own, as it is generation relative to ego that is involved.
39. D. McGilvray points out to me that strictly the correspondence is not complete. The cross/parallel categories map neatly into 0-generation and below, but in the generations above they do so only on the assumption of the complete incorporation of women into their husbands' lineages on marriage (for which David 1973 provides some putative cultural metaphysics).
40. Compare in English 'I went out with {^{a mother}_{mother}} yesterday', where the absence of the indefinite article implicates the speaker's mother, although it does not actually say so.
41. The reader may be confused by the introduction of two further kinship terms, aNNi and citti, not in Figure 5.1 or 5.2. These are optional variants for the terms nankayaa and ammaa respectively which do occur in Figure 5.1, but their use is more restricted in the following ways. The term aNNi clearly derives from aNNan, the category including elder brother, by the substitution of a regular female ending, and this means wife of a person elder than ego in the parallel category and in ego's generation. Similarly citti (perhaps a little less clearly) derives from cittappaa, the category including father's younger brother, and thus means wife of a man younger than ego's father in +1 generation and in the parallel category. These two terms thus have an affinal component in that they pick out a woman through the category assigned to her husband. Not all uses of the more basic terms nankayaa and ammaa would be compatible: for instance ego's MZ would be ammaa but unless she was married to someone known to be in the same category as ego's FB she would not be citti. The affinal element thus makes the terms somewhat more limited, and shifts the focus to a relationship through a male.
- As far as I know these terms are generally current among the upper right hand castes, 5, 8, 9 and 10.
42. I am very grateful to Dennis McGilvray for helping me to understand this passage.

43. More details of caste variation here are to be found in Beck 1968. She notes that the kavuNTar word for clan is naaTu, 'land' or 'territory', and infers that members of this caste were also probably originally territorially exogamous. She adds "...ritual (service) castes are said to maintain the fiction of exogamy by territory, while the kavuNTars themselves have long since found this system cumbersome and have changed over to clan names instead" (1968:465).
44. And in fact Beck in an earlier version of the rules for establishing priorities between different genealogical pathways (1968:261), seems to have taken this into account. Her original scheme of priorities was as follows:



In addition to stressing the priority given to affinal connections as we do, this set of priorities also recognises the existence of a distinct mode of reckoning cross/ parallel by clan membership. The account that is presented here can then be seen to be partially implicit in Beck's analysis. By recognizing two distinct modes of reckoning cross/parallel, and by isolating rules of priority both within and between them, we have simply untangled some of these themes.

45. This is one of the few points where a dynamic view, in terms of the repetitive domestic and life cycles, is taken in this thesis. But E. Annamalai notes that there are a number of points where a similar perspective could have been taken to advantage. A number of our thresholds for T/V usage are transient aspects of individuals, social immaturity for example being a state that individuals pass through. The duration of acquaintance is also likely to be relevant to persons in the categories of distant kin or friends. Take for example the habits of class-mates in urban schools: boys and girls exchange T, but the last two or three years in high school are likely to show evidence of a change towards the usage prevalent in colleges. In colleges boys exchange V initially, ~~which~~ may change to T in some cases of special friendship; girls however acquire a different usage giving T to their female class-mates, asymmetric V to their female students in classes above (T to those below), and symmetric V to boys in all classes.

Again even in the life of the kuTumpum there are changes I have not described: the daughter who leaves to marry may or may not retain her old usage to members of her natal kuTumpum; the son who grows up may no longer be referred to by his mother with avaan (non-honorific 'he') but rather with the neutral honorific atu (literally 'it'), and address may also be influenced (though not in the father-son, mother-daughter dyads). Some of these changes

45. (contd.) are likely to be more dramatic in urban communities where kinship ties play a lesser role in daily life.

The anthropologist's short stay is always likely to obscure such dynamics. I am grateful to E. Annamalai both for the examples and the general point.

46. A simpler line of explanation than any of these would be that at the time of ego's marriage, his WyB is almost certainly not socially mature due to the young age at which the latter's sister will most likely have married. In that case the use of T to an immature affine would fall into the general pattern for respectful use of T/V to affines. Later when WyB grows up there might then be a tendency to retain the previous (now inappropriate) T usage. E. Annamalai suggests that in fact this is the correct explanation for the usage in his own caste in Ramnad district.

This seems a weak explanation for two reasons. First we have to invoke a principle of inertia against change from an earlier T usage; but if this principle operated generally then no systematic thresholds in T/V usage could exist, whereas in fact they are strictly operated especially with respect to affines. Secondly there is a way in which this special usage to WyB is culturally salient, at least in our village (as I indicated the villagers emphasized and delighted in the fact that the WyB is subordinate to the husband). D. McGilvray tells me that there is a similar salience in Tamil communities in Ceylon, linked to the cultural significance accorded the ZH "who is virtually bribed to come and marry the sister" (this is the same fact that was the basis of the second explanation in the text). So something more than T/V usage organized around age or maturity does seem to be involved.

47. But we do not mean to imply that social distance is always simply (inversely) correlated with frequency of interaction. As J. Gumperz points out (personal communication) that simple view is already proved false by the facts about affines described above; he notes too from his own data on the sweepers in Khalapur, that despite the fact that they spend most of their days in the homes of upper castes they do not adopt any of the speech features associated with their employers - or display any other behaviour indicative of social closeness. If frequency of interaction is not a sufficient condition nor is it even a necessary condition for social closeness, as co-revolutionaries or football players will affirm (see for example Friedrich 1972). Rather what seems to be involved is perceived similarity, which can (but need not) be based on close acquaintance over a number of interactions.
48. This is nicely made clear in the case of caste 18, who quite exceptionally treat distant kin like close ones - probably because their moiety organization makes cross and parallel assignment universally applicable. But affines are still treated with quite exceptional respect. See the details below.

49. These differences hold also in the use of pronouns of reference, so in Telegu ego would say the equivalent of the Tamil appaa colraar ('father says' with singular respectful verbal ending), but in Tamil appaa colraanka (literally 'father they say', with plural verbal ending).
50. I am using the term 'class' here in the somewhat loose sense of 'wealth and familial prestige' as used by American sociologists. Their European counterparts tend to interpret 'class' strictly in terms of the Marxist or Weberian orthodoxies. The relevance and application of the term 'class' to the Indian situation in either the Marxist or Weberian interpretations is strongly open to question. Nevertheless some term is needed to identify a definite and recurrent phenomenon in rural Indian society, namely the existence of an uneven distribution of wealth and family standing that cross-cuts (and cuts within) caste categories. I therefore follow Beteille 1969 in calling this phenomenon 'class'. (I am indebted to D. McGilvray for pointing out the possibly misinterpretations here).
51. For diplomatic reasons I have chosen here a family outside the village of this study so that it cannot easily be identified. Large holdings of land infringe recent land-ceiling legislation.
52. Are lower strata really solidary? And what is solidarity anyway? What we are saying here is that in lower strata or groups we can observe patterns of language use that can be shown to signify perceived similarity of identity and rank equality. We cannot know from this alone whether these language patterns are responses to the reality of social relations or rather to ideologies at some remove from the facts.
 Pressed to define solidarity I would invoke Brown and Gilman's (1960) definition in terms of a symmetrical relation based on perceived similarities 'that make for like-mindedness or similar behaviour dispositions' (see also the definition of social closeness in terms of shared wants and goals in Brown and Levinson 1977). Pressed still further, I would retreat to a characterization of the types of social network within which solidarity flourishes. Dense networks with what Gluckman called 'multiplex relations' would seem to be inherently linked to (but not the only source of) solidary relationships. But this is to preview the text below.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- A.A. = American Anthropologist
 A.L. = Anthropological Linguistics
 B.L.S. = Papers from the annual meeting of
 the Berkeley Linguistic Society
 C.L.S. = Papers from the annual regional meeting
 of the Chicago Linguistic Society
 J.R.A.I. = Journal of the Royal Anthropological
 Institute
 F. of L. = Foundations of Language
 WP.LBRL = Working papers of the Language Behaviour
 Research Laboratory, Berkeley, California.

Altmann G. and Riska A, 1966. Towards a typology of courtesy in language. A.L. 8(1):1-10.

Andronov, 1969. A standard grammar of modern and classical Tamil. Madras, New Century Book House.

Annamalai E. and Ramanujan A.K. A reference grammar of Tamil. Chicago mimeo.

Arden 1942 (1891). A progressive grammar of common Tamil, 5th edition. Madras, The Christian Literature Society.

Atlas J. and Levinson S., 1973. What is an implicature? Part II: a version of Kenny logic. Berkeley mimeo.

Atkins J.R., forthcoming. GRAFIK: a general relational algebra for investigating kinship.

Bar-Hillel, Y., 1954. Indexical expressions. Mind 63:359-379.

Barnes J.A., 1969. Graph theory and social network: a technical comment on connectedness and connectivity. Sociology, Vol.3, pp.215-32.

Barnett S.A., 1970. The structural position of a South Indian caste. Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Chicago.

——— 1973. The process of withdrawal in a South Indian caste in Entrepreneurship and modernization of occupational cultures in S. Asia, ed. Milton Singer, pp.179-204. Durham, N. Carolina.

Beck B.E.F., 1968. Social and conceptual order in Konku: a region of S. India. D.Phil. dissertation. Oxford Univ.

——— 1968b. A diagrammatic representation of S. Indian society using two contrasting social models. Univ. of Chicago, MS.

- 1970. The right-left division of S. Indian society. *J. of Asian Studies* 29, No.4:779-98.
- 1972. Peasant society in Konku: a study of right and left subcastes in S. India. Vancouver, Univ. of British Columbia Press.
- 1973. The right-left division of S. Indian society in Right and left, ed. R. Needham, pp.391-426. Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press.
- 1974. The kin nucleus in Tamil folklore in (ed.) T. Trautmann, Kinship and history in S. Asia. Ann Arbor, Center for S. and S.E. Asian Studies, Univ. of Michigan.
- Bellman R., Cooke K., and Lockett J., 1970. Algorithms, graphs and computers. New York. Academic Press.
- Beisenherz H., 1910. A dictionary, Tamil and English: based on Johann Phillip Fabricius's "Malabar-English dictionary", 2nd edition. Evangelical Lutheran Mission Publishing House, Tranquebar.
- Berlin B., and Kay P., 1969. Basic color terms: their universality and evolution. Berkeley and Los Angeles, Univ. of Calif. Press.
- Bernstein B., 1973. Class, codes and control. Vol.1. Paladin, St. Albans. (First published 1971 by Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.)
- Beteille A., 1965. Caste, class and power: changing patterns of stratification in a Tanjore village. Berkeley and Los Angeles, Univ. of Calif. Press.
- Bloch Jules, 1910. Castes et dialectes en Tamoul. *Memoires de la Societe de Linguistique*, 16:1-20.
- Bloch M. (ed.), 1975. Political language and oratory in traditional society. New York and London, Academic Press.
- Blom and Gumperz, 1972. Social meaning in linguistic structures: code-switching in Norway in Gumperz and Hymes (eds.) 1972, pp.407-435.
- Bott E., 1971. Family and social network. Second edition with re-considerations. The Free Press, N.Y. [Originally published 1957, Tavistock Institute of Human Relations, London].
- Bright W. and Ramanujan A.K., 1964. Sociolinguistic variation and linguistic change in Proceedings of the Ninth International Congress of Linguists, ed. Horace G. Lunt. The Hague, Mouton. [Reprinted in Pride and Holmes (ed.) Sociolinguistics].

- Brown P. and Levinson S., 1977. Universals in language usage: politeness phenomena. To appear in E. Goody (ed.) Questions and politeness: strategies in interaction. Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, pp.56-324.
- Brown R. and Gilman A., 1960. The pronouns of power and solidarity in (ed.) T. Sebeok, 1960, Style in language, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press. Reprinted in P.P. Giglioli (ed.) 1972 - page references are to this edition.
- Brown R and Ford M., 1961. Address in American English. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*. Vol.62 (1961):375-85. Reprinted in Hymes (ed.) 1964.
- Buhler K., 1934. Sprachtheorie. Jena.
- Carnap and Bar-Hillel, 1952. An outline of a theory of semantic information in Bar-Hillel (1964) Language and information, Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 221-274.
- Carstairs G.M., 1967. The twice born. Bloomington, Indiana University Press.
- Charniak, 1972. Towards a model of children's story comprehension. MIT, A.I.Lab., Cambridge, Mass.
- Cole P. and Morgan J., 1975. Syntax and semantics Vol.3: speech acts. New York, Academic Press.
- Comrie B., 1975. Polite plurals and predicate agreement. *Lang*. Vol.51, number 2, 406-418.
- 1976. Linguistic politeness axes: speaker-addressee, speaker-referent, speaker-bystander. *Pragmatics microfiche* 1.7, A3-B1.
- Corbett G., 1976. Syntactic destructors - problems with address especially in Russian. *Pragmatics microfiche* 2.3:A3.
- David K.A., 1973. Until marriage do us part: a cultural account of Jaffna Tamil categories for kinsmen. *MAN new series* Volume 8: 521-35.
- Den Ouden J.H.B., 1969. The Komutti Chettiyan: position and change of a merchant caste in a S. Indian village. *Tropical Man* 2 (1969):45-59.
- 1975. De onaanraakbaren van Konkunad. Wageningen, H. Veenman and Zonen B.V.
- Dixon R.M.W., 1972. The Dyirbal language of North Queensland. Cambridge Studies in Linguistics 9, Cambridge.

- Dreyfus S., 1967. An appraisal of some shortest path algorithms.
RAND Corporation: RM-5433-PR, Oct. 1967, Santa Monica,
California.
- Dumont L., 1953. The Dravidian kinship terminology as an expression
of marriage. *Man* 54: article 224.
- 1957a. Hierarchy and marriage alliance in S. Indian kinship.
Occasional papers of the Royal Anthropol. Institute, No.12 (1957)
London.
- 1957b. Une sous-caste de l'Inde du Sud. Paris, Mouton.
- 1959. Structural theory and descent group theory in S. India.
Man 60: article 125.
- 1966. Homo Hierarchicus: essai sur le systeme des cartes.
Paris: Gallimard.
- 1972. Homo Hierarchicus. (English translation with revisions).
London, Paladin.
- Elson M., 1973. Concepts of programming languages. Science Research
Assoc. Inc., Chicago.
- Emeneau M.B., 1937. Toda marriage regulations and taboos. *A.A.*39:
103-112.
- Ervin-Tripp A., 1972. On sociolinguistic rules: alternation and co-
occurrence in (ed.) Gumperz and Hymes 1972.
- Ferguson C.A., 1959. Diglossia. *Word* 15:2. Reprinted in Hymes 1964.
- 1964. Diglossia. Reprinted in Hymes (ed.) 1964.
- Fillmore C., 1966. Deictic categories in the semantics of come. *F. of L.*
19:208-231.
- 1971. Towards a theory of deixis. Working papers in
linguistics. Dept. of Linguistics, University of Hawaii.
- 1973. A grammarian looks to sociolinguistics. Georgetown
Univ. Monographs in languages and linguistics, No.25:273-287.
- 1974. Pragmatics and the description of discourse.
Berkeley. Studies in syntax and semantics, Vol.I, Chapter V:
1-21.
- 1975. An alternative to checklist theories of meaning.
*B.L.S.*1:123-132, Berkeley, Ca.
- 1976. Santa Cruz lectures on deixis. Indiana University
Linguistics Club mimeo.

- nd. Early version of Fillmore 1976. Xerox MS.
- Fortes M., 1949. Time and social structure: an Ashanti case study in M. Fortes (ed.) Social structure: studies presented to A.R. Radcliffe-Brown. Oxford, Clarendon.
- 1970. Kinship and the social order. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Frake C. Notes on queries in anthropology. A.A.66, No.3 part 2: 132-45.
- Freed, Stanley, 1963a. Fictive kinship in an Indian village. *Ethnology*, 2:86-103.
- 1963b. An objective method for determining the collective caste hierarchy of an Indian village. A.A.65:879-891.
- Frei H., 1944. Systemes de deictiques. *Acta Linguistica* 4:111-129.
- Friedrich P., 1972. Social context and semantic feature: the Russian pronominal usage in Gumperz and Hymes (eds) 1972.
- Garvin R.L. and Reisenberg S.H., 1952. Respect behaviour on Ponape: an ethnolinguistic study. A.A.54:201-20.
- Gazdar G., 1976. Formal pragmatics for natural language: implicature, presupposition and logical form. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Reading, England.
- and Klein E., 1976. How to formalize context-sensitive transderivational constraints. Paper presented at 3rd Groningen Round Table in Linguistics.
- Geertz, 1960. The religion of Java. New York, Free Press.
- Geoghegan W.H., 1969. Decision making and residence on Tagtabon Island. W.P.17, L.B.R.L.
- 1970. A theory of marking rules. W.P.37, L.B.R.L.
- 1971. Information processing systems in culture in P. Kay (ed.), Explorations in mathematical anthropology. Cambridge, Mass, MIT Press.
- 1973. Natural information processing rules: formal theory and application to ethnography. Monograph 3, L.B.R.L., Berkeley, Calif.
- Giglioli P.P., 1972. Language and social context. Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Gluckman M., 1955. The judicial process among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia. Manchester, Manchester Univ. Press.

- Goffman E., 1975. Replies and responses. Working papers, Centro Internazionale di Semiotica e di Linguistica. Urbino, Italy.
- Goodenough W., 1965. Rethinking "status" and "role": towards a general model of the cultural organization of social relationships in M. Banton (ed) The relevance of models in social anthropology. London, Tavistock.
- Gordon D, and Lakoff G., 1971. Conversational postulates. C.L.S.7 Chicago.
- Gough, 1956. Brahman kinship in a Tamil village. A.A.58:826-853.
- Gregerson E.A., 1974. The signalling of social distance in African languages, in Language in its social setting ed. W.W. Gaye pp.47-55. Washington D.C.
- Grice H.P., 1975. The logic of conversation in Cole P. and Morgan J. (eds.) 1975. [Being Chapter II of the William James lectures 1968].
- 1961. The causal theory of perception. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Soc. Supplem. Vol.35:121-52.
- Grimshaw A., 1976. Social interactional and sociolinguistic rules. MS to appear in (ed.) U. Quasthoff Sprachstruktur-Sozialstruktur: zur linguistischen theorienbildung.
- Gumperz J., 1958. Dialect differences and social stratification in a North Indian village. A.A.60:668-81 (1958).
- 1975. Code switching in conversation. Pragmatics microfiche 1.4:A2.
- 1977. The conversational analysis of inter-ethnic communication in Inter-ethnic communication, ed. E. Lamar Ross, Georgia, Univ. of Georgia Press.
- Gumperz J. and Hymes D., (eds.), 1972. Directions in sociolinguistics. New York.
- Harada S.I., 1976. Honorifics in Syntax and semantics Vol.5: Japanese Generative Grammar ed. M. Shibatani. New York. Academic Press.
- Harary F., 1960. Some historical and intuitive aspects of graph theory. SIAM Rev.2:123-131. Philadelphia, Pa. Published by Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics.
- Herman V., 1976. Code-switching in Tamil. Diploma dissertation. Dept. of Linguistics, Univ. of Cambridge.

- Herzberger H., 1971. Some results on presupposition and modality.
Univ. of Toronto. Xerox MS.
- Hollos M., 1975. Comprehension and use of social rules in pronoun
selection by Hungarian children. W.P's in
S.W. Educ. Develop. Lab., Austin, Texas.
- Hiebert P., 1969. Caste and personal rank in an Indian village:
an extension in techniques. A.A.Vol.71, 434-453. 1969.
- 1971. Kondura: structure and integration in a South Indian
village. Minneapolis, Univ. of Minn. Press.
- Hymes D. ed. 1964. Language in culture and society. New York.
- Irvine J., 1975. Wolof speech styles and social status. Working papers
in sociolinguistics, No.23. March 1975. Austin, Texas.
- Jain D.K., 1969. Verbalization of respect in Hindi. A.L.11(3):79-97.
- Katz J.J. and Fodor J.A., 1963. The structure of a semantic theory.
Language Vol.39 (1963):170-210.
- Kay P., 1965. A generalization of the cross/parallel distinction.
A.A.67:30-43.
- 1975. Tahitian words for race and class. W.P.40, L.B.R.L.
- 1976. Constants and variables in English kinship semantics.
W.P.45, L.B.R.L.
- Kay P., and McDaniel C., 1975. Color categories as fuzzy sets.
W.P.44, L.B.R.L.
- Karttunen L., 1971. Some observations of factivity. Papers in
Linguistics 4.
- 1973a. Presuppositions of compound sentences. Linguistic
Inquiry 4:169-193.
- 1973b. The last word. Texas mimeo.
- 1974a. Remarks on presupposition. Texas mimeo.
- 1974b. Presupposition and linguistic context. Theoretical
Linguistics I:181-94.
- Karttunen L. and Peters S., 1975. Conventional implicature in Montague
Grammar. B.L.S.1.
- Keenan E.O., 1974. Conversation and oratory in Vakinankaratra,
Madagascar. Ph.D. dissertation in anthropology, Univ. of Penn.

- Keenan E.L., 1971 Two kinds of presupposition in natural language, in Fillmore and Langendoen (eds.) 1971. Studies in Linguistics Semantics. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Keesing R.M., 1971. Formalization and the construction of ethnography in Explorations in mathematical anthropology, ed. P. Kay. Cambridge, Mass, MIT Press.
- Kempson R.M., 1975. Presupposition and the delimitation of semantics. Cambridge, C.U.P.
- Kuno S., 1973. The Structure of the Japanese Language. Cambridge, Mass.
- Laberge S., 1976. Changement dans l'usage des clitiques sujets dans le français montréalais. Draft Ph.D. dissertation, Université de Montréal.
- Labov W., 1972. Sociolinguistic patterns. Philadelphia. Univ. of Pennsylvania Press.
- Lakoff R., 1972. Language in context. *Language* 48(4):907-27.
- 1975. Language and women's place. New York.
- Lakoff G., 1970. Some thoughts on transderivational constraints. in B.B. Kachru et al (eds.) Papers in honor of Henry and Renee Kahane. Illinois.
- 1972. Hedges: a study in meaning criteria and the logic of fuzzy concepts. *C.L.S.8*:183-228.
- 1975. Pragmatics in natural logic. In E.L. Keenan (ed.) Formal semantics of natural language. Cambridge, C.U.P.
- Leach, 1958. Concerning Trobriand clans and the kinship category tabu in The development cycle of domestic groups, ed. J. Goody, pp.120-145. Cambridge papers in Social Anthropology No.22, C.U.P.
- 1960. What should we mean by caste? Introduction to E. Leach (ed.) 1960, Aspects of caste in S. India, Ceylon and N.W. Pakistan, C.U.P.
- 1960b. The Sinhalese of the dry-zone of N. Ceylon in Social structure in S.E. Asia ed. G.P. Murdock. New York.
- 1961. Pul Eliya: a village in Ceylon. A study of land tenure and kinship. C.U.P.
- Lefebvre C., 1975. Report on a case of T/V alternation in Cuzco Quechua. MS, Université de Québec à Montréal.

- Levi-Strauss, 1949. Les structures elementaires de la parente. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France.
- Lewis D.K., 1969. Convention: a philosophical study. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Press.
- 1972. General semantics in Semantics of natural language ed. Davidson and Harman. Dordrecht and Boston, Reidel.
- Lounsbury F., 1964. The structural analysis of kinship semantics. Reprinted in Tyler 1969:193-212.
- 1965. Another view of Trobriand kinship categories in Hammel E. (ed.) Formal semantic analysis, pp.142-185. A.A. special publ. Vol.67(5) part 2.
- Lowie R.H., 1948. Social organization, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Luce R.D. and Raiffa H. Games and decisions. John Wiley & Sons Inc. New York.
- Lyons 1968. An introduction to theoretical linguistics. C.U.P.
- Mandelbaum D., 1970. Society in India, Vols I and II. Berkeley and Los Angeles, Univ. of Calif. Press.
- Mahar P.M., 1959. A multiple scaling technique for caste ranking. *Man in India*. 39:127-147. Calcutta, Sakti Press.
- Marriott M., 1959. Interactional and attributional theories of caste ranking. *Man in India* 39:92-107.
- 1968. Caste ranking and food transactions: a matrix analysis in Structure and change in Indian society, M. Singer and B. Cohn (eds.) Chicago, Aldine.
- 1974. Hindu transactions: diversity without dualism. Mimeo Chicago. Now published in B. Kapferer (ed) Transaction and Meaning, Philadelphia. I.S.H.I. 1976.
- Marriott M. and Inden R., 1973. Towards an ethnosociology of Hindu caste systems. IXth International Congress of Anthropol. and Ethnolog. Sci. n.2206.
- 1974. Caste systems. *Encyclopedia Britannica*.
- Martin S., 1964. Speech levels in Japan and Korea, in Hymes (ed.) Language in culture and society. New York. pp.407-15.
- Mathur, 1964. Caste and ritual in a Malwa village. Bombay, Asia Publishing House.

- McCormack W., 1960. Social dialects in Dharwar Kannada in Ferguson C. and Gumperz J. (eds.), Linguistic diversity in South Asia. Bloomington, Indiana Univ. Research Center in Anthrop., Folklore and Linguistics.
- McGilvray D., 1974. Tamils and Moore: caste and matriclan structure in Eastern Sri Lanka. Ph.D. dissertation in anthrop., Chicago.
- 1976. Caste, matri-kinship and bodily substance in Eastern Sri Lanka. Paper prepared for 5th European Conference on Modern S. Asian studies.
- Miller G., 1956. The magical number seven plus or minus two: some limits on our capacity for processing information. Psychological review 63:81-97.
- Miller G., Galanter E. and Pribram K.H., 1960. Plans and the structure of behaviour. New York, Henry Hold.
- Miller R.A., 1967. The Japanese Language. Chicago.
- Montague R., 1974. Formal philosophy: selected papers of Richard Montague. Ed. R. Thomason, New Haven, Yale Univ. Press.
- Morgan, Lewis H., 1870. Systems of consanguinity and affinity of the human family. Smithsonian Contributions to Knowledge, 17:4-602.
- Morgenstern A., 1968. Game theory: theoretical aspects in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol.6, pp.62-8. Ed. D. Sills, N.Y., Macmillan and Free Press.
- Morris C., 1938. Foundations of the theory of signs. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science 1.2:77-138. Chicago.
- Neustupny, 1968. Politeness patterns in the system of communication in Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, pp.412-19. Tokyo and Kyoto.
- Obeyesekere G., 1975. The left-right subcastes in S. India: a critique Man. Vol.10.3, 462-464.
- Ore O., 1962. Theory of graphs. Amer.Math.Soc.Colloq.Publications 38.
- Orenstein H., 1965. Gaon: conflict and cohesion in an Indian village. Princeton, N.J.; Princeton Univ. Press.
- Paulston C.B., 1975. Language and social class: pronouns of address in Swedish. Working papers in sociolinguistics No.29. S.W. Educ. Dep. Lab., Austin, Texas.
- 1974. Language universals and sociocultural implications in deviant usage: personal questions in Swedish. Studia Linguistica, 1974.

- Pillai M. Shanmukam, 1960. Tamil-literary and colloquial in Linguistic diversity in S. Asia, Gumperz and Ferguson, eds. Bloomington.
- 1965. Caste isoglosses in kinship terms. A.L.7:59-66.
- 1972. Tamil today. Indian linguistics. Vol.33, No.1. Jan-March 1972.
- Quinn N., 1974. Getting inside our informants' heads. Reviews in Anthropology. May 1974:244-252.
- Radcliffe-Brown A.R., 1952. Structure and function in primitive society. London, Cowen and West.
- Ramanujan A.K., 1968. The structure of variation: a study in caste dialects in Structure and change in Indian society, ed. M. Singer and B. Cohn. N.Y.: Viking Fund Publications in Anthropol.
- Reisman K., 1974. Contrapuntal conversations in an Antiguan village, in Bauman and Sherzer (eds) 1974. Explorations in the ethnography of speaking. Cambridge, C.U.P.
- Rescher N., 1966. Aspects of action in The logic of decision and action, ed. N. Rescher, pp.215-221. Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh Univ. Press.
- Rosch E., 1971. On the internal structure of perceptual and semantic categories. Unpublished paper, Psychology Dept., Univ. of Calif., Berkeley.
- 1976. Human categorization in N.Warren (ed.) Advances in cross cultural psychology (Vol.1). London, Academic Press.
- Sacks H., Schegloff E. and Jefferson G., 1974. A simplest sys. matics for the organization of turn-taking in conversation. Language 50(4):696-735.
- Sadock J., 1974. Towards a linguistic theory of speech acts. New York.
- 1975. The soft interpretive underbelly of generative semantics in Cole P. and Morgan J. (eds.) 1975.
- Sangster B.C., n.d. Homonymy in Tamil reduplication. Unpublished M.A. thesis, Univ. of Chicago, submitted 1968.
- Sansom G.B., 1928. An historical grammar of Japanese. Oxford, Clarendon.
- Schegloff E.A., 1972a. Notes on a conversational practice: formulating place, in Sudnow D. (ed.) Studies in Social Interaction, New York.
- 1972b. Sequencing in conversational openings. in Gumperz and Hymes (eds.) 1972.

- Schelling T.C., 1960. The strategy of conflict, Cambridge, Mass. Harvard Univ. Press.
- Schiffer S.R., 1972. Meaning. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Schiffman H.F., 1971. Reader for advanced spoken Tamil, parts I and II. Washington D.C. U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare.
- Schubiger M., 1972, (1965). English intonation and German modal particles: a comparative study. Reprinted in Intonation ed. D. Bolinger, pp. 175-193. Penguin, Harmondsworth.
- Searle J.R., 1969. Speech acts. Cambridge C.U.P.
- 1975. Indirect speech acts in Cole and Morgan (eds.) 1975.
- Shanmugam, 1971. Dravidian nouns: a comparative study. Annamalai Univ. Annamalaiagar, Madras.
- Slobin D., 1963. Some aspects of the usage of the pronouns of address in Yiddish. Word 19:193-202.
- Southworth F.C., 1975. Sociolinguistics research in S. India: achievements and prospects, in ed. B. Stein (1975) Essays on S. India. Asian studies at Hawaii 15. The Univ. Press of Hawaii.
- Stein, Burton., 1968. Brahman and peasant in early S. Indian history. The Adyar Library Bulletin, Vol.31-32 (1967-8):229-269.
- n.d. Right and left hand castes. Chapter IV of a book in manuscript.
- Stevenson H.N.L., 1954. Status evaluation in the Hindu caste system. J.R.A.1, Vol.84:45-65.
- Stevens A.M., 1965. Language levels in Madurese. Language 41(2):294-302.
- Tambiah S.J., 1965. Kinship fact and fiction in relation to the Kandyan Sinhalese. J.R.A.1 95:131-73.
- 1973. From Varna to caste through mixed unions, in J. Good (ed.) The character of kinship. Cambridge, C.U.P.
- Thorne D., 1976. Arwyddocad y rhagenwau personal ail berson unigol ym Maenor Berwig, Cwmwd Carynwyllion (The significance of the second person singular pronoun on the Manor of Berwig in the Commute of Carnwyllion). Studia Celtica 10-11:383-7.
- Tiger and Fox, 1971. The imperial animal. N. York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc.

- Torgerson W., 1965. Theory and method of scaling. N.Y. John Wiley.
- Trudgill P., 1974. Sociolinguistics: an introduction. Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Tyler S., 1966. Parallel/cross: an evaluation of definitions. S.W. Journal of Anth. 22(4):416-32.
- 1969. Cognitive anthropology. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Watkins J., 1970. Imperfect rationality. Cioffi (ed.) Explanation in the Behavioural Sciences. C.U.P.
- Weber 1947. The theory of social and economic organization, (ed. T. Parsons). O.U.P. Reprinted 1964, Free Press, N.Y. (references are to this edition).
- Wilks W., 1973. An artificial intelligence approach to machine translation in Schank and Colby (eds.) Computer models of thought and language. San Francisco, Freeman.
- Wilson D., 1975. Presupposition and non-truth-conditional semantics New York, Academic Press.
- Winograd T., 1972. Understanding natural language. Edinburgh, Univ. Press.
- Yalman N., 1962. The structure of the Sinhalese kindred: a re-examination of the Dravidian terminology. A.A.64:548-75.
- 1967. Under the Bo tree: studies in caste, kinship and marriage in the interior of Ceylon. Berkeley, Univ. of Calif. Press.
- Yamanashi M., 1974. On minding your p's and q's in Japanese: a case study from honorifics. C.L.S.10:760-71.
- Young M. and Willmott P., 1957. Family and kinship in East London. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Zadeh L., 1971. Quantitative fuzzy semantics. Information and Control 8:338-53.
- Zvelebil K., 1962. Personal pronouns in Tamil and Dravidian. Indo Iranian Journal 6:65-69.
- 1964. The spoken language of Tamilnad. Archiv. Orientalni 32: 237-265.
- Zwicky A., 1974. Hey, whatsyourname! C.L.S.10:787-801.