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Newman, John. *Give: a cognitive linguistic study*. (Cognitive Linguistics Research, 7). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 1996. Pp.xviii+319.

John Newman's book, on the syntax and semantics of GIVE across languages, strikes an excellent balance between descriptive, typological, and theoretical concerns. This is a highly accessible work, both for those interested in semantic theory and current developments in Cognitive Linguistics, as well as those interested in general typology and descriptive work in both syntax and semantics. While N makes his theoretical position very clear, no time is wasted with involved theoretical preliminaries. The discussion and presentation is, in general, simple and clear, and not too demanding for those unfamiliar with the theoretical background. The book makes a significant contribution to Cognitive Linguistics by applying the principles of schema theory, schematic networks, polysemy structure, and correspondence in metaphor and metonymy, to a broad range of data from around one hundred typologically diverse languages. It contributes to less theory-specific linguistic research through its presentation of rich data in a clear and simple style, allowing readers with little experience in this theoretical background to easily access and utilize the data and findings.

N's main aim is to show that while various languages display great variation in how they treat the expression of GIVE syntactically, and in how GIVE is used figuratively, the attested patterns are all arguably motivated through conceptual extensions of various substructures of a basic prototypical GIVE scenario. The variety of syntactic forms GIVE takes in languages, and the range of semantic extensions based on GIVE, are argued not to be arbitrary, but both licensed and constrained in various ways by the basic conceptual schema.

Chapter 1 introduces the "GIVE verb", with general discussion of the putatively universal frame (scenario, schema) of giving. N stresses the "basicness" of giving in human social interaction, and how this is reflected in the apparent semantico-grammatical "basicness" of the "GIVE verb" in languages.

In Chapter 2, N characterises the semantics of GIVE. A complex schema of the prototypical giving scenario is presented, namely "an act whereby a

person (the GIVER) passes with the hands control over an object (THING) to another person (the RECIPIENT)" (p.1), and the various "domains" of this scenario are elaborated. These domains are "spatio-temporal", "control", "force-dynamics", and "human interest". N consistently and constantly refers back to these aspects of his semantic characterisation throughout the book, and the result is an impressive account, especially in providing bases for motivation of the various ways GIVE verbs behave syntactically in languages.

Chapter 3 examines "constructions with literal GIVE". Given a universally established AGENT-PATIENT syntactic pattern, languages are alike in treating the GIVER like an AGENT (e.g. as "subject"), while they differ in how the THING and RECIPIENT are treated (morpho-)syntactically. Possibilities are: first, treat the THING as syntactic object, mark the RECIPIENT as oblique (e.g. as dative, goal, locative, benefactive, or possessor); second, treat the RECIPIENT as object, mark the THING as oblique (typically instrumental); third, treat both lower arguments as syntactically object-like (in a double object construction); fourth, and more unusually, mark both lower arguments as obliques. N rejects any claim that either of the first two alternatives is any more "basic" or less "marked" than the other, cross-linguistically. Central to N's overall approach, this wide variety of behaviour across languages is not regarded as arbitrary or unprincipled, but rather *motivated* by correspondences between aspects of the prototypical GIVE scenario, and the core meanings of available syntactic markings in a given language.

Chapter 4 (the longest chapter) details a variety of figurative extensions of GIVE in languages. N shows how GIVE may be used in expressions of interpersonal communication (*give a talk*), emergence/manifestation of entities (*what gives?*), causative constructions (*given to believe*), permission/enablement (*I give you cook* = 'I make you cook'), schematic interaction (*give the car a wash*), recipient/benefactive (*7 cook give you* = 'T cook for you'), movement (away/into), and completedness. N gives a very cogent and plausible account of the variety of extensions of GIVE in these figurative constructions, based squarely on his initial characterisation of the basic, prototypical giving scenario. The result is a complex and well justified network of metaphorical and metonymic extensional relationships.

Chapter 5 is basically a review of preceding chapters, with additional comments on prospects for further research. One suggested area for prospective research raises an important question. N writes, "The present study has suggested connections between some of these additional meanings associated with GIVE, without, however, attempting to document the full history of any one development. Providing historical accounts of these extensions, particularly the grammaticalizations, is, however, necessary in order to fully substantiate claims and hypotheses concerning the

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interrelatedness of the extensions." (p.270) But can we assume that an accurate historical account of semantic extension will necessarily match at all with a synchronic network of sense-relations? Should we assume, for example, that the most "concrete" polyseme is necessarily the "central" one? If synchronic "extensions" can be explained by diachronic ones, does this suggest that speakers actively make these extensions, by "zero derivation" or the like? We still lack reliable ways to substantiate claims and hypotheses concerning semantic relatedness which are plausible synchronically, i.e. which are demonstrably part of the system "in the minds" of speakers.

An additional prospect for further research which N does not explicitly mention arises from one of his own "statements of faith" on p. 1: "a language community imposes its own categorizations upon the entities which constitute reality and such categorizations may differ considerably from one language community to another". For instance, one language stresses the "goal" status of the RECIPIENT by marking it morphosyntactically in the same way as a prototypical goal, while another stresses the RECIPIENT'S likeness to a "possessor/controller" (e.g. with genitive marking). But why should we find particular grammatical "choices" being made in languages when and where we do? Why are these choices often *areally* consistent? Are there relationships between the grammatical choices made in languages, and cultural preoccupations of speech communities? N's nice description of different ways to categorize a given (putatively universal) complex schema of human experience provides a fine starting point for a study in anthropological linguistics.

In taking the Cognitive Linguistics approach, N stresses from the outset that non-linguistic phenomena are as central to the analysis as purely linguistic ones. It is not always clear, however, whether this implies that a distinction between the linguistic and the non-linguistic cannot be maintained. For instance, there is a persistent element of vagueness about the status of N's notationally marked capital-letter term GIVE. It appears to represent the (non-linguistic) *concept* of the putatively universal "give scenario". This is a conceptual entity, non-linguistic and presumably universal. By contrast, particular words in particular languages (such as English *give*, Cantonese *bei*, Kunwinjku *wo*, etc.) presumably do not correspond directly to N's "GIVE". N does not discuss the question of whether every language has a word which means the same as English *give*, rather what he is discussing is the particular (linguistic and language specific) expression in languages of a *conceptual* entity (experiential and universal). N is thus presumably not arguing for a universal linguistic entity GIVE. Rather, the universal GIVE is based on a fundamental scenario in human experience, a non-linguistic entity, and the language-specific words and constructions arise from the expression of aspects of the scenario.

One problem the book has is one shared by most work in its field. Given the expressed assumptions of Cognitive Linguistics, one is usually led to expect explicit reference to findings of cognitive science. As Lakoff put it, the commitment of Cognitive Linguistics is to "make one's account of human language accord with what is generally known about the mind and the brain" (Lakoff 1990:40). In the same vein, one of N's opening "statements of faith" is that "there are important links between linguistic structure and human cognition, making it imperative to acknowledge the role of human cognition and human experience in motivating and explicating linguistic structure" (p.ix). However, as in much of Langacker's work, N's discussion makes no detailed reference to specific concrete findings of cognitive science with regard to linguistically relevant cognitive organization. While terms like "figure/ground alignment" are indeed well-established in experimental psychology, their relation to linguistic structure is often claimed on an "it-just-makes-such-good-sense" basis. N gives next to no references which could be categorised as belonging to "*cognitive science*". While I am, for the most part, convinced by N's exposition, it is perhaps time to address the problem of Cognitive Linguistics' indulgence in "speculative psychology" (Langacker 1987:6). There are crucial theoretical and descriptive constructs which are actually not based on any "established" cognitive abilities. A prime example is the ubiquitous and fundamental "profile/base" distinction, which Langacker is prepared to "adopt as a primitive of the theory", for want of a cognitive explanation (Langacker 1987:187). One can't help thinking that a more appropriate term for much of the work under this rubric might better be "conceptual linguistics".

This is an important book, insightful and expertly put together, and a fine contribution to typological studies and basic linguistic theory in general, as well as Cognitive Linguistics in particular. The book presents, in a clear and methodical way, a wide range of data from a wide range of languages. N thereby acknowledges the role of careful and detailed descriptive studies of individual languages, and their value to any theoretical endeavour. It would be a shame if this book were missed by those who might judge it by its theoretical cover.

The overall presentation of the book makes it very readable. It is well set out, and almost free of typos. N utilises the trademark Cognitive Grammar diagrams, which I find helpful in clarifying some concepts. Fortunately for those who find such representations opaque, there is little in N's diagrams which cannot be gleaned from the clear and detailed explanations in his text.

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Reviewed by Nick Enfield
Department of Linguistics and Applied Linguistics
University of Melbourne
Parkville VIC 3052
AUSTRALIA