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Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology

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Religion, Identity, Postsocialism

The Halle Focus Group 2003 - 2010

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Edited by Chris Hann

Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology
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CONTENTS

Preface

Religion was the main theme of the sixth conference of the European Association of Social Anthropologists, which was convened in Kraków in July 2000. There was general agreement among participants that, a decade after the collapse of Soviet socialism, far too little was known about how religious beliefs and practices had persisted through decades of repression, and what role faith communities of many kinds were playing in postsocialist societies. This is a field in which the quantitative data collected by other social scientists can be usefully supplemented with the qualitative data which result from long-term fieldwork, the hallmark of modern socio-cultural anthropology. Even in Kraków, the city where Karol Wojtyła served as Bishop, Archbishop and Cardinal for so many years before he was elevated to the papacy, the deeper significance of religion in changing socio-political conditions might be more complex than journalistic stereotypes of a monolithic Polish Catholicism allowed for.

The Max Planck Institute (MPI) for Social Anthropology is uniquely equipped to respond to such a research need by organizing comparative team projects. In this case, as with my Department's first Focus Group, which investigated rural property relations, the common baseline was provided by socialism. As with the projects on property, behind ideological uniformity, actual relations between socialism and religion were very different. The paths followed in the 1990s also diverged in interesting ways. On this occasion, we decided to pursue comparisons primarily within regional clusters, leaving open the possibility of comparing and contrasting these clusters within a wider Eurasian framework.

The first cohort of Focus Group members joined the MPI in early 2003. Their main themes addressed the new position of religion in the public sphere. Under the rubric "Religion and Civil Society", we sought to engage not only with the new landscape of Non-Governmental Organizations, but also with older referents of civil society and everyday understandings of civility and tolerance. The scholars of this first phase worked in two regional clusters, Central Asia and East-Central Europe.

In the second phase, between 2006 and 2009, we shifted the emphasis away from politics and the public sphere towards norms, values and the new meanings of religion for individuals in the changed social conditions. Under the heading "Religion and Morality", the researchers of this second cohort worked in three regions: Eastern Germany, European Russia and South-East Asia. There was constant interaction between members of the various clusters and much continuity between the two phases. Indeed, the groundwork for the focus on morality was to a large extent established by two of the post-doctoral members of the first cohort. In effect they formed a single intellectual community. For the purposes of this final report, I have therefore combined them under a new title: the term 'identity' is broad enough to encompass all these

projects, from those who concentrated on collectivities at national and supranational levels to those more interested in continuity and change at the level of local communities, families and 'selfhood'.

In addition to these five clusters (most of which included Associated Projects by colleagues not holding a full-time position or scholarship from the MPI), four researchers investigating contemporary Catholicism in Lithuania and Poland have been funded separately by the Volkswagen Foundation. Strictly speaking, they are not members of this Focus Group and their projects are still running as this publication goes to press in January 2010. However, given the similarity of their themes, we have decided to include provisional reports on this research in this booklet, thus constituting a sixth regional cluster.

This final report draws on materials already published on the homepage of the MPI and in our biannual reports. However, the bulk of what follows is made up of newly commissioned individual reports by the thirty-one scholars involved, most of them now widely scattered outside Germany. I thank them for their continued commitment to this initiative, their cooperation in producing this report and their helpful comments on my introductory materials (for which, of course, I alone take the final responsibility).

It seemed sensible to group the individual reports in their regional clusters; within each region, the order is alphabetical. A full record of the workshops and conferences organized by this Focus Group precedes the unified bibliography.

It remains for me to thank numerous external research partners and guests who have contributed to the activities of this Focus Group over the last seven years. It is impossible to name them all but we are particularly indebted to Alexander Agadjanian, Ingeborg Baldauf, Glenn Bowman, Melissa L. Caldwell, José Casanova, Vytis Čiubrinskas, Hermann Goltz, Paweł Jessa, Roger Just, Grażyna Kubica-Heller, Anke von Kügelgen, Wolfgang Levermann, Marcin Lubaś, Sonja Luehrmann, Zdzisław Mach, Paul Robert Magocsi, Vasilios Makrides, David Martin, Jacek Nowak, Jürgen Paul, Detlef Pollack, Aleksander Posern-Zieliński, Kathy Rousselet, Stanisław Stępień, Galia Valtchinova and Monika Wohlrab-Sahr.

Finally, thanks also to our copy editor Elisabeth Arweck; to Bettina Mann, whose interest and support for these projects have gone far beyond her duties as MPI research coordinator; and to Berit Westwood and Katharina Wiechmann, who have shared with me the bulk of the work in preparing this report for publication

Chris Hann
6 January, 2010

I INTRODUCTION

Broken Chains and Moral Lazarets: the politicization, juridification and commodification of religion after socialism[1]

Chris Hann

In 2003, I introduced our new projects on "Religion and Civil Society" with the following portentous paragraphs on the Institute's webpage:

> What is the significance of religion in human societies? How does it change in modern conditions, i.e. with more complex divisions of labour and representative forms of government? The former question has traditionally been the preserve of philosophers and theologians. The latter has been a central theme for the social sciences since their inception, from Jean-Jacques Rousseau's outline of a "civil religion" in the eighteenth century to Thomas Luckmann's notion of "invisible religion" two centuries later. Contrary to the dominant trends in social science theorizing, epitomized in the concept of secularization, scholars have in recent decades been obliged to recognize that religion has remained a force in the public sphere; in the countries that concern us, it has returned to public prominence after many generations of being confined to the private sphere and, in extreme cases, abolished altogether.
>
> Anthropologists have contributed to the scholarly literature in a variety of ways. First, they have asked searching questions about the very definition of religion. It turns out to be very hard to pin down criteria with universal validity. Some anthropologists favour a looser understanding, perhaps still using the Durkheimian opposition between sacred and profane, but prepared to allow non-supernatural persons and things to enter the category of the sacred. This move may allow the identification of "secular religions", a frame of analysis that is potentially useful in dealing both with modern nationalisms and with the various forms of socialist ideology.[2]

[1] This is an introductory overview of the projects of our Focus Group, not an academic paper. The bibliography lists only a few of the authors with whom we have engaged. Most references are to the work of Group members — either to specific items listed in the Publications section at the end of this report or, where no date is supplied, to an individual project report in Part II below.

[2] This electronic text (with plentiful illustrations from a well-known Polish pilgrimage site and elsewhere) drew on my plenary lecture at the Conference of the European Association of Social Anthropologists in 2000 in Kraków (Hann 2000a). Together with more details of our regional clusters and preliminary formulations of the individual projects, it can now be accessed in the MPI archive: http://www.eth.mpg.de/links/d2_religion.html

In this initial charter for the Focus Group, I went on to elaborate some of the particular difficulties facing students of religion in postsocialist conditions, but also the potential rewards, not only for various branches of academic theorizing, but also from the point of view of a better understanding of real world problems, including the increased existential insecurity and intolerance prevalent in many postsocialist societies. It would be rash to claim that our projects have resolved all of the issues that I raised in that opening statement—or even any single one of them. Both the general literature (e.g. on secularization and modernity) and the literature addressing problems of postsocialist transition have continued to expand. All of our researchers undertook fresh fieldwork, the results of which they analyzed at the MPI in conversations with each other, but also with scholars such as Talal Asad, Hans Joas, Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor, who have all published relevant work during these years. We have not converged to formulate new paradigms at the end of these projects. Rather, I see a number of strands recurring in our various clusters. I shall outline these briefly in this introduction, drawing attention to the limitations of central concepts of Western social theory for grasping the historical experience of socialism in Eurasia. The individual reports which follow in Part II provide evidence for my generalizations as well as insight into the work undertaken by this Focus Group at the micro-level.

METHODS

All our projects have been based on ethnographic fieldwork. Except where stated in the individual reports, this meant twelve months or more in the field. In most cases, this was a foreign country where the researcher was not using her native language. This is normal in socio-cultural anthropology. Less common is the stress we put at the MPI on teamwork, which allows us to pursue many types of comparison without sacrificing ethnographic depth (as happens all too often with projects based on 'multi-sited ethnography'). For example, our Volkswagen Foundation project (see Lithuania-Poland cluster, below) examines the same world religion in two neighbouring countries where that religion has experienced diverging histories over the last two centuries. Two members of this group are working in villages and two in cities. They seek theoretical inspiration from common sources (notably Gramsci and Bourdieu). Admittedly, this project is exceptional in the rigour of its *a priori* design. Our other teams were assembled on the basis of individual project applications, following advertisements which specified only rather broad themes and regions. Here are some examples of the kind of comparisons which emerged in the other clusters:

- different field sites and sub-themes within a country endowed with a dominant religion (e.g. the European Russia cluster)
- different religious traditions within a single country (e.g. the projects of Roszko and Vargyas in Vietnam)

- regional (sub-state) variations within a dominant religious tradition (e.g. the projects of Hilgers, Kehl-Bodrogi and Rasanayagam in Uzbekistan)
- different religious traditions as they interact in a single rural locality (e.g. Fosztó in Tranyslvania) or metropolis (e.g. Richardson in Ukraine)

The most ambitious comparative venture of this Focus Group was undertaken by members of the East-Central Europe cluster. It was one that I had been keen to launch for many years—indeed ever since I first came into contact with Greek Catholics in Poland in 1979. These Churches acknowledge papal authority, but have retained the 'practical religion' of the Byzantine rite. They thus occupy a distinctive position between Eastern and Western Christianity. Nowadays, like Catholics of the Latin rite, the Greek Catholics of Central Europe are organized in accordance with secular political boundaries. They were repressed under socialism, with the exception of Hungary, so their revival after 1990 is evidence for the tenacity of religious identity. In Hungary, elites have recently been trying to 're-orientalize' the church, i.e. free it of some of the Latin accretions it has acquired over the centuries, to which ordinary parishioners may be deeply attached (Mahieu). This tension is found elsewhere, but in Poland the political context is quite different. Whereas in Hungary, Greek Catholics of East Slav origin have long assimilated into Magyar society, in Poland their close kin have become identified with Ukrainian nationalist sentiment. Following the demise of socialism, in Poland, the newly legalized Greek Catholics face more competition (compared to Hungary) from the Orthodox Church as suppliers of 'Eastern' spirituality to a population where Roman Catholicism is dominant (Buzalka). In Romania and Ukraine (Naumescu) their position is different again, since in these countries, Orthodox Churches are dominant. Thus the Greek Catholics are everywhere a minority, but their profile (both religious and secular) varies with the local context. To understand this diversity it is necessary to pursue the comparative analysis deep into earlier centuries—above all, into the contrasting ethnonational policies of the two halves of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Mahieu and Naumescu 2008).

The results of these investigations are of more than parochial interest, since the Greek Catholic Churches raise more general issues concerning the transmission of religious ideas and the persistence of 'deep' boundaries. Samuel Huntington (1996) classified Greek Catholics with the West, on the grounds that some four centuries of political affiliation to Rome and polities dominated by Western Christianity were sufficient to detach them from the civilization of Eastern Christianity. I prefer to approach Greek Catholics as an interstitial group, which reveals the crudity of Huntingtonian civilizational analysis (Hann 2000b, 2003a, 2006b). For our Focus Group, they have served as a bridgehead to a more general engagement with Eastern Christianity (Hann and Goltz 2010b).

So far I have emphasized fieldwork and comparison. But it will be quickly obvious to readers that, setting aside the Volkswagen Foundation project, these comparisons have not been driven by a single theoretical agenda—not even the projects on Greek Catholics. At no point did I as Director attempt to formulate an elegant original hypothesis for all the fieldworkers to test. In a few cases I was able to persuade applicants to make modifications to their proposals: for example, to carry out the research in an alternative location from that which they had planned, in order to optimize the teamwork of a cluster. However, readers who might expect more rigorous and systematic comparisons from an Institute which carries the name of Max Planck should bear in mind a number of factors which distinguish research in socio-cultural anthropology from work in other social sciences, let alone the natural sciences. Our 'laboratory' is a fieldwork setting where conditions can seldom be reliably predicted in advance. No matter how precisely harmonized the proposals we prepare in Halle in advance of fieldwork, implementation will always be subject to innumerable contingencies. But the more important point concerns the demands of ethnographic fieldwork on the researcher, which are often extreme. For this reason it is essential to respect the integrity of the researcher and her/his original proposal. One might in theory ask researchers to tear up individual plans and head off to a field site determined by the MPI, in order to test a theory determined by the Director. But given that successful field research depends so heavily on the commitment and enthusiasm of the investigator, who must immerse herself into another community for a year or more, a *dirigiste* model would hardly be productive. In practice, what unfolds is a process of negotiation which continues throughout the researcher's stay at the MPI and beyond. It is of course in the individual researcher's interests to integrate her work as effectively as possible into that of the immediate cluster and of the Focus Group as a whole; but no one is asked to give up the central interests which led them to apply to the MPI in the first place.

FOUR CONCEPTS

I have made rather a meal of explaining our procedures in order to help the reader understand the diversity of theories in the individual reports below. This Focus Group has recruited its members internationally and the intellectual influences they brought with them have enriched our discussions at the MPI. Rather than congealing into a new paradigm, the cumulative outcome of our projects has been to shed sceptical light on over-simplified accounts of 'the revival of religion' and to draw attention to gaps in some influential general theories, which do not adequately address socialism and its aftermath. Let me now illustrate these claims by turning to consider four of the key concepts which have come up again and again in our seminars over the last seven years.

(Civil) Society

Civil society came into vogue in the social sciences in the 1980s, shortly before the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Many found the concept helpful in explaining that collapse and the developments of postsocialism. More than two decades later, the concept is still around. I have commented critically from the beginning (Hann 1990a). It always seemed to me, in the light of my fieldwork in Hungary and Poland, much too simple to account for the revolutions in terms of a mysteriously unified 'civil society' sweeping away a detested 'totalitarian' regime. In the postsocialist years, civil society was increasingly reduced in social science analysis to a limited range of formal associations, particularly NGOs in capital cities. The term was helpful for some academics submitting grant proposals to Western donors, but it gradually lost its wider appeal to intellectuals, at least in the countries which I know best. To those large sections of the population struggling to cope with postsocialist dislocation, the term was an irrelevance. I drew attention to a darker side of civil society, e.g. when extremist groups in Przemyśl, Southeast Poland, took advantage of the new freedom of association of the 1990s to foment hatred towards ethnic and religious minorities (Hann 1997). All in all, normative deployment of the concept of civil society in disciplines such as political science, combined with empirical attempts to measure it by counting up the clubs and associations, seemed to me beside the point in explaining ethnographic realities. In my most extreme formulation of the critique, I concluded that the new civil society was itself the disease to which it claimed to be the cure (Hann 2003b).

But the concept refuses to go away, and we appropriated it shamelessly ourselves when launching this Focus Group in 2003. We might equally have used the term 'public sphere', since the main thrust of the work of that first cohort was to examine the political consequences of the end of socialist restrictions on religious expression. During those projects we discussed notions of 'civil religion' and eventually published a collective volume in which we applied this term in a new way. We took up the everyday meaning of 'civil' and showed how, in various countries of Central Asia and East-Central Europe, postsocialist religious developments were impacting on *civility* and *tolerance* (Hann and the "Civil Religion" Group 2006). It transpired that, in Southeast Poland, the tensions which I had identified in the 1990s had receded in the second postsocialist decade. However, the tolerance recommended by liberal multiculturalists differed radically from the "agrarian tolerance" found in this ethnically and religiously mixed region in presocialist times (Buzalka 2006, 2007). The concept of civil society is now being critically deployed by the Polish members of our Lithuania-Poland cluster. In a rural setting unusual for its religious pluralism, faith-based associations are the principle form of associational life and political organization (Pasieka), while in the suburbs of Kraków, parish-based associations provide their members with a quasi-

familial support network (Sekerdej). The concept has also been applied in accounting for the influence of the Catholic minority in Eastern Germany, both under socialism and after its demise (Huber).

These analyses are complicated by the fact the term civil society has a degree of recognition in Poland and Germany today (which would not be found, if, for example, we had tried to apply it in Taiwan and Vietnam). My point here is to recall that this term originated in the European Enlightenment, when it was used in opposition to religious, ecclesiastical institutions. If we nowadays posit religious communities of all kinds as 'civil society actors' (as the human rights professionals routinely do), then we should at least be aware that this implies a distinctively modern understanding of both religion and civil society. The more general issue is whether adapting concepts with specific histories in European discourses is the best way to further global comparisons. Of course we cannot invent a new language, but perhaps it is advisable in this case to drop the qualifier 'civil' and declare simply that virtually all of our projects have shared a basic concern with the connections between religion and society in the distinctive conditions of postsocialism.

(Multiple) Modernities

'Modern' is another term that has cropped up repeatedly in our discussions (as it has already in this text). In this case, the potential risk of ethnocentricity has long been acknowledged. Few would now defend the ideas of 'modernization' that were dominant half a century ago, according to which the 'traditional societies' of the postcolonial era would sooner or later progress in a direction revealed by the path which the North Atlantic states had pioneered. If the terms 'civil society' and 'civil religion' originate with the philosophers of the Enlightenment, the opposition between traditional and modern was sharpened by the pioneers of modern social theory a century or so later, in the wake of the industrial revolution. A great deal of anthropological literature in recent decades has been devoted to qualifying the dichotomy, which has nonetheless proved resilient, even in the recent debates over "multiple modernities" (Eisenstadt 2002). In this literature, it is explicitly conceded that the West has no monopoly on the modern; a less individualistic Japanese variant may be no less authentically modern. But it is not always clear what the units and the common criteria for modernity might be in this perspective. In practice, the unit is often a *civilization* in the manner of Huntington, and the diagnostic turns out to be the familiar differentiation of structural spheres according to the Western prototype (polity, economy, law—and of course religion).

For our Focus Group, the problem has been how to accommodate socialism in such unsatisfactory dichotomies. The Soviet Union and most other socialist states succeeded in a remarkably short period of time in transforming their underdeveloped, agrarian economies into industrial, scientifically advanced planned economies in which the population was concentrated in towns and

cities. Lifestyles were transformed in both rural and urban sectors. Citizens brought up under socialism, even in the last decades when stagnation was evident in many walks of life, could hardly avoid absorbing something of its utopian, quasi-religious ideology (Rajtar). They often understood themselves as supremely modern. This equation of socialism with modernity was paradoxically strengthened in the postsocialist years, particularly for those who lost their jobs as the planned economies disintegrated. Some responded to the failure of socialist modernity by turning to what they perceived to be modern forms of religion. This might mean intensive engagement with religious texts (Rasanayagam), but it could also include the adoption of Islamic clothing, motivated by the orientalized images of a TV soap drama (McBrien). Regardless of how the actors assert claims to be modern, or to have seen modernity slip through their fingers, academics still need to agree on the criteria. It might be held that—in the absence of a market economy, an independent judiciary and religious freedom—the socialist countries remained thoroughly unmodern, right down to their final disintegration. If veiling as an expression of religious identification is tolerated by a state which guarantees religious freedoms through legislation, we might have to conclude that this state is more modern than its socialist predecessor. That is not necessarily how most of its citizens would perceive the change. The real tragedy in Central Asia is that, in key political respects, not much has changed at all. Particularly in Uzbekistan, heavy-handed repression leaves no room for free debate about the role and meanings of Islam in a modern democratic state.

With confusion prevailing both among the actors and among the academic commentators, the concept of modernity remains suspect. Scholars are only just beginning to explore whether Orthodox Christianity might form one of the admissible variants, despite all the negative representations which have multiplied from Adolf von Harnack and Max Weber to Samuel Huntington (Roudometof, Agadjanian and Pankhurst 2005). The bigger issue at stake, which we may need to pursue in future Focus Groups at the MPI, is the status of *socialism as a civilization*.

Morality

The concept of morality has undergone a vigorous revival in anthropology in recent years, to which several MPI researchers have made major contributions (Heintz, Rasanayagam, Zigon). Morality was understood in a holistic way by Émile Durkheim, yet this aspect of his sociology now finds few defenders (see e.g. Rogers 2008: 115–6). Certainly, his analysis of totemic unity among Australian aboriginal groups (Durkheim 1912) is of little help in addressing the kinds of distinctions we have explored in this Focus Group, e.g. between core groups of religious activists and the larger population (Mahieu, Tocheva, Sekerdej). In theory, under socialism there was always a clear gap between state school and mosque or church, and this affected every aspect of how

morality was transmitted. In practice, compromises were forged. Local categories such as "Orthodox atheist" (Ładykowska) or "cultural Muslim" (Hilgers, Pelkmans) suggest that the notion of a Durkheimian totality might not be irrelevant after all. By and large, however, the concept of morality has been purged of macro-sociological content. Instead it has been deployed in novel ways at the level of the individual, e.g. in relation to Muslim "moral reasoning" (Rasanayagam) or "working on the self" in a Russian Orthodox rehabilitation programme for drug addicts (Zigon). Postsocialism has been approached through the lenses of Foucault and Nietzsche rather than those of Durkheim and Mauss. It might be asked to what extent these approaches have been determined by changing academic fashions in the West, rather than by the realities of postsocialist societies.

We might be able to step back and salvage something of the Durkheimian approach if we cease to look for morality exclusively or primarily in religion and remind ourselves of the more general transformation which has taken place across most of Eurasia over the last two or three decades. The basic change, in China and Vietnam as in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, is a shift away from the centralized political economy of socialism to the principle of the market. However widely welcomed this principle may be in terms of its economic efficiency, virtually no one believes that the market alone can ensure *social* cohesion and provide a source of *values*. Its advocates therefore add other principles, such as democratic accountability, civil society, human rights, and of course religious freedom. The ensuing fragmentation, between the secular and the religious, and then between the many brands of religion available in the marketplace, makes it very hard for societies to find a common moral foundation on which to resist and overcome the *anomie* of the market. Socialist aspirations to forge a new, secular, unitary moral order clearly failed. In the wake of this failure, the disorder of the present phase has presented unprecedented short-term opportunities for faith communities of all kinds. But are there signs, beyond all the present confusion, of a new moral order or civil religion, which would encompass the cacophony of faith communities and keep the market in its place? Postsocialist Eurasia today remains a long way from that happy condition, but it were to be realized, it would demonstrate that Durkheim's views on morality and religion were not irrelevant to modern society after all (see Pickering 1984: ch. 26).

Secularization

Like the three concepts I have discussed so far, 'secular' is not a specifically anthropological concept; but this term brings us closer to the main topic of this Focus Group, religion. Classical theories of secularization shared key deficiencies of the modernization paradigm in assuming that religious faith would fade away in other parts of the world, as it had allegedly faded already in the North Atlantic countries. But problems in generalizing the Western

concept have long been recognized (Asad 2003; Joas and Wiegandt 2007). Some Western countries, notably the United States, have managed to implement a variety of secularism in their mode of government, while the society remains highly religious. Even where figures for church attendance indicate a high level of secularization, sociologists have identified the phenomenon of "belief without belonging" (Davie 2003). Other sociologists of religion have shown the continued significance of religion as a "chain of memory", binding citizens into collectivities (Hervieu-Léger 2000). Recent literature on the secular is beginning to explore variation, but Western bias remains strong (e.g. Taylor 2007). Jürgen Habermas (2008) has added the notion of the 'post-secular' to his earlier influential analyses of the postnational and the post-metaphysical; but, like the other scholars I have mentioned here, he pays no attention to the experiences of socialist secularity and to what is happening in the postsocialist countries today.

In some places, models of secularization have indeed been quite crudely exported from the West. Republican Turkey opted to impose a French model of *laïcité* in the 1920s and sustained it for over seven decades with the help of regular military interventions. During this period, the relationship between the religious and the secular was finely balanced: each continuously shaped and constrained the other. Lately, this secularism has evolved into a government of democratically elected 'moderate Islamists', which has upheld the basic demarcation of religion and state, and arguably done more to *modernize* the republic than its nominally more secular predecessors. This Turkish example is closely watched in the Turkic-speaking republics of Central Asia.

Other varieties of secularism, however, e.g. in East Asia, draw more on non-Western roots, quite different from the patterns of European history. Little effort has been expended in studying how older traditions of secularism shaped the socialist experience. Atheism was everywhere propagated as an integral part of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology. However, only in Albania was religion formally abolished. In China, most popular practices were condemned as 'feudal superstition', but some religions were legally recognized and allowed to function, under strict controls. The Communist Party of Chairman Mao cultivated some of the attributes of a religious movement, perhaps more than any other Communist Party. This was harder to achieve where local religious traditions upheld a transcendental God. Nonetheless, in both Christian and Muslim societies socialist power holders enjoyed considerable success in establishing new collective rituals. These were arguably a new form of *political* religion rather than a genuine civil religion (Lane 1981). In certain cases, however, secular power holders were also able to introduce new life-cycle rituals, notably the *Jugendweihe* in Eastern Germany (Peperkamp, Rajtar). To show a religious commitment was detrimental to one's educational and career opportunities, and people therefore ceased attending religious services. But they did not necessarily lose their religion altogether, especially where the rituals of the life cycle retained much of their traditional character

(Hilgers, Stephan). By the same token, statistical data indicating a rise in church or mosque attendance in the postsocialist years may not be conclusive evidence of desecularization. It all depends on how one defines the term (see Norris and Inglehart 2004; Pollack and Olson 2008).

The chief feature of socialist secularization, distinguishing it even from Atatürk's radical secularism in Turkey, was the state's aggressive propagation of scientific atheism. In most socialist countries, these policies seemed to be very successful; the transmission of religion was confined to the domestic sphere (Dragadze 1993). In some places it ceased altogether, notably in large parts of Eastern Germany, where expectations of a major religious revival after the *Wende* were disappointed (Pollack and Pickel 2000). Elsewhere, many people were able to muddle through by making everyday compromises. Even Party members were sometimes able to hold on to their faith (Hilgers) and Christians managed to assert a presence in model industrial connurbations (Huber, Sekerdej). On this interpretation, socialist secularization was at best partial and superficial, and this is the major lesson of postsocialist religious revival. In Poland, where the Roman Catholic Church was the major vehicle of opposition to socialism, it would seem that socialist secularization failed completely. Yet here, too, religion was profoundly conditioned by socialism. If one distinguishes participation in the liturgy and sacraments from private convictions and moral behaviour, then even Poland exhibits many signs of secularity, both during socialism and after it. A sceptic might argue that the revitalization of religion in regions such as Central Asia and Russia, where it had faded from the public sphere, is merely a blip, a correction to the 'premature' dismissal of religion by socialist ideologues, but one which will prove unsustainable in the face of a 'second secularization' of a more conventional character, based on the structural differentiation of society. Anthropologists suspicious of this Eurocentric yardstick must join in these debates by bringing forward their own definitions, questions and evidence. Was the filigree chain of religion that persisted in Western countries destroyed in socialist countries, or was it merely damaged? Two decades after the collapse, why do so many postsocialist citizens resemble the casualties of a Lazaret? What cures are possible, what forms of belief and belonging can be resuscitated here?

POSTSOCIALIST RELIGIOUS IDENTITIES

The concept of identity, fully as problematic as the four discussed above, was added to the name of this Focus Group retrospectively, after fieldwork had been completed, replacing the provisional labels 'civil society' and 'morality'. I distinguish here four levels: that of the person (or self); the local community (typically a parish or *mahalla*); the ethnic community (or nation); and the transnational (or global). These distinctions are inevitably somewhat arbitrary, since these identities feed into each other; some researchers addressed all four levels in their analyses, though most concentrated on just one or two.

Personal Religiosity

Many postsocialist citizens, irrespective of whether they had practised a religion under socialism, embarked in the 1990s on a new 'quest for spirituality'. This was very often linked to the healing of psychological or moral ailments as well as physical cures (Central Asia cluster, Naumescu). Not satisfied with routine ritual participation, they took advantage of the new availability of religious publications and transnational flows of religious knowledge to find out more about the faith into which they had been born, and/or to explore alternatives to it. The intensification of an existing nominal allegiance could have all the force of a conversion, as could 'conversion from atheism'. Members of the Focus Group collected individual conversion narratives and found them to be shaped by a range of factors, from the teachings of *mullahs* to new print and audio media and the aesthetics of television serials (Fosztó, Hilgers, Pelkmans, McBrien). They documented both mundane and more extreme manifestations of faith, including apparitions and exorcism practices (Naumescu). They explored the individualistic, increasingly delocalized character of spirit mediumship (Binder) and showed how Eastern Orthodox theological notions could be reconciled with a modern, neoliberal notion of the self (Zigon). The Eastern Germany cluster drew on a large body of work in *Alltagsgeschichte* when tracing the biographies of religiously committed individuals and modifying the stereotype of Eastern Germany as an overwhelming secular society. Members of this group, working in a context where to be religious at all means to deviate from the mainstream, emphasized the importance of religious socialization (or the lack of it), both at home and at school, for shaping a person's later religious sensibilities and behaviour.

The Local Community

Most researchers of this Focus Group studied the small-scale, 'face-to-face' communities in which they resided. These ranged from fishing villages in Vietnam (Roszko), to an urban *mahalla* in Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan (Stephan); and from a farming community in Transylvania (Fosztó) to a *Kiez* in East Berlin experiencing massive social problems (Becci). In the last of these, the established Churches seemed rather ineffective in the promotion of a community identity, though minority Protestant churches were making their presence felt. The Transylvanian community has recently devised some new, secular rituals ('village days'), but they do not challenge the position of the Reformed Calvinist Church. The revival of the parish as a corporation able to build new churches and provide services to the needy among its members is well documented in projects of the European Russia cluster (Tocheva, Komáromi). In many places, shrines constitute *lieux de mémoire,* providing a focus for local identity as well as opportunities for entrepreneurship in drawing pilgrims from afar (Hilgers, Kehl-Bodrogi, Naumescu, Lauser, Roszko).

Ethnic Group, Nation

As already indicated, religion under socialism was always a highly political matter. The end of socialism led to new forms of politicization, especially where newly independent states sought to consolidate their fragile legitimacy by integrating religion into a nationalist vision of the past (Hilgers, Pelkmans; Hann and Pelkmans 2009). The pattern was by no means restricted to Central Asia.[3] In the Russian Federation, the Russian Orthodox Church benefited from preferential treatment. Many former communists converted to Orthodoxy, leading some critics to allege a return to the monolithic model of Byzantium, in which religious institutions had no autonomy from the state. This critique is badly informed historically, since Russia underwent radical secularization under Peter the Great in the early eighteenth century. Yet the new links between the Orthodox faith and Russian nationality are evident everywhere, from school textbooks (Ładykowska) to xenophobic pamphlets (Komáromi). They impact on private businessmen (Köllner) as well as parish-based associations and local historians (Benovska-Sabkova). But before we interpret this tendency to nationalize the sacred (Bowman 1993) as evidence of 'civilizational difference', we should note the resemblances not only to Muslim Central Asia, but also to Catholic Lithuania (Schröder), Poland (Buzalka, Pasieka), and even Vietnam (Lauser).

On the other hand, cases such as the Greek Catholics show how complex the links between secular and religious identities can become at the ethno-national level. Ukraine, where cities such as Odessa are trying to recover their cosmopolitan past, differs from Russia in the sense that its Eastern Churches have become highly fragmented (Naumescu, Richardson). The universality of the link between ethnicity and faith is most clearly contradicted by the stateless Roma; yet the dominant groups around them in Transylvania confirm the norm of tight links between ethnicity ("culture") and confession (Fosztó).

Transnational Factors

The rapid spread of Pentecostalism in countries such as Romania (Fosztó) and Kyrgyzstan (Pelkmans) would have been unthinkable under socialism. Throughout the postsocialist world, new groups, most of them Protestant, have sought to gain converts. Their strategy has been to deny the link posited by the state to a traditional religion and to insist instead that it is possible to be, say, an Uzbek, without necessarily being a Muslim (Hilgers). Protestant converts have typically encountered many difficulties in their families. Sometimes, however, those who intensify their faith under the influence of Islamists

[3] I first studied it myself in Hungary, where the symbols of Roman Catholicism, the country's largest religious community, became prominent in the public sphere in the last years of socialist rule (Hann 1990b).

from Pakistan or the Middle East are also viewed locally as a political threat or as 'fanatics'. Our projects indicated that, despite the crude insinuations of power holders, the revival of Islam was unrelated to any political threat (Khizrieva, Rasanayagam, Stephan). Whereas the Roman Catholic Church is by definition international, Orthodox Churches are organized on a decentralized basis and, at any rate in recent decades, they have had little engagement in foreign missions. The Romanian Orthodox Church appears not even to recognize the new, foreign influences with which some of its urban members are experimenting (Heintz). Overall it seemed that, in spite of the new information flows and the increased mobility of people as well as ideas, e.g. through international pilgrimages, notably the *hajj*, few postsocialist citizens have developed a strong affiliation to a 'universal' faith which they perceive as detached from their ethno-national identity. Their public sphere, the political and social context that shapes their experience of religion, is still very much that of the nation-state.

THE LEGAL DIMENSION

It was not our intention in these projects to prioritize law or to address the agendas of legal anthropology in any significant way. In terms of state law, the end of socialism brought few changes. Legal recognition of the Greek Catholics was an important exception, leading as it did to new processes of contestation and institutionalization (Buzalka, Naumescu). But none of the newly independent Central Asian republics introduced the *sharia*. Here as elsewhere, postsocialist constitutions proclaimed freedom of conscience and the separation of religion from the state; in other words, they reasserted the conditions people had already enjoyed, at least in theory, under their socialist constitutions. Where changes could be observed 'on the ground' in the 1990s, these had more to do with new implementation practices than with the replacement of 'socialist legality' by substantively new state law.

And yet it gradually became apparent that, in most postsocialist countries, something important had indeed changed in the standing of the law. This hinged critically on internationalization. Human rights professionals generally consider religious freedom to be a basic human right and support the right of foreign missionaries to proselytize (Danchin and Cole 2002). Some of the new states which opened up in this way soon recoiled when it became evident that, in a climate of extreme economic dislocation, aggressive Protestant missionaries were enjoying considerable success (Pelkmans, Fosztó). By the end of the 1990s, both the Russian Federation and Uzbekistan had introduced more restrictive legislation, which privileged 'traditional' churches at the expense of newcomers (Ładykowska, Hilgers). These states have been frequently accused by foreigners of repressing the religious rights of minorities. Yet within both Russia and Uzbekistan, there has been much sympathy for these measures; many citizens view the missionaries even more negatively than the way they

perceive foreign businessmen: as a threat to family stability, and perhaps even to the nation.

Western NGOs have targeted their criticisms at Orthodox and Muslim countries, sometimes implying that Western countries are free of religious discrimination. Yet this is far from being the case. Our projects also covered Germany and Poland, where the dominant churches continue to enjoy a privileged link to the state (buttressed in the Polish case by a Concordat between the state and the Vatican). I know from my own fieldwork in Poland that some members of minority religions, notably the Orthodox, were fearful that the end of socialism would expose them in new ways to the hegemonic Roman Catholic Church. Such fears were shared by fellow Catholics, if they happened to practise the Eastern rite. As in the former Soviet countries, there is wide support in Poland for drawing a basic distinction between 'traditional' (or 'historic') churches and the new intruders. In the case of Poland, this has worked out well enough in practice; new groups such as the Hare Krishnas have no difficulty in obtaining legal recognition. But it is myopic to suppose that judicial regulation can trump political factors in crisis situations. This was abundantly clear in the case of the Greek Catholic cathedral in Przemyśl, Southeast Poland. Due to the *force majeure* of Polish nationalists in the new civil society, and against the express wish of the Pope himself, this building was not handed back to its previous owners when the Greek Catholic Church was finally granted legal recognition (Hann 2001, 2002a).

Numerous other EU member states continue to offer their citizens legal protection against 'sects' of various kinds. There is no consistency in judicial regulation of the religious field. This should be borne in mind by those who rush to condemn the authorities in Moscow for using legal machinery to establish a hierarchy of religions, with the Russian Orthodox Church at the top and communities such as the Jehovah's Witnesses currently banned from operating at all (Knox 2008).

THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION

The discussion in the preceding section implicitly revolved around an economic metaphor: should state law guarantee all actors (the 'faith communities', however defined) equal rights in the religious marketplace? This metaphor has been highly influential in the sociology of religion in recent decades. Drawing on rational choice theory, scholars have analyzed the rise and fall of different religious 'products', as if they were goods in a marketplace. The collapse of Soviet socialism opened up vast new possibilities for transnational religious entrepreneurs, and so it is not surprising that the market model has been especially popular in this region. Mathijs Pelkmans has analyzed the inadequacies of this literature, particularly its implications of 'symmetry' between the competing actors (2006b).

But to reject the market model as a norm and as an adequate tool for explaining empirical trends does not mean that we should exclude economic factors from our analysis. Pelkmans himself has shown that conversion to Pentecostalism in the town he studied in Kyrgyzstan was clearly related to economic decline (2009b). Fosztó illuminates a complex mix of economic and social factors inducing Roma to convert to Pentecostalism in the village which he studied in Transylvania (2009). Economic dislocation in the aftermath of socialism has evidently been a significant factor in the renewed importance that people attach to religion; but this link is too complex to be reduced to a rational choice framework.

Of course religion itself, whatever else it might be, always has an economic dimension. This comes across conspicuously in South-East Asian spirit mediumship (Binder), but anticlerical allegations of material greed unbecoming of a specialist in spirituality are also noted in Catholic Lithuania and Poland (Pranaitytė, Pasieka). The problem is evident on a larger scale in several of the projects concerning the Russian Orthodox Church (Köllner, Tocheva). This church is widely criticized for failing to match up to new foreign rivals in the provision of welfare services to the needy. Yet when the church seeks to raise the wherewithal it needs to finance its activities, it is promptly condemned for its involvement in the affairs of this world. Instead of commodifying religion, it is expected to concentrate on the spiritual. While the tension between embracing the world and renouncing it is inherent to all the world religions, the difficulty for the ROC is that for seven decades it was severely limited by the secular authorities in both the pastoral 'service' domain (primarily associated with parishes) and in the domain of ascetic contemplation (primarily associated with monasteries). It may take some time yet before a new equilibrium is found between these "modes of moral action" (Kenworthy 2008). This elusive equilibrium would allow the ROC to function as a major economic institution in much the same invisible way that the Church of England does, without having to worry about public scrutiny every time a priest buys a car or takes a foreign holiday.

CONCLUSION

The projects of this Focus Group have continued the path opened up by our first Focus Group, which distinguished three macro-regions in the unravelling of rural property relations which followed the abandonment of collective farming (Hann and the "Property Relations" Group 2003). It is more difficult to identify such boundaries in the case of religion. Eastern Germany and European Russia have very different religious traditions, yet socialist secularization had similar far-reaching effects on both. Their postsocialist paths have again diverged. If the nationalization of the sacred has become a prominent trend in Russia, this is also conspicuous in Central Asia and by no means a peculiarity of Orthodox civilization. The Roman Catholic Church was a

highly successful opponent of Marxist-Leninist ideology in Poland, but rather ineffectual in Lithuania and other states of the region. Secular appropriation (or co-optation) of older religious traditions can be observed in all of these Christian and Muslim cases. Yet similar forms of appropriation can be found in the South-East Asian cases, where regimes which claim still to be socialist have increasingly looked to integrate religious 'heritage' in their strategies to forge national unity. Perhaps it is easier to accomplish this integration in the absence of Abrahamic transcendence. If we had been able to extend our projects to China, it would have been interesting to compare the strategies of the authorities in regions with contrasting religious traditions (Islamic, Buddhist, and other, less institutionalized forms). But the overall picture is confusing: different religious and civilizational histories have interacted with socialist ideals and practices in complex ways; the outcomes defy easy generalization.

Is this all we can say? Perhaps the notion of transcendence can be pushed speculatively further. At least since Nietzsche's declaration that God was dead, Europeans have been struggling to locate new foundations for ultimate values. Catholic and Protestant churches are still significant social actors but they cannot hope to recapture their former authority in the multicultural states of today's European Union. The impossibility of transcendence appears to be a condition of modernity, at any rate the pluralist modernity of Western Europe.

By contrast, in Eastern Europe and other regions of Eurasia, Marxist-Leninist socialism replaced one transcendental principle with another. It proclaimed a secular, materialist vision of salvation on this earth. For some, this substitution always remained fraudulent. But many socialist citizens came to internalize the values and future-oriented worldview that were foisted upon them. The strength of their belief in secular progress owed much to the break-neck speed of industrialization and urbanization, which were accomplished without the periodic crises that punctuated capitalist development in the West. By this yardstick, it was the certainty of this teleology which kept these societies non-modern mentally, for all their impressive material accomplishments. Little wonder, then, that the disintegration of this utopia created far more disorientation among greater numbers of people than other political revolutions, or the deepest recession of a capitalist business cycle. While most Western Europeans have been learning to come to terms with the immanence of capitalism for some two centuries, two decades after crossing the Rubicon Eastern Europeans are still understandably bereft of transcendence.

This is the context in which fragile governments have been doing their best to promote a combination of the old religion and a new secular faith oriented towards the nation. The resurrection of the former God, prematurely pronounced dead under socialism, places non-Western churches in a situation that is very different from those faced by churches in the Western religious field. But is such a resurrection possible? The long-term political implications of this attempt to establish a dual transcendent, both religious and secular, are far

from clear. The implications for the study of morality in everyday life are just as murky. One possibility, noted above, is that the Nietzschean postsocialist moment could evolve into a Durkheimian moment on a global scale, driven by revulsion from the values of the disembedded market. Only one thing is certain: no enquiries into the social shaping of religion, values and ethical judgements can afford to ignore what ethnographers have uncovered about socialist and postsocialist experiments in the recent history of Eurasia.

This brings me to our larger agenda at the MPI, which is to contribute to comparative analysis in socio-cultural anthropology and the human sciences more generally. While the modern social sciences whose names derive from the Greek *polis* and *oikonomia* can shed light on *religio* and *identitas*, the full complexity of religious identity tends to elude academic specification. There is more at stake here. The help of a gamut of philosophers and theologians is still not enough. The enduring contribution of the anthropologist, whatever further theoretical agenda she/he may have, is to warn against insidious bias through the very terms we use, including all the Latin-derived concepts I have discussed above. We should be aware that the dichotomy between immanance and transcendence, which I have used in a speculative way in closing this discussion, is itself a product of the European imagination. It may not be very helpful in understanding distinctive features of Eastern Christianity and Central Asian Islam, nor in grasping epochal changes in the basis of morality.

Perhaps we should be sceptical about the very possibility of such epochal schisms. Be that as it may, recent scholarly work on Christianity and secularism has been largely restricted to the Western genealogies and dependent on Western vocabulary. There are comparable biases in the study of Islam. If Central Asia is mentioned at all in synthetic accounts, it is likely to be in the form of an awkward appendix. The failure to integrate socialism into theories of modernity and secularization has thus been accentuated by neglect of the most important religious influences in socialist Eurasia. Academic models of socialism focus on the absence of market economy and multi-party political competition, but they seldom probe deeper into the interaction of religions and civilizations with varieties of socialism, or the ways in which socialism itself came to resemble a religion or a civilization. This is the space we have been seeking to fill.

There has been talk in recent years of "provincializing Europe" (Chakrabarti 2000). So far, however, this has largely taken the form of a dialogue between North Atlantic and South Asian scholars about 'difference'. It is time to provincialize that particular dialogue in postcolonial studies and open up wider comparisons. As far as religion is concerned, socialist and postsocialist Eurasia pose an exceptional challenge; this Focus Group has not exhausted their interest.

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II REGIONAL CLUSTERS

CENTRAL ASIA

The projects of this cluster were concentrated in former Soviet republics and addressed populations which have been overwhelmingly Muslim for many centuries. The regime of President Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan (Hilgers, Kehl-Bodrogi, Rasanayagam) is widely recognized as repressive, while Kyrgyzstan (McBrien, Pelkmans) is classified as one of the most open and liberal of the post-Soviet republics. This contrast is reflected in religious policies: whereas Uzbekistan has made life difficult not only for new religions, but also for forms of Islam diverging from that endorsed by the President, Kyrgyzstan has been significantly more tolerant of 'missionary encounters' (Pelkmans). Associated Projects extended this cluster's coverage to Tajikistan and the North Caucasus (Stephan and Khizrieva, respectively). We were also able to support doctoral research by Paweł Jessa (Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań) in Kazakstan. Short visits to Turkmenistan by Kehl-Bodrogi and Pelkmans allowed us to include this case in certain limited comparisons (Kehl-Bodrogi 2006c; Hann and Pelkmans 2009).

All the projects addressed the return of religion to the public sphere after years of 'scientific atheism' throughout the region. Both repressive and liberal regimes have drawn on Islam in the construction and legitimation of new nation-states. There is a widespread sense of disorder and decline from a Soviet model of modernity that looks increasingly attractive in retrospect. The secularized norms of 'cultural Islam', which evolved in the Soviet decades, have not lost their appeal, though some are now actively seeking new ways to be modern (Hilgers, McBrien, Stephan). There is considerable diversity within countries. Religion in Khorezm, at the western extremity of Uzbekistan, is pervasive in everyday life, but lacks political salience (Kehl-Bodrogi). At the other end of the country, the authorities in the Ferghana valley stifle political opposition by whipping up fears of 'Wahhabi' extremism (Hilgers, Rasanayagam). Nationalizing pressures accentuate the difficulties for those who convert to Christianity (Hilgers, Pelkmans). At the same time, the influence of transnational forces in shaping opinions about what it means to be a Muslim is evident throughout the region, e.g. "newly pious" women in the Kyrgyzstan section of the Ferghana valley are viewed as a threat by others in their small town (McBrien). Postsocialist freedoms have also enabled a revival of popular religion, above all locally specific practices of shrine visitation (Hilgers, Kehl-Bodrogi, Khizrieva). The secular authorities have tended to be more tolerant of practices which are not perceived to pose any political threat, especially if they can be instrumentalized to serve the national identity.

Between the competing tugs of the national, the transnational and the local community, these projects have shown that all diagnoses of transformation need to be qualified and supplemented with more complex analyses of 'partial continuities' in changed contexts (McBrien, Pelkmans, Stephan) and 'recycling' (Khizrieva). In more intimate contexts, researchers have explored how individuals struggled to find new meanings (Hilgers), turned to 'superstitious acts' for healing (Kehl-Bodrogi, Rasanayagam), subjectively expressed Muslim selfhood through their moral reasoning (Rasanayagam) and transmitted moral concepts of respect to the next generation (Stephan).

Religious Identities in the Ferghana Valley

Irene Hilgers

Irene Hilgers was a PhD student at the MPI from 2003, having previously studied Anthropology at the Universities of Bonn and Cologne. She died unexpectedly in February 2008, just before completing her dissertation. The draft has been revised for publication by Chris Hann, who is also responsible for the following report.

Uzbekistan has the largest population among the ex-Soviet republics of Central Asia. And it contains much of the region's celebrated Islamic heritage. Although less famous than Bukhara or Samarkand, Kokand is a city with a long history of Islamic learning, located in a region (the Ferghana valley) with a reputation for religious conservatism and political volatility. After an initial stay in the capital Tashkent to familiarize herself with developments at the national level, Irene Hilgers selected Kokand as her principal field site and lived there for the best part of a year (2003–4). She read widely on the presocialist and socialist history of the city, and drew on life histories to grasp fluctuations in policies toward religion. Religion was banned from schools and the public sphere, many religious institutions were closed down and knowledge of Islam declined. However, the mechanisms set up by the state to control religion generally allowed for some continuity at the level of the local community: even in urban contexts, some Uzbeks were able to embrace Soviet ideals of modernity without abandoning their faith.

A healer at work in front of the mausoleum of Bibi Ubayda, Kokand.

The main focus of this project was on the tight relationship between being Uzbek and being Muslim in postsocialist conditions. After independence in 1991, Uzbekistan adopted a constitution which separated religion from the state and declared that all citizens would enjoy freedom of conscience. In practice, however, for its own legitimation purposes, the government, led by Islam Karimov, began to promote Islam as a national religion, i.e. as fundamental to Uzbek ethnic identity and the civilization which this nation had created over many centuries. This political appropriation of Islam as a key component of 'tradition' in the new national ideology involved a considerable reification of the lived religion as it existed in the aftermath of socialism. Of greater immediate concern to the new secular power holders was the threat posed by conservative currents, some allegedly orchestrated from abroad. These 'Islamists' condemned many local practices for their deviation from the sacred sources. In opposition to an artificial national Islam, they urged a return to text-based universalism.

Throughout her project, Irene Hilgers explored the contestation of the "religious field" (a concept taken from Pierre Bourdieu). In doing so, she concentrated on local variants of 'Muslimness' (*Musulmonchilik*) rather than on Islam *per se*, following Maria Louw and particularly Bruce Privratsky who insisted on this distinction in his recent work on Kazakstan. At the same time, Hilgers devoted considerable attention to the impact of transnational forces and to placing the discourses and local action she observed in Kokand in the context of the objectification of Islam worldwide.

In her analyses of the postsocialist religious field, Hilgers identified continuities with the socialist era in the way the secular authorities undermined religious freedom in practice. The nominal pluralism was subverted by a surprising alliance between the state-sponsored Muftiate and the Russian Orthodox Church. Both these established religions supported the government's measures in the late 1990s to tighten legal regulation of new, 'non-traditional' religious movements that threatened their hegemony. Numerous Protestant groupings have nonetheless persevered in their efforts to gain a foothold and refute the widespread assumption that an Uzbek has to be a Muslim, just as a Russian is naturally assumed to be an Orthodox Christian (Hilgers 2007).

In the local public sphere, Hilgers found that officials might diverge from their ideological instructions to acknowledge instead the norms of the local community (Hilgers 2006). Analysis at this level was complemented in this project by detailed explorations of individual 'quests for spirituality'. The cases presented in Hilgers's book (2009) are chosen to exemplify general patterns in the re-negotiation of religious selfhood (cf. Rasanayagam below). They include a 'cultural Muslim' who remains imbued with the values of the Soviet intelligentsia (cf. Pelkmans, below); a former Communist Party member who was privately committed to Islam even in Soviet days and now engages with it more actively; a young man who has intensified his faith in the Islamist direction; and a woman who has become a born-again Christian.

Hilgers's monograph also contains rich ethnographic studies of religion in action. One chapter explores the discourses surrounding an 'Islamic wedding'; it examines who is likely to organize such weddings and why they are often evaluated critically in the community (cf. McBrien, below). Another chapter narrates a day the author spent with a group of female pilgrims at the shrine of a female saint near Kokand. She shows that shrine veneration practices fuse sacred and profane elements into a satisfying unity for the participants, some of whom make innovative use of this 'semi-public' space (cf. Kehl-Bodrogi, below). The gendering of religious space remains an enduring characteristic of Uzbek Islam.

In the final substantive chapter of her book, Hilgers returns to the impact of Western missionaries by investigating a community of Uzbek converts. The often intolerant reactions of other Uzbeks reveal the deeply rooted force of the (imagined) congruence between religious (Islamic) and secular (Uzbek) identities, although Irene Hilgers was also able to document cases where these prejudices were being overcome (cf. Pelkmans, below).



Local Islam in Postsocialist Khorezm (Uzbekistan)

Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi

Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi was born in Budapest. She completed her PhD in Anthropology at the Free University of Berlin in 1986. Before joining the MPI she was Assistant Professor in the Department of Comparative Religion at the University of Bremen. After leaving the Institute she was Visiting Professor at the University of Pécs.

In Uzbekistan, as elsewhere in the former Socialist Republics of Central Asia, the dissolution of the Soviet Union brought about a dramatic increase of interest in Islam. In the first years of independence, which Uzbekistan gained in 1991, the number of mosques increased rapidly and religious attendance grew considerably. Apart from interest in the normative tenets of Islam, popular religious practices also experienced a revival. Throughout the country, dilapidated shrines were renovated or newly constructed and the number of pilgrims visiting them increased enormously. These developments were paralleled by the emergence of Islamic groups propagating a narrow, scripture-based understanding of Islam and striving for the Islamization of the entire society. At the same time, Islam was also incorporated in the national rhetoric of the new Uzbek regime. Within the official discourse, however, Islam is referred to as being part of the cultural and historical heritage of the nation, rather than as a divinely revealed religion with a universal claim. In its efforts to nationalize Islam, the state has discouraged any interpretation of Islam which tolerates practices that are not supported by the sacred textual sources. Startled by the rise of militant Islamic movements in the region since the mid-1990s, the state has adopted an increasingly repressive policy towards religious groups and individuals whose practice and interpretation of Islam are regarded as extremist (cf. Hilgers above, Rasanayagam below).

While currents of political Islam in Uzbekistan have received much scholarly attention, little research has so far been carried out into everyday religiosity in the post-socialist context. Since modes of religiosity can differ greatly from one region to another and even within them, this project focused on the exploration of lived religion in a particular geographical setting: the province of Khorezm in the far west of Uzbekistan.

In Khorezm, the reassertion of Islam after socialism has taken far less spectacular forms than in other parts of the country (especially in the Ferghana Valley, which in post-Soviet times became known as the stronghold of religious 'fundamentalism'; see Hilgers above, Rasanayagam below). Although independence also resulted in an upsurge of interest in religion in Khorezm, by the time my fieldwork began in 2004, Islam had largely retreated from the public sphere and few signs of a religious awakening could be detected in everyday life. Following the new registration law of 1998, most of the newly

erected mosques had been closed, on the grounds that they had failed to meet the minimum membership requirements. To illustrate with an example: while twenty registered mosques operated in the city of Samarkand in 2004, only three were registered in the Khorezmian capital of Urganch, which appeared fully to meet local needs. Khorezm also lacked private schools, which in other parts of the country provide basic religious education for children. The low level of mosque attendance in Khorezm corresponded to a general laxity in religious observance, an attitude which the inhabitants themselves regarded as a typical feature of their province. Most people saw this indifference towards Islamic prescriptions in positive terms, as evidence of a lack of religious fanaticism, particularly in comparison with the religious devotion of their fellow countrymen in other regions. Even if obedience to the formal tenets of Islam has become more pronounced since independence, I found that for most Khorezmians, Muslim identity manifested itself primarily in the observance of rituals connected with life-cycle events and the commemoration of the dead, in much the same way as it had done during the Soviet era.

Two saintly shrines near Shovot (Khorezm, Uzbekistan).

The most visible sign of the return of Islam to the public sphere in post-Soviet Khorezm has been an increase in shrine pilgrimage (*ziyorat*), the main focus of the initial phase of my fieldwork. While the previous regime had severely disapproved of *ziyorat* activities, the current government approves of them and has co-opted holy sites as an important element of its nation-building agenda. For local politicians, visiting shrines and hosting sacrificial meals

there has become a prestigious act through which they seek popularity. My investigations at the major shrines of the region have shown that they can be analyzed as an arena of competing religious and secular discourses. Thus, on the one hand, the new state has promoted shrines and sought to graft its own symbols on to them, thereby staking a claim to have a say in the interpretation of the holy sites and, by extension, of Islam as a whole. On the other hand, the learned experts of the faith have opposed the view that local religious traditions, as displayed by the pilgrims, are part of Islam (Kehl-Bodrogi 2006b).

The realm of domestic rituals, which has also been affected by post-Soviet developments, was the main focus of research in the second fieldwork period in 2005. Feasts held on the occasion of life-cycle events have traditionally provided opportunities for maintaining and reinforcing social relations of mutual obligation and for affirming the host's social status. With the improvement in living standards from the 1960s onwards, life-cycle rituals were transformed into occasions for conspicuous consumption. While most people had been able to keep up with the general standard before, the growing economic disparities that followed independence widened the gap between 'losers' and 'winners' of post-Soviet developments, which became increasingly evident in the way people celebrated life-cycle events. In independent Uzbekistan, both the state and the religious authorities sought to curb *to'y*s (feasts held on the occasions of circumcision and marriage) and *maraka*s (commemoration rituals held several times during the first year following a death). In 2002, fearing the negative effects of excessive displays of wealth at a time when a large part of the population was experiencing economic degradation, the Uzbek regime banned extensive entertainment on the occasion of life-cycle rituals, on the grounds that this was socially harmful and undermined national values. The advocates of 'real' Islam, on the other hand, attacked life-cycle celebrations, because they involved alcohol, music and the mixing of the sexes. They also called for the abandonment of the institution of the *maraka*, arguing that Islam allowed only a three-day period of mourning and condemned ostentatious expressions of grief, such as the ritual weeping of women, a crucial element of such occasions. This project explored the ways in which life-cycle rituals were maintained and reformulated, given the constraints of state regulations, religious reformism and the demands of tradition.

Another aspect of everyday religious life investigated in this project was religious healing. During the Soviet period, 'Western' biomedicine was the only officially recognized and tolerated form of health care. Indigenous healing practices were condemned as backward and dangerous. Although such practices did not completely die out, religiously inspired traditional healing appears to have become a rather marginal phenomenon. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, however, religious healing, too, experienced a revival. Those who called on the services of such healers came from all social strata and educational backgrounds. What promoted the post-Soviet proliferation of religious healing was not only the fact that secular ideologies had lost credi-

bility, but also the disastrous state of the biomedical sector in the post-Soviet era. I looked at different categories of religious healers and their therapeutic rituals, and explored their modes of legitimacy. The narratives of healers and the ways their clients perceived their activities showed that, although the persuasiveness of religious healing largely rested on the authority of the traditions, the current upsurge was not a straightforward revitalization of pre-Soviet indigenous healing practices and their underlying ideas. Rather, religious healing in Khorezm evidently involved the reconstruction of traditions that were capable of incorporating new methods and meanings.

As elsewhere in Central Asia, people in Khorezm were faced with tensions between the local heritage, the Soviet legacy, the new state ideology and the pull of a religious modernism that was informed by diverse external and internal influences, which also manifested themselves in people's everyday behaviour. Opinions varied as to which beliefs were correct and which rituals qualified as superstitious acts. Due to textual sources being more readily available and due also to the activities of Islamic missionaries in the first years of independence, I found that awareness of universalistic alternatives to customary beliefs and practices had grown in recent years. However, the tensions between different interpretations of 'true' Muslim religiosity had not led to outright conflict in the community. What emerged from looking at the different modes of religious behaviour was a picture of temperance and tolerance. This tolerance derived from a general attitude towards religion, reinforced during seven decades of Soviet secularization, which regards religious belief as a matter of personal conscience rather than a public issue. This prevailing attitude prevents, at least for the time being, Islamic puritans and religious militants from making major inroads in the region.



Modern *Murid*s: Islamic Revival in the North Caucasus

Galina Khizrieva

Galina Khizrieva graduated from the Philological Faculty of Moscow State University and obtained her PhD in 2002 from the Council of Cultural Anthropological Studies. She is now a researcher at the Institute for Cultural Studies and the Institute for Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow. This was an Associated Project of the Central Asia cluster.

The Muslims of Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia traditionally incorporate two main Sufi orders (*turuq*), the Qadiriyya and the Nakshbandiyya-Schazaliyya. Since the first third of the nineteenth century, Sufi Islam has functioned in the region not so much as a syncretic religious form, but as a socio-political entity with its own social, ideological and political structures. The Qadiriyya order is dominant among the Vainakhs of Chechnya, Ingushetia and Georgia, some of the Avars, Botlikh, Akki and Andy peoples of Dagestan and some of the Inghiloys (Azerbaijan). The process of forming the religious structures of the Vainakhs stretched over 150 years. It was marked by complex interactions between different groups of newly Islamized peoples and inter-religious relationships. This process paved the way for the emergence of Sufi brotherhoods, with their unique forms of *sheikh* teaching known as *wird*. Under Communist rule, *sheiks* and *murid*s (adepts) of the brotherhoods were continuously persecuted. The persecution reached its peak in 1944 with the deportation of the Ingush and Chechens from the North Caucasus, which led to the complete destruction of their communities. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, brotherhood structures were revived in Chechnya and Ingushetia. In the early 1990s, they began to acquire political significance in the course of national-religious revitalization, competing with 'non-traditional' Muslim groups.

This project focused on the re-emergence of the Qadiryya brotherhoods and their relations with other Muslim groups in the region and the exploration of the nature of their connections. I made several trips to the Republics of Ingushetia and Chechnya, where I had the opportunity to observe the rituals of *Qadiriia murid*s and interview members of their communities. I conducted fieldwork both in the rural foothills of Ingushetia and in the urban communities of Nazran, Karabulak (Ingushetia) and Grozny (Chechnya).

Among the brotherhoods, the transmission of *wird* teachings and ritual practices occurs orally through the collective memory. Adepts believe that the *sheikh* who founded the Qadiriyya *wird* brotherhoods among the Vainakhs, *sheikh* Kunta-Haji Kishiev, is eternally alive, like the prophets Hizr and Isa (Jesus). His modern *murid*s are awaiting his return to the North Caucasus. Modernization of the Vainakhs started in the 1850s when oil extraction began. This led to a reform of the earlier system, although in rural areas, the bounda-

ries of tribal groups and *wird* brotherhoods remained stable and were often congruent. This 'canonical' unity is nowadays to be seen in the architecture of certain *wird* cemeteries where *ziarat* is practised at the tomb of local *sheikh*. Such tombs have been augmented by the building of new mosques.

The Ustaz Hussein Hadji Gardanov wird brotherhood's cemetery in Plievo. Outside the cemetery is a memorial mosque dedicated to sheikh Kunta-Haji Kishiev.

Controversies and politico-religious rivalries dating back to the Czarist period still influence the spiritual traditions of the modern *murid*s. However, such disagreements no longer play a significant political role. The brotherhoods are a marker of religious identity and have no bearing on the Vainakhs' political preferences and mobilization. Many researchers have been interested in the functional relation between the lineage (*taip*) and *wird* in this region. I argue that, while the former remains crucial for the social and biological reproduction of the members of a patronymic group, the *wird* has served the ideological (religious) consolidation of patronymic groups. Inter-*wird* marriages have been possible, albeit with restrictions, whereas inter-*taip* marriages have been a strict requirement, due to the ancient tradition of exogamy among the Vainakh tribes. Thus each Vainakh-Muslim is a member of both a *taip* and a *wird* group; the former is 'responsible' for his 'right' birth and the latter for his 'right' death.

The revival of Islam in the North Caucasus has not been a simple restoration of traditional Islamic forms and structures. Modernization processes and

the infiltration of different ideological concepts (which intertwine both religious and secular aspects) have changed the original scheme. Today, the *Vainakh* society is a more complex entity than simply a composition of religious groups. The networking community of *wird* fraternities is only one of its components. The effects of modernization in this part of the North Caucasus proceeded in parallel to the formation of its Muslim tradition. Modernization has been associated primarily with the extraction of oil, the transportation of which across territories belonging to various ethnic, patronymic and religious groups helped to undermine traditional group structures. In the 1990s, when rural *wird* communities were confronted by militant representatives of *Salafi* Islam, who regarded them as pagans or infidels (*kafirun*), they rejected all attempts at mobilization. They were similarly immune to the overtures of other groups whose core ideology was separatism, although they were far from endorsing all the policies of the federal government.

A private letter of Kunta-Haji's to his murid, Haji Muhammad.

The project has also explored the creative efforts of modern *murid*s to document their history in the North Caucasus. In the course of the research I was able to find numerous manuscripts and letters of Kunta-Haji Kishiev, which were long considered lost. Further details of this archival work and of the scholarly editions of his text can be found in the publications listed in the bibliography.

Muslim Life in a Kyrgyz-Uzbek Town

Julie McBrien

Julie McBrien completed her BA at Biola University in California in 1995 and her MA in Anthropology at the University of Amsterdam in 2003. She joined the MPI in 2003 and defended her PhD thesis in 2008. She is now Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the University of Amsterdam.

This project, based on fourteen months of research in 2003–2004, examined the religious landscape of Bazaar-Korgon, a small Kyrgyzstani town, where the majority of the inhabitants were ethnic Uzbeks. It focused on the role of 'newly pious' Muslims in the (re)construction of the social and political order more than a decade after the end of socialism. In the early post-Soviet period, this segment of Muslims developed several religious institutions (e.g. mosques, *madrasas* and study groups) to promote education and proselytization. Initially, this trend had very little impact on the institutional life of the community as a whole. After 2000, however, the presence of Islam began more substantially to influence the social, and hence political, life of the town. I found that the return of religion to public spaces in Bazaar-Korgon had both positive and negative consequences.

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, it signalled, for many in the West at least, the 'triumph' of democracy. Rather than applauding its demise, Central Asian governments attempted to forestall the dissolution of the Union which had, relatively speaking, made them quite prosperous. Unable to stop the change and confronted with the breakdown of political and economic life, the effects of which included abject poverty for very large portions of the population, most Central Asian governments accepted (although to differing degrees) financial and technological aid directed towards democratization and market reforms. This meant a concomitant spread of Western ideology, including freedom of conscience. In Kyrgyzstan, freedom of conscience, quickly enshrined in the constitution of the new nation-state and embodied in various laws, was one of the easiest and most celebrated steps Kyrgyzstani citizens took on the path towards 'democratization'. Although the anti-religious campaigns of the Soviet period had dramatically altered the religious landscapes of the region, very few inhabitants gave up their affiliation to Islam (but see also Pelkmans, below). The early post-Soviet period showed a sharp increase in religious observance among large portions of the population.

In the late 1990s, freedom of religion remained one of the most popular aspects of post-Soviet change in Kyrgyzstan, even while disappointment with 'democratization' and the 'transition to capitalism' had already become a normal part of everyday life. Eventually, this celebrated freedom, too, was called into question. Following the turn of the millennium, the effects of a slower, more lasting turn towards mainstream Hanafi religious belief and

observance became apparent. Many realized that religion was more than a matter of private conscience. Religious individuals, their sensibilities, discourses, actions and the institutions they formed began to have an impact on the construction of local social and political life. The most obvious signs of this religious expansion were the construction of mosques, increased mosque attendance and alterations in female dress (more covered forms of veiling). Less apparent, but still influential, were the proliferation of ideas and modes of practice through small, home-based Quranic study groups and the missionary efforts of local *davatchi*s (persons who deliver a religious message).

Reactions to the return of religion to public life were varied. Certain public religious discourses, institutions and actions, flourished and had quite constructive effects in Bazaar-Korgon. For example, the construction of mosques—one of the few ways in which foreign Muslims actively took part in the religious life of the community—promoted solidarity among both religious and non-religious residents. Moreover, it contributed to larger development projects aimed at halting the disintegration of the town's infrastructure. The construction of a new central mosque served as a model of religious social action, contradicting the notion that collective endeavours for the public good must necessarily be secular.

Another instance which I studied was a foreign soap opera with romantic, stereotypical portrayals of Muslims. The serial *Clone* served to ignite public debate about what it meant to be a modern Muslim and provided material which broadened community perceptions of the range of acceptable interpretations and enactments of Muslimness. The programme, whose main characters were Brazilians and Moroccans and whose setting oscillated between the two countries, presented a highly orientalized view of Moroccans and of Muslim life. But the beauty and the sensuality of the imagery ensured the soap's popularity, providing positive images of religiously inspired actions—like veiling—that were usually negatively evaluated in the town. In this way, *Clone* widened many residents' perceptions of Muslim life.

Yet there were many instances where the ideas, actions and institutions of the newly pious in Bazaar-Korgon created tension and division in the community. They challenged dominant late-Soviet and early-independence era conceptions of Muslimness as primarily an ethno-national marker (cf. Hilgers above). They asserted a vision of Muslimness as an inherently and almost exclusively religious identity. One mode through which alternative interpretations of Islam were created and transmitted was that of new wedding parties in which the supposedly sinful elements of traditional evening wedding parties—such as dancing, drinking and gender mixing—were excised (McBrien 2006b). In their place, an invited religious teacher delivered a message calling guests closer to the 'true' path of Islam. The interpretations of Islam taught at these weddings, and Islamic ideas which were generally gaining ground in the community, tended towards doctrinally-based forms. Followers of these interpretations validated their claims to orthodoxy with an appeal to written text;

they evaluated proper Muslimness on the basis of religious knowledge and the performance of religious duties, including daily prayer (cf. Rasanayagam, below). These notions challenged the ideas and identities of community members who held to interpretations of Islam that stressed the keeping of life-cycle rituals, incorporating supposedly 'non-Muslim' elements, such as charms or healing (cf. Kehl-Bodrogi, above).

The expansion of Islam was widely perceived to be threatening. The religious observances, bodily fashioning and discourses of the newly pious, now visible and audible in public spaces, indicated the erosion of secular public life for many Bazaar-Korgonians, who perceived their actions and discourses as congruent with the kinds of beliefs and practices attributed to religious extremists in regional discourses about *Wahhabis*, prominent since the 1970s. These in turn built on long-standing modernist discourses about 'backward' and 'threatening' Muslims circulating in the region since at least the beginning of the twentieth century. The geo-political environment of the 2000s, marked by the US-led 'Global War on Terror' and pressure not only from Western nations, but also from Russia and China on Kyrgyzstan to play its part in the fight against Muslim terrorists, fortified negative discourses about *Wahhabis* and heightened the perceived need to monitor and control religious behaviour and teachings (Rasanayagam, Stephan, below). This environment ensured that debates about religion became *de facto* political, despite the fact that the newly pious in Bazaar-Korgon had neither articulated nor been inclined towards a political agenda (cf. Khizrieva, above).

The assertion of 'new' ideas in the public sphere and the ensuing responses forced a rethinking of personal and group identity and the role of religion in (local) society. Many residents, especially the young, already involved in rethinking these notions, responded with enthusiasm. Although not always accepting the new ideas, they enjoyed the opportunity to explore what they saw as 'real Islam'. Others, whose way of life and sense of identity were more frontally challenged by the alternative interpretations of Islam, often responded by distancing themselves from those propagating these ideas by labelling them 'extremists'.

The project also addressed wider discussions about the global 'Islamic revival' of the last few decades. The anthropology of Muslim societies generally, and the more specific topic of Muslim religious life, has often been split between those who do research in Muslim majority societies and those who research Muslim minorities. Demographically, the populations of the five constituent states of ex-Soviet Central Asia—Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan—are certainly Muslim majority societies. Yet their long Soviet history means that institutions, discourses and practices concerning Islam are closer to those of Europe than to those of any Muslim majority country. This project therefore questioned certain assumptions about the Islamic revival, arguing that, while the return of religious discourses, actions and institutions to public spaces was a world-wide phenomenon, the

contours and implications of this return were highly variable (McBrien 2009a/2010). For example, the relationship of the newly pious to the West and their constructions of religiously textured public space in Bazaar-Korgon are markedly different from piety movements in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Like many newly pious the world over, some Muslims in Bazaar-Korgon challenge secularist notions of the modern by asserting a religiously textured interpretation and enactment of it. But their experience of a recently defunct Soviet modernity and of the newly imported Western variants has created a unique environment. Here Islamic, Soviet and Western notions meld and clash; modernity is simultaneously experienced as a dreamed-of future and a societal moment already consigned to the past. Soviet-era atheism was perhaps the most militant and thorough enactment of any modern secularizing project and its legacy continues to shape the postsocialist religious landscape (cf. Pelkmans, Stephan below).

Observing life-cycle rituals like the Beshik Toi *(cradle ceremony) is criticized by the newly pious, but understood as inherently Islamic by many others.*

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Religious Frontiers after Socialism: Missionary Encounters and the Dynamics of Conversion in Kyrgyzstan

Mathijs Pelkmans

Mathijs Pelkmans obtained his MA in Cultural Anthropology at Radboud University Nijmegen in 1996 and completed his PhD at the University of Amsterdam in 2003. After leaving the MPI in 2006 he held teaching positions at University College Utrecht and the University of Amsterdam before taking up his present appointment as Lecturer in Anthropology at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

This project was designed to understand the effects of evangelical missionary activities in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan. I was interested in this topic because, since the early 1990s, hundreds of missionaries had been active in Kyrgyzstan. As 'former atheists', as Muslims and as a so-called 'unreached people', the Kyrgyz were an attractive evangelization target. Moreover, Kyrgyzstan had the most liberal religious policies of all post-Soviet Central Asian republics, which meant that Christian missions faced few state-imposed obstacles, even though missionary activities were not without controversy. By the early 2000s, the approximately 25,000 Kyrgyz (alongside Russian, Korean, Tatar and other) converts to evangelical Christianity formed a viable religious community which had a conspicuous and sometimes controversial public presence.

Given the frequent failure of evangelical Christians to convert Muslims, I wanted to understand how and why conversion had become an option for some Kyrgyz, that is, how the conditions conducive to conversion had emerged historically. This was particularly interesting because Christian missions in the pre-Soviet period (mostly by German Mennonites) had failed miserably. To the Kyrgyz, the idea of converting to Christianity remained inconceivable; evangelization rather reinforced the idea that Christianity was a religion of alien Europeans (Pelkmans 2009b). Soviet rule inadvertently strengthened the amalgamation of national and religious identity, but the 'cultural Islam' thus produced was vulnerable to subsequent post-Soviet challenges (Pelkmans 2006c; McBrien and Pelkmans 2008; cf. Hilgers above, 2009). Soviet militant secularism relegated religious expression to the domestic sphere while contributing to the objectification of religion. This enabled Kyrgyz to consider their position vis-à-vis Islam. In the early 1990s, being Muslim was a central element in understandings of national identity, but it was no longer inconceivable to change religious affiliation.

The evangelical missionaries I talked to were aware of, and actively engaged with, these issues. They identified 'the ethnic barrier' as a key obstacle to conversion and tried to overcome it by disconnecting religious from ethnic categories. Avoiding terms and practices with Russian connotations and ad-

justing church services to Kyrgyz musical tastes, for example, served to make evangelical Christianity less alien. Such tactics aimed to demonstrate that being Kyrgyz was not synonymous with being Muslim, that Christianity was not a religion exclusively of Europeans and that it was perfectly possible to convert and still be Kyrgyz (cf. for the Uzbek case Hilgers 2007, 2009). Ironically, evangelical efforts to distinguish between religion and culture drew on the Soviet model of being 'national in form and socialist in content', with the same (unintended) consequence of folklorizing and objectifying 'culture' and thereby partly re-inscribing the very ethnic boundaries which evangelical missionaries intended to overcome (Pelkmans 2005d, 2007).

While missionaries did not admit that their approach to some extent resembled Soviet ways of dealing with culture, similarities with Western development agencies were not only admitted, but actively used. Many missionaries presented the mix of humanitarian and spiritual aid as unproblematic: it was a natural result of being a Christian, the essence of which, according to them, was to share one's faith with others, no matter in which context; and it was legitimate because economic or social development would be meaningless, if it was not accompanied by spiritual transformation. Several missionary organizations actively used development rhetoric to hide the more controversial aspects of their agenda and to present themselves as 'transparent' agents of civil society. Similar practices by foreign Muslims were more likely to trigger suspicion and thus the evangelicals' use of development rhetoric and their emphasis on religious rights revealed some of the asymmetries of the 'religious market' ideal (Pelkmans 2006b, 2009a).

These analyses of the 'mission field' (to use the evangelical term) explained why conversion was a possibility, why the missionary presence went relatively unchallenged and why there was interest in what these new religious movements had to offer. They did not say much about the motivations for, or the social and cultural patterns of, conversion. Certainly, the general appeal of 'the West' and 'the modern' contributed to the attractiveness of these churches. The rapid growth of several Pentecostal churches that preached variants of the Gospel of Prosperity was quite revealing in this respect. The emphasis on 'contextualization' was also important: church leaders always tried to translate biblical messages to address specific local concerns.

To gain more insight into the processes of 'contextualization' and the dynamics of conversion, non-conversion and re-conversion, I focused on the Church of Jesus Christ, an evangelical Pentecostal church, which was the fastest growing church in Kyrgyzstan, with over 10,000 members and 45 congregations in 2004. Part of this church's appeal was that it offered not only salvation, but also access to prosperity, health and success through faithful prayer. The message was particularly attractive to those who were economically or socially marginalized, which in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan meant substantial numbers of people. These elements also figured in conversion narratives as critiques of postsocialist change, in particular regarding gender ine-

quality, economic deprivation and social exclusion (Pelkmans 2006b, 2009c). The converts' turn towards the 'power of Jesus' did not necessarily imply a radical transformation of spiritual convictions. In fact, there were remarkable similarities between the worldview promoted by Pentecostal churches and indigenous notions about spirits as well as between 'Christian' faith-healing and traditional 'Muslim' healing.

I documented this church's successes and failures in three settings: the capital Bishkek, the provincial capital of Jalalabad in southern Kyrgyzstan and Kok-Jangak, a small mining town located not far from Jalalabad. While the sermons in Bishkek often focused on problems such as drug addiction, consumerism and loneliness, in Jalalabad, the sermons often centred on occultism, which the pastor had identified as the most pernicious local problem (Pelkmans 2006b). Such flexibility guaranteed that the church's messages had local relevance, but it did not guarantee success. The comparison between the three different settings—which varied in scale, economic profile and religious outlook—was illuminating, because it showed that the church produced different conversion patterns according to the context. Conversion was less controversial in the more 'secular' northern part of the country, especially in the anonymous urban space of Bishkek, where it could be hidden from relatives. This was difficult in Jalalabad and even more so in Kok-Jangak, where social (support) networks were more compact. Here, conversion drew explicit reactions from Muslim neighbours, kin and local leaders. As a result, converts were less likely to waver between religious communities (which was not uncommon in Bishkek). Confronted with the negative reactions of Muslim Kyrgyz, converts either had to dissociate themselves even further from their previous religious and social background or to recant their newly found belief. Indeed, many conversions were only temporary (Pelkmans 2009c).

The sustainability of these new communities of faith also depended on the extent to which the church's promises—of health and wealth—continued to convince. This depended partly on the strength of the congregation within which success stories circulated, but also on actual opportunities for success. In the mining town of Kok-Jangak—which lacked opportunities for economic as well as social advancement and thus failed to produce success stories—disillusion quickly set in and the newly established congregation evaporated. In short, although conversion can be seen as an emancipatory strategy for those involved, its success depended on the strength of the support provided by the congregation and on the economic environment in which it operated.

I have used this empirical case in comparative analyses of religious change. In a comparison with a previous study on conversion from Islam to Orthodox Christianity in Georgia (Pelkmans 2006a), I drew on the concept of the frontier to highlight the asymmetries in missionary encounters. While the Orthodox Christian mission to Georgia's Muslim provinces could lean on national pro-Christian policies and rhetoric, in Kyrgyzstan, such backing was obviously absent. Nevertheless, both in Kyrgyzstan and Georgia, the missionary

groups were able to benefit from internationally circulating and locally reverberating discourses which associated Christianity with progress and civility and Islam with backwardness and terrorism (Pelkmans forthcoming 2010). I made broader comparisons in several joint publications on conversion in the former Soviet Union (Pelkmans, Vaté and Falge 2005b; Pelkmans 2009b, 2009d). Recurring themes in these studies were the following: a) conversion often involved an attempt to reconnect to 'the modern', which was experienced as having been lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union; b) these religious movements were appealing, because they presented and provided a moral compass out of 'post-Soviet chaos'; c) conversion often offered a strategy for dealing with social inequality. The Kyrgyz case showed, however, that conversion provided no guarantee of success in these matters and that the conversion movements needed to be analyzed in relation to the multiple ideologies of hope which had entered the region and which tended to produce not only hope and conviction, but also doubt and disillusion. Ultimately, the analysis of conversion provided insight into how new frontiers and boundaries take shape, thus illuminating new configurations of religion, self and society in contexts of rapid social change.

*Foreign missionaries and local church members at a circumcision feast (*sunnet toi*) in southern Kyrgyzstan.*

Becoming Muslim in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan: An Anthropology of Moral Reasoning

Johan Rasanayagam

Johan Rasanayagam received a BA in Middle Eastern Studies from Durham University in 1987 and an MA in Turkish Studies from the School of Oriental and African Studies in London in 1991. He completed his PhD at the University of Cambridge in 2002. Since 2005 he has been a Lecturer in Anthropology at the University of Aberdeen.

This project, based on fieldwork in 2003-4 in the city of Samarkand and the Ferghana Valley, explored processes of reasoning by which Muslims in Uzbekistan come to particular understandings of Islam and what it means to be a Muslim. Within the Soviet Union, the place of religion in the public sphere was restricted and closely regulated by the state. Opportunities for public religious expression were severely curtailed, with only a tiny number of Muslims being able to attend the two Islamic educational institutions which served the entire Union. Contact with Muslims outside the Soviet Union was limited. Although Islam continued to be an important part of the lives of many Central Asians in the form of life-cycle rituals, shrine visits and various forms of religious healing, most were cut off from knowledge of the central texts—the Qur'an and Haddith. Since Uzbekistan gained its independence, Islam has re-entered the public sphere and people have joined the rest of the Muslim world in contemplating reflexively what it means to be a Muslim.

The broad context for the research was the diverse understandings of Islam which have been emerging and the debates and contestations concerning 'correct' Islamic practice. For example, *imam*s and others educated in the *madrasa*s, which have been newly established under state control, draw upon the core Islamic textual sources. This textual interpretation is often at odds with local Muslim practice, such as the veneration of Muslim saints, healing with the aid of spirits and much of the ritual practice which is embedded within local flows of sociality and which *imam*s condemn as illegitimate innovation (Rasanayagam 2006a).

An important concern was the effort of the post-Soviet government to define legitimate religious practice and to shape the subjectivities of citizens in particular ways. The government has attempted to construct Islam as part of a Central Asian national and spiritual heritage, to incorporate it within a conception of indigenous culture and tradition (cf. Hilgers 2009). 'Good' Islam is portrayed as culturally authentic, tolerant of other religious traditions in the region and non-political. 'Bad' Islam is characterized as alien to Central Asian spiritual values, intolerant in that it espouses a narrow version of the faith, which excludes many Central Asian practices and is politically motivated. Interpretations of Islam not endorsed by the regime are labelled as 'extremist'

and 'Wahhabi', with the suggestion of links to international networks of terror. An atmosphere of existential vulnerability surrounds religious expression, where the label 'Wahhabi' has come to represent any aspect of religious practice which does not fit into the category of established 'tradition', the clearly 'acceptable' and the 'harmless' and which might therefore make those associated with it a target for the state security services (Rasanayagam 2006b).

As a result of this, the practice of Islam occurred in a subdued, even fearful atmosphere. At the same time, there was a wealth of interpretation and exploration, with regard to both Islam and the variety of Christian and other religious or spiritual groups which have emerged after independence and were attracting adherents (see Hilgers, Pelkmans above). In Samarkand, one of the two research sites of this project, I found that both registered and unregistered Protestant Christian groups were active and attracting members from the indigenous Muslim population. Groups like the Hare Krishnas or Baha'i were becoming established and new spiritual movements outside more formally institutionalized religions were emerging.

Although mosque attendance has decreased since it peaked immediately after independence, a number of men of all ages still regularly attended at least the main Friday prayers. Ritual events, such as *mavlud* commemorations of the birth of the Prophet Muhammad or *khatmi qur'on,* a ceremony at which the Qur'an is recited for the benefit of the deceased, have become common since independence. Another important development has been the spread of formal knowledge of the sacred texts and interpretations of what constitutes correct Muslim practice based upon them. The expansion of the number of *madrasa*s, albeit under the control of the quasi-state Muslim Board of Uzbekistan, has enabled more young men, and to a more limited extent young women, to obtain a formal Islamic education. Popularized interpretations and advice on how to lead a Muslim life have become readily available. Affordable, locally printed texts in Uzbek are on sale in many bookshops, on street and market stalls and at many of the larger mosques. A significant number of individuals have also been able to undertake the *hajj* (pilgrimage) to Mecca. It is not uncommon to encounter Muslims who self-consciously strive to follow Muslim lives, observing ritual prescriptions such as praying five times a day and abstaining from alcohol and pork and studying the sacred texts. However, such individuals have to be careful to ensure that their practice cannot be interpreted by others as 'extremist' or 'alien'.

I found that Muslims in Uzbekistan were creatively developing understandings of moral selfhood and moral community, resulting in a great diversity of interpretations of Islam and what it means to be a Muslim. Anthropological studies of Islam in diverse Muslim societies frequently discuss the debates and controversies about the nature of 'correct' Islam. Some have described how reformist groups have criticized practices such as shrine visits or Sufi cults as un-Islamic. Others have framed their analyses in terms of an Islamic modernity, providing accounts of piety movements which advocate self-reflexive

and critical engagement with the texts and active efforts at self-improvement, in contrast to a 'traditional' stance of unreflexive immersion in established practice. Such an analysis would not be possible in Uzbekistan. What is distinctive about processes of moral reasoning in Uzbekistan is the absence of public and open debate. Because of the government's suspicion of religious expression outside the parameters of what it has laid down as acceptable 'traditional' practice, public processes of reasoning are restricted.

This lack of open debate has directed attention to experience itself as a site of moral reasoning. Concern for the moral is evident in a large amount of anthropological literature, but anthropologists have rarely addressed the concept directly. Morality is often located in 'values' and in intellectual processes of reflection upon them. Attempts have been made to discuss morality in terms of practice, as a dynamic relation between the universal and the particular. However, these implicitly or explicitly set up an opposition between the two, which frames morality as a value, an object which can be primarily assessed through self-conscious reflection. This research explored how moral reasoning is inherent within ongoing experience in a material and social world. Experience is not 'neutral', but is apprehended as particular qualities of experience through models for action and experience, cosmologies and local histories. It is made meaningful within a developing narrative frame. Through ongoing, experiential reasoning, an individual develops a moral self.



The mullah of a neighbourhood mosque in a village in the Ferghana Valley.

An important aspect of this research concerned the question how Muslims with particular, even uniquely individual understandings of Islam and of what it meant to be a Muslim—understandings which they had developed through processes of experiential reasoning—at the same time participated as members of a moral community of Muslims where others would, inevitably, have different understandings. This research proposes a concept of intelligibility, which focuses on how the self-representations and practice of Muslims are accepted by others, without insisting on a shared interpretation. A focus on intelligibility moves away from attempting to define Islam as an object of study in which the diverse practice and interpretation of individual Muslims must be accommodated. Rather, Islam as an object is constructed within the development of Muslim selfhood by individual Muslims and attention focuses on how this remains intelligible to others, perhaps within the frame of a common moral community of Muslims, or in certain cases as conversion to alternative traditions such as Protestant Christianity.

Moral Education, Islam and Being Muslim in Tajikistan

Manja Stephan

Manja Stephan studied Anthropology and Central Asian Studies in Berlin. Her MA dissertation was an investigation of women's religious practices in Uzbekistan. Her PhD project was originally part of the international research project on "Islamische Bildung in der Sowjetunion und ihren Nachfolgestaaten" *at the Ruhr-Universität Bochum, supported by the Volkswagen Foundation. After becoming an Associate Member of the MPI's Focus Group, Manja Stephan completed her doctoral thesis in 2009 at the Martin Luther University in Halle-Wittenberg.*

This project analyzed how children and adolescents in Tajikistan were raised, in various secular and religious contexts, to be morally upright members of society. Fieldwork was conducted between 2002 and 2004 among the Sunni Muslim population of Dushanbe, Tajikistan's capital, and focused primarily on urban neighbourhoods with a traditional settlement structure (*mahalla*). The local term *tarbiya* (education, care, upbringing) comprised a variety of practices which all involved the conscious, intentional teaching of norms, values and moral principles. It encapsulated the most basic ideas of the urban Muslim population concerning morality viewed as the ultimate goal of education. Moral education was practised and negotiated in Muslim families (*oila*), private religious courses (*sabaq*) and the ethics courses (*odobnoma*) offered at state-run schools.

*Traditional neighbourhood (*mahalla*) with mud brick houses and old Friday mosque in the center of Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan.*

At the time of my fieldwork, Tajikistan exemplified postsocialist dislocation. The country's long economic crisis had had a severe impact on the living standards of urban families, public sector education was in a dire state and the consequences of the civil war (1992–1997) were still palpable. The 'crisis of values' or 'values insecurity' brought about by the demise of the socialist value system and the opening of the country to the Western and Islamic world was accentuated by the destabilization of established identity models, evident in the increasing differentiation of urban life styles and in forms of religious expression. The other crucial frame of reference for the project was the post-Soviet religious revival, which in the Tajik capital had allowed the return of Islam to the public realm and the intensification of religious beliefs and ritual practices among its Muslim inhabitants.

I found that the parental generation strove to use education as a means to preserve the established order and its values, norms and moral principles, in order to ensure the survival and cohesion of its own social group. The moral teachings conveyed in families, schools and religious courses largely overlapped with each other. That the same methods were used uniformly by all three institutions was testimony to their mutual compatibility: they strengthened each other's educational agendas. The centrality of *hurmat*, i.e. showing respect for elders, was a good example of this consensus. Embedded in a national-secular (school), traditional-local (family), and religious-Islamic (religious courses) context, the principles encapsulated in the *hurmat* concept, notably seniority and patriarchality, are confirmed as generally binding norms of social behaviour.

Preserving the authority of the elders over youth was particularly relevant at the time of puberty. This passage in the life cycle marks an important break in parental educational practices. Henceforth good moral practice was a form of symbolic capital (in Bourdieu's sense), yet at the same time, incipient maturation marked a phase of liminality and wildness, which adults considered to be a danger to both the individual and the order of the social group. Thus the goal of education was to 'tame' young people and to point them towards 'the right path'. For both girls and boys, as well as for their parents, religion was an important stabilizing and strengthening force.

Preparing palov *for the communal* navruz*—New Year's celebration in an urban neighbourhood in Dushanbe.*

The Muslim family and the institution of private religious courses followed the ancient tradition of the *maktab* in providing elementary knowledge about the basic tenets of Islam for both girls and boys, with moral and religious spheres overlapping. In many urban families, the teaching of religious knowledge—in a more or less systematic way—was an important pillar of moral education. Whether presented in terms of respect for the parents or as an expression of a newly revived religious awareness, the so-called 'religious method' of teaching basic religious knowledge was primarily intended to prepare young people to perform the formal prayer (*namoz*). The new market for religious books and a wide range of religious tapes were available in the capital to support parents in their efforts. Despite the new easy access to religious knowledge, I found that these novel media did not replace the authority of local custodians of religious knowledge. Courses on moral and religious education for young Muslims have, in recent years, become increasingly popular in urban neighbourhoods, although the state has not assigned these traditional institutions of religious education a place in the official Islamic education system. Embedded in the local environment of the urban neighbourhood, these courses were an extension of domestic education in a religious context. Especially for residents who had recently migrated to the city and had no social networks, these courses were an effective method to

ensure that their sons and daughters progressed to religious and social maturity under the aegis of religious authorities and that they were protected against the immoral influences of 'the street'. Popular religious courses thus offered an alternative form of meaningful recreation with a religious veneer. This development was all the more significant as the Tajik state was increasingly unable to fulfil its educational responsibilities.

In the ethics courses in state schools, moral education was presented in a context that fused religious and secular spheres (cf. Ładykowska, European Russia cluster). The courses, although secular, made frequent references to religion; religious symbols were a prominent part of everyday teaching practices. This was not only evidence that Islam had returned to the public realm, but also a consequence of the desolation of secular pedagogy. Religion served as a source of inspiration for teaching new secular moral content. Thus contrary to their intended purpose, the ethics courses did not provide a secular alternative to the established religious courses in the neighbourhoods, but rather fostered continuity by reinforcing Muslim awareness among the local population.

The religious revival in Dushanbe has clearly resulted in the return of religion to the public realm. Yet I found that this realm was still dominated by secular forces. On the one hand, there were signs of a desecularization of the public realm, but on the other hand, this was accompanied by a new form of secularization. Religion returned as a moral and cultural resource rather than a religious force, thereby adapting itself to a secularity whose coordinates were fixed in the Soviet past and are currently primarily set by the state and the secularization course of the ruling political elite.

The balance between religiousness and secularity that shaped the political agendas of the country's new secular elites could also be recognized in the ideas and practices of local Muslims. This mix substantially guided Muslim models of selfhood (cf. McBrien, Rasanayagam above). In the everyday life of urban Muslims, education was a continuous negotiation process between religion and secularity. The way in which the parental generation and the previous local religious authorities had constructed the balance between religious and secular issues in Soviet everyday life continued to serve as an important frame of reference. The old religious attitudes, as modified by Soviet 'modernity', also served as the basis for the local population's rejection of increasingly visible new forms of religious expression by young Muslims in the urban public sphere. With their openly displayed 'Islamic elitism', their revolutionary behaviour and their option for a life style that was guided more by the after-life than this world, Islamists challenged established norms and disturbed the 'right' balance. The continuing power of the post-Soviet state to shape local models of Islam and ideals of how to be a good Muslim was clearly demonstrated in the way the majority of citizens classified these Islamists as 'fanatics'.

EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

The main religious tradition uniting the research of this cluster was Eastern Christianity. However, complexities entered into each of the case studies. In post-Soviet Moldova (Heintz), the new state has struggled to resolve rivalry between Orthodox dioceses associated with more powerful neighbours, Russia and Romania. In Ukraine, Orthodox Christians are split into several Churches (Richardson); however, in western districts, even the Greek Catholics (Eastern Christians affiliated to Rome) are encompassed within a single 'Orthodox imaginary' (Naumescu). The situation of the Greek Catholics is different in Hungary (Mahieu) and Poland (Buzalka), since in these countries they form a small minority in populations where Western Christianity is dominant. In both cases, despite the differing histories, Greek Catholics may now be increasingly appreciated as a source of emotional, 'Eastern' spirituality. In urban Romania, Buddhism and New Age offer comparable opportunities for individual bricolage (Heintz). Finally, Transylvania has long been characterized by tight, 'monopolistic' links between ethnicity and religion. In a setting where to be Orthodox is to be Romanian and to be Calvinist is to be Hungarian, low-status Roma are attracted to 'culturally neutral' Pentecostalism (Fosztó).

The researchers of this group engaged with a variety of theories and contemporary social issues. The revival of the Greek Catholics in Ukraine pro-

vides excellent material for investigating religious institutionalization and testing new cognitive theories concerning the transmission of religious ideas (Naumescu). Religious revival does not necessarily mean that personal behaviour (e.g. lying) is subjected to new criteria: in rural Moldova, the 'civil' domain remains largely insulated from the moral (Heintz). Rituals remain important in cementing collective identity, not only at village level (Fosztó, Heintz), but also at the level of the imagined national community, since commemorations of past violence are central to both sides of the Ukrainian-Polish conflict in Southeast Poland (Buzalka). Contemporary efforts to recuperate traditions of tolerance and cosmopolitanism may be good for tourism, but what was once destroyed can never be restored in its earlier form (Buzalka, Richardson).

Nation, Religion and Tolerance in Eastern Europe

Juraj Buzalka

Juraj Buzalka graduated from Comenius University, Bratislava, in 1999 with a major in Political Science. He went on to complete an MA in Social Anthropology at the University of Sussex (2002). After completing his PhD at the MPI he became Lecturer in Anthropology at his alma mater.

My research focused on the role of religion in civil society in south-east Poland. I undertook my field research in and around the historical city of Przemyśl in 2003–04. This city is important for two religious-national collectivities: the Roman Catholic Poles and the Greek Catholic Ukrainians. It has been perceived by locals and many outsiders as lying on the margins of the Polish state and of Europe. Ethnic violence during and after World War II left a strong imprint on the people of Przemyśl and the surrounding rural districts, especially the Greek Catholic population, which was accused of supporting Ukrainian terrorist activities and expelled from south-east Poland in 1947 (*Akcja Wisła*). As I showed in my book (Buzalka 2007d), these dramatic ruptures on the threshold of the socialist People's Republic nourished nostalgia for a lost peasant world. The Ukrainian community, within which returnees gradually supplemented the few who had managed to avoid the deportations, was inward-looking, grounded in family memories and church-driven ceremonies. Despite the dominance of Roman Catholicism, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic community managed to emerge from its clandestine existence after 1989 and entered the public sphere.

Since 1989, the vitality of public commemorations of ethnically defined events has grown steadily in Przemyśl. To understand the politics of these commemorations in south-east Poland, both the micro-level of everyday commemorative practices and the macro-level of nationalist narratives of history need to be explored. Peasants' memories of violence and oppression need to be complemented with investigations of the invention of tradition at the level of nation-state commemorations of suffering and patriotic cults of military action. Nonetheless, the past which is remembered and revered in south-east Poland is predominantly a peasant past.

Partly because institutional religion remained crucial in safeguarding family and national memories in Poland throughout the socialist years, the Catholic Church was able to consolidate its power quickly after 1989 and retain its strong presence in the public sphere. Despite the critical opinions many people voice nowadays about some practices of the Church and its clergy, its leading role results not only from the preservation of traditional power relations, but also from the fact that the Church offered 'development projects' which were alternatives to those of postsocialist capitalism. The Roman Catholic Church takes care of 'the people' when they face economic hardship.

On the peripheries of post-peasant, postsocialist Eastern Europe, where the secular social democratic tradition has been largely absent, social criticism takes the form of what I call 'post-peasant populism', a distinctive offshoot of the populist movements which flourished in agrarian Galicia from the late nineteenth century (Buzalka 2008b).

The Roman Catholic Church's dominant position in politics is also visible in processes that promote tolerance and civility in south-east Poland. Even though religion can be a source of tension between religious-national groups and commemorations that foster mutual exclusivity are often staged by church employees, religion can also promote tolerance. In south-east Poland, tolerance has recently developed into a celebration of diversity, with the boundaries between the two religious-national groups strictly drawn. Even multicultural narratives and policies strengthen nationally defined cultures. However, in addition to the elite-driven 'artificial' tolerance that operates within the framework of grand narratives, 'ordinary' tolerance has continued to soften people's suspicions towards others in everyday life. Postsocialist power holders largely ignore the role of ordinary tolerance, either within the religious sphere or outside it. Their multiculturalism remains locked in national cultures and a model of civil society that is structurally and normatively dominated by the middle classes.

The climax of the Corpus Christi procession, the largest annual procession in Przemyśl, demonstrating the strong presence of religion in the public sphere (2004).

Like artificial tolerance, religious rites appear to be objects not only of older, high church politics, but also of relatively recent appropriation by secular elites. The politics behind a new synthesis of competing discourses about and policies towards religious mixing and ethnic commemorations helps to clarify what it is to be a Ukrainian Greek Catholic in Przemyśl. Young, well-educated Ukrainians participate in an elite-driven anti-syncretism in the Greek Catholic Church, claiming to see clearly what constitutes a 'pure' Greek Catholic tradition (Buzalka 2008c; see also Mahieu below). Although many features of religious syncretism remain alive in Przemyśl, the assertion of purity predominates politically, creating a discursive congruence between religion, nation and culture.

Local politics is obviously shaped by broader societal changes and both are reflected in the ethno-revival movement in south-east Poland. Ukrainians, a once proscribed religious-national group, are becoming a commodified national minority which is valued for its cultural characteristics, including its alleged deep spirituality and closeness to nature. The essentialist narratives surrounding this shift were fostered by local nationalists and Greek Catholic priests and they were indirectly nurtured by Europe-wide and nation-state policies and discourses on multiculturalism as well as by the growing demands of ethno-business and tourism. The politics of commemoration and the cultural fundamentalism on which post-peasant populist politics is based were mutually reinforcing.

In the quickly changing environment of twentieth-century south-east Poland, basic understandings of nation, religion, family and community have nonetheless persisted into the early twenty-first century. These understandings entail a set of practices and ideas, which are hostile to some aspects of secular modernity. Some pre-modern, agrarian-era images, social practices, relations and narratives survive, even though the actual peasantry has been substantially reduced or has died out. At the same time, the ruptures and insecurities of the postsocialist and ongoing European transformations have fuelled new attitudes which are based on a romanticized, nostalgically imagined peasant past. The combination of two types of practices, identity narratives and memories related to the recent peasant past—those determined by continuity and those determined by rupture—creates a particular populist way of doing and perceiving politics in the post-peasant setting of south-east Poland and other parts of Eastern Europe. Recent developments in Central and Eastern Europe, particularly the salience of nationalist and populist agendas at the highest levels of politics in Poland, Slovakia and Hungary since their entry into the European Union as well as the growing popularity of neo-fascist movements, confirm the need for a better understanding of popular mobilization at the grassroots.

Since 2006, I have extended my findings in south-east Poland in further research. I have used the concept of 'agrarian tolerance' to discuss pre-capitalist patterns of co-existence which persist in the unevenly developed Eastern

Europe of today (cf. Fosztó, below). This tolerance is manifested in the activities of ordinary people who avoid nationalist participation, practise their faith alongside the members of other communities and provide social assistance to others regardless of ethnicity or faith. These people show conviviality in everyday life, trust their neighbours as well as religious and community leaders, form cultural clubs, organize community events and yet, at the same time, they take part in actions often considered 'illiberal' by urban intellectuals. They also employ economic practices which 'embed' the individual's profit within community, religion and kinship. A research focus on these economic practices becomes all the more imperative as the global economic crisis has more impact on the region. I have thus continued to investigate the patterns of political mobilization that I call 'post-peasant populism' among steelworkers in Slovakia. A particularly intolerant form of this populism permeates neofascist activism that is increasingly gaining popularity outside official party politics in Eastern Europe. Looking at the social organization of politics and representations of the past, it is important to reconsider the role of populism in all its forms. Populism was the midwife of modernization projects in the nineteenth century, but the alternatives it offers to Western liberal and/or socialist modernization projects are the very opposite of emancipatory.



Charismatic Christianity among the Roma in Romania

László Fosztó

László Fosztó obtained his first degree in Hungarian Language and Ethnography at the Babeş-Bolyai University in Cluj/Kolozsvár in 1996 and his MA in Nationalism Studies at the Central European University in Budapest in 2000. After defending his PhD in 2007 he took up a research position at the Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities.

My project focused on religious changes in postsocialist Romania. I was interested in how ethno-national minorities and minority churches experience the increasing religious activity which has characterized the whole country during this period and how religious revitalization influences the public sphere. More specifically, this research inquired into the consequences of conversion to neo-Protestant movements for grassroots social relations and established patterns of religious and ethnic divisions in a traditionally multiethnic and religiously plural region. Fieldwork was carried out in 2003–04 among the Roma in the Cluj area of Transylvania, in both urban and rural settings. My main field site was a village for which I use the pseudonym Gánás. It had approximately 1,400 inhabitants: roughly two thirds of them were Hungarians, one third Roma and only a handful were ethnic Romanians. In Gánás, there was no disputing the dominance of Hungarians regarding both numbers and prestige. The main form of religiosity was Calvinism (Reformed) which was considered to be a 'Hungarian faith' in Transylvania. Most of the local Roma belonged to this church, but I paid special attention to the emerging Pentecostal minority among them.

Ethnic relations and social life were largely organized on the basis of patterns that could be better understood in terms of the long-term social history of the settlement than in terms of the more recent socialist past. The social life of the village seems to have moved from socialism into postsocialism without any major ruptures. Relationships between ethno-religious groups in Transylvania traditionally consisted of monopolistic structures. All of the 'historical churches' in Romania have a connection with ethno-national ideologies or identity projects. This is not only true for the connection between the Romanian national identity and Orthodox Christianity; it is also the case for the so-called 'Hungarian churches'. These are the Roman Catholic, Reformed (Calvinist), Unitarian and to a more limited extent the Lutheran Evangelical church. The members of these churches tend to be Magyars and the churches promote (though to different degrees) the Magyar identity. Belonging to the Orthodox Church is similarly equated with being ethnically Romanian. The main exceptions from this pattern are the neo-Protestant churches, where ethno-national belonging is not as central to the denominational identity.

Roma girls dressed in folk costumes during a Calvinist confirmation ceremony (2004).

My findings demonstrated that the 'traditional churches' had a rather permissive attitude towards local practices and variations: pastors or priests contributed to the maintenance of local forms of solidarity and respected the traditional sense of 'civility' in the villages. My ethnography of life-cycle rituals showed that the ideas and practices of the local community could mobilize moral and material support for other villagers, regardless of ethnicity. 'Agrarian tolerance' (Buzalka, above) or, as I referred to it, 'rural civility' (Fosztó 2006) is not uncommon in other parts of Eastern Europe. The other side of this argument is, I suggest, that Hungarians, supported by the Calvinist Church, insisted on the symbolic subordination of individuals to the community. This subordination was clearly expressed in religious rituals, which were controlled by Hungarians. However, the Roma had other ways of maintaining their community. Individualism and a more competitive ethos were characteristic of their own rituals, but when they attended the local rituals controlled by Hungarians, they usually tacitly accepted their subordination.

Some elements of religious life that were hidden during socialist times have become more visible in the postsocialist era. I found that people were more ready to display their religiosity and ethnic belonging in public, e.g. in confirmation rituals, which were no longer restricted to close kin. Religious education has been introduced in school and a church-related foundation has become active in Gánás. The most visible changes could be perceived in the revitalization of rituals that created new public events for the local community (Fosztó 2007b). These lent a homogeneous appearance to the local commu-

nity, canonizing new elements and masking status differences, which in Gánás were also ethnic differences. For example, the canonization of a dress code (local folk costumes used by youth of all groups) was invested with ethnic meaning by both participants and outsiders who observed the ritual. However, segments of the local society might opt for divergent forms of rituals. Hungarians were more receptive to communitarian rituals, which focused on the revitalization of local traditions and symbolically connected the 'local' to the 'national'. For example, a newly created annual ritual known as 'Village Days' drew on local folklore and agricultural traditions. Pentecostals paid less attention to culture in this sense and instead emphasized a new form of moral personhood. Their rituals were distinctive in the manner in which they symbolically separated the individual from his or her social identity and relationships, thus diminishing the significance of ethnicity and social status and creating a direct and intimate connection between the individual's open heart and God. This has proven very popular among the Roma.

The recent success of Pentecostalism in Romania can be interpreted as an example of the appeal of a 'culturally neutral' religious movement among low-status segments of the population, at a time when the historic churches were engaged in 'culturally sensitive' revitalization. The cultural values which were salient in the discourses of the historic churches kept the Roma in a marginal position within communities dominated by the majority. Roma therefore gravitated towards the neo-Protestants—in the case of my research, the Pentecostals. I supported this analysis by paying close attention to conversion narratives (Fosztó 2005; cf. Pelkmans, Central Asia cluster).



Moral Education in Romania and the Republic of Moldova

Monica Heintz

After studying Philosophy at the University of Paris IV-Sorbonne in France (1993–1997), Monica Heintz obtained her Masters degree in Social Anthropology at the University of Oxford (1998) and her PhD in the same discipline at the University of Cambridge (2002). After leaving the MPI she took up a position as Lecturer in Anthropology at the University of Paris (Nanterre).

My project was based on fieldwork carried out in 2003–04 and dealt with the moral education of the Romanian-speaking population in Romania and the Republic of Moldova. I paid particular attention to the transmission and spread of religious knowledge and practices in Romanian Orthodox communities in both countries and their impact on moral deliberations.

The Romanian Orthodox Church is the dominant church in Romania: 87% of the country's population declare themselves to be Orthodox. It is a national church and the often encountered equation 'Romanian = Orthodox' is probably its strongest missionary tool. Moldova is a multi-ethnic country that nonetheless presents a high degree of homogeneity in terms of religious affiliation: 93.3% of its inhabitants are Orthodox. However, behind this homogeneity, several Orthodox churches compete for the support of the population and the state (see also Naumescu, below). Each church is appealing to a different historical heritage to support its claim: the Romanian Orthodox Church through the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and the Russian Orthodox Church through the Metropolitan Church of Moldova. The state's guarantee of religious freedom (since 1992) has not prevented a major conflict with the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia (Heintz 2006, forthcoming).

The links between religion and nationalism are well documented in Eastern Europe (Buzalka, Fosztó above). However, the approaches of historians, political scientists and sociologists, based on the analysis of documents, secondary literature and political declarations, tend to privilege the views articulated by elites. Ordinary people are often unaware of the issues at stake in the nationalist conflicts lurking behind religious conflicts (Heintz 2006). In my fieldwork, I found that most religious celebrations were actually community celebrations and that the key element in sharing sacredness and substance was often food (Heintz 2004). I also showed that in the current context of social instability in the Republic of Moldova, 'civic' norms, in the sense of conformity to majority standards, were more important than moral norms. The question was not which party to a conflict was in the right, but which option promised to cause less trouble (Heintz 2006).

Romanians whose religious education during the Communist period was precarious and whose involvement with church institutions remained weak, nonetheless affirmed their belonging to Orthodoxy and outright rejection of

atheism. High levels of trust in the Orthodox Church were offset by distrust towards local priests and the number of regular church-goers has remained small. The explanation of these paradoxes lay partially in the socialist inheritance, but also in the specificity of the Orthodox faith, where one's relationship with God does not have to be mediated by Church institutions.

The transmission of religious ideas varied between urban and rural areas. My analysis concentrated upon practices of religious socialization and education during the socialist and postsocialist periods (cf. Ładykowska, European Russia cluster, Stephan, Central Asia cluster). There was much continuity between the two, since the Romanian socialist regime was by and large surprisingly tolerant towards religion (Heintz 2004). New religious trends specific to the postsocialist period emerged mainly in urban contexts, where socialist propaganda and policy had been more efficient. Orthodox Romanians gave a variety of reasons for asserting their Orthodox belonging; these ranged from faith in God and emotional involvement with the divinity to nationalistic motivations. Religious faith has become better 'informed' after 1989, especially in the urban milieu, but it has also become much more heterogeneous: incorporated in this faith, but still under the heading of Orthodoxy, one could find elements of Buddhism and New Age as well as nationalism. This 'creolization' of faith was not denounced by the Church (Heintz 2009).

The case of Moldova was somewhat different. After 1989, religion that had survived in the private sphere went public. The first manifestations were the renovation, reconstruction or establishment of new churches in local communities, mainly with local funds and community work. The number of rebuilt churches in Moldova was especially impressive in view of the difficult economic situation of the country and the fact that Orthodox communities, unlike other religious communities, had little or no help from abroad. Rebuilding churches is also part of an effort to recover a cultural and historical heritage and to promote tourism (see Richardson below; Benovska-Sabkova, European Russian cluster). Monasteries, such as Căpriana, Saharna and Țîpova, and churches, such as the Saint Dumitru Church of Orhei, have come to constitute important symbols of the Moldovan state (for instance, they are represented on banknotes). The visibility of the Orthodox religion in public spaces has also increased with the presence of religious leaders at important state events and the presence of crosses and other religious symbols on the roads, on books, etc. While my project uncovered great continuity in rural Romania and a creolization of faith in urban areas, in Moldova, I was able to document a more classical phenomenon of religious revival.

In the two rural parishes I studied—Lăngeşti in the south of Romania, near Piteşti, and Cosăuți in the north of Moldova—I paid close attention to the role of the priest and other local authorities and to the confrontation between the axiological models proposed by the Church (Christian morality) and other cultural models (socialist values, neo-liberal values). I documented the content of moral teaching and the ways in which it was received, negotiated and inter-

nalized by lay people and also their practices, as revealed through 'cases' facing open judgment in the community. In the village of Cosăuți, I addressed the question of whether and how communities could incorporate individual deviant behaviour, i.e. co-citizens who held different beliefs or practised different life styles. I argued that tolerance was possible when the moral law was violated by deviant behaviour, provided that this violation was not perceived as a threat to the community (Heintz 2006). In a context of debates around religious pluralism where the question of tolerance was often posed, I found that tolerance could be achieved via behavioural conformity.

My research in Moldova extended to include moral and civic education more generally, a topical subject in a country massively affected by migration, where many children grow up without parental education and authority. I explore lying in the public space of the wider society, in the local community and in interpersonal contexts and I analyze the education which families provide with regard to lying. This has allowed me to develop a new focus for my on-going work in the methodology of research on values (Heintz 2009).

Case studies of moral behaviour in the context of emigration suggested that immoral behaviour abroad did not come under the same scrutiny as immoral behaviour in the community (Heintz 2007). The illegal aspects of some forms of work undertaken abroad, such as prostitution, did not attract criticism from the community, although such work was seen negatively in moral terms. The civic and moral domains remained separate, with non-civic action not being considered immoral; this confirmed the separation between these two spheres and the general distrust towards the state (Heintz 2008).



Re-orientalizing the Church: Charity and Morality in the Hungarian Greek Catholic Church

Stéphanie Mahieu

Stéphanie Mahieu received her first degree and Masters in Social Anthropology from the Free University Brussels and her PhD at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (Paris) in 2003. In addition to her association with the MPI, she has held post-doctoral fellowships at Viadrina University (Frankfurt/Oder), the European University Institute (Florence) and the Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales (Madrid) where she is currently García-Pelayo Fellow.

My project focused on recent internal changes in the Hungarian Greek Catholic Church (HGCC), the only Greek Catholic Church of the region to escape political repression during the socialist period. It built upon earlier doctoral research in Romania. The data I gathered in the region of Nyíregyháza in 2004–05 have helped me to develop a comparative approach to Greek Catholicism in general, past and present (Mahieu and Naumescu 2008).

Two main trends could be identified within the HGCC: while some activists advocated a return to the 'true' tradition, others defended the *status quo*, that is a combination of Latin and Eastern elements. This tension is nothing new or specific to the HGCC. Like other Greek Catholic Churches of Central Europe, the HGCC is located on the border between Eastern and Western Christianity and presents an original synthesis of the Catholic canon and Byzantine ritual (see Buzalka above, Naumescu below). While officially adhering to the Byzantine rite, these churches have been subjected to Latinization for centuries. However, since 1990, with the Vatican's promulgation of the *Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches*, a liturgical 'purification' aimed at eliminating Latin elements has been actively promoted 'from above', that is both by the Vatican, through the *Congregation for the Oriental Churches,* and by the local Greek Catholic authorities. This has affected all dimensions of religious life: not only the liturgy, but also church architecture, interior decoration and hymns. I argue that Latinization has been opposed more vigorously in Hungary because, unlike the situation in Romania and Ukraine, Greek Catholics in Hungary do not have to differentiate themselves from dominant Orthodox Churches. Instead they can claim a specific niche to offer Eastern spirituality as a more profound religious experience than any to be found within the secularized traditions of Western Christianity (Mahieu 2010). I therefore explored the meanings and consequences of liturgical 'renewal', both for the faithful and for the priests, and the elements which had to be changed (church architecture, interior decoration, hymns) in order to be brought in line with the 'authentic' tradition.

Icons, architecture and church interiors were among the most visible aspects of transformation and probably the field where priests and believers had the most autonomy vis-à-vis the church hierarchy. Since icons are part of the liturgy, any change was bound to affect the overall Greek Catholic religious experience (Mahieu 2010). Moderate 'orientalizers' labelled other activists 'wild Byzantinists' (*vad Bizánciak*). I introduced the term 'charismatics' as a more apt designation of the re-orientalizers within the HGCC, with regard to both the nature of the religious experience they promoted and the transnational dimension of their movement. The term refers to *charisma* in its original sense as the gift of the Holy Spirit and to the atmosphere of early Christianity (Mahieu 2010).

In Hungary, the two trends could not be reduced to a straightforward opposition between elite and people, between modernity and tradition, between official and popular religion or to a generational problem (cf. Sekerdej, Lithuania and Poland cluster). Although almost all the advocates of re-orientalization belonged to the elite, some parts of this elite (including the bishop) defended the *status quo* in order to avoid tensions. Moreover, the classical opposition between tradition and invention was blurred in the HGCC: the advocates of a return to the—sometimes invented—traditions were, sociologically speaking, the most modern people, who live in cities and travel abroad. The quest for a purified liturgy did not automatically entail moral conservatism: in this domain, the HGCC was imbued with an Eastern conception of morality that was very different from that of the Latin Church. The quest for spiritual depth and liturgical authenticity articulated by my informants was more important to them than the moral domain as such (cf. Heintz, above). The fact that Greek Catholic priests did not have to observe celibacy influenced the morality they taught. In this domain, there was probably greater moral conservatism in rural regions than in the cities. More generally, the partisans of liturgical purification were aware that the only way to stem the massive drop in church attendance, especially among young people, was to follow the current trends in European religion and promote highly emotional religious experiences on special occasions. They argued that the Divine Liturgy of St John Chrysostom, the basis for regular weekly services, was deeper and more intense than its Latin equivalent.

Another component of my research concerned charitable activities in the context of Byzantine theology and monastic mysticism. In the postsocialist years, new forms of institutionalized faith-based charity have been emerging within the HGCC, supplementing informal networks and family-based solidarity (cf. Tocheva, European Russia cluster). My main case study centred on a detoxification and rehabilitation centre managed by the HGCC in a village in Zemplén in North-East Hungary. This centre was both an expression of Eastern monastic spirituality and a modern Non-Governmental Organization. Compared with Catholic and Protestant traditions, institutionalized charity has been slow to develop within Eastern churches. The priest in charge of the

detoxification centre openly advocated the rediscovery of the HGCC's Eastern roots. Since arriving in the village with his young wife, he had been trying to change the habits of his parishioners gradually, recognizing that a rapid and radical return to a 'pure' Byzantine form of the liturgy was not possible and perhaps not even desirable. Yet he took advantage of his position to provide retreat facilities for young Greek Catholics from urban areas. Here in rural Zemplén, they could enjoy an intense Byzantine religious experience analogous to that offered in the monastic tradition. The creation of a charitable non-profit organization, in the context of HGCC's single diocese, was an astute way for this priest to gain autonomy from his bishop and room for manoeuvre in the on-going lively debate about how deeply the liturgy should be purged of its Latin elements. I studied similar religious NGOs in two other regions in Hungary (Mahieu 2006). By organizing retreats, linking them to charitable activities and grounding both in Byzantine monastic mysticism, those responsible for the new NGOs have been able to emotionalize religion and promote Byzantine religious renewal without offending their ordinary parishioners. One could of course argue that this apparent quest for Eastern mysticism on the part of a tiny minority of mostly young, well-educated people is not in fact uniquely Eastern at all. Similar emotional and mystical experiences are to be found in the Taizé meetings or the World Youth Days of Roman Catholicism.

In conclusion, the freedom of the HGCC to operate during the socialist period exempted it from the revitalization processes experienced in other Greek Catholic churches, but the re-orientalizing activists whom I call 'charismatics' have played an important role in making the contemporary HGCC a dynamic minority church. Like many other Central and Western European churches, however, the HGCC is confronted with declining church attendance, which is accentuated in this case by the migration of so many parishioners from their homeland in the east to Budapest and western Hungary.

Pilgrims at the Greek Catholic shrine of Máriapócs, Hungary, August 2004.

Modes of Religiosity in Eastern Christianity: Religious Processes and Social Change in Ukraine

Vlad Naumescu

Vlad Naumescu obtained his BA in Social Psychology (2000) from the University of Bucharest and his MA in Social Anthropology (2002) from the National School of Political and Administrative Studies, also in Bucharest. He defended his PhD in 2006 in Halle and has been, since 2007, Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the Central European University, Budapest, Hungary.

My research at the MPI started as a comparative investigation of recent developments in the Greek Catholic churches in Ukraine and Romania. The histories of these two churches are very similar from their inception in the period between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries: both have an ambiguous confessional position between Eastern and Western Christianity, both made important contributions to nation-building processes, both were forced underground during socialism and both made a spectacular return to the public sphere after the demise of socialism (Mahieu and Naumescu 2008b). This revival involved questions of identity, institutionalization and nationalism, but also questions of secular and religious reconfigurations in adapting to more pluralist societies. These factors have resulted in quite different trajectories in Ukraine and Romania since 1990.

For this research project I undertook extensive fieldwork in western Ukraine (2003–2004), supplementing my earlier field research in Romania (Naumescu 2004). The comparison that I had initially planned was modified as I began to appreciate the complexity of the contemporary religious landscape in Ukraine, where the dominant Eastern Christian tradition encompasses not only Greek Catholic, but also several Orthodox churches. Beyond the details of this particular case, I have addressed more general theoretical questions concerning the role of religion in postsocialist societies and religious transmission in Eastern Christianity. My argument, framed by Harvey Whitehouse's modes of religiosity theory, has been based on close observation of religious practice and variation in ritual transmission during and after socialism. I rejected classical anthropological approaches to 'tradition' in favour of a processual model that emphasizes a subtle dialectic between different modalities of religious transmission: imagistic and doctrinal. While the imagistic mode seems more suitable for the underground church, where it was cultivated by priests and believers alike, the revival of the Greek Catholics led to an increase in doctrinal religiosity. In a *longue durée* perspective, however, I have argued that Eastern Christianity is a tradition in equilibrium, drawing on both modes in order to maintain its vitality and the commitment of its believers (Naumescu 2007).

One of the factors which facilitated the successful revival of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) was the pluralist religious landscape of Ukraine, which contrasts with religious monopolies in neighbouring countries, including Romania (see also Fosztó, Heintz, above). Since its independence (1991), Ukraine has maintained a rather loose legal framework for religious groups, which—combined with the low-key involvement of the state in religious matters and the balance of forces between the major churches—has enabled the consolidation of religious pluralism (Naumescu 2006; see also Richardson, below). In order to understand the emergence of 'religious marketplaces' in this context (cf. Pelkmans, above), I investigated a suburb of L'viv (Sykhiv), built during the late Soviet period, and a former multi-cultural Galician town that is nowadays little more than a large Ukrainian village (Shchirets). Both places have witnessed radical secular transformations in the twentieth century, each of which implied new religious contours. I explored successive divisions of originally united communities into two and even three 'new churches' and the re-emergence into the public sphere of formerly banned groups: Greek Catholics, Pentecostals and Jehovah's Witnesses.



In the central square of Sykhiv, churches of six different confessions have appeared since 1990. The Greek Catholic Church of the Nativity of the Mother of God dominates the square, dwarfing two Orthodox chapels—all three resulted from splits in a formerly united Orthodox parish.

While religious pluralism is generally understood in terms of an open contest between religious groups competing for 'believers', I argued—on the basis of my case studies—that, faced with a choice between different churches, Ukrainians typically preferred not to choose one over the others, but to relate to an overarching 'Orthodox imaginary' encompassing the majority of the rivals (Naumescu 2006, forthcoming a). The roots of this imaginary lie in the local tradition of practice and belief, which is the outcome of a long historical process that produced an original synthesis of Eastern and Western Christianity. By connecting to this Orthodox imaginary, Ukrainians transcend newly established confessional borders, moving between different churches rooted in the same tradition. This aspect is well reflected in their low commitment to religious institutions, an outcome of the forced separation between religious practice and institutionalized churches during the Soviet regime. When churches were closed, religious practice became a matter of personal concern and rituals were adapted to restrictive circumstances. Religious life could only be stimulated and enriched by occasional excursions into spirituality, such as participation in clandestine liturgies and visits to apparition sites. Since 1990, the underground structures and imagistic practices developed by Greek Catholics during Soviet repression have been gradually routinized to adapt them to the doctrinal core of the re-established UGCC. Religious institutionalization and the redefinition of religious orthodoxy depended both on the standardization of the rite (see Buzalka, Mahieu, above) and recovery of the memory of the years in which the UGCC was confined to the 'catacombs'. These processes were essential for the establishment of a new ecclesiastical hierarchy (following the marginalization of alternative sources of religious authority established in the underground).

I investigated these processes in the case of the traditionalist movement in the UGCC, a movement committed to maintaining the underground practices of the church and its Latin orientation (Naumescu 2008). This case was a good illustration of the uneasy passage from the imagistic to the doctrinal in the local tradition, which led to much fission and religious unrest. In the postsocialist period, many believers continued to cultivate imagistic religiosity in spite of the increasing standardization of rituals and doctrine. They discovered new sites which encouraged imagistic religiosity, especially monasteries and apparition sites. I followed pilgrims to places where the Mother of God had appeared to local girls, following the model of famous Catholic apparitions, and to monastic communities famed for their exorcisms and healing power (Naumescu 2010). Only there could they formulate personal and collective responses to social changes and express them in a religious idiom. Such imagistic practices, by channelling minor, but cumulative changes into the mainstream tradition, function as a means of innovation and change in Eastern Christianity. Set against the background of doctrinal church practice, they seem to be the privileged mechanisms of change in this religious tradition.

Based on this evidence I argued that religion (as both doctrine and practice) in this case accommodates social changes through specific mechanisms of the imagistic mode (Naumescu 2007). Since believers are not simply passive recipients of 'divine agency', but become concrete agents of change, I also contended that religion is itself a potential source of social transformation. The religious imaginaries generated by imagistic practices permeated the lived reality of visionaries, monks and pilgrims, enabling them to act upon reality and transform it accordingly (Naumescu forthcoming b). Religion has often been seen as a mere substitute for other ideologies or motivations, but I argued that it can offer believers compelling models of change.

The theoretical framework I have used, Harvey Whitehouse's modes of religiosity theory, was suggested by both the nature of my ethnographic evidence and my theoretical interest in the interconnectedness of the individual and society in religious experience. The novelty of the modes theory lies in the connections it posits between cognitive and social processes in religious transmission. To put it simply, the way memory works determines the ways in which individuals come to practise religion. I have used this theory to analyze social reality almost independently of its core psychological components, which I could not analyze empirically. I came to realize that psychological explanations alone are insufficient for explaining complex social phenomena and that the inevitable reductionism of cognitive approaches must be balanced by an exhaustive sociological investigation. Recent cognitive approaches have definitely expanded our understanding of the interrelatedness of psychological and sociological processes, but they are not yet adequate to analyse the complex interrelations between social change and religious experience.



Living Cosmopolitanism? Religious Revival and Local Identity in Odessa

Tanya Richardson

Tanya Richardson holds a BA from the University of British Columbia (1995) and an MPhil (2000) and PhD (2005) from the University of Cambridge. After leaving the MPI she was a post-doctoral fellow at the Harriman Institute at Columbia University and is currently Assistant Professor in the Department of Anthropology at Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Canada.

My project at the MPI was an expansion of my doctoral fieldwork in 2001 and 2002, in which I examined the contradictions of local and national identity in Odessa, a city of one million people in the south of Ukraine. Odessa was founded in the late eighteenth century and quickly became the major Black Sea port of the expanding Russian Empire. As its inhabitants commonly assert that their city is 'multi-ethnic', 'international' and 'tolerant', I wanted to know if such local discourse had practical effects on social relations between people of different ethnicities and faiths in the city. What kind of model of tolerance did this local discourse propose? What did this model envision for the place of different ethnicities and religions in the public life of the city? Given that the genealogy of tolerance in the local ideology can be traced to the Imperial Russia of the early nineteenth century, what effect did it have in a radically different political context? I also sought to show how the discourse of tolerance as a local category related to practices of toleration in the city (see also Buzalka, Fosztó above, Rasanayagam, Central Asia cluster).

Two main avenues were pursued during further fieldwork in 2005. The first line of research explored how differences were perceived and how toleration and conflict operated in everyday spaces, such as marketplaces and residential courtyards in the old part of the city. Odessans consider the historical cohabitation of different nationalities—mainly European—in communal courtyards to have played a major role in the historical production of the 'Odessan character'. In the early 2000s, marketplaces were considered the arena of the most intensive interactions between city residents of 'old' and 'new' nationalities (i.e. migrants from Africa, Asia and the Caucasus). Although the traders interviewed asserted that no conflicts arose among different nationalities, some indicated their dislike of a particular nationality occupying a profitable market niche—most often Muslims from the Caucasus, such as Azerbaijanis and Chechens. In commenting on relations at markets, traders, like Odessans in general, asserted that conflicts did not arise because of nationality, but because of some other issue (personality, economic competition). This type of argument was also used in incidents that appeared to have a clear ethnic element, such as the destruction of Roma houses by their Bulgarian neighbours in a village outside Odessa in the spring of 2002.

Secondly, through interviews with religious leaders, I explored how religious institutions interact with local authorities, perform as political actors and generate or mitigate conflict with other churches or faith communities. One dimension of conflict concerned relations between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchy and the remaining Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant churches. In Odessa, the UOC-MP is the dominant church and possesses some thirty churches and monasteries, whereas the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate has only one church and the Russian Orthodox Church (Abroad) has two. In a representative survey, 40% of respondents identified themselves as Orthodox, while the percentages for Catholic, Protestant, Jewish and Muslim communities were all around 1%. Two informal councils of Christian faiths had emerged since 2001 in order to lobby for common interests in the local administration, counter legislation they disagreed with, such as the law on freedom of conscience, and issue joint statements on events such as the presidential elections in the autumn of 2004. No comparable council had been created to encompass all confessions, although the oblast council did convene more inclusive meetings to which representatives of the Muslim, Jewish and other minority congregations were invited.

The trope of tolerance is evidently part of an Odessan discourse of distinctiveness that circulates images about cosmopolitanism in the Russian Empire as well as tropes of Soviet internationalism. While there may be elements of toleration in the contemporary practices of Odessa's residents, when they call their city 'tolerant', they actually often refer to social situations of the past, such as intermarriage and cohabitation in courtyards during the Soviet period, when differences had been muted through assimilation and an official policy of scientific atheism. With the re-emergence of sharper ethnic and religious differences in the post-Soviet context, Odessans were confronted with the tensions and contradictions that such distinctions produce. For example, the 2004 presidential elections revealed that city residents were susceptible to the tensions generated by contemporary political conflict, just like residents of any other city in Ukraine were.

In combining an analysis of the trope of tolerance with instances of interaction and conflict from everyday life, I tried to show that it was an oversimplification to characterize the practice of sharing and coexistence in terms of categories used in Western political philosophy as examples of exclusively 'positive' or 'negative' toleration. I showed how the Odessan case illustrated not only that in a given situation, different forms of what can analytically be called toleration are at work, but also that local ideas about tolerance are an important dimension to consider when examining such dynamics (Richardson 2006).

Some aspects of the research I conducted while at the MPI were incorporated into my monograph, which addresses the ways in which the cultivation of a cosmopolitan sense of place has generated contradictions in the formation

of commonsense understandings of Ukrainian nationhood. By examining the co-presence and interplay of different histories in schools, walking groups and urban landscapes, I analyzed the production and reproduction of Odessa as a distinct locality and contests over its location in cultural geographies of nation and empire. I argued that, while the Odessan experience is unique, that very uniqueness is nonetheless exemplary for borderland countries such as Ukraine (Richardson 2008).



EASTERN GERMANY

Our Institute is located in Halle, historically one of the most important centres of German Protestantism. The city's famous Stiftungen*, founded in 1698 by August Hermann Francke, have been impressively restored in recent years. The MPI cooperates with the* Franckesche Stiftungen *in fields of common interest, notably Siberia research, to which Halle Pietists made pioneering contributions in the eighteenth century.*

Nowadays, however, only a small minority of the urban population of Halle belongs to a church. The proportion has risen significantly since 1989 but,

despite the renewed visibility of religion in the public sphere, there has been no large-scale religious revival. According to the usual sociological indicators, this society remains one of the most secularized in the world. Atheism is the norm here. Thus Eastern German prisoners who convert while in jail are unlikely to maintain their faith after their release, unless their rehabilitation is facilitated by a faith-based initiative. If this is not the case, those who wish to rejoin the mainstream tend to drop their religion, since in Eastern Germany (in contrast to Western Germany), having a religious affiliation is 'abnormal' (Becci).

Other projects of this cluster uncovered the difficulties experienced in GDR times by religious minorities such as the Jehovah's Witnesses (Rajtar) and by committed Christians generally (Peperkamp). Some were able to counter the negative impact on their educational opportunities and career prospects by finding a niche, away from the glare of the political authorities, in the family business sector (Peperkamp). Conversion to the Witnesses continues to differ from the patterns found in Western countries. Narratives suggest a strong affinity with the utopian vision and absolutist truth claims of the ideologues of socialism (Rajtar).

Catholics, too, were a small minority in the GDR. However, the impact of Catholic activists on the public sphere in the socialist model city of Hoyerswerda was nonetheless significant, both under socialism and after its collapse (Huber). Nowadays, Christian moral ideals can again be transmitted through mainstream educational institutions, which are attractive to many who have no formal affiliation to any church. Yet self-declared Christian entrepreneurs in Dresden insisted that their moral norms were those of a common humanity; they did not derive them from their religious faith (Peperkamp).

Religion at Prison Release in Eastern Germany

Irene Becci

Irene Becci obtained her Masters degree in Social Sciences at the University of Lausanne in 1998 and her PhD in Social and Political Sciences at the European University Institute in Florence in 2006. The title of her thesis was "Religion and Prison in Modernity: Tensions between Religious Establishment and Religious Diversity—Italy and Germany". Since leaving the MPI in 2009 she has been leading a research project on "Religious Diversity in Swiss Prisons", funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation.

In the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the rehabilitation of ex-offenders only began to be seen as a social problem in the postsocialist period. In the GDR, the 'educational goal' of prisons was to 'train' inmates 'politically and ideologically' so that, once released, they could resume the positions they had previously occupied in society. Religion had no role in this model, nor in any general plan for society—indeed, the government was highly successful in eliminating the churches' influence on citizens' lives. A *Reintegration Act*, revolving around employment and housing in particular, promoted far-reaching measures for resocialization. In practice, however, ex-offenders often encountered hostile workers' collectives and inadequate housing standards. The situation of ex-prisoners was hence problematic and religious actors were in no position to help, as they themselves experienced a range of political and social difficulties. During the late 1980s, a movement of church-based opposition denounced the government's repressive policy and the inhuman conditions of imprisonment. Numerous activists were themselves arrested and kept in prison under harsh conditions. However, when unification put an end to political imprisonment, prison conditions faded from public attention.

After 1989, the *Reintegration Act* was abolished and new ex-offender rehabilitation programmes were promoted, which adopted a different logic. Centralized top-down organization in the area of social support was replaced by the subsidiarity principle, as in the West German model. This meant that ex-offender rehabilitation was to be provided from the bottom up, that is, in the first instance by civil associations and only then by state-run structures. This granted church-related organizations a privileged status to shape and implement welfare and social service provision. A variety of civil associations developed—some secular, some denominational. However, while religion was officially proclaimed to be an important resource for rehabilitation, East German society remained highly secularized in terms of religious affiliation and organized practice. The social frame for rehabilitation programmes in East Berlin, Brandenburg and Magdeburg, where I carried out fieldwork in 2006–07, locates religious arguments, practices or thoughts in the realm of the 'abnormal'.

My project inquired into various secular and religious associations that offered rehabilitation programmes to ex-offenders. The Catholic organization *Caritas* found itself pushed to undertake major initiatives, as did the Protestant *Diakonie* and the evangelical free churches (principally the Baptists and the Salvation Army). They received significant organizational support from the West, while local civil activists created independent self-help structures from below. As a result, the emergence of religious and secular actors was coloured with East-West issues and the perception of an imbalance in power relations.

My participant observation of two main groups extended over a year and included work with the social workers of the programmes as well as the ex-convicts they were caring for, mostly multi-recidivists and alcoholics, who had experienced long-term imprisonment. I concentrated on a secular institution which offered ex-convicts housing in the suburbs of East Berlin. All the ex-convicts were East Germans. This area appealed to them because of its marginalized status in the city: it is widely seen as the stage where 'typical' East German problems are played out, such as right-wing extremism, conflicts linked to the Vietnamese, East European and Russian mafias, unemployment and a shrinking population. Another element of the backcloth is the former GDR Ministry of the Interior, whose buildings are located at the margins of this area. Three religious communities have been present in this neighbourhood since before unification: the New Apostolic Church, the Lutheran Protestant Church and a Baptist congregation. The latter two actively participate in shaping the public discourse about topics such as anti-racism and welfare support for the needy. However, only the Baptists had recruited ex-convicts and shown active interest in their rehabilitation.

Unemployment, social isolation and health problems were among the major concerns of ex-prisoners after their release. While I knew from earlier research that religious practice and conversion often develop intensely during detention, I wanted to find out what role religion played once individuals were released: whether contact with religion had an impact on their life-choices after prison, whether this impact varied according to denomination or religion and finally whether religious practice changed after prison. I analyzed both the moral discourses and practices of various confessional and secular actors with regard to ex-prisoners and the wider understanding of the Lutheran Christian churches as a 'prophetic minority', taking its force from history and maintaining a critical distance to the power of the state. This position was crucial for the churches during the political transformation of 1989 and it endows them even today with a mythical aura (Becci 2008, forthcoming b).

I conceptualized rehabilitation programmes as spaces of transition, in-between or *liminal* spaces. The time former inmates spend in the programme is the moment when they realize (at the latest) that their past imprisonment constitutes a stigma, which has to be eliminated, if they are to escape from their *liminal* state. The concept of *liminality* puts the accent on the personal

perspective of inmates and on the way they perceive their social interactions. After having experienced religion in a relatively free way in prison, former inmates need to discipline their religious practices outside in order to fit these into the narrow private, often bourgeois forms which the highly secular East German society assigns religion. While religious practice is encouraged in prison, the opposite is true outside prison (see Becci 2009).

Former inmates celebrate Christmas in Lichtenberg.

Observing individuals' passage from inside prison to the outside highlighted contrasts which are typical of Eastern Germany. Where normality is secular, any form of religious commitment implies being at the margins. This is not the case in West Germany, where being religious is not that stigmatized. East German ex-inmates who remain religiously active therefore remain marginal and rely very much on the ties they have with their religious community. While West-German former inmates (including those of Turkish descent) generally continued after their release to practise in an individual way any religious commitment they had acquired during their detention, East German ex-inmates relied much more on their respective religious communities outside in order to continue being religiously active. Those who joined religious programmes after release appreciated the community dimension they found there, which offered them human warmth and dedication and allowed them to feel appreciated without them having to hide their past. For the Baptists and the Salvation Army, imprisonment was not a stigma. However, former inmates keen to rejoin 'normal' or 'mainstream' society stopped practising after leaving the institution.

My research thus confirmed that local moral and social contexts determine the orientation of individual action. After release, social actors tended to re-align their practice to the dominant norms of the group they felt attracted to or shared an identity with. These themes will be expanded theoretically and ethnographically in a monograph (Becci, forthcoming c).

Catholics in Eastern Germany: A Case Study in the Anthropology of Moralities

Birgit Huber

Birgit Huber was educated at the Universities of Freiburg (MA in Anthropology and German Literature in 2000) and Tübingen, where she obtained her PhD in 2008 with an ethnographic study of freelancers in the new knowledge-based economy. After leaving the MPI in 2009 she took up a position at the Institut für Sächsische Geschichte und Volkskunde *in Dresden, Germany.*

Like the Czech Republic, the former GDR is considered to be highly 'de-Christianized' country, perhaps the most secularized region in the world. The majority of East Germans do not consider themselves religious at all. However, even in very secular countries, there can be much regional variation—an aspect which is often neglected in the anthropology and sociology of religion. Within Eastern Germany, Catholics constitute only 4% of the population. Unlike Protestants, they were not very visible in the period preceding German unification, when Protestant clergy and congregations played a decisive role in the peaceful revolution. But Catholics are nowadays prominent in public, not only in charitable organizations, but also in civil society more generally. Most of their activities are driven by small, but very active groups of religious people. Quantitative data show that a disproportionate number of Catholics are active in local politics. Many Catholic schools have been founded since German unification; they are very popular, not only among Christians, but also among parents and pupils, who do not belong to any church.

The main aim of my project was to analyze the Catholics' impact in Eastern Germany, both before and after the *Wende*. In contrast to studies which aim to verify the secularization paradigm on the basis of quantitative indicators, I focused on the qualitative *intensity* of religious action. My fieldwork in 2006–2007 included participant observation in religious contexts, including interactions of Catholics and their clergy, but also in settings where Catholics interacted with areligious people—obviously an essential aspect in the case of Eastern Germany. I also carried out enquiries into the scope and social relevance of Catholic activities during the socialist period, drawing both on interviews and archival work. The outcome proved to be an ideal case study in the emerging field of the 'anthropology of moralities'.

Among all the Catholic churches of Communist Europe, the East German Catholic Church was the only church obliged to operate in a largely Protestant cultural milieu, in the shadow of a historically dominant Lutheran Church. Catholics in the GDR found themselves in the situation of a 'double diaspora' (*doppelte Diaspora*). They were obviously in conflict with socialist moral frames, but additionally they had to confront major *internal* changes concerning religious traditions, practices and moral frames. Catholics in the GDR

were dispersed. They represented very different social groups, who had nothing in common apart from their faith. The first Catholics had arrived in Eastern Germany in the nineteenth century, when they founded small parishes. Their number increased significantly after 1945 with the influx of displaced persons. Therefore, the Catholic Church in the GDR had to integrate people who had very different senses of territorial belonging (*Landsmannschaften*). Each local grouping had a specific religious and ecclesiastical imprint.

For my ethnographic work I chose a city in which both conflict between Catholic and socialist moral frames and internal Catholic moral dynamics were in clear evidence. Hoyerswerda is located in Saxony, in the region of Oberlausitz. This is a region dominated by strong Catholic traditions, which are also a feature of the ethnic identity of a Slavic minority, the Sorbs, a very visible group during socialist times. Yet, from the 1950s onwards, the city was built as an explicitly atheist project: it was conceived as the ideal city for the socialist worker, free from religion (cf. Sekerdej, Lithuania-Poland cluster). There was no local continuity among families in this newly founded city. Most of the employees of the new industrial complex came from what had become Polish territory (Silesia) and most of them were Catholic. These immigrants brought with them a conservative Catholicism which was marked by a strong influence from specific Silesian ecclesiastical traditions. Most of the arrivals comprised young families in need of housing. Newly founded Catholic groups provided the means for families to meet and establish connections in the new community. By integrating new immigrants, members of the newly founded 'family circles' (*Familienkreise*) helped to define local public life in Hoyerswerda, as elsewhere in the GDR.

The family circles were a striking example of the local development of Catholicism during socialist times. The Catholic Church practised a 'morality of reproduction', in the form of perpetuating traditional ecclesiastical routines and concentrating on its core activity of pastoral care, spirituality and charity. Accordingly, the Church emphasized preaching and liturgy as well as its outreach to the young. This tactic may be regarded as a form of resistance, though it largely avoided direct conflict with the state. The Church's strategy could be summarized as 'follow your conscience, make no compromises, stand by the church'. The clergy tried to instil this attitude in lay circles, especially through religious education, which had to take place outside school. Catholics were morally embedded in their parishes, but also in religious groups independent of the parish. I found that some of the most important of these groups in my region derived from a Catholic association whose traditions originated in the nineteenth century—the Kolping movement; others were newly founded.

The family circles, which were highly relevant for these processes, were initially guided by priests, who concentrated on topics of belief and family life. Moral behaviour was grounded in the Christian religion as the belief in transcendence and in religious revelation in the form of the Bible, which was

regularly consulted. However, these groups also often developed wider circles of associates and opened up more general discussions of how Catholics could be exemplary members of society. Some of these groups, especially those for academics, developed ideals of self-education and reflected critically on the rift between 'modern' science and belief that the state was actively promoting. Some group members became conscious of having to make new choices, thereby calling into question the 'morality of reproduction' emphasized by the Church. Surprising experiments in the creative reconfiguration of daily religious life became possible, despite (or perhaps because of) the total lack of religious information and instruction in the atheist city. In general, to be Catholic meant to be permanently highly visible in several spheres of the socialist public and therefore to be obliged to live an exemplary life. My interviewees often took pride in excellent performance in both work and school. These Catholics also recognized and appreciated such behaviour in atheists.

These patterns created family traditions of public action in contexts of local politics and social and cultural work. A common striving for civility, including networking with Protestants and with non-religious institutions, was accentuated by racist attacks in Hoyerswerda in 1991 (the first severe attacks of this kind in Eastern Germany after the peaceful revolution). Of great importance for the city were two educational institutions which were subsequently founded. The independent Christian grammar school had a board of trustees consisting of members from both denominations. A third of the pupils were Catholic, a third Protestant and a third were not affiliated with any church. The Catholic nursery school was very popular with both citizens who were not part of a church and committed Christians. This kind of ecumenism drew on Christian traditions which were negotiated and practised at the grass-roots level in socialist times. (In the 1980s, with the Pope's encouragement, bishops in the GDR had stressed a new openness to Protestants.)

I found that the Catholic Church was now meeting the needs of not only third-generation Catholic youth, but also of areligious people. The conservative 'morality of reproduction' practised by Catholic priests during socialist times, which had been effective in reaching out to the young and in communicating religious knowledge, has thereby created a basis for current 'experiences of self-transcendence' (a term I borrow from Hans Joas). I observed that children in the nursery school were taught to pray from the very beginning of their attendance. Prayer is a practice which does not need any religious knowledge, but provides the basis for the children's future religious education. The performance power of Catholic rites and their emotional aspects, with which a-religious parents also come into contact in the nursery school, made for a striking entry into Catholic traditions. Parents often described this as 'religious atmosphere', which intrigued them. (Quantitative data show that all over Eastern Germany, areligious people are generally interested in religion and well disposed towards it.)

Within the context of the explicitly Christian oriented grammar school, it was not so much the emotional, but the reflexive moment of religion which counted. The paramount value was a kind of tolerance which emphasized the uniqueness of every pupil, which is in line with Catholic theology. At the same time, there were conscious attempts to implement moral practices reaching beyond self-realization and explicitly recognizing responsibility for others and the environment. To prevent educational practice from ending up in an amorphous humanism without any religious grounding and to prevent the Christian religion from degenerating into simple folklore, the head of the school, together with some parents and priests (most of them members of the school's board of trustees) were continuously developing counter measures. These included basic religious education for all teachers and the invention of new Christian rituals designed to inculcate responsible Christian conduct in both teachers and pupils (cf. Ładykowska, European Russia cluster, below).

Catholic children enacting a scene from the Bible during a pilgrimage.

To sum up, I was able to observe a process with relevance far beyond the Catholic minority in Hoyerswerda, a city which was the distinctive creation of the German socialist state. The clear interest and willingness on the part of people not affiliated to any religious denomination to look to explicitly Christian institutions for moral precepts reveal a pattern that could spell the future of Christianity in Germany generally. This does not mean that such persons are likely to join the church as an institution. Churches themselves react to this situation by trying to integrate this section of the population, without modifying their own clear Christian position. The question of what it means to be an *active* Christian without belonging to any institution will be expanded theoretically and ethnographically in a monograph (Huber, in preparation e). One aspect of this investigation will focus on the possible emergence of a 'supra-denominational milieu'.

Business and God in Saxony: Life Histories and Moral Narratives of Christian Entrepreneurs

Esther Peperkamp

Esther Peperkamp obtained her MA at the University of Nijmegen in 2000. In 2006, she completed her PhD in Anthropology at the Amsterdam School of Social Science Research (ASSR) with a study of a Catholic youth movement in Poland. She is now a Lecturer at the University of Applied Sciences in Breda.

The political changes after the *Wende* and the unification of East Germany with West Germany significantly affected the lives of East Germans in many respects. The relationship between the two fundamental domains of economy and religion has been a fundamental concern of the social sciences since the pioneering contributions of Max Weber. In postsocialist societies, including the former GDR, entrepreneurship stood for capitalism and religion was 'the opium of the people'; the state was implacably opposed to both. Most private enterprises were nationalized in successive waves, leaving only the smallest ones intact. Confessing one's religion brought with it severe limitations, in particular in one's educational options and thereafter in one's professional career. After 1989, new opportunities (as well as new dangers) arose in both these spheres, which also became connected in new ways. In the economic sphere, some people could finally realize their dream of becoming self-employed (others became self-employed out of necessity, as their jobs had disappeared). Those with an entrepreneurial spirit tended to welcome the opportunities provided by the political changes. Active participation in church and religious matters no longer had negative repercussions for the life course and there was even room for Christian initiatives in the economic sphere, such as Christian business organizations.

My research project on Christian entrepreneurs in Saxony looked at the experiences of believing and practising Christians during socialism and capitalism. I documented how religious conviction had influenced their career choices and mobility. I also addressed the problems and moral dilemmas these entrepreneurs encountered while conducting business in contemporary Germany, together with the way they presented themselves as believers, entrepreneurs and individuals (Peperkamp, forthcoming a; cf. Köllner, European Russia cluster). The introduction of a market economy and consumer society after 1989 challenged many values with which East Germans had been brought up—including the stereotype of entrepreneurs as greedy capitalists. Changes in both the economic and the religious sphere raised the questions of how the private and public dimensions of religion were experienced in the labour market and to what extent experiences during the GDR were relevant for understanding new articulations of God, work and 'world'. I soon realized that self-

employed Christians had held on to many elements of what could be called 'secular morality', infused by their experiences in the GDR.

The project was carried out in 2006–07 in Saxony, a region with rich industrial and religious traditions. Almost fifty interviews were conducted with owners of small-scale enterprises as well as with persons active in organizations of Christian entrepreneurs and with pastors. (Members of other religions were very few in number and therefore not included.) Contact was established through Christian business organizations, which had been established throughout Eastern Germany on the West German model in order to provide moral and practical support for the anticipated revival of business activities.

The social background of the interviewees was diverse. Some had a working class background; very few belonged to the intelligentsia. A couple of interviewees had fathers or brothers who were pastors, preachers or priests (depending on the denomination). The majority had been raised in the Christian faith; some came from atheist families, some of whom had included members of the Communist Party. Most interviewees had been trained in a technical occupation or a craft. Some had remained in their former jobs as carpenters or technicians, while others had changed jobs and moved into new fields such as advertising, office equipment, management consultancy, real estate, ecological consultancy or shop keeping.

As Christians who did not conceal the fact that they were religious, the interviewees had all experienced discrimination in their education and professional careers, with consequences that persisted after 1989. All had refused at some point in their lives to participate in state organizations. For some, this was a refusal to join the Pioneers, for others it was the next grade up, the FDJ (the youth organization), whereas others had joined these, but taken a stand when they refused to take part in the secular coming of age ritual (*Jugendweihe*). For men—the majority of my interviewees were men—serving in the army was also an issue. Positioning oneself as a Christian in this way often had the consequence of being denied admission to high school and thereby access to university. Although in theory it was possible to petition for admittance, most chose instead to give up their ambitions for higher education and opt for vocational training. Some were able to gain a place at university by combining vocational training with the *Abitur* diploma. Nonetheless, disproportionate numbers of practising Christians ended up in vocational training courses and in manual labour. Private businesses faced serious limitations, for example, regarding the number of employees they could hire or the taxes they had to pay. Despite these difficulties, a self-employed *Handwerker* could occupy a non-political niche, which was attractive, even before the *Wende*. Two kinds of motivation were stressed: some simply hungered for freedom—for not having a boss and for taking their own decisions—while for others, being self-employed meant being more or less sheltered from the state.

The narratives I collected provided far more nuance about Christians' experiences in the GDR than stereotypes of repression. The interviewees did not

speak in terms of resistance and compliance. They presented themselves neither as victims nor as collaborators. They were the authors of their own lives, both in the GDR and afterwards. They had a strong attachment to moral autonomy, which found expression in their relations to the church and to religious authority. Protestant interviewees tended to move from church community to church community; some even stated that their beliefs were a mixture of various (including Catholic) elements. One man described himself as a convinced Christian with some "rough edges" and his "own opinions". A Catholic woman emphasized that she had her own opinions about matters such as whether mothers should work and whether stores should be open on Sundays. She went to church when it suited her, adapting church attendance to the irregular pattern of her professional life. Another man, who was very critical of the Catholic Church as an institution, said that he was not in fact a staunch Catholic: "I'm a Christian, but not a Catholic."

Exhibits at a Conference for Christian Managers in Leipzig.

I have used the word 'integrity' to capture the general sensibility among East German Christians of various denominations. Personal integrity was repeatedly stressed in accounts of their (professional) experiences, both in the GDR and in recent years. One woman, for example, had rejected Party membership because she did not think that she could be both a Christian and an atheist. When asked how religion influenced his work, a man stated that he could not "live in two worlds". Integrity also extended to experiences with non-Christians. The divide between Christians and socialists was not seen in

terms of black and white. Interviewees said that the best contacts they had with non-Christians in the GDR were often with dedicated Communists. Such individual experiences shaped their attitudes towards fellow workers and worldviews in general. What mattered was to be *menschlich* (human/humane) and even if evangelization was expected (depending on the denomination), my interviewees were very reluctant to do so. They preferred subtler ways of communicating their faith.

The faith of the self-employed Christians in Eastern Germany was thus a form of privatized religion. Even if most interviewees subscribed to the importance of religion, in particular in relation to moral (humane) behaviour, they did not make this link explicit or public. They hesitated to attribute their moral principles to the religion they adhered to, preferring instead to regard these as generally valid. In this respect, one could speak of a thoroughly secular morality that seems to be specific to the former GDR and today's Eastern Germany (Peperkamp, forthcoming b).

‘Heaven on Earth’: Conversion and Morality in Eastern Germany

Małgorzata Rajtar

Małgorzata Rajtar obtained her MA in Ethnology at the Department of Ethnology and Cultural Anthropology at the University of Warsaw in 2000. In 2006 she completed her PhD in the Humanities (Sociology) at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw with a study of rural popular religion and ethics. She is now a Collaborator of the Research Group on Culture and Lifestyles at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at the Polish Academy of Sciences.

My research project examined the moral issues behind processes of conversion to the Jehovah’s Witnesses, an active and relatively large religious minority in Eastern Germany. Drawing on life histories to analyze the interplay between socialist and religious ideologies, I paid particular attention to the emotions experienced during the process of conversion. My findings have also illuminated other issues, such as socialization and religiously and socially constructed gender patterns related to work. My research methods consisted of participant observation, biographical and semi-structured interviews and textual analysis. The project was conducted in 2006–07 in the region of Chemnitz, Saxony.

Karl Marx Bust in the centre of Chemnitz.

Chemnitz (Karl-Marx-Stadt between 1953 and 1990) is nowadays a city of about 240,000 inhabitants. It is a good example of an Eastern German city that was deeply influenced by both the socialist ideology of production and rapid social and everyday life changes in the wake of unification. Moreover, Chemnitz and the *Chemnitzer Land* (the area around the city) host the highest population of Jehovah's Witnesses in Germany. According to the organization's own statistics, of about 163,000 active members living in Germany, over 13,000 live in Saxony (figures of January 2007). This is not a recent development; its roots extend back to the pre-socialist era.

Scholars of religion agree that East Germans tend to be born into 'non-membership': most do not believe in God and have no interest in religion. In the Chemnitz area, being a Jehovah's Witness is 'an act of non-conformity'—but not much more so than being a practising member of a larger denomination. Despite having been banned between 1950 and 1990 and despite having undergone persecution and surveillance, the Witnesses have managed to retain most of their members—unlike Protestant and Catholic churches, which both suffered huge membership losses. There were about 23,000 'publishers' (i.e. active Witnesses) in 1950; in 1990 the number was around 21,000.

Socialists have in common with religious movements such as the Jehovah's Witnesses a temporality which focuses on a particular vision of the future, a 'salvation' which can only be achieved when the 'circumstances' of today's existence are overcome. Relations between the Jehovah's Witnesses and the state have been greatly influenced by historically changing interpretations of Romans 13:1 ("Let every soul be in subjection to the superior authorities"). According to the Society's tenets, Witnesses should obey the laws of the country in which they live, provided they are not in conflict with those of God. On the other hand, however, they should also maintain their neutrality as Christians. A principle of political neutrality did not satisfy the socialist state and the Communist Party, which wanted the ideology of Marxism-Leninism to permeate the everyday lives of its citizens. Abstention from political activity or trade union membership, refusing to do military service, not to mention public evangelizing, regularly caused trouble for the Witnesses in the organs of the Ministry of State Security. However, one sees here a 'misrecognition' of the Jehovah's Witnesses' message by GDR authorities and GDR society. Witnesses' activities were put into the same category as political opposition. In contrast to their self-image as people who 'do not participate in doing certain things', teachers, co-workers, neighbours and even Party members perceived Witnesses as people who were *against* the political system. This misrecognition was particularly visible when Witnesses refused to do military service. My interviewees stressed that they had been arrested, but when they had explained that their refusal was based on grounds of conscience and religion rather than on political reasons, the situation was swiftly resolved.

Adult Witnesses and their children do not as a rule participate in any political or national activity. During the GDR, Witness children did not take part in

socialist organizations such as the Pioneers or the FDJ (cf. Peperkamp, above) Neither did they participate in the socialist coming of age ritual, which was introduced in 1954–55. Witness parents could not help but be caught up in the educational discourse of the socialist state, a discourse which conceived of the educational process as not only an instrument for transmitting knowledge, but also, and primarily, as the instrument of a socialist upbringing (Rajtar, forthcoming b). Among the goals of socialist ideological education were the concepts of the 'new man' and the 'new socialist personality', which can be characterized as a mixture of patriotism, humanism, collectivism, a socialist attitude to work and responsibility to the Party. The 'ten commandments' of the Pioneers stressed the values of diligence and discipline as well as socialist duty. Loyalty to the state and a socialist attitude were generally considered to be more important than school grades. In these ways socialists pursued their own vision of 'Heaven on Earth'.

Conversion to the Jehovah's Witnesses during the GDR and after the *Wende* was quite different from conversions in Western European countries or post-socialist Poland. It is commonly assumed that Witnesses work with the existing religious views of prospective members, who seldom have agnostic or atheist backgrounds. By contrast, I found that in Eastern Germany, people lacking any religious background or affiliation were the very people who were generally more approachable and ready to listen. Many converts I talked to had not been conscious 'religious seekers'. Convinced that religion was the opium of the masses, they usually connected it with established churches and/or with political opposition. Witnesses 'approached' and 'found' people who were not 'religious seekers' (although they were 'seekers') or had heard about this religious minority before. They did so primarily through their door-to-door proselytizing, which distinguishes Witnesses from the major denominations.

While examining converts' narratives I focused on the evolution-versus-creation issue that played an important role in many conversion accounts (Rajtar 2009a). I realized that 'evolution' stood for a more complex set of questions concerning the purpose of life and the justification of individual action and being in the world. Some interviewees claimed that their parents had never explained to them why they had to do things in one way rather than another. Hence the impact of a Witness publication designed for non-believers/atheists: "Did man get here by Evolution or by Creation?" (1st edition in 1967). Interviewees emphasized that this publication had 'opened their eyes' and generated an interest in Witness teaching. The 'creation option' did not contradict or undermine interviewees' scientific interests, but rather enabled them to re-contextualize their scientific views within a religious worldview. The reasoning which both this book and Witness preaching employed resembled the kind of scientific reasoning to which interviewees had become used during their socialization in the GDR. The authority of the Bible was no different in principle from the authority of father's newspapers or the scien-

tific arguments for evolution taught in biology classes. Each presented itself as the unique source of 'true knowledge'.

Finally, during my research I became interested in the ways in which emotions are used in the organization. In most of the scholarly literature as well as in the general public's view, the Jehovah's Witnesses are perceived as serious people concerned with finding the truth in a rational way. I argue that, at least for Eastern German Witnesses, morality and emotions are mutually constitutive (Rajtar, in preparation a). For Witnesses, love and emotions go hand in hand with the observance of rigorous moral standards. What has escaped scholars' attention is the fact that, for the Witnesses, the Bible is the charter for both morality and emotions. Drawing on Durkheim's notion of collective effervescence and Collins's notion of emotional energy, I have called the Bible the 'sacred object' of the Jehovah's Witnesses (Rajtar 2009b).

A biblical drama enacted at a congress of Jehovah's Witnesses in Chemnitz, July 2007.

EUROPEAN RUSSIA

Like Eastern Germany, and in contrast to the Catholic territories which separate them (see the Lithuania and Poland cluster below), European Russia has long had a dominant Christian church that has not been subject to control by an ecclesiastical hierarchy with its centre elsewhere. The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) was harshly (albeit inconsistently) repressed under socialism, but—like the Lutheran Church in Eastern Germany—it emerged strongly as a political force in the late 1980s. Here, however, the similarities would appear to end. The revival of Orthodoxy has continued well beyond the political revolution and penetrated deeply into Russian society. The projects of this cluster illuminate these on-going processes in a variety of settings, including a number of small towns with a distinctive place in Orthodox history (Benovska-Sabkova, Köllner, Komáromi). Some researchers worked closely with specific parishes and parish groups, where they explored new patterns of charity (Benovska-Sabkova, Tocheva) and attempted to gauge levels of religiosity by distinguishing 'core' groups from the much larger population of occasional church-goers (Komáromi, Tocheva). Links between business and religion seem deeper here than in the Eastern German case, e.g. companies may or-

ganize pilgrimages for their workers (Köllner). However, some religious people protest when they perceive that the sacred is being instrumentalized for profane purposes. Even the posting of prices for rituals and the sale of religious memorabilia in church shops raise sensitive issues (Tocheva). Nevertheless, given chronic underfunding, the ROC needs all the help it can get to maintain and expand its infrastructure. It therefore looks to the state as well as to the new private sector. Close links to national identity have evidently deepened in the Putin years (since 2000) and were conspicuous in most of the field locations. This is the means by which Orthodoxy is entering the curriculum of nominally secular schools in Rostov (Ładykowska). The new harmony of church and state may take benign forms, e.g. the construction of new monuments (Köllner) or in kraevedenie*, the celebration of local cultural heritage and discovery of new heroes and martyrs (Benovska-Sabkova). However, it can also take the form of virulent conspiracy theories which mix the religious and the secular and depict Holy Russia as sullied by new foreign enemies (Komáromi). One obvious symptom of this chaos to many is the spread of the AIDS/ HIV virus in Russia; the ROC has engaged itself actively to help those infected (mostly drug addicts) to become new, Christian moral persons (Zigon).*

The Strategies of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Context of Religious Revival in Russia

Milena Benovska-Sabkova

Milena Benovska-Sabkova is one of Bulgarian's best known anthropologists. She was educated at the Faculty of Slavic Philology at the University of Sofia "St. Kliment Ochridski", from which she graduated in 1975. She is currently Professor of Ethnology at the New Bulgarian University and Senior Research Fellow at the Ethnographic Institute (with Museum) of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. The project she describes here was an Associated Project of our European Russia cluster.

In 1988, celebrations marking the millennium of the baptism of Kievan Rus' took place in Moscow. They gave a massive boost to the 'return to religion', which has been an uneven and contested process ever since. This process is often described as a 'religious revival' (*religioznoe vozrozhdenie*) and I have adapted this term analytically to provide an overarching frame, within which to investigate heterogeneous manifestations of religious life in Russia after more than seventy years of more or less strict atheist policies.

My project involved two quite short periods of fieldwork (September 2006 and July–August 2007) in the city of Kaluga, which is located 180 km from Moscow and has about 350,000 inhabitants. Research was carried out in two of the city's parishes. The strategies of the ROC were addressed at two levels: 'from above', actions were designed to further clerical interests and power ambitions; 'from below', questions were posed by parishioners and other laity, to which the ROC had to find answers.

The 'religious revival' in Kaluga has developed in two main dimensions, which were both opposite and interrelated. First, there was the aspiration to reconstruct an idealized, abstract and invented 'glorious past' of (pre-Soviet) religious traditions. Secondly, the ROC has had to adapt to the realities of everyday life in the context of a globalizing world and a globalizing country. The co-existence of these processes often brought dissonance and internal tensions in religious life.

I found that the ROC's ambition to reinstate and strengthen its institutions and its attempts to reconstruct pre-revolutionary structures were clearly discernible in the local context. Numerous Orthodox educational institutions functioned in Kaluga: an Orthodox grammar school, a seminary, a theological evening class for adults—to mention but a few. Most Orthodox institutions bore the names of their pre-1917 predecessors. Expanding the numbers of priests and church workers was one crucial task. In Kaluga, the Women's Eparchial School (later renamed the 'Spiritual School of Kaluga') illuminated these intentions most clearly. It had restarted its activities in 1996 and, at the time of my fieldwork, it was providing instruction to three classes of religious

experts: conductors of church choirs, icon painters and Sunday school teachers. Yet the School's ostensible *raison d'être* was to educate the wives of future priests.

As elsewhere in Russia, reconstructing old churches and building new churches were the most visible aspects of the religious revival (cf. Tocheva, below). Some aspects of this process showed that references to the past could be used as means of legitimation for social practices which were new and had only recently been introduced. Certain monastic practices have been accepted into the life of the parish communities, since monasticism was often perceived as an ideal model to emulate. One of the manifestations of this strategy was to build separate dining rooms called *trapeznaja* at churches, thereby adapting a term associated with the monastic order. The rules of how to behave in the *trapeznaja* during feasts (attended mainly by the core of devout parishioners; see Tocheva, below) also followed monastic patterns: communal meals were preceded and concluded by a choir singing prayers; the meals were of rather short duration and were eaten in silence, accompanied by a reading from the lives of the saints. The introduction of religious services according to monastic patterns (typically lasting three and half hours) in some of the city churches of Kaluga was an expression of the same trend.

Kaluga parishioners enjoying a festive lunch at the end of a fasting period, while reading the lives of the saints.

When the past was used as a point of reference for current religious practices, intensive 'memory work' was only to be expected (see also Köllner below) The politics of memory in Kaluga could be described in terms of an interplay between different institutions and social actors at the local and national levels. I addressed different manifestations of the politics of memory as an intersection of religious and secular activities. I paid particular attention to the proliferation of *kraevedenie* (expertise in local history and cultural heritage) and the worship of the 'special dead'—martyrs and heroes (Benovska-Sabkova 2008). Church *kraevedenie* gained momentum after 2000, after president Putin had come to power, determined to strengthen nation-affirming views in Russian society. Church *kraevedenie* was also an aspect of the return to Orthodoxy as (historic) identification, filling the vacuum left by the collapse of Soviet political identity (Benovska-Sabkova 2009). I found that ROC *kraevedenie* developed mostly in a secular milieu, although in close cooperation with local clergy. These initiatives involved investing efforts to discover the locations of vanished churches and monasteries and to retrieve the names of deceased priests from oblivion. Church *kraevedy* (individuals involved in *kraevedenie*) contributed to the sacralization of half forgotten legends based on popular renderings of fateful historical events.

The activity of *kraevedy* also extended to the practice of worshipping the 'special dead': martyrs and heroes. Clergy played a key role in this process. I have addressed particular forms of venerating the dead: activities regarding the canonization of new martyrs, 'shined up' during the Soviet period (i.e. victims of atheist repression). I documented the project for creating the Centre of the New Martyrs of Kaluga as a *lieu de mémoire* as well as the construction of narratives dedicated to new martyrs: hagiographies or legendary texts, set out in texts or narrated orally. My observations confirmed the significant role of the 'religious entrepreneur' who acts as an intermediary between clergy and laity. Canonization practices in Kaluga included the identification of graves and the identification of the dead bodies. The aim was to achieve personalization by identifying graves and body remains, but this was a symbolic as well as a physical process, without which the dead bodies would not obtain the status and aura of martyrs and heroes. While in principle martyrs belonged to the religious sphere and heroes to the secular sphere, in practice there were similarities and interplay between these two categories. Narratives revealed new martyrs through the prism of hero worship, while (secular) heroes could acquire the aura of martyrdom. The Russian solution to the problem of reconciling irreconcilable historical legacies often required using the narrative of martyrdom as a tool to reappraise the traumatic experiences of past atheist repression of clergy and believers. Thus the Orthodox project of shaping social memory contributed to the larger societal project of elaborating a positive vision of the past (Benovska-Sabkova 2010b).

Despite the idealization of the past and the clergy's ambitions to impose 'pure' Orthodoxy, the realities of everyday life in Russia demanded that the

ROC develop strategies for adaptation. An important aspect of this was the concern about practices which were part of the Soviet legacy. Lack of conflict and a flexible approach to the Soviet past were well demonstrated by the transformations which the former pioneer camp *Koster* (bonfire) has undergone. Located just outside Kaluga, this camp was acquired in 1998 by the local authorities, who handed it over to the Eparchy. It then continued to operate as the "Orthodox Youth Centre *Zlatoust*" (St. John Chrysostom).

It is no secret that charity has contributed significantly to the public legitimation of Russian religious communities in recent years and to helping new groups to find a place in the 'religious market' (cf. Mahieu, East-Central Europe cluster). I interpreted charity too as a kind of adaptive strategy. The ROC's financial resources were totally insufficient for running large-scale charities (and in any case reconstructing and building churches had higher priority). However, the Orthodox sisterhood (*sestrichestvo*) "St. Elisaveta Fyodorovna" had developed important charitable projects in Kaluga. In the parishes, by contrast, charity played only a rather peripheral role (see also Tocheva under review a and b). The sisterhood looked after the residents of a retirement home and organized a daily soup kitchen for about seventy *bomzhi* (homeless people). The financial resources of the sisterhood were limited (they depended on donations and on the local *Kazansky* convent), but they invested significant personal efforts and offered a systematic programme of catechization.

Orthodox parishes are by definition social communities based on religious commitment. They have developed as complex social institutions, combining religious and educational practices with economic and charitable activities. The scale of the economy of Kaluga's larger parishes was comparable to that of a small enterprise. The parish priest of the church of the "Shroud of the Holy Mother" not only ran a *trapeznaja*, but also a small kindergarten. The priest's children and the children of the builders who were reconstructing the church were educated there. In terms of finance, the parish had to rely on its own income and donations. Matushka, the priest's wife, was the editor of a religious newspaper, *Vera molodyh* (Faith of the Youngsters), aimed at the young. The Sunday school of the parish had the reputation of being not just the largest in Kaluga, but also the best organized. This parish paid special attention to religious activities for children and young people. A significant part of its daily activities—the upkeep of the church building, the kindergarten, *trapeznaja*, newspaper, Sunday school, etc.—depended on the voluntary work of parishioners. However, some activities were carried out by permanent employees. This kind of economy, operating in the spaces between the sacred and profane, was based on a constant process of negotiation between the clergy and the most committed parishioners (cf. Tocheva, below).

Entrepreneurship, Religion and Morality in Contemporary Russia

Tobias Köllner

Tobias Köllner completed his MA in Political Science, Sociology and Social Anthropology at the University of Leipzig in 2005. The project described here is the basis of his doctoral dissertation, which is currently being completed. In October 2009 he started work as a Research Associate at the Institut für Strukturpolitik und Wirtschaftsförderung *in Halle.*

In this project, based on fieldwork in the city of Vladimir in 2006–07, I examined the interrelation between two apparently independent and, according to widespread local opinion, mutually exclusive social phenomena: the religious revival and the re-emergence of private economic activity. Post-Soviet Russia underwent both processes simultaneously, but the causal relationships between them (if any) remain unclear (see also Peperkamp, Eastern Germany cluster). I attempted to trace the dynamics, nuances and paradoxes of this relationship and its consequences for post-Soviet Russian society, working both at the level of discourses and at the level of practices.

Due to its historic importance, I often heard Vladimir described as the 'heart/soul of Russia' (*serdtse/dusha Rossii*). It was founded in 990 and became the political and religious centre of *Rus'* in the thirteenth century. From these early days, two churches and the Golden Gate are nowadays securely lodged on the UNESCO World Heritage List. In socialist and postsocialist times, Vladimir underwent profound economic, social and religious changes. The socialist modernization project led to intensive industrialization: many big factories opened and a new district was built in order to accommodate their workers, thus changing this small town considerably. After the demise of socialism, many state factories closed down, dismissing most of their staff; others were successfully privatized. Many new small, privately owned enterprises emerged and these were the main focus of my study.

Socialist leaders had regularly described religion as superstition, to be overcome by modernization. The expression of religious commitment in public was banned and most churches were closed or used for other purposes, such as museums, radio stations or warehouses. The situation changed profoundly during the *perestroika* period. Within a few years, the state handed most church buildings back to the ROC. Most of them were in a dilapidated state and required urgent restoration. Therefore, the most serious problem the ROC faced was the financing of its building activities. According to the new Russian Constitution, the ROC was separated from the state and it was therefore not easy for the state to support it financially. However, once Vladimir Putin had become President, the official separation was blurred and the state began to support the ROC in a variety of ways, e.g. by declaring church buildings to be architectural heritage and thus eligible to receive state funds. Nevertheless,

the ROC was still highly dependent on private donations, mainly provided by businessmen. This source was especially important when it came to erecting new church buildings.

Although donations (*pozhertvovaniia*, *dareniia*) and charitable contributions (*blagotvoritel'nost'*) from businessmen were generally appreciated, they were also controversial. Some people questioned the donors' underlying motivations (Köllner, in preparation b; cf. Tocheva, below). Conflicting moral discourses differentiated between monetary donations and contributions in the form of labour: churches built with gold (*na zolote*) or tears (*na slezakh*) (Köllner forthcoming). By shifting the emphasis from the beauty or quality of a newly erected church to the arduous labour which had been expended in building it, those who had participated with their efforts and tears were able to claim moral superiority. Attempts by businessmen to convert monetary capital into social capital and prestige by making lavish donations—prestige was a precondition for those who sought to fulfil political ambitions—were thereby frustrated.

I also examined the particularities of entrepreneurial religious beliefs and practices. In a plethora of booklets and journals, the ROC teaches the crucial importance of daily prayers and priestly benediction (*blagoslovenie*) for virtually all activities. Its concept of 'inchurchment' (*votserkovlenie*) plays a pivotal role (cf. Komáromi, below). This means engaging deeply with the church and following clerical prescriptions strictly. In contrast to the Church's prescriptions, my observations among businessmen revealed a high level of embarrassment about showing religiosity openly and only loose connections with the parish. For most of my informants, attachment to Orthodoxy served more as an ethnic marker and displaying deep religious feelings in public was considered shameful. Despite their obvious absence in everyday parish life, businessmen were, nevertheless, considered to be an important part of the parish. Through their financial support they were able to build personal relations with priests who, in return, delivered religious services, such as prayers, blessings and baptisms, on business premises, in homes or in closed churches. Priests often served as spiritual teachers (*dukhovnyi nastavniki*) and tried to influence the behaviour of businessmen with their advice. However, the priest's role as spiritual teacher was often ambivalent, because, due to their financial importance, businessmen were able to exercise pressure, for example, by choosing priests who desisted from criticizing entrepreneurial misconduct too harshly. Moreover, believers and priests criticized businessmen and their attitudes towards the Church: businessmen were accused of treating the ROC like a client in the market who provided a particular, spiritual service (*dukhovnaia usluga*), with the understanding that 'the more I pay, the more I could expect and get in return'.

*Two entrepreneurs (on the right) asked a priest (left) to bless the foundations of their new business. Blessings with water (*osviashcheniia*) are considered to protect the company from evil and to promote efficiency and profitability. Not only buildings are blessed, but also equipment and sometimes even finished goods.*

Religious revival brought an increase in religious practice and a widespread interest in well-known religious sites, such as former monasteries and sacred places. Alongside other religious practices, pilgrimage (*palomnichestvo*) has gained astonishing popularity in Russia among groups with different social backgrounds, different understandings and different motivations to visit such places. Some businessmen organized and paid for trips to sacred places for the whole workforce—both entrepreneurs and employees. Their motives for organizing such pilgrimages were diverse. Apart from personal religious reasons, the intention to strengthen community spirit in the workforce and educational aspects were also significant. Pilgrimages had varied, sometimes conflicting meanings for the participants: for some employees, it was just a day out, while for others, the possibility of a religious experience was important. Some entrepreneurs sought to bring their employees in contact with Orthodoxy and expected the active participation of the workforce in religious rituals that were considered to benefit and protect the business as a whole. It seemed to me that there were striking similarities with workers' outings during social-

ism, when trips to museums, shopping sites and other places of interest were undertaken collectively by the brigade. Besides providing opportunities for relaxation, the trips' function was to construct a particular symbolic reality. Similarly, collective Orthodox pilgrimages transmitted knowledge about Orthodoxy and Russian history and fostered patriotism and a Russian identity that drew heavily on religious symbols (icons, saints) and concepts such as Holy Russia and *sobornost'* (communality).

On a more general level, I explored the politics of religious memory in many situations: public celebrations, the unveiling of religious monuments and religious readings of historic events (cf. Benovska-Sabkova, above). This often meant that the foundation of a city or other historic events that hitherto had had a secular connotation were now given an exclusively religious interpretation. Again, businessmen played an important role by covering the costs of these occasions. Their personal connections with priests and power holders allowed businessmen to mediate between both sides, when necessary.

All this raised the question about the relationship between the Russian state and the ROC in general. My observations showed that developments on the local level in Vladimir conformed to trends in the rest of Russia. In summer 2007, a monument to Prince Vladimir Sviatoslavich, the founder of Vladimir, was unveiled as part of the national programme "From Kaliningrad to Chukotka". This programme was paid for by the all-Russian charitable fund *Nikolai chudotvorets* (St Nicolai the wonder worker), most of whose members were businessmen; it was obvious that it operated under the auspices of the state. Despite the obvious benefits which the ROC gained from the state's financial and moral support, some local clergymen did not appreciate all the consequences of state interference and voiced criticism in private. They perceived the state's support as a kind of instrumentalization of the ROC's potential to mobilize and unite citizens, which risked jeopardizing the Church's integrity.

Religious and Secular Concepts of Evil in Contemporary Russia

Tünde Komáromi

Tünde Komáromi obtained her BA in Hungarian Language and Literature-Ethnology in 1995 and her Masters degree in Ethno- and Sociolinguistics in 1996, both at the Babeş-Bolyai University in Cluj, Romania. She completed her PhD in Ethnography and Cultural Anthropology at Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest in 2005 with a study of witchcraft in Transylvania. She is presently Assistant Researcher at the Institute of Folklore of the Romanian Academy of Sciences in Cluj.

My project concentrated on concepts of evil in contemporary Russia. The aim was to explore disquieting features of Russian society after *perestroika*. I was interested in how economic and social change is mirrored in fears and which of these fears are tied in some way to religious concepts of the Devil and demons. Both the secular and the religious sphere was investigated, with special attention being paid to Orthodox Christian believers. Fieldwork was conducted in 2006–07 (with a follow-up month in July 2008) in the small town of Sergiev Posad, which houses the Trinity-Sergius Lavra, Russia's most famous monastery, and in two adjacent settlements (Semkhoz, Loza/Podsosino), located not far from Moscow.

Delimiting secular and religious concepts of evil turned out to be a difficult task. Some were common to all Russians, while others were specific to Orthodox believers. Some of these concepts overlapped. The ROC and its clergy picked up and accentuated some of these concepts in their mission.

I found that secular or 'national' demonology contained two main components, both related to political and economic power. The first highlighted the ambiguity of power and its sources, e.g. conspiracy theories concerning Jews and Freemasons. The second expressed fear of poverty and was related to Russia's loss of territory and the economic weakness of all the post-Soviet states, which has led to significant numbers of migrant workers moving to Russia from even poorer neighbouring states. All these fears were strongly connected to nationality and articulated discomfort with cultural change. The resulting xenophobia is not restricted to the Orthodox (cf. Tocheva 2008). Although the expansion of the European Union had given rise to unease, Russians still regarded the United States as their classical rival. Pre-revolutionary ideas and writers such as Nilus (1862–1929), the first to link the Jews to the Masons, were rediscovered. In this way, elements from different historical periods were effortlessly combined: pre-revolutionary feelings triggered by an earlier modernization were revived to articulate today's fear of globalization. The anti-American propaganda of Soviet times had been recycled to foment new waves of anti-Western sentiment. The transnational flow of goods and

information through markets and the mass media was thought to contaminate the purity of 'Holy Russia'.

The second component of the national demonology which I identified was the fear of immigrants from the Caucasus and Central Asia, who generally came to work in construction or sell goods in local markets. Russians commonly called them *chiornye liudi* ('the black people') and I found that older sentiments of fraternity among the people of the Soviet Union had all but disappeared. The state was encouraging xenophobic attitudes by limiting the possibilities for migrant workers to settle and work in Russia.

Poor migrants were by no means the most frequent phenomena attributed to the work of demons and the devil (or of 'dark forces') in the contemporary world. The mass media were held responsible for the general moral decay of the nation by encouraging passions and sins such as alcohol consumption, drug abuse, gambling, adultery and pornography. Most of these ills were ultimately attributed to the same source of evil—Western civilization. But if the fundamental targets of Orthodox demonology were 'Western culture', globalization and the modern mass media, there were also many supplementary targets. They included: the influence of religious (or 'mystical') sects; the use of witchcraft and sorcery; popular beliefs which were 'distorting' proper religious practice (*sueverie*); and the introduction of bar codes and personal identification numbers (PINs).

Dangers were recognized at the global, national, family and personal levels. Orthodox publications on social changes condemned flows of transnational capital, uncovered patterns of international and national corruption and alleged global conspiracies of occult forces. Akin to the everyday practices of priests and spiritual fathers, the Orthodox publications I studied offered moral guidance on Christian responses to contemporary temptations. They prescribed codes of personal behaviour (e.g. regarding sexuality, but also concerning appropriate dress, food and drink) and advised against the consumption of Western goods. Ultimately they aspired to exert influence not only over politics, bureaucracy, the economy, consumption and the media, but also over human relationships in general and family life in particular. Orthodox Christians were expected to affirm the Ten Commandments and to abide by them in their everyday lives.

Certain recent changes at the time of my fieldwork had resulted in a moral panic inside the ROC. Besides the recurrent fear of the Apocalypse (predicted by some local priests), a new wave of anxiety had been caused by bureaucratic changes and a new type of passport. The fear of being controlled through PIN numbers and of being manipulated by chips inserted into the body shook the church at its highest levels. Discussion regarding the introduction of Juvenile Justice (*Yuvenalnaia Yustitsia*) disturbed many Orthodox people in the region, though to a lesser degree. Many foods and beverages were perceived as sources of danger, which could be alleviated, if they were blessed and sprinkled with holy water. TV and the Internet, the main sources

of Western immorality, were to be used with extreme care or not at all. Ideal Christian life was imagined in terms of monastic life (cf. Benovska-Sabkova, above). This was in spite of the fact that many believers have contested such ideals in recent years and turned to their parish priests for advice, in their pursuit of more worldly models of how to lead a Christian life.

As a first step in exploring the interrelatedness of the social sphere and demonology, I tried to define categories of believers and to identify their group-specific fears. Based on interviews with clerics and believers, participant observation and the work of Russian researchers, I initially defined three categories of believer: the distant, the passionate and the balanced. The classification referred to the believer's relationship to the church and her or his religious practice. *Votserkovlenie* (cf. Köllner, above) meant becoming part of the church and becoming religious. However, this process was often obstructed by the forces of darkness. My interlocutors described their battles with the devil who, they said, wanted them to throw away the cross, to drink alcohol or not to attend church services because of the pain in their legs or their spine. Monks and priests at the beginning of their vocation were particularly susceptible to such attacks, but other 'passionate' converts were similarly affected. Such people had often suffered in the course of the transformation process and found spiritual help and a new sense of balance inside the church.

The strength of religiosity can be approximately gauged by observing participation at church services and the extent to which individuals apply religious principles in the course of their personal lives. Using these criteria to define religiosity produced results that were consistent with my initial categorization. The first level was 'distant': these were people who passed through the church occasionally, but stayed only long enough for a quick prayer and to light candles and write *zapiski* for their loved ones, living and dead. A second level, but still within the general category of the distant, involved using the services of a priest for a baptism or a burial. This was prompted by the preference for a beautiful and traditional ritual or perhaps by a Christian vision of death and the soul. Although marrying in a church has high aesthetical value among Russians, this ritual was less popular in Sergiev Posad, perhaps because it implies that the Church should have some control over the couple's sexual relationship, family planning and their children's education. If taken seriously, a church marriage meant being at a much higher level of religiousness, at which one was expected to go to confession and take communion regularly. I found many nuances of balanced and passionate religiosity, including variations in keeping fasts, praying, reading and learning, and involvement in parish life. From the point of view of a secular or non-religious person, the ROC attempted to limit the lives of believers to a very high degree. For the committed religious, it was simply providing the guidelines necessary for a healthy and normal life, which would otherwise be too much disturbed by contemporary cultural 'noises'.

I found that the intensity of belief in demons was proportional to the intensity of religiosity. Individuals with a balanced religiosity were less likely to experience temptation. The passionate type of believer was the most disturbed by demons. Such believers were well catered for in the parish of the exorcist Father Herman, who had an unusually intense relationship to his core parishioners This was an impetuous, visionary community, resting more on fear than on belief and ridden with interpersonal conflicts. While other parishes attracted people who were settled in the city or in a nearby village, members of Father Herman's parish were mostly new immigrants. They had a strong need for the radiation of saintliness and blessing (*blagodat*) from sacred sites, relics, icons and living saints in order to help them to overcome the evils of the nation and the soul.

By contrast, although my project was focused on concepts of evil, I also came across examples of peace and *communitas* at the local level, including a small village community which seemed to have reached a spiritual equilibrium. This community functioned as a kind of civil society: parishioners gave each other practical and spiritual support, under the pastoral guidance of their priest. All social ties, be they family and kin, friends or colleagues, were enhanced and reinforced by church attendance. People came to light a candle for their loved ones and say prayers for the living and the dead, thereby expressing love and care and restoring feelings of security, which have been endangered during recent decades.

The last day of school in an Orthodox grammar school in Sergiev Posad: priests, teachers and pupils gather for a group photo.

'Orthodox Atheist'—Religion, Morality and Education in Postsocialist Russia

Agata Ładykowska

Agata Ładykowska obtained her BA in Ethnology at the Institute of Ethnology and Cultural Anthropology at the University of Warsaw in 2001. She obtained her Masters degree in Ethnology at the same institute in 2005. She is presently completing her doctoral dissertation.

My project addressed issues of continuity and change in the light of changing educational practices in schools and in Orthodox parishes in Rostov-on-Don, where I carried out fieldwork in 2006–07. My research focused on the role of the educators, especially middle-aged Orthodox converts who had acquired their education and first professional experience in the Soviet school system.

In the Soviet Union it was illegal for parents to teach the Orthodox catechism to their children. The state established 'Communist moral education' instead, in order to produce the 'New Soviet Man' (cf. Zigon, below). Soviet educators developed and maintained a distinctive approach to what they referred to as *vospitanie* ('upbringing', 'character education', 'social training'). The abolition of this system was followed by intense discussion, from which it was hoped a consensus would emerge concerning the values that would be taught to children and young adults across Russia.

After a short period in which diverse models of moral education existed side by side in what was now, legally, a pluralist society, a distinction was drawn between *traditional* (i.e. Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism) and *non-traditional* religions. This distinction was employed in the preamble of the law "On Freedom of Consciousness and on Religious Associations" (*O svobode sovestii i o religioznykh ob'edineniiakh)* of 1997. This Law created favourable conditions for the ROC and extended its special treatment. Nevertheless, the Constitution also proclaimed the separation of Church and state and anti-clerical voices were still strong in the wider society at this time. This forced the ROC and 'religious activists' (as they were called) to submit a creative curriculum proposal for a new subject that would be suffused with Orthodoxy, but be eligible for adoption in nominally secular schools. This new subject has been given a variety of names, but the most widespread and popular is "The Foundations of Orthodox Culture" (*Osnovy pravoslavnoi kul'tury*). Its adoption is voluntary, but in most schools, there has been some parental demand for it (or alternatively the school has taken the initiative to adopt it). This was a response to what was widely perceived in Russia as a lack of morality or ideology. Many pinned their hopes on this new course as a 'cure' for the poor moral state of society.

The main focus of my project was the role of teachers in moral and religious education in state schools. Advocates of secular schools challenged those who

argued for the inclusion of "Foundations of Orthodox Culture" in the curriculum. The lines of division in this 'battle' did not necessarily coincide with the teachers' personal attitudes towards religion. While many remained atheist, a significant number have overtly embraced an Orthodox identity. Some of those have drawn on their social capital and organizational skills, built up during socialism, to establish Orthodox schools and courses or to develop a curriculum for the religion-oriented subject which is intended for the secular school. Such 'recycling' among pedagogues and 'culture workers' has been observed in non-Orthodox parts of European Russia as well. I found that it served not only to create a smooth link between the secular and the religious, but also to connect the Soviet past and post-Soviet present into a seamless harmonious entity.

Accordingly, many of the biographies I explored revealed trajectories from atheism to religious commitment, though the individuals did not see themselves as undergoing any fundamental change. Former Communist Party and Komsomol (the Party's youth organization) activists who had converted after *perestroika* thought of themselves as consistently moral persons. Some informants emphasized both structural and ideological similarities between Communist ideology and Christianity; they stated, for example, that 'there was one Party like there is one God' (*odna Partiia, odin Bog*) or that the values of sharing and community and of fairness and respect were at the core of both. Many said that the "Moral Code of the Builder of Communism" was nothing else but the Ten Commandments in disguise. (This Code, adopted at the 1961 Communist Party Congress, laid down twelve moral principles to be followed by all Soviet citizens. Examples were "man is to man a friend, a comrade and a brother"; "honesty and truthfulness, moral purity and modesty in social and private life".) Apparently contradictory sources of morality were combined. The idea that the Communist system had a religious foundation, and/ or was actually an inverse form of religion, was a conviction which people liked to illustrate with examples of how Communist rituals had drawn on Orthodox precursors. When I asked people about transformations, they often responded by pointing to structural similarities between Communism and Orthodoxy (and sometimes to ideological similarities as well, such as the values of sharing or justice). I interpreted this as evidence of a strong notion of continuity in the shaping of the moral self (Ładykowska forthcoming; see also Benovska-Sabkova, above, Zigon, below, Rasanayagam, Central Asia cluster).

During my fieldwork I found that it was essential to look at the broader spectrum of educational activities and at the acquisition and transmission of religious knowledge in general. Orthodoxy was presented in terms of "learning about one's *own* religion". Both adults and youngsters were familiarising themselves with what 'their' religion consisted of; much the same could be said of their priests. The evidently great need for religious self-education and the possibility of transmitting acquired knowledge to others led to the obvious question of how such learning occurs. Therefore I extended my research out-

side state schools to take account of educational activities in local churches. These were aimed at both children and adults, including those about to be baptized. In this context, too, I probed into the educators' life histories—into how they had received their religious instruction as well as the content of their teachings.

Developing a religion-oriented subject that met the requirements of a secular curriculum was by no means a straightforward task: educators agreed that it could only include the 'secular' element of religious teaching, i.e. aspects that were not directly connected to religious practice. This still left a wide range of possibilities, among them the moral teachings of the Orthodox Church; the history of Orthodoxy; and the sociology of religion in general (the net was never cast as widely as this in the schools where I did my fieldwork). Although many publications were available to support courses touching on 'Orthodox culture', almost every teacher I met had written or was in the process of writing her or his own textbook. There was general agreement among educators on the moral potential of Orthodox teachings. The primary role of the subject was to promote an Orthodox world view (*mirovozzrencheskii predmet*). In July 2007, there was an attempt in several schools to re-name the course 'Foundations of Morality' (*Osnovy nravstvennosti*).

'The Pride of Russia': schoolchildren dressed up in traditional Don Cossack costumes, behind them a poster displaying the greatest Orthodox churches of the Russian South.

I found that Orthodoxy, being a vital part of people's national identity, was often understood to be inherent in the national landscape and history. Even self-declared atheists shared a romantic view of the Russian Orthodox tradition (cf. Benovska-Sabkova, above). Yet for many, this intuitive understanding was not sufficient. The project of introducing 'Orthodox culture' into schools was an example of the widely recognized need for a 'proper' education in what Russian Orthodoxy *really* is. Since the canon of Orthodox teachings was not adequately specified by Church traditions alone, there was great latitude in the criteria invoked to set norms and rules. In this context, the need for acquiring religious knowledge has grown enormously.

This short overview allows for some preliminary generalizations. Orthodoxy has gained legitimacy in the Russian public arena and has become a key reference point for personal identity, morality and belief. The ROC as an institution has publicly promoted Orthodox classes to re-educate former atheists and Orthodox teachers, often former atheists themselves, play a pivotal role in the accomplishment of this task. The proliferation of multiple (and sometimes apparently contradictory) messages, all designed to raise new Orthodox citizens, shows a specific articulation of the dichotomy of continuity and change. The theological claim that Eastern Christianity descends directly from the first Christians posits continuity as a foundational principle. Historically, however, Russian Orthodoxy has always been characterized by plurality and malleability. It has reflected the ability of Russian society and institutions to fashion coherence in the course of dramatic transformations, to combine multiple ideologies without ever abandoning the claim that some moral fundamentals never change. This flexibility is taken to its extreme when some Russians call themselves 'Orthodox atheists': the first term signifies their Russianness and 'cultural Orthodoxy' (cf. Hilgers, Central Asia cluster); the second signifies their personal adherence to Soviet anti-religious principles (Benovska-Sabkova et al. 2010).

Community and Economy in Parish Life

Detelina Tocheva

Detelina Tocheva obtained her MA (DEA) in Social Anthropology at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris in 2000. She obtained her PhD at the same institution in 2005 with a study based on fieldwork in Estonia. She is currently a member of a new MPI Focus Group "Economy and Ritual".

The contemporary 'rebirth' of Russian Orthodoxy is a composite phenomenon. It builds on a mix of practices and moral positions, which combine traditional theological teachings, collective and private ethics of everyday life in the Soviet era, experiences of the post-Soviet economic and ideological crises in the 1990s, popular beliefs and subjective aspects. One domain in which this composite character is particularly visible is the parish economy. My project investigated the emergence of church communities, which hold together through reciprocal and unreciprocated support; the fragile equilibrium of the community, which allows the ubiquitous beggars to be relatively integrated in parish life; church trade as a site where fundamental questions about how economic action and ethical values are renegotiated; shifting combinations of encouragement and asceticism regarding the giving and taking of money in churches and among committed parishioners; and the popular Orthodox imaginary of a pre-Revolutionary 'golden past' of the Church, which draws on many elements of Soviet ideology relating to selflessness and devotion to the collective and to the leading institution. I found that I could connect all these issues with two transversal threads: first, the complex nexus formed by continuity (between Soviet and pre-Soviet ideas and practices) and transformation (enhanced by the religious revival itself and by the political and economic changes that have occurred since the *perestroika* period); secondly, the reassertion of the social and moral nature of economic action inside and outside ritual space, studied in a *longue durée* perspective.

I conducted fieldwork in 2006–07 in Gatchina, a city of approximately 80,000 inhabitants, located in the region of Saint-Petersburg (*Leningradskaia oblast'*), in North-Western Russia. The official level of unemployment was low, but this figure was misleading. Many people who needed a job did not bother to contact the employment office, because the allowance was extremely low and only the less attractive jobs were advertised there. Many commuted daily to Saint-Petersburg, situated around 40 km to the north. The town was neither economically dynamic nor stricken by an exceptional economic crisis, at least in comparison with other urban centres of the Saint-Petersburg region. I studied three parishes in Gatchina itself and several others in neighbouring villages. Sociologically and economically, these parishes, their members and their occasional visitors were representative of those urban

and periurban areas in European Russia, where Orthodox revival has been strongest in recent decades.

Several recent sociological and anthropological studies have tried to determine the boundaries and content of recently emerging Orthodox communities. I concentrated on core groups of 'committed' parishioners (cf. Komáromi, above). However, I extended this approach by focusing on certain marginal groups and on much larger imagined communities, whose existence is made explicit through the churches. I distinguished two types of core community (Tocheva in preparation d). The first was exemplified by those who participated in the reconstruction of a church. The church in question had reopened in early 1991, but had remained a construction site for the following ten years. The core community consisted of the clerics, the church workers (many of whom had taken part in re-building the church), new members (mainly unmarried men and women in their 40s and 50s), and committed young couples, who had recently converted, and their children. Subscription to a specific dress code, fasting, adherence to strongly gendered rules of conduct and mastery of a particular religious vernacular were the main signs which distinguished these core members. They were connected by strong ties of mutual support for all kinds of practical matters. Those who were not part of this support network tried by every possible means to show that they were.

The main religious school, attached to the central parish, provided an example of a second type of tightly knit religious community. The predominantly female staff, many of them former Komsomol activists, ran the school in the spirit of an enlightened return to traditional religious values.

What I called the imagined community was another entity altogether. It consisted primarily of ordinary Russians experiencing need and poverty. The popular self-image of Russians was made concrete in 'grassroots charity' that took place in churches: clothes and shoes, household items and other goods for everyday use were brought along and re-distributed through the informal networks of the female church workers. Such practices were widespread in local churches. The clerics regarded them as useful, but unimportant and never referred to them as 'charity' (cf. Benovska-Sabkova above, Mahieu, East Central Europe cluster). These were arrangements put in place by local people, who thought of themselves as somehow tied to each other, even to those they did not know personally. The motivation was not primarily religious. I concluded that most churches were caught up in the practical manifestations of a secular ethos of relatedness. This was just one of the ways in which Russians incorporated the ROC into their local social worlds.

I also found it useful to approach the dynamics of Orthodox communities by looking at groups occupying a space between inclusion and exclusion, between the core community and the unstructured, amorphous, yet individualized group consisting of the occasional church-goers. I focused on beggars, especially apparently younger, able-bodied male beggars who were marginal characters in the churches (Tocheva under review b). Spatially and morally,

they were excluded from the sacred core, mainly because it was considered that they should work rather than beg. This moral stance clearly drew on Soviet ideology which grounded human virtue in work. However, Christian principles which advocate alms-giving as a highly moral act counterbalanced the logic of rejection and promoted a form of inclusion. The tension between these two positions was reflected in everyday practices and created a distinctive liminality. This was just one example of the pervasiveness of the Soviet past and ideology, which continue to shape multiple aspects of social interaction in these communities (cf. Ładykowska, above).

I also analyzed enduring tensions over the sale of religious goods and charging for ritual services according to price lists. Although the ideas invoked in determining appropriate profit margins and acceptable ways of conducting church commerce bore the imprint of the moral legacies of the Soviet period, they were nonetheless subject to constant re-adjustment. I also found that the depiction of honest, devoted and generous pre-Revolutionary believers and clerics was a popular image in projecting the Church's 'golden past' (Tocheva in preparation b). Here, too, it was not difficult to see that Soviet moral standards were shaping perceptions of pre-Soviet Orthodoxy (cf. Benovska-Sabkova, above). In practice, however, the necessities and irreconcilable aspects of everyday life entailed constant adaptation. Renunciation and asceticism could not be rigorously kept apart from engagement in monetary and other economic transactions and the pursuit of profit (Tocheva in preparation c). In everyday life, in complex processes of valuation in which moral and economic aspects merged, they came together to form an unstable balance.

In recent years Russian Orthodox Christmas has become an occasion for people with very different degrees of religious commitment to go to church.

Cultivating Responsible Persons in the Drug Rehabilitation Programme of a Russian Orthodox Church in St. Petersburg

Jarrett Zigon

Jarrett Zigon completed his BA in 1996 at the University of Delaware. In 1998 he obtained his Masters degree at St. John's College. In 2006 he completed his PhD at City University of New York Graduate School and University Center with a study of Orthodoxy in postsocialist Moscow. After leaving the MPI he took up an appointment as Assistant Professor in the Department of Anthropology and Sociology at the University of Amsterdam.

This project examined the role of the ROC in combating the HIV and drug use epidemics in contemporary Russia. It was based on ethnographic fieldwork in 2006–07 in an ROC rehabilitation and HIV prevention and care programme in St. Petersburg. From the perspective of the anthropology of moralities, I investigated such critical issues as therapeutics as self-transformation; religious approaches to the relief of social suffering; HIV and injected drug use in the context of globalization and social change; rehabilitation as moral training and the cultivation of self-governance and responsibility.

A former drug user assists the priest during an Orthodox service in a St. Petersburg hospital for HIV-positive persons.

Since 2001, Russia and Eastern Europe have experienced one of the fastest growing HIV/AIDS epidemics in the world. The number of officially registered cases of people living with HIV/AIDS was over 400,000 at the time of my fieldwork. This number ranked highest among all European countries and accounted for 70% of all reported cases in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. However, most relevant sources agreed that the true number was much higher, possibly well over one million. I was interested in how this epidemic was affecting individual Russians and how local organizations, notably the ROC, were responding to it.

Russia differs significantly from most other countries in the way the epidemic has been spreading. In Africa, the vast majority of the 27 million affected people became infected through heterosexual contact. In Russia, by contrast, an estimated 70–80% became infected through sharing contaminated needles during heroin use. Thus the Russian context differed significantly from the other epidemic 'hot spots' in terms of risk groups, strategies for prevention and education. For this reason, this project focused on injecting drug users as both a risk group and as individuals living with HIV/AIDS and on the ways in which these individuals were attempting to remake themselves through the spiritual-moral therapeutic training offered by the ROC.

Curiously, despite this continuing social and health crisis, the topic has received little attention outside epidemiological circles. Despite the increasing participation of drug users in rehabilitation and therapeutic programmes in Russia and worldwide, very little anthropological attention has been paid to the ways in which drug use and HIV are addressed in such programmes. This project sought to address these *lacunae* in three ways.

First, by analyzing the Church-run rehabilitation and care programmes from the perspective of the anthropology of moralities, this project considered the therapeutic process as a process of making new moral persons. By focusing on specific therapeutic techniques in a particular context, it revealed the ways in which rehabilitants must continuously work upon their bodies, emotions and words in order to cultivate a new moral personhood with which it is hoped they can return to the social world, without returning to injecting drug use. I found that, unlike in American rehabilitation programmes where the emphasis was on the revelation of the true and real self which drug use has obscured, in the Russian context, rehabilitation was understood as a process of self-transformation during which an entirely new person is cultivated. This focus on transformation has roots not only in the Soviet legacy of making the New Soviet Man (cf. Ładykowska, above), but also in the Russian Orthodox tradition of constant spiritual work towards moral perfection.

Secondly, by considering the process of self-transformation in the context of an ROC-run rehabilitation and care programme, this project critically engaged with the convergence of religious and secular therapeutic techniques and strategies within one context (cf. Mahieu, East-central Europe cluster). Contrary to the way in which the ROC represented its programme in official

documents and discourse, the research found that the actually existing therapeutic programme combined religious and secular approaches in a hybrid manner, in such a way as to call into question the modernist distinction between the religious and the secular (cf. Komáromi, above, McBrien, Central Asia cluster). In a country that for nearly one hundred years had been governed by an official policy of atheism, it was clear that religion and secularism were now converging not only in this one particular context, but also in the way in which the government and private sector officials were urging the Church to contribute further to the struggle with HIV/AIDS.

Thirdly, this project found that the increasing convergence of the religious with the secular could also be understood, perhaps ironically, as contributing to the increased influence of neo-liberal policies in Russia. While the ROC publicly condemned the influences of globalization and the West on post-Soviet Russia, my research suggested that the unintended consequences of the rehabilitation process in the Church-run programme were to cultivate new persons who were better equipped to succeed in the very neo-liberal environment which the Church had blamed for the HIV and drug use epidemics in the first place. Thus, while the programme might help individuals overcome drug addiction, it cultivated at the same time subjects' sense of responsibility in order to make them better attuned to a world to which the Church was implacably opposed.



SOUTH-EAST ASIA

Although small, this cluster expanded the framework of our comparisons in several important ways. First, the religious landscape here differs radically from that of the monotheist Abrahamic faiths, which dominate in all our other clusters. The world view in Vietnam and Taiwan is predominantly immanent and there are few central institutions to authorize interpretations of texts and administer the clerisy. (Buddhism is a partial exception to these assertions, but it was not a major focus of these projects.) Secondly, Vietnam is still a socialist country. Unlike the other countries studied by this Focus Group, the expression of religion in the public sphere remains severely constrained by socialist ideology. Thirdly, with Binder's project in Taiwan we deliberately included a case where popular religious practices have never been subject to the disruptions of socialism. It turns out that spirit mediumship has long at-

tracted similar criticism from modernist, secular authorities in Taiwan as well as in the democratic mass media. The practices which nonetheless continue to flourish on that island have also enjoyed a renaissance in Vietnam since the reform era was launched in the 1980s. The authorities nowadays seek to control this activity and channel it for their own purposes (Lauser, Roszko). Here, too, religious rituals are closely tied to collective identities at various levels. However, individualization provides another common thread (Binder, Roszko) and the commercialization of religious practices is ubiquitous. Finally, in his Associated Project, Gábor Vargyas explores religious continuity and change among members of the Bru ethnic minority. Following the destruction of their traditional villages and economy, the ideas and practices of the resettled Bru concerning the maintenance of proper relations with their forebears have largely converged with the ancestor worship of the dominant Vietnamese, as studied in contrasting settings by Lauser and Roszko.

Urban Spirit Mediums and the Construction of Moralities in Modern Taiwan

Friedrich Binder

Friedrich Binder obtained his Masters degree in Religious Studies and Sinology at Philipps University in Marburg in 2005. He is currently completing his PhD dissertation, which he will submit at the Martin Luther University, Halle-Wittenberg.

My research project examined changes in the practice of spirit mediumship in Taiwan. I carried out fieldwork in 2006–07 in the city of Huālián. The importance of mediumistic practice as a fundamental part of religious life in the Chinese cultural sphere has been recognized by many scholars and features in many ethnographies. Yet, studies that focus on mediums still occupy a marginal position, especially if compared with the expansive corpus of works on Daoism, Confucianism and Buddhism—the 'three teachings'. The practice of spirit mediumship has continued despite disapproval and attempts to control it by various governments and their local agents. Indeed, spirit mediumship has flourished in recent decades, along with other popular religious practices. It is clear that modernization does not necessarily lead to a decline of religion. Instead of rendering such practices obsolete, the contemporary conditions have been conducive to new forms of spirit belief and practice. My main focus was the comparatively recent phenomenon of urban entrepreneurial spirit medium shrines. They began to appear in the 1960s (coinciding with the onset of Taiwan's 'economic miracle') and their number has continuously increased—to the point of superseding public temples as the main loci of mediumistic practice.

Huālián has a population of 110,000. The research focused on a shrine whose main attraction is a 'modern god' who can be consulted through the possessed medium. This shrine was known for both its novel practices and its strict adherence to 'true Daoism'. Shrines were managed by individuals in their private homes, where they offered religious services to individual clients on a fee-for-service basis. In contrast to bigger temples, which were often part of large 'incense networks' and thus connected to other temples on the island and in some cases to the Chinese mainland, and in contrast to the veneration of a god in a particular neighbourhood, private shrines were de-territorialized, that is, they were not associated with or representative of a larger social unit. They differed, however, from pietistic sectarian movements which also extended beyond kinship and social ties and practised forms of spirit mediumship, but which had a corporate membership and emphasized moral teachings based mostly on the Confucian and Daoist textual tradition.

Private shrines were mainly an urban phenomenon and the practices associated with them were constantly changing as their operators engaged with their

clients and their clients' gods. They catered for the demands of customers whose lives were marked by the rapid changes and uncertainties of modern capitalist Taiwan, which have affected all aspects of social life. Although this project looked at religious change, it has not attempted to provide a list of what is new and what is traditional. The research examined the dynamics of tradition and innovation as played out in the setting of the entrepreneurial shrine and sought to trace the dialectics of authenticity and authority in various spheres of social interaction. At the heart of the research was the notion of efficacy or 'Líng' (靈), which referred to a deity's responsiveness—or ability to effect changes—to requests from followers. Temples and shrines were judged by their ability to provide 'Lingness'. While Ling could also refer to the 'abstract' quality of divinities in general, it only became meaningful in the concrete exchanges between worshippers and particular deities. In this sense, efficacy was a commodity and shrines were "efficacy service providers"—a term I borrow from Adam Yuet Chau. However, how can divine intervention be provided? Setting aside the possibility that supernatural agents exist, Ling must be seen as a human (social) product created and sustained through the interaction between various social actors; thus I observed that Ling was *done* in a range of settings: when client and the mediated god communicated during possession rituals, when clients exchanged their experiences of the ritual, when they reflected on the words of the deities, when they followed the advice of the deities, when they spread the word about the 'Lingness' of a shrine, when they watched other clients offer to do chores at the shrine to express their gratitude for the help they had received—and in a host of other contexts. Even though Ling was a social product, it nonetheless produced effects, as it affected people's experiences and actions.

From this starting point, a number of sub-themes have been developed. One of the most important has been cultural improvization. Plural and flexible interpretation has long been recognized as a core characteristic of popular religion in China. It is most evident in the varying interpretations of the cult of gods in different social and political contexts. Seemingly contradictory ideas about supernatural agents and how one should interact with them can exist side by side. This project took a processual view, according to which traditions have to be constantly re-made in order to be sustained. Popular religion in China has always been 'on the move', but the pace with which new forms are emerging has accelerated. It was therefore important to ask how these innovations gained social acceptance, despite their 'made up' character. 'The new gods' and their 'modern ways' which I observed during this project, demonstrated an extreme form of cultural creativity, in the sense that the social actors involved were conscious of and expressed the novelty of their inventions.

In addition to innovation, I probed questions of doubt and authority. I found that the public viewed spirit mediums and their shrines with—at best—caution. This had to be seen against the background of, firstly, elite criticism

of mediums dating back to late imperial China and, secondly, the Kuomintang government's representation of mediums as charlatans who clung to outdated superstition and were thus a hindrance to building a modern rational society. In the wake of democratic reforms, attempts to control religious practices in Taiwan have become more relaxed so that spirit-mediumship and other aspects of 'folk religion' have been revived and become a marker of Taiwanese identity. I found that the older tropes still resonated and that the contemporary media often described mediums as charlatans and presented their clients as gullible victims of old superstition. These media images, together with enduring scepticism within Chinese religions and the impact of modern education, have all exerted a strong influence on people's perceptions of shrines. Claims of supernatural intervention were subject to critical scrutiny. This project attempted to show how individuals' prolonged social interaction with other clients and mediums as well as with the gods at the shrine helped them to overcome their initial ambivalence and to make room for different convictions and beliefs.

The interior of a private shrine in Huālián.

Private shrines did not have the communal function of temples and catered for the needs of individual clients with an emphasis on utilitarian practices (cf. Roszko, below). However, I found that providing utilitarian help for a fee was only one aspect. While the clients' initial motives for visiting the shrine might be extremely individualistic and utilitarian, over time, new moral communities were formed among the regular customers. These often had very different

backgrounds, but they identified with the particular teachings of their respective shrines and supported each other. The experience of *comunitas* contributed strongly to the consolidation of a shrine's "Lingness". The 'religious teaching' at private shrines (such as it occurred) did not celebrate individualism, but drew on traditional family or community values. In reference to Marc Moskovitzs's notion of an Asian tradition of "quiet individualism", which differs from modern ideologies of individualism in the West, I argue that private shrines are arenas where individualistic desires (both of the traditional quiet type and of the modern type) are not only catered for, but also shaped into morally acceptable forms.

Ancestor Worship and Pilgrimage in Late Socialist Vietnam

Andrea Lauser

Andrea Lauser received her MA (1984) and PhD (1992) from the University of Freiburg and completed her Habilitation (2004) at the University of Marburg. She has carried out field research in the Philippines and among diaspora groups in Germany. She taught Anthropology at the Universities of Berlin, Bremen, Freiburg, Hamburg and Marburg before joining the MPI in February 2006. In September 2007 she was appointed to a Chair in Ethnology with a regional focus on Southeast Asia at the University of Göttingen.

Ancestor worship, as I learned through conversations with Vietnamese both in Germany and during my fieldwork in Vietnam (Hanoi) in 2006-7, is a ritual practice of high vitality and relevance. On the family level, nearly every household keeps a family altar (*bàn thờ gia đình*), whether in Vietnam or in migration. On the national level, Vietnamese politicians and high-ranking statesmen take a public pilgrimage on the tenth day of the third lunar month, the annual anniversary of the death of Hùng kings, to Phú Thọ province, about 85 km northwest of Hanoi, to venerate the Hùng kings as ancestors and legendary founders of the Vietnamese nation at their tombs and temples in the Nghĩa Lĩnh mountains. The familiar concept of *ngày giỗ tổ tiên* (abbreviation: *giỗ tổ*—anniversary of the death of ancestors) evokes feelings of warmth and thankful obligation: the whole nation shares a *giỗ tổ* centred on the same ancestor.

The New Year's celebration of *Tết Nguyên Đán* is one of the most important and popular festivals among the Vietnamese, both in Vietnam and abroad. Vietnamese travel great distances to celebrate with their families, including the attendant ancestors. All family members, living and deceased, share a meal in front of the ancestral altar. *Tết* is seen on the village level as well as on the national level as *the* festival of all-encompassing renewal and union. In a way both symbolic and real, it marks "communion between man and nature, man and the supernatural, between the dead and the living, and between family, village and nation" (*interview with the cultural scientist and author Huu Ngoc, 22 February 2007, Hanoi*). In recent years, many overseas Vietnamese, encouraged by their home country's improving diplomatic relations, have returned to Vietnam from all over the world to celebrate *Tết* at home (*về quê*). This 'homeward movement' (*về nguồn*) is not only tolerated, but actively promoted in the official policies of 'opening up'.

The cultural and religious landscape of Vietnam has undergone striking transformations in the course of the economic and political reforms known as the 'Renovation' (*đổi mới*). In tandem with intensification of practice in institutional religions (notably Buddhism), there has been a sharp increase in non-institutionalized religious activities, ranging from household rites and individ-

ual propitiation rites at neighbourhood shrines to local festivals and pilgrimages. Life-cycle rituals (including anniversaries of deaths, ancestor worship, hero worship and religiously mediated ethnic, regional and local identities have all gained in importance (Lauser 2008b and c).

One of the most influential discourses on the concept of 'religion' in Vietnam is linked directly with the state. Religion has played a part in legitimizing and reinforcing the state *and* in rebellions against it. The relationship between 'religion' and 'state' is thus best characterized in terms of 'persistent ambiguities' or 'balanced tension'. It follows that what counts as 'good religion' or legitimate beliefs (*tín ngưỡng)* and 'beautiful customs' is continuously negotiated by the state, Vietnamese scholars, the media and local ritual actors. This applies particularly to traditions such as the worship of ancestors, legendary heroes and local guardian deities. Even the practices of the mother goddess religion (*Đạo Mẫu*), also called 'Religion of the Four Palaces' (*Đạo Tứ Phủ*), which had been illegal as superstition (*mê tín*) due to central rituals of spirit possession (*lên đồng*), were revitalized and have become an extremely popular ritual practice.

In my project I hypothesized that contemporary ancestor worship was a dense, multi-layered phenomenon, including a double trend of transformation and change on the one hand, and 'back to the roots' and 'return to home' on the other hand. As a ritual of return to one's origins, which is focused on the family, the community, commensality and autochthony, ancestor worship has been called the 'national religion of Vietnam' as well as 'Vietnam's religion of nationalism' (cf. Vargyas, below). Ancestor worship plays an important role not only in daily life, but also during pilgrimages to specific sites and graves. The notion of ancestors is applied here in the broadest sense, to include not only family and lineage forebears, but also heroes of the distant (mythical) past, local guardian spirits and gods as well as, more recently, deceased political figures and war heroes. The rhetoric used in venerating all of these is similar. Analyzing changes in ancestor worship, understood in this broad sense, can illuminate general processes of transformation at both individual and collective level, because the veneration of ancestors and guardian deities (*tín ngưỡng thờ Thành Hoàng*) is fundamental to Vietnamese culture and national identity (*bản sắc văn hóa dân tộc*). The veneration of historical personages and legendary heroes and heroines is often characterized as authentically Vietnamese, as it expresses values that are perceived to be threatened by foreign influences. Thus ancestor worship touches not only on the 'ultimate questions' of dying, death and mourning, but also makes visible the significance of translocal ritual spaces and their negotiation as an on-going process.

Vietnamese religiosity is marked by the fact that no distinct lines are drawn between the different systems of belief. Throughout a turbulent modern history—from colonialism to independence, from a policy of division to unification, from war to postrevolutionary peace—the country experienced many

more or less dramatic changes, amalgamations and subtle hybridizations. I found it heuristically useful to classify Vietnamese religious pluralism on four levels: a) governmental religious power; b) officially acknowledged religious institutions; c) persecuted and oppressed institutions; d) the taught discourses. On the governmental level, freedom of religion and belief is a fundamental constitutional right and all religions are equal before the law. However, the establishment of any religious organization without governmental permission is illegal. The government decides what kinds of activities or forms of organization are considered to be 'religion'. Religious practices and philosophies are labelled *tín ngưỡng*, while religion as a category, or institutional forms like Christianity or Buddhism, are called *tôn giáo*. Religious freedom, in general, is supposed to be maintained in the context of *national unity*, which is assumed to face countless challenges in the late socialist era. The *Đổi Mới* government therefore integrates ancestor worship not as one acceptable religious practice among many, but as a privileged practice with special governmental approval. Ancestor worship helps to rejuvenate the nation—away from the image of the army defending the borders, towards a national unity carried by a collective sentiment of patriotic thankful obligation towards the ancestors (Lauser 2008b).

I also found that the ritual handling of war casualties and 'lost souls, or 'wandering souls' (*hồn ma*, *linh hồn* etc.) gave insight into the tension-laden interaction between official government politics of commemoration and local religious practice. Whereas the postcolonial Communist Vietnamese state mounted enormous administrative and political efforts to enforce militant enlightened philosophy, the current situation presents a much more dynamic relationship between officially mandated commemoration and local family ancestor and spirit rituals (cf. Roszko, below). Until recently, the authorities were seeking to replace the traditional ancestor cult with memorials and commemorations for war heroes and martyrs (cf. Buzalka, East-Central Europe cluster; Benovska-Sabkova, European Russia cluster). Memorabilia of war martyrs and revolutionary leaders were even supposed to substitute genealogical tables on *domestic* ancestor altars. This trend has been reversed in that the focus of commemoration is shifting from the state back to local social units. While the official narrative glorifies the role of the war dead and national heroes in Vietnam's history of repelling foreign aggression, local conceptions and ritual practices related to death and commemoration have generated more intimate narratives that deal with personal grief, distress and suffering in everyday life. The interrelation between various layers of commemoration politics is vividly demonstrated when national heroes become gods and when anonymous hungry ghosts become ancestors worthy of veneration (Lauser 2008b and c; Endres and Lauser, under review a; cf. Roszko, below, 2010 forthcoming).

A phenomenon of such complexity inevitably presented some methodological difficulties. By following my Vietnamese informants and interlocutors

(some of whom I got know in Germany, others in Hanoi) to many different sites of worship and commemoration of ancestors, I was able to study the intersection of different discourses and ritual practices: not only the national-patriotic, but also the spiritual-religious and the moral-economic. Pilgrimage can be many—even contradictory—things at once: a political movement and a memorial, a celebration of roots or homecoming and an experience of liminality, a personal journey of healing and of entertainment, and a place of *comunitas*, but also of conflict and division. Sites of religious pilgrimage or patriotic commemoration in Vietnam have grown into tourist attractions, where commercial refashioning is a constant part of the business. Pilgrims may act like tourists and tourists, especially overseas Vietnamese travelling home, may become pilgrim-tourist hybrids looking for their roots. Both roots-tourism and pilgrimage are best viewed as multi-vocal semantic systems. As a result, my fieldwork, too, had to be multi-dimensional and multi-sited, moving between public and private spheres of activity, from official to 'subaltern', informal contexts, and in a very literal sense following people from one place to another. Multi-sited research was essential for my project, since the agency at all religious sites in Vietnam is changing in response to political, economic, ideological and cultural transformations in a range of translocal contexts.

Distribution of Money during a Posssession Ritual (2007).

Spirited Dialogues: Contestations of Religious Landscapes in Central Vietnam's Littoral Society

Edyta Roszko

Edyta Roszko obtained her MA in Ethnology at the University of Łodz in 2002. In 2009 she received a scholarship from the Center for Asia-Pacific Area Studies, Academia Sinica in Taipei, Taiwan, where she is currently writing up her PhD dissertation, to be submitted to the Martin Luther University, Halle-Wittenberg.

My project was based on fieldwork in Central Vietnam, carried out in 2006–07 in the coastal villages of Sa Huỳnh and Lý Sơn of Quảng Ngãi province. In the wake of recent socio-economic liberalization and increasing geographical mobility, villages have experienced significant changes in their social structures: community and family ties have weakened, the individualization of work has undermined the family system and the network of moral obligation has ceased to be the principal force which holds communities together. Individuals' growing autonomy has deepened anxiety and insecurity. Taking advantage of the opportunities for financial gain, which the new highway (A-1) and hydrofoil have provided, villagers have adopted many new methods which have revolutionized their fishing industry. They have been caught up in new patterns of trade and small business transactions and must compete with one another in the struggle to win customers and earn a living. I found that people coped with new social uncertainties by developing more individualized and utilitarian aspects of their religious practices. Consultation with spirits for the benefit of personal, instead of community, interests has increased.

My project has examined religious revitalization and the intersections between religion and politics. I looked at different forms of 'religious capital', including ancestor worship and the hero-centred political culture (see Lauser, above). I also explored communal rituals, sacred spaces representing historical and cultural heritage and spirit mediumship (see Binder, above). In the process of competition and struggle over religious capital, different groups of actors made use of different practices to legitimate power and wealth. I identified a basic confrontation between the state's ideological objectives and popular versions of religiosity. Although the socialist state no longer played the strong ideological role in people's lives that it did before the reforms, it still tried to standardize religious practice and to instrumentalize it to provide moral and cultural reinforcement for the state's social projects. However, the struggle over religious capital took place at many levels, involving religious specialists, lineages and local officials. Rather than establish a dichotomy between state and societies or between the central and the local, I demonstrated how these categories intersected with each other in everyday life.

Before the reform period, religion was excluded from the public sphere. In Northern Vietnam between the 1950s and the late 1980s, sacred spaces were converted into granaries, storehouses and schools; monks and nuns were forced to cast off their robes and return to secular life. Spirit medium rituals were banned and ritual professionals were controlled by local authorities. By 1975, this strategy had spread across the southern parts of Vietnam; it lasted until 1986 when the state relaxed the enforcement of its anti-superstition laws.

However, the marginalization of the religious sphere did not lead to a complete break with religious traditions. In the late 1980s, when Vietnam was gradually opening its borders to the international community, traditional religious practices experienced a phenomenal revival. They were appropriated for the new nation-building process, even though the Party still proclaimed a clear separation of religion and state. The new rhetoric emphasized harmony between ethical religious values and the ideology of the socialist system. Since the political and economical situation has improved, some popular practices, previously labelled as superstitious, have been recognized as 'national heritage' and the real 'essence' of a people. The national folk tradition was cast in opposition to 'Western things' and considered a 'commodity that constructs the glory of the national past'. The state has begun to adapt and manipulate traditions to engage people emotionally and thereby foster national unity. This subversion of the sacred dimensions of religion with regard to the state's secular objectives is found in many other Asian countries.

The project sought to show how established boundaries between the sacred and profane were undermined in everyday life (see Binder, above). As many anthropologists have observed, modernization does not necessarily lead to secularization. It can lead to the very opposite: an increasing quest for the sacred and 'spirituality'. The Vietnamese case shows that religious revival and the individualization of religious preference in Asia must be explained not only in relation to rapid socio-economic change, but also in the context of the state's agenda, which stimulates, standardizes and controls popular expressions of religion in various ways. By combining my ethnographic data with an analysis of discourses on secularism and modernism, I sought to go beyond simplistic perceptions of an antagonistic relation between state and religion. People neither resisted nor submitted to the state's modernizing project. Rather, I found that they engaged with the state's modernizing policy and the relationship between the state and the local community was much more flexible and dialogical than is usually assumed in the literature.

The littoral society of this region has adopted a variety of strategies in responding to the concepts and cultural policies of the state. The project explored how these people were able to reconcile their religious traditions with the state's political culture and why it was important for them to obtain the state's recognition of their ancestors and divinities. I found that the process of restoring religious practices in Vietnam was taking place on two overlapping levels. In the public discourse, there was approbation and encouragement for

obtaining official recognition of historic figures, who had demonstrated moral and patriotic behaviour by heroically resisting foreign invaders, and of gods and spirits with a long-standing presence in popular religion (cf. Benowska-Sabkova, European Russia cluster). Privately, however, local officials and local communities often had their own ideas regarding the recovery of local memories and sacred spaces. They sometimes promoted particular spirits, which they pursued independently of state directives. However, the people of this littoral society did not represent a unified community. Remaking the past was not a peaceful process from which local and national unity emerged effortlessly, but rather a process in which conflict and antagonism regularly came to the fore. Local groups and individuals had different memories and interpretations of history and they often adopted conflicting strategies to achieve their goals. The most common was the integration of personal narratives with official history, with a view to gaining the government's recognition of ancestors, divinities and heroes. National history and heroism became meaningful for people only when they could be incorporated in their local concerns. Thus my study examined struggles over various forms of religious capital and the attempt of littoral communities to establish continuity with the past, through their ancestors, spirits and sacred spaces, in order to demonstrate solidarity, patriotism and their own prestige. Analysis of the multiple narratives revealed that local lineages and individual identifications were more important than national-level factors (Roszko 2010 forthcoming).

New Year ritual to open the fishing season, Sa Hùynh, Central Vietnam, 2007.

Resettled Ancestors: Religious Change among the Bru (in the Central Highlands of Vietnam)

Gábor Vargyas

Gábor Vargyas, one of Hungary's leading social anthropologists, is currently affiliated with the Ethnographical Research Group of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the University of Pécs. His Associated Project at the MPI took him back to a people with whom he first worked in the 1980s.

A series of cataclysms have affected religious life among most of the fifty-three officially recognized ethnic minorities of the Vietnamese Socialist Republic, including the Bru (Vân Kiều), a Mon-Khmer speaking, agricultural hill tribe of the Central Highland (Vargyas 2008a). My project for the MPI was based on four months of fieldwork in 2007, carried out not in the group's original location in Quảng Trị , but in a re-settled community, some 500 km to the south, in Đắc Lắc province (Ea Hiu commune). Taking their religion as I had studied it in Quảng Trị in the 1980s as a reference point for their 'tradition', my aim was to explore how recent political and socio-economic changes had affected Bru religion.

I had previously identified three major domains in 'traditional' Bru religion, all of them related to different spheres of everyday existence. I found in 2007 that all three had been confronted with problems of modernization. The first pertained to subsistence agriculture and its accompanying ritual cycle. Traditional Bru agriculture had been based on slash and burn dry rice cultivation and it formed the basis of notions of belonging and land ownership. As with many other minorities, the alleged primitiveness and harmfulness of this kind of subsistence economy led the authorities to proclaim that 'nomad' agriculturalists needed to be turned into sedentary ones. In the 1990s, land reform and the distribution of 'free' land through an officially orchestrated migration policy transformed demographic and ethnic landscapes.

From the Bru's religious point of view, the essence of the subsistence cycle is that dry rice was much more than simply a plant or food. It was a living being whose soul *(ruviêi)* or divinity, *yĩang Abon*—conceptualized as an old lady ('grandmother')—*lived* in the plant. During the agricultural year, *yĩang Abon* was thought to leave the house and establish herself in the swidden, from where she did not return until after harvest, when the last ears of corn had been collected. Most Bru agricultural ceremonies recreated this symbolic cycle: first the seed-corn had to be 'awakened', then *yĩang Abon* 'departed' to the swidden, where a special miniature hut was built for her. She spent the whole season there and manifested herself in each rice plant and stalk. Numerous prescriptions and taboos surrounded the whole cycle, defining not only the appropriate rituals, but also the proper techniques for sowing and harvesting. The Bru swidden agricultural cycle was thus an intricate complex

in which each technological phase was preceded or accompanied by an appropriate ritual.

However, dry rice cultivation had been coupled with wet rice agriculture for at least several generations in the territory inhabited by the Bru. Some Bru in the new settlement of Đắc Lắc engaged in intensive coffee cultivation. Neither of these products was associated with any form of religious activity. The reason for this was that the Bru 'do not make a sacrifice for a foreign thing'—both wet rice and coffee (as well as other cash crops) were considered to be of foreign origin. However, given their practical, rational, almost secular mentality (Vargyas 2008a), they had been able to reconcile not only two highly divergent agricultural technologies, but also two mutually exclusive religious world views. I concluded that nothing stood in the way of an eventual shift from dry to wet rice cultivation.

Sacrificial prayer in the coffee garden to mark a house-warming party, 2007.

My data from Đắc Lắc in 2007 confirmed my earlier predictions. The complete reliance on wet rice and cash crop served to make the 'disenchantment' of the agricultural world of the Bru more obvious. With the disappearance of swidden agriculture (because of a general lack of available land and forest, coupled with a formal ban on this type of cultivation), the former ritual cycle which centred on dry rice has virtually vanished. Apart from the 'thanksgiving', involving the sacrifice of a few chickens by some of the family heads at the end of the harvest on the wet rice fields, I found that nothing remained of the old religious practices. A plant associated with the soul of *yĭang Abon* was

now planted in the coffee gardens of some houses in order to 'remember her'—to remind people of their former religious representations.

The second major sphere in traditional Bru religion related to the individual and her or his fate and especially to issues of illness and misfortune and the ways of dealing with these—shamanism and healing. This sphere reflected Bru ideas about the way in which representatives of the supernatural world intervened in human matters. Although official views and judgments of this sphere have fluctuated in socialist Vietnam, it has generally been considered to be 'superstition' or 'bad custom', which state policies sought to eliminate. This negative opinion was supported by the Protestant Church, which I found had a strong presence in Đắc Lắc (approximately half of the population of Ea Hiu commune belonged to it). In this instance, too, outside pressures complemented the secular mentality of the Bru, creating spaces for change and innovation. In the 1980s, they had responded to the ideological pressure from the state to give up their shamanistic practices by asking: "How could we abandon our divinities? We are often ill! Give us some medicine and we shall leave them out!" By 2007, radical improvements in health care had transformed matters. Although some old shamans were still alive, no-one in the next generation was emerging to replace them and their clientele had greatly diminished. I witnessed only two shamanic ceremonies in 2007, both connected with 'bad deaths' that had to be 'eliminated'.

I found the third sphere, that of the ancestor cult, to be the only form of traditional religious practice which had persisted very strongly among the Bru. The most likely reason for its survival was that it overlapped significantly with Vietnamese forms of ancestor cult and was therefore the element of Bru religious practice which was most easily acceptable to the nation-building majority. In traditional settings, the cult of the dead and funeral feasts to commemorate the dead at specified intervals and, finally, after three generations, their transformation into ancestors, marked climactic points in the religious calendar. Similarly, the role of the divinity, which united and embodied the patrilineal ancestors, *yĩang* Kaneaq, remained fundamental to the definition and cohesion of the patrilineage, *ntắng*. This exogamous corporation was first and foremost defined in reference to the common ancestors, Kaneaq, and to the group of the 'recent' dead (meaning three or four rising generations) who had not yet been incorporated.

Many elements of the extremely complicated and grandiose death rituals had not survived, not even among the pagan Bru of Đắc Lắc. Secondary burials had been discontinued; tombs were now fashioned in the style of Vietnamese stone work; the structure of the funeral had become simpler: no buffaloes were sacrificed, no funereal songs *(aruai, paryỗng)* were performed and there was no gong music or dancing before a burial. However, most key elements could still be found, for example, the altar/sanctuary (*dống nsắk*) in the shape of a house, built in the forest (now in the coffee groves) for the recent agnatic dead, and also the Kaneaq altars in the houses of the lineage heads. It should

be noted here that Protestantism was a tougher opponent for Bru religious practice than Vietnamese Communist ideology: conversion to Protestantism entailed total rejection of old forms of religion, especially sacrifices for divinities and ancestors.

Modernization and competing ideologies notwithstanding, I found that this syncretic form of the ancestor cult, following the mixing with Vietnamese elements of ancestor veneration, seemed to remain at the core of the religious practice of the pagan Bru in Đắc Lắc. I was able to participate in a housewarming party during which both the ancestors and the recent dead of the landlord and lineage head were invited from Quảng Trị to 'follow them' to Đắc Lắc. In Quảng Trị, in their original homeland, there were no living members of the lineage: the lineage had died out and the village was deserted due to the construction of a reservoir, which would shortly submerge the entire district. The invitation was expressed in the question, "How would you survive without the sacrifices you receive from us?" Thirty-five years after their resettlement, these people were determined to maintain close contacts with their ancestors, so that they could take care of each other in times of need.



LITHUANIA AND POLAND: VOLKSWAGEN FOUNDATION PROJECT

*Unlike all the clusters presented above, this small team is still working together at the MPI at the end of 2009, as we prepare this Report for publication. The summaries and publication lists of these four scholars therefore remain more provisional. Their project is titled "*The Catholic Church and Religious Pluralism in Lithuania and Poland: An Anthropological Study of Public and Private Meanings of Religion in Postsocialist Society*". It has been supported financially by the Volkswagen Foundation. In each country, a post-doctoral researcher undertook an urban project and a PhD student carried*

out a rural study. All four drew central concepts from Antonio Gramsci and Pierre Bourdieu, among others. Of the four researchers, only Schröder was not working in his home country.

Catholicism is the principal religion in both countries. There has been a vigorous revival of the Roman Catholic Church in Lithuania since the country regained its independence. However, only in Poland can Catholicism be described as a dominant force in society—before, during and after socialism. It is undisputed that the Polish pope, elected in 1978, played a significant role in the dénouement of socialism, both in his native country and elsewhere. The secular authorities were unable to counter the deep appeal of Roman Catholicism, not even in such model socialist towns as Nowa Huta, now part of Kraków, where Sekerdej did much of her fieldwork. The state did, however, try to weaken the dominant church whenever it could. One strategy was to uphold a measure of pluralism and offer support to churches which were considered more friendly to the regime, notably the Orthodox Church, which was supported at the expense of the Greek Catholics. This helped to give rise to some surprising pockets of pluralism under socialism, especially where religious diversity was reinforced by ethnic diversity, as in the Carpathian villages studied by Pasieka. Such locations offer an interesting window through which to investigate the impact of postsocialist changes.

Sekerdej shared Pasieka's interest in how religion contributes to new forms of civil society, but her urban project concentrated more on diversity within the dominant church. She found that parish-based groups provided their members with vital social support, though they were maligned for their doctrinal ignorance and political extremism by 'liberal' intellectual Catholics. In urban Lithuania, by contrast, commitment to the Church weakened substantially during the decades of Soviet rule. Schröder found that religious revival has remained superficial among the urban groups with whom he worked. The Church here, too, supports numerous lay associations, but it was sometimes criticized for its lack of social engagement. Religiosity was strong in the elderly rural population studied by Pranaitytė, above all through the symbolic community which unites villagers with their ancestors. However, contrary to the widespread view that villagers are the passive recipients of a tradition dictated by their church and its priests, Pranaitytė suggests that their contemporary faith is actively shaped by personal experiences and subject to rational scepticism, as it is in the cities.

Further comparative analyses of the data collected by members of this cluster will be presented at the international conference which they are organizing in Halle in June 2010 (see p. 160).

'Seven Ways to God': The Dynamics of Religious Pluralism in Rural Southern Poland

Agnieszka Pasieka

Agnieszka Pasieka completed her MA thesis in 2007 at the Institute of Sociology at the Jagiellonian University, Kraków. Her research interests include religion and gender, social memory, postsocialist change and anthropological concepts of civil society.

I carried out fieldwork in 2008–09 in several villages of Uście Gorlickie, a commune in the district of Gorlice, in the Małopolska region. The commune consisted of twenty tightly linked villages, many of which were very small, while others were centres of employment. Until 1947, the vast majority of the population in this part of Poland was Lemko, a Ruthenian (or some would insist Ukrainian) ethnic group. The language and customs of the Lemkos distinguished them from Polish peasants. So, too, did their religion: the majority of Lemkos were Greek Catholics, but there were also Orthodox among them, as a result of conversion processes dating back to the beginning of the twentieth century. The difficult living conditions in this mountainous area in the late Habsburg period forced many Lemkos to migrate to the United States. Many returned, bringing new religions with them, but the spread of new beliefs ceased in 1939. In 1947, the Lemkos were expelled from their Carpathian homeland ('Operation Vistula'). Most were resettled in the western part of the new Polish state, where the socialist government tried to assimilate them into Polish society. Roman Catholic, Polish families were brought in to take over the abandoned villages. Some Lemkos managed to come back when the regime liberalized in the late 1950s and 1960s, but the government did not allow the Greek Catholic Church to function openly and instead supported the Orthodox Church. Some Greek Catholics converted to Orthodoxy in these years, while others preferred to practise Roman Catholicism, returning to their original rite after the restoration of the Greek Catholic Church in the 1990s. Other religions have also spread in recent decades, including Seventh-day Adventism, Buddhism (introduced by members of the urban middle class who had opted out to lead a rural life), Pentecostalism and the Jehovah's Witnesses. At the time of my fieldwork, Roman Catholics constituted the majority of the commune's population (c 80%). Lemkos constituted around 15%. Relations between members of different religious persuasions were 'correct' on the surface, but far more complex underneath. Neither inter-religious nor inter-ethnic coexistence was entirely harmonious and sometimes only a fine line separated a 'good neighbour' from a 'member of a rival group'.

Given this complexity, unique in the Polish context, I made religious pluralism the key focus of my research. My initial idea was to explore this pluralism as a phenomenon of civil society, but the data I collected led me to emphasize

political aspects instead. I therefore analyzed the dynamics of religious pluralism (past and present). I sought to understand how this pluralism functioned both in everyday life and during religious feasts. I paid particular attention to majority-minority relations and to the means by which Roman Catholic dominance was reproduced. My overarching question was: *How does religious pluralism work in a society where Roman Catholics are so dominant?* I also investigated generational differences, concentrating on questions of social memory and the practice of 'history making'. And I did not abandon my original concern with local forms of civil engagement.

Orthodox and Greek Catholic carol singers in Uście Gorlickie, Christmas 2009.

My methods were of necessity diverse. First, in order to get to know all the religious communities in the commune, I participated in numerous public events, including masses, church fairs and key religious festivities. It was important to see how the minority faith communities organized their activities to maintain their niche in the 'religious market'. Secondly, I developed close relationships with families practising different religions, which gave me insight into more private dimensions of religious experience and generational differences. Participation in everyday family life helped me understand the complexity of relations across religious boundaries, which often divided kin groups as well as neighbours. Thirdly, I worked with a range of institutions—schools, groups of rural housewives, parish circles—in order to explore how

civil society might develop in this locality and the role of religious factors in this process.

For my theoretical framework, I have drawn on Antonio Gramsci's theory of hegemony and counter-hegemony and also on Pierre Bourdieu's understanding of 'frames of reality' and his reflections on the imposition of norms. I have found the latter's notions of 'symbolic violence' and 'legitimate culture' particularly useful for examining the discourse on what is (or is not) 'normal' in the perception of my informants. When placing my materials in the broader context of the Roman Catholic Church's influence on Polish society, I have drawn on Michel Foucault's reflections on normative systems and biopolitics. The conduct of the Catholic Church seemed an almost perfect illustration of Foucault's understanding of power. In applying the concept of hegemony, I looked closely at the links between Roman Catholicism and nationalistic discourses and at problems of memory and history making in this region of Poland. My aim has been to combine Maurice Halbwachs's notion of collective memory with the work of social historians inspired by Eric Wolf's emphasis upon power relations in the production of memory. Ultimately, although the problems observed at the local level are unique to this commune, they nonetheless illuminate general phenomena in Polish society and much tension between hegemony and religious pluralism that is far more widespread.

Meaning and Experience in Symbolic and Material Exchange Practices: The Church, the Priest, the Living and the Dead in a Lithuanian Rural Catholic Community

Lina Pranaitytė

Lina Pranaitytė completed her BA in 2004 and her MA in 2006, both in the Department of Sociology at Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas. Her interests include religion, postsocialism, gender and studies of subcultures.

I gathered data in 2008–09 in the southern part of Lithuania on the meanings and experiences of religious belief in a rural Catholic community. The focus was on the interplay between personal religious experiences and the role of institutions. I found that there was much variation in individual perceptions of religion and church dogma and I explored the reasons for this, paying particular attention to the explanations offered for certain funerary rituals and to the motivations underlying exchange practices, both between parishioners and their priest (and also with the Church) and between the living and the dead. I worked in several villages belonging to two neighbouring parishes, which comprised a total of twenty-four villages. Although the two parishes shared one church and one priest, every village had its own cemetery. Most of my informants were elderly people for whom the topics of death and the afterlife were acutely important.

In general, the Lithuanian countryside is considered more religious than the cities. This is due to several factors: age (elderly people are considered to be closer to religious matters), locality (residence in a less economically developed area) and poor access to education and information, including religious knowledge. This lack of information is assumed to support a conservative, uncritical attitude towards religion. City dwellers (and also some villagers themselves) typically stated that people in rural areas did 'not reflect' on religion. They were said to be more religious, since they never questioned the religious knowledge inculcated in childhood.

I was able to document a more complex picture. Although most villagers did indeed act in accordance with what a Gramscian model of Catholic hegemony would predict, their public performances hid deeper strands of understanding. They, too, were searching for meaning and they were concerned with finding a rational basis for their beliefs (and their doubts) in experience. Far from accepting Catholic doctrine as 'traditional', many individuals practised forms of *bricolage* that were rooted in personal (and thus more meaningful) experiences. To put it differently, personal experience seemed to be much more important than hegemonic dogma. Stories about personal experiences, the guidance and help received from saints and knowledge obtained from communicating with the dead were more significant than dogmatic preaching. The public expression of religious affiliation in the parishes I studied was

obviously affected by this expanding individualism. Villagers were questioning religious meanings, 'calculating' ritual behaviour and shaping personal attitudes towards the sacred in ways usually associated with urban populations.

Although religious knowledge and attitudes were modified during the life course, villagers never questioned the foundations of the Church as an institutional order. It was of course one of the most important mediators in the communication with the dead and the supernatural, for example, when people ordered a Mass to petition for the peace of a soul or to thank their patron saint.

My analysis of symbolic and material exchange practices included both institutional actors (the Church, the priest) and a variety of supernatural actors (the deity, patron saints, the dead). These practices reproduced the symbolic community of the living and the dead. My ethnographic data suggested that individuals' beliefs about death and the afterlife were largely independent of their actual religious practice and of what the priest might sermonize dogmatically. In general, world views were derived from personal and local experience rather than from the explanations provided by religious institutions. Dogmatic notions, e.g. about this-worldly life and the beyond, were not entirely absent, but co-existed with personally derived systems of meanings. I examined this co-existence in the light of three perspectives in anthropological studies of death rituals: values and symbolism, personal relationships and social order.

The pivotal role of mediator in exchange practices between the living and the dead was played by the priest. The figure of the priest proved to be authoritative and generally respected; however, at the micro-level, the priest appeared to be a more complex and ambivalent personage. He was valued as both 'one of us' and at the same time as one of the most spiritually authoritative figures in the community. He was a powerful figure who promoted Catholic awareness, but at the same time could be the target of local criticism directed at the Catholic Church in general.

The difference between the religiosity of the priest and the religiosity of the people can be theorized in terms of Max Weber's notion of the *virtuosi*. The priest was expected to remain detached from the social pulse and to transcend ordinary secular behaviour. In the two parishes, the priest transcended the stereotypical image according to which priests are either very charismatic, able to summon people of all ages, occupations and interests to the Church (usually such charismatic priests are affiliated to religious orders) or very 'material', the subjects of deprecatory stories of love affairs and/or profit-oriented entrepreneurship. The priest of the two parishes I studied was considered to be very spiritual and devoted to his religious mission, but at the same time unable to bridge the gap between his authoritative convictions and the needs and requests of the parishioners. The ambivalent attitude to the priest affected church attendance: weekly masses were attended only by the elderly.

A procession around the church, Varėna district, Summer 2008.

During my fieldwork I paid equal attention to public behaviour during sacred and profane events and the individual meanings attached to them. Experience and meaning were the anthropological notions which I found most useful in the analysis of rural religiosity. Contrary to the images held in the urban population, Lithuanian rural Catholics were not enslaved in habitual religious behaviour. The exchange practices which they enacted with the Church and the priest as well as with the deceased were viewed both as ways to support and restore institutional order and as ways to support and restore cosmological order. The analysis of the items circulating in transactions (material as well as symbolic) revealed the nature of the relationships among individuals and groups as well as ties to institutions. The structures and patterns evident in the exchange processes were also the objects of reflection by the agents involved. People's commentaries revealed their general views towards the Catholic Church as an institution and its dogma and the extent to which it was accepted in the community. My provisional conclusion is that rural religiosity is equally shaped by Gramscian concepts of common sense understandings of religion and by internalization of the hegemonic doctrine.

Catholic Hegemony, Common Sense and Secularism in Urban Lithuania

Ingo W. Schröder

Ingo W. Schröder obtained his Masters in Social Anthropology at the University of Bonn in 1986. He completed his PhD at the University of Frankfurt (Main) in 1992 and his Habilitation at the University of Marburg in 2005. He has taught at the universities of Bonn and Münster and held research positions at the University of New Mexico, Albuquerque (1997–1999) and the University of Marburg (1999–2002). Since 2008 he is also a Professor of Social Anthropology at Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas.

I carried out fieldwork in 2008–09 in the urban environment of Kaunas and Vilnius, Lithuania's two largest cities. Urban and rural settings in Lithuania have differed significantly regarding their experience of socialism and the transition and they continue to represent vastly different social worlds. I soon realized that, in the everyday life of the urban population, the role of the Church and the Catholic faith was much less significant than the statistical data and the visibility of Catholicism in the public sphere suggested. There are obvious socio-historical reasons for this. In the long term, the connection of Catholicism with ideas of the nation and of a national culture in Lithuania has been complicated ever since the 'national awakening' in the nineteenth century, when Catholic and secular ideas of the nation were often at odds. Only on rare occasions, such as the initial years of the first Lithuanian Republic and during the years of the second national awakening predating independence from the Soviet Union in 1990, has the notion of a close connection between Catholicism and national identity prevailed. Under the Soviet regime, the state's anti-religious policy proved quite successful in the cities, eroding the Church's social relevance and severely restricting people's knowledge of Church doctrine. The impact of this policy can still be felt today. Moreover, the influence of cosmopolitanism and recent 'Western' modernization, consumerism and individualization is felt most strongly among the urban middle class, especially the younger generation. The forces of 'globalization' have both supported the trend towards religious indifference and at the same time spawned individualized religious *bricolages* that combine strands of Catholicism with elements from a range of other beliefs, including Baltic Paganism and Eastern or New Age spirituality. Thus, in the urban environment, I found that Catholicism has largely become a matter of choice and most people preferred to maintain only a superficial connection with the Church. They took the sacraments and attended Mass on special occasions, but they had no interest in doctrine and only a weak sense of belonging to the Church.

Given this background, this project posed two main questions:

1. In what way does the Church reach out to the people, many of whom do not care deeply about Catholicism?

2. What does religion really mean to people in the social category which appears to be the least affected by the Catholic *habitus*: young urban academics and professionals?

I examined religion as a political reality by drawing on Gramsci's concepts of hegemony and common sense. Popular understanding of Catholicism as Lithuania's 'religion by default' is shaped by a range of factors that emerge from the on-going interplay between the two.

In studying how the Catholic Church sought to impose its understanding of the world, I focused on institutions and activities designed to disseminate Catholicism among the Lithuanian population: secondary school education (a Jesuit grammar school and religious education in state schools), catechism in Church institutions (the Kaunas Archdiocese's catechistic centre and family centre), Church-affiliated NGOs, the campus ministry in Kaunas and the Church's media politics. Attention was also paid to non-mainstream Catholic organizations (e.g. the Order of St. Jean) and the extensive field of Catholic cultural activities related to music and the arts. I distinguished four overall strategies which the Church practised in its attempts to achieve hegemony:

(a) *party politics*: the Church has supported legal initiatives to codify family structures, gender roles and sexual orientation, usually in cooperation with the Christian Democratic Party;

(b) *ecumenical politics*: the Church has frequently asserted its dominant position vis-à-vis the other smaller religions;

(c) *civil society and education*: the Church supports a range of lay associations as well as educational initiatives and the Catholic media;

(d) *cultural politics*: the Church seeks to introduce a Christian idiom to the realm of popular culture.

Only rarely did I observe the Church addressing the everyday problems of those who have been suffering increasing hardship in the wake of neo-liberal economic reforms. The Roman Catholic Church deliberately focused its activities on issues of faith and doctrine rather than the provision of welfare services and charity (cf. Tocheva, Russia Cluster).

Although many catechism courses, seminars and retreats were well attended, only a small minority of my young urban professional interlocutors could be described as practising Catholics in the full sense—as having accepted the Church's teachings as guidelines for their own lives. Many had little interest in religious matters and most of those who felt attracted to Christian spirituality perceived the Church as conservative and inflexible, serving the interests of an elite rather than those of the general population. Those who sympathized with Lithuania's 'pagan cultural heritage' did not consider the Church to be an authentic part of society at all. Some 'unconventional Catholics' preferred to affiliate themselves with one of the more liberal religious orders and Catholic grassroots groups (cf. Sekerdej, above) or to work out their own syncretic forms. Such persons tended to detach themselves from any religious institution, although some were active in Catholic cultural politics.

Thus, for the majority of my interlocutors, the link with Catholicism was shaped by common sense understandings embedded in a complex relationship with the hegemonic Catholicism of the Church hierarchy. They thought and acted in ways that were neither intentionally hegemonic nor resistant, but arose from their personal convictions and everyday experience. While common sense was entangled with hegemonic Catholicism, it also served to erode the hierarchy's hegemonic aspirations and could be deployed to criticize ideologies of consumerism, social disintegration and right-wing politics.

In sum, the scenario of Catholicism in urban Lithuania raised questions about proclamations of de-secularization and the renaissance of religion in the formerly socialist world. If secularization is understood as the 'decline of religious authority' of the Catholic Church throughout society, then secularism is evidently still a major force to be reckoned with in urban Lithuania, even among the majority of occasional church-goers. The Catholic Church has clearly failed to uphold or re-establish a Catholic hegemony in doctrinal terms. At the same time, it has largely succeeded in gaining people's acquiescence and in preventing large-scale counter-hegemonic activities, such as defections to other religious communities.

The Archbishop's residence in Kaunas.

Religious Pluralism in Poland: *contradictio in adiecto*? Internal Diversity in the Roman Catholic Church

Kinga Sekerdej

Kinga Sekerdej studied Psychology and Sociology at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, European Studies at the University of Exeter and Nationalism at the Central European University in Budapest. She obtained her PhD in Sociology at the Jagiellonian University in 2006 with a study of the origins of Jewish and Arab nationalism. Her research interests include the anthropology of religion, politics, gender and ethnicity.

The Roman Catholic Church undoubtedly plays a significant role in Poland, both in the public sphere and in the individual lives of many citizens. However, in order to understand the internal dynamics of the Church in Poland, it is important to stress that it is not a homogenous institution. On the contrary, there is much space for internal pluralism. My project was designed to investigate how people of different—and sometimes opposite—world views, values, goals and religious practices can all come together within a single dominant Church.

I conducted fieldwork in 2008–09 in the city of Kraków, both in its centre and in the district of Nowa Huta. Kraków is considered to be a very Catholic and conservative city and both the influential Catholic weekly *Tygodnik Powszechny* and the well-known Catholic publishing house *Znak* are located here. Karol Wojtyła was the Archbishop of Kraków before he was called to the Holy See. Several churches in the city centre have active lay groups, including student groups, but the congregations which are best known and considered to be the most open are not related to parish churches, but to the Dominican and Jesuit orders. I worked most closely with socially active students at the Dominican church. My other field site was Nowa Huta, built after World War Two as an exemplary Communist city, a city for workers of the new Lenin Steelworks and a settlement intended to remain devoid of religion. Most of the workers were migrants from rural areas and the inhabitants today look proudly back to their struggles to build churches, their fundamental act of resistance towards socialist power holders. Here I carried out research in a parish, concentrating on its charity group, its library and the "circle of friends of Radio Maryja". I also conducted interviews throughout the city with NGO activists connected to the Roman Catholic Church.

Although the groups I studied belonged to the same religious community, their beliefs, understandings and practices of Catholicism differed significantly (cf. Mahieu, East-Central Europe cluster). I found that liberal Catholic elites, including journalists who shaped the mainstream discourse, looked at some of these differences normatively. This reinforced divisions and led to Manichean distinctions between 'good' and 'bad' Catholicism. Good Catholi-

cism was liberal and always open for dialogue. It was based not only on faith, but also on knowledge. Among the clergy, although a few bishops were considered to be liberal, this strand of Catholicism was mainly associated with the Jesuits and Dominicans. They have created centres for debates which have attracted large numbers of students and intellectuals.

Enacting a nativity play in a parishioner's home, Kraków, January 2009.

Bad Catholicism, according to this elite perspective, had at least two variants: the harmless and the harmful. The benign form of bad Catholicism was folk or popular religion, as epitomized in the cult of the Virgin Mary. People in this category might have a deep faith, but they lacked basic knowledge of the teachings of their religion. This element of popular religion was generally treated with concern, shame and embarrassment rather than with contempt. However, lack of education and ignorance about Catholic doctrine could render these people susceptible to the 'ugly' influences of harmful Catholicism. This variant of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland was disparaged as integrist, nationalistic, xenophobic and obscurantist. It was always on the lookout for external enemies, who could be blamed for any signs of evil within the Church (cf. Komáromi, Russia Cluster). Although a few bishops were associated with this viewpoint, it was held to reach its apogee in the community around Radio Maryja. The groups that I researched in the parish of Nowa

Huta belonged to the Catholicism that was looked down upon by elites. Some were considered benign (the pious members of various parish groups) and some were perceived as harmful, notably the circle of friends of Radio Maryja. My intention was not to reinforce this dualistic view of Catholicism, but to probe emic understandings of it, especially as it became apparent during my research that this division was a general point of reference: for the Catholics in Nowa Huta, liberals such as those in the city centre functioned as the 'significant other'.

Like other members of the team I borrowed theoretical concepts from Antonio Gramsci and Pierre Bourdieu. For my purposes, Bourdieu's analysis of how taste serves to maintain and reproduce power relations in society was particularly relevant (Sekerdej in preparation a). I came to understand that normative divisions within the Catholic Church were based not only on different beliefs and practices, but also to a large extent on aesthetic forms, which feed back into distinctions based on social and cultural capital.

The concept of civil society has been a further theoretical concern of this project. Like Pasieka (above), I examined the place of voluntary parish groups in civil society in Poland. I questioned whether and to what extent the model of civil society (itself a normative category in the Polish context) is appropriate for analyzing these communities (Sekerdej in preparation b; Pasieka and Sekerdej 2009). My research showed that gender has remained a key organizing principle of the institutional church and its parish-based groups and Catholic associations, among liberals and conservatives alike. I also inquired into the ways people deal with hierarchy. The hierarchical structure of the Church was visible everywhere in religious symbolism and emphasized in religious teachings, yet I found that it could in practice be substantially modified and surprising degrees of agency could be exerted at lower levels of the hierarchy. This was made possible through divisions of labour within the local religious community, which allowed the various circles and groups around the church to be semi-autonomous. When I enquired into what attracted individuals to different Church-based lay communities, it became apparent that these groups had multiple meanings and functions for their members. They often formed support groups for those who were living far from their relatives, were struggling to cope with bereavement or were simply in need of counsel and a temporary refuge. The experience of serious illness was often a key factor leading lay people to affiliate to such group. The religious mass media (notably the controversial Radio Maryja) offered a sense of close family relations that transcended the parish and the immediate neighbourhood and created a nationwide virtual community.

In sum, the binary normative division obscures a much bigger diversity within the Roman Catholic Church in Poland, while at the same time it helps to reinforce power relations in society.

III CONFERENCES, WORKSHOPS AND PANELS

From the left: Chris Hann, Frances Pine, and João de Pina Cabral, convenors of the launch conference of this Focus Group.

Conference: On the Margins of Religion, 15-17 May 2003

Convenors: Chris Hann, João de Pina Cabral (University of Lisbon, Portugal), Frances Pine (University of Cambridge)

Papers presented by: AFE ADOGAME (Department for the Study of Religion, University of Bayreuth), TATIANA V. BARCHUNOVA (Novosibirsk State University), SIMON COLEMAN (Department of Anthropology, University of Durham), HEIKE DROTBOHM (Institute for Comparative Cultural Studies, Philipps-University of Marburg), GRANT EVANS (Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong), STEPHAN FEUCHTWANG (Department of Anthropology, London School of Economics), BEATRIX HAUSER (Institut für Ethnologie, Martin-Luther-Universität, Halle-Wittenberg), THOMAS G. KIRSCH (Institut für Ethnologie, Martin-Luther-Universität, Halle-Wittenberg), AGNIESZKA Z. KOŚCIANSKA (Institute of Ethnology and Cultural Anthropology, Warsaw University), GALINA LINDQUIST (Department of Social Anthropology, University of Stockholm), SONJA LUEHRMANN (University of Michigan), JONATHAN PARRY (Department of Anthropology, London School of Economics), JOÃO DE PINA-CABRAL (Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon), FERNANDA PIRIE (MPI), URSULA RAO (Institut für Ethnologie, Martin-

Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg), RAMON SARRÓ (Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon), INGO W. SCHRÖDER (Institute for Comparative Cultural Studies, Philipps-University of Marburg), CORNELIA SORABJI (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London), OLGA TCHEPOURNAYA (European University, St. Petersburg), GALIA VALTCHINOVA (Bulgarian Academy of Sciences), JOÃO VASCONCELOS (Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon), RUBIE AND JAMES WATSON (Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology, and Department of Anthropology, Harvard University).

Discussant: MAURICE BLOCH (London School of Economics)

Workshop: Greek-Catholics between East and West, 19th May 2003

Convenor: Chris Hann

External participants: BERTALAN PUSZTAI (University of Szeged), STÉPHANIE MAHIEU (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris), PAUL ROBERT MAGOCSI (University of Toronto)

Workshop: Emerging Citizenship and Contested Identities between Dniester, Prut and Danube Rivers, 10-11 March 2005

Convenors: Monica Heintz and Deema Kaneff

Papers presented by: EKATERINA ANASTASOVA (University of Sofia), ELISABETH ANDERSON (New York University), FLORENTINA BODNARI (Centre Marc Bloch, Berlin), TANJA BONEVA (University of Sofia), JENNIFER CASH (University of Pittsburgh), HULYA DEMIRDIREK (University of Victoria), PATRICIA FOGARTY (Emory University, Atlanta), ALEXANDER GANCHEV (Odessa University), LEYLA KEOUGH (University of Massachussets, Amherst), CRISTINA PETRESCU (University of Bucharest), ABEL POLESE (International Christian University, Kiev), ALEXANDER PRIGARIN (Odessa State University), VSEVOLOD SAMOKHVALOV (Odessa National University)

Discussants: DAN DUNGACIU (University of Bucharest), VINTILA MIHAILESCU (University of Bucharest), STEFAN TROEBST (University of Leipzig)

Conference: Religious Conversion after Socialism, 7-9 April 2005

Convenors: Mathijs Pelkmans, László Fosztó and Irene Hilgers

Papers presented by: TATIANA BARCHUNOVA (Novosibirsk State University), BILL CLARK (NGO Yntymak, Kyrgyzstan), NATHALIE CLAYER (CNRS, Paris), HEATHER COLEMAN (University of Alberta, Canada), JEFFERS ENGELHARDT (University of Chicago), LÁSZLÓ FOSZTÓ (MPI), IRENE HILGERS (MPI), JAROSLAV KLEPAL (Charles University, Prague), JOHN PEEL (School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London), MATHIJS PELKMANS (MPI), ESTHER PEPERKAMP (Amsterdam School for Social Science Research), SEBASTIEN PEYROUSE (French Institute for Central Asia Studies), JOHANNES RIES (University of Leipzig), OSCAR SALEMINK (Free University Amsterdam), MAGDALENA SLAVKOVA (Bulgarian Academy of Sciences), LAUR VALLIKIVI (Estonian National Museum), GALINA VALTCHINOVA (Bulgarian Academy of Sciences), VIRGINIE VATÉ (MPI), CATHERINE WANNER (Pennsylvania State University), MONIKA WOHLRAB-SAHR (University of Leipzig).

Participants of the Conference 'Religious Conversion after Socialism'.

Internal Workshop: Civil Religion, 24-27 May 2005 (in Przemyśl, Poland)

Convenor: Chris Hann (Organization: Judith Orland, Stanisław Stępień)

Papers given by: JURAJ BUZALKA, LÁSZLÓ FOSZTÓ, MONICA HEINTZ, IRENE HILGERS, PAWEŁ JESSA (Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań), KRISZTINA KEHL-BODROGI, STÉPHANIE MAHIEU, JULIE MCBRIEN, VLAD NAUMESCU, MATHIJS PELKMANS, JOHAN RASANAYAGAM, TANYA RICHARDSON

The Focus Group on the road in Poland: from left, Juraj Buzalka, Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi, Monica Heintz, Paweł Jessa (Adam Mickiewicz University), Irene Hilgers, László Fosztó, Mathijs Pelkmans, Stéphanie Mahieu; Poznań, 28th May 2005.

Conference: Popular Religiosity After Socialism, 28-29 May 2005 (in Poznań)

Convenors: Chris Hann and Aleksander Posern-Zieliński

Papers presented by: WERONIKA BIELAYEVA (Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań), JURAJ BUZALKA (MPI), LÁSZLÓ FOSZTÓ (MPI), MONICA HEINTZ (MPI), IRENE HILGERS (MPI), PAWEŁ JESSA (Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań), KRISZTINA KEHL-BODROGI (MPI), STÉPHANIE MAHIEU (MPI), KATARZYNA MARCINIAK (Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań), MARIUSZ MARSZEWSKI (Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań), MATHIJS PELKMANS (MPI), ANDRZEJ STACHOWIAK (Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań), VIRGINIE VATÉ (MPI)

Discussant: JOACHIM OTTO HABECK

The Czerniejewo conference centre of the Adam Mickiewicz University, venue of the Conference 'Popular Religiosity After Socialism'.

Conference: Post-Soviet Islam: An anthropological perspective, 29-30 June 2005

Convenors: Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi and Johan Rasanayagam

Papers presented by: HABIBA FATHI (IFEAC, Tashkent), PAWEŁ JESSA (Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań), DENIZ KANDIYOTI (School of Oriental and African Studies, London), KRISZTINA KEHL-BODROGI (MPI), MARIA LOUW (Aarhus University, Denmark), JULIE MCBRIEN (MPI), AMIR NAVRUZOV (Institute of History and Ethnography, Dagestan), JOHAN RASANAYAGAM (MPI), GUSEL SABIROVA (Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow), NAZIF SHAHRANI (Indiana University), SHAMIL SHIKHALIEV (Institute of History and Ethnography, Dagestan), RICHARD TAPPER (School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London), EDMUND WAITE (Institute of Education, University of London), SAULESH YESSENOVA (University of British Columbia), ANNA ZELKINA (School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London).

Participants of the Conference 'Post-Soviet Islam: An anthropological perspective', 29-30 June 2005.

Conference: Eastern Christianities in Anthropological Perspective, 23-25 September 2005

Convenors: Chris Hann, Juraj Buzalka, Vlad Naumescu and Hermann Goltz (Martin Luther University, Halle-Wittenberg)

Papers presented by: GLENN BOWMAN (University of Kent), MELISSA L. CALDWELL (University of California, Santa Cruz), MARIA COUROUCLI (CNRS, Paris), JEFFERS ENGELHARDT (University of Chicago), ALICE FORBESS (Goldsmiths College, University of London), GABRIEL HANGANU (University of Oxford), STEPHEN C. HEADLEY (CNRS and École Pratique des

Hautes Études), RENÉE HIRSCHON (University of Oxford), JEANNE KORMINA (European University, St. Petersburg), MARCIN LUBAŚ (Jagiellonian University, Kraków), SONJA LUEHRMANN (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor), STÉPHANIE MAHIEU (MPI), INNA NALETOVA (Pastorales Forum, Wien, and Boston University), JACEK NOWAK (Jagiellonian University, Kraków), ANNA POUJEAU (Paris X Nanterre and CNRS), LUCIAN TURCESCU AND LAVINIA STAN (Concordia University Montreal/ St. Francis Xavier University Antigonish).

Workshop: Rethinking Moralities, 15-16 December 2005

Convenors: Johan Rasanayagam (University of Aberdeen, Scotland) and Monica Heintz (Université Paris X Nanterre)

Papers presented by: MARIAN BURCHARDT (University of Leipzig), MICHAEL CARRITHERS (University of Durham), BOUDOUIN DUPRET (CNRS/IFPO, Damascus), MARK GOODALE (George Mason University, Fairfax), THOMAS HAUSCHILD (University of Tübingen), SIGNE HOWELL (University of Oslo), PATRICE LADWIG (University of Cambridge), PATRICK PHARO (CNRS/CERSES, Paris), JOHAN RASANAYAGAM (Aberdeen University), JOEL ROBBINS (University of California, San Diego), HELLE RYDSTROM (University of Lund), KAREN SYKES (University of Manchester), THOMAS WIDLOK (University of Heidelberg), JARRETT ZIGON (City University of New York).

Workshop: Religious and Secular Sources of Moralities in Eastern Germany, 17 July 2006

Convenors: Chris Hann, Irene Becci, Birgit Huber, Esther Peperkamp and Małgorzata Rajtar

Papers presented by: IRENE BECCI (MPI), JOSÉ CASANOVA (New School for Social Research, New York), ANSELMA GALLINAT (Newcastle University), KLAUS HARTMANN (University of Bonn), BIRGIT HUBER (MPI), DAVID MARTIN (London School of Economics), OLAF MÜLLER (Viadrina University, Frankfurt/Oder), ESTHER PEPERKAMP (MPI), MAŁGORZATA RAJTAR (MPI)

Participants of the Workshop 'Religious and Secular Sources of Moralities in Eastern Germany', 17 July 2006.

Panel: Religion and the Secular in Eastern Germany (International Society for the Sociology of Religion, 29th Conference), Leipzig, 23-27 July 2007

Convenors: Irene Becci, Esther Peperkamp, Małgorzata Rajtar

Papers presented by: ANJA FRANK (University of Leipzig), CHRISTIAN HALBROCK (Humboldt University Berlin), WOLFGANG JAGODZINSKI and PASCAL SIEGERS (University of Cologne), ANNA KÖRS (University of Hamburg), ESTHER PEPERKAMP (MPI), MAŁGORZATA RAJTAR (MPI), THOMAS SCHMIDT-LUX (University of Leipzig), NIKOLAI VUKOV (New Bulgarian University, Sofia),

Workshop: Eastern Germany, 1 April 2008

Convenor: Irene Becci

Papers presented by: IRENE BECCI (MPI), UTA KARSTEN (University of Leipzig), ESTHER PEPERKAMP (MPI), MAŁGORZATA RAJTAR (MPI), THOMAS SCHMIDT-LUX (University of Leipzig)

Workshop: Multiple Moralities in Contemporary Russia: Religion and transnational influences shaping everyday life, 17-19 September 2008

Convenors: Jarrett Zigon, Detelina Tocheva and Tünde Komáromi

Papers presented by: ALEXANDER AGADJANIAN (Russian State University of the Humanities, Moscow), JULIA BELOZEROVA (St Petersburg State University), INGRID BENDHOLM (Oxford University), MILENA BENOVSKA-SABKOVA (New Bulgarian University and Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia), MELISSA L. CALDWELL (University of California, Santa Cruz), BAIRA DARIEVA (Baikal Institute for Nature Management, Ulan-Ude), ELENA GOLOVNEVA (Ural Sate Technical University), MARINA HAKKARAINEN (European University at St Petersburg), TOBIAS KÖLLNER (MPI), TÜNDE KOMÁROMI (MPI), JEANNE KORMINA (Higher School of Economics St Petersburg), AGATA ŁADYKOWSKA (MPI), SAYANA NAMSARAEVA (MPI), ALEXANDER PANCHENKO (Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow), EUGENE RAIKHEL (McGill University), DOUGLAS ROGERS (Yale University), KATHY ROUSSELET (CNRS, Paris), KATERINA SERAIDARI (LISST, Toulouse), SERGEY SHTYRKOV (European University at St Petersburg), DETELINA TOCHEVA (MPI), CATHERINE WANNER (Pennsylvania State University)

(left to right): Douglas Rogers, Jarrett Zigon and Catherine Wanner at the Workshop 'Multiple Moralities in Contemporary Russia: Religion and transnational influences shaping everyday life'.

Workshop: Can Postsocialism Be a Useful Explanatory Category in the Study of Religion in Lithuania and Poland? 28-29 February 2009 (in Lipnica Murowana, Poland)

Convenors: Kinga Sekerdej and Agnieszka Pasieka

Papers presented by: MILDA ALISAUSKIENE (Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas), JANUSZ BARAŃSKI (Jagiellonian University, Kraków), ANDRZEJ BUKOWSKI (Jagiellonian University, Kraków), GRAŻYNA KUBICA (Jagiellonian University, Kraków), MARCIN LUBAŚ (Jagiellonian University, Kraków), SŁAWOMIR MANDES (Warsaw University), DOMINIKA MOTAK (Jagiellonian University, Kraków), ANNA NIEDŹWIEDŹ (Jagiellonian University, Kraków), JACEK NOWAK (Jagiellonian University, Kraków), MARIA ROGACZEWSKA (Warsaw University), JUSTYNA STRACZUK (Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw), ANNA SZWED (Jagiellonian University, Kraków), KATARZYNA WARMIŃSKA (Jagiellonian University, Kraków), KATARZYNA ZIELIŃSKA (Jagiellonian University, Kraków)

Workshop: Religious Hegemony and Religious Diversity in Eastern Europe: Postsocialism vis-à-vis the Longue Durée, 24-25 June 2010

Convenors: Agnieszka Pasieka, Lina Pranaitytė, Ingo W. Schröder, Kinga Sekerdej

Invited participants: ALEXANDER AGADJANIAN (Russian State University for the Humanities, Moscow), MILDA ALISAUSKIENE (Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas), JURAJ BUZALKA (Comenius University, Bratislava), VYTIS ČIUBRINSKAS (Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas), GRACE DAVIE (University of Exeter), AGNIESZKA HALEMBA (GWZO, University of Leipzig), AGNIESZKA KOŚCIANSKA (University of Warsaw), JAN KUBIK (Rutgers University, New Brunswick), GEDIMINAS LANKAUSKAS (University of Regina, Canada), VLAD NAUMESCU (Central European University, Budapest), ANNA NIEDŹWIEDŹ (Jagiellonian University, Kraków), JACEK NOWAK (Jagiellonian University, Kraków), VITA PETRUSAUSKAITE (Social Research Institute, Vilnius), MICHAELA SCHÄUBLE (Martin Luther University, Halle-Wittenberg), KONRAD SIKIERSKI (Armenian National Academy of Sciences, Yerevan), JUSTYNA STRACZUK (Polish Academy of Science, Warsaw), TATJANA THELEN (University of Zurich/MPI), GENEVIÈVE ZUBRZYCKI (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor)

IV PUBLICATIONS

Note: the listings which follow are necessarily provisional. They do not include relevant work published before the researcher joined the MPI, nor recent publications unrelated to the MPI Focus Group. For the items described as 'forthcoming' and 'in preparation', we have reproduced the information supplied by the individual researchers.

Irene Becci

2008 "Collapse and Creation: the rise and fall of religion in East German offender rehabilitation programmes". *Working Paper* 109. Halle/Saale: Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology.

2009a (with J. Willems). „Gefängnisseelsorge in Ostdeutschland im gesellschaftlichen Wandel". *International Journal of Practical Theology* 13: 90 – 120.

2009b (with Malgorzata Rajtar, Esther Peperkamp, Birgit Huber). "Eastern Germany 20 years after: past, present, and future". *Eurostudia* 5 (2).

Forthcoming (a) "The Curious Attraction of Religion in East German Prisons". In: Courtney Bender and Pamela Klassen (eds.), After *Pluralism: Reimagining Models of Religious Engagement.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Forthcoming (b) "The Rehabilitation of Ex-Offenders in Eastern Germany: A Religious-Secular Configuration". In: Esther Peperkamp & Malgorzata Rajtar (eds.), *The Religious and the Secular in Eastern Germany*. Leiden: Brill.

Forthcoming (c) *Imprisoned Religion. An Analysis of the Transformation of Religion during and after Imprisonment*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Forthcoming (d) "Pratiques religieuses et assistance spirituelle dans les prisons d'Europe". *Les Archives des Sciences Sociales des Religions.*

Forthcoming (e) "L'invention de la religion en prison". *Revue d'histoire des sciences humaines*.

Forthcoming (f) „Religion im Aufbau der Straffälligenhilfe in Ostdeutschland". In G. Pickel, and K. Sammet (eds.), *Religion in Ostdeutschland 1989-2009*. VS-Verlag.

Forthcoming (g) "Trapped between in and out. The post-institutional liminality of ex-prisoners in East Berlin". *Tsantsa*.

Forthcoming (h) "La religion genrée dans des contextes mono-sexués: Le cas des prisons". In: J. Dahinden, A.Lavanchy, and A. Hoeplinger*, Religious Pluralism: Uncovering Gender*.

In preparation (with M. Burchardt, and J. Casanova) *Mobile Boundaries: religion in the Urban Space.*

Milena Benovska-Sabkova

2008 "Martyrs and Heroes: the politics of memory in the context of Russian post-Soviet religious revival". *Working Paper* 86. Halle/ Saale: Max Planck Institute of Social Anthropology.
2009 "Church Kraevedenie: the Politics of Memory and Religious Revival in Postsoviet Russia". *Narodna umjetnost* 46 (1): 121-132.
2010a (with Köllner, Tobias, Komáromi, Tünde, Ładykowska, Agata, Tocheva, Detelina, Zigon, Jarrett). "'Spreading Grace' in post-Soviet Russia or Return to Holy Russia?". *Anthropology Today* 26 (1): 16-21.
2010b "Martyrs and Heroes: the religious and secular worship of the dead in Post-Soviet Russia". *Ethnologia Europea.*
In preparation *Martyrs and Heroes: trajectories of the religious revival in post-Soviet Russia*. (in Bulgarian).

Friedrich Binder

Forthcoming "Believe but don't be superstitious! Discourses of authority and authenticity in a Taiwanese spirit-medium shrine". In: Mathijs Pelkmans (ed.), *Ethnographies of Doubt*. London: IB Tauris.
In preparation *Urban Spirit Mediums and the Construction of Moralities in Modern Taiwan*. Dissertation, Martin Luther University, Halle-Wittenberg.

Juraj Buzalka

2006a (with Vladimír Bilčík). „Die nicht-existente Gemeinschaft. Die Slowakei und Deutschland in der EU". *Osteuropa* 56/10: 65-75
2006b 'Agrarian Tolerance versus Artificial Tolerance: The Reconciliation of Nations in South-East Poland'. In Chris Hann and the "Civil Religion" Group, *The Postsocialist Religious Question: Faith and Power in Central Asia and East-Central Europe*, pp. 293-313. Berlin: Lit Verlag.
2007a "Nacionalizmus, náboženstvo a multikulturalizmus v juhovýchodnom Poľsku [Nationalism, religion and multiculturalism in south-east Poland]". *Sociologický časopis - Czech Sociological Review* 43 (1): 31-47.
2007b *Nation and Religion: The Politics of Commemoration in South-east Poland*. Berlin: Lit Verlag.
2008a "Multiculturalism and National Cultures in Eastern Europe". *Sociológia – Slovak Sociological Review* 40 (6): 495-514.
2008b "Europeanization and Post-Peasant Populism in Eastern Europe". *Europe-Asia Studies,* 60 (5): 757–771.

2008c "Syncretism among the Greek Catholic Ukrainians in Southeast Poland". In Stéphanie Mahieu; Vlad Naumescu (eds.), *Churches In-between. Greek Catholic Churches in Postsocialist Europe*, pp. 183-205. Berlin: Lit Verlag

2009a "Scale and Ethnicity in Southeast Poland: Tourism in the European Periphery". *Etnografica* 13 (2): 373-393.

2009b 'Národ, náboženstvo a modernita v juhovýchodnom Poľsku: antropologická štúdia nacionalizmu v stredovýchodnej Európe' (Nation, nationalism, and modernity in South-East Poland: an anthropological case study of nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe), in Findor, Andrej and Peter Dráľ (eds.), *Ako skúmať národ. Deväť štúdií o etnicite a nacionalizme*, pp. 131-157. Brno: Tribun.

László Fosztó

2006 "Mono-ethnic Churches, the 'Undertaker Parish', and Rural Civility in Postsocialist Romania". In: Chris Hann and the "Civil Religion" Group, *The Postsocialist Religious Question: Faith and Power in Central Asia and East-Central Europe*, pp. 269-292. Berlin: LIT Verlag..

2007b "The Revitalization of Diverging Rituals: the case of Roma and Gadje in a Transylvanian village". *The Anthropology of East Europe Review* 25 (2): 121-131.

2007c **"**A megtérés kommunikációja: gondolatok a vallási változásról pünkösdizmusra tért romák kapcsán". *Erdélyi Társadalom* 5 (1): 23-49.

2007d "Beszéd és moralitás: az eskü egy kalotaszegi magyarcigány közösségben". In: S. Ilyés and F. Pozsony (eds.). *Lokalitások, határok, találkozások. Tanulmányok erdélyi cigány közösségekről*. Kriza János Néprajzi Társaság Évkönyve 15.Kolozsvár: Kriza János Néprajzi Társaság, pp. 81-95.

2007e **"**Királyok, papok, újságírók és az angol bárónő: romániai romák a posztszocialista nyilvánosságban". *Regio* 18 (1): 25-50.

2008a **"**Taking the oath: Religious aspects of moral personhood among the Romungre". In: Jacobs, Fabian / Ries, Johannes (eds.) *Roma/Zigeunerkulturen in neuen Perspektiven // Roma/Gypsy Cultures in new perspectives*. Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Ethnologie der Universität Leipzig/ Reihe: Tsiganologie - Vol 1, pp. 119-133. Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag.

2008b **"**Conversion Narratives, Sincere Hearts, and other Tangible Signs: Communicating Religious Change among the Transylvanian Roma". *Transitions* 48 (2).

2008c "Ritual Revitalisation after Socialism: Community, Personhood, and Conversion among the Roma in a Transylvanian village". In: H. Ar-

bula and E. Magyari-Vincze (eds.), *ANTROPO Lenyomatok / Amprente / Imprints*. Cluj-Napoca: Editura Efes.

2009 a *Ritual Revitalisation after Socialism: Community, Personhood, and Conversion among the Roma in a Transylvanian Village*. Berlin: LIT Verlag.

2009 b *Colecţie de studii despre romii din România*. Editura Institutului pentru Studierea Problemelor Minorităţilor Naţionale. Cluj-Napoca: Editura Kriterion.

2009 c (with G. Fleck, I. Horváth, T. Kiss, L. Péter) "Comunităţi Fragmentate. Studii de caz asupra romilor din România". In: T. Kiss, L. Fosztó, and F. Gábor (eds.), *Incluziune şi excluziune. Studii de caz asupra romilor din România*, pp. 7-37. Editura Institutului pentru Studierea Problemelor Minorităţilor Naţionale. Cluj-Napoca: Editura Kriterion.

2009 d "De la practici de integrare la o filozofie a integrării romilor". *Sfera Politicii",* Vol. XVII (138): 69-73.

2009 e "Viták és irányzatok a roma-kutatásban: vázlat közpolitikák kidolgozásához". *Korunk* 5: 22-30.

Forthcoming "Mobilising 'Culture' and 'Religion': Ritual Practices and Social Relations among Two Minority Groups in Rural Transylvania". *Sociologie Românească*.

Chris Hann

2000a "Problems with the (De)privatisation of Religion". *Anthropology Today* 16 (6): 14-20.

2000b "Culture and Civilization in Central Europe; a Critique of Huntington's Theses". In: Werner Konitzer and Kristian Bosselmann-Cyran (eds.), *Ein erweitertes Europa verstehen/Understanding an Enlarged Europe*, pp. 99-120. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang/Europa-Universität Viadrina.

2001 "Problems with Religion and Nationalism in Przemyśl". In: Michał Buchowski, Édouard Conte and Carole Nagengast (eds.), *Poland Beyond Communism. 'Transition' in Critical Perspective*, pp. 71-89. Fribourg: University Press.

2002 "The Development of Polish Civil Society and the Experience of the Greek Catholic Minority". In: Peter G. Danchin and Elizabeth A. Cole (eds.), *Protecting the Human Rights of Religious Minorities in Eastern Europe*, pp. 437-54. New York: Columbia University Press.

2003a "Creeds, Cultures and the Witchery of Music". *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 9 (2): 223-239.

2003b "Civil Society: The Sickness, Not the Cure?". *Social Evolution & History* 2 (2): 34-54.

2004 "Modell der Toleranz und Ökumene?". *Ost-West-Gegeninformationen* 15 (4): 3-9.

2005a "The Limits of Galician Syncretism". In: Chris Hann and Paul Robert Magocsi (eds.), *Galicia: a multicultured land*, pp. 210-37. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

2005b "Religia społeczna a postsocjalistyczne społeczeństwo obywatelskie. Jak powiązać skalę mikro i makro w antropologii społecznej?" (Social religion and postsocialist civil society. How to link macro and micro in social anthropology?) In: Anna Zadrozynska and Jerzy Wasilewski (eds.), *Horyzonty Antropologii Kultury na wiele sposobów przez badaczy opisane i Profesor Zofii Sokolewicz ofiarowane*, pp. 329-44. Warszawa: DiG.

2006a *"Not the Horse We Wanted!". Postsocialism, Neoliberalism and Eurasia.* Münster: Lit Verlag.

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