

life course are interlinked" (11). Therefore, these dimensions are to be regarded as the core principles of flexibilization. However, according to Apitzsch, the effects of flexibility would be determined by the magnitude of Rational-legal authority (Weber) on the respective job market (12). Consequently, there are variants of projectification which are specific for professional guilds or specific to a certain branch (20). To analyze the peculiarities of this interaction as well as to distinguish between the formal and informal job market institutions, she compares the network-based and widely informally organized film branch to the professionally mature and highly organized branch of architecture. The main focus, however, lies on the film branch, in particular with regard to the empiric implementation and analytic conclusions. The central findings of the study are that in network-shaped and project-related employer-employee relationships the filmmakers' dependency on informal networks becomes more important for the individual status within the industry. As a result, the life course is liable to get fragmented as well by being organized around those projects. However, a clear difference appears between the coordination principles of the two branches. Since the architecture branch is structured relatively formally, Apitzsch finds a determining difference in the professional organization of the architecture branch and the film industry. In the film branch informal processes replace professional and bureaucratic coordination forms (118). Thus the film branch is based upon "greedy projects", as Apitzsch argues in support of Lewis Coser (93). Here, "greedy projects" are defined as functionally vague claims enclosing the whole person. "Greedy projects" are supposed to be not only exhausting but also reduce the workers' social every-day life to their occupational milieu. Significant is also the fact that networks made of "weak ties" offer little to no security in project-related and network-like organized job markets like the film branch. On the contrary, they are relatively nontransparent and, therefore, difficult to navigate productively. This is owed to the informal coordination of these job markets (225).

Conceptually Apitzsch anchors her study in a broadly invested theoretical access which besides theoretical perspectives on the coordination and control of project work draws on life course and social network approaches. Since the study seeks to offer an empirical explanation, the theoretical discussion is focused on analyzing the effects of flexible project work on the life course. In the course of the theoretical implementation the characteristic features of project work are seen as a temporal variable difficult to

standardize or fit into bureaucratically taxable work routines (134).

Concluding her findings, Apitzsch diagnoses a shift from collective risk regulation to informal support on networks. With regard to the branch comparison, in the film branch this shift appears in different aspects, such as the instrumentalization and weakening of social-life relations, the fact that social benefits are not granted institutionally, but are based on social mechanisms and on informal coordination. According to Apitzsch these aspects of network based risk regulation lead to the weak status of special interest groups (trade unions) and, at the same time, the existence of distinctive exploitation structures (229-231).

Beside the sound presentation of the structural development of both branches, the strength of the study lies with its theoretical framing which allows the author to illuminate the subject of project-based work in a thorough way which up to now has not been done. Therefore, the main argument – that in project-based labor markets we find a high dependency on informal networks – is demonstrated persuasively. However, the theoretical approach is somewhat loose. Here, one would have wished a theoretical rounding-off of the interpretation. What also is to be missed in the book, is a chapter about her methods and methodologies. However, the subject oriented site of the argument and with it the question by subjective action logics runs out in the argument that film-makers are cineastes who share the same passion and, therefore, are liable to exploitation. Additional qualitative investigations of other creative branches could have delivered supporting evidence. In doing so, a more complex understanding of the subjective motives and an even more comprehensive picture of flexible working conditions could have been achieved. To sum up, Apitzsch's study offers valuable information and an instructive theoretical perspective which moves forward the discussion on project job markets. Therefore, the interested scientific community would be well-advised to adopt this book.

**Book:** Debra Satz, 2010: *Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale. The Moral Limits of Markets*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

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In her book Debra Satz explains why commercial exchange of certain goods and services should not take place. She starts with a discussion of early political economy and contemporary political philosophy. Contemporary economics is described as helpful for stressing the role of property rights, free information, trust, anti-monopoly and its insight into reasons for market failure, but criticized for its inability to make moral decisions on certain markets. In contrast to that, classical economists like Smith and Marx allowed for the different nature of particular markets (e.g. the labour market). Especially Satz' reading of Adam Smith is illuminating and hints to the liberating power of markets as compared to the feudal society which is the most important consequence of markets for Smith. The author, however, rejects - how she calls it using a term from James Tobin - general egalitarianism that prefers social redistribution to limiting markets as well as specific egalitarianism that considers the social meaning of certain things changed when these things are traded like a common product. From this more general discussion on markets Satz comes to the core of her argument which consists of a theory why some things should not be for sale. There are four reasons why markets become noxious, two based on the consequences of markets and two based on the sources of markets (pp.94-96).

Firstly, some markets can have extremely harmful outcomes for individuals and, secondly, certain markets can be extremely harmful for society. In the latter case, "markets can undermine the social framework needed for people to interact as *equals*, as individuals with equal standing" (p. 95; italics in original). Child labour markets and bond labour deprive people of exercising their basic political and economic rights. Other markets should be illegitimate because they infringe preconditions for the emergence of markets. The third reason thus is "very weak or highly asymmetric knowledge and agency on the part of market participants" (p. 96; italics in original). Child labour serves again as an example, but prostitution is also characterized by weak agency of the women who are dominated by their pimps. Forth, some markets only emerge because of the extreme vulnerabilities of one of the transacting parties. Organs are sold by desperate people in less developed countries who would not do that under other circumstances.

Satz applies this categorization to five specific markets, namely markets for women's reproductive labour, women's sexual labour, child labour, voluntary slavery, and human kidneys. Most of her arguments are clear-cut and provide an alternative view independent of moral beliefs

on "commodifying" certain products or services as an abstract category. Voluntary slavery (bonded labour), for example, is noxious because it exploits the dire situation of people in despair (the vulnerability argument) who will suffer of weak agency and extreme individual harm (pp. 182-186). In a similar vein, prostitution is not primarily wrong because of the common intuition as intrinsically degrading. Satz believes "that this intuition is itself bound up with well-entrenched views of male gender identity and women's sexual role in the context of this identity" (p. 153). Instead of this, prostitution (as currently practiced) is a noxious market because it perpetuates status inequality between men and women. One might raise the objection that all labour discriminating women (cleaning, elderly care etc.) are noxious. Satz argues, however, that the negative image effect is especially strong in the case of prostitution. Apparently, the critical value when markets become noxious needs further clarification as the author herself admits (p. 111). This is even more necessary with regard to the category "extremely harmful outcomes for individuals." Applying this argument without precaution could justify regulation of markets whenever a contracting party is willing to take a certain risk without negative consequences for the other contracting side or society in general.

Satz prudently avoids going so far as to demand to prohibit all noxious markets because that could lead to even more difficulties for the persons concerned. Rather Satz suggests main features of policies which would minimize or even avoid harmful consequences for the involved parties. The current market for organs that violates the equity principle because the rich abuse the poors' situation could "theoretically" be replaced by a government-regulated market. The state should establish a monopsony where it is the only legal buyer of organs which are made available for both the rich and the poor. The donors must be paid after their death "as a way of staving off coercive ploys" (p. 199).

Debra Satz' book is a well written study on the reasons why markets must be regulated. She proposes an alternative to standard economics which tries to overcome market failure by extending the scope of markets as well as to political philosophy which (among other reasons) hints to the quality of certain goods that is changed by merchandising them. The five examples of noxious markets are very precisely described because Satz abstains from a crude legal/illegal dichotomy.