Aristotle and Linguistics

P A M Seuren, Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
© 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The study of language has always had two kinds of practitioners, the practical and the theoretical linguists. Aristotle was no doubt the first theoretical linguist (in addition to being the first in many other subjects), but he also contributed essentially to the development of practical linguistics. His role in the history of linguistics has been highlighted in a few publications (e.g., Seuren, 1998; Allan, 2004).

Aristotle was born in Stagira, in Ancient Macedonia, in 384 B.C.E. His father was the personal physician and a close friend of the king of Macedonia, Amyntas II. An exceptionally gifted boy to begin with, Aristotle joined Plato’s Academy in Athens at the age of 17, to remain there until Plato’s death in 347. Having been passed over as Plato’s successor, he left Athens to live, first, in Asia Minor and then in Lesbos. In 343–342, Amyntas’ son and successor, Philip II of Macedonia, invited him to come and teach his son Alexander, then 14 years old. This he did for 2 years. In 336, Alexander succeeded his father and immediately conquered the whole of Greece. Under
Alexander’s political protection, Aristotle returned to Athens in 335 and founded his school of philosophy, the Lyceum. There he taught until 323, when news of Alexander’s death reached Athens. No longer certain of Macedonian protection, he left Athens overnight and sought refuge in Chalcis, just north of Athens, where a Macedonian garrison was stationed. One year later, in 322, he died of an intestinal disease.

His first great contribution to the study of language—not often mentioned—is the fact that he demythologized language. Rather than seeing language as a magical instrument to cast spells, entrance people, and call up past, present, and future spirits, he saw language as an object of rational inquiry, a means of expressing and communicating thoughts about anything in the world. The ‘semiotic triangle’ of (a) language as the expression of (b) thoughts that are intentionally related with (c) elements in the world, famously depicted in Ogden and Richards (1923: 11), is due to Aristotle. This is Aristotle’s most general and perhaps also his most important contribution to the study of language, even if it is not often mentioned by modern authors, for whom it has become a matter of course that language can be seen as a valid object of rational inquiry.

In a more analytical sense, Aristotle’s role in the development of linguistics is in large part due to his theory of truth. For him, truth and falsity are properties of either thoughts or sentences. A classic statement is (Metaphysics 1027b25):

For falsity and truth are not properties of actual things in the world (so that, for example, good things could be called true and bad things false), but properties of thought.

A few pages earlier, he defines truth as follows (Metaphysics 1011b26):

We begin by defining truth and falsehood. Falsehood consists in saying of that which is not true, or any other which is not what it is. Truth consists in saying of that which is true, or of what is not that it is not.

Here Aristotle introduces not as a simple truth-functional inverter of truth values: a toggle between true and false. This has momentous consequences.

Aristotle’s truth theory is known as the correspondence theory of truth, in that it requires a correspondence between what is the case in the world on the one hand and what is said or thought on the other. To make this notion of correspondence more explicit, some form of analysis is needed. Aristotle made a beginning with that. He analyzes the ‘world’ as consisting of things that are named by any of the 10 categories substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, or affection (Categories 1b25–30). Within the category ‘substance,’ there is a hierarchy from the primary substances (individual existing entities) through a range of secondary substances, from species and genus to any higher order. The secondary substances together with the remaining 9 categories are properties or things that things are (“everything except primary substances is either predicable of a primary substance or present in it”; Categories 2a33).

On the other hand, he analyzes sentences as resulting from the application of a katégoroiménon (Latin praedicatum) to something. The something to which the predicate is applied he calls hypokeimenon (literally ‘that which underlies’; Latin subiectum or suppositum). Primary substances (entities) can be the object only of predicate application—that is, can only be hypokeímena (Categories 2b39–40). All other things can be either hypokeímena or properties, denoted by a predicate. Yet in orderly talk about the universe, it is proper to take lower categories of substance as the things predicates apply to and reserve predicates themselves for the denoting of higher-order substances and other categories of being (Categories 3a1–5).

The combination of a predicate with a term denoting the hypokeímenon Aristotle calls prótasis (Latin propositio). A proposition is true just in case the property assigned to the hypokeímenon actually adheres to it; otherwise it is false. Moreover, a true proposition is made false, and vice versa, by the prefixing of not (“it is not the case that”). The term prótasis occurs for the first time on the first page of Prior Analytics, which contains his doctrine of syllogisms (Prior Analytics 24a16):

A proposition (prótaíasis) is an affirmative or negative expression that says something of something.

A proposition is divided into terms (Prior Analytics 24b16):

A term (hóron) I call that into which a proposition is analyzed, such as the predicate (katégoroiménon) and that to which the predicate is applied.

One notes that Aristotle lacked a word for what we call the subject term of a sentence. During the late Middle Ages, the Latin subiectum began to be used in that sense—an innovation that has persisted until the present time (Neuren, 1998: 121–124).

This was the first semantic analysis of sentence structure in history, presaged by, and probably unthinkable without, Plato’s incipient analysis of sentence meaning in his dialogue The Sophist. It is important to note that Aristotle’s analysis of the proposition does not correspond to the modern syntactic analysis in terms of subject and predicate, but rather to what is known as topic-comment analysis. The identification of Aristotle’s sentence constituent for the denoting of a hypokeímenon with “grammatical
subject,” characterized by nominative case, and of Aristotle’s predicate with “grammatical predicate,” may have been suggested by Aristotle, as when he says that a morphological verb “always is a sign of something said of something else” (On Interpretation 16b7). But it was carried through systematically a few decades after Aristotle’s death by the linguists of Alexandria, whose task it was to develop teaching material for the Egyptian schools where local children had to learn Greek in the shortest possible time (Seuren, 1998: 21–22). Unfortunately, this identification was, though convenient, rash and ill-considered. It persisted more or less unchallenged until the middle of the 19th century, when some, mostly German, scholars discovered that the Aristotelian subject–predicate distinction does not coincide with the syntactic subject–predicate analysis universally applied in linguistics. For in actual discourse, very often what should be the subject according to Aristotle’s definition is not the subject recognized in grammatical analysis, and likewise for the predicate. Steinthal, for example, observed (1860: 101–102):

One should not be misled by the similarity of the terms. Both logic and grammar speak of subject and predicate, but only rarely do the logician and the grammarian speak of the same word as either the subject or the predicate....Consider the sentence Coffee grows in Africa. There can be no doubt where the grammarian will locate subject and predicate. But the logician? I do not think the logician could say anything but that ‘Africa’ contains the concept that should be connected with ‘coffee grows’. Logically one should say, therefore, ‘the growth of coffee is in Africa’.

Observations like this gave rise to a long debate, which lasted more than 80 years. At the end, it was decided to keep the terms subject and predicate for the syntactic analysis and speak of topic and comment for the semantic analysis in the Aristotelian sense (see Seuren, 1998: 120–133 for a detailed discussion).

Syntax, in the modern sense, is largely absent from Aristotle’s writings. He does, however, distinguish between different sentence types (On Interpretation 17a1–12):

Every sentence is meaningful, not in virtue of some natural force but by convention. But not all sentences are assertions, only those in which there is question of truth or falsity. In some sentences that is not so. Wishes, for example, are sentences but they are not true or false. We will leave all other sentence types out of consideration, as they are more properly studied in rhetoric or poetics. But assertions are the topic of the present study [i.e., logic]. The primary assertive sentence type is the simple affirmation, the secondary is the simple negation. All other, complex, assertions are made one by conjunction. Every assertion must contain a verb or a conjugated form of a verb. For a phrase like “man” is not yet an assertion, as long as no verb in the present, past, or future tense is added.

Some word classes are already there. Thus, at the outset of On Interpretation, he defines ὄνομα (noun) as “a stretch of sound, meaningful by convention, without any reference to time and not containing any internal element that is meaningful in itself” (On Interpretation 16a19–21). Ῥήηνα (verb) is defined as “that which, in addition to its proper meaning, carries with it the notion of time, without containing any internal element that is meaningful in itself; it always is a sign of something said of something else” (On Interpretation 16b6–8). In his Rhetoric, at 1406a19, Aristotle uses the term epitheton for adjective. All other terms for word classes are of a later date, with many of them having been created by the Alexandrian linguists.

The term πτώσις is found relatively frequently, in the sense of nominal or verbal morphological modification, as in Categories 1a13–15: “Things are said to be named ‘derivatively’ when they derive their name from some other word that differs in morphological form (πτώσει), such as the grammarian from the word grammar or the courageous from the word courage.” The literal meaning of πτώσις is ‘fall’ (Latin: casus). Its use in the sense of morphological modification is based on the metaphor that the word ‘as such’ stands upright (in the ‘upright case’ or orthē πτώσις; Latin: casus rectus). Its other falls are represented by forms that are modified morphologically according to some paradigm. The Alexandrians began to reserve the term πτώσις for the nominal cases of nominative (the form of your own name), genitive (the form of your father’s name), dative (the name of the person you give something to), accusative (the name of the person you take to court), and vocative (the name of the person you call). These terms smell of the classroom, not of philosophy.

Bibliography


