Language presupposes an enchronic infrastructure for social interaction
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Introduction

Any approach to research on language evolution, whether it concern the phylogenesis of the human capacity for language, or the diachronic evolution of languages in social history, must be concerned with causal processes in historical human populations. Accordingly, the term ‘language’ must naturally be defined for this research in such a way that its causal connections to cognition and behaviour are both explicit and realistic. This accounts in part for the appeal of those approaches to language that come under the functionalist rubric. Functionalist approaches are gaining increasingly wide acceptance in research on language evolution (Tomasello 1998; Tomasello 2008; Christiansen and Chater 2008; Hurford 2007). Among the reasons why functionalist approaches to language have been attractive is that they do not suffer from certain fatal inadequacies of the once-dominant generative approach to linguistics, which has tended to assume that language’s central function is unrelated to communication or any other aspect of social life (Chomsky 2011), and which has tended to rely on a methodology of introspection rather than observation (Enfield 2010; cf. Schütze 1996, Dabrowska 2010, Gibson and Fedorenko 2010). But while functionalist approaches to language are to a large degree germane to, and often explicitly linked to, an idea that language is social in nature, they have not been able to cover all of the necessary ground, for at least two reasons. First, their scope has often been largely constrained to a view of language in which the basic unit is the isolated sentence along with the sub-sentential structures that constitute it; structures like words, morphemes, phrases, and constructions (Langacker 1987, Lakoff 1987, Wierzbicka 1988). When these approaches do go beyond the level of the sentence it is often to explore the structure of monologic narratives, that is, multi-unit structures produced by single speakers, thus not in an essentially social-interactional type of functional context. In monologic contexts, the functions being served by grammatical selection may have more to do with reflecting and/or organizing the individual’s thoughts than with communication per se (Chafe 1994). A second restriction in the scope of functionalist approaches to language is that the aspects of cognition on which they have tended to focus are not essentially social-interactional in nature. Rather, the interest in cognition
relates in large part to the capacity for monitoring or manipulating states of attention, construal, or conceptual focus (Chafe 1980, 1994, Langacker 1987, Lambrecht 1994, Tomlin 1997). These are kinds of intentional states that do not necessarily invoke the presence of another person who is being oriented to in social-relational terms.

While functionalist linguistic approaches have remained thoroughly linguistic yet without becoming particularly social, some approaches to language evolution have had the opposite problem. Coming out of an ethological tradition of research on primate social systems, Dunbar hypothesizes that language arose in our species as a way of managing or servicing social relationships, in a way analogous to physical grooming in apes and monkeys (Dunbar 1993, 1996). This approach is solidly grounded in research on processes of maintaining social relations in complex social groups, but it has failed to gain traction in linguistics because, linguists say, the argument ‘does not say anything about the intricate grammatical structures of human languages’ (Hurford 1999:182). And further: ‘While language is used for social “grooming” purposes, this emphasis fails to account for the impressive and subtle referential power of language’ (Hurford 1999:186). This sentiment points to a deep disconnect between the social and the linguistic in current research of relevance to language evolution. Either the researcher is handling the technicalities of language without really grasping what is going on socially, or vice versa. In this chapter, we want to draw attention to a sorely needed solution to this problem, taking as a starting point the behavior of social interaction from a technical point of view, and seeing what language looks like from there.

Language in social interaction

Suppose that in order to get at the social origins of language we would begin by looking at language as it is employed in social interaction rather than looking at language as linguists traditionally view it. We might expect that these patterns of social interaction vary radically across cultures perhaps without significant constraint. Inuit song duels, Wolof greetings, Iatmul Naven are just a few of the anthropologically more famous forms that human social interaction takes (Eckert and Newmark 1980, Irvine 1974, Bateson 1936). When seen in comparison to more familiar forms such as found in English courtrooms, American presidential press-
conferences and French family dinners we may be impressed by apparently limitless diversity. However, research on the basic structures of social interaction, which serve as a necessary chassis for linguistic behaviour, has shown that beneath such diversity is a robust, universal, generic infrastructure that exploits a range of species-specific cognitive abilities and prosocial motivations (Enfield and Levinson 2006, Levinson 2006, Scheglof 2006, Sidnell 2007, Tomasello 2008). This ‘infrastructure’ is emphatically not some kind of conversational equivalent of the mental module or device that has been proposed by generative linguists to underlie putative commonalities among the grammars of the world’s languages. The infrastructure being described here emerges from a combination of evolved cognitive capacities in the domain of sociality (in part specifically human, though not specific to language) and the structural patterning that emerges when social moves are made and counter-made, in the form of the kinds of few-second chunks of behaviour we call utterances. The precise nature of this emergence is a major topic for research. The hypothesis is that even when basic styles of human interaction seem to differ radically across groups—compare, for example, norms of interaction in Japan versus Anglo America (Lebra 1976, Lebra and Lebra 1986, Wierzbicka 1991:72ff)—there is a universal underlying infrastructure for the use of language in interaction. But the technical properties of this infrastructure are not to be discovered by applying the standard research tools of linguistics, not even the tools of well-intentioned functionalists.

If research on the social origins of language is to be properly informed about the object of study, then what is needed, as a complement to existing functionalist approaches to language, are approaches that focus on (a) those aspects of language that are unique to multi-unit sequences produced not by a single person but by multiple people in a social interaction; i.e., conversation, and (b) those aspects of cognition-for-language that are unique to the management of social relations rather than to the conceptual management of information per se. Fortunately, these needs are already met. There are established research traditions that provide resources for studying language and cognition in just these ways. To date, however, they have tended not to be well connected with linguistics, or cognitive science more generally, partly for reasons of disciplinary affiliation: they exist as branches of anthropology and sociology. They take an enchronic perspective on language, that is, they look at language in the move-by-move flow of interaction, as opposed to the (also invaluable) perspectives diachronic versus synchronic,

Current thinking about face-to-face interaction from an enchronic perspective has been influenced by a variety of lines of research including linguistic pragmatics, Peircean semiotics, as well as studies in anthropology, psychology and other disciplines (see Enfield in press, and many references therein). Here we want to highlight an approach to interaction that emerged in the work of Harvey Sacks, Emanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson and that has come to be known asConversation Analysis (Sacks 1992, Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974, Sidnell 2010, Sidnell and Stivers 2012). Both Sacks and Schegloff were students of Erving Goffman, a transdisciplinary scholar who though trained as a sociologist had a major impact upon, and indeed was himself strongly inspired by, anthropology (see especially Goffman 1964, 1967 and 1971, the last of which is dedicated to the memory of Radcliffe-Brown). Goffman was perhaps the first and certainly the most eloquent defender of the view that face-to-face interaction constituted its own phenomenon, that it had properties which were *sui generis* and not reducible to individual psychology or broader social processes (Goffman 1964). Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson incorporated this idea, and it may be understood as the first pillar of Conversation Analysis (see especially Schegloff 1968).

When Sacks and Schegloff were studying with Goffman at Berkeley, they were influenced by the highly original studies of Harold Garfinkel and the approach he developed known as Ethnomethodology (Garfinkel 1967). The goal of Garfinkel’s early studies was to uncover the underlying practices of reasoning which members of a society use in accomplishing everyday activities and which ultimately make society possible. A major part of Garfinkel’s investigations was taken up with the question of how a person makes sense of another’s conduct including their talk. This concern was incorporated into Conversation Analysis, as a kind of second pillar: the idea that participants in social interaction engage in practical reasoning both to produce their own talk and to understand the talk of others (see Heritage 1984). Both Goffman and Garfinkel thus
provided inspiration for a new and distinctive approach to the study of ordinary social interaction. Others were left though with the task of inventing a method by which ordinary social interaction might be systematically studied.

Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson took up this challenge. They studied social interaction by looking at audio recordings of telephone calls as well as co-present interaction, and there they found a locus of intricate order. Early studies showed that an interaction can be analyzed into parts and that these parts consist of definable practices of speaking which have systematic effects and which together form orderly sequences of action in interaction (Schegloff 1968, see also Schegloff 2006). This order is not the product of statistical regularities or of categorical imperatives but rather of a persistent and pervasive orientation by the participants to a set of structures or norms. Like any set of norms in this sense, the norms that organize social interaction do not determine conduct but rather provide a framework through which it is intelligible and through which it is evaluated (see Heritage 1984, Stivers et al 2011).

Membership in any particular social group (e.g. German, Surgeon, Skateboarder) requires that one be aware of, and unable to deny the existence of, a certain set of norms, and thus to be accountable to those norms at every step. Participants in interaction can then be seen—not only by analysts but, in the first place, by other participants—as following a rule, deviating from it, attempting but failing to follow it, or simply violating it flat out. These alternatives generate further informative inferences about what that participant intends or means by behaving in that way (Sidnell 2010). The orderliness of interaction then is an endogenous product that is achieved by participants in interaction in each and every one of its local instantiations through the application of regular practices of reasoning.

Since the establishment of Conversation Analysis as a field of empirically-based research on the structures of social action, a significant literature has been produced. The recent Handbook of Conversation Analysis (Sidnell and Stivers 2012) has a list of some 2000 bibliographical references. But from the point of view of linguistics and other branches of cognitive science it is as if there were a hermetic seal around this literature. In even the best, most sympathetic work in linguistics, there is little if any connection to what is empirically known about the structure of human interaction, nor to the social cognition that underlies it or the situated use of language as a
cooperative activity. There are a few notable exceptions, for example in psycholinguistics (e.g., Clark 1996) and linguistic anthropology (e.g., Moerman 1988, Sidnell 2005), but surprisingly, in the language evolution literature that begins with the social-relational functions of language (e.g., Dunbar 1996, Dessalles 2007) this large and directly relevant field of research is entirely overlooked.

*Linguistic structures in social interaction*

When we look at language in the context of its functions and distributions in social interaction, the phenomenon takes on a new light. Over the last 20 years or so, a group of linguists with functionalist affiliations have begun to yield new insights by incorporating analytic concepts developed in Conversation Analysis, particularly those of turn-taking and conversational sequence, in the analysis of traditional linguistic topics. For example, Ford (1993) examines the grammatical structures known as sentence-final adverbial clauses in English and shows ways in which their structure and distribution are not arbitrary but may be ‘interactionally generated’ (Ford 1993:108 and passim). In the following example (1) the speaker S poses a question, and when no uptake is forthcoming from the recipient R in the subsequent line, S then adds the increment, which in turn elicits the uptake from R that lets S know they are being understood.

(1)

1  S: Y’know when it- (. ) came from the:: I think (a) air conditioning system, it drips on the front of the ca:rs?
2          (0.1 second pause)
3  S: if you park in a certain place?
4  R: mm-hm

The increment produced in line 3 is grammatically fitted to what came before it in line 1, but clearly lines 1 and 3 were not produced as a whole unit, such as they might appear to have been if cleaned up and written down on the page (...it drips on the front of the cars if you park in a certain place?). Rather, we see that in the real-time context of the dyadic interaction, at line 2 some sort of confirmation of understanding appears to have been due from R, but there was
silence instead. By then producing the increment in line 3, S can continue as if the turn was not yet finished, thus getting another opportunity to elicit a confirmation of understanding, which indeed comes from R in line 4 (see also Sidnell 2012). This type of study complements traditional linguistic research on grammatical structures by giving us a sense of the functions that such structures have in the enchronic social context of the speech event, as distinct from their referential or representational relations to the event being narrated or described.

Another area is the study of the ‘procedural resources’ that languages provide for managing talk (cf. Blakemore 1987, 2002, Schiffrin 1988, Clark 1996). All languages have various kinds of ‘feedback markers’ (mm, uh-huh), ‘discourse markers’ (oh, so, well, etc.), ‘trouble markers’ (um, uh), ‘editing expressions’ (I mean, etc.), ‘repair initiators’ (what? huh?), etc. Despite their ubiquity and importance in regulating the flow of interaction, these kinds of items are seldom studied in typological or cognitive scientific approaches to language, with their tendency to focus on the referential functions of language. Upon inspection of data from conversation, it can be shown that these types of items have distinct distributional properties in relation to formal patterns of language use. For example, with regard to so-called ‘newsmarks’ in English (such as Really?), Jefferson (cited in Heritage 1984:340) shows that there are definable and recurrent multi-turn sequences like the following: (Move 1) announcement of some piece of new information by Speaker A (e.g., that she didn’t smoke any cigarettes); (Move 2) Oh really? by Speaker B; (Move 3) reconfirmation by A; and finally (Move 4) an ‘assessment’ by B (e.g., Very good). This kind of pattern is not a construction in any standard linguistic sense, but it clearly points to a kind of interactional grammar surrounding these procedural linguistic elements. Yet in some research, items of this kind are not even considered to be linguistic at all. Levelt (1989) looks at er as a marker of disfluency (similar to um, uh, etc.), and while he shows that er has a specifiable function—signaling that ‘at the moment when trouble is detected, the source of trouble is still actual or quite recent’—he concludes that it is ‘a symptom, not a sign’ (Levelt 1989:484). Jefferson (1974:184) suggests, by contrast, that uh perhaps has ‘the status of a word in the English language’, and the same has been argued by Clark and Fox Tree (2002), who found in a corpus study that um and uh show different functional distributions in English. In addition, a quick look across languages reveals that the precise form of such items are locally conventionalized: English has um while Lao has ‘un’ (Enfield 2007:314). These kinds of
procedural items do not have the referential functions that linguists tend to privilege, but they are no less linguistic for that.

In the sorts of approaches we have just reviewed, the researcher is either looking at a familiar grammatical structure in the unfamiliar light of conversational sequence, or is looking at a well-known but oft-marginalized element that can hardly be studied at all without conversational data. But then there are domains of structure that are off the linguistic map altogether. These possibly universal and arguably generic underlying components of the infrastructure for interaction, already alluded to above, are organized into partially independent or semi-autonomous domains or systems. We now want to draw attention to two of the most central of these systems, which will need to be properly defined and handled by any natural approach to language as a form of social behavior.

*Turn-taking and sequence organization in conversation*

An organized system of *turn-taking* provides for the orderly distribution of opportunities to participate in talk-in-interaction. Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974) define the system as having two components. A turn constructional component defines the units out of which a possible turn can be constructed and by extension allows participants in interaction to anticipate the possible/probable extent and shape of any actual unit and thus to project or predict its completion. A turn allocation component specifies an organized set of practices by which transition from a current speaker to a next speaker is managed. Together these two components and the rules that organize the relation between them provide for the orderly or systematic nature of turn-taking in interaction. Sometimes the system operates in such a way that we see seamless transitions between speakers in a sequence. The following example from a telephone call shows tight temporal alignment in ‘floor transition’ between the two speakers:
(2) (Rahman corpus A:1:VM:(4); transition measurements in secs from de Ruiter et al 2006)

(Begin call)

Mat: ‘lo Redcah five o’six one?,

Ver: [+0.15s] Hello Mahthew is yer mum the:hr love.

Mat: [+0.13s] Uh no she’s, gone (up) t’town,h

Ver: [+0.24s] Al:right uh will yih tell’er Antie Vera rahn:g then.

Mat: [-0.03s] Yeh.

Ver: [+0.13s] Okay. She’s alright is she.

Mat: [+0.10s] Yeh,h

Ver: [+0.07s] Okay. Right. Bye bye luv,

Mat: [+0.02ms] Tara, .h

(End call)

The turn-taking model suggests that people in a conversation will actively minimize the amount of overlap in speech (i.e., they will avoid having two or more people speaking simultaneously) and at the same time they will actively minimize the amount of silence between turns in a sequence, as we have just seen. But having such imperatives or ‘rules’ does not entail that all conversation actually proceeds one speaker at a time. In fact overlaps and gaps occur constantly (Sacks et al. 1974; cf. Schegloff 2000:47–48, n. 1), and these exceptions can have functional effects, arising from the very fact that people perceive them as exceptions. It is sometimes suggested that in this or that culture or social setting, a completely different system applies, or that there is no system at all (for instance, ‘In Language/Culture X, people all talk at the same time’; cf. Stivers et al 2009:10587). However, there are to date no systematic empirical studies of informal conversation that provide counterexamples to the existence of a one-speaker-at-a-time
normative design feature for the regulation of conversational turn-taking (Schegloff 2000:2). As in many domains of linguistic analysis, impressions and intuitions turn out not to be supported by empirical data (see de Ruiter, Mitterer and Enfield 2006, Stivers et al 2009). Sidnell (2001) tested Reisman’s (1974) claim that everyday conversation in Antigua follows a ‘contrapuntal’ style, and found that in fact the data are compatible with a one-speaker-at-a-time model.

It is common to observe overlapping speech in conversation, but rather than constituting exceptions to the turn-taking rules, such cases usually provide evidence in support of it. When people self-select as speakers of next turns, the system dictates that they should begin speaking at a point where the previous speaker’s turn is ‘possibly complete’ and where transition to a new speaker is (pragmatically) relevant. In example (3) below, left square brackets mark the onset of overlapping talk. Our focus is on what happens at lines 04 and 05. After Old Man says ‘The funfair changed it’, this is a point of possible completion of his utterance, and it is a point where transition to a new speaker would be relevant. Parky twice attempts to begin his turn ‘That changed it’ (before it is eventually produced in full at line 06), yet finds himself in overlap on both occasions (line 05). Notice the split-second timing here with Parky attempting to come in at just those points where Old Man has reached possible (though obviously not actual) completion of his current turn. Clearly, in order to come in at just these points, Parky must have anticipated where Old Man would reach possible completion of his current turn.

(3) Parky (example from Sacks et al 1974)

01 Tourist: Has the park changed much,
02 Parky: Oh:: ye:s,
03 ____________________________ (1.0)
04 Old man: Th’ Funfair changed it’n [ahful lot [didn’it.
05 Parky: [Th- [That-
06 Parky: That changed it,

An important and widely underappreciated point is that this turn-taking system operates independently of whatever actions are being accomplished in and through the talk it organizes—i.e., whether people are requesting, inviting, questioning, answering, agreeing, disagreeing, complaining, excusing, insulting or whatever else they do in turns-at-talk constructed and distributed through an orientation to the turn-taking system. All of this supports the idea that the
turn-taking system is part of the infrastructure that operates ‘underneath’, and independent from, the goal-directed social behavior that people are effecting with their situated usage of language. The arrangement of linguistically-conducted social actions into sequences represents a distinct domain of organization in interaction, yet it presupposes an underlying turn-taking mechanism (Schegloff 1968, 2007). A basic observation is that many social actions that are carried out through the use of language come in pairs, e.g., request and granting (or rejection), invitation and acceptance (or refusal), complaint and excuse (or denial), and so on. These pairs are linked together by a relation of conditional relevance whereby, to paraphrase Schegloff, given a first action (such as a request, invitation or complaint), a second action is made expectable. Upon the occurrence of a second it can be seen to be a second item to the first (rather than an independent turn) and upon its nonoccurrence it can be seen to be absent (where an infinite number of other things did not occur but were not absent in the same way; Schegloff 1968). Conditional relevance thus establishes a relation between a first and second action that has both a prospective and a retrospective dimension. The prospective dimension ensures that the doing of a first action will activate a norm making the doing of the second action relevant and noticeably absent if not produced. This norm draws on a cooperative assumption in social interaction. The retrospective dimension allows the speaker of the first to see if and how she was understood. For example, if someone produces a responsive utterance that is recognizable as an excuse, this will reveal to the first speaker that she was apparently heard to be complaining or accusing, whether that was her intention or not. Thus the production of actions within sequences constitutes an architecture of intersubjectivity by which understandings are publically displayed and ratified incarnately, en passant in the course of whatever business the talk is occupied with (Heritage 1984). Episodes of talk-in-interaction can, typically, be described in terms of base sequences (often adjacency pairs) and their frequently multiple pre-, insert- and post- expansions (Schegloff 2007). Such expansions are also made up of sequences and these may be the loci of their own expansions. Thus a maximally simple ordering of utterances into adjacency pairs can nevertheless result in sequences of considerable complexity, again implying a kind of structured grammar of interaction, of clear importance to the social origins of language and yet completely unknown to the science of linguistics.
If we take the elements of this turn-taking system and the action sequences that ride upon it and incorporate them into our understanding of language structure, this can give us new insights into the function and distribution of the kinds of lexico-grammatical structures that linguists want to explain. One of the central features of conversational sequences, as just described, is the notion that utterances are not just produced in a flat string of moves in conversation, but rather are related to each other in specific ways. Most important among such inter-move relations is the relation between initiating utterances and responsive moves. A simple example of an initiating utterance is a question: it initiates one person’s local project (e.g., it is a means to achieve a person’s goal to get a piece of information that they need prior to some next action, such as when I ask you the time so I can know whether I need to run for the train or not), and obliges another person to join this local project, and if possible, cooperate by providing the required information (see example 3, Q = “Has the park changed much,” A = “Oh:: ye:s,’’). Many other kinds of two-turn sequences have this kind of structure, where the first move puts an obligation on another person to provide a next move of a certain type: a greeting should be followed by a greeting, a request should be followed by a granting, and so on.

Linguists seldom invoke turn-taking structure in carrying out core linguistic research, but recent attempts to do just this have yielded good results. Gipper (2011) examines a set of grammatical markers of evidentiality in Yurakaré (a language isolate of Central Bolivia), of the kind that have proven notoriously difficult to pin down in semantic and pragmatic analysis. Gipper draws on data from Yurakaré conversation, which allows her to use sequential position as a factor in the analysis. She distinguishes cases in which a usage of a certain evidential is in an initiating type of turn from cases in which it is in a responding type of turn in a conversational sequence. She finds that the different effects or meanings of evidential markers can be defined in terms of the conversational position (and, relatedly, the action type) they occur in.

Earlier research used these pair-part asymmetries of conversational sequence as a way to account for the distribution of certain kinds of lexical and grammatical structures, while bringing in more explicit reference to the social elements of speakers’ rights and duties in producing different kinds of utterances. Pomerantz (1984) discovered some ways in which an utterance can set up a ‘preference’ structure that constrains the ways in which another person can respond (Pomerantz
and Heritage 2012). For example, when a person issues an invitation, the linguistic structure of the response will be different depending on whether it is an acceptance or a rejection. In the case of accepting, which we can regard as the socially preferred, cooperative response to an invitation, the response normally comes without delay and in simple form, as shown in example (4a). By contrast, in the case of declining, which we can regard as the relatively non-cooperative, socially marked response to an invitation, the response has a set of formal properties that are not observed in the acceptance, namely delay, prefacing with ‘discourse markers’ like well, markers of disfluency or hesitation, and the provision of accounts or reasons for the declination, as shown in example (4b):

(4)  
(a)  
i. Do you want to go for a drink?  
ii. Sounds good!

(b)  
i. Do you want to go for a drink?  
ii. (pause) Um, well, I kinda still have work to do, so maybe um....

A series of studies have subsequently examined these issues of preference, where the social-interactional factors at play at a given moment in the interaction can account for why a particular grammatical structure has been selected at all, accounting thus for both the specific function and distribution of a grammatical device which might otherwise go unexplained (Pomerantz 1984; Pomerantz and Heritage 2012; Heritage and Raymond 2005; Sidnell and Enfield 2012, among many others). These kinds of features of preference structure have two important properties that make them lie outside the scope of most linguistic research. Firstly, they are explained in terms of inherently social-interactional factors such as the degree to which an utterance constitutes a cooperative action, as opposed to an action that resists the trajectory that another person has set out on. Secondly, they are inherently enchronic, being defined in terms of specific positions in conversational sequence—initiating versus responsive—which cannot be studied without looking at data from conversation. Conversation is a type of data that is seldom studied in linguistics, and certainly not in the kinds of linguistics that have currency in research on language evolution.
Repair

A second system of practices for the use of language in interaction is the system for repair (Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks 1977). In using language in human interaction, there is always the possibility that troubles will arise in speaking, hearing and understanding (Levelt 1983, Clark 1996, Schegloff 2006, Hayashi et al 2012). An organized set of practices of repair constitutes a natural, interactive system by which such troubles may be addressed at or near the point where they occur, and may be potentially resolved more or less immediately before there is intolerable divergence of the participants’ intersubjective understandings of what is going on in the interaction. Research on the practices of repair have shown it to be a structured and systematic domain, as if repair had a grammar all its own; though again, this system has remained firmly outside of the usual purview of linguistics.

The analysis of instances of repair in interaction makes reference to several kinds of distinguishing structural features. First, there are distinctions in the components of the repair sequence, listed in (5):

(5) Components of a repair sequence

A. **Trouble source or repairable** = some element of an utterance that constitutes a source of trouble, for any of a range of reasons including problems of production, word choice, hearing, and appropriateness, relevance, among other possible problems.

B. **Signal of trouble** = a sign that there is a source of trouble, including the manifest nature of the trouble itself as well as techniques for drawing attention to the trouble.

C. **Initiation of repair** = a sign that the trouble will be, or should be, fixed; often is formulated in such a way as to identify and/or characterize the trouble source.

D. **Repair** = a correction or re-doing of the trouble in (A).

Second, there are distinctions in the personnel involved in the repair sequence. The speaker of the trouble source turn is often referred to as ‘self’ (e.g., in the term self-repair), though this person may or may not be the one to produce some other component of the sequence; for
instance, a major class of repair sequences is called *other-initiation of repair*. This refers to cases in which a problem in one person’s utterance is signaled by another person in a subsequent turn, and is subsequently repaired by the original speaker, as shown in the following examples:

(6) Other-initiation of repair in 3-turn sequences (examples from Schegloff et al 1977:376-8)

(a) **Trouble source**

D: Wul did’e ever get married ‘r anything?

**Initiation of repair**

C: Hu:h?

**Repair**

D: Did jee ever get married?

(b) **Trouble source**

B: Oh _Sibbie’s _sistuh hadda ba:by bo:way

**Initiation of repair**

A: Who?

**Repair**

B: Sibbie’s sister.

Third, there are distinctions in the possible *positions* in a ‘repair opportunity space’ at which the different components can be observed, and where different personnel can be involved:

(7) Positions in the repair opportunity space: ‘3 turns long’, 4 main positions

A. **Same turn** = within the turn that includes the ‘trouble source’ (T1)

B. **Transition space** = at completion of T1, when turn transition is relevant/possible

C. **Next turn** = in the turn that follows T1 (T2)

D. **Third turn/position** = in the turn that follows next turn (with complexities left aside here)

Together, these three sets of distinctions—the components, personnel, and positions of a repair sequence—define the parameters of a possibility space for how any repair sequence might emerge or be generated in a given stretch of social interaction. A solid literature has begun to make inroads into mapping out the many possible structures and functions of repair sequences, mostly with a focus on English. Much more work needs to be done, not only on continuing to empirically test the hypothesized grammar of repair and the extent to which it constitutes a system, but also to carry out the necessary cross-linguistic comparative work (see Hayashi et al 2012, and references therein, for steps in this direction).
Conclusion

We have introduced a couple of the most important contributions of pioneering research on talk-in-interaction over the last 30 years or so. A key feature of this line of work is that it has effectively taken an ethological approach to the use of language in human behavior, but has not suffered from one of the central problems of human ethology, namely the problem of proceeding as if our possession of language doesn’t make enough of a difference that we should study people any differently from how we study animals. We are animals, and we are not excused from being studied as such (Tiger and Fox 1966), but let’s face it, having language changes things a very great deal. We have argued that to get a direct view of how language works in social terms, an enchronic perspective is required, a temporal-causal perspective from which the moves that we build with bits of language (and much else) are embedded in trajectories of joint activity that necessarily involve multiple parties and that necessarily have social causes and consequences. Technically-defined infrastructural systems for interaction such as turn-taking and repair seem to transcend language, and yet they are so closely bound up with it that we might ultimately expect some kind of a co-evolutionary account. That said, to have been able to get language up and running as we know it today, it seems to us that the fundamentals of the infrastructure for interaction would have to have been in place first. This implies, as many have suggested (e.g., Tomasello 2006), that if our closest relatives lack certain key capacities for the shared intentionality that enables the most basic sequences of human interaction, this would account for why they also don’t have language, and can’t get it. It is clear that in the realm of vocal communication (cf. Clay and Zuberbühler, this volume), other apes do not show anything like the responsive, contingent turn-taking behavior so characteristic of human interaction (Arcadi 2000); though we note that in the realm of visible bodily behaviors such as ritualized gestures, there are patterns of behavior that do more closely resemble the kernels of ‘adjacency pair’ sequences (Rossano 2012). So what’s now needed is more empirical research. The ‘first pass’ that Conversation Analysis has carried out over recent decades was an important initial step toward developing a rigorous account of the enchronic infrastructure for interaction. By determining the systems or domains out of which talk-in-interaction is composed, and upon
which language usage rides, this work has uncovered some fundamental areas upon which entire research programs can now be based.

Subsequent research will have to explore implications for language evolution of the idea that language *presupposes* an enchronic infrastructure for social interaction. If language is not possible without such an infrastructure, then the question turns to the evolutionary origins of the infrastructure itself. An important issue for subsequent work will be to test the extent of human diversity in the basic structures of interaction. Recent work from an anthropological and cross-linguistic perspective has begun to ask whether the particular language being spoken has consequences for the organization of interaction as described here (see Sidnell ed. 2009, Dingemanse and Floyd in press). That research is still in its infancy but initial results suggest that the underlying, generic structures of interaction may be inflected or torqued by the particular semiotic structures through which interaction is accomplished as well as the local circumstances within which it operates. Sidnell and Enfield (2012) explore the idea that the distinct lexico-syntactic resources of a language can have distinct *collateral effects* on the ways in which certain types of social action can play out in sequences of conversation.

Our goal in this chapter has been to draw attention to some aspects of language that inhabit the divide between the established reference-oriented, sentence-based interests of linguistics, on the one hand, and the social-relational concerns of research on human sociality, on the other. Linguistics has achieved an enormous amount, yet it still struggles to connect with social cognition and social behavior in ways that other disciplines can readily apprehend and apply. But this is less of a problem than it seems, thanks to the existence of a significant body of literature that, we submit, provides the link between language and human sociality that is needed in research on the social origins of language.
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