

Modified Repeats: One Method for Asserting Primary Rights From Second Position

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In this article I examine one practice speakers have for confirming when confirmation was not otherwise relevant. The practice involves a speaker repeating an assertion previously made by another speaker in modified form with stress on the copula/auxiliary. I argue that these modified repeats work to undermine the first speaker's default ownership and rights over the claim and instead assert the primacy of the second speaker's rights to make the statement. Two types of modified repeats are identified: partial and full. Although both involve competing for primacy of the claim, they occur in distinct sequential environments: The former are generally positioned after a first claim was epistemically downgraded, whereas the latter are positioned following initial claims that were offered straightforwardly, without downgrading.

Researchers of interaction have observed that speakers regularly repeat utterances that were previously produced by another speaker (cf. Brown, 1998; Couper-Kuhlen, 1996; Jefferson, 1972; Keenan, 1977; Kim, 2002; Schegloff, 1996a, 1996b; Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks, 1977; Selting, 1996; Sorjonen, 1996; Tannen, 1989). The functions of these repeats, particularly in next turn, appear to cluster around initiating repair. Whether and how an utterance is modified when it is produced the second time is relevant for analyzing its action import. Couper-Kuhlen pointed out

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that repeats range along a cline “extending roughly from ‘perfect copy’ at one extreme through ‘near copy’ at some intermediate stage to a mere ‘copy for all practical purposes’ at the other extreme” (p. 368). By “perfect” or less than perfect, Couper-Kuhlen was posing whether, within the verbal (i.e., lexico-syntactic) channel, there is a complete and exact reduplication of the words, a modified version or only a rough paraphrase. She made the same argument for the many dimensions of prosody, which can be reproduced across a similar cline.

Although repeats are often vehicles for initiating repair (Kim, 2002, 2003; Schegloff et al., 1977; Selting, 1996; Sorjonen, 1996), they can also function to sustain or direct a particular topical focus in conversation (Brown, 1998; Keenan, 1977; Kim, 2002; Tannen, 1989), register receipt of a prior turn at talk (Brown, 1998; Keenan, 1977; Kim, 2002; Schegloff, 1996b; Tannen, 1989), “target” a next action (Schegloff, 1996b), or do confirmation (Kim, 2002; Schegloff, 1996a).

In this article I focus on what I call “modified repeats” of assertions made previously by another speaker. A key component of the modified repeat is that the copula/auxiliary is expanded and stressed in the repeat.¹ In what follows I begin by discussing agreement and confirmation. I then look at two types of modified repeats—partial and full. I show that both types are primarily concerned on one hand with confirming and thus aligning with the claim and on the other hand with competing with the prior speaker’s right to socioepistemic authority over the matter at hand. However, I show that the two types occur in somewhat different sequential environments, and thus the means through which they compete for primacy over the matter are somewhat different. Moreover, these confirmations do not only occur in environments where confirmation is a conditionally relevant next action. I discuss each type of modified repeat in turn.

DATA AND METHOD

The data on which this analysis is based are audio and video recordings of naturally occurring spontaneous social interaction in a range of different social contexts. The analysis relies on conversation analysis (CA) as a methodology. CA embodies a theory of social interaction that views interaction as systematic, rule guided, and practice oriented, and thus as a domain that can be investigated for its underlying mechanics (for reviews see Heritage, 1984b; Levinson, 1983). The theory assumes that no detail of

communication can be discounted a priori as random or arbitrary. This article follows in the CA tradition. Here, I attempt to add to the existing corpus of descriptions of actions (Schegloff, 1996a) as part of a larger collective effort to build an empirical theory of social action.

ANALYSIS

Agreement

It appears to matter to conversational participants (a) if they are the first or the second person to make a claim and (b) whether and who has superior versus subordinate rights to make a particular claim. First-position assertions (whether descriptions or assessments) carry an implied claim that the speaker has primary epistemic rights over the claim (Heritage, 2002). Due to the sequential organization of conversation, second assertions will always be heard as having been positioned relative to the first and thus relative in terms of epistemics as well. Whereas asserting something can be done in either first or second position (including a second-position assertion that works to overcome its “secondness”), agreement is intrinsically a second action as, by definition, it aligns with a previously taken position. Because of this, agreements do not claim to have previously had a position on whatever they agree with at that moment. However, different practices for doing agreement have different consequences for the in-progress interaction. As Heritage and Raymond (2005) observed, participants are oriented to the “terms of agreement” as consequential to the ongoing interaction. Perhaps the most neutral form of agreement is accomplished by some form of “Yes” because with “yes,” a speaker does *just* agreement. In particular, with “yes” the speaker makes no claim to have previously held a position on the topic or to have either independent or primary rights over the claim. For instance, see Extract 1. Here Lateisha, Tim, and Joe are discussing a recent news story about a man who killed his family.

(1) HS 4 T208

- | | | |
|---|------|-------------------------------------|
| 1 | LAT: | They was his babies that he killed? |
| 2 | TIM: | I think <u>so</u> . |
| 3 | JOE: | =Y[eah:. |
| 4 | TIM: | [(It was) his <u>babies</u> . |
| 5 | | (.) |

- 6 TIM: All of 'em.
 7 ((intervening talk about killings))
 8 JOE: (Two) months, ((age of child))
 9 (0.2)
 10 JOE: (Three) months,
 11 (.)
 12 TIM: Go:d they don't know [(^nothin')
 13 JOE: -> [That's an infant.
 14 TIM: => Ye^a:h.

At line 13 Joe asserts that a baby of only 2 or 3 months of age is an infant. Tim agrees with Joe through a prosodically emphatic “Ye^a:h” in line 14. Similarly, see Extract 2. Here Linda assesses Craig’s hair as “startin’ tuh look better.” In line 2, Joan agrees with this, with “Ye:a:h.”

(2) TC Linda & Joan (TCIc-side 2)

- 1 Lin: -> Craig's hair rilly wz startin' tuh look better.
 2 Joa: => Ye:a:h.

A third case is shown in Extract 3. In line 2, Serena agrees with Katie’s assessment from line 1.

(3) Sorority breakfast 1 4:20

- 1 KAT: -> He was quite uncomfortable.
 2 SER: => Yeah.
 3 SER: I'd say:_

In Extracts 1 through 3, speakers do agreement but no more. Although the respondents here do align, they are, in Heritage’s (2002) terms, “vulnerable to the inference that their response is fabricated on the instant to achieve agreement or disagreement, and is thus a dependent or even a coerced action within a field of constraint that is established by the first” (p. 200). This is specifically wrestled with by Serena in Extract 3, line 3 when she reasserts agreement with “I’d say:” where, with the stress on “I”, she works to emphasize that this is not bland or “mere” agreement.

In contrast with bland agreements such as “Yeah,” agreements that are prefaced by “Oh” convey a “change of state of orientation” and systematically indicate that the speaker has both independent access to and a previously held position on the matter (Heritage, 2002). As an example, see Ex-

tract 4. Here, a family is talking about the city planning in Madeline's town. Following Madeline's assessment that it would be "far more dangerous" to walk or ride a bicycle in her town, Jenny aligns with an "Oh" prefaced agreement (line 3).

(4) Beach house 16:10

- 1 MAD: And if I wanted tuh wa:lk, (.) or ride uh bicycle it
 2 would be far more danjərəus [because there are no bike=
 3 JEN: [Oh of cou:rsə. No-
 4 MAD: =lanes and no wɔ:lkɪŋ lanes.=

Here the "epistemic independence" (Heritage, 2002) is doubly marked because it is "Oh" prefaced and the agreement token is "of cou:rsə." which underscores Jenny's position as previously held, even if occasioned in this instance as a second. Heritage noted that "Oh" prefaced agreements are most frequent in contexts where the second speaker has primary rights in the matter at hand; however, the practice does not in and of itself assert primary rights but rather claims epistemic independence (Heritage, 2002).

Confirmation

Bland agreements neither convey nor claim that the speaker had a previously held position on the matter at hand; further, they can be either requested by a first speaker or offered unsolicited by a second speaker. By contrast, confirmations are most commonly positioned following requests for confirmation by a first speaker. That is, with declarative questions, B-event statements (Labov & Fanshel, 1977), and negative interrogatives, speakers take a particular stance toward the claim that makes relevant confirmation or disconfirmation. For instance, see the declarative question in Extract 5. It is confirmed by Mark in line 4.

(5) Ravioli dinner

- 1 Mark: I don't like thuh bean one.
 2 (2.0)
 3 Kim: -> This is the bean one?
 4 Mark: => Mm hm,

Similarly, in Extract 6, two couples have been talking about John's having taken a course to quit smoking. In the course they showed films about what smoking does to the lungs. In the extract, Don makes a B-event statement in line 16, "They just- just give you that bit of support.", an extension of the claim made in lines 11 to 13 that the films and the course did not do a lot to help John because he already was very determined. This is a B-event statement that makes relevant confirmation by John (Labov & Fanshel, 1977) and receives this confirmation in line 19.

(6) Chinese dinner

- 1 ANN: Did it sc[a:re you::]? ((about the films))
 2 JOH: [unhh
 3 JOH: No: it didn't.
 4 ANN: Oh [:.
 5 JOH: [Tha'wz the funny thi:ng,
 6 BET: But it still helped t[uh reinforce yer determination=
 7 JOH: [It didn' bo:ther me,
 8 BET: =(thi[s way or tha:t.)
 9 JOH: [No: it dih-it didn' really (relate[d tuh []
 10 TER: [(I'nna [go Mommy)
 11 DON: [The point is
 12 you wouldn't take that course if you weren't determined in the
 13 first[place.
 14 TER: [(I'm nna [go mo: [my)
 15 JOH: [Mm hm, [
 16 DON: [They ju[st- just give you that=
 17 ANN: [Well,
 18 DON: =bit of support.
 19 JOH: -> Th't's right.

Both of these cases show confirmations in sequential locations where the confirmation was relevant because it was either requested (Extract 5) or sequentially implicated (Extract 6). In both cases, both participants treat the confirming party as having greater epistemic authority over the matter. The first speaker does this by performing an action that seeks confirmation, and the second speaker does this by confirming in the manner that they do "Yes" or "Th't's right.". By contrast, another type of confirmation, "confirming an allusion" (Schegloff, 1996a), appears primarily concerned with which participant has primary rights to state something. In this practice, a speaker articulates something that had previously been alluded to by a prior speaker. In doing so, the speaker seeks confirmation of the assertion. For instance, see Extract 7.

(7) Menzies, farmers' market: air plant merchant and a customer (Schegloff, 1996, p. 208)

- 1 Liz: Hi:
 2 Cus: I want to ask you something.
 3 Liz: Sure
 4 Cus: [I bought three of those uh you know like ()
 5 Cus: [((pointing to tray of plants))
 6 Cus: One of them died out.
 7 ((gap))
 8 Cus: Uhh
 9 Liz: It did,
 10 Cus: Yeah
 11 Liz: -> The other ones are doing well,
 12 Cus: => The other ones are doing well.
 13 Liz: They were all in the same area,
 14 Cus: Same thing, yeah.

Here, as Schegloff (1996b) analyzed, the customer asserts that one of his three plants died (line 6). Through this, he implies, but does not state, that the other two plants are still alive. It is understanding precisely this information that Liz makes explicit with her candidate in line 11. This assertion, by virtue of its B-event status, makes relevant confirmation (Labov & Fanshel, 1977). The customer confirms the prior with a full repeat in line 12.² By doing the confirmation with a full repeat rather than a “Yes” or “That’s right” the speaker highlights that this is a claim which is within his domain and which he has primary rights to make.

When confirmation is not explicitly being sought by an interlocutor but is nonetheless offered from second position, then this can be seen as a competitive move, competitive in terms of asserting epistemic authority over the claim or competitive in terms of asserting primary rights to make the claim or undercutting the authority or primary rights of the first speaker. In this article I argue that modified repeats are a practice that, similar to confirming allusions, display the speaker to be concerned with having primary rights to make the claim as evidenced by the redoing of the claim. However, unlike the practice used to confirm an allusion, speakers of modified repeats make use of syntactic and prosodic resources to highlight that the claim is being done *as a second*; moreover, these confirmations are offered when confirmation was not sequentially implicated. For these reasons, I argue that modified repeats are also concerned to compete with the epistemic authority of the claim. Thus, unlike other forms of confirmation, which appear to be primarily concerned either with epistemic rights or with epistemic authority, this practice appears to be dealing with both of these dimensions.

Modified Repeats

As an initial instance of a modified repeat, see Extract 8. Although I return to this case for a fuller analysis shortly, here I mean only to point out some of the differences between this practice and others shown so far in this article. Note that Tim’s assertion in line 1 (“it was some black folks”) does not make relevant a confirmation, although one is provided in line 3.

(8) HS4 7-9-03 T1 59:46 ((simplified))

- 1 TIM: A-> I think it was some black folks
 2 cuz you see(n) 'em on (thuh TV)
 3 JOE: C-> It was.

Also, Joe’s confirmation repeats the “it was” from Tim’s prior claim but adds stress to the “was”, which allows it to be heard as doing confirmation and specifically as a *second*.

The sequential position of this practice is significant because when speakers make an assertion in first position, they claim primary rights to make that assertion. This is true whether they assert the claim straightforwardly (see Extracts 1, 3, 4, and 6), assert it with intensification (see Extract 2), or even make use of epistemic downgrading such as “I think” (Extract 8), “It looks like”, “Apparently”, and so on. Part of the evidence for this is that, except for claims about the addressee (“B-event statements”), nonassessment assertions do not make confirmation conditionally relevant. Thus, these assertions differ from utterances that solicit confirmation (Extracts 5–7). Although agreement or acknowledgment is common following assertions, when a next speaker *confirms* a prior assertion, this is a marked action.

Partial modified repeats. Partial modified repeats are most commonly done in environments where the first claim was offered with epistemic downgrading. Whereas unmarked agreements in this environment both preserve the indefiniteness of the claim and take no position on whether or which participant has primary rights to make the claim, modified repeats typically address both of these dimensions. First they generally do not repeat any downgrading that was done in the original claim; second, through repetition (whether partial as discussed here or full as discussed later) and stress on the copula/auxiliary, modified repeats are specifically positioned

as “seconds” to some prior saying. However, partial modified repeats do not merely second a prior claim. Rather, they at least compete with and often assert epistemic authority over it through the features just outlined. One of the most common means through which they assert authority is through a claim of primary rights to have made the claim, and this in turn is often grounded in the interactional role of the speaker. Modified repeats therefore typically involve both alignment between the speakers (in terms of agreement on a particular description or assessment) and competitiveness between them (in terms of primary rights to make and authority over the claim). This is true even in partial modified repeats where first speakers typically mitigate their claim to primacy with downgrades.

Partial modified repeats can thus be characterized as pro-termed repeats of the first claim (i.e., they rely on anaphora to redo the claim), which reassert the prior claim with stress on the copula/auxiliary. I focus on affirmative examples, but modified repeats also appear in negative assertions, although less commonly.

An example of a partial repeat was shown in Extract 8. There, in a barber shop, Tim and Joe have been discussing a widely reported incident where a woman left her two children in a car in southern California during a hot summer day and both children died. Joe had topicalized this and further had been the one who was retelling the incident and expressing disbelief over the details and claims offered by the mother. It is in this context that Tim claims something about the incident—that the people involved in the incident were Black. However, he downgrades his own rights to primacy over the claim in two ways: first, with “I think” as a qualifier; and second, with the account “cuz you see(n) ’em on (thuh TV).”³ In response, Joe confirms Tim’s assertion with a partial modified repeat: “It was”. The repeat involves the use of anaphora, which requires Tim to return to his initial claim to make sense of Joe’s turn, but note that this is still expanded and marked relative to mere agreements such as “Yes”. Unlike Tim’s claim, Joe’s repeat both cleanses the assertion of the qualifications on it in Tim’s turn and further collaborates with Tim’s stance that he has subordinate rights to make the claim by asserting his own authority over the story and its details. In addition to collaborating with Tim’s diminished epistemic rights to the claim, by confirming in this way (i.e., with a modified repeat) in this position (i.e., when confirmation was not conditionally relevant) Joe can be understood to actively undermine Tim’s claimed primacy over the assertion. Here we see that for Joe it is not only about positioning himself as in agreement with Tim but also about their respective positioning within

that agreement: the terms of their agreement (Heritage & Raymond, 2005). In particular, here the terms that are important have to do with epistemic authority over the matters that are part of the telling. Thus, although at one level Tim and Joe align in terms of who has primary rights to make the claim, on another level, that Tim says it first sequentially claims primacy despite it being mitigated against with the account, and Joe quarrels with this through his modified repeat.

As another example, see Extract 9. Here, three housemates in their mid 20s are preparing dinner together. Lance is making hamburger patties out of raw beef, and Judy is known as someone who will eat bits of raw meat but is considered strange for doing so. Here at line 1 Lance comments that the meat smells so good that he might do the same thing.

(9) Housemates 2:30

- 1 LAN: This's smelling goo:d_ I might start eating raw meat,
 2 (0.2)
 3 JUD: S::ee:?
 4 (1.0)
 5 LAN: Yeah but I'm not [that weird.]
 6 GIO: [I th(h)ink] it's just all the spices.
 7 (0.2)
 8 LAN: It is.

Gio, the third housemate who is preparing food with Lance and Judy, asserts that the meat is smelling good because of all the spices (line 6). Similar to Extract 8, here Gio also downgrades his own rights to make the claim with the qualifier “I th(h)ink”, here produced through a laughing outbreath. Lance confirms Gio’s assertion with the partial modified repeat “It is.” (line 8).

When Lance confirms Gio’s assertion with a modified repeat, he aligns with Gio about the spices causing the meat to smell good. However, similar to Extract 8, Lance’s repeat simultaneously competes with the primacy that Gio claims simply by virtue of being the first to make the assertion. This mixture of alignment and competitiveness is also present in that the repeat does not include the epistemic downgrade that was present in Gio’s first production. With the modified repeat, Lance asserts epistemic authority over whether it is the spices that make the meat smell good. Here, the authority appears to be derived from a claim of primary rights to assert what smells good to him. That is, because the topic is Lance’s own sense of

smell, Lance has primary rights to assess whether this is what makes the meat smell good. Thus, the argument is that through this claim of primacy, Lance also hearably claims epistemic authority from second position with the modified repeat. Also like Extract 8 then, the larger issues involved have to do with the relative social positioning of the interactants and thus with the *terms* of their agreement and not only with whether they are *in* agreement.

The first two cases suggest that through their confirmations, speakers index their own primary rights to have made the claim originally offered by the first speaker. Although the confirmation does not explicitly connect the grounds for the primary rights and ultimately for greater epistemic authority, the confirmation communicates to the recipient (the first speaker) that he or she can and should locate the grounds for these primary rights. Typically these grounds are either the speaker's role as an interactant (such as that of teller in Extract 8) or their social role (such as that of teacher or the person who has experienced the relevant event) as in Extract 9. In this way the interactants are oriented to who is "the right person" to make a given assertion.⁴ In a third example, a family is talking about city planning in southern California and the difficulty of using any mode of transportation other than cars. Madeline has been talking about her town—that there are no bike lanes or pedestrian lanes and that even if there were, there is nothing nearby that she could walk or bike to. It is in this environment that her mother Margot asserts that biking would be difficult up the hill on which Madeline lives (line 8).

(10) Beach house 16:10

- 1 MAD: And if I wanted tuh wa:lk, (.) or ride uh bicycle it
 2 would be far more dangerous [because there are no bike=
 3 JEN: [Oh of cou:rse. No-
 4 MAD: =lanes and no walkin[g lanes.=
 5 JEN: [(for [safety.)
 6 MAR: [(well-)
 7 MAD: Huh huh huh huh huh
 8 MAR: It would be [hard tuh- tuh bike (.) up on your hill.
 9 MAD: [((sniff))
 10 (0.2)
 11 MAD: Well it would be.

Again, by virtue of sequential position, Margot claims primary rights to the claim. However, she mitigates against this default primacy by marking the

initial assertion (line 8) as speculative with the modal “would”. Further, ownership of the hill is firmly placed with Madeline through the possessive “your”, which further diminishes Margot’s rights to make claims on this topic (Labov & Fanshel, 1977). In response, Madeline confirms with “Well it would be.”⁵ Similar to other modified repeats, Madeline both repeats Margot’s claim and stresses the modal auxiliary “would”. In the way she confirms Margot’s assertion she makes her own claim that the assertion is appropriately within her domain and that she has primary rights to make it. It is through her own primary rights to the claim that I also argue she asserts epistemic authority to assess whether or not it would be difficult to bike up the hill.

A final example offers evidence that the roots of primacy may not always be self-evident, although the partial modified repeat nonetheless indexes a claim of epistemic authority and leaves the interlocutor to locate the grounds on which a claim of primary rights would rest. Here, a hairstylist and his client are talking about creativity and success. The stylist is an Asian man whose dialect clearly reflects him to be a non-native speaker of English. Thus both his ethnicity and his language are available to the client as indices of his status as an immigrant to the United States. The client is an older White woman whose dialect suggests her to be a native speaker of American English. In line 1, the stylist asserts that “it take talent and hard wor:k to be successful.” The client confirms this using a partial repeat of the stylist’s utterance.

(11) HS2: 23:57

- 1 STY: And I work very hard so_ (1.0) It take t- it take
- 2 talent and hard wor:k to be successful.
- 3 CLI: >.ml< It do^es.

As in earlier cases, the modified repeat involves the client repeating the assertion using anaphora and emphasizing the *do*-auxiliary. As in earlier cases, this works to undermine the stylist’s authority over the claim because, as before, the first assertion did not make confirmation relevant, but here the client is doing confirmation by reasserting the claim and underscoring it as an assertion. The question, as in other cases like this, is what the client is doing given that, unlike Extracts 8 to 10, the grounding for her primary rights over this claim is a bit less transparent.

The analysis offered is that the client treats the stylist as offering a generalization about American culture. Talent and hard work are what it takes to be successful in the United States, and it is rhetoric that is familiar, even

stereotypically provided, to immigrants. The claim to epistemic authority over this assertion likely underscores the client as an American who would know about her country and who would have primary rights to make claims about what it takes to be successful there. When the client responds with a partial modified repeat, she undermines the first speaker's primary rights to make the claim by claiming authority over the claim and indexing herself as having primary rights to make it. What this claim to primacy is rooted in is left to the stylist to determine. This is no different from other cases we have seen except that the roots of the claim to primacy may be less transparent in cases such as this. In addition, unlike other cases, here the participants do not align in terms of these rights because the first speaker does not attempt to downgrade his epistemic stance relative to the claim. This was unusual in the collection of cases.

To summarize, we observed that partial modified repeats are used as a way to do confirmation, a fundamentally aligning action. However, this action is done in a sequential environment where it was not requested and thus is a marked action in terms of its position. It is further marked in form because it is not a minimal "Yes" type response but is rather a repeating of a prior assertion. Specifically, the repeat involves a redoing of the original claim relying heavily on anaphora. This redoing emphasizes the second speaker's claim to have primary rights to make the assertion. In addition, it involves stressing the already present auxiliary or expanding or adding the copula/auxiliary and stressing that component. It has been argued that this stress emphasizes the claim as *second* and thereby emphasizes its claim to epistemic authority as well. In most cases, partial modified repeats are positioned in sequential environments where first speakers had downgraded their rights to make the claim. Thus, on one level the two speakers are aligned, but on another the second speaker is competing with the first speaker's claim to primacy by virtue of their claim having been made in first position and through that asserting epistemic authority over the claim.

There may be a variety of reasons why it would matter to the participants whether one has the upper hand over a particular state of affairs. As mentioned earlier, this may have to do with an interactional role (e.g., teller or recipient) or it may have to do with a social role (e.g., teacher, doctor, or otherwise expert over a domain). And these reasons are not generally made explicit by speakers for hearers. Rather, the use of this marked practice for doing confirmation in an environment where it was not a conditionally relevant next action communicates to hearers that they can and should properly look for an account for this claim to primacy.

Full modified repeats. Full modified repeats are qualitatively similar to partial modified repeats, as stated earlier, in that they both involve confirming a just prior claim by asserting it again and by expanding and/or stressing the copula or auxiliary. In both cases, confirmation was not necessarily made conditionally relevant by the prior assertion. However, full modified repeats differ from partial modified repeats in several critical ways. First, and most obviously, whereas partial repeats only reproduce the most minimal portion of the claim to be understood as a redoing and to do confirmation and do so relying primarily on anaphora making them highly parasitic on the prior turn, full modified repeats reproduce the core claim. Recall the cline outlined by Couper-Kuhlen (1996) in the introduction. As she pointed out, repetition can vary along a cline toward more precise repetition both in terms of lexicon and prosody. Full repeats involve a much higher position along this cline, as they repeat more of the initial claim and are therefore less parasitic on the initial claim.

This then brings us to the second primary difference between the two types of modified repeats: Whereas partial modified repeats typically occur in environments where speakers of the initial claim have displayed subordinate rights to make the claim, full modified repeats respond to assertions that straightforwardly, both by virtue of the design of the turn *and* its position, claim primary rights to make the claim. In this way, although both types of modified repeats are competitive over the primacy of the claim, full modified repeats may be more competitive because they occur in sequential environments where speakers of the initial claim do not generally downgrade their claims to primacy.

As a first instance, see Extract 12. Here, Robbie has recently taken over as the teacher for a class of children Lesley had previously taught. Robbie assesses them at lines 2 to 3 with “the children’re lovely”. Lesley responds to this in line 5 first with an “Oh” prefaced agreement. Heritage (2002) argued that through the “oh” prefaced agreement, Lesley conveys that this opinion had been arrived at previously and independently from Robbie’s bringing it up here.

(12) Holt 5/88:1:5:4

- 1 ROB: Oh I'm such a ^so: gla:d t'have a chat with you cz
 2 I ^do want t'know'n I'm en^joying it 'n the children're
 3 love[ly.
 4 LES: [.tch
 5 LES: ^Oh yes.=They ^are lovely:: I[h if a little exciteable.
 6 ROB: [()

- 7 ROB: Th[a:t's w't I thought. I've ^thirty in that roo- I=
 8 LES: [Hm:.
 9 ROB: =do:. sympathize with you.

Subsequent to this agreement, Lesley does a modified repeat of Robbie's assessment: "They ^are lovely:," which repeats the full first claim "the children're lovely" modifying only the initial full reference from "the children" to the anaphoric reference "they". Thus, she maintains the key assessment term "lovely." This is redundant and thus may be hearable as doing something that is not "simply agreeing" (Levinson, 2000). As is characteristic of modified repeats, the copula "are" is expanded and stressed shifting from the contracted "re" to ^are". This action confirms what Robbie has said both by repeating what Robbie had said—the same basic assessment—and by emphasizing the copula. In this way, although the action is positioned as a second, it is designed to override the first. Leslie claims to have primary rights to assess the children and through that claims greater epistemic authority to do this. She recasts Robbie's assessment in this way as having less authority than Robbie had originally claimed (note that there is no downgrading of the original claim by Robbie in lines 2–3). That Lesley is claiming to have more rights than Robbie is further supported in what she does in her next Turn Constructional Unit (TCU)—qualify her assessment with "if a little exciteable." This qualification of the assessment now reasserts the primacy of her own assessment by further transforming her second-position assessment into a first-position assessment to be aligned with (or not) by Robbie. This case also supports a claim that although independent agreement and primary rights may not *always* be separable for participants, they certainly *can* be separated, and both dimensions appear to be oriented to by interactants.

As another example, see Extract 13. Here, as a protest of the teacher's request that a student do a particular task, the student (a female child) claims to the teacher that the task was for another student. With the past tense, the girl asserts at least that a prior decision had placed this task with another student. Further, the assertion "That was Alison's job" does not orient to her own diminished rights to make this claim. Her first TCU, as Schegloff (1996a) analyzed, includes a change-of-state token (Heritage, 1984a) followed by an overt confirmation of the girl's assertion. In addition, as suggested by the change-of-state token "Oh" in the turn "Oh that's right.", "that's right" may index that the facts in the assertion have been remembered (Heritage, 1984a, 1998). This portion of the turn effectively

credits the child with reminding her while asserting the independence of her own memory of the fact.

(13) Schegloff (1996a, p. 176)

- 1 TEA: Check and see if there's any down on the
- 2 bottom that people forgot to hang up.
- 3 GIR: That was Alison's job.
- 4 TEA: Oh that's right. It is Alison's job.
- 5 GIR: A:lison! ((Calling out for her))

In the second TCU of the turn, the teacher confirms the girl's claim and, through her use of the present tense, renews the prior decision that the job belongs properly to Alison. Through her modified repeat the teacher asserts herself to have primary rights to the claim that it is Alison's job. Although the change in tense from "was" to "is" with the emphasis on "is" in another context might be doing correction, in this case, the shift in tense appears concerned not so much with correcting as with extending the relevance of the confirmation. The stress also works to emphasize her claim of epistemic authority over the matter. Her social roles—teacher versus student; adult versus child—appear to be indexed in the teacher's claim of authority. This is shown to be at issue for the participants by the fact that the contingent next action—calling Alison to perform the task—is not done until after the reassertion. But notice as well that it is the child who does the summoning once the action has the authority of the teacher behind it. Across all the cases we have seen, whether what is indexed is the second speaker's interactional or social role, the underlying issue appears to be the same: How are these people to position themselves relative to one another with respect to the current claim about some state of affairs.

Another example is shown in Extract 14. Here again, housemates are preparing dinner. Judy has proposed drinking red wine, and Lance has agreed to the proposal but in lines 3 to 4 and 6 teasingly adds a condition. In overlap with the last component of this tease, Gio asserts as an additional issue "it's uh school night." (line 7). Of importance, Lance has already taken a position that Judy should restrict her drinking. Gio's assertion, particularly with the *And*-preface, attaches his claim to Lance and is potentially hearable as stepping into Lance's domain by asserting why Judy should be careful with her drinking. In addition, Gio's assertion is rather hypocritical because he just had two shots of Jack Daniel's whisky and previously told this to the others. After 1.0 sec of silence Lance confirms this

by fully reasserting “It is a school night.” (line 9). Once again, the full modified repeat is positioned following a claim that was offered straightforwardly without any epistemic downgrades; it involves a repeat of the full claim with an expanded and stressed copula.

(14) Housemates 10:27

- 1 LAN: Great_
 2 (0.2)
 3 LAN: .h As long as you don't have too much.= “cuz
 4 you remember what happen'=las'=time.”
 5 GIO: h[h(h)
 6 LAN: [(Got chel got [°drunk didn' sh-)
 7 GIO: [An' it's uh school night.
 8 (1.0)
 9 LAN: It is a school night.
 10 (0.4)
 11 LAN: Mister- <two jacks already,>

After Gio's claim, Lance initially says nothing. During the 1.0 sec of silence at line 8, he continues the same food preparation activity he was engaged in earlier: molding hamburger patties. By repeating Gio's claim after 1.0 sec of silence, Lance communicates both that he “thought” about it and that he arrived at that conclusion as well. This is one way that he undermines Gio's rights to make such a claim because the repeat retroactively casts Gio as having lesser rights than were claimed by his own turn design (which was straightforward with no epistemic downgrading). As with other cases we have seen, by confirming the assertion in this way Lance treats himself as having primary rights to the matter, through the reassertion of the claim, and as having greater epistemic authority through the reliance on stress to emphasize the claim in second position as doing confirmation of a claim that the second speaker had primary rights to make.

That relative rights over the claim are at issue is further evidenced in the second TCU of Lance's turn (line 11). The increment (Schegloff, 2000) “Mister- <two jacks already,>”, makes reference to Gio's drinking of Jack Daniel's that evening. This increment is an address term relying on “Mister” to be heard as such. With it, Lance addresses Gio in such a way that he is characterized as an inappropriate person to be taking a moralistic stance on drinking alcohol on a weeknight. In this way Lance further reinforces his own claim to having primary rights to make such an assertion. Here, those rights appear to be two-pronged: First, he had earlier implied that

Judy should not drink too heavily that evening; second, Gio is in a compromised moral position to give reasons for not drinking “too much.”

Another example is shown in Extract 15. Here, Dixie has been complaining about one of her aerobics instructors who, like others she has had, will stop working out during the class and stand “pretending <to watch us,>” (line 7). She then assesses this as “infuriating”. In response to this telling, her husband, Sam, states “That’s thuh way thee instr-uctors cheat” (line 9). Dixie partially repeats this assertion in line 11 with “It i^s.” She then redoes Sam’s entire turn doing a full repeat. “It is thuh way they cheat”. This shift appears to be related to the fact that the latter is a stronger way to assert authority in an environment where the first speaker did not orient to his or her own subordinate rights to make the claim.⁶ The full repeat is offered in a characteristic sequential environment, where the first assertion had been produced straightforwardly without epistemic downgrading. Further, it involves a full repeat of the claim with an expanded and stressed copula.

(15) Stew dinner 38:15

- 1 DIX: They’ll ^stop. (.) they’ll stop doing it and stand there
 2 and call it for you.
 3 SAM: Mm hm:,
 4 DIX: Like she’s trying to catch her brea:th, or
 5 (.)
 6 SAM: Uh [huh,
 7 DIX: [she’s pretending <to watch us,> .hh that is
 8 infuriating.
 9 SAM: That’s thuh way thee instr-uctors cheat.
 10 (0.2)
 11 DIX: It i^s. It is thuh way they cheat and [it’s infuriating=
 12 SAM: [Mm:.
 13 DIX: =to me cuz it (makes them think-) ya know she
 14 thinks she’s coo:l an’ checking out on us an’
 15 everything_<.h an’ uhm (0.4) it’s very frustrating.

By confirming with a full modified repeat (line 11), Dixie treats herself as having primary rights to make the claim. Her emphasis on this as a redoing of the original claim also works to underscore her assertion of greater epistemic authority. This is further supported in the way that she continues her turn in a way that co-opts her husband’s turn and syntactically builds on it (with “and”), recompleting the turn with her own prior turn completion (“it’s infuriating”).

Sam's claim about the instructor's behavior is hearably aligning in that it displays his empathy with the situation through a possible upshot of Dixie's prior turn. However, it also implicitly claims primary rights to make the assertion through its first position. Sam can be said to have equal rights to observe and make claims about aerobics instructors insofar as Dixie's claim was a generic one and both parties take aerobics classes. But this is Dixie's telling, and thus through her interactional role it is her knowledge domain. Further, with "pretending", Dixie had already conveyed a position that the instructor was using "watching" as a cover for not exercising. Although she had not stated that it was cheating, she had implied this. When Sam asserts that this is the way instructors cheat, he claims "firstness" and, by virtue of this sequential position, primary rights to make this assertion. By redoing the claim with a modified repeat, Dixie undermines Sam's rights and works to reclaim primacy over the matter and further, through the emphasis on the claim, asserts epistemic authority over it.

Another instance is shown in Extract 16. Here three people are discussing gun control laws. Jason initiates a brief description of the gun control policy in the Netherlands. This description reaches its first possible completion point at the end of line 4, as this is the first point where a fact that could be assessed as interesting is syntactically and prosodically possibly complete. With no uptake, Jason continues by expanding on the point he has already made. This next reaches possible completion at the end of line 7. After a slight delay, Margot begins to respond (line 10). This response is relatively minimal and continuative (particularly the "Yeah"). Further, Jason is gazing at Madeline across Margot's response and thus appears to be pursuing response from Madeline.

(16) Beach house 21:15

- 1 JAS: W'll in the Netherlands: (.) tuh gun laws are
 2 interesting_ uhm (.) You c'n ow:n: (.) uh rifle or shotgun?,
 3 (0.2)
 4 JAS: But you're not allowed tuh take it home with you.
 5 (0.5)
 6 JAS: Uhm (.) Basically: if you buy uh rifle or shotgun? it-
 7 You hafta keep it (.) <at a shooting range.>
 8 (.)
 9 JAS: [((gaze to MAD))
 10 MAR: [Tha- Yeah[Oh:.
 11 JAS: [and you can go to tuh shooting range
 12 JAS: and use it.

- 13 (.)
 14 JAS: at tuh shooting range. but it [stays there.
 15 MAD: [Mm hm,
 16 MAD: Hm. ((nodding))
 17 MAD: Mm hm, ((nodding))
 18 JAS: [So it's kind of interesting.
 19 MAD: [(So it's -)
 20 MAD: That is interesting.

Jason pursues Madeline's response across lines 11 to 14. He again reaches possible completion at the end of line 12. This is recompleted saying much the same thing with the increment in line 14. Apparently targeting the completion of Jason's next TCU, Madeline offers a continuer in partial overlap with it—itself a recompletion and one that again makes the same point made in line 4 and again at lines 6 to 7. The continuer treats Jason as not yet done. Following the TCU completion of line 14, Madeline nods and offers a minimal response token “Hm.” followed by “Mm hm,” which is equivocal as an agreement or a continuer. None of these responses fully takes up Jason's telling as interesting or even as complete. Jason had prefaced his telling with a characterization of the description as “interesting”. This characterization at the outset of the description communicates to the recipient both what type of response would be appropriate to the description and when it will be over—when something “interesting” has been mentioned (Sacks, 1974).

In this sequential environment, Jason explicitly offers a candidate response to his own telling. It is hearable as a response that “should” have been offered by a recipient, evidenced first by the turn-initial upshot marker “So”. Furthermore, he uses the very same framing he used in lines 1 to 2 to project the type of telling it would be—a return to the beginning of the telling is a way to communicate that the end has been reached (Jefferson, 1978; Schegloff, *in press*). The response is a first-position assertion that assesses the gun laws as “kind of interesting.” (line 18). Madeline confirms the basic claim with a full modified repeat of the assertion (line 20). Similar to the other cases, the copula is expanded and stressed. In this case, there is a deictic shift from “it” to “that”. Although Jason had downgraded his assessment of the description from “interesting” to “kind of interesting”, note that he does not downgrade his rights to make the claim. This is clearly searching for uptake of the description, and in overlap Madeline had been on her way to providing some sort of evaluation (line 19). But now she is in a sequential position where, as Heritage (2002) suggested, she is vulnerable to being heard as merely echo-

ing in her agreement or agreeing out of coercion. Therefore, if she is to be heard as having a position that is not entirely interactionally generated, some sort of evaluation is relevant.

Thus, when Madeline confirms through a modified repeat, she does work to assert that whether the description of the gun control policy is interesting is properly within her domain, where her claim to primary rights appears to be rooted in her interactional role as the recipient of the telling. Further, she works to assert that it is not only her place to do this but that she, as the recipient, has greater epistemic authority to assess whether it is interesting. This case, similar to Extract 15 and several others we have observed, further evidences that claims of primacy are frequently rooted in social or interactional roles. Here, the interactional role that appears relevant is Madeline's role as a recipient, and the assertion was one that belongs properly to the recipient: an assessment of the telling. In summary, once again the full repeat is positioned in an environment where the prior speaker has straightforwardly made a claim. The second speaker relies on the full modified repeat to override the first assertion and thus to reclaim primary rights normally associated with being "first." Once again, at issue is the relative social positioning of the interactants. It is not simply a matter of whether they are aligned that the telling is interesting but that the terms of that alignment are negotiated such that the recipient of the telling has greater rights and greater epistemic authority to assess whether what was reported in the telling was interesting.

As a final example, see Extract 17. Here, a teenage girl, Virginia, has requested a raise in her allowance during a family dinner. In lines 1 to 2, Virginia assesses \$5 a week as a ridiculous (i.e., ridiculously low) amount. In line 4, Prudence, the girlfriend of Virginia's older brother, asserts that this amount is a lot. After Prudence laughs, Virginia's mother responds to this assertion. First, she repeats the target assessable "FIVE Dollars a WEE:k?," which helps to relink her turn to Virginia's (line 1) and further acts to target the action of the remainder of the turn (Schegloff, 1996b). This also gives the mother's turn stronger rhetorical force as she builds her case in confirmation of Prudence's more mitigated assertion. Subsequently she adds the increment "Jus' to throw away:,". Although not an overt assertion, this recasts the \$5 allowance less as "allowance" and more as "play money". The prosody of both line 7 and the increment in line 9 is rising and in this context further indicates that this is something to be commented on. This comment comes in the form of an emphatic "my gosh" and then the full modified repeat "it is a lo:t."⁷

(17) Virginia 02:15 ((Recorded during the 1970s))

- 1 VIR: A(h)llo::wan(h)ce? I o(h)nly g(h)et fi(h)ve
 2 d(h)ollars a week. That's rid(h)i(h)c(u)l(h)ous.
 3 ???: .hh
 4 PRU: [£(Well) that seems like] a lo(h)o(h)ot! heh! uh! .hhh!=
 5 MOM: [()]
 6 PRU: =[I(h) n(h)elver g(h)ot that! mu:ch],
 7 MOM: =[F I v e | D o l l a r s | a WEE:]k?;=
 8 VIR: =W[u-
 9 MOM: [Jus' to throw away;, my gosh it is a lo:t.

Unlike other full modified repeats, here the initial speaker's initial claim is epistemically downgraded with "seems like", which displays a possible orientation to having subordinate rights to make the claim. However, note that there are several important differences with this case. First, the initial claim is positioned as a disaligning response to Virginia's assessment of her allowance amount as "ridiculous" (line 2). Thus, the smile voice, the well preface, and the evidential downgrade of the turn may be primarily dealing with the disagreement. Second, and closely related, unlike the other cases, here the first speaker's claim is delivered to another addressee (i.e., to Virginia rather than to Mom), and the second speaker (i.e., Mom) here is capitalizing on that. Third, the sequential position of this second makes a full (rather than a partial) modified repeat very close to mandatory for comprehensibility. That is, although it is in an adjacent turn, it is rather more distal than our other cases.⁸

The mother's claim to have primary rights here indexes a similar social role to that of the teacher we saw earlier insofar as her role as the mother and the money provider is here instantiated with this practice, but this case is also not unlike Extracts 14 and 15, where the second speaker had previously implied this position but, by virtue of going "second", is at risk of losing primary rights over this domain. Thus, although Prudence and Mom are in agreement, when Mom does a modified repeat, she addresses the terms of that agreement and works to reclaim primary rights over the domain of Virginia's allowance. Further, the emphasis on the claim once again is hearable as asserting greater epistemic authority over the claim as well. We see then that, perhaps to a greater extent here, on one level Mom and Prudence are aligned against Virginia and in that sense are putting Virginia in her place. However, with the modified repeat, Mom asserts the priority of her own position and authority over Prudence, thereby putting Prudence in her place as well.

This section has focused on full modified repeats as a way of doing confirmation of a matter. It was observed at the outset of this section that as an action the production of a confirmation in this position is marked because it was not conditionally relevant by the prior turn. By doing confirmation, and by doing it with a modified repeat (i.e., redoing an original assertion with an expanded and stressed copula/auxiliary), the speaker undermines the primacy that was claimed by the first speaker and asserts his or her own authority to make the claim from second position.

DISCUSSION

In this article I show that modified repeats are a way of doing confirmation that, through the redoing of a just prior claim, undermines the prior speaker's claim of primacy and instead asserts the second speaker as having primary rights to make the claim and his or her own epistemic authority over the matter. Modified resayings index interactional or social grounds through which the second speaker, rather than the first, is "the one" who has greater epistemic authority over the assertion. I argue that this is accomplished first because, in contrast to most confirmations, these are not restricted to sequential environments where confirmation is generally conditionally relevant. Further, this practice relies on (a) stress of an expanded copula/auxiliary, which communicates to a hearer to look backward to some prior utterance; (b) lexical repetition; and (c) the removal of any epistemic downgrades. It was observed that two main types of modified repeats were used and that they occur in qualitatively different environments. Partial modified repeats are generally positioned following initial claims where the speaker has oriented to their own diminished rights to make the claim. Full modified repeats are typically positioned following initial claims where the speaker has asserted a claim straightforwardly and thus has not oriented to his or her own rights as subordinate. The full repeat is a stronger action because it asserts primary rights in an environment where this was not previously credited, whereas partial repeats collaborate with the prior speaker in his or her orientation to having subordinate rights to make claims about the matter at hand.

As a type of response, I argue that modified repeats are a marked way of aligning (in contrast with, e.g., "Yeah") and thus ask hearers to understand them as doing special work. This then is in line with a theoretical position asserted by Levinson (1987, 2000), which claims that one way

interactants economize is to allow metalinguistic properties of an utterance to carry a message. He claimed that one way this is achieved is that utterances can have default forms that are attached to default interpretations. I do not mean here to invoke a claim of essentialism. Rather, I mean to suggest that the practice here may be part of a larger interactional organization whereby a nonminimal or marked usage (as evidenced by what has been shown here) can implicate a particular sort of response. Levinson's argument suggests that marked usages violate certain Gricean maxims. In this case, the maxim of quantity (and the related maxim of minimization discussed by Levinson, 1987) is breached insofar as "Yeah" is shorter and is all that is necessary to align. Thus, doing more than "Yeah", however aligning the action is, may be heard by the interactant as doing "more" than mere agreement. A modified repeat then signals that the situation is *not* business as usual and that the hearer can and should look for what the speaker may be taking issue with, and on what grounds. Here, the issue is competing for primary rights to make a claim that has just been made by another.

This research contributes to a larger set of findings that shows social interaction to be very much concerned with something we might broadly identify as the building and maintaining of social relations. Maynard and Zimmerman (1984) pointed to a variety of ways in which "participants preserve an attitude of respect, if not reverence toward each other's 'self'" (Maynard & Zimmerman, 1984). Related, Heritage and Raymond (2005) drew on Goffman's concept of the ways in which different sorts of territorial preserves are "patrolled and defended by the claimant" (Goffman, 1971, p. 52) to argue that there is evidence within conversation that participants patrol and defend information preserves. Specifically, they argued that the rights parties have to particular information is part of their own knowledge territories. The findings I report in this article are very much in line with those of Heritage and Raymond (2005) but allow us to go one step farther, as the instances focused on here were generally claims about some state of affairs that did not make agreement or confirmation conditionally relevant. Interactants could be seen to be concerned with their social positioning not only when an assessment or confirmation was due but also in terms of claiming rights to make assertions about matters when this was not specifically implicated.

This is potentially interesting if we consider that how language is being used in social interaction provides us with information about what language was designed to do (Dunbar, 1996, 1998, 2003). Many studies of social interaction have offered evidence that linguistic devices are being used

to navigate and position the interactants relative to one another. In some cases this positioning is with respect to whether they are in agreement about a given matter. There are a number of practices that reflect social interaction to be biased to at least support, if not promote, social solidarity among interactants (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Heritage, 1984b). However, interactants are not only concerned to be in agreement. Often it is much more complex and relational than that. For instance, in response to a *yes/no* question, if a speaker is going to respond affirmatively, he or she has alternative turn designs available to do this. These alternative designs (e.g., versions of “yes”; “Oh yes”; “of course”; or partial or full repeats of the turn, to name a few) deal not with agreement per se but with other aspects of how the respondent is positioned with respect to the questioner (Heritage, 1998; Raymond, 2003; Schegloff, 1996a). Who has rights to know what with how much authority?

This is precisely what is at issue in the practice discussed here but also in a great many of the social interaction practices thus far identified and described. Modified repeats are a practice through which speakers manage not just what is known but, most important, who has rights to know more about what; this appears to be central for the participants in managing both their reputations (and thus their territories) and their relationships with one another (and hence where they stand relative to one another). Thus, as we inch closer to the development of a theory of social interaction, we must account for existing observations that conversation appears to be fundamentally designed to promote alignment (through its turn-taking organization and its sequential organizations) and that it is concerned with issues of sociorelational positioning.

NOTES

- 1 For a review of the functions of phrasal stress offered from a linguistic perspective, see Bolinger (1989) and Ladd (1980, 1983).
- 2 Note that with this full repeat, the speaker resists the terms of the question. That is, the customer does not provide a “Yes” answer, which would conform to the terms of the question (Raymond, 2003). Rather, the customer treats the terms of the question as somehow ill-fitted. In this case what is ill-fitted about it is likely that the information was already implied by the prior speaker and thus did not need to be stated explicitly (Schegloff, 1996a).
- 3 The “you” here appears to be the generic “one” as in “one could see them on the TV.”

- 4 Note that a possible exploitation of this practice can occur if it is used when no grounds for primary rights can be found. In these cases it appears that the second speaker is not primarily asserting his/her superior rights but quarreling with their having been treated as having inferior rights by virtue of going “second.”
- 5 Unlike other cases, this confirmation is delayed both by a 0.2-second silence and a turn-initial “Well”. Although Margot and Madeline are agreeing that the hill would be difficult to bike, Margot’s assertion is slightly ill-fitted and possibly disaligning. Madeline had been making a case about the deficiencies of southern California city planning. Thus, her complaint about not biking has to do with the fact that it is unsafe (due to no bike lanes). That it might be difficult to do could be heard as supporting the city’s implicit position against bike lanes—no one would use them if they were there because the city is too hilly. It therefore appears that the delays here have to do with Madeline’s resistance of this dimension of Margot’s assertion.
- 6 This allows us to see that Extract 11 is less competitive than it could have been had it involved a full repeat.
- 7 Although the mother’s reassertion is positioned after a TCU by Prudence (line 6), another one by the mother (line 7) and an increment to that TCU (line 9) before the exclamation “my gosh”, which prefaces the repeat like other adjacently positioned repeats, here the positioning remains in an adjacent turn although not otherwise immediately adjacent (i.e., turn final in T1 and turn initial in T2). Still, the adjacent turns allow the recipient of the second turn to be arguably in a position to make sense of “my gosh it *is*” in a way that in a nonadjacent turn such a partial repeat would no longer be easily retrievable.
- 8 Full modified repeats can also be observed in distal sequential environments. For instance, in a pediatric encounter, physicians can be observed to use this as a way of confirming a parent’s candidate diagnosis (e.g., “It *is* impetigo” or “He *does* have an ear infection”); Stivers, 2000). Its function however is not clearly the same as that of adjacently positioned modified repeats, so these instances will be worked up separately.

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