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The contents of manuals, entries therein and field-kit materials are modified from time to time, and this provides an additional motivation for keeping close contact with the Language and Cognition Department. We would welcome suggestions for changes and additions, and comments on the viability of different materials and techniques in various field situations.

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KNOWLEDGE ASYMMETRIES IN GRAMMAR AND INTERACTION
Lila San Roque and Elisabeth Norcliffe

Project	Multimodal Interaction; Categories Across Language and Cognition
Task	Examining linguistic categories that are likely to be particularly relevant to the expression of knowledge asymmetries; recording conversational material; discussing ideas about the opacity of other minds and related topics.
Goals	Identify 'epistemically loaded' linguistic or interactional structures and concepts that could be fruitful areas for further close study.
Prerequisites	For translation task: basic understanding of grammatical relations and argument structure in object language; for recording of conversations: good command of object language, access to consultants to help with transcription and translation
Outcomes	The tasks are exploratory. Data will be used to inform ongoing subproject work and to refine subsequent research questions.

Background on the subproject

A fundamental aspect of social cognition is our awareness that people do not all know the same things in the same ways. For example, we assert our own feelings and thoughts with a different kind of authority, directness, and certainty than we describe those of other people. Or do we? What do *you* think? The purpose of this project is to examine ways that such apparently basic asymmetries of epistemic access and authority are reflected and constructed in grammar and usage, and build a detailed picture of the nature and salience of 'primary knower' roles within and across languages.

The category of 'primary knower' emerges dynamically in interaction, its value constantly shifting over the course of the evolving discourse. Certain sentence and event types (e.g., declarative, A-event) typically conspire to position the speaker as a primary knower, others (e.g., interrogative, B-event) to foist the role of primary knower onto the addressee; and these are norms to be exploited and disrupted. This subproject brings the intersection of linguistic categories and speech event exigencies to the fore as an object of scrutiny.

We hypothesise that all languages exhibit sensitivities to knowledge asymmetries. However, how these asymmetries manifest will vary across and within languages, and across different pragmatic contexts and semantic domains. For example, in one language the identity of the primary knower may correlate strongly with selection or dispreference for certain evidential markers; in another language distinct grammatical structures may be available for predications that inherently concern subjective experience. We want to document the cross-linguistic and language-internal space of variation, and to look at which patterns (if any) are universal to the languages sampled, and which are culturally specific.

The tasks

This entry outlines a number of tasks which will help you to engage with the topic of knowledge asymmetries in your language(s). Most of these tasks are exploratory, with the exception of Task 2, which is a structured translation/elicitation task. We urge you to at least

complete Task 2, as we hope this will generate important cross-linguistically comparable data, which we can use to hone further research directions. The remaining tasks offer some suggestions for a more general exploration of primary knower roles in your language. They sketch broad questions concerning areas of enquiry that are obviously large and complex. You might have already undertaken detailed investigation of one of these topic or subtopics. We would love to hear more from you about approaches to these domains. Even if you are unable to tackle these other tasks in full, please read through them all before beginning Task 2, as they provide important additional background information on the topic which will help you complete the translation questionnaire.

Task 1: Exploring domains that (might) encode or imply 'access to mind'

We expect domains that encode or imply access to mind or consciousness of some kind to be of particular interest in this project. This includes, for example, words, bound morphemes, and constructions that are used in expressing:

cognitive activity/disposition (e.g., thinking, forgetting, realising, surprise, apprehension)
modality meanings (e.g. desire, possibility, obligation, commitment, certainty)
perception (e.g. feeling, hearing, tasting, seeing, smelling)
emotions (e.g., happiness, fear, loneliness, excitement)
subjective evaluation (e.g. good, bad, preferences, dispreferences)
sensations (e.g. cold, itchy, dizzy)
intention (e.g. planning, imagining)
volition (e.g. wilful v. involuntary movement)
the future (e.g. predicting, expecting, envisioning)

Terms relating to these (overlapping) domains often make a primary knower or knowers relevant because they suggest a consciousness that experiences, assesses, or otherwise holds an attitude towards a situation, event, or thing. Talking about these phenomena assumes some kind of access to that consciousness. For example, being able to assert that an action was volitional involves an implicit assertion of access to the intentions of the person who undertook that action.

We would like you to think about which words, grammatical categories, and constructions in your language strongly suggest or evoke 'access to mind', and explore the morphological, syntactic, and implicational properties of some of these items through observation, text analysis, and/or targeted elicitation/translation.

The list below shows some general questions it would be good to be able to answer about 'mindful morphemes' (or constructions) in your language, with a few illustrative examples from other languages. Following this is a sentence elicitation/translation task.

- Class grouping: Do any of these forms group together as a class of 'private predicates'? Some languages use distinct lexical items when first person reference is intended in statements pertaining to certain internal experiences. For example in Japanese, *ureshii* is used to express the speaker's feeling of happiness, while *yorokobu* is used of a non-speaker subject (Nariyama 2003:140).

- Perceived prototypical uses: Do speakers have strong senses of the prototypical situational uses of the items? What are they? Do they have strong senses of what would be inappropriate or atypical uses (e.g., when being impolite, angry, wanting to embarrass someone)?

- Sentence type restrictions: Are there restrictions in the sentence types that these forms can occur in? For example, in Cuzco Quechua evidential markers occur in declaratives and content interrogatives, but cannot be used in yes-no interrogatives (Faller 2004).

- Shifts in connotative or implied semantics: Are there connotative, normative, or implicated meanings of forms that seem quite different depending on person (e.g., of the subject) or sentence type? For example, the English verb 'feel' typically shifts from describing internal sensation in the case of first person declaratives (*I feel cold*) to external perceivability based on external evidence in the case of non-first person declaratives (*you feel cold).* See also Curnow 2003.

- Skewed distribution: Is the distribution of the form quite different depending on person of an argument, or of a sentence type? For example, in Korean, dative experiencer constructions involving private predicates are restricted to first person in declaratives. One can say *Na-nun Chango-ka coha* 'Chango is likeable to me', but not ??*Ne-nun Chango-ka coha*, '??Chango is likeable to you'.

- Implications for interpreting the speech act/action Do varying combinations of forms trigger different normative understandings of speech act type? For example, in Newari the use of the 'conjunct' (roughly, primary knower) verb form with a first person subject in an interrogative sentence signals that this should be interpreted as a rhetorical question, not a genuine question (Hale 1980). A sentence with a second person subject and a marker of uncertainty ('Maybe you're going') might be typically interpreted as a request for information. Conversely, with a marker of certainty, it might be interpreted as a command ('You're certainly going!').

- Individual and collective knowledge How are situations of plural activity or experience treated? For example, if the language has differential treatment of the primary knower in talking about internal sensation, how does it go with a plural experiencer? (e.g. 'We feel cold.')

Task 2: Translation/elicitation

The suggested sentence set targets contrasts relating to subject identity, sentence type, and modality meanings. The sentences concern people's attendance at a future event. The larger roman text items are the basic sentences we would like you to work with and translate. We hope you will also be able to get translation equivalents and grammaticality/applicability assessments concerning at least some of the italicised sentences, which introduce more modal variables. Please be sure to read the notes (next page) before you start.

1) 1st person, declarative-like, singular and non-singular

I will go.   We (incl./excl.) will go.

I will certainly/obviously/hopefully/maybe go.   *We will certainly/obviously/hopefully/maybe go.*

2) 2nd person, declarative, singular and non-singular

You(sg) will go.   You(non-sg) will go

You will certainly/obviously/hopefully/maybe go.

3) 3rd person, declarative, sg and non-sg, varying familiarity

My mum will go   My family will go

My mum/family will certainly/obviously/hopefully/maybe go.

Your mum will go.   Your family will go.

Your mum/family will certainly/obviously/hopefully/maybe go.

[Someone not familiar, e.g. a visiting government official] will go.

The [someone not familiar, e.g. a visiting government official] will certainly/obviously/hopefully/maybe go.

4) 1st person, interrogative-like, singular and non-singular

Will I go?   Will we(incl./excl.) go?

Will I/we certainly/obviously/hopefully/maybe go?

5) 2nd person, interrogative-like (yes/no and content), singular and non-singular

Will you(sg) go?   Will you(non-sg) go?

Will you(sg/non-sg) certainly/obviously/hopefully/maybe go?

When will you go?

When will you certainly/obviously/hopefully/maybe go?

6) 3rd person, interrogative (yes/no and content), varying familiarity

Will my mum (or family) go?

Will my mum certainly/obviously/hopefully/maybe go?

When will my mum go?

When will my mum certainly/obviously/hopefully/maybe go?

Will your mum go?

Will your mum certainly/obviously/hopefully/maybe go?

When will your mum go?

When will your mum certainly/obviously/hopefully/maybe go?

Will the [government official(s)] go?

Will [the official(s)] certainly/obviously/hopefully/maybe go?

When will the [government official(s)] go?

When will [the official(s)] certainly/obviously/hopefully/maybe go?

7) 3rd person, impersonal, declarative and interrogative

It will rain.

It will certainly/obviously/possibly/hopefully/maybe rain.

Will it rain?

Will it certainly/obviously/possibly/hopefully/maybe rain?

When will it rain?

When will it certainly/obviously/possibly/hopefully/maybe rain?

8) Imperative/hortative/optative

You(sg/non-sg) go!

You(sg/non-sg) certainly/obviously/hopefully/maybe go!

Let's go!

Let's certainly/obviously/hopefully/maybe go!

May I go!

May I certainly/obviously/hopefully/maybe go!

May you go!

May you certainly/obviously/hopefully/maybe go!

May my/your mum go!

May my/your mum certainly/obviously/hopefully/maybe go!

May [the government official] go!

May [the government official] certainly/obviously/hopefully/maybe go!

Notes:

Running requirements We do not plan to use this data for frequency comparisons. It is not necessary to get lots of individuals to complete the task separately and we do not expect people to be able to get every combination of sentences all at one time. Breaking them up and doing them at different times and in different orders with different speakers is fine, as long as you record that information, and keep good notes of the context in which the work was undertaken.

If you get versions of the sentences with two or more modal contrasts, fantastic. If you can only do one complete version of the set using a basic future frame (the non-italicised sentences), without imposing changing modal values (the italicised sentences), this will still be informative and helpful.

Formal/functional definitions of utterance types. Where possible, we want you to start by testing *formally* distinct sentence types (declarative, interrogative, imperative, etc. – see e.g. Sadock and Zwicky 1985). We then want to be able to look at how these formal types match up with different functional speech act types (statement, question, command, etc), and see if this relationship changes according to subject identity, modality specification, and/or other contextual cues. If participants can judge what speech act function the different sentences prototypically achieve (e.g., building on the 'Metalanguage for Speech Acts' task, see Enfield & Levinson, this volume) this would be really great.

Contextual frame The sentences concern people's attendance at a future event. Remember that you might find that varying certain features of the event results in a change in judgement of a sentence's acceptability or function. Some possibly relevant (and inter-related) features are: kind of obligation/necessity for attendance; expectation of enjoyment or benefit at the event; speaker's idea of the addressee's attitude toward the situation; the length of time between the time of utterance and the event (e.g. if it is planned to happen later the same day or not for months).

For example, for something like attendance at a community work day, there might be quite high social pressure to attend, but low expectation of enjoyment – thus in this situation we might expect second person declaratives (e.g. 'you will go') to have more of a 'command' flavour. So, keep this in mind, and keep good notes about any hypothetical contexts you and your consultants develop.

Modal meanings The basic constant of the translation task is that we are talking about a future-time event, which in itself imposes a kind of modal frame. If possible we want to further manipulate modality meanings in the sentences, and see which combinations of meanings people judge acceptable and which they think are rude, silly, or unsayable.

The English modality adverbs 'certainly, obviously, hopefully, maybe' are only a guide. Try to figure out rough equivalents for the English adverbial expressions if you can (e.g., maybe your language has a sentence final particle that conveys something like 'certainty'). The general meanings of these words in the English sentences can be paraphrased as:

maybe – The speaker/someone isn't sure about it.
certainly – The speaker/someone is sure about it.
obviously – It should be clear to most people/someone (from some observable evidence).
hopefully – The speaker/someone would like it to happen.[7]

If an expression just doesn't seem to translate well and people are finding this frustrating and annoying, <u>record what the specific problems with this expression are</u>, and see if you can think of another similar meaning (e.g. possibility, intention) that is more natural to work with.

Incompatiblities It is likely that certain modal markers will be incompatible with certain sentence types. For example, 'When will he obviously go?' sounds quite odd in English. This is interesting! Take careful note of any such incompatibilities and people's explanations of them.

Task 3: Mindful morphemes in conversation

One of the aims of the project is to undertake cross-linguistic study of morphemes that imply 'access to mind' (including words, particles, clitics, affixes, etc.) in interaction. To do this we hope to examine tokens of relevant morphemes in conversational material, and compare aspects of their distribution, typical collocations, and uses across different languages. As such, *any* reasonably natural conversation that you video-record and transcribe will be very valuable to the project.

For our first close study of mindful morphemes in conversation we will focus on perception predicates. These provide a good starting point because they have an inbuilt potential to express viewpoint, are 'private predicates' in that the experiencer has privileged access to the described perception (Nariyama 2003), and can be used evidentially to express the mode of access that someone has for a situation, thing, or event (see Hanks 2007; Pomerantz 1980). Exploring this domain should also allow cross-over between material gathered for the perception verbs task (see Norcliffe et al., this volume) and the defining ideophones task (Dingemanse, this volume).

If you pursue any of the discussion topics outlined in 4, it would also be great if you could video record these conversations and transcribe as much of them as is feasible. Although this might not provide highly naturalistic conversation, the discussions are likely to provide lots of examples of relevant tokens.

Task 4: Free discussion topics

What are people's explicit ideas about the opacity of other minds? In discussion do people have a strong feeling as to how other people's intentions can be observed, inferred, known (see, e.g., Robbins and Rumsey 2008)? Is it a good thing or a bad thing to be transparent in one's feelings and intentions? What other categories or constructions concerning the distribution of knowledge comes up in these conversations?

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[7] This is different from the expected meaning, 'in a hopeful manner' (e.g. 'I looked around hopefully'), which is preferred by some prescriptive grammarians.

What kinds of situations or domains do people identify as prototypically private/individual knowledge as opposed to collective/general knowledge?

Which people seem to be included (perhaps peripherally) within the domain of one's 'privileged access'? For example, in some languages it may be appropriate to mark oneself as a primary knower when talking about a close kin member, or one's child, but not when talking about other people.

What ideas do people have about children's mindfulness? Are babies and children thought to experience and enact wilful intention in the same way that adults are thought to? How are children thought to learn about other people's thoughts and feelings?

Task 5: Further issues in grammaticised person

When a speaker talks about their own actions, feelings, lives (etc.), they are often in a position of privileged access. Partly because of this, first person is a category that tends to attract special morphology and constructions that might relate to the primary knower. Are there any first/non-first distinctions in your language, in any area of the grammar? (e.g. in free pronouns; future markers; agreement markers; possessive constructions; other 'different treatment', for example marking or collapsing distinctions within first person that are not present for other persons, or vice versa)? If you are not already sure about it, check to see if the special first person forms can occur in questions, and how they operate in indirect speech.

What forms are used for generic person reference (e.g. generic 'you' in English in procedural texts)? What situations is generic person reference used in?

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