21   Reference in Conversation[*]

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1   Introduction

Reference is a way of relating to another person. In perhaps its barest form, referring consists of literally pointing to something in order for two people to share attention on that thing, for some interactional purpose. For instance, a child points to a toy in order to get someone to pass it; or I direct your attention to a museum exhibit so that we may appreciate it together (cf. Enfield, 2009; Goodwin 2003a; Kidwell & Zimmerman, 2007; Kita, 2003; Moore, 2008; Sidnell, 2005; Tomasello, 2008). But while gestures of pointing and showing can readily achieve reference without the involvement of language, in the context of social interaction we are typically using the rich and elaborate resources that languages provide.

In making reference, whether to a person, place, object, time, or other ontological category, a speaker must select from a variety of lexical and gestural possibilities. Reference is therefore a matter of *selection,* whether lexical or otherwise (Frege 1960[1892]; cf. Brown 1958, Chafe 1980). At the same time these referring expressions have to be delivered in the form of turns, or as elements of turns, and so reference is also a matter of *turn design* (cf. Drew, this volume). But the topic of reference is narrower in scope than both word selection and turn design—hence the need for a distinct chapter on reference here. In this chapter, when we say that a speaker makes reference to something in interaction, we mean that the speaker establishes or maintains a communicative focus on some entity, usually in order to say something about it.

The focus here is on reference as relevant to current research in Conversation Analysis and other work on talk-in-interaction. After some opening illustrations from the domain of reference to time, I examine some of the principles that have been identified as elements of a system that are specific to the formulation and interpretation of referential expressions in conversation. In this discussion of reference as a general problem of recipient design and interpretation in interaction, special attention is given to one illustrative ontological domain, that of persons. Person reference is a good focus for illustration not only because it is likely to be especially well tuned to the subtleties of navigating social relations, but also because it is the domain that has received most attention in prior research. Before concluding, I will suggest some directions for further research.

2   Lexical selection in reference: introductory examples of reference to times

When we make reference in conversation, we select from among alternative ways of doing so. This selection is shaped by a number of factors specific to the speech event, including who the

speaker is, who s/he takes the addressee to be, what the relationship is between the two, and what the speaker's communicative purpose is—that is, the social action s/he wants to produce. Any referential formulation will constitute a complex 'analysis' of all these elements of the speech event (Schegloff, 1972).

Take an example involving reference to a time. Edgerton has taken a phone call at his home from a woman who asks to speak to Edgerton's son for business reasons. The son is away, and Edgerton states that he will be back the following day. The form of Edgerton's reference to the time in question is "to<u>morro:w</u>" (line 1). He subsequently makes more specific time references (lines 4 and 7) in saying when the addressee might call again to speak to the son. There is an obvious practical reason for the more specific formulation in lines 4 and 7: *tomorrow* is too broad, as the son may not be back until late morning; were the caller to call again early the following morning, it would be 'tomorrow' but she would not reach the son.

(1) Heritage 1 Call 6

```
1   Edg:    He'll be back agay:n tomorro:w,
2   MrsH:   O:keh-eh Oh he i:s coming back t'[morrow i[s he?
3   Edg:                                    ['t!    [He'll be back
4           agayn tomorrow I would think about mid da:y so if you: you
5           could pheo:ne throu:gh,
6           (0.5)
7   Edg:    uh this ti:me tomorrow? cou[ld you?]
8   MrsH:                              [O : k a]y I will[do.
```

Edgerton makes the more specific formulation in two separate ways. *About midday* is an absolute reference to time using a culturally conventional system relating to clock hours. *This time tomorrow* is a relative reference depending for its interpretation on a deictic link to the time of speaking. Each of these referential strategies is effective for the apparent purpose of Edgerton's utterances, namely, to inform the caller of when she can call again to reach the son. For this purpose, it's not clear that there is any functional difference between the two strategies *about midday* and *this time*,[1] and indeed Edgerton supplies both.

Later in the same call, after Edgerton has handed the phone to his wife, the wife also makes a time reference for exactly the same reason—to advise the caller when best to call back in order to reach the son. It turns out that this is not a trivial matter since, as the caller explains, she does not have use of a phone at home. To make the call she must use a phone booth in the village.

(2) Heritage 1 Call 6

```
1    Ile:    eeYup. Yup.  hhh Well now look e-Jeremy said he'd be back
2            t'morrow morning actually,=
3    MrsH:   =Ye:s,=
4    Ile:    =I should imagine he pohly be back about lunch ti:[me.
5    MrsH:                                                     [Ah: hah?
6            (0.2)
7    Ile:    [He:-
8    MrsH:   [Shall I give a ring then.
9    Ile:    eeYah.  hh=
10   MrsH:   =[Okay,          [(              )
11   Ile:    =[He went do:wn[t'take his girlfriend back t'Bournemuth.
```

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              ((25 lines omitted))

37  MrsH:   =So I'll try'n give a ring about lunch time
38          t'morrow hah?
```

In making reference to the same time period for the same purpose as in Edgerton's earlier utterances, Edgerton's wife uses yet another way of referring to the time in question: "about lunch ti:me.". For the purpose of informing the caller of when best to call back, this strategy is as good as the two we just saw above: *about midday* and *this time tomorrow*. Note that all three of these are functionally more appropriate than *tomorrow*—Edgerton's first, overly broad reference to the time at which the son would be back—and presumably they are also functionally more appropriate than many imaginable time references that we do not observe here. For example, were a speaker in this context to give a point-precise time reference such as *at 12:37 p.m. and 43 seconds*, then, as Grice would predict, this unaccountable degree of specificity would evince surprise and would give rise to some kind of special interpretation.

Examples (1) and (2) show that while a referential formulation should be appropriately specific and accurate in informational terms, it must also be appropriate to the action being carried out in the turn that includes the referential form. These cases also show that a single action or communicative purpose can, in some contexts at least, be equally well served by multiple kinds of referential formulation.

Consider now a different kind of example of reference to a time, from the same phone call, but in the context of a different communicative action. Here, a time period is referred to as *all over Christmas* and *over Christmas*:

(3) Heritage 1 Call 6

```
1   Ile:    eeYup. Yup.  hhh Well now look e-Jeremy said he'd be back
2           t'morrow morning actually,=
3   MrsH:   =Ye:s,=
4   Ile:    =I should imagine he pohly be back about lunch ti:[me.
5   MrsH:                                                     [Ah: hah?
6           (0.2)
7   Ile:    [He:-
8   MrsH:   [Shall I give a ring then.
9   Ile:    eeYah.   hh=
10  MrsH:   =[Okay,         [(             )
11  Ile:    =[He went do:wn[t'take his girlfriend back t'Bournemuth.
12  MrsH:   Mm:::?
13  Ile:    But I think it's just about the end'v a beautiful
14          friendship so ee was'n(h)t g(h)ont(h)uh st(h)ay dow(h)n
15          [ve(h)ry lo(h)n(h)g] [hnh-hnh]
16  MrsH:   [hhhh-hhhh-hhhh    } {hn-huh-]huh
17  MrsH:   hhh I see:. ((smile voice))
18  Ile:    ehh heh-heh-hn-°hn°[ hhh
19  MrsH:                      [Ah hah.=
20  Ile:    =He said ee wz goina tay cuz she's been here all ovuh
21          °Christmas,°
22  MrsH:   Oh dear[ie me.
23  Ile:           [An he:'s decided thet it's not fuh hi:m. sohrt'v
24          thing?
25          (.)
26  MrsH:   Oh sensible bo[:y.
27  Ile:                  [e-u- So we had s'm rahthuh (.) floods of
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28          teahrs 'n things ovuh Christmas which is alwiz all a bit
29          tryi[ng,
30  MrsH:       [Oh: n:no:[::.
31  Ile:              [uh- Anyway: uh (.) u-he's d-he:: ih took huhr
32          back ih mean ee had- that he had tih do,  hh A[nd uh e-so=
33  MrsH:                                              [(Right.)
34  Ile:    =he: said ee wz comin:g (.) back t'morrow morning.
35  MrsH:   Ah I se[e<
36  Ile:          [ tk hh=
37  MrsH:   =So I'll try'n givr a ring about lunch time
38          t'morrow[hah?
39  Ile:            [eeYe:s::,
40  Ile:    That's fi:ne,
```

Could she have referred to that time in lines 20-21 in some way other than "all ovuh °Christmas,°"? Consider a couple of referential formulations that would be, roughly speaking, informationally equivalent, i.e. that would pick out the same time period. She could have used an absolute-reckoned calendrical expression like *since December 24* or a relative expression like *over the last week* (it can be gleaned from the content of the conversation that the date of the phone call is on or very soon after the new year). But it's clear that these alternatives would not be very well fitted to the course of action that the speaker is pursuing. The time period in question is the time during which the son's girlfriend had been visiting the family home. The context in which the speaker refers to this time period is in reporting that the son and the girl have just broken up. Saying that the girlfriend had *been here all over Christmas* does triple duty as a referential expression. First, it specifies the time period in question (let's say, for a period of some days beginning from December 24th). Second, it gives additional information about the visit: its reasons, and the kinds of activities that would have taken place (feasting, gift-giving, family time).

Third, and perhaps more important from the point of view of how this referential form contributes to the speaker's course of action, referring to it as "all ovuh °Christmas,°" helps to invoke and highlight a sense of protracted drama, in connection with the emotional nature of a young couple's break-up ("floods of teahrs", 'all a bit trying," lines 27-29), in this case also invoking the seriousness of the relationship, as well as the likely impact on the speaker herself who would have also been present throughout. Christmas is—for many people—a stressful period, particularly due to the pressure it tends to put on social relations. An alternative reference form such as *over the last week* might have been equally accurate in picking out the target time period, but it would not have served the communicative action of the utterance as well. While in the *call back tomorrow* examples, above, we saw that several different kinds of formulation could be more or less equally effective for the action at hand, here we see a single referential formulation uniquely serving multiple action functions at once—not only making unique reference to a time period, but also introducing added information of specific importance to a somewhat marked course of social action being constructed with talk.

As these examples show, there is no one-to-one or otherwise direct relation between words and the things they refer to. When we want to talk about a thing, place, person or time, we cannot just 'use the word for it'. In the *call back tomorrow* case above, a single time was referred to in three ways with equal effect for a single communicative goal: *about midday*, *this time tomorrow*, and *about lunch time*, as ways of telling someone when best to call back. In the other case, a rather marked time reference—*all over Christmas*—was important for the construction of

a telling that had rather particular social-relational nuances. Referentially equivalent formulations would not have sufficed.

The key point here is that the speakers in each of these cases made a choice from among options, and indeed they *had to* make a choice. They selected their words for specific communicative ends, in a specific context. This fundamental point about referential formulation was first made by Schegloff (1972) in his exploration of reference to 'locations'. Schegloff stressed that when people formulate reference, they reveal a complex analysis of the speech situation. He argued that a referential formulation—such as *home* in *It's good to be home*— shows three kinds of analysis: (1) a *location analysis* (a construal of the referent in some specific terms such that it may be identifiable, given that there are multiple ways of putting it), (2) a *membership analysis* (concerning social statuses of the interactants, including what addressees are assumed to be able to understand and recognize; cf. also Goodwin, 2003b; Sidnell & Barnes, frth.), and (3) a *topic analysis* (or 'activity analysis'; a fit with the activity or action being carried out by the utterance). Under his notion of topic analysis, Schegloff lists possible "sorts of formulations" (1972: 96), by which he means various grammatical possibilities for formulation, qualitatively distinct alternatives that, it is suggested, may be appropriate for different kinds of actions. For place reference he lists five possibilities: a geographical specification such as an address, a description of a place in relation to interactants (*John's house*), in relation to a landmark (*left of the billboard*), in terms of 'course of action' (*where they leave the garbage*), or as a proper name *(New York)*. These possibilities, and more, are laid out in the typology of the expression of space in languages of the world (Levinson & Wilkins, 2006; cf. Anderson & Keenan, 1985; Diessel, 1999; Dixon, 2010).

What are the principles that shape our linguistic choices in making reference? We turn now to this question under the heading of 'preferences' (cf. Pomerantz, 1984; Pomerantz & Heritage, this volume).

3   Multiple 'preferences'

The formulation problem that we face in designing a referential expression has the hallmarks of any decision-making task. The right solution must do the communicative job adequately while satisfying a range of constraints.[2] At every turn in a conversational sequence, we need to meet functional communicative requirements of getting others to recognize what we are saying and doing (to meet an informational imperative), while also having to deal with real social consequences of what we say and the way we say it (to meet an affiliational imperative; Enfield, 2006). It is also fair to assume that we will minimize the amount of effort involved, given that we are doing so many things at once, with so little time. A useful way to handle this is to employ 'default' or unmarked solutions that one can adopt without reflection as long as things are running along as they should (see below for further discussion). An ideal solution should minimize effort while optimizing effect. Let us turn to the domain of person reference, a good case study in which a system of preferences has been well explored.[3]

3.1   Preferences in person reference

Sacks and Schegloff (2007 [1979]) proposed a logic of 'minimize-optimize' as the solution to the speaker's linguistic production problem of making reference to people in conversation. They

proposed that when a speaker makes reference to a person, s/he will go for a solution that optimally satisfies two preferences simultaneously. One preference is for *minimality*: a speaker should prefer a formulation that consists of one and only one referring unit. Another preference is for achieving *recognition*: a speaker should prefer a formulation that will most readily lead to recognition, by the addressee, of the intended reference. In English, these two preferences together make 'first name only' a *default* format for initial mention of persons (on initial versus subsequent mention, see section 3.4 below). A default format is for doing what Schegloff (1996) terms *referring simpliciter*, that is, referring to a person without trying to convey that one is doing it in a special way or for a special reason. Here is an example:

(4) Field 5/88:2:1:1 (transcription simplified)

```
1    Dwa:   u-How is everybody in general[(          )
2    Mar:                                 [Oh we:ll: uh (0.2)
3           pretty good uh:m: (0.4) Kathrine seems to be alright
4           she's: still at Yo:rk
```

Margie's form of reference to this person in line 3 using the form *Kathrine* is neutral in the sense that she does not appear to be doing anything pragmatically special by choosing that specific formulation over other possible ones. The English 'first name only' format is an optimal solution for reference that best meets the sometimes-competing motivations basic to any operating system: minimize cost, optimize benefit. This default format contrasts with other options that might be less minimal (e.g. *my daughter Kathrine*) or may be phrased for special effect, at a risk of being less certain to guarantee successful recognition (e.g. *the birthday girl*). On the one hand, the speaker in (4) supplies the right kind and amount of information for the hearer to recognize the referent; and on the other hand, she minimizes the 'cost'[4] by not doing *more* than this. Giving too much information is costly in two senses: first, it means more effort in production of an action/utterance, and second, it means greater likelihood of distracting or confusing the hearer with information over and above what s/he needs.

We can now summarize these two preferences proposed for person reference in English by Sacks and Schegloff (2007: 24):

(5) Two preferences for formulation of person reference in English

    i.   Recognition: form of reference should invite and allow addressee to know who is being referred to
    ii. Minimization: reference should be done with a single reference form[5]

Another way to characterize these two injunctions is (1) don't give less information than would be required for understanding (i.e. don't 'under-tell'), and (2) don't give too much information (i.e. don't 'over-tell') (Enfield, 2010: 8; cf. also Enfield, 2007; Schegloff, 2007).

Levinson (2007: 30-1) has proposed a revision and expansion of the 'two preferences' scheme shown in (5). In the context of a cross-linguistically comparative survey of person reference in languages from around the world (Enfield & Stivers, 2007), Levinson presents five constraints, shown here in (6):

(6) Five constraints on formulation of person reference (Levinson, 2007: 30-1)

i. Achieve recognition (*recognition* = Sacks & Schegloff's *recognition*)
ii. Minimize the expressive means (*economy*)
    a. use a single referring expression (= Sacks & Schegloff's *minimization*)
    b. use a name rather than a description
    c. use only one name of a binomial if possible
iii. Fit the expressive means to the recipient
iv. Fit the expressive means to the action being performed
v. Observe 'local constraints' (cultural, institutional) (*circumspection*)

Levinson's point (6i) is identical to Sacks and Schegloff's (2007 [1979]) *recognitionality*. His point (6ii), called *economy*, explicates three different senses of minimization. The first sense corresponds directly to that proposed by Sacks and Schegloff. The second, specific to names, assumes not only that person names are universal (a safe assumption), but also that names are both distinct from, and simpler than, descriptions (Schegloff, 1996: 460ff.). The ethnographic record shows that this second assumption is not always borne out (Stivers, et al., 2007). Further, in some cultural settings people have many names, and so in those cases an injunction to 'use a name' will be too vague (Sidnell, 2007: 286 and passim). The third point under (6ii) will, similarly, not be applicable in all cases, such as for example in cultures where people do not have a multi-part name at all, having no family name or equivalent. As is also the case with pronouns, when there are multiple options for person reference, one of these options may serve as a default, but note that there need not always be a default; that is, in some systems it is possible for *none* of the options to be pragmatically unmarked.[6]

In his point (6iii), Levinson proposes a distinct constraint/preference for recipient design (though he notes that it might possibly be exhausted by his (6i)); he gives examples such as saying *mommy* versus *your mother* to refer to an addressee's mother. His point (6iv) relates to an argument made by Stivers (2007), to which we shall turn in a moment (and which was discussed in the case of *all over Christmas*, above).

Levinson's point (6v) concerns the local, cultural constraints that may operate on person reference forms. These constraints are many and varied. They will often relate to matters of kinship (Enfield, 2007), where the constraints are often found in domains of ritual relations (e.g. between 'godparents'; Hanks, 2007; Haviland, 2007) and affinal relations (between in-laws; Blythe, 2010a, b; Dixon, 1971; Garde, 2008). Further, these constraints relate to sensitivities of social life such as a requirement to show respect to those socially higher than oneself (Brown & Gilman, 1960; Brown & Levinson, 1987; Enfield, 2007), or for other reasons such as the referent being deceased (e.g. Brown, 2007) or in a ritually liminal state (Van Gennep, 1960 [1908]). As an example, consider the constraints on using names to refer to people in Yélî Dnye, the language of Rossel Island in Papua New Guinea:

(7) Taboos on naming in Yélî Dnye (Levinson, 2007: 40)

i.   Strict taboo on designated in-laws (*choko* relation)
ii.   Taboo on direct reference to other in-laws
iii.   Avoidance of direct reference to the recently dead
iv.   Preferential use of kin terms for reference to senior kin
v.   Preferential avoidance of the names of co-present parties

The following example involves a repair sequence, which reveals a speaker's preference for avoiding saying the referent's name. In the first bold face line, the reference is grammatically zero (in a gerund type construction; *its repaying*, i.e. *the repaying of something by someone-not-mentioned*). This is upgraded to an explicit person reference in the form of deictic-plus-kin-relation reference (line 6), and only after real failure (3 seconds of silence with no uptake, line 7) does the speaker eventually say the referent's name to secure recognition (line 8).

(8) Levinson (2007: 57)

```
1  K:  awêde nga  anî        tóó, u   pyinê d:a            ngmêê, ngmepe,
       today here 1sPresCont sit  3Pos goal 1sImmPastPI+Close go-get repaying
       'I am here today, I'm looking for its repaying.

2      law nkwodo até  nî            kmungo.
       law on.top then 1sImmPastCont put.up
       'I took it up to the law' (eye-points)

3  T:  n:uu ye   ngmepe?
       who  that repaying
       'Who is paying back (to you)?'

4  K:  :aa?
       eh?

5  T:  n:uu ye ngmepe?
       who  that repaying
       'Who is paying back (to you)?'

6  K:  kî    pini    dy:eemi               knî
       that man.spec man.with.brother-in-law Augm
       'that man with his brothers in law'

7      (3.0)

8      Kopwo
       man's.name

9      (2.0)

10 T:  n:uu?
       'who (else)?'

11 K:  Wuyópu
       man's.name

12 T:  (nods)

13 K:  tapî,      dîpî          kede           wo
       Shell.coin 3DualNegPast  failed.to.come Past
       'a Tapî coin. Those two have failed to come'
```

The sequence of upgrading in specificity, Levinson points out, begins with zero (line 1), going to minimal description with a kin term (line 6), and finally to a name (line 8), where the name "has

to be extracted against obvious reluctance" (ibid.: 57). Similar phenomena are discussed for Australian Aboriginal languages in Garde (2008) and Blythe (2009, 2010a, b), inter alia.

A further preference is proposed by Brown (2007: 199). This is a preference for *association*: "Associate the referent as closely as possible to the current conversation participants".[7] Brown observes a general tendency to use an 'association' strategy in referring to people in Tzeltal, a Mayan language of upland Mexico, often involving expressions that refer to relations of kinship (implied by Levinson's point 6iv, above), or fictive kinship. In example (9), AN is visiting SL in San Cristóbal, where she now lives, catching up on gossip and personal history. An initial reference to a person (in line 1) is formulated in accordance with a preference for explicit tying to the recipient in terms of kinship.

(9) Sluskox2

```
1    AN:  ja' nix in  te'-wix-e  j-teb           ma  a'  laj-0  k-u'un
          PT DEIC DET 2E-ELSi-CL CL-small_amount NEG CMP die-3A 1E-REL

2         te  namej-e
          DET long_ago-CLI

          It was just like that with this one your elder-sister, she
          nearly died by my fault long ago.

3    SL:  te   namej-e
          'Long ago.'
```

Note that the full person-referring expression in line 1 contains two distinct referential expressions—*this one* and *your elder sister*, separately highlighted in line 1—thus representing a departure from the preference for minimization. If the information provided in the element glossed as *this one* is the only thing accounting for success in reference (cf. for example if the addressee had more than one elder sister), then the speaker is going to the trouble to add the *your older sister* element even where not necessary. Brown argues that this is evidence that the preference for association out-ranks the preference for minimization in this linguistic community. Speakers prefer to make explicit the relatedness of referents to the speech act participants even where this does not serve any disambiguating function.

Similarly, in an example from Yucatec, a Mayan language of lowland Mexico, we see the initial reference done in the form of a speaker-associated ritual kin term:

(10) Hanks (2007: 162)

```
1    Dol:  . . . le tyáalik ten o'
           . . . that's what he tells me

2    WH:   hàah
           Yeah

3    Dol:  hé'el o' kú'un (( kux túun)) 'in komàadreh,
           OSTEV TD PART              A1 N
           There it is  What about    my  comadre
           There we go, and what about my comadre,

4          má'alo' 'anih? (.) máagdalèena?
           ADJ      V B3        N
```

```
        Good   is   Madeieline
        Is she OK? Madeleine?

5   WH:   'éstèeh (.) bwénoh máagdalèená tí'an bòoston  e
          Ah, Madeleine is in Boston.
```

In this case, we also see that a second form of reference—first name—is used when the first attempt via association alone does not yield a signal of recognition from the recipient (there is a micropause just prior to production of the name as a second attempt at reference). This is evidence that the association preference outranks the preference for using a name in this language (unlike in English).

We can now summarize the various principles that have been proposed as underlying mechanisms for any system of person reference; see (11). The notion of recipient design comes up both in Levinson's point (6i) and (6iii), and so we may put these together under one heading, (11i). Minimization of expression is itself a way of displaying proximity in social relations (Enfield, 2006; Hanks, 1996); Schegloff (2007) discusses a way in which self-identification, a kind of person reference, taps into this (e.g. saying *It's me* on the phone and thereby giving the addressee nothing more than a voice sample from which to recognize the person). Points (11ii-iv) are from Levinson (2007), and (11v) is added from Brown (2007).

(11) Summary of 'preference' type principles for reference to persons

    i.   Design the expression for the recipient
              a. achieve recognition (=Sacks & Schegloff)
              b. invoke or display relationship proximity/type
    ii.   Minimize the expressive means
              a. use a single referring expression (=Sacks & Schegloff)
              b. use a name rather than description
              c. use only one name from a binomial if possible
    iii.   Fit the expressive format to the action being performed
    iv.   Observe local cultural/institutional constraints
    v.   Associate the referent explicitly with one of the speech participants

Note that the preferences as given here apply in everyday interactions of the maximally informal kind, between people who are socially close. As soon as the interaction becomes formal, or involves strangers, the applicability of the preferences changes in various ways—most obvious being restrictions due to recipient design (I cannot use a name to refer to someone if I figure you do not know the person I am referring to) and politeness (which typically accounts for more elaborated forms of expression where these would not have otherwise been required).

All of this clearly establishes that we have a person reference *system* in the sense of having a set of interrelated principles and options that generate the possibilities for referring to persons.

3.2   *Marked formats and their interpretation*

One principle that we have not discussed so far is (11iii): fit the expressive format to the action being performed—though we touched on the issue in discussion of the *all over Christmas*

example in section 2 above. This is essentially the principle that Schegloff (1972) termed *topic analysis* as one feature of place reference formulation. Recall example (4) above: there is nothing special being done with the person reference, the first-name-only *Kathrine*. The speaker is asked how "everybody" is (line 1), and she answers by beginning with a central member of that category—her daughter—referring to her by first name only. But in other examples, the choice of words departs from the unmarked standard, and we find that this happens for a reason.

In an American English example from Stivers (2007: 78ff.), a young woman is talking to her mother. The young woman has had a difficult morning. She is at work (as a hair dresser) and also needs to arrange things for her young son's birthday party. Earlier that morning, the young woman's aunt—her mother's sister—had been calling her about making the arrangements.

(12) HS 5 7-23-03 T1 (ibid.)

```
9    Mom:  so- what are you grinnin' (cuz you picked)
10         [(    )
11   Nic:  [Cuz yer s:ister been on the phone all
12         mo:rnin' an' I told'er-
13   Mom:  ^Which o:ne.
14   Nic:  Aunt Ale:ne? [I got a cramp in my=
15   Mom:               [hehhehhehhehhehheh
16   Nic:  =ne:(h)ck 'n I gotta g(h)o.
17   Nic:  so-=
18   Mom:  =^Whut did she [want.
19   Nic:                 [Sh:e wanted=tuh=w=uh:
20         everything.
21         (.)
22   Nic:  'Didju check on tha park=didju'-ah sed let
23         me tell you sump'in. Ah ain' checked on
24         nuthin'. if y-anything you wanna do? get
25         on thuh phone 'n do it.=so she done called
26         Nimvolia park, . . .
```

In line 11 the daughter says "Yer si:ster been on the phone all mo:rnin'". The choice of *your sister* is pragmatically marked in comparison to the more usual *Aunt Alene* (note that in line 14, this is the form that disambiguates in responding to the question *Which (sister)?*). Why would she say *your sister* here? Partly, to mark the action as special, by not being the normal way of referring. Partly, and in addition to this, to specify *in what way* the action is special, as revealed by the meaning of the expression itself. This two-part mechanism is a general pragmatic one (cf. Grice, 1989):

(13) Two-step heuristic for interpreting marked reference

   i.   Ask: Is the form pragmatically marked?
   ii.   No: Selection of the form is not specific to the action being formulated; do not inspect the formulation for any added function.
        Yes: Something extra in action terms is being done by this; inspect the form to find out what.

In the *your sister* case (12), one thing this formulation does is to explicitly associate the addressee with the referent (by formal *association*; see discussion above). Stivers (2007) notes

that the relevant talk is key to a complaint sequence. The alternative form of reference specifies that the referent is closer to the addressee than the speaker and thereby helps to convey that she is part of what is complainable. The referent is "responsible for the complainable action" (ibid.: 78), and because the form also explicitly associates the referent to the addressee, it helps to implicate the addressee in the complaint as well.[8]

3.3   *Repair as a window into the system*

One way to get an empirical handle on the nature of a system of referential practice is to examine problems in usage, in particular problems of understanding, and to see how the trouble is repaired (Levinson, 2007; Sacks & Schegloff, 2007 [1979]; Schegloff, 1972; Sidnell, 2007; cf. also Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks, 1977; Hayashi, Raymond & Sidnell, frth.; Kitzinger, this volume).

Consider Extract (14). Here, Emma makes initial reference to Percy by last name only.[9] This treats Lottie as someone who should be able to recognize who she means just by the last name. But Lottie says "<u>Who</u>:?" in the next line, initiating repair by Emma. This form of other-initiation of repair specifies that the problem has to do with the person reference, but it does not specify the nature of the problem. Had Lottie heard the form of reference clearly but been unable to recognize who it was that Emma meant, this would reveal that Emma was wrong to have assumed that Lottie would recognize her reference to Percy by name. But Emma takes it to be a hearing problem, as revealed by the way she does the repair, namely by simply repeating the form of reference (line 5), maintaining her stance that Lottie should know who she means.[10]

(14) NBII:1:R:6

```
1            (0.2)
2    Lot:   U[h:.
3    Emm:    [But PERcy goes with (.) Nixon I'd sure like tha:t.
4    Lot:   Who:?
5    Emm:   Percy.
```

Now consider the sequence in light of lines 6-9, following it:

(15) NBII:1:R:6

```
1            (0.2)
2    Lot:   U[h:.
3    Emm:    [But PERcy goes with (.) Nixon I'd sure like tha:t.
4    Lot:   Who:?
5    Emm:   Percy.
6            (0.2)
7    Emm:   That young fella thet uh (.) .hh his daughter wz m:urdered?
8            (0.5)
9    Lot:   .hhh [OH::: YE::AH:. YE:A[H. y-]
10   Emm:        [They-             [They:] said sup'n abou:t hi:s
```

In (15), after Emma's repeat of the person reference *Percy*, there is a brief silence (line 6) in which Lottie does not produce any sign of recognition of the form of reference. As becomes clear to Emma, it turns out she was wrong to assume that Lottie would recognize the referent

based on his surname *Percy* alone. In line 7, Emma seeks to deal with the problem by presenting a very different way of referring to the same person: "That y<u>ou</u>ng fella thet uh (.) .hh his d<u>au</u>ghter wz mu:<u>r</u>dered?" This new formulation reveals at least three features of referential formats that are used when there is some kind of doubt, or less than full confidence, that the addressee knows the referent and can get it from the formulation being supplied.

A first feature of the reformulation of reference in line 7 of (15) is that the speaker now provides a description rather than a name, appealing to the addressee's knowledge about the person being referred to. Notice that in making reference in the form of a description, the speaker selects from a possibly open set of distinguishing features she might have chosen in order to secure recognition. Presumably the murder of Percy's daughter was particularly salient or memorable for these interlocutors.[11]

A second notable feature of the repair reformulation in line 7 of (15) is the inclusion of the demonstrative *that* in what appears to be a usage that has been termed *recognitional* (Himmelmann, 1996; cf. Ariel, 1990). This way of referring conveys that the speaker and addressee have some kind of personally shared access to the referent. Ariel illustrates this by contrasting the two constructed sentences in (16):

(16)   a. The holiday we spent in Cyprus was really something.
       b. That holiday we spent in Cyprus was really something.

Ariel (1990: 53) argues that example (16b), featuring the recognitional demonstrative *that*, "activates a common memory" between speaker and addressee, in a way that (16a) does not. Similarly, in (15), by using the recognitional *that* in *That young fella…* Emma is able to deal with having previously misjudged the common ground shared by her and Lottie, which led her to choose the minimal recognitional format earlier on. In doing the repair of reference in line 7, Emma is using a less presupposing format, and thus stepping back from her assumption that Lottie shares the necessary common ground. It may be here that Emma is nonetheless still explicitly appealing to that common ground by using the recognitional demonstrative form *that*.

A third feature of the reformulated reference in line 7 is that it has rising pitch, a formal feature loosely associated in semiotic terms with expressing 'insecurity' (Ohala, 1983, 1984; see also Gussenhoven, 2004), and thereby well fitted to actions like asking and otherwise expressing doubt. There are times when a speaker may have reason to suspect that a recognitional form of reference alone might not be adequate to secure reference. In line 7 of (15), this lack of certainty is partly signaled by rising pitch. Notice that, since variation in pitch is independent of lexical formulation of the utterance, the expression of 'uncertainty' can be restricted to the prosodic channel while allowing the speaker to maintain a more optimistic, presupposing lexical formulation in the lexico-syntactic components of utterance (Sacks & Schegloff, 2007 [1979]: 26; cf. Stivers & Rossano, 2010).[12]

Several of the above examples have illustrated how repair can be a resource for analysts investigating relations between mechanisms for formulating reference (see also Lerner & Kitzinger, 2007; Sidnell, 2007). When we compare this kind of evidence across languages, different patterns emerge, giving evidence for cross-linguistic differences in the *ranking* of principles. See how in the English example (14), a 'name only' strategy is the first choice. Only when that fails is a description used (shown in 15). But in the Yélî Dnye example (8), the reverse order is seen: a description is given first, and only when reference fails and repair is initiated do we see a name being used for person reference. And in the Yucatec Mayan example (10), an

associative expression was given first; only when this failed was a name produced in order to achieve recognition. Based on this kind of cross-linguistic evidence, Stivers, et al. (2007: 16) suggest that while all languages may work with a similar set of preferences and principles, there may be differences in the relative *ranking* of these preferences and principles.

3.4   Initial versus subsequent reference

So far we have concentrated on the formulation of reference in the first mention of a person in a stretch of conversation. Schegloff (1996), in line with earlier linguistic work (e.g. Fox, 1987; Givón, 1984, 1990), points to a distinction between initial and subsequent in person reference. Schegloff discusses two distinct senses of 'initial versus subsequent'. First is the matter of the *position*[13] of the reference; i.e. whether the referent is being mentioned for the first time. In the following Extract (16), *Leslie* is an initial reference as she is being mentioned for the first time. In line 2, *she* is a subsequent reference—*she* refers to the same person as *Leslie* in line 1.

(17) Field 5/88:2:1:1

```
1    Mar:  Uh:m Leslie's been teaching the whole'v this yea:r?
2          Uh: she went in to do uh: uh a couple a'weeks: for
3          uh: .hh teacher who had s-back trouble
```

Second is the matter of initial versus subsequent *form*. An *initial form* is a type of form that is normal for initial position; something like a full noun phrase (i.e. a name or description; something other than a pronoun), such as *Leslie* in line 1 of (17). Correspondingly, a *subsequent form* is a type of form that is normal for subsequent position; for instance a pronoun, like *she* in line 2 of (17). Example (17) shows the canonical situation in which there is alignment between position and form: initial form in initial position, subsequent form in subsequent position. In non-canonical cases, with a subsequent form in initial position or an initial form in subsequent position, there is a special pragmatic effect. An example is Paul Bremmer's 2003 Baghdad press conference announcement "Ladies and gentlemen, *we got him*", where his initial position reference to Saddam Hussein was done using a subsequent form (*him*), thus indexing the ready accessibility of the referent in the collective consciousness, as the announcement had been widely anticipated.

4   Future directions

I want to suggest two directions for further research in conversation analytic studies on reference. The first is empirical: we need to build upon our still meager empirical base, both through expanding the scope of ontological domains being explored, and by expanding the number and diversity of languages being studied. The second direction involves the development and refining of a theoretical framework that will account for reference across domains and languages, like the preference-based model specific to person reference discussed above, but with the power and flexibility to handle other ontological domains as well.

4.1   Empirical work, concentrating on language diversity

We will not be able to gain a comprehensive understanding of systems for reference in conversation until we know much more about how reference is done in very different kinds of languages, spoken in very different kinds of cultures. A way forward is to combine (a) the collection and systematic study of video-recordings of dyadic and multi-party conversation with (b) available frameworks from research in linguistic typology on the range of systematic resources that languages have for making reference in various domains. It is often the case that languages will have the same types of alternative strategies, but the specifics of how those strategies work in each language will differ. Again, let us first illustrate with the case of person reference.

4.1.1 Linguistic resources for person reference   A long history of empirical and analytic work done in linguistic typology provides a useful outline of the resources for person reference that we observe in use in conversational corpora. All languages will have basic means for formulating reference by means of explicit description (e.g. *the bastard who stole my knife* or *that guy sitting by the door*). Additionally, grammatical systems such as demonstratives and markers of definiteness will come into play (e.g. '*the' bastard who* versus '*a' bastard who*; '*that' guy* versus '*this' guy*). Yet further, all languages have proper names for people. These *rigid designators* (Kripke, 1980) allow us to make unique reference to individuals by a fixed connection between word and person, rather than by means of a description (Searle, 1958). Languages show great diversity in their systems of naming (Bodenhorn & Vom Bruch, 2006; Tooker & Conklin, 1984): for instance, in some communities a person will have many names, often changing at various stages in the person's life; and communities will differ as to the degree to which everyday names can have some kind of discernable descriptive content (often the case with nicknames such as *Fatty*—cf. Hanks, 2007, on Yucatec Mayan—but also the case with regular names in some languages; Mohawk *Aronhianónhnha* / 'He watches the sky', Mithun, 1984). Variation in naming practices is both linguistically and ethnographically complex.

In yet another common linguistic system with potential for diversity, all languages have grammatical systems of person-marking, including agreement markers and pronouns (Siewierska, 2004). Pronoun systems in particular have received a great deal of attention in sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology (Brown & Gilman, 1960; Cooke, 1968; cf. Agha, 2007, and many references therein). In Conversation Analysis, a number of recent studies have touched on pronouns and related grammatical phenomena. Oh (2005, 2006) discusses the use of zero anaphora in English. Hacohen and Schegloff (2006) examine the conditions under which speakers of Hebrew refer to persons through verb agreement alone as opposed to adding explicit pronominal reference. Lerner and Kitzinger (2007) look at the distinction between the 'individual' pronoun *I* and the 'collective' pronoun *we*, linking this to action formulation. Schegloff (2007) examines English speakers' ways of referring to themselves, which is largely done through pronouns such as *me*. Schegloff's study raises the issue of how in *self*-reference, recognition of the referent can be done by means of voice quality alone.

Finally, in addition to these various linguistic resources for person reference, utterances may be constructed not only from words and other conventional forms of language, but also from other, co-occurring visible bodily behavior such as hand gestures (Enfield, 2009; Goodwin, 2000; Kendon, 2004; Streeck, 2009). A very common gestural mechanism for reference in context—whether to people, places, or things—is finger-pointing (Kita, 2003). To date, relatively little is understood about when and how pointing is used for referring, particularly in

terms of how it contrasts with linguistic and other ways of referring (but see Sidnell, 2005; see also Enfield, 2009).

4.1.2 Reference on other ontological domains   The notion of reference that has arisen in research from a conversation analytic perspective has been decidedly shaped by a bias toward working in the domain of reference to persons. However, this does not mean that person reference is a model for reference in other domains. There is no reason to assume that reference in other ontological domains—such as place, time, things and events—will follow the patterns and principles found for person reference. We still need to figure out what aspects of the system are general to reference, and what aspects are specific to the different ontological domains. Therefore, if we are going to understand general principles of reference in conversation, the most urgent directions for further research are in the less-studied domains.

There is clearly a need to open up the scope of investigation as widely as possible, well beyond the major ontological domains of person, space and time. Many areas of research are effectively looking at these issues, yet without necessarily framing the research as being about reference *per se*. For example, research on the production of accounts in conversation can yield insights for the study of reference to reasons (see, e.g., Antaki, 1994; Parry, 2009, and references therein). Research on the reformulation of reference in repair sequences can yield insights for the study of reference to objects, actions and events. Consider this example from Sidnell & Barnes (in press):

(18) Kids_G2_T1_37:00

```
1    Adult:    Guys too loud.
2    Child-1:  She po::ked it.
3    Child-2:  I ta:pped it.
4              (0.2)
5    Child-1:  Well you knocked it over.
6    Child-2:  No I didn't.
7    Child-1:  Yes you did.
8    Child-2:  Oh whatever.
```

Here we see a single event being referred to, but here the alternatives have to do with apportioning blame. The accusing child refers to the action as *poking*, the defending child as *tapping*. In a comparable case, a little girl who is with her grandmother in the park runs off in the direction of some play equipment:

(19) Field Note, NJE

```
1    Grandmother:    Careful, don't run!
2    Granddaughter:  I'm not running I'm jogging!
```

Such referential choices are not merely matters of conceptual construal, as some linguists might put it (e.g. Langacker, 1987). The differences are often socially consequential, in these cases potentially determining whether a single action is taken to have been innocent or blameworthy.

As we embark on research on reference in new domains, and in diverse languages, it is worth registering a note of caution. It is not clear that our readily-labeled and thus intuitive categories like 'time', 'place', 'actions' or 'reasons' actually correspond to real distinctions that are relevant to people in conversation. One task is to empirically determine what the right

ontological categories are. For example, might 'location' be a different kind of referential domain from 'setting'? In preliminary cross-linguistic work on place reference conducted at the MPI Nijmegen, we observed a clear distinction between references to 'locations' (e.g. in telling or asking someone *where something is*, for instance, so that someone may be able to find it), and references to 'setting' (e.g. in launching a telling, to invoke a rich context, specifying not only a place but information about the people and activities that happen there). Correlations between distinct types of social actions and distinct semantic specifications involved in the relevant linguistic practices should guide our mapping out of the possibility space for reference in conversation.

4.1.3 Typological variation and grammatical resources for referring

A further task will be to draw on what is known from linguistic typology to map out the sets of resource options for reference in the different domains. In person reference, as laid out above, there are different strategies including names, kin terms, descriptions and pronouns. We know from linguistic typology that all languages make these options available, though of course with significant differences in the details of the systems (e.g. not all languages will have dual pronouns, not all will distinguish gender in the pronouns, etc.). In the domains of place and time reference, we also already know a lot about the expressive resources that languages will make available—different sorts of formulations which will be fitted in different ways to the actions they are used for. Fleshing out the categories Schegloff (1972: 96) suggests for formulating place, we get the following:

(20) Options that any language will make available for formulation of place reference[14]

    i.   place names (*London, New South Wales, The Hamptons*)
    ii.   words for settings (*bus stop, orange grove, night club*)
    iii. descriptions (*where they got married, where we met yesterday*)
    iv. with specifiers (*a/the bus stop, my/our orange grove, a/some night club*)
    v.   topological specifications
         a. relative (*left of the hut*)
         b. absolute (*north of the inn*)
         c. intrinsic (*on the desk*)
    vi. demonstratives (*there, here*)
    vii. gestures (*pointing to places*)

There are some obvious differences between place and person reference. For example, conceptually, places are more 'fractal' in the sense that individual places *contain* other individual places and one can freely zoom in and out. That I can answer the question *Where is he?* with *In room 277*, *In Nijmegen*, *In the Netherlands* and *In Europe* does not have an exact analog in the domain of person reference.

And what about time reference? While there is a rich linguistic literature on the ways in which time and times can be referred to (Bernstein & Kockelman, 2009; Bull, 1960; Klein, 1994; inter alia), there is little work so far on this topic in Conversation Analysis (but see Pomerantz, 1987; see also Lynch & Bogen, 1996). Schegloff (1972: 116) suggests that practices for temporal formulation may be "congruent" with those for location, noting that there are parallels between time and place in the available "sorts of formulation": *on 23 September* versus *at 23 Main Street*;

when we met versus *at our place*; *two weeks before the election* versus *two blocks east of the station*, etc. There are some obvious differences too. Times are less likely to have proper names (though many events have definite descriptions, and these are incorporated in time references; e.g. *during World War II*, *before the Last Glacial Maximum*, *after Christmas*). And the linearity of time is associated with slightly different possibilities for formulation if we consider the fuller set:

(21) Options that any language will make available for formulation of time reference

    i.   names for 'times' (*Christmas*, *Easter*, *X's birthday*)
    ii. words for time periods (*an hour*, *a day*, *a month*, *a while*)
    iii. descriptions (*when they were still married*, *that time we lost our way*)
    iv. relative temporal specifications
         a. relative (*two weeks ago*, *next year*)
         b. absolute (12th *of December*, 3rd *day of the waning moon*)
         c. intrinsic (*after that*, *before you were born*)
    v. demonstratives (*then*, *now*)
    vi. gestures (metaphorical pointing; e.g. back for 'past')

4.2   Development of 'preferences' and their ranking in theoretical work

A second general direction for further research is to use the growing set of empirical findings to develop a more solid and more broadly applicable theory of the preferences that apply in formulating reference, in such a way as to take into account both the qualitative differences in the various ontological domains, and the differences across cultures and languages. Among the tasks for further research in this area, we need to determine: (a) what are the dependencies among these preferences, (b) what are the possible different rankings of the preferences in different languages, and (c) whether there are any further preferences that have not yet been observed. As outlined above, while we have been able to chart out in some detail a set of preferences for person reference, we cannot presume that other domains will operate with the same set, and indeed only a cursory look has suggested some differences. Schegloff (1972: 99-100) suggests that in place reference in American English, there is a preference for association (e.g. *John's house*) over a geographical specification (*105 Smith Street*); yet in person reference, association tends to be outranked by a preference for names (Sacks & Schegloff, 2007 [1979]). More research is needed.

5 Conclusions

To refer to something in a certain way is to define a relationship with an interlocutor who is expected to be able to properly interpret the referential expression given the interpersonal relation between speaker and addressee, the social statuses of the interactants, and the action and activity being carried out by talk. When I refer to a thing, I don't just specify its identity and nature, I treat the thing as identifiable by you from the specific form of reference that I used, and in addition I treat you as able to identify the referent by that form of reference. I can't 'just label' the thing: there is no one way to label it. I choose words which I trust will be an adequate guide

for you to know what thing I mean, and how I want you to take what I am saying about it, to a degree that is at best perfect, and at least adequate, for communicative purposes.

We are never free from the consequences of our choices in interaction both in terms of how they increment or alter common ground (knowledge, beliefs, focus of attention), and how they increment or alter social relationships (affiliation, distance, etc.). Affiliational functions of talk generally require reference to have been successfully made in order for them to work at all. If I am going to gossip with you about a person in order to create or strengthen a coalitional bond we have, I had better select a form of reference to that person that ensures you know who I am talking about, otherwise my gossiping project will fail. Only through successfully referring to things and saying things about them can we ask or tell people things, agree or disagree with people, joke, propose or complain. This is why reference is central to constructing social action with talk.

NOTES

1   There may, however, be other motivations for the switch in type of formulation in this instance. Jack Sidnell (personal communication) suggests that to repeat the same reference form *midday* after the delay in response at line 6 might sound insistent, as if the delay had been a show of resistance. Changing to the different format in line 7 may be a way to avoid this.

2   Neither term *constraint* nor *preference* quite captures the key idea, as both words have an evaluative tinge. To speak of 'constraints' on how we refer is to draw attention to what we are prevented or discouraged from doing, while the term 'preference' draws attention to the opposite: what we ought to do, or what is good to do. And note that these are not rules but norms. As Levinson (1983: 321) puts it, we are "not so much constrained by rules or sanctions, as caught up in a web of inferences"; i.e. we will be held to account for others' interpretations of our behavior. Thanks to Jack Sidnell for drawing my attention to the Levinson quote.

3   Of the ontological domains in which reference is made, person reference has received the most attention in Conversation Analysis and related research (see Enfield & Stivers, 2007; Lerner & Kitzinger, 2007; Sacks & Schegloff, 2007 [1979], and many references therein). This is no accident. The domain of persons is surely the domain most likely to be tied up in the vagaries of human sociality, the central focus of Conversation Analysis.

4   Sacks and Schegloff (2007 [1979]) did not speak in terms of cost, though this is a possible interpretation of their minimization preference—and not, of course, only in terms of cost for the speaker in uttering the referential formulation, but also for the addressee in interpreting it.

5   The term *minimization* is used in two distinct senses in the literature. Sacks and Schegloff use the term to mean that reference should be done "with a single reference form" (2007 [1979]: 24), thus meaning that *John* and *John Smith* are equally minimal because they are both 'one unit' for purposes of reference (as distinct from, say, *my friend John Smith*). Most research that works in terms of 'max-min' heuristics would treat *John* as more minimal than *John Smith*, simply because it is briefer. See Levinson (2007).

6   An example is the case of pronouns in Japanese, where, it is argued, one always strives to make reference in a way that sounds out of the ordinary, thus driving a constant proliferation of innovative forms (Barke & Uehara, 2005).

7   Schegloff (1972: 99-100) suggests a "preference rule" like this for place reference in English (hence, we prefer *your place* to *105 Smith Street*).

8   Cf. the classic *Your son* as spoken by a wife talking to her husband about something bad that their child has done; see also example (5) in Stivers (2007: 81).

9   Charles Percy was a U.S. senator from Illinois who held office from 1967 to 1985.

10 Emma does not appear to consider that the person reference problem might have been "Nixon"; clearly, the recognition value of the name *Nixon* is much greater.

11 Percy's daughter was murdered at the age of 21 while Percy was first running for office in 1966. The contrast between lines 5 and 7 in (15) illustrates a disadvantage of referring by means of a description rather than a name (Searle, 1958: 591): one runs the risk that what is introduced in the description becomes topicalized, thus potentially redirecting the course of the interaction. Did Emma want to raise the matter of the murdered daughter? This problem of collateral damage from referential formulation is explored in a study by Land and Kitzinger (2005) of some ways in which everyday forms of person reference (for example the gendered pronouns of English) give off information including the sexuality of speakers and referents. When the information given off is normatively unmarked in a broader social sense (e.g. that a speaker is heterosexual, as revealed by a man referring to *my wife* and using the pronoun *she*), this information is not likely to become overtly attended to or thematized (cf. Enfield, 2007).

12 Cf. Enfield, Kita and De Ruiter (2007) on similar affordances of pointing gestures that accompany verbal reference. Like prosodic marking, a pointing gesture can be produced simultaneously with speech, thus adding information without perturbing the under-telling formulation of the utterance's spoken component.

13 Here, the term *position* is not used in the same way as in sequence organization (i.e. first position versus second position in a pair-part structure). A reference can be in 'first position' here in Schegloff's (1996) terms, independent from whether the form occurs in an initiating or responding position in a conversational sequence.

14 For a survey, see Levinson and Wilkins (2006), inter alia.

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