Policy failure and institutional reform: why should form follow function?

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Introduction

In a recent article, Linder and Peters (1984) have urged policy analysts to shift their attention from policy evaluation to policy design. Instead of attempting to predict the impact of a given set of policy alternatives and evaluating the prospects for enactment and trouble-free implementation, analysts are urged to give systematic attention to the design and formulation of ‘generic strategies for solving problems’ (pp. 252–3). This, it is argued, may be achieved by systematic attention to the interaction between three sets of design variables: the characteristics of problems, of goals, and of instruments. What is perhaps surprising, given the leading role of one of the authors in the formation of an International Political Science Association (IPSA) study group on ‘Structure and Organization of Government’, is the absence of any reference to the characteristics of the institutional setting as an important dimension of any systematic concern with policy design. There is, surely, no reason to suspect that this lack of concern – which is shared by other enthusiasts of the design approach (Alexander, 1982; Dryzek, 1983) – should come from a naïve notion that institutions might somehow be treated as neutral vessels, equally serviceable for any kind of policy proposal. Yet, if one does consider that ‘organization does matter’ in policy-making (Scharpf, 1977a, b), one can only conclude that the authors are convinced that institutional problems, if they should prove relevant in a particular case, may be handled as just another design variable. Indeed, John Dryzek (p. 354) explicitly suggests ‘organizational design’ as one promising response to a particular policy problem. In the same spirit, of course, the charter document of the IPSA study group on ‘Structure and Organization of Government’ proposes a focus on ‘manipulated’ institutional changes which respond either to manifest inadequacies of policy performance, or to changes in the policy environment, or to changes in political priorities (Peters, 1983; pp. 1–2). The assumption clearly is that institutions may be important determinants of policy performance, but that it is within the power of ‘a government or administration’ to manipulate institutional conditions within a design perspective.

Sympathizing with the design philosophy in general (Scharpf, 1973), and even more with the notion that the ‘goodness of fit’ with a given institutional structure is an important precondition of policy success (Scharpf, 1977b, 1982; Mayntz and Scharpf, 1975). I nevertheless do not share the optimistic expectation that institutional or organizational factors could be treated as easily manipulated design variables.

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in policy analyses. On the contrary, even though institutional conditions are certainly changeable and changing all the time, I am fully convinced that the policy analyst ought to approach them with a healthy respect for their ability to resist purposeful change and with an even greater respect for the extremely low predictability of the consequences of institutional change, if and when it can be brought about. In other words, even though I do consider institutions as very powerful determinants of public policy, I do not consider purposeful institutional change and government reorganization as very promising strategies for the improvement of public policy. That does not, of course, preclude the possibility that the policy-making system may find itself in an institutional trap, where the only hope for improving does indeed depend on large-scale institutional change (Scharpf, 1985). But there is, unfortunately, no assurance that necessity and feasibility must always overlap.

In the following sections I will attempt to develop the outline of a highly abstract argument supporting these sceptical propositions. But as all abstractions are likely to be grounded in, and strongly influenced by, some particular experiences, it seems only fair to alert the reader to the range of empirical references upon which I am drawing. They include policy and reorganization studies in the German ministerial bureaucracy (Mayntz and Scharpf, 1975), studies of joint federal-Länder decisions in Germany (Scharpf, Reissert and Schnabel, 1976; 1978), studies of policy implementation in the manpower field (Scharpf, Garlicks, Maier and Maier, 1982) and an ongoing study of the policy responses of four Western European countries to the worldwide economic crisis after 1974 (Scharpf, 1981; 1984). It is the last study in particular which has persuaded me that the differing responses should be explained less in terms of differences of political priorities, or differing policy analyses, than in terms of the 'policy inertia' of countries which were institutionally restricted to a limited repertoire of policy options. But in none of the four countries were institutional changes introduced in order to increase the range of available policy choices. Policy changes, if they occurred at all, were dependent upon changes of government, rather than upon manipulated institutional change or purposeful reorganization.

**Why do institutions matter?**

The link between institutional conditions and the substance of public policy is more easily perceived in practice than established in empirical research. The reason is anticipation: participants in the policy-making process tend to be expert judges of institutional feasibility, and policy proposals violating institutional constraints tend to remain in the limbo of non-observable 'non-decisions' (Bachrach and Baratz, 1961; 1963). Thus, in order to determine which policy choices were eliminated by institutional constraints, it is either necessary to construct normative propositions about the policy choices that should have been adopted, or to rely upon comparative studies for the identification of policies that were adopted in one system and not in another (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970). Both methods are, of course, open to the challenge that what is interpreted as the effect of institutional constraints might simply be due to different policy preferences (and the comparative method is open to the additional challenge of different policy environments). Furthermore, there is no theoretical reason for assuming one-to-one relationships between institutional conditions and policy output, or between policy-output and outcomes. Even when the policy environment is the same, similar outcomes may be obtained by different policies, similar policies may be produced by different institutional structures, and a given institutional structure is capable of producing different policy responses. Thus, structural determinism is, at best, a limiting case, while the empirical relationship between structure, policy and outcome is likely to be highly contingent in general.

Nevertheless, practitioners know that their policy choices are often constrained by existing institutional conditions and, even if definitive proof according to the canons of empirical social science research is often very difficult to establish, it is possible to specify theoretically the conditions under which this should be so.

The simplest and most obvious case is defined by the presence or absence of specific institutional capabilities for policy implementation. Without the existence of a still serviceable machinery for the implementation of price controls, the British government could not even
have considered issuing wage guidelines in 1978, after the unions had ended their support for a voluntary incomes policy. Conversely, the fact that Austrian attempts to reduce interest rates in the late 1970s were quickly defeated by massive capital exports is ascribed to the institutional development of fully integrated international money and capital markets during the 1970s, which had made obsolete the existing machinery for the control of capital transfers in and out of Austria. Finally, even though the Federal Republic of Germany and Sweden had much the same administrative infrastructure for an active labour market policy in the 1970s, Swedish labour market administration had been able to build up highly efficient networks of communication and collaboration with employers, unions and training institutions over 20 years, while the Federal German commitment was of more recent origin (Hanf, Hjern and Porter, 1978). Thus, when the crisis struck, Swedish manpower programmes were able to provide training or employment for about 4 per cent of the labour force, while similar programmes never included more than 1.5 per cent of the labour force in the Federal Republic of Germany. As the growth of effective local networks of communication and co-operation cannot be centrally controlled, it is not easy to see how any degree of sophisticated policy design could have got around the institutional weakness of German labour market administration, at least in the short run.

More important, but also more elusive, is the influence of institutions upon the processes of policy formation themselves. Policies are produced by specialized organizations, ministerial departments, divisions and subdivisions, parliamentary committees and subcommittees, political parties in coalition or opposition and their specialized groupings, interest organizations and specialized segments of the media. Thus the 'seamless robe' of the policy environment is inevitably represented by a highly uneven patchwork of policy institutions separated by organizational boundaries, and sometimes by organizational battle lines. As a consequence, the focus of the policy-making system as a whole is inevitably shaped by the 'selective perception' of organizational units and sub-units (March and Simon, 1958, pp. 127ff) whose attention is drawn towards the problems and policy options within their specialized areas of jurisdiction. Problems falling between jurisdictions, or cutting across jurisdictional boundaries, are at a disadvantage in the competition for policy attention (Mayntz and Scharpf, 1975, pp. 145ff). Even more important is the influence of institutional arrangements upon the resolution of conflicts between competing interests or policy priorities. The differing effectiveness of organized and non-organized interests is a well-known theme in political science (Schattschneider, 1960; Olson, 1965). Thus the mere creation of a specialized organization may significantly improve the competitive efficiency of particular interests, and the same is true if economic or social interests, whether organized or non-organized, have specialized 'counterpart organizations' within government ministries and parliament. And, of course, the internal effectiveness of organizational sub-units within government is reinforced by the importance and the organizational capability of their external clienteles with whom they may find themselves in 'iron triangles' or other types of continuing symbiotic relationships (Jordan, 1981).

Furthermore, organizational arrangements within and between government units are also important determinants of policy processes. It does make a difference whether environmental protection is submerged beneath many other important issues in the parliamentary committee of the interior, or whether a separate parliamentary committee would offer career opportunities and political visibility for politicians specializing in environment policy (Müller, 1984). By the same token, the organizational proximity or distance or policy areas within the ministerial organization, their relative status in the hierarchy of sections, subdivisions, divisions and ministerial departments, and the internal decision rules of the government, are crucial determinants of the substantive compromises that must be accepted, and of the ability to raise an issue to the level of a cabinet decision.

Thus, even if the 'intrinsic' strength of economic and social interests, and their organizational capabilities, are treated as givens from the perspective of policy-makers (which is not necessarily true when the possibilities of 'enacted' environments and 'induced' clientele organizations are considered), organizational
arrangements in government are likely to have an enormous influence upon the allocation of attention to, and competitive strength of, the various interests within the processes of policy formation and policy implementation. And, of course, there is no logical reason why a body of systematic knowledge about the links between institutional arrangements and policy processes should not also be utilized, in a design spirit, for the improvement of policy-making capabilities in general or of the chances of success of particular policy options.

But, unfortunately, logical possibility does not imply practical feasibility, and the path toward an ‘improvement of the policy-making system through better metapolicy’ (Dror, 1971; p. 74) is littered with the skeletons of too many practical failures of perfectly logical improvements of policy-making institutions and procedures such as ‘systems analysis’, ‘cost–benefit analysis’, ‘programme budgeting’, ‘zero-base budgeting’, ‘rationnalisation de choix budgétaires’, ‘Mittelfristige Finanzplanung’, or ‘programme analysis and review’. Apparently, Aaron Wildavsky (1966) was right all along: no amount of procedural innovation was able to exercise the inherently political character of public policy choices. But that, by itself, would not explain the difficulties and frustration of purposeful institutional change initiated from a design perspective.

The difficulties of purposeful institutional change

What I have said so far supports the conclusion that the existence, relative strength and positional advantages of institutional capabilities, inside and outside government, have an effect upon the definition and articulation of societal interests and problems, and upon their differing opportunity to be ‘converted’ into public policy. It is, indeed, this very structural selectivity of policy-making institutions that establishes their importance from a policy-design perspective. But the effect of institutional arrangements on policy processes is not fully explained by differing organizational capabilities for the transmission and amplification of societal interests. Policy-making institutions are not only the agents of economic and social interests, they also have institutional self-interests to pursue. Just as the neo-Marxists had to modify the ‘agency theory of the capitalist state’ by a recognition of the ‘Interesse des Staates an sich selbst’ (Offe, 1975), so policy-designers need to recognize the importance of the self-interest of the institutions which they would like to redesign.

That some kind of an ‘agency theory’ is presupposed in most contributions to policy analysis is, perhaps, explained by the intellectual prestige which the ‘private-vice-public-virtues’ paradigm of classical economics has gained in political theory. If the pursuit of self-interested goals by competitive political parties (Downs, 1957) and interest groups (Lindblom, 1965) results in an ‘intelligence of democracy’ that tends to maximize the satisfaction of societal or voter interests, then policy designers might also proceed from the assumption of a natural harmony between well-designed policy proposals and the self-interest of the institutions that would have to adopt and implement them. But whatever may be the present intellectual status of natural-harmony theories in ‘modern political economy’ (Frey, 1977), it is clear that they would offer no comfort at all to policy designers contemplating not only changes of substantive policy, but changes of institutional arrangements within the policy-making system itself. This proposition does, perhaps, require some explanation.

In the last analysis, surely, public policy is made by individuals — politicians, bureaucrats, lobbyists, publicists, scientists and others. Even if they all are motivated by idealistic concerns for the common weal, they surely also have individual interests in their own career advancement, professional development, public recognition, status and income. By and large, however, these private interests are harnessed, and at the same time neutralized, by organizations balancing ‘inducements’ and ‘contributions’ in such a way that individuals are sufficiently motivated to pursue organizational goals (March and Simon, 1958, pp. 84ff). Of course, these neutralizing mechanisms do not work perfectly, and battles for individual advantage are frequent within organizations. What is important to realize is that neutralizing mechanisms of the ‘inducements–contributions balance’, operating however imperfectly within organizations,
are no longer available when the fate of organizations themselves is at stake. When their own organization is threatened, even the most public-spirited individuals will fight for its survival with no moral inhibitions at all (they are, after all, not pursuing nakedly egoistic interests), and with all the professional competence which they have perfected in their policy-making roles. Organizational battles are, thus, likely to be fought with more motivation, less inhibition and greater skill, than are brought either to conflicts over the substance of public policy or to competition between personal interests.

Furthermore, as organizational issues are decided in the same decision processes in which conflicts over policy are settled, institutional interests have the extremely important advantage of privileged access: while all 'external' economic or social interests are somehow dependent upon mechanisms of representation, institutional interests are directly involved in the decision processes that determine their own fate. And, of course, the relative advantage of institutional interests over substantive policy interests is not necessarily conducive to optimal policy performance. To use an analogy from biological evolution: just as the Irish elk lost the battle for survival because the size of its antlers had become decisive in the competition for procreation (Matthews, 1984), so the comparative advantage of the institutional interests over substantive policy interests may well be sub-optimal from the point of view of the larger community.

That does not imply, of course, that purposeful reorganization against the self-interest of institutional actors is entirely impossible. Their resistance may be overcome under conditions in which policy-makers enjoy unequivocal power over the institutional interests that would be affected by reorganization. Such situations do exist, as evidenced by the ability of the state to push through the territorial reorganization of local governments in the Federal Republic of Germany and other (but not all) Western European countries. But they are probably much less frequent than the ubiquity of hierarchical relationships would suggest (and much less frequent than policy-designers seem to suppose). To illustrate the point, let us take the seemingly extreme example of a ministerial department which is hierarchically organized under the monocratic direction of a cabinet minister, who, in the Federal Republic at any rate, has full authority over its internal organization. Here, if anywhere, purposeful organizational change should be made easier by abundant hierarchical power.

In practice, the organization of ministerial departments is indeed changed quite frequently. In most instances, however, the organization is changed to accommodate politically motivated personnel shifts, rather than to improve policy effectiveness. In the few cases where reorganization plans derived from an analysis of the policy problems of a ministry, and were intended to facilitate shifts in policy emphasis, their implementation was heavily compromised (Garlicks and Müller, 1977). The explanation is quite straightforward: once it was realized that reorganization would indeed change the relative weights of specialized sub-units within the decision processes of the ministry, the losers were able to emphasize not only the disruptive consequences which this would have for their own work, but also the extreme irritation which the reorganization plan would (and in fact did) cause among their counterpart organizations in other ministries, in parliament and in the client industries. In the end, the leader of the department had to realize that reorganization might jeopardize the performance of the losing sections and divisions at least in the short run, and that it would antagonize important interests in the policy environment to such a degree that any hoped-for gains in medium-term policy effectiveness would be outweighed by the short-term political costs.

The explanation can be given more generally: even in strictly hierarchical organizations, lower-level units are likely to have considerable power because of their monopoly over specialized information and clientele contacts, and because it is their performance which directly determines the output of the organization. Thus any ongoing organization is likely to be characterized by a multitude of exchange relationships, including commitments and expectations of future exchange, which are likely to transform formal hierarchies into networks of mutual dependence. Of course, in a showdown within the organization top leaders would still come out on top. But they might have to pay a heavy price for the disruption of
the established network of expectations, commitments and loyalties. That price is likely to be prohibitive when the political fate of the leadership is highly dependent upon the short-term performance of the organization.

As a consequence, serious efforts at policy-oriented reorganization are likely to be undertaken only when a change in government allows a deterioration of performance to be discounted on the theory that 'things will have to get much worse before they will become better', and when previous commitments are devalued by the change in leadership. Thus, paradoxically, hierarchical authority may be fully exercised only when top management is too new in the job to use it intelligently, and it erodes very rapidly as the new managers begin to discover the real problems, but also to care about the performance of the organization. From then on, the new management is, again, the captive of its own commitments and of the self-interest of an ongoing organization.

If departmental reorganization is more likely to be the result of negotiated change than unilaterally imposed, this is even more true of changes in the inter-organizational arrangements between ministerial departments, between central planning staffs and line ministries, between coalition parties, between the executive and parliament, between government and the federal bank, between the federal government and the Länder or, for that matter, between the government and the unions or between the European Community and its member governments. In all of these instances, institutional change must be negotiated if it is to come about, and such negotiations must inevitably respect the institutional self-interest of all the necessary participants. Furthermore, in these negotiations there is likely to be a trade-off between substantive policy concessions and institutional concessions. Those participants who care most about immediately pressing substantive problems are most likely to be forced...
to buy collaboration on policy at the expense of institutional concessions. This probably explains why the Federal government, which is dependent upon the agreement of Länder governments for most of its own policy initiatives, saw its own share of total revenues reduced from 53 per cent in 1970 to 48 per cent in 1983 – just during the period, that is, when its political commitment to interventionist policies was greater than ever before (Scharpf, 1985).

In short, unilaterally imposed institutional change, under conditions of total interdependence, is possible only when a (perhaps) temporary loss of policy performance is acceptable – either because a previous government or management can be blamed for it, or because a shift in policy priorities reduces the importance of certain performance measures (which explains why a ‘monetarist’ government in Britain could afford a level of conflict with the unions which would have brought political defeat to its Keynesian predecessors, Labour as well as Conservative). If short-term policy performance is important, on the other hand, institutional change can only be achieved through bargaining. Under such conditions, the possible course of institutional evolution is tightly constrained by the self-interest of existing policy institutions. If change is possible at all, it is likely to be at the expense of those participants who are most committed to active policy-making (and, hence, potentially most interested in promoting institutional reforms). Neither possibility seems to offer much support for the hope that organizational design might be employed as the able and willing handmaiden of ambitious policy-designers.

The unpredictability of institutional change

Finally, even when policy-oriented institutional reform is feasible, and when it is successfully implemented, the outcome may still prove disappointing from the policy designer’s point of view. The explanation of such failures can be developed at various levels.

At the most general level, institutional change is up against a fundamental problem of all varieties of purposeful change (Tenbruck, 1967): in contemplating change, the human mind tends to focus upon goal values which are presently unrealized or problematic, and it tends to ignore those latent values which are implicit in the status quo and likely to be destroyed by change. The very fact that their realization does not at present pose a problem makes it terribly difficult for policy analysts to discover, and properly to weight, these latent values in ex ante evaluations. Thus, in the Federal Republic of Germany, the general enthusiasm for local government reform or school reform in the 1960s has given way to an equally general nostalgia for the democratic vitality of small-scale self-government, and the intimacy of small neighbourhood schools – but only after both had been destroyed in the pursuit of greater economic and technical efficiency. The same inability fully to appreciate the latent benefits of the status quo seems to explain the successive cycles of centralization and decentralization in large-scale organizations.

While all varieties of policy design are haunted by the difficulties of anticipating future evaluations, there are additional problems of anticipation which are specific to institutional change. In general, consequences of change are predictable only to the extent that human behaviour is itself predictable. Given the fundamental indeterminacy, volatility and malleability of human nature, and the psychological differences among individuals, the possibility of prediction depends largely upon the existence and power of behaviour-stabilizing factors – such as legal and organizational rules of conduct, social norms, customs, roles and mutual expectations. Many of these are defined and maintained by social institutions and, more specifically, by formal and informal organizations. If these institutions are changed, there is always a possibility that the behavioural regularities which they had stabilized might also become unfrozen – with the implication that predictions based upon past patterns of behaviour might be far off target.

One dramatic example that comes to mind is the almost universal expectation in the early 1970s, at least among professional economists, that a change from the regime of fixed exchange rates to floating exchange rates would assure the continuous adjustment of the external value of national currencies to changes in their internal purchasing power and, hence, would reduce
incentives for international currency speculation. Instead, the change in the institutions of the international monetary system resulted in much wilder fluctuations of exchange rates, departing much further and for much longer periods from the economists’ equilibrium of purchasing power parities. Apparently, the new freedom of currency markets had changed the behaviour patterns of banks and private firms, increasing their interest in, and organizational capabilities for, speculative international portfolio investments. Similarly, to take an example from the academic world, the high expectations associated with university reform in the Federal Republic of Germany during the mid 1960s were frustrated because, after the institutional setting had been fundamentally changed, faculty and students alike failed to perform according to the standards of behaviour characteristic of the ‘old university’. It was only after years of upheaval, self-defeating feuds and bureaucratic inefficiency that some of the ‘reformed’ universities were able to develop new norms and stable patterns of expectation allowing them to combine greater degrees of egalitarian responsiveness with the elitist respect for professional competence and intellectual excellence that is essential for first-rate academic institutions.

Finally, even when institutional norms and values are entirely unaffected, as is true of many ordinary reorganizations, the results are often quite disappointing. One of the reasons is the fact that usually reorganizers are able to influence only a few of the determinants of organizational behaviour – jurisdiction, resources and decision rules – and that these may not be powerful enough to make a difference. In the Federal Republic of Germany, for instance, reorganization efforts at the Federal level have never been allowed to touch the prevailing patterns of recruitment and career advancement in the public service (Luhmann and Mayntz, 1973), or conditions of mobility between the public and private sectors, or even between one ministerial department and another. Given the fact that in a civil service system with life tenure, recruitment and career opportunities are likely to be the most powerful determinants of the attitudes and orientations of the ministerial bureaucracy, these are surely severe constraints for policy-oriented reorganization.

What is more important, however, is the fact that even within these constraints, reorganization may severely damage the overall effectiveness of policy-making organizations. In order to establish this point, one need not refer to the distinction between formal and informal organization (Blau and Scott, 1963). But it is necessary to acknowledge the importance of what Richardson (1982) and his associates have labelled ‘styles of decision making’. For may own purposes, I have found the triad of confrontation, bargaining and problem-solving a useful classification, and I have argued that it
is the interaction between formal decision rules and these decision styles which will in fact determine the quality and effectiveness of policy-making (Scharpf, 1985).

More specifically, confrontation and bargaining are only compatible with a pattern of negative co-ordination among separate decision units which, at best, helps to avoid the negative externalities of one decision area upon another (Mayntz and Scharpf, 1975). Positive co-ordination, however, which would use synergistic positive externalities in order to optimize the overall policy performance of a department, of the government as a whole or even of networks of independent organizations (Friend and Jessop, 1969; Friend, Power and Yewlett, 1974) seems to be incompatible with either confrontation or bargaining. It is dependent upon problem-solving or integrative bargaining (Walton and McKersie, 1965) which emphasizes the importance of common interests, goals and values, at the expense of separate, individual self-interest and distributional conflicts. By the same token, problem-solving also takes the emphasis from importance of organizational boundaries and divisions. This is probably what is meant when practitioners frequently assert that it is the quality of people, rather than of formal organization, which determines the quality of policy-making.

Unfortunately, however, problem-solving is a very fragile decision style which depends upon a commitment to common goals and the evolution of mutual trust (Bonoma, 1976) – conditions, surely, which reorganization cannot create or directly control, but which are easily destroyed by the disruption of existing networks of collaboration and the devaluation of existing commitments, with which reorganization is often associated. If that happens, the capacity for problem-solving will be reduced and the policy-making system is likely to revert at least temporarily to a bargaining style, or even to confrontation. As a result, positive co-ordination will become impossible and negative co-ordination will again prevail and, hence the overall quality of public policy-making is likely to deteriorate as well.

That does not mean that reorganization could not help to increase the probability of positive coordination. At least in hierarchical organizations like the ministerial bureaucracy, organizational proximity and the managerial influence of a common superior are likely to be helpful, while organizational distance and the dependence upon different political masters will tend to increase competitiveness and conflict among lower level units. Thus, there are excellent reasons for grouping organizational units responsible for closely interdependent policy areas as close to each other as possible within the ministerial organization (Scharpf, 1977b). But even in that case, the benefits of reorganization are likely to be realized only in the longer term, while the short-term costs are inevitably high. And given the short time horizon of political leaders in competitive democracies, it is easy to see why, even though they may be fully aware of the importance of organizational constraints, reorganization is not usually foremost among their concerns. Chances are that they would suffer from the short-term deterioration of policy-making capacity while improvements would only help their successors (whose policy goals might, however, require yet another change of organization).

Speaking more generally, even though institutions, and even formal organizations in the narrow sense, do matter as a serious constraint on policy-making, institutional reform may not be a very promising strategy for the improvement of public policy. It is difficult to achieve, its outcomes are hard to predict and its benefits are likely to be realized only in the longer term while the short-term costs are not negligible. Instead, would-be policy-designers might do well to try working with (or, if need be, working around) existing institutions. That would require a careful analysis of institutional self-interests and a creative search for policy options which could advance the public interest without violating the institutional self-interest of necessary participants. More promising would be efforts aimed at the explication of definitions which potentially could be shared by those with common interest which might enlarge the willingness and ability to engage in problem-solving among organizations. But even then, there is a caveat: if a convergence of world views and interests were ever within reach, policy-designers would then have to adopt the role of 'devil's advocate' in order to guard against the equally pernicious dangers of 'group think' in policy-making institutions.
References


