Insiders, Outsiders, and the Politics of Corporate Governance: How Ownership Structure Shapes Party Positions in Britain, Germany, and France
Helen Callaghan
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What is This?
Insiders, Outsiders, and the Politics of Corporate Governance

How Ownership Structure Shapes Party Positions in Britain, Germany, and France

Helen Callaghan
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne, Germany

This article argues that differences in the dispersion of corporate ownership help to explain why party positions on corporate governance vary across countries and over time. It shows that British, French, and German political debates over takeover regulation since the 1950s differ significantly along several dimensions, including the pattern of left–right competition and the timing of debate, and that these differences correspond to differences in the structure of corporate ownership. To explain the observed correlation, the article presumes that parties cater to their core constituents and so provides reasons explaining why ownership structure shapes the preferences of upscale socioeconomic groups and working-class clienteles. These empirical and theoretical contributions inform the literatures on party competition, corporate governance, varieties of capitalism, and institutional change.

Keywords: party competition; corporate governance; ownership dispersion; varieties of capitalism; takeover regulation; convergence

According to conventional wisdom, parties on the left favor the interests of stakeholders over shareholders. In Mark Roe’s influential argument (2003), social democracy—through its presumed negative effect on shareholder rights—is the main determinant of cross-national differences in ownership dispersion. Roe assumes that, in countries where social democratic values prevail, minority shareholders have more reason to fear that their interests will be trampled on, and that this induces owners in such countries to hold larger blocks of shares. This view stems from the widespread impression that traditional leftist ideology and commitments...
to working-class and low-income constituencies are incompatible with the
distributional consequences of increased shareholder orientation.

Recent empirical evidence challenges the conventional wisdom. Cioffi and Höpner (2006; Höpner, 2007) find that recent shareholder-friendly reforms in Germany, Italy, France, and the United States were promoted by left-leaning parties, against resistance from the right. To explain their findings, Cioffi and Höpner focus mainly on factors affecting the electoral strategies of parties on the left, including a need to attract middle-class voters and the growing number of individuals owning shares. Höpner (2007) adds that transparency gains from some shareholder-oriented reforms can benefit workers as well as shareholders, thus leading these two groups to unite against company managers. Parties on the right receive less attention but are depicted as being reluctant to embrace shareholder-oriented reforms because of ties to corporate elites, supposedly leading “politicians on the right to value managerial autonomy as matters of political expedience, personal economic interest, and ideological conviction” (Cioffi & Höpner, 2006, p. 487).

This article takes the enquiry one step further to systematically examine when and how left-leaning parties promote the interests of shareholders and to closely look at the electoral strategies of parties on the right. By mapping German, French, and British party positions on takeover regulation from the 1950s onward, I show that the pattern identified by Cioffi and Höpner (2006) does not obtain everywhere. Instead, I find significant variation along three dimensions. First, left–right competition differs across countries. In Britain, from the 1950s until the arrival of Tony Blair, it was a straightforward battle between capital and labor. In Germany, left–right positions are reversed, with Social Democrats, Greens, and Socialists all joining the Liberal Party to promote outside shareholder interests against Christian Democrat resistance. In France, left and right are barely distinguishable, owing to their equal ambivalence. Second, the timing of debate varies considerably. In Britain, takeover regulation first entered the political agenda in the early 1950s. In Germany, it was a nonissue until the mid-1990s. In France, it received little attention until the mid-1980s; then, it provoked passionate reactions before vanishing from the agenda, only to resurface 10 years later. Third, over time, parties everywhere have become more supportive of outsider-friendly takeover rules.

The documented variation contributes to growing evidence that patterns of party competition differ systematically across national production regimes (see also, Amable, 2003; Callaghan & Höpner, 2005; Fioretos, 2001), thus raising the question, why? The seminal volume edited by Hall and Soskice (2001) focused on the consequences of varieties of capitalism,
superficially dealing with causes in an unsatisfactorily functionalist manner. It may well be that rules that enhance the economic performance of liberal market economies are bad for coordinated market economies. However, as Hall and Soskice themselves note (p. 52), political choices are often motivated by considerations other than efficiency. The relationship between political and economic variables therefore merits closer examination.

In search of answers, recent research has examined the role of political institutions. Gourevitch and Shinn (2005), Pagano and Volpin (2005), and Iversen and Soskice (2006) all claim that electoral systems shape political preferences and alignments on political economy issues. Among the mechanisms identified is the varying credibility of long-term political commitments. Majoritarian systems are more prone to radical policy swings than are systems based on proportional representation. Rational voters anticipating such swings should be less willing to support policy measures or enter political bargains with pay-offs premised on long-term continuity. By themselves, such institutional accounts are not satisfactory, because they fail to explain change over time. Empirically speaking, voting systems have remained stable, whereas in many countries, including Germany, France, and Britain, party positions have shifted. Logically, the claim that the stability associated with proportional representation is necessary for coordinated market economies does not imply that the same condition is sufficient. The mere capacity to commit to the deals that sustain corporatist coalitions cannot force people to want them.

I propose an alternative explanation, which links party positions to the structure of corporate ownership. The following section lays out the theoretical reasoning behind this argument. The subsequent section maps British, French, and German corporate ownership structures and political debates over takeover regulation from the 1950s onward, to demonstrate that the values of the dependent and independent variables differ across these countries and covary over time. The final section spells out the implications of my argument for research on party politics, corporate governance, varieties of capitalism, and institutional change. The final section concludes with suggestions for further research.

The Argument: How Ownership Structure Affects Party Positions

To explain the variation documented below, my argument links party positions on takeover regulation to the structure of corporate ownership, by
focusing on the party–voter nexus. I assume that party positions reflect the preferences of their core voters, and I argue that ownership patterns shape the preferences of upscale socioeconomic groups as well as working-class clienteles. Upscale groups are affected because they are split into insider and outsider factions and because the relative size of these factions depends on the degree of ownership dispersion. Workers are affected because ownership structure determines the frequency of job-threatening hostile bids and because it defines the target group for anticapitalist sentiments. (Where banks and large blockholders can be plausibly cast as the villains, left-leaning parties can better afford to support outside shareholders without alienating their base.) The following paragraphs discuss the assumptions that underlie this argument.

The assumption that voters’ preferences are relevant to an issue so seemingly technical as takeover regulation rests on four observations. First, it does not amount to an assumption that all voters are mobilized on the issue. Many voters do not know or care about corporate governance matters; as such, I expect parties to cater to only those who do. Second, the proportion of voters owning shares, though still small, is by no means negligible in all advanced industrialized democracies. In Britain, the number reached 21% of the population after Margaret Thatcher’s privatization initiatives. Third, voters are affected by takeover rules, not only as shareholders, but also as employees. (As shareholders, they are likely to support rules that facilitate hostile bids because these are widely regarded as a means of encouraging shareholder value maximization. As employees, they are likely to oppose such rules because hostile takeovers are commonly associated with job loss and restructuring.) Fourth, although takeover regulation is not typically foremost on the mind of most voters, it does rise to prominence in the wake of controversial bids—namely, when it is catapulted to the front pages of newspapers and so generates the heated political debates documented below.

The assumption that parties are both office seeking and loyal to their core clienteles draws on two theories of party behavior that are distinct but often regarded as being complementary. Vote-seeking theories presume that “parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies” (Downs, 1957, p. 28). Policy-promoting theories presume that parties have electoral ambitions because they want to implement policies favoring their core constituencies (e.g., Hibbs, 1977). My argument is based on the compromise view that both motivations operate jointly; that is, “parties are organizations of political entrepreneurs who make strategic calculations even while implementing policies that are in the interest of their supporters” (Alt, 1985, p. 1037; see also, Frey & Schneider, 1982; Strøm, 1990).
To understand why upscale socioeconomic groups are divided into insiders and outsiders, one needs to know that a major purpose of corporate governance is to address the principal–agent problems that arise in companies run by managers on behalf of shareholders. Which solutions are available depends on the structure of corporate ownership. Large blockholders can supervise from the inside by threatening to replace badly performing managers via their seats on the supervisory board and/or their majority of voting rights in the shareholders’ assembly. Minority shareholders have fewer means of exercising voice because they suffer from collective action problems and so lack individual incentives to spend resources on monitoring management. Instead, dispersed shareholders exercise arms-length control by threatening exit from companies that perform badly.

Regarding takeover regulation, the interests of insiders and outsiders are almost diametrically opposed. Outside shareholders like takeover rules that spur managers to maximize shareholder value. One such rule is the requirement that managers obtain authorization from shareholders before implementing so-called poison pills, which may deter hostile bidders. Managers dislike such rules because the increased supervision constrains their scope for acting as they see fit. Large blockholders have little reason to care, one way or the other, because they have more direct means of keeping managers in check and because companies with concentrated ownership are rarely subject to hostile bids.

The relative size of the insider and outsider factions depends on the structure of corporate ownership, for at least three reasons. First, more dispersed ownership usually, though not always, implies more outside shareholders favoring active markets for corporate control. (In principle, increased dispersion can also result from the same number of investors spreading their capital over a larger number of firms. Moreover, an increase in the number of individuals owning shares need not imply a larger constituency in favor of hostile bids. Where employees acquire shares in their own company, this is not the case.) Second, dispersed ownership is a precondition for hostile bids, and more active markets for corporate control imply more lawyers, investment bankers, stock market analysts, and others, whose jobs depend on outsider-friendly takeover rules. Third, ownership structure defines the target group for anticapitalist sentiments. Where ownership is widely dispersed, the typical class enemy is a “casino capitalist” with a diversified and mobile portfolio. In countries with concentrated capital ownership, bosses, banks, and blockholders are the preferred villains for the left.
On the basis of these assumptions and observations, I argue that ownership structure affects party positions both on the right and on the left. Right-leaning parties respond to changes in the relative size of the insider and outsider factions among their core upscale socioeconomic clientele. A larger outsider faction implies deeper divisions on the right of the political spectrum, thus increasing the likelihood that outsiders prevail. Left-leaning parties respond to changes in companies’ vulnerability to hostile bids and to the spread of share ownership among their core clientele. On one hand, more dispersed ownership and the associated increase in potentially job-threatening hostile bids make it harder for parties on the left to support outsider-friendly takeover rules. On the other, a larger number of individuals owning shares makes it easier for parties on the left to support outsider-friendly takeover rules as a means of favoring small shareholders over bosses, banks, and blockholders. Where both developments coincide, left-leaning parties face a dilemma, but as explained above, this is not always the case. Beyond that, variation in ownership structure also contributes to explaining cross-national differences in the timing of debate. Two separate mechanisms are at work here. First, a pro-outsider constituency must emerge before politicians will advance its cause. Where minority shareholders are rare, their concerns are less likely to attract political attention. Second, public interest in takeover regulation tends to peak in the wake of high-profile bids, and a minimal degree of ownership dispersion is a necessary precondition for such bids. The following section presents my empirical evidence.

The Evidence: Party Positions and Corporate Ownership Patterns in Britain, Germany, and France

A large-sample study examining whether ownership has a significant influence on party positions is beyond the scope of this article and may be impossible to conduct. In theory, the argument could be falsified by showing the lack of a significant correlation between the dependent and independent variables. In practice, many other variables besides ownership—including voting rules, number of parties, economic structure, political climate, historical legacies, and so on—are likely to affect party positions on corporate governance issues. Given the limited number of advanced industrial democracies, it is impossible to control for all of them. Moreover, mapping party positions over time for a large number of countries is a time-consuming
endeavor, and measurement on a numeric scale is fraught with difficulties. Corporate governance issues, which are too technical to regularly appear in party manifestos, are not covered by the Manifestos Project Data Set (Budge, Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, & Tanenbaum, 2001).

As such, the following section presents historical evidence for the three cases from which the argument was inductively derived. It maps British, French, and German political debates on takeover regulation from the 1950s onward, to show that differences in party positions across countries and over time broadly correspond to differences in the structure and evolution of corporate ownership. Comparison across countries shows that ownership has always been far more dispersed in Britain, with hostile bids being far more frequent, as broadly reflected in party positions. On the right, British Conservatives were more deeply divided than French Gaullists and German Liberals and Christian Democrats, and the outsider faction was more vocal. On the left, the pre-Blair Labour Party was more passionately opposed to outsider-friendly takeover rules than were the French Socialists and all German left-of-center parties, including the post-Communist Party of Democratic Socialism.

Over time, ownership concentration has declined everywhere; the frequency of hostile bids has fluctuated; and the number of individuals owning shares has increased abruptly after large-scale privatization of previously state-owned companies. These developments are reflected both in changing party positions and in the timing of debate. In all three countries, sudden growth in the number of individuals owning shares was followed by left party efforts to champion the interests of small shareholders. In Germany, where the spread of shares coincided with an increased vulnerability to hostile bids, the Social Democrats belatedly noticed the double-edged nature of shareholder capitalism and thus made a U-turn on takeover regulation, with their spectacular last-minute withdrawal of support for the outsider-friendly European Union (EU) takeover directive. Moreover, in all three countries, debate was sparked off by controversial takeover battles following increased ownership dispersion. In Britain, takeover regulation first entered the political agenda in the early 1950s. In Germany, it was a nonissue until the mid-1990s. In France, it received little attention until the mid-1980s; then, it provoked passionate reactions before vanishing from the agenda, only to resurface again 10 years later. Before turning to the political debates, the following paragraphs present details on the variation in corporate ownership structures across countries and over time.
Corporate Ownership Structure in Britain, Germany, and France

Several indicators capture the stark contrast between British, French, and German levels of ownership concentration. First, listed companies in Britain account for a larger fraction of total national corporate activity than do listed companies in Germany or France (see Table 1). This matters for the purposes of my argument because only companies listed on the stock market are potential targets for hostile bids. Since 1963, the number of domestic companies listed on the stock exchange in Britain has ranged from 1,900 to 4,400, out of a total population of around 500,000 firms. In Germany, it has never exceeded 750. In France, the number of domestic listed companies peaked at around 1,000 in 1950 and again at the turn of the millennium. The total value of companies listed on the stock market was also much higher in Britain, rising from close to 77% of the gross domestic product in 1950 to more than 200% in 1999. In Germany and France, market capitalization throughout most of the period was well below one third of the British level (see Table 2).

Second, ownership concentration of listed companies is lower in Britain than it is in Germany or France (see Table 3). This matters because listed companies are less vulnerable to hostile takeovers if their ownership is concentrated. In all the years for which data are available, more than 50% of French and German companies had a blockholder owning more than 50% of shares, and 70% of companies had at least one blockholder owning more than 25% of shares. In Britain, the proportion of companies with a majority blockholder was always well below 10%, and the proportion of companies with at least one blockholder owning more than 20% of shares never exceeded 16%.

Third, cross-shareholdings are less common in Britain than they are in Germany or France (see Table 4). This matters because differences in the degree of cross-shareholdership are a further source of divergence in companies’ vulnerability to hostile bids. When companies have significant ownership stakes in one another, mutual dependencies increase the incentives for corporate shareholders to shield managers against raiders. From 1970 to the late 1990s, nonfinancial enterprises held around 40% of all German shares, compared to 5% in Britain. Despite a recent decline, German corporate cross-shareholdership remains quite high by international standards. In France, the privatization process of the late 1980s was designed to deliberately strengthen its cross-ownership network, through the sale of large stakes to a limited number of interlocked shareholders (see
Table 1

Number of Listed Companies

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>4,409</td>
<td>3,418</td>
<td>2,747</td>
<td>2,173</td>
<td>2,111</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>2,371</td>
<td>2,311</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>684</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,095</td>
<td>836</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>873</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>1,013</td>
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Table 2

Market Capitalization of Domestic Companies as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product

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<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
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Data source: Rajan and Zingales (2003, p. 15, Table 3).

Table 3

Proportion of Listed Companies Where Largest Blockholder Owns More Than 50% (25%) of Shares

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<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>&gt; 10 (&gt; 10)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6 (16)</td>
<td>2 (10)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>50 (85)</td>
<td>50 (70)</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>50 (80)</td>
<td>50 (70)</td>
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Fourth, until recently, the role of banks in corporate ownership was more pronounced in Germany than it was elsewhere. Under the system of bank proxy voting (Depotstimmrecht), private shareholders could authorize the
banks (those in which their shares were deposited) to vote on their behalf at companies’ annual shareholder meetings. This means that even dispersed ownership need not imply dispersed control, because the controlling influence of banks is far greater than what their equity holdings suggest. A study on the role of banks in 24 of the top 100 listed Germany companies showed that in 1992, banks controlled an average of 84% of voting rights: 13% by virtue of their own shareholdings, 10% by virtue of their subsidiary investment funds, and no less than 61% by virtue of proxy votes (Jürgens, Naumann, & Rupp, 2000, p. 59). In 1996, the supervisory boards of 29 of the 100 largest firms were chaired by representatives of Deutsche Bank (Beyer & Höpner, 2003).

Over time, ownership concentration has declined everywhere. The German network of intercompany shareholdings started displaying signs of dissolution in the late 1990s, with share ownership by nonfinancial enterprises dropping below 30% for the first time in 1999. The number of capital ties between the 100 biggest German companies declined from 169 to 80 between 1996 and 2000. At the same time, German banks began relaxing their ties to industrial companies, partly to avoid conflicts of interests with their increasingly lucrative investment banking activities, partly in response to a new law limiting proxy voting (Beyer & Höpner, 2003). In France, cross-ownership networks have also begun unraveling since the late 1990s, and the number of foreign institutional investors has grown (Goyer, 2007; Morin, 2000, p. 39). The British decline, starting from lower levels concentration, was more gradual and less significant, with industrial cross-shareholdings dropping from 5.0% in 1963 to 0.7% in 2003.

The number of individuals owning shares increased abruptly in all three countries following large-scale privatization of previously state-owned companies (see Table 5). In Britain, and largely as a result of share offerings by companies privatized under Thatcher, the number of individual shareholder rose from fewer than 3 million in 1980 (5% of the population) to more than

Table 4
Percentage of Shares Owned by Nonfinancial Companies

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<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>39.86</td>
<td>39.14</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>32.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>19.2</td>
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11 million in 1991 (21% of the population). British Gas shares alone gained 2.4 million shareholders; British Telecom gained 800,000. About 1.6 million people acquired shares in the company for which they worked (Florio, 2002, p. 21). In France, the privatization initiatives of the 1980s raised the proportion of individuals owning shareholders from 4.4% of the population in 1980 to 16% in 1991. In Germany, where privatization was initiated later and on a smaller scale, the proportion of shareholders among the population peaked at 9.7% in 2000, after public offerings by Deutsche Telecom.

The frequency of hostile bids has fluctuated over time (see Table 6). Unfortunately, systematic comparative data on the number of hostile bids is available only from 1988 onward. It is, however, well documented that hostile bids in Britain first started occurring during the early 1950s and that the mid-1980s were a period of intense takeover activity. Franks and Mayer (as cited in Goergen & Renneborg, 1997, p. 185) report 80 hostile takeovers in Britain for 1985–1986 alone. In Germany, the first hostile offer was made in 1988, and the total number of hostile bids, both successful and unsuccessful, can be counted on two hands. In France, hostile takeovers were unknown until the late 1960s, when three such bids were launched, all unsuccessful (see von Kapff, 1975, pp. 162-166). The next 15 years saw very little takeover activity. According to Daigre (1990),

between 1965 and 1975, less than a hundred takeovers occurred, and all were friendly. In the years 1976, 1977 and 1978 about twenty takeovers a year occurred, most of them friendly. From 1979 to 1986 takeovers steadily declined in number. (p. 92)

However, this figure increased sharply from 1986 on, sparking off the political reactions documented below. Although the number of takeovers remained low by Anglo-American standards, the rise was sufficient to not only inspire headlines such as “Paris Gripped by Takeover Fever” (Financial

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### Table 5

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<tr>
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<td>5.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6.8</td>
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Comparative Political Studies

Times [FT], April 2, 1986) but also render the French acronym for “takeover bid” (OPA; *offre publique d’achat*) “a cult word to use in every context from political commentaries to illicit love-affairs” (*FT*, April 11, 1988). The following narratives show how this variation in ownership structure across countries and over time is reflected in British, French, and German party positions from the 1950s onward.

**British, French, and German Party Political Debate Over Takeover Regulation, 1953–2003**

In Britain, takeover regulation first entered the political agenda in the early 1950s, in response to the previously unknown phenomenon of hostile bids. Heated debate during the 1959 election campaign followed controversial bids for British Aluminium and the brewing company Watney Mann, as well as a major city scandal involving takeover malpractice. As Roberts (1992) explains, “the City [of London] had long been a *bête noire* of some Labour politicians, and take-overs provided a ‘live issue on which to arraign the government’” (p. 137). The *FT* reckoned that “the average person . . . is so offended by the trappings of some bids and mergers that he tends to be sickened by the whole process,” thereby making takeovers “just about the only issue on which the Socialists could win an election these days” (*FT*, July 7, 1959, as cited in Roberts, 1992, p. 194). A second peak of political interest, one that occurred during the late 1980s, happened in the wake of high-profile controversial takeover battles for British Leyland, Pilkington, and Rowntree, as well as an insider-trading scandal at Guinness.

The Labour Party conformed to the conventional image of a leftist, anti-shareholder party for most of the period under consideration. In 1953–1954, Labour Party spokesmen, including Hugh Gaitskell, Roy Jenkins, and Harold Wilson, complained about the asset stripping and large tax-free

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**Table 6**

*Number of Hostile Bid Announcements*

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<tbody>
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profits associated with hostile bids (Johnston, 1980, pp. 10-12). During a heated House of Commons debate in June 1959, Labour members of Parliament condemned takeovers as “economic gang warfare.” Wilson, then shadow chancellor, accused the Conservative government of serving shareholders at the expense of the national interest:

Just as shareholders are becoming more and more avid for quick gains, so the Government regard any quick capital gains as good business, to be encouraged whatever the production realities. Of course, the capitalist international knows no national frontiers. In the presence of a quick profit the patriotism of the government melts like snow in the summer sun. (House of Commons, 1959, pp. 36-37)

Evoking the image of class struggle, Wilson calculated how long it would take a “coal miner in the most profitable mine in the country” or a “Lancashire mule spinner, after thirty years in the industry” to earn the sums associated with takeovers. He asked the government how it could appeal for wage restraint in the payment of a job honestly and well done, while millions of pounds can be made in this effortless manner by a section which does no work at all? . . . These people “toil not, neither do they spin” yet their gains are out of all proportion to any services they render to that industry. (pp. 39-42)

Thirty years later, the same rhetoric was still in use. In 1986 and 1987, Roy Hattersley, shadow chancellor, branded the Thatcher administration as a “government of the City, for the City, and by far too large an extent by the City” that would not address the problems created by takeovers (Guardian, March 13, 1986). Bryan Gould, the Labour Party’s campaign coordinator, complained on television about

the sort of society which the present government has tried to bring about. It’s a get rich, something for nothing sort of society where people can get enormous rewards not related in any way to the real contribution they make to our economy. (Newswire, February 18, 1987)

Blair (at that time, Labour’s industry spokesman) questioned whether 30 or 40 fund managers were the right people to decide the future of key industrial sectors (FT, May 28, 1988). From 1991 onward, the Labour Party toned down its confrontational rhetoric. Mo Mowlam, Labour’s spokeswoman for the city, announced that “up until now there has been a natural
antagonism between the City and Labour. That has now passed.” But at the same time, Mowlam declared that industry was “pig-sick” of its vulnerability to predators (FT, April 26, 1991).

The desire to control the takeover process was also reflected in Labour’s policy initiatives. Wilson’s Labour government, elected in 1964, brought large mergers within the ambit of the monopolies legislation, thereby increasing the scope for government intervention in takeovers (Johnston, 1980, p. 165). Although in opposition, Labour’s proposals included the following: incorporating the Takeover Code and the Takeover Panel into a statutory framework of city regulation; asking companies to prove that industrial or commercial gains would come from a proposed merger; replacing the Tebbit doctrine—which made competition the main test for barring takeovers—with other public interest tests, including research and development; lowering the threshold triggering mandatory bids; ensuring employee consultation on takeovers; and changing the tax treatment of share ownership to produce a bias in favor of long-term holdings (see Callaghan, 2006, pp. 78-79).

Labour’s stance on takeover regulation changed shortly before Blair’s 1997 election victory. In February 1997, a commission established by the left-leaning Institute of Public Policy Research pronounced that “there should be no new administrative restraints on takeovers.” Since its election in May 1997, the Labour government has followed this advice. In June 2000, Stephen Byers, trade and industry spokesman, told a conference organized by the Trades Union Congress that the government’s agenda did not include reforms that were intended to make companies pay more attention to stakeholders (FT, June 8, 2000). In May 2001, Blair promised a shake-up of business merger law to facilitate takeovers, stating that he was proud to be right in the centre of the City of London, one of the main financial institutions, launching our business manifesto with the support of many successful business people and able, credibly, to claim after four years the mantle of economic confidence and economic stability in our country. I don’t suppose there is a greater indication of the change in British politics than that and certainly there is nothing that we have done over the past four years that I am prouder of than that. (Guardian, May 30, 2001)

Britain’s Conservatives throughout the period provided the counterrhetoric to Labour’s traditional leftist stance, branding their opponent as being anticapitalist and depicting themselves as the saviors of free markets and private property. During a Commons debate in 1959, Derick Heathcoat
Amory, chancellor of the Exchequer, countered Wilson’s complaint about takeovers, arguing that

the [Labour] Government of which [Wilson] was a member did quite a bit of taking-over, and it seems that the Opposition are planning to thrust more down the throats of the people if they ever again get the chance. There is, however, one vital disqualification. The take-overs of the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues were compulsory ones, with no choice to the owners. What the right hon. Gentleman today has been inveighing against are take-overs with the collective approval of the owners of the businesses concerned. That is a significant distinction. (House of Commons, 1959, p. 63)

Three decades later, Cecil Parkinson, a former secretary for trade and industry, suggested in the same vein that city concern with short-term interests was partly Labour’s fault:

One of the reasons why our investors shorten their thinking is because of the uncertainty that could arise if we have a change of government. Unlike other successful capitalist countries, we have an Opposition which basically doesn’t believe in private enterprise and does not support the system. (Guardian, January 29, 1987)

The Conservatives defended shareholder value orientation for its own sake and as a means to better overall economic performance. In 1959, Amory insisted that “we have to accept that the control of a business is vested in its shareholders” and that, on balance, takeovers to date had been “beneficial rather than harmful from the point of view of the efficiency of industry, of the interests of the employees concerned and of the economy at large” (House of Commons, 1959, pp. 65-67).

Similarly, Kenneth Clarke, then minister for trade and industry, declared in 1987 that

the Conservative party believes that the greatest national public interest lies in allowing such things [as takeovers] to take place within the market place. . . . It is contrary to all experience to believe that an industrial strategy, as managed by Labour Ministers, is in the interests of employees, compared with the decisions of shareholders in the free market economy that we are now operating. (House of Commons, 1988, p. 333)

The argument that takeover threats could help to keep managers in check was also regularly invoked, especially by Thatcher’s supporters, who regarded barriers to hostile bids as being incompatible with government efforts to bring
in “the refreshing winds of competition.” Lord Young, then secretary for trade and industry, dismissed calls for better protection against bids as “ingenious schemes to protect sitting directors” (Times, March 1, 1989). Determined to promote the best interest of business, even against the express wishes of the peak employer federation, he explained that “if we were to follow the sort of policy [the Confederation of British Industry] advocates, the economy would soon lose its competitive edge” (FT, November 9, 1998).

Unlike their French and German counterparts, British Conservatives were deeply divided over takeover regulation, with a sizable faction resenting the pro-shareholder stance of their party leaders. In 1959, the FT suspected that, on a free vote, a motion condemning hostile takeovers brought by the Labour opposition would have been carried by a majority of two to one. During a Commons debate in January 1987, Edward Heath, the former Conservative prime minister, condemned predators moving into long-established family firms that had set aside money for long-term investment (House of Commons, 1987, pp. 792-795). Sir Anthony Grant, “as traditional a Tory [member of Parliament] as one could find,” regretted that the energy spent on takeover deals was not invested into building up productive business (Times, January 18, 1987). In 1988, Crossbow, the publication of the Conservative Bow Group, called for a change of rules to ensure “that takeover activity is not undertaken at a frenetic pace at the behest of City interests” (Times, August 8, 1988). Peter Lilley, trade and industry secretary under Thatcher and John Major, said in October 1990 that deal making in London’s capital market had gone “beyond the economically justifiable to become almost an end in itself” and that shareholder value pressure could not be dismissed as a factor feeding short-termism (FT, October 25, 1990). Less than 2 weeks after Thatcher’s resignation, even John Redwood, former head of the prime minister’s policy unit, with a reputation as a free marketeer, joined the chorus by referring to evidence that except in the very short term, takeovers can all too often damage the wealth of shareholders of the bidding company rather than improve it. Only a limited number of British companies have been adept at taking over others and taking the business on to better success. (Independent, December 8, 1990)

Many Conservatives also criticized the Thatcher government’s noninterference with foreign takeovers. In the context of the 1986 bid for British Leyland, Tory members of Parliament who were supporting the “Keep BL British” campaign pressed the government to cease talks with General Motors and so concentrate on negotiating with British organizations (FT,
February 17, 1986). In June 1988, more than 60 Conservative members of Parliament signed a Commons motion brought by the Labour Party against the government’s decision to not refer Nestlé’s bid for Rowntree to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (Toronto Star, June 2, 1988). Crossbow accused Young of “blatantly and shamelessly” ignoring the regional dimension in merger policy (FT, August 8, 1988).

However, the pro-shareholder faction always maintained the upper hand in the Tory party. Conservative governments never yielded to calls for legislative or political intervention that were advanced not just by the Labour opposition but also from within their own ranks. In 1984, Norman Tebbit, then secretary for trade and industry, renounced the main instrument of intervention available to British governments by announcing that, henceforth, takeovers would only be referred to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission if there were reason to fear significant adverse effects on competition. During the years that followed, the government resisted pressure to prevent foreign takeovers of British “crown jewels,” including British Leyland, Pilkington, and Rowntree (FT, May 16, 1988). The change in Conservative rhetoric after Thatcher’s departure was not matched by any significant change in policy. An all-party parliamentary select committee on trade and industry recommended wide-ranging changes to takeover law in 1991 and again in 1994, but these recommendations were not implemented (FT, December 20, 1991; Independent, April 29, 1994). Instead, the Major government sought to address the problem of market myopia by promoting private coordination. Tax breaks to encourage long-term shareholdings were ruled out in favor of attempts to improve communication between investors and managers over business aims and investment plans (FT, October 25, 1990). In the same spirit, the 1995 Myners report Developing a Winning Partnership “described what institutional investors should do but did nothing to ensure they would do so” (Howard, 2005, p. 180).

In Germany, takeover regulation was a nonissue until the mid-1990s. The country lacked not just binding rules regarding the conduct of takeovers but also the political will to create them, despite periodic attempts by the European Commission, from 1974 onward, to promote takeover law harmonization (see Callaghan, 2006). Both chambers of the German parliament unanimously rejected the 1989 draft of the EU’s takeover directive, on the grounds that there was “no need for regulation” (Deutscher Bundesrat, 1989; Deutscher Bundestag, 1990). A complete absence of hostile takeovers until the 1990s provides the backdrop to this lack of political interest in takeover regulation until postunification, when more German firms started turning to
the stock market to finance their investments. As in Britain and France, political passions were first aroused by large-scale hostile bids. The 1997 battle between Krupp and Thyssen brought 35,000 steelworkers to the streets in protest (see Ziegler, 2000, p. 210). Two years later, 62% of surveyed Germans thought that Vodafone’s takeover of Mannesmann would be bad for their country, whereas only 19% welcomed the idea of German companies being taken over by foreigners (Associated Press Worldstream, February 9, 2000). When takeover battles in the late 1990s brought the issue to the forefront of the political agenda, all parties condemned hostile bids. In response to Krupp’s hostile bid for Thyssen AG in 1997, “politicians from left to right, from state government to federal government, union leaders, the media, all protested against the Krupp move and clamored to have the tender offer withdrawn” (Hellwig, 2000, p. 122). Vodafone’s bid for Mannesmann 2 years later met with similar cross-party condemnation (for details, see Callaghan, 2006, pp. 104-106).

However, outside the spotlight of public attention cast on the issue by these unpopular bids, party positions were more nuanced, and in contrast to pre-Blair Britain, a conventional left–right framework does not capture the main cleavage line. During the late 1990s, the Social Democrats, Greens, and Socialists (Party of Democratic Socialism) all joined the Liberals to support the dismantling of two major structural barriers to takeover bids in Germany—namely, the system of proxy voting by banks and the tight network of cross-ownership—whereas the Christian Democrats defended these characteristic features of “Germany Inc.” (see Cioffi, 2002; Cioffi & Höpner, 2006; Höpner, 2007).

The Free Democratic Party, consistent with its ideological commitment to economic liberalism, strongly supported active markets for corporate control. The Liberals were a driving force behind the 1998 Control and Transparency Act (KonTraG), which stripped German firms of important takeover defenses by placing limits on proxy voting and by abolishing unequal voting rights, voting caps, and the voting of cross-shareholding stakes above 25% in supervisory board elections. When the KonTraG was debated in the Bundestag in 1997, Otto Graf Lambsdorff called Germany a rent-seeking society and insisted that German companies would benefit from increased exposure to capital market pressures (Höpner, 2007). During a debate on the German takeover law in 2001, Free Democratic Party member Rainer Funke complained that the chancellor had caved to trade unions and managers, instead of facing international competition (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001a).

More surprisingly, the center-left Social Democratic Party also supported the dismantling of takeover barriers during the late 1990s, before suddenly reversing its stance in 2001. In 1997, while still in opposition, the party took the
initiative of presenting the draft for a German takeover law, which, like the EU’s takeover directive, contained a neutrality rule and mandatory bid rule. The Control and Transparency Act, presented by the Free Democratic Party–Christian Democratic Union coalition government in 1997, was criticized by the Social Democratic Party as being insufficiently shareholder oriented. During a 1998 Bundestag debate on the proposal, Hans-Martin Bury (Social Democratic Party) called the KonTraG a “placebo law designed to appease the public without introducing any real change, a law to protect managers and banks against shareholders.” He argued that the German corporate sector was stifled by the power of banks, interlocking directorates, a lack of transparency, and underdeveloped markets for corporate control and so demanded a ban on bank ownership of industrial shares (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998, p. 20354). Eckhard Pick added that the protection of shareholders and the development of the capital market were important goals for the Social Democratic Party (p. 20365). Four years later, during a Bundestag debate on the German takeover law, Nina Hauer insisted that “the shareholders own the corporation and should have the final say” (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001b, p. 19829). Upon coming to power in 1998, the Social Democrats, in coalition with the Green Party, immediately passed the KonTraG, which stripped German firms of important defenses against hostile bids. Two years later, they abolished capital gains tax on the sale of large share blocks, to unwind the web of cross-shareholdings, which had traditionally made takeovers difficult (Cioffi, 2002 p. 379). The Schröder administration initially lent its support to the EU takeover directive; however, following heavy lobbying from business associations and trade unions, Schröder changed his stance in 2001. On April 28, weeks before the final vote in the European Parliament, Schröder withdrew his support from the European Council’s common position on the directive. In May, the government announced its intention to redraft the German takeover law, to allow management and supervisory boards to obtain shareholder authorization for the use of poison pills before an actual bid. This law, allowing the preauthorization of poison pills, was passed in November 2001.

Left of the Social Democratic Party, the Green and Socialist parties during the late 1990s supported the removal of takeover barriers. As Ziegler (2000) explains, the Greens used the issue of corporate governance to criticize established concentrations of economic power as obstacles to desirable types of change. Much like the Social Democrats, the Greens attacked the multiple sources of influence that the large universal banks exercised over German firms. Much like the liberals, they argued ever more pointedly through the 1990s that Germany needed a modern equity market to support entrepreneurs in the small and medium-sized sector. (p. 205)
The Socialists shared the desire to curb the power of banks and interlocking capital. During a Bundestag debate on the KonTraG, Uwe-Ernst Heuer for the Party of Democratic Socialism explained that more active markets for corporate control would democratize and revitalize the economy.

This left the Christian Democrats as the main defenders of Germany’s structural barriers to hostile bids. During a Bundestag debate on Social Democratic Party proposals for a German takeover law in 1997, members of the Christian Democratic Union rejected the draft as being “too early and too wide-ranging” and so maintained that the absence of a takeover law had not, to date, done any harm (FAZ, October 4, 1997). Instead, they favored a self-regulatory system based on the voluntary takeover code introduced in 1995. During a Bundestag debate on the KonTraG in 1998, Joachim Gres (Christian Social Union) said that a change of direction in German corporate governance was neither intended nor necessary. “Constancy,” he said, “is important in economic policy. . . . Please don’t think that the job of economic policy makers is to permanently introduce new ideas.” Gres also insisted that the image of a “Germany Inc.” built on quasi-cartels did not reflect reality. Hartmut Schauerte (Christian Democratic Union) dismissed calls for curbing the power of banks as “pure ideology” (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001a). Klaus-Heiner Lehne (Christian Democratic Union), rapporteur for the directive in the European Parliament, played a key role in mobilizing his fellow members of the European Parliament against the neutrality rule and proudly claimed credit when the European Parliament rejected the directive in 2001.

In France, political interest was sporadic. Hostile takeovers were unknown until the late 1960s, at which time three hostile bids, although unsuccessful, occasioned a brief spell of debate, which resulted in France’s first takeover code (see von Kapff, 1975, pp. 162-166). The following decade of silence on the issue was a period of low takeover activity. Political interest returned during the mid-1980s in response to increased activity on the market for corporate control. As in Britain, takeover battles and scandals over controversial bidding practices heated up the political atmosphere (for details, see Callaghan, 2006, p. 112). The subsequent period of relative calm was, again, one of low takeover activity. Political interest returned in October 1996 when French employer federations AFEP and Entreprise et Cité launched papers demanding reforms of French takeover law to make takeovers more difficult (Le Monde, October 15, 1996). One observer explained the sudden mobilization, after years of complacency, by pointing to changes in corporate ownership structures:

[Until recently], few French companies considered themselves attractive to foreign investors. . . . But they now find themselves in a state of weakness
that is cause for concern. . . . French companies see themselves as potential victims of takeovers, all the more because the “hard core” (noyau dur) system of cross-shareholdings put in place ten years ago is dissolving. (Le Monde, October 15, 1996)

As in Germany and Britain, and in line with populist sentiment, the immediate political response to hostile bids was passionately hostile. During his presidential reelection campaign in April 1988, Francois Mitterrand called for regulatory intervention to tame “financial anarchy and savage takeovers,” deeming it “time for the triumph of an economy of short-termist speculation to come to an end.” A year later, during a television interview shortly before the French municipal elections, he warned his audience “against takeover mania, against the gangsterism and the rule of the strongest” and so promised to defend French producers, company managers, French entrepreneurs, against this wandering money, these birds of prey, who grab all this . . . without having taken part in the daily effort. That’s too easy! So I say that the role of the state, in this area, is a major role. The state can prevent things. (Le Monde, February 14, 1989)

However, the accumulated words and actions of French politicians on both the left and the right sent a less clear-cut message. Edouard Balladur, Gaullist finance minister under prime minister Jacques Chirac, explained in 1988 that, regarding takeovers,

two things need to be taken into account. First, protecting the continuity of companies and the interests of their shareholders and employees. Second, ensuring that the companies do not seal themselves off, blocking all evolution, all alliance formation, all restructuring. Where is the good measure between these contradictory aims? It clearly depends on the circumstances. (Le Monde, March 1, 1988)

Balladur’s successor, Pierre Bérégovoy, Socialist finance minister under prime minister Michel Rocard, opened a parliamentary debate in 1989 by declaring that “the government wants to neither prevent nor encourage takeovers, but the role of the legislator and of the market authorities is to guarantee the clarity and legality of the rules of the game” (Le Monde, April 21, 1989). Gaullist prime minister Chirac announced in 1996 that “we do not want to return to protectionism, but we don’t want to sell out either” (Le Monde, October 15, 1996).
These ambivalent attitudes are reflected in legislative measures. The Gaullists in 1986 embarked on the privatization of French industry but not without creating golden shares and interlocking capital structures to protect the previously state-owned enterprises against hostile bids (see *Le Monde*, June 13, 1987). Foreign ownership of privatized companies was initially limited to a maximum of 20% (*FT*, June 15, 1987). In March 1988—following takeover battles over Prouvost, Télémécanique, Rhin-Rhône and Compagnie de Midi—Balladur suggested that

the recent takeover developments should lead us to consider whether it would not be useful, in certain cases, to increase the stabilized portion of capital of companies that are particularly threatened, and to reduce the number of candidates so that the hard core becomes less fragile. (*Le Monde*, March 4, 1988)

Balladur also asked the French stock market authorities to reinforce companies’ defense options against hostile bids. The authorities turned down his request, but three less-radical rules, designed to reduce the number of hostile bids, were adopted in April 1988 (*Vie Française*, May 14, 1988). In 1995, Alain Madelin, then economics minister, abolished the legal requirement that all foreign takeovers be registered with and formally approved by the government (*FT*, June 20, 1996). However, 1 year later, Chirac stated that “by comparison to our main competitors, we are too open at times” (*Le Monde*, October 5, 1996), and he initiated three changes to the French takeover code, to make hostile bids more difficult (*Le Monde*, October 11, 1996; *Le Monde*, March 21, 1997). Socialist policies were similarly ambivalent. Between 1984 and 1986, during his first term in office under the Socialist government of Laurent Fabius, economics minister Bérgéovoy launched France on its path of financial modernization by pruning credit and exchange controls and by creating new markets for commercial paper and financial futures. In 1986, he gave up his ministry’s right to veto all French takeovers. However, as takeover activity increased, Bérgéovoy stepped on the brakes. In the spring of 1988, while still in opposition, he proposed creating a special investment fund to intervene in takeover battles on behalf of a besieged management. Back in office, he responded to a series of takeover scandals in the spring of 1989 by passing a bill on the “safety and transparency of the financial markets,” which strengthened the disciplinary powers of the Commission des Opérations de Bourse, the French stock market watchdog. The bill also strengthened employee information rights in the context of takeover bids, allowed target companies to augment capital to dilute the proportion of shares held by bidders, required the CEO to inform the *comité*
d’entreprise (works council) of takeovers in progress, and introduced transparency requirements regarding the crossing of thresholds and the revelation of shareholder pacts (Le Monde, April 21, 1989). The nouvelles régulations économiques (new economic regulations), passed by the Socialist government of Lionel Jospin, strengthened employee information by depriving bidders of all voting rights acquired during an offer, until they complied with the obligation of discussing their intentions with the works council. They also broadened the scope for state intervention by requiring potential bidders for a bank or an insurance company to inform, in advance of an offer, either the economics minister or the president of the committee of banks and investment companies. However, they also suspended shareholder pacts involving more than 0.5% of capital for the duration of the offer period, thereby facilitating hostile bids (Echos, May 14, 2001).

Implications

In sum, my article shows that British, French, and German political debates over takeover regulation since the 1950s differ along several dimensions, including the pattern of left–right competition and the timing of debate, and that these differences broadly correspond to differences in the structure of corporate ownership. To explain the observed correlation, I focus on the party–voter nexus, by assuming that parties cater to their core constituents and by providing reasons explaining why ownership structure should affect the preferences of both upscale socioeconomic groups and working-class clienteles. The remaining paragraphs point out what my empirical and theoretical findings contribute to current debates in comparative politics and political economy.

First, the article addresses the literature on party competition over political economy issues (e.g., Alt, 1985; Alvarez, Garrett, & Lange, 1991; Budge & Robertson, 1987; Hibbs, 1977, 1992; Hicks & Swank, 1992; Wilensky, 2002). Like many of the authors of this literature, I assume that party positions reflect the interests of their core constituencies and that parties on the right cater more to upscale socioeconomic groups whereas parties on the left are more attentive to workers. I depart from the traditional framework by noting that the relevant conflict line on takeover regulation is not between upscale and working-class constituencies but between insiders (including workers, managers, and large blockholders) and outside shareholders. Distinguishing between insiders and outsiders has a long tradition in the corporate governance literature, but my exploration of possible implications for party strategies represents a new endeavor. It builds on
recent work by Rueda (2005, 2006), who shows how the divergent interests of employed and unemployed workers affect party positions on labor market issues. I argue that a similar insider–outsider divide on the capital side affects party positions on corporate governance issues. The segmentation of capital confronts center-right parties with dilemmas that can be exploited by parties on the left, just as, per Rueda’s analysis, the segmentation of labor benefits conservative parties.

Second, it challenges existing work on the relationship between ownership patterns and minority shareholder protection. Most authors explain correlations between ownership dispersion and various political factors by treating ownership as the dependent variable. Roe (2003) argues that social democracy discourages ownership dispersion by making it more difficult for outside shareholders to claim primacy vis-à-vis other stakeholders, including workers. Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) suggest that the larger number of veto players in consensus-oriented political systems, as opposed to majoritarian political systems, favors concentrated ownership by encouraging corporatist coalitions among managers, workers, and blockholders, against outside owners. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) claim that the degree of dispersion depends on the quality of corporate law, including minority shareholder protection. I argue that a causal arrow runs in the opposite direction—that is, from ownership structures to politics and corporate law. Outside shareholders must first emerge as a sizable constituency before a political party will advance their cause. Unlike the arguments discussed above, mine is compatible with Coffee’s observation (2001, p. 66) that political and legal efforts to protect shareholders have historically tended to follow, rather than precede, the appearance of securities markets.

Third, it contributes to growing evidence that different patterns of party competition correspond to different varieties of capitalism. Amable (2003) uses regression analysis to show that liberal market economies are more likely than coordinated market economies to be governed from the right. Callaghan and Höpner (2005) find that members of the European Parliament from countries with low shareholder protection were less likely than delegates from countries with high protection to support the EU’s takeover directive. Fioretos (2001) remarks that governments in EU negotiations act as though they are defending their respective countries’ comparative institutional advantage. The present article shows that Britain and Germany—the closest real-world examples of a liberal economy and a coordinated market economy respectively—display strikingly different patterns of party competition on a policy issue that is considered central to generating the comparative institutional advantages of these national production regimes.
Fourth, it advances the literatures on varieties of capitalism and institutional change by suggesting that political support for shareholder capitalism is greater in Britain than it is in Germany, not because actors in both countries know about and seek to defend the comparative institutional advantage of their production regimes, but simply because Britain has more shareholders. The implicit assumption in parts of the varieties-of-capitalism literature—that interest groups and governments care mainly about preserving the comparative institutional advantage of their national production regime (see Fioretos, 2001, p. 225)—makes it difficult to explain moves away from equilibrium. Widespread recent growth in support for shareholder-oriented corporate governance is easier to explain once ownership structure is recognized as a determinant of preferences and party positions. My argument implies that increased ownership dispersion owing to privatization, tax changes, or the like may undermine political support for stakeholder-friendly corporate governance rules regardless of their contribution to the comparative institutional advantage of coordinated market economies.

Beyond that, my article opens up several agendas for further research. First, more nuanced descriptions of ownership patterns and their relationship to political preferences would be desirable. The present article takes only one of many necessary steps toward disaggregating capital. Although the insider–outsider distinction is reasonably informative on the issue of takeover regulation, it may not be the most relevant cleavage on other corporate governance issues. Among the insiders, one could further distinguish between managers and owners of listed and unlisted companies, as well as small and large companies of different sectors, and among family owners, banks, the state as blockholder in nationalized enterprises, and so on. Among the outsiders, individual shareholders differ from various types of institutional investors, including pension funds, hedge funds, and mutual funds. Who wants what on any particular issue is impossible to analytically ascertain because no model is better than its assumptions and because standard assumptions remain controversial, such as the idea that material interests can be inferred from material positions. Some of these concerns would be alleviated by a systematic empirical study of lobbying efforts by groups representing different segments of capital.

Second, although the present article focuses on the party–voter nexus, electoral pressures are clearly not the only conceivable channel through which ownership structure might affect party positions. Alternative channels include a structurally privileged position of business in capitalist economies (e.g., Lindblom, 1979) or the role of bureaucrats in the policy-making process (e.g., Tiberghien, 2007). Arguments along these lines...
require different assumptions from the ones that I make regarding the motivations and autonomy of politicians, but they are compatible with my claim that party positions depend on the structure of corporate ownership, to the extent that business preferences and expert recommendations depend on the structure of corporate ownership. There are good reasons for believing that this is the case. The varieties-of-capitalism literature has long argued that companies in coordinated market economies, where concentrated ownership prevails, have different corporate governance requirements than do companies in liberal market economies, which are more exposed to stock market pressures (e.g., Vitols, 2001); in fact, recent empirical research confirms that these differences are reflected in employer preferences (Callaghan, 2007). Ascertaining whether politicians are swayed more by electoral pressures or interest-group demands is ultimately impossible, but careful process tracing of lobbying efforts and political responses might go some way toward answering this question.

Third, the effect of factors other than ownership structure on the politics of corporate governance merits further exploration. Institutional variables, though insufficient by themselves, surely play a role. Apart from the above-mentioned effect of electoral systems on coalition behavior, differences between federal and unitary systems seem likely relevant. So far, research into the effect of federalism on corporate governance has focused on policy outcomes (Bebchuk & Ferrell, 1999, pp. 1176-1177; Miller, 1998, pp. 70-73; Roe, 1993, pp. 332-333). It seems worth exploring how multilevel governance affects party competition. More so than the United States, the EU would be a promising terrain for such studies.

Fourth, the consequences of the timing and sequencing of debate for the content of debate remain to be examined. As shown above, British parties started arguing over takeover regulation almost four decades before the issue entered the German political agenda. Timing is likely to affect the content of debate not only because economic ideas en vogue in one period may be less fashionable decades later; that is, the order in which countries liberalize their markets for corporate control is also likely to matter because latecomers suffer disadvantages of backwardness. Britain removed barriers to hostile bids at a time when cross-border capital mobility was limited, and British firms had decades to adapt to the British Takeover Code before it was proposed as a blueprint for regulation throughout the EU. Partly as a result, German firms found themselves in a position of asymmetric vulnerability, which helps to explain why German members of the European parliament from all political parties voted against the 2001
outsider-friendly version of the EU takeover directive (Callaghan & Höpner, 2005). The advantageous position of British companies in an increasingly transnational market for corporate control may also help to explain why British parties on the right and the left, bitterly divided over takeover regulation until the 1990s, have since converged to endorse the absence of barriers to hostile bids.

Finally, it will be interesting to see how German, French, and British parties respond to future changes in the structure of corporate ownership. But this is a question that only time can answer.

References


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