Architectures of Interreligious Tolerance: The Infrastructural Politics of Place and Space in Croatia and Turkey

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Abstract

Drawing on research conducted at a mosque in the Croatian port city of Rijeka and an integrated space of worship (a “mosque-cem house”) for Sunni and Alevi Muslims in the Turkish capital of Ankara, this essay traces the divergences between discursive practices and spatial practices in relation to infrastructures of religious diversity. After developing a theoretical model based on Michel de Certeau’s distinction between place and space, I examine the shared discourse of interreligious tolerance and pluralism that framed both Rijeka’s New Mosque and Ankara’s mosque-cem house. Following this, I analyze the radically different spatial practices choreographed by the two projects: the spatial “mixing” of distinct religious communities and forms of worship in the case of the mosque-cem house, and the spatial separation and sequestration of Islam in relation to the city and nation at large in the case of the New Mosque. I argue that the contrast between the politicization of the mosque-cem house project and the near-unanimous approbation for the New Mosque stems from this contrast in spatial practices. The essay concludes with a vignette from the neighborhood near the mosque-cem house that draws attention to the potential contradictions between infrastructures of diversity and more protean forms of social, cultural, and religious plurality.

Keywords: politics of tolerance, spatial practices, Muslim minorities, Islam, Croatia, Turkey

Introduction: Discursive and Spatial Practices of Infrastructures

In recent years, the promises and discontents of religious pluralism have taken center stage in an ensemble of academic and political debates surrounding liberal democracy. With the end of the Cold War and the decommissioning of its ideological polarities, hosannas to the world historical triumph of liberal democracy as a political economic system (e.g. Fukuyama 1992) have been shadowed by recognition of the contradictions that undergird liberal democracy itself (e.g. Mouffe 2005). Multiculturalism as a political...
project for organizing religious difference within the nation-state has become a focal issue in this regard, especially in the wake of 9/11 (the recurrent sense of *déjà vu* that accompanied responses the Paris attacks of 13 November 2015 and the Brussels bombings of 22 March 2016 illustrates how entrenched this logic remains). Religious pluralism constitutes a fault line that bifurcates the political field. Tolerance of religious plurality is an object of desire and testament to the capaciousness of liberal democracy for many on the Left; conversely, the prospect of a political settlement that ratifies a multiculturalist model of religious pluralism is a bugbear for many on the Right. Within this broad ideological landscape, both political and scholarly evaluations of religious pluralism have pivoted on two intertwined issues: the place of religious minorities within liberal democratic nation-states, on the one hand, and the disciplines, effects, and varieties of secularism as a principle for the governance of religion, on the other.

My panoramic aim in this essay is to extend the themes and insights of recent literatures on multiculturalism, pluralism, religious minoritization, and secularism by shifting their perspective. In general, debates over religious pluralism, secularism, and religious minorities have focused on the nation-state as the privileged institutional and discursive site for the production and management of religious difference, and with good reason. As Talal Asad (2003), Winnifred Sullivan (2007), Saba Mahmood (2005, 2015), Hussein Agrama (2012), and Elizabeth Shakman Hurd (2015) have powerfully demonstrated in various ways, secularism is inseparable from the monopoly of the modern state over the domains of law and politics. While my own argument integrates the lessons of this body of critical work on secularism, I redirect ethnographic and theoretical attention to the ways in which specific spaces and places simultaneously constitute and complicate secular logics and attendant projects of religious pluralism. In seeking a more “phenomenological” perspective on religious pluralism, I draw inspiration from a largely separate field of recent ethnographic and theoretical inquiry, the study of infrastructure(s). More specifically, and in keeping with the aspiration of this edited volume to probe “the processes that turn infrastructures into sites of contestation around diversity” (Burchardt and Höhne 2015: 11), I explore how specific “infrastructures of diversity” both cultivate and confound discourses and practices of religious pluralism and tolerance. I do so in reference to two specific sites that have staked their legitimacy on the principle of liberal-pluralist tolerance for religious diversity, specifically in relation to Muslim minority communities: a new mosque in Croatia and an intersectarian house of worship in Turkey. As my analysis illustrates, the very spatial characteristics of these two sites render and refract the abstract discourses of religious pluralism and interreligious tolerance in divergent, even contradictory ways.

In contrast to the relative abstraction of nations and states, infrastructures are resolutely “embedded” (Björkman 2015) and contextual. The quotidian ubiquity of infrastructures in modern life has encouraged their naturalization, often placing them at a vanishing point of epistemological and political awareness. Infrastructures “comprise the architecture for circulation, literally providing the undergirding of modern societies, and they generate the ambient environment of everyday life” (Larkin 2013: 328). Like Marx’s commodities, infrastructures abound with “metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties” (Marx 1977: 163). As anthropologist Brian Larkin observes, infrastructures are definitively double in a way that echoes Marx’s analysis of commodity fetishism: “Their peculiar ontology lies in the fact that they are things and also the relation between things” (2013: 329).[^3]

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Take, for instance, the mode of infrastructure that concerns me in this paper: architecture, in particular religious buildings. The two specific structures that I will discuss are clearly material objects, “things” in and of themselves, yet they are also spatial forms that project and constitute relations among people, both practitioners and others who inhabit their spaces. Larkin points out another signature duality of infrastructures: They are both pragmatic “networks that facilitate the flow of goods, people, and ideas” (Ibid.: 328) and symbolic objects whose aesthetic and poetic qualities are resources for representation and argument. This second, Janus-faced quality of infrastructures is especially crucial in relation to questions of religious pluralism. As we will see, the embedded spatial practices that inhabit religious architectural infrastructures do not necessarily correspond to the symbolic valences that architectural projects acquire in broader discursive realms.

In order to structure the presentation to come, I marshal a distinction that mirrors Larkin’s analysis of infrastructures as both networks and symbolic objects: infrastructures as nexuses for spatial practices and infrastructures as objects of discursive practices. This distinction also draws on Michel de Certeau’s pioneering theorization of the relationship between space (espace) and place (lieu); it is therefore worth quoting his discussion at length:

At the outset, I shall make a distinction between space (espace) and place (lieu) that delimits a field. A place (lieu) is the order (of whatever kind) in accord with which elements are distributed in relationships of coexistence. It thus excludes the possibility of two things being in the same location (place). The law of the ‘proper’ rules in the place: the elements taken into consideration are beside one another, each situated in its own ‘proper’ and distinct location, a location it defines...A space exists when one takes into consideration vectors of direction, velocities, and time variables. Thus space is composed of intersections of mobile elements...in short, space is a practiced place. Thus the street geometrically defined by urban planning is transformed into a space by walkers. (de Certeau 1984: 117, emphasis in original).

De Certeau’s intervention – in particular, the simultaneous contrast and mutual constitution of the “street of the planners” and the “street of the walkers” – suggests a powerful model for theorizing infrastructural practice, and it is curious that his work has remained largely untapped in the recent “infrastructural turn” in anthropology, sociology, and urban geography. Architectural infrastructures are clearly both places, defined by their discursive abstraction and “the law of the ‘proper’,” and spaces, pragmatically inhabited and transformed by specific actors, with their “vectors of direction, velocities, and time variables.”

Space and place also express different modalities of power. Like the other contributors to this volume, I comprehend “diversity in urban space as a form of governing populations” (Burchardt and Höhne 2015: 11). My approach to diversity as a principle of governance draws inspiration from Wendy Brown’s interrogation (2006) of tolerance as an instrument of governmentality in the Foucauldian (1991) sense. Yet I am also attentive to the modes of spatialization that mediate tolerance as a technique of governmentality. While inhabitations of space and discourses of place may both frame “the conduct of conduct” (Lemke 2001: 2) – the classic shorthand definition of governmentality – there is also a necessary gap between the orders of space and place. Indeed, as we will see, “tolerance” as a principle of urban governance is often far more troubled and contested at the level of embedded spatial practices than it is at the level of discursive abstraction; space involves complications and contradictions, rooted in the “intersections of mobile elements” (de Certeau 1984: 117), that the uniform “properness” of place does not.

The two infrastructural sites that anchor my argument evince contrasting relationships...
between spatial and discursive practices. The first site is a recently constructed mosque, the New Mosque (Nova Džamija), which serves the Bosniak community of the Croatian port city of Rijeka. The second site is an ongoing project to construct an integrated space of worship for Sunni and Alevi Muslims, a so-called “mosque-cem” house (cami-cem evi), in an impoverished district of Ankara. I have chosen these two sites strategically. In the case of Rijeka’s New Mosque, spatial and discursive practices have not contradicted each other in any overt manner. On the other hand, the Ankara mosque-cem house presents a dramatic, deeply politicized divergence between spatial practices and discourses of interreligious tolerance and pluralism. Although I have analyzed these two sites in relation to each other in another context (Walton 2015b) vis-à-vis discourses of “cultural intimacy” (Herzfeld 2005), my argument here foregrounds the contrasting relationships between space and place – the orders of spatial and discursive practice – that differentiate these two infrastructural projects.

Some readers might object that Rijeka’s New Mosque and the Ankara mosque-cem house constitute an awkward pair – that, in essence, they have set out to compare apples and oranges. After all, the New Mosque is devoted solely to a single religion, Sunni Islam, while the mosque-cem house is explicitly an intersectarian, interreligious site. But it is this very contrast that sustains and fuels my argument. The New Mosque and the mosque-cem house suggest a provocative comparison precisely because a shared discourse of religious pluralism and tolerance has enfolded and served to legitimate both sites, despite the divergent religious and spatial practices that inhabit the two spaces. Accordingly, my overarching theoretical aim is to illuminate how different infrastructures embody and complicate common discourses of religious pluralism and interreligious tolerance. For this reason, my exposition does not focus exhaustively on the historical, sociological, and political situation of Islam in Croatia and former Yugoslavia or the relationship between Sunnis and Alevis in Turkey. While these two contexts are clearly crucial to my intervention, I address them principally as backdrops to my conceptual, theoretical argument.

My presentation begins with an analysis of the discourses of tolerance and interreligious pluralism that heralded both the opening ceremony of the New Mosque and the groundbreaking for the Ankara mosque-cem house. Following this discussion, I consider the contrasting spatial practices of each site and argue that the divergent political fates of the two infrastructural projects partially stem from this contrast. Finally, the essay concludes with a vignette from my second ethnographic foray to the Ankara mosque-cem house, an encounter that suggests that pragmatic negotiations of togetherness across social, religious, and political-economic fissures may occasionally benefit from an absence of infrastructure, rather than its ubiquity (cf. Butler 2015).

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4 “Bosniak” is the standard term for Bosnian Muslims, as opposed to Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats. While “Bosnian” alone refers to citizenship, and can thus apply to a member of any of the three communities, “Bosniak” refers specifically to the Bosnian Muslim community.

5 Alevi is a minoritized religious community in Turkey, whose distinctive beliefs and ritual practices include elements drawn from both Twelver Shi’a Islam – for instance, reverence for the Ehl-i Beyt (the holy family of Muhammad, Fatima, Ali, Hasan, and Hüseyin) and lamentation over the martyrs of Karbala – and shamanistic Central Asian traditions. Because the Turkish state refuses to recognize any theological or sociological distinctions within Islam, census figures do not exist for Alevism; most estimates place them at between ten and twenty per cent of the population. For comprehensive studies of Alevism, see Shankland 2003; Dole 2012; Massicard 2012; Dressler 2013; and Tambar 2014.

6 The cem is the definitive Alevi ritual practice, a form of ritual circumambulation (semah) that involves both male and female participants and is set to musical accompaniment. Frequently, cems are held in commemoration and mourning of figures from Shi’a communal history such as Ali, Hasan, and Hüseyin. In rural contexts, cems are typically convened in private homes; the designation of a specific architectural space and structure, the cem house, solely to the performance of cems is an effect of rural-urban migration on the part of many Alevis in the past half-century or so. See Erdemir 2005 for a thorough discussion of these issues.
Discursive Practices: Religious Infrastructures as Multiculturalist Places

In his assessment of the recent infrastructural turn, Brian Larkin stresses that infrastructures “are not just technical objects... (they) also operate on the level of fantasy and desire. They encode the dreams of individuals and societies and are the vehicles whereby those fantasies are transmitted and made emotionally real” (2013: 333). This relationship between infrastructure and public fantasy is especially prominent in the context of architectural projects. From the moment that the first stones were laid for the Pyramids of Giza, if not before, architecture has served as a preeminent expression of a variety of modes of power. Buildings are erected to embody the puissance of deities, the sovereignty of states, and the vainglory of private citizens. In pursuit of these lofty aims, discourses about architectural infrastructures attempt to “freeze” their meanings, to fix them as one or another type of “place” in de Certeau’s sense.

Recent years have witnessed the emergence of a peculiar, new type of place within the broader domain of architectural infrastructure: the multiculturalist place. In her critique of the governmentality of tolerance, which inspires much of my analysis in this section, Wendy Brown discusses an exemplary multiculturalist place: The Simon Wiesenthal Center Museum of Tolerance in Los Angeles (2006: 107 ff.). From Brown’s perspective, the Museum of Tolerance functions as an infrastructure for the depoliticization of alterity, precisely because it extolls “difference as itself the essence of humanity” (Ibid.: 125). She describes the museum as a monolithic place, where all spatial practices are oriented toward and subsumed within a single, hegemonic image of depoliticized, tolerated differences. Because the Museum of Tolerance is defined by and oriented toward a fetishized vision of multiculturalist difference, it denies any spatial practices that would be “improper” to this vision.

Like the Museum of Tolerance, both the Rijeka New Mosque and the Ankara mosque-cem house have been hailed as multiculturalist places: infrastructural sites that inculcate tolerance for religious diversity. In Rijeka, the New Mosque has been inscribed in local, national, and international narratives of tolerance for Croatia’s Bosniak residents and Islam in general. Its opening was greeted as evidence of Croatia’s commitment to religious pluralism, a commitment sanctioned by broader European discourses and institutions (not coincidentally, the opening of the Rijeka Mosque occurred less than two months prior to Croatia’s accession to full EU membership in July 2013). Similarly, the groundbreaking for Ankara’s mosque-cem house was acclaimed as a decisive intervention within the fraught history of tension, suspicion, and violence between Sunnis and Alevis in Turkey, a gesture that sought to overcome the wounds of the past with the balm of contemporary tolerance. The discursive practices that framed both the Rijeka Mosque and the Ankara mosque-cem house sought to fix them as multiculturalist places, infrastructures of diversity and tolerance.

The opening ceremony for Rijeka’s New Mosque on 7 May 2013 was an unprecedented pageant of public religion (Casanova 1994) in Croatia. Islam is a decidedly minoritized religion in Croatia – there are approximately 63,000 Muslim residents in the country, comprising about 1.5 percent of the population, while just over 86 per cent of Croatia’s inhabitants identify as Catholic (Croatian Bureau of Statistics 2011), and Catholicism is deeply intertwined with post-independence Croatian national identity more generally (Perica 2000, 2002; Pavlaković 2001; see also Grubišić et. al. 1993 and Shaw and Štiks 2013). The New Mosque is only the second major mosque in Croatia, after the Zagreb Mosque (Zagrebačka Džamija) in the capital; a third, smaller mosque is located in the eastern town of Gunja, near the border with both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia (Pavelić 2013). Like the Zagreb Mosque, Rijeka’s New Mosque serves as

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7 The relatively small literature on Islam in post-Yugoslav Croatia includes Čičak-Chand 1999; Kolanović 2004; and Mujadžević 2014.
a communal space of worship for Bosniaks who first moved to the city during the socialist Yugoslav era (1945-1991), and continue to reside the surrounding area. The festivities that accompanied the mosque’s opening, however, were not principally a local matter – rather, they were an event on a national and international scale, with participation and implications that stretched far beyond Rijeka’s Bosniak community. Among the dignitaries in attendance were Bakir Izetbegović, the Bosniak member of the tripartite (Bosniak-Croat-Serb) Bosnian-Herzegovinian presidency; Ghaith bin Mubarak al-Kuwari, the Qatari Minister of Endowments and Islamic Affairs (the Emir of Qatar sponsored and partially funded the mosque); Paul Vandoren, president of the EU delegation to Croatia; and Ivo Josipović, the president of Croatia at the time. A host of lesser luminaries joined these speakers to deliver encomia to the mosque as a triumph of interreligious tolerance and moderation.

The congratulatory remarks that saluted the mosque’s opening were unanimous in their interpretation of the structure as a symbol and place for tolerance of religious diversity. Like multiculturalist discourses at large, the discourse of tolerance in the context of the Rijeka mosque necessitated an abstraction from specific contexts to general principles: Islam as practiced by Rijeka’s Bosniaks stood as a placeholder for “religious diversity,” and tolerance for the mosque community counted as a commitment to religious pluralism in general. President Josipović extolled the complementary relationship between Croatia and Islam, rooted in tolerance of the latter by the former. He proclaimed that Islam and Muslims form “part of Croatian history and, together with other minorities, enrich Croatian cultural identity” (Ibid.); in doing so, Josipović tactfully avoided any allusion to the political histories that undergird, and potentially destabilize, this “enrichment” of the Croatian majority by the Muslim minority in favor of a salute to deracinated tolerance. Bin Mubarek al-Kuwari gestured to the geopolitical lessons offered by Rijeka’s New Mosque, claiming that the Center will help to “correct false pictures about Islam and Muslims” (Ibid.). Finally, EU ambassador Verhoven stressed that the mosque represents Croatia’s adherence to “multiculturalism and diversity (which) are among the basic values on which the European Union is built” (Al Arabiya News 2013). Taken together, the garlands of praise that discursively decorated the New Mosque’s opening aimed to transform the architectural infrastructure of the mosque – a striking building based on a space-age design by the famous, now-deceased Croatian-Macedonian architect and sculptor Dušan Đžamonja – into a symbol and instantiation of interreligious tolerance, a definitive multiculturalist place.

Similar discursive labors were evident some four months later, on 9 September 2013, in the Turkish capital of Ankara. Like the opening of the New Mosque, the groundbreaking ceremony for Ankara’s mosque-cem house was a carefully choreographed public spectacle that foregrounded participation from a variety of politicians and civil society activists, Sunni and Alevi alike. Among the roster of speakers and participants were prominent Alevi civil society leaders, MPs from both the governing Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi; AKP) and the opposition Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi; CHP), the mayor of the district of Mamak, where the project is located,
and the chief mufti – in Turkey, a state-appointed interpreter of Sunni-Hanafi Islamic jurisprudence – of this same district (Zaman Gazetesi 2013). The chief institutional and financial supporters of the project included the Cem Foundation (Cem Vakfı), one of the largest Alevi NGOs in Turkey, and the famous Sunni theologian Fethullah Gülen and his global Hizmet network (Turam 2007; Hendrick 2013; Walton 2014, 2015c).

The comments made by advocates of the project echoed the proclamations of interreligious tolerance, reconciliation, and goodwill that accompanied the opening of Rijeka’s New Mosque. One participant in the ceremony, a parliamentarian from the governing AKP, underscored the importance of the project’s status as a civil society initiative by dismissing criticisms levelled against the mosque-cem house as misplaced. He averred that “if this had been a state project, perhaps the (negative) reactions would be justified” (Şahin 2013: 1), thereby implying that infrastructural projects within the sphere of civil society are inherently free from the problematic instrumentalism and co-optation that define state-based political projects, a utopia of civil society that I have elsewhere described as “the civil society effect” (Walton 2013). İzzetin Doğan, the famous Alevi public intellectual whose Cem Foundation partially sponsored the project, offered the most explicit articulation of the mosque-cem house as a multiculturalist place of interreligious tolerance: “This project (is part of) the same garden in which all members of our society, both Alevi and Sunni, both Şafii and Hanbali,\(^9\) both Christian and Jew…were able to meet their (religious) needs – in this garden, different flowers were able to blossom (Bu projenin, halkımıza Alevisi ile Sünnisi ile ve Şafiiisi Hanbelisi ile, Hıristiyanı Mesevesi ile…ihtiyaçların

\(^9\) Şafii and Hanbali are two of the four authoritative schools of jurisprudence in Sunni Islam; the other two schools are Maliki and Hanafi.
In both Rijeka and Ankara, discourses of interreligious tolerance and pluralism sought to fix the meaning of new architectural infrastructures as multiculturalist places. As Wendy Brown (2006) predicts, the discourse of tolerance in both instances “silenced” other pasts (Trouillot 1995) by depoliticizing histories of violence. In Rijeka, the discursive framing of the New Mosque whitewashed the fraught, recent history of intercommunal and interreligious violence in the Western Balkans, in particular the inordinate violence that Bosniaks suffered at the hands of Bosnian Serb, but also Bosnian Croat, military forces during the war following the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Similarly, in Ankara, predictions of harmony and tolerance between Alevi and Sunni threatened to depoliticize both the long, asymmetrical history of violence suffered by Alevi at the hands of Sunnis and the ongoing, obdurate refusal of the Turkish state to recognize Alevism as a religious minority, defined by a distinctive theological and ritual tradition (in particular, the practice of the cem ceremony) (Dole 2012; Dressler 2013; Tambar 2014). Like the Museum of Tolerance in Los Angeles, both Rijeka’s New Mosque and the Ankara mosque-cem house celebrate diversity as a depoliticized, deracinated good in its own right; in doing so, they exemplify the discursive practices that characterize infrastructures of diversity and multiculturalist places. As we will see in the next section, however, the discursive status of these two projects as multiculturalist places does not presuppose the same constellation of spatial practices.

Spatial Practices: Infrastructural Mixing vs. Infrastructural Separation

By uniting de Certeau’s theorization of place with Brown’s critique of the governmentality of tolerance, the previous section traced the discursive practices that have aimed to fix both Rijeka’s New Mosque and the Ankara mosque-cem house as infrastructural places of diversity, what I have dubbed multiculturalist places. In this section, by contrast, I attend to the radically different political reactions that the two projects provoked: near-unanimous approbation in the case of the New Mosque, and vocal condemnation and protest in the case of the mosque-cem house. My basic argument is that the contrasting spatial practices entailed by the two infrastructural projects partially determine this political contrast. More specifically, I argue that the envisioned “mixing” of distinct confessional communities and modes of worship in the mosque-cem house has incited anxieties that the relative separation of the New Mosque, and, by proxy, Islam as a whole, from majoritarian Croatian Catholicism has avoided.

On the day of the groundbreaking ceremony at the Ankara mosque-cem house in September 2013, a demonstration against the project and, the depredations of Sultan Yavuz Selim “the Grim” carried out against Anatolian Kızılbaş Alevis in the early 16th Century.
erupted in the surrounding neighborhood of Tuzlucaýr. To some extent, this street demonstration was a site within the broader geography of protest that emerged in the wake of Istanbul’s Gezi Park protests in summer 2013 (see Walton 2015a). Beyond this national terrain, however, the protest also focused on two issues central to the infrastructure and spatial practices of the mosque-cem house itself: the impoverishment of the immediate neighborhood surrounding the construction site and the potentially treacherous effects of the simultaneity of Alevi and Sunni worship within the same physical space.

As I observed during my first visit to the mosque-cem house construction site in March 2014, the district in which it is located, Tuzlucaýr, is a shantytown, a gecekondu. The residences near the construction site are all informal structures, built without the required municipal permits; the owners of such homes typically lack property deeds or other forms of certification that would provide protection under the legal regime of private real estate. During interviews conducted with local residents in March and September 2014, I was frequently told that the legal invisibility of the shantytown – the fact that gecekondu homes are not certified and recognized as private property – was crucial to the selection of the construction site in the first place. According to my informants, it was relatively easy for the backers of the mosque-cem house to obtain title to land from the municipality because, from a legal perspective, the neighborhood was “empty,” despite the many shanty homes and small businesses that occupied it. Residents of the district also told me that several homes had been unceremoniously bulldozed in order to clear space for the project. The ramshackle, broken brick walls that ended abruptly at the margins of the construction site testified to this history of dispossession. Furthermore, as in shantytowns the world over, infrastructural goods such as plumbing and electricity, which are mediated by both market and state mechanisms in Turkey (cf. Björkman 2015), are often difficult to access in Tuzlucaýr. A blacksmith who spoke with me in his atelier only a few meters from the construction site identified this infrastructural precarity and neglect as a key cause for the protests against the mosque-cem house: The project to create an infrastructure of interreligious diversity in a neighborhood so egregiously lacking in more basic infrastructural goods and services was interpreted as an insult. A graffito on the wall of an abandoned shanty home near the con-

13 As the summer protests sparked by Gezi continued into the autumn, it seemed that each subsequent victim of police violence in response to the demonstrations was Alevi. In particular, the police murder of a young Alevi man, Ethem Sansıslük, in Ankara on 14 June 2013, and the death of Berkin Elvan, an Alevi adolescent who fell into a coma after being hit in the head by a tear gas canister during the June protests in Istanbul, stoked the impression that Alevis were specific targets of police and state violence during the Gezi protests.

14 Gecekondu – literally “put up at night” – is the catchall term for extralegal constructions, shantytowns and squatter settlements in Istanbul, Ankara, and Turkey’s other cities (Keyder 1999).

15 For an accessible survey of the global pandemic of informal housing, shantytowns, and slums, see Davis 2006.
struction site made this same point wryly with an ironic petition: “We want a church, too (kilise de istiyoruz).” In such a blighted area, the mosque-cem house is as irrelevant as a church would be.

The sardonic request for a church also highlighted another key feature of the neighborhood that residents consistently raised in conversation: demographically, the area immediately surrounding the mosque-cem house construction site is predominantly Alevi, with only a handful of Sunni families. This demographic fact incited suspicion on the part of most of my interlocutors. Who, they collectively asked, were the envisioned worshipers in the mosque section of the project?

On a local level, the construction of the mosque-cem house merited disdain because it ignored both the demography and the more urgent infrastructural needs of the neighborhood. More broadly, Alevis throughout Turkey expressed skepticism over the project due to the specific spatial practices and configuration of worship that the mosque-cem house proposes to choreograph. The shorthand for this criticism was “assimilation,” a term that expresses a ubiquitous anxiety in Alevi public discourse generally. Ercan Geçmez, the president of the Ankara-based Hacı Bektaş Veli Anatolian Culture Foundation (Hacı Bektaş Veli Anadolu Kültür Vakfı), one of the largest Alevi civil society institutions in Ankara, unequivocally summarized the doubts, suspicions, and cynicism of many Alevis in a statement to the daily newspaper Radikal: “There is no such thing as a mosque in the Alevi tradition... the project is a program of assimilation (proje asimilasyon programıdır)” (Şahin 2013: 7; my translation). Geçmez expanded on this point during an interview with me in March 2014. In particular, he stressed Alevis’ deep discomfort over the prospect that daily prayer (namaz; salat), the cardinal Sunni form of worship, and the cem ceremony, the definitive Alevi ritual, would be con-
ducted in the same space. In his estimation, the simultaneity and proximity of Sunni and Alevi forms of worship inherently entailed the risk of assimilation of the latter by the former – he could not envision a scenario in which Sunnis and Alevis could worship side-by-side without Sunni practices dominating Alevi practices. For Alevi critics of the project such as Geçmez, the spatial practice of “mixing” between Sunnis and Alevis, which constitutes the basic infrastructural logic of the mosque-cem house project, amounts to an imminent threat to the distinctiveness and autonomy of Alevism in the first instance. From this perspective, discursive attempts to fix the meaning of the mosque-cem house as a place of tolerance and diversity are alibis for spatial practices that aim to assimilate Alevi difference. And it is this anxiety over spatial practices of mixing and assimilation that has fuelled the thorough, on-going politicization of the project.

In contrast to the agonistic political debate over the Ankara mosque-cem house, the opening of Rijeka’s New Mosque was greeted with an absence of dissent on municipal, national, and international levels alike. This contrast between the political trajectories of the two projects corresponds directly to a sharp contrast between the spatial practices that characterize each infrastructure. Unlike the prospect of spatial “mixing” and the consequent threat of assimilation that has incited anxiety over the Ankara mosque-cem house, an infrastructural spatiality of separation and sequestration defines Rijeka’s New Mosque. In de Certeau’s terms, the New Mosque is a relatively homogeneous space despite its symbolic status as a multiculturalist place. Although the New Mosque has been hailed as a place of tolerance and pluralism, it is not an infrastructural space of interreligious plurality and mixing in the manner that the mosque-cem house aspires to be. Only one form of religious practice, Sunni worship, occurs within the New Mosque. As in mosques throughout the world, the principal religious and spatial practice in the New Mosque is the collective Friday prayer, accompanied by a sermon delivered by the resident imam. The mosque also hosts a variety of other activities, of course: A restaurant offers halal Bosnian cuisine, and a conference hall hosts occasional symposia and seminars. During an interview with me at the mosque in January 2014, the imam’s son described the most recent event hosted by the mosque, a regional competition in Qur’anic recitation (tajwid) – with a proud blush, he added that he had placed first in the contest. Notably, however, none of the activities and spatial practices that inhabit the New Mosque entail the interreligious spatial mixing that defines the mosque-cem house.

This point applies on a broader spatial scale, as well. Within the cityscape of Rijeka, the contrast between the visibility of the mosque and its relative inaccessibility reflects a divergence between place and space, between discourses about the mosque and the spatial practices that define it. Dušan Džamonja’s postmodern structure is a prominent feature within the built environment of the city, visible at a distance from multiple vantages – indeed, it can be seen from as far away as the seaside promenade in the resort town of Opatija, some fifteen kilometers to the west of Rijeka across the Gulf of Kvarner. Yet this public visibility is also a matter of separation. The mosque is located in a peripheral, relatively poor neighborhood, at a remove from the city’s central historical core. On my first visit to the mosque, I was frustrated and befuddled by the difficulty that I had in reaching it. Although the mosque looms conspicuously over the motorway that connects Rijeka to the Istrian peninsula, one must navigate a non-intuitive labyrinth of alleyways and backstreets in order to reach it. Clearly, the premium placed on the mosque’s visibility does not imply accessibility – there is a stark disparity between the mosque as a public sign of tolerance for Islam and as a space of quotidian Muslim worship.

Within Croatia at large, tolerance of both Muslim Bosniaks and Islam in general has entailed the articulation of specific places – mosques – that are defined by their spatial separation from the unmarked ethno-religious majority of Catho-
lic Croats. Rijeka’s New Mosque embodies this logic of separation and sequestration, as does the Zagreb Mosque. In contrast to the spatial practice of intercommunal mixing that defines the mosque-cem house, the mosque’s spatiality of separation encourages a depoliticized mode of tolerance. Islam has achieved a place as a tolerated religion within Croatia – one that, as former President Josipović rather patronizingly asserted, can “enrich Croatian cultural identity” – precisely because its spaces and spatial practices exist at an inoculated remove from the national public at large. Like the New Mosque, Islam in Croatia is visible as an object of tolerance, but not easily accessible.

**Conclusion: A Moment to Complicate Infrastructures of Diversity**

On my second trip to the Ankara mosque-cem house, a sweltering September day in 2014, I wandered through the dusty alleys of the shantytown ensconced by an eerie silence; the demonstration that had produced such sound and fury on my first visit six months earlier had dissipated, and I was one of the few pedestrians braving the midday heat. As I snapped photographs of the mosque-cem house from below – substantial work had been completed since my previous visit – a middle-aged man emerged from a nearby gecekondu home and beckoned to me. He invited me to join him and his friends, all local residents, for a drink in the shade of his ramshackle veranda, and I was soon enjoying a glass of rakı (Turkey’s de facto national liquor, an anise-flavored grape brandy similar to ouzo) accompanied by melon and feta cheese. I sat with my host and his friends for several hours, discussing both the mosque-cem house and the vicissitudes of Turkish political and social life more generally. The owner of the house narrated his Sisyphean legal battle to obtain legal recognition of his property rights from the municipality, and I was soon enjoying a glass of rakı (Turkey’s de facto national liquor, an anise-flavored grape brandy similar to ouzo) accompanied by melon and feta cheese. I sat with my host and his friends for several hours, discussing both the mosque-cem house and the vicissitudes of Turkish political and social life. The owner of the house narrated his Sisyphean legal battle to obtain legal recognition of his property rights from the municipality, and several of the other men described the struggles of a mutual friend whose property had been destroyed to make way for the mosque-cem house. Above all, we discussed the prospect of Alevi and Sunni interacting on the basis of the mosque-cem house. My interlocutors were unanimous in their skepticism. Our host summarized their mutual opinion: “We’re all here already, even in this small group: Alevi and Sunni, left-wing and right-wing, rich and poor. We don’t need some ‘mosque-cem house’ (cami cemevine filan ihtiyacımız yok).” On cue, each of the raconteurs identified himself according to religious, political, and socioeconomic background to illustrate the protean diversity of the drinking circle.

As I have argued over the course of this essay, infrastructures of diversity articulate and achieve definition through both discursive and spatial practices. Following Michel de Certeau, I have theorized these two modes of practice through the distinction between place and space. In conclusion, however, I pause on this brief encounter, which occurred in both the literal and figurative shadow of one particular infrastructure of diversity, because it draws attention to the manner in which infrastructures of diversity and quotidian forms of plurality complicate, and potentially contradict, each other. From the perspective of my drinking partners in the shantytown of Tuzluçaýır, infrastructures of diversity such as the mosque-cem house neglect and fail to recognize the protean forms of social and religious plurality that already exist in urban environments such as Ankara. By reifying “difference” and “diversity” through both discursive and spatial practices, infrastructures of diversity – multiculturalist places – not only fail to attend to these more protean modes of interaction; they actively threaten them.

When sitting at a table, shielded from the heat with a glass of milky rakı in hand, it is seductively easy to succumb to a romantic vision of the authenticity of the urban poor and the inherent diversity of the city street (cf. Jacobs 1961), and it is therefore worth flagging this romance as an ethnographic and analytical pitfall. However, one does not need to assent to such hyperboles in order to argue that the shantytown residents who welcomed me at their table articulated a more nuanced perspective on questions of
“diversity” and “plurality” than many advocates and mouthpieces for infrastructural projects for diversity and tolerance. They recognize the divergence between the mundane, improvisational “diversity” that animates their own interactions and the reified forms of “diversity” that are summoned to projects of power – what, with Wendy Brown (2006), we might call techniques of liberal governmentality. This difference is of paramount importance to assessments of infrastructures of diversity, whether in Rijeka, Ankara, or elsewhere. Even more panoramically, it suggests that new perspectives on many of the “big” questions of liberal democracy – secularism, religious pluralism, and the situation of religious minorities – demand insight into spaces, times, and contexts where contemporary infrastructures of diversity, whether state or civil society, do not monolithically determine social practices, forms of citizenship, and modes of intimacy.

References


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