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
covert rehearsal, I will play out the different implications of what I think you know about me and what I know about you. I will formulate closed, pretense, suspicion, and open awareness definitions of the situation. These will be shaped in the pre- and postphases of interpretation. I will also develop a directive hypothesis that will allow me to modify these meanings as our interaction unfolds. During interaction I will formulate reflective hypotheses that allow me to incorporate the new information I have gathered into my current definition of what we are doing.

2.7 Accounts and Justifications

As interaction develops and the interactants modify and alter their definitions of one another, they may be led to develop 'accounts' (activities and statements which are employed when an action is subjected to valuative inquiry) of their actions. As Lyman and Scott note there are two general types of accounts: excuses and justifications. *Justifications* are accounts where one accepts responsibility for the act or definition in question, but denies doing anything wrong. An *excuse* relieves the person of responsibility.

These accounts allow individuals to escape responsibility for their actions, while they adjust their definitions to the situation. Most critically, the account gets them off the hook for a wrong or incorrect pre- and postinterpretation of the situated interaction.

3. Conclusions

The interaction order is a social structure which impinges on all members of society. In and through our participation in this order we reproduce our situated versions of society. Situated interaction enacts the interaction order. That order, in turn, is shaped by the definitions of the situation persons bring to their ongoing projects. These definitions are processual productions involving awareness contexts, taken-for-granted meanings, and accounts. All definitions of the situation are gendered productions. They involve gendered selves enacting their situated (and interactional) versions of male and female. The concept definition of the situation is central to this process which continually reproduces the gender stratification systems of contemporary social life.

See also: Social Psychology; Sociology of Language; Symbolic Interactionism.

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N. K. Denzin

Deixis

The term 'deixis,' from the Greek word for pointing, refers to a particular way in which the interpretation of certain linguistic expressions ('deictics' or 'indexicals') is dependent on the context in which they are produced or interpreted. For example, *I* refers to the person currently speaking, *you* to the intended recipients or addressees, *now* to the time of speaking, *here* to the place of speaking, *this finger* to the currently indicated finger, and so on. These deictic expressions introduce a fundamental relativity of interpretation: uttering *I am here now* will express quite different propositions on each occasion of use. This relativity makes clear the importance of the distinction between sentence-meaning and utterance-meaning or interpretation: in large part because of deixis, one cannot talk about sentences expressing propositions—only the use of an affirmative sentence in a context expresses a determinate proposition. For this reason, some philosophers (e.g., Montague 1974) equate the semantics vs. pragmatics distinction with, respectively, the description of (artificial) languages without indexicals vs. (natural) languages with them, but the distinction then serves no linguistic purpose as all natural languages would then be 'pragmatic' (see Levinson 1983: ch. 2).

The contextual dependency introduced by deixis is quite pervasive; for example, it inheres in tense, and nearly every English sentence is tensed, so that *The capital of the USSR was Moscow* makes a claim only of a time prior to the time of speaking. Yet such relativity of interpretation seems to inhere only in certain expressions, not for example in proper names like *The Parthenon* or descriptive phrases like *the tallest building in the world*. Most semantic theories have been primarily fashioned to handle the latter kind of expression, and it is controversial whether such theories can simply be extended (as opposed to fundamentally recast) to handle deixis adequately.

The phenomenon of deixis has been of considerable interest to philosophers, linguists, and psychologists. It raises a great number of puzzles about the proper way to think about the semantics of natural languages, and about the relation of semantics and pragmatics. It also reminds us that natural languages have evolved for primary use in face-to-face interaction, and are designed in important ways to exploit that circumstance. As people take turns talking, the referents of *I, you, here, there, this, that*, etc. systematically switch too; children find this quite hard to learn (Wales 1986), but the penalties of such a system far outweigh the advantages of, e.g., substituting unique proper names (if

indeed such a system could even in principle operate in a full language, see Lyons 1977: 639ff).

1. Philosophical Puzzles

Philosophers often call deictic expressions 'indexicals,' and the corresponding contextual dependency of interpretation 'indexicality.' C. S. Peirce, who introduced these terms, considered indexicals to form a special class of signs characterized by an existential relation between sign and referent; however, his notion was broader than that commonly found today in analytic philosophy or linguistics (but see, e.g., Hanks 1990).

The phenomenon raises a number of fundamental philosophical puzzles about the nature of meaning in natural language (see Yourgrau 1990). On the face of it, a central 'design feature' of language is its context-independence: the truth of *The atomic weight of gold is 196.967.* does not depend on who says it where and when (otherwise science could hardly progress). It is the constancy of lexical meanings, together with invariant rules of sentential composition, that are normally taken to be the principles that allow us to generate unlimited sentences and yet still understand the associated meanings. Hence in formal semantics, it is normally held that the 'intensions' (or senses) of expressions determine the corresponding 'extensions' (or referents) in every 'possible world' (any set of circumstances). The phenomenon of deixis shows that this is, at best, an oversimplification: the extension of deictic expressions depends not only on the described circumstances (if any), but also on who says them, to whom, where, and when.

One influential modern treatment (due to Montague 1968) is to let the intension of an expression only determine the extensions relative to a set of contextual indices (e.g., speaker, addressee, time, and place of utterance). Another rather more interesting approach (due to Kaplan 1989) is to distinguish between two aspects of meaning: one aspect, the 'character,' concerns how the context determines the content or intensions, the other, the 'content,' concerns how intensions determine extensions in different circumstances (or possible worlds). On this account, nondeictic expressions have invariant, vacuous character and invariant intensions, picking out variable extensions in varying circumstances (or different possible worlds). But deictic expressions have potentially variable character, and vacuous or variable content, picking out different extensions in different contexts. (Kaplan 1989 himself holds that indexicals are directly referential and have no intension, but contribute to the intensions of the containing expressions; but others have found fruitful the idea that the character of indexicals determines variable intensions.)

Kaplan's scheme raises the query: to what extent are deictic expressions really exceptional, and to what extent is *character* quite generally determinative of meaning throughout natural language lexicons? The suspicion that much of the vocabulary may really be quasi-indexical is raised, first, by noticing that there are many kinds of deictics easily overlooked, like *ago* or *local*. Second, many expressions have a wide latitude of interpretation like *near* which specifies very different kinds of proximity in the phrases *near the kidneys* vs. *near the North Pole*, given an understanding of the likely contexts of use. Just as *today* is a word containing a deictic parameter (it might be glossed as

that diurnal span including the time of speaking), so perhaps *near* contains a parameter fixed contextually. Third, even expressions that look least like indexicals in fact require contextual information for interpretation: thus definite descriptions presuppose a circumscribed domain in which they pick out unique referents (*the white dog* will not do in a situation with more than one), and quantifiers presuppose a domain of discourse (*All the boys ran away* quantifies over a contextually given set of boys). These suspicions have given rise to various fundamental reorganizations of formal semantics, notably Situation Semantics (Barwise and Perry 1983; see also *Situation Semantics*) designed to capture what is taken to be the partially deictic character of most linguistic expressions.

Another philosophical puzzle is posed by deictic expressions. There is a quite widely entertained idea that there is, as it were, a 'language of thought' (to use the phrase popularized by Fodor), structurally close to, or even identical with, the semantical system in which propositional content is represented. How can the content of indexical expressions be represented (e.g., for memory and recall) in such a language, which must itself be nonindexical? It is tempting to think that all one would need is the content, the extensions determined by the context and circumstances. But if I am lost, I can say or think *I'll never find my way out of here* without knowing where *here* refers to, and replacing *here* with, e.g., *Sherwood forest* may not be recognizable as my thought. It would seem that indexical or deictic expressions cannot easily be reduced by translation into a nonindexical language.

There are further puzzles. For example, 'demonstratives' like *this* and *that* which sometimes only succeed in referring by virtue of an accompanying gesture, seem a fundamental, primitive kind of referring expression, and are sometimes held (e.g., by Lyons 1975) to be the ontogenetic origin of referring in general. But as Wittgenstein (see *Wittgenstein, Ludwig*), Quine (see *Quine, Willard van Orman*), and others have pointed out, pointing itself depends on prior understandings: otherwise, how does the recipient know when I point at a flying bird whether I am referring to a particular part, the colour, or the event? The success of pointing would seem to rely on complex assumptions about mutual salience and identification, and on examination ostension is anything but self-explanatory.

2. Frameworks for the Linguistic Description of Deixis

Linguists normally think of deixis as organized around a 'deictic center,' constituted by the speaker and his or her location in space and time at the time of speaking. This is an oversimplification because the identity and location of the addressee are also normally presumed, forming a two-centered system. A further normal assumption is that where linguistic expressions exhibit both deictic and nondeictic uses, the deictic ones are basic, and the nondeictic ones derived (or transposed, as Bühler put it). Thus *here* and *now* normally refer to the place and time of speaking, but in *What should he do here now, Harry wondered?*, the deictic center has been shifted or transposed from the writer to the protagonist, *Harry*.

Further distinctions between kinds of usage of deictic expressions are necessary (Fillmore 1975). A fundamental distinction is between gestural and nongestural usages: *this*

finger requires a demonstration indicating which finger is being referred to, *this afternoon* requires no such gestural demonstration. Many expressions that would normally be used nongesturally, like *you* or *we*, may be used gesturally to pick out a subset of possible referents (*you, not you*, or *we but not you*). Other expressions, like *here*, are used equally either way (*We like it here in Holland* vs. *Place the chairs here and here*). Yet other expressions that would not normally be deictic in character (e.g., *the man wearing the hat* or *him* in *Look at him!*) can be converted into deictics, as it were, by gestural specification. Many languages have deictic elements that (in their deictic uses) may only be used gesturally, e.g., presentatives like French *voici*, or the English demonstrative pronoun *that* as in *Who is that?* Where gestural specification is required, it raises very interesting problems for semantic theory (Kaplan 1989). When deictic expressions are used nondeictically, one needs to distinguish anaphoric usages (*We saw Macbeth. We enjoyed that.*) from nonanaphoric ones (*Over the weekend, I just did this and that.*).

It then becomes an empirical matter to try to establish the kinds of contextual parameter that are encoded in deictic linguistic expressions in the languages of the world. A number of surveys are available (see Anderson and Keenan 1985; Fillmore 1975; Levinson 1983: ch. 3; Weissenborn and Klein 1982), and the following sections, organized around the primary deictic parameters, summarize some of this work.

2.1 Person Deixis

The traditional grammatical category of person, as reflected, e.g., in pronouns and verb agreements, involves the most basic deictic notions. First person, for example, encodes the participation of the speaker, and temporal and spatial deixis are organized primarily around the location of the speaker at the time of speaking. The traditional paradigm of first, second, and third persons is captured by the two semantic features of speaker inclusion (S) and addressee inclusion (A): first person ($+S$), second person ($+A$), and third person ($-S$, $-A$), which is therefore a residual, nondeictic category. As far as is known all languages have first and second person pronouns (though sometimes, as in Japanese, these may derive from third person titles), but not all have third person pronouns. The traditional notion of 'plural' (likewise 'dual' and so on) as applied to the person system nearly always needs reanalysis (e.g., *We* does not mean more than one speaker); in some pronominal systems 'plural' can be neatly analyzed as augmenting a minimal deictic specification with 'plus one or more additional individuals' (AUG). Thus the distinction between *I* and *We* might be analyzed as ($+S$, $-$AUG), ($+S$, $+$AUG). Many languages distinguish 'inclusive we' from 'exclusive we,' i.e., ($+S$, $+A$) from ($+S$, $-A$, $+$AUG).

More sustained analysis will show that it is necessary to distinguish between various finer-grained kinds of participation in the speech event: e.g., to 'decompose' the role of speaker into source of the message vs. transmitter, and addressee into recipient vs. overhearer, and so on, simply in order to describe grammatical distinctions in various languages (see Levinson 1988).

Many other features are often encoded in person systems, whether in pronominal paradigms or predicate agreements, including gender (e.g., masculine, feminine, neuter, or further classes) and honorific distinctions (which are intrinsically deictic on a separate deictic parameter, see below). In languages with predicate agreement, most sentences will obligatorily carry person deictic specification, ensuring the prominence of this deictic parameter.

2.2 Time Deixis

As mentioned, the deictic center is normally taken to be the speaker's location at the time of the utterance. Hence *now* means some span of time including the moment of utterance, *tomorrow* means that diurnal span succeeding the diurnal (or nocturnal) span including the time of utterance, and one reckons *ten years ago* by counting backwards from the year including the speaking time. In written or recorded uses of language, one may need to distinguish 'coding time' from 'receiving time,' and in particular languages there are often conventions about whether one writes *I am writing this today so you will receive it tomorrow* or something more like *I have written this yesterday so that you receive it today*.

Most languages exhibit a complex interaction between systems of time measurement, e.g., calendrical units, and deictic anchorage through, e.g., demonstratives. In English, units of time measurement may either be fixed by reference to the calendar, or not: thus *I'll do it this week* is ambiguous between guaranteeing achievement within seven days from utterance time, or within the calendar unit beginning on Sunday (or Monday) including utterance time. *This year* means the calendar year including the time of utterance (or in some circumstances the 365 day unit beginning at the time of utterance), but *this November* means the next monthly unit so named (usually, the November of this year), while *this morning* refers to the first half of the diurnal unit including coding time, even if that is in the afternoon (see Fillmore 1975).

But the most pervasive aspect of temporal deixis is 'tense.' The grammatical categories called tenses usually encode a mixture of deictic time distinctions and aspectual distinctions, often hard to distinguish. Analysts tend to set up a series of pure temporal distinctions that roughly correspond to the temporal aspects of natural language tenses, and then note discrepancies. For example, one might gloss the English present tense as specifying that the state or event holds or is occurring during a temporal span including utterance-time; the past as specifying that the relevant span held before utterance-time; the future as specifying that the relevant span succeeds utterance-time; the pluperfect as specifying that the past tense relation held at a point in time preceding utterance-time; and so on. Obviously, such a system fails to capture much English usage (*The summit meeting is tomorrow; I have hereby warned you; John will be eating right now*, etc.), but equally it is clear that there is a deictic temporal element in most of the grammatical distinctions linguists call tenses.

Although tense is an obligatory deictic category for nearly all sentences in English and many other languages, firmly anchoring interpretation to context, it is as well to remember that there are many languages (like Chinese or Malay) that have no tenses.

2.3. Space Deixis

Deictic adverbs like *here* and *there* are perhaps the most direct examples of spatial deixis. As a first approximation,

here denotes a region including the speaker, *there* a distal region more remote from the speaker. This suggests a distinction between proximal and distal regions concentric around the speaker, and indeed as a first approximation the demonstrative pronouns *this* and *that* contrast in the same way. Many languages seem to make a similar three-way distinction (*here, there, yonder*) or even, allegedly in the case of Malagasy adverbs, a seven-way distinction. But caution is in order, as the distal categories are often in fact organized around the addressee or other participants, as in Latin *hic* 'close to speaker,' *iste* 'close to addressee,' *ille* 'remote from both speaker and addressee' (see Anderson and Keenan 1985). Further, careful analysis of actual examples of use shows a much more complex pattern, where, e.g., proximal and distal deictics may be used to refer to things at an equal physical but different social distance (Hanks 1990).

Demonstratives often occur in large paradigms, with distinctions of relative distance from speaker or proximity to addressee crosscut by other deictic distinctions, for example visibility to participants. It is tempting, but incorrect, to assimilate the visibility dimension to spatial deixis: many languages (e.g., North West Coast Native American ones) show a systematic sensitivity to mode of apprehension of referents, and some require obligatory marking of noun phrases for this dimension. Further spatial distinctions found in demonstrative systems (in, for exampls, some Austronesian and Australian languages) include 'upriver/downriver from speaker,' 'above/below speaker,' 'north/south/east/west from speaker,' and so on. Such dimensions import absolute, fixed angles into spatial deixis, contrasting greatly with more familiar systems of relative spatial organization. Finally, it should be noted that there are close diachronic and semantic links between demonstratives and definite articles; some analysts (e.g., Lyons 1977) suggest that English *the*, for example, is simply a demonstrative determiner contrasting with *this* and *that* by being unmarked on the proximal/distal dimension, thereby suggesting a fundamental link between the concept of definiteness and deixis.

Spatial deixis is also frequently encoded in verbal roots or affixes, with a typical basic distinction between 'motion towards speaker' (cf. English *come* in some uses) and 'motion away from speaker' (cf. English *go*). Some languages, like the Mayan ones, have a set of a dozen or so motion verbs, encoding distinctions like 'arrive here' vs. 'arrive there.' Sometimes, the basic distinction is between 'motion towards speaker' vs. 'motion towards addressee' (rather than 'motion away from speaker'), or 'motion towards vs. away from speaker's home base.' English *come* in fact exhibits a complex set of such conditions, as shown by examples like *I'm coming to you* vs. *Come home with me*. Parallel notions are often encoded in adverbial or question particles like (archaic) English *hither, thither, whence?, whither?*

Just as the interpretation of *this year* rests on a complex interaction between calendrical units and deictic anchorage, so the interpretation of *on this side of the table* relies on a complex interaction between deixis and nondeictic spatial descriptions, wherein sides, fronts, backs, insides, etc. are assigned to objects. As frequently noted, *The cat is in front of the truck* is ambiguous between the cat being at the intrinsic front of the truck (as determined by direction of canonical motion), and the cat being between the truck and the speaker. *The cat is in front of the tree* can only have the latter kind of interpretation, because trees are not assigned intrinsic facets in English (as reportedly they are in some cultures). This kind of interpretation is curious because there is no overt deictic element: the tree is assigned a front as if it were an interlocutor facing the speaker. In Hausa, a sentence glossing 'The cat is in front of the tree' would be interpreted to mean the cat is behind the tree, as if the tree was an interlocutor facing away from the speaker. Similarly, English *The cat is to the left of the tree* is taken to have implicit deictic specification (left in the speaker's visual field). These examples point to the fundamentally deictic nature of spatial organization in many languages (but not all: some languages, for example, some Australian ones, have no relative spatial notions like 'left of'/'right of,' employing absolute, cardinal point-like, notions instead).

2.4 Discourse Deixis

In a spoken or written discourse, there is frequently occasion to refer to earlier or forthcoming segments of the discourse (as in *in the previous/next paragraph*, or *Have you heard this joke?*). Since a discourse unfolds in time, it is natural to use temporal deictic terms (like *next*) to indicate the relation of the referred-to segment to the temporal location of the present utterance in the discourse. But spatial terms are also often employed, as in *in this chapter*.

Reference to parts of a discourse which can only be interpreted by knowing where the current coding or receiving point is, are clearly deictic in character. Less clear is the status of anaphora in general, wherein extratextual entities are referred to, but often through a device (as in the legal use of *the afore-mentioned party*) which likewise relies on knowing where one is in a discourse. Analysts tend to make a practical distinction between anaphora (taken to be non-deictic) and textual deixis, while noting that the phenomena grade into one another, and in any case that anaphora is ultimately perhaps deictic in nature (Lyons 1977). Anaphora is fundamental to much syntactic structure, and once again deixis can be shown to be connected to the heart of linguistic organization (see *Anaphora*).

2.5 Social Deixis

Honorifics (see *Honorifics*) are frequently encountered in the languages of the world, drawing on recurrent metaphors of plurality, height, distance, and so on (see Brown and Levinson 1987 for references). They are often thought of as an aspect of person deixis, but although organized around the deictic center like space and time deixis, honorifics involve a separate dimension of social deixis. Honorifics encode the speaker's social relationship to another party, frequently but not always the addressee, on a dimension of rank. There are two main kinds: referent honorifics, where the honored party is referred to, and nonreferent addressee honorifics, where respect is signaled without referring to the addressee. The familiar pronouns of respect, like French *vous* to a singular addressee, are referent honorifics (which happen to refer to the addressee). But in Korean, Japanese, Javanese, and many other languages it is also possible to describe any situation (e.g., the meal is ready) and signal a particular degree of respect to the

addressee by a choice between alternate lexical and grammatical items. In such languages, it is difficult to say almost anything without encoding the relative status of speaker to addressee, and no treatment of the lexicon is complete without such specifications. The so-called 'speech levels' of the southeast Asian languages are usually customary collocations of both referent and addressee honorifics, forming locally recognized degrees of politeness (see, for example, Errington 1988 on Javanese).

There are other aspects of social deixis, for example, similar linguistic devices may be used to encode specific kinship relations, as in some Australian languages, rather than disparities in social rank. Perhaps all languages have distinguishable formality levels or genres that serve in a Peircean sense to index the social gravity of the context of utterance; but some languages have discrete, grammaticalized levels of this kind, for example the diglossic levels of Tamil encoded especially in distinct morphology.

There are many sociological aspects of other deictic dimensions, e.g., whether to describe some space as 'here' vs. 'there' may depend on whether one thinks of it as near 'us' or near 'them,' this being sociologically defined (for an exemplary study, see Hanks 1990).

3. Conclusions

Some languages require all (or nearly all) sentences to be tensed; others require all noun phrases to be marked with spatially deictic information; and others require a specification of honorific level. As a result, most sentences in most natural languages are deictically anchored, that is, they contain linguistic expressions with inbuilt contextual parameters whose interpretation is relative to the context of utterance.

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S. Levinson

Delattre, Pierre (1903–69)

Pierre Delattre was born in 1903, the thirteenth child of a Huguenot minister. He achieved international prominence in the field of experimental phonetics and French linguistics, and was recognized by numerous honors including designation as Fellow of the Acoustical Society of America, and the award of the title of Chevalier de la Légion d'Honneur, given by the French government.

An emigrant to the USA, Delattre enrolled at the University of Michigan, taught French at Wayne State University, and studied at the Institut de Phonétique of the Sorbonne. In 1941 he joined the faculty of the University of Oklahoma, and in 1944 launched a well-known experimental French course which applied some of the procedures of the 'Army Language School Method.' In 1947, he joined the University of Pennsylvania, which placed him in propinquity to acousticians at MIT, Bell Telephone Laboratories, and Haskins Laboratories.

Delattre began his career in articulatory French phonetics with a strong commitment to developing practical applications for teaching French to American speakers. Following the publication of *La durée des voyelles en français: Etude expérimentale sur la durée des E d'un Français* (1939), he published more than 40 articles on various aspects of French articulatory phonetics and pedagogical application.

Delattre's approach to remedial phonetics was heavily influenced by the early articulatory phoneticians: Rousselot (see *Rousselot, Pierre Jean, Abbé*), Passy (see *Passy, Paul Edouard*), and Jones (see *Jones, Daniel*). It was not until relatively late, in his work *Comparing the Phonetic Features of English, French, German and Spanish,* that he worked explicitly with the notion of the phoneme. Rather than claiming to predict very specific points of phonological interference by comparing the phonemic inventories of the native and target language, Delattre held that the inaccurate pronunciation of the target language stemmed mainly from transfer of the native articulatory set. For him, pronunciation is directly linked to articulatory motions rather than abstract linguistic units, and is thus compatible with a weak version of linguistic interference theory anchored in physiology. An articulatory set subsumes a variety of target language features, so the remedial phonetician needs to