Pre-Bronze-Age Principles? Implications of Endogamy in the South-West Eurasian Highlands

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Pre-Bronze-Age Principles?
Implications of endogamy in the south-west Eurasian highlands¹

Patrick Heady and Lale Yalçın-Heckmann²

Abstract

The high levels of endogamy characteristic of the circum-Mediterranean area have long been a puzzle for anthropological theory. Several theorists – notably Tillion, Pitt-Rivers, and Goody – have sought the explanation in the deep historical processes that gave rise to plough agriculture and the eventual rise of bronze age states. Despite their differences, these authors agree that endogamy was a consequence of this historic transformation. We argue instead that local kinship endogamy was a cause. The argument is supported by a critical assessment of Goody’s analysis in Production and Reproduction, followed by a review of ethnographic case studies which suggest an alternative approach. We present an account of spatio-historical processes that can be used to support this kind of back-projection of limited present-day evidence. Finally, we note a contrast between the systems of age- and gender-relations in different parts of the Mediterranean area – and argue that our overall analysis can help to explain this contrast and the ways in which both Mediterranean systems differ from those in sub-Saharan Africa.

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South-East Anatolia and North-East Italy – Similarities Between Two Highland Societies

This argument starts with data from our own first field sites: the Kurdish village of Sisin in the south-eastern Turkish province of Hakkari where Yalçın-Heckmann worked between 1980 and 1982 (Yalçın-Heckmann 1991); and the Romance speaking village of Ovasta, in the sub-region of Carnia in north-east Italy where Heady worked between 1989 and 1991 (Heady 1999). Both villages had populations of about 200 in the 1980s. They were situated in mountainous areas, with traditional economies based on a mixture of farming and transhumant herding, and in each case an important role was played by common property held by the village as a whole. In both places, post-marital residence was strictly patrilocal, and property was inherited almost exclusively by males, with brothers receiving equal shares. Though the ideologies of marriage differed, they both attached a positive value to locally endogamous matches, without making them an exclusive rule. In both places, unions between a man and a woman from the same village amounted to about half of the resident married couples.

Why These Similarities Matter

There are two reasons why we think these similarities matter. First, these two communities are not exceptional cases. Similar findings have been reported in ethnographies of highland communities in many parts of the circum-Mediterranean region. The second reason is that our data enables us to test some of the explanations that have been given for the phenomenon of endogamy.

Some Theories of Endogamy

A frequently offered explanation of local kinship endogamy is that it keeps property within the local kinship group, by preventing its transmission to outsiders through the dowries or inheritances of out-marrying brides. But this theory does not fit Hakkari or Carnia – since the practice of near exclusive male inheritance means that any loss of property through out-marrying brides would be minimal. Property can be preserved without resorting to endogamy.

We tend to favour a second explanation which is also quite often advanced (e.g. by Pina-Cabral 1992). In both Sisin and Ovasta, there is a strong emphasis on village unity and harmonious relationships. Harmonious relationships are practically important for the effective joint exploitation of common resources. Locally endogamous marriages express this sense of unity, while also providing the families concerned with local allies on whom they can draw for practical and moral support within the village community.

However, neither of these explanations addresses the question of why endogamy is so frequently found in circum-Mediterranean societies – while in several other parts of the world – including sub-Saharan Africa it is a rare exception. There have been a number of attempts to explain this (e.g. Tillion 1983 [1966]; Pitt-Rivers 1977), which highlight different aspects of marriage and its implications (see Table 1).

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3 Tillion (1983 [1966]) explores similar phenomena, looking at long-term changes in the circum-Mediterranean societies, but argues that a particular endogamy (FBS-FBD marriage) was a result of the neolithic revolution (p. 17). We argue for a different kind of causality here, even if – like her – we follow conjectures rather than facts.
Table 1: Theories of Endogamy, Exogamy and the Meaning of Marriage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect of marriage highlighted by theory</th>
<th>Endogamous Variant</th>
<th>Exogamous Variant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>involves property transmission</td>
<td>keeps property in the group (e.g. Barth 1954, Tillion 1983 [1966])</td>
<td>“total exchange” between groups (e.g. Needham 1962)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sets up social relationships</td>
<td>strengthens within group solidarity (e.g. Leach 1940 and the Bedouin discussed by Peters 1976)</td>
<td>social ties with other groups (e.g. Lévi-Strauss 1969 [1949])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>defines group boundaries</td>
<td>includes affines in the group (e.g. the Maronites discussed by Peters 1976)</td>
<td>excludes affines from the group (e.g. Fortes 2006 [1969])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>expresses implicit assumptions about identity</td>
<td>marriage is a relationship of “likeness” (e.g. Khuri 1970)</td>
<td>marriage is a relationship of difference (e.g. Tillion 1983 [1966]; Campbell 1964)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But by far the most ambitious and far-reaching attempt to answer this question is Goody’s theory about the connections between intensive agriculture, inequality, marriage, and state power at the outset of the *Eurasian miracle* (Goody 2010) – which were first set out in his 1976 book *Production and Reproduction*. The starting point of Goody’s theories is the development of intensive agriculture, maximising the output for a given area – which he contrasts to the less intensive strategies in sub-Saharan Africa where population densities were lower and land, according to him, was not a scarce resource. Though their absolute population densities were low, both Hakkari and Carnia had intensive systems in Goody’s sense, with terracing of fields and careful use of resources to extract the maximum yield from their rugged terrain.4

Goody (1976) noted an empirical association between intensive agriculture and endogamy – under which heading he included a number of distinct phenomena. First of these is status-endogamy, in which high-status parents marry their children to those of other high-status parents. Second is kin endogamy, in which marriages are arranged within the kinship group. And third is local endogamy, which does the same between existing neighbours. Goody explains the association between intensive agriculture and all kinds of endogamy by way of a status argument. According to this argument, intensive agriculture yielded surpluses which provided the material basis for bronze-age states, whose landowning and political elites took more than their fair share – passing on the advantages to their children through status-endogamous marriage. In order to achieve these status-endogamous marriages, daughters had to be endowed with property to match that of their potential husbands. This created a risk for social groups based on locality or descent – namely that the property settled on out-marrying daughters could impoverish the group as a whole. The need to prevent this from happening created pressures for women to marry within their existing social group – thus leading to local and kinship endogamy (Goody 1976, 2010).

The data from Hakkari and Carnia do not refute this argument, but they show that it cannot be the sole reason for Eurasian endogamy, or for its association with intensive agriculture. The proof is that these societies have intensive agriculture, along with all three kinds of endogamy – but that

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4 This applies of course to the fields and not to the hay cutting terrain or meadows which were for the economy of animal herding. We return to this point below.
status endogamy is expressed by marriage with high-status outsiders, while the marriages that are endogamous in kinship or local terms are generally between medium or low status families. This fact, which duplicates the situation reported by Bourdieu (1977, 1979) in Kabyle, demonstrates that some other explanation is needed for the common pattern of local kinship endogamy.

Later in this paper we will offer an alternative explanation. But before we do so, it is worth examining the evidence that Goody himself offers in support of his explanation – because, as the next section will show, it does not fully support his theoretical claims.

A Critique of Goody’s Thesis in Production and Reproduction

The evidence comes from Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock 1967) which, despite the name, is not a collection of maps. In fact, it is a data-base, compiled from ethnographies and historical accounts, of codes representing selected characteristics of 863 societies. In order to test his ideas, Goody and his research team created eight binary (“yes/no”) variables, which are set out in Tables 3 and 4 below, together with the correlations between them.

As Goody points out, the way the variables are defined depends both on his own theoretical aims and on the data that was actually available in the Ethnographic Atlas. The composition of each variable is explained in the text and in footnotes to the tables – including references to the codebook of the Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock 1967). So, before discussing the relationships between the variables, it will be worth reviewing some of the definitions. Three of them call for some explanation.

“Diverging devolution” – the first variable listed in Table 2 – is a term invented by Goody to describe inheritance systems in which both sons and daughters can inherit some of the property of their natal family. As explained on page 12 of Production and Reproduction (1976, henceforth PAR), these include

→ all societies in which daughters inherit a share of either land or movable property
→ all societies with dowry as the main or alternative method of marriage transaction.

Goody contrasts diverging devolution with systems – predominant in sub-Saharan Africa but found elsewhere as well – in which men inherit from men and women from women and so, strictly speaking, the conjugal family is not a property-holding unit.

“Sibling kin terms” are defined on page 124 of PAR in the footnote to Table 8. The variable refers to terminological systems in which siblings are distinguished from cousins of all types. As Goody explains on pages 19 and 20 of PAR he believes that terminologies of this kind are connected with property systems in which family property is inherited by a couple’s own children rather than by collateral relatives – and, as we will see, he sees this as the reason why kinship terminologies are correlated with the other variables in his system. However, this does not mean that the rest of us have to interpret the resulting correlations in this way. The alternatives to sibling kin term systems include systems in which siblings and parallel cousins are referred to by the same terms, and contrasted with cross-cousins who are referred to by different terms. As both Murdock (1949) and Lévi-Strauss (1969 [1949]) point out, systems of this latter kind are strongly associated

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5 The number of societies included in the Ethnographic Atlas has been steadily growing in the decades since Goody wrote (Gray 1999). This is the number included in the version that Goody used.
with exogamy. So we should bear in mind that correlations between sibling kin terms and other elements in Goody’s system might reflect differing attitudes to endogamy and exogamy, rather than commitments to different inheritance systems (or, of course, both factors might be relevant).

The third variable that needs to be discussed before we proceed is “in-marriage”. This variable is defined on page 127 of PAR, in the footnote to Table 13. Because of its importance for the argument of this paper, Table 7 in our Appendix sets out the definition in detail, including the relevant code-specifications from the code book of the Ethnographic Atlas. There are two essential points. The first is that the definition includes all three kinds of endogamy: by locality, by kinship, and by status. The second point is that the definition does not only refer to marriage patterns, but also to the way those patterns are understood. Thus marriage within the same local community is only treated as endogamous if the community is the smallest relevant spatial unit beyond the family itself. If the community is internally divided into exogamous spatial subsections, these take precedence and the system is treated as exogamous. Similarly, not all marriages with close kin are treated as endogamous. They are only treated as endogamous if they involve preferential marriage with the father’s brother’s daughter – i.e. marriage within the same patrilineal descent group. Finally, the measure of status endogamy is the existence of caste or ethnic endogamy with little possibility of personal movement between the categories involved. So for all three kinds of endogamy, it is not simply a case of marrying close or similar partners – but of marrying within a socially recognised group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>In-Marriage present</th>
<th>In-Marriage absent</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Div. devolution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>present</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Div. devolution</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>absent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>513</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Row percentages

|                      |                    |                    |       |
| Div. devolution      | 42%                | 58%                | 100%  |
| present              |                     |                    |       |
| Div. devolution      | 13%                | 87%                | 100%  |
| absent               |                     |                    |       |

Column percentages

|                      |                    |                    |       |
| Div. devolution      | 59%                | 23%                |       |
| present              |                     |                    |       |
| Div. devolution      | 41%                | 77%                |       |
| absent               |                     |                    |       |
| TOTAL                | 100%               | 100%               |       |

Table 2: “Diverging Devolution” and In-Marriage

The figures are taken from PAR page 127 Table 13. They exclude societies for which information was unavailable.
Having dealt with these definitional questions, we are now ready for an initial look at the data. Because of the central role that property transmission plays in Goody’s argument, we begin by looking at the relationship between *in-marriage* and *diverging devolution*. The figures in Table 2 confirm that there is a strong connection. Forty two percent of societies (N 67 out of 160) with diverging devolution are endogamous, compared with an endogamy rate of only 13 percent among societies (N 46 out of 353) in which women do not receive a share of family property. Nevertheless, it is clear that diverging devolution cannot provide a complete explanation for endogamy: 58 percent of societies (N 93 out of 160) with diverging devolution are not endogamous; and 41 percent of endogamous societies (N 46 out of 113) do not practice diverging devolution.

While this must raise some doubts about the central place that Goody assigns to inheritance strategies in his explanation of Eurasian endogamy, it does not completely undermine it. It could still be the case that, although other factors are relevant to endogamy, higher levels of female inheritance explain the *increase* in endogamy levels that is associated with the development of advanced agriculture. In order to find out whether this might have been so, we need to look at Goody’s overall model of the social changes accompanying advanced agriculture, along with the matrix of correlations on which it is based.

Goody presents his overall causal model in a diagram (Figure 4) on page 38 of *PAR*. Table 3 below sets out the same relationships in a different format.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal order</th>
<th>(1) →</th>
<th>(2) →</th>
<th>(3) →</th>
<th>(4) →</th>
<th>(5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of variable</td>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>Polity Division of labour</td>
<td>Transmission of property</td>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>Kinship terminology</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific variables</th>
<th>Complex polity</th>
<th>In-marriage</th>
<th>Advanced agriculture</th>
<th>Diverging devolution</th>
<th>Monogamy</th>
<th>Sibling kin terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male farming</td>
<td>Prohibited premarital sex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 3: Goody’s Overall Model*

There are two general points to note about the model in this table. The first is that causation runs from left to right: from *Economy* as the first cause, to *Kinship Terminology* as the final effect. The second point, which is more clearly apparent in Goody’s original diagram, is that causation proceeds one column at a time – so that any causal relationship between variables in non-adjacent columns is assumed to be due to their mutual relationship to the variable or variables in the column in between. The fact that *diverging devolution* is the only variable in column 3 expresses Goody’s belief that it provides the sole connection between the economic and political variables in the first two columns and the marriage and kinship variables in columns four and five.
Table 47: Variables Included in Goody’s Model and the Correlations between them (phi coefficients\(^{8}\))

This is the issue that we will be examining in the next few paragraphs. However, before focusing specifically on the connection between inheritance and endogamy, we need to consider the evidence for the validity of the model as a whole. This evidence is summarised by the correlations in Table 4. The table is set out symmetrically, so that the reader can trace each variable’s correlations with all the others either by looking along the row, or by looking down the column, for the variable concerned.

Perhaps the best place to start is with the highest correlations. There are three correlations of 0.4 or more: between deviating devolution and male farming; between male farming and advanced agriculture; and between advanced agriculture and complex polity. Taken together, they form a chain –

\[
\text{diverging devolution} \leftrightarrow \text{male farming} \leftrightarrow \text{advanced agriculture} \leftrightarrow \text{complex polity}
\]

– connecting the variables that Goody has placed in the first three columns of his causal model.

The way that Goody has entered the variables in Table 3 expresses his view of the likely causal sequence. But it is important to realise that this sequence is not the only one that would be consistent with this particular chain of correlations. The existence of correlations generally implies that there is some kind of causal connection between the variables concerned, but it does not tell us the direction of the causal relationship. So in this example it could be that the causal process starts with deviating devolution, runs through the two farming variables, with complex polity as the ultimate outcome. Or it could run the other way, with the formation of complex polities (aka states) as the first step, which could have promoted advanced agriculture, leading to predominantly male farming and an inheritance system based on deviating devolution. If so, the first step in the process would be consistent with Wittfogel’s (1957) theory of “hydraulic states”.

\(^{7}\) This table reproduces Table 22, on page 132 of Production and Reproduction (Goody 1976).

\(^{8}\) This is a type of correlation coefficient that is appropriate for binary variables.
A third possibility would be that the causal process started in the middle of the chain – with advanced agriculture or male farming – and then spread out in each direction. This is the approach that Goody himself adopted in Table 3 – taking advanced agriculture as the first step in the causal sequence. In this respect, his analysis would be consistent with a Marxist view in which the technical “forces of production” (advanced agriculture) are fundamental, giving rise to “relations of production” (the division of labour involving male farming, and property transmission involving divergent devolution) and a political “superstructure” (complex polity) which keeps the relations of production in place. In itself, the chain of correlations would be consistent with any of these causal processes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
<th>Circum-Mediterranean</th>
<th>East Eurasia</th>
<th>Pacific</th>
<th>North America</th>
<th>South America</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female farming</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male farming</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal participation</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No agriculture</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total N = 100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>232</strong></td>
<td><strong>86</strong></td>
<td><strong>92</strong></td>
<td><strong>121</strong></td>
<td><strong>214</strong></td>
<td><strong>85</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Sex Participation in Agriculture by Continent

However, before moving on, it is worth considering a fourth possibility: that male farming may have provided the crucial first step – and reflecting on the figures in Table 5. Although Goody always emphasises the contrast between Africa and Eurasia, these figures tell a different story. Here, the contrast is between Africa, the continent of female farming, and the Mediterranean zone which stands out as the zone of male agriculture. The rest of the world – including East Asia – comes somewhere in between. But agriculture began near the eastern shore of the Mediterranean, so might it be that advanced agriculture and male farming share a common origin in a socio-economic development that contrasted with what was happening south of the Sahara?

Whatever the causal sequence connecting these four core variables – which may well have differed in different parts of the world – it is now time to consider their connection with the other variables in the model. Table 4 contains five correlation coefficients with values between 0.3 and 0.4 – all of which link other variables to the one or other of the core variables that we have been considering up to now.

Three of these correlations involve the variable in-marriage – linking it to male farming, diverging devolution, and complex polity. The three correlations are of almost exactly the same strength (0.33, 0.32, and 0.30 respectively). The correlation with the fourth variable, advanced agriculture is only 0.22 – quite a bit weaker. This would be consistent with the way Goody has ordered the four core variables – placing advanced agriculture at the start of the causal chain, and

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9 Due to rounding, the percentages in some columns add to 101%.
10 From PAR page 131 Table 21, the continents are as defined by Goody.
therefore most distant from *in-marriage*. However, the pattern of correlations is not consistent with Goody’s contention that *male farming* and *complex polity* are only linked to *in-marriage* through the mediating effect of *diverging devolution* – since, if that were the case, the correlation between *in-marriage* and *diverging devolution* would have to be much stronger than the rest. This is the crucial point, because it confirms that there must be other processes that connect endogamy with the development of agriculture and state institutions – either as an effect or as a cause.

However, in the case of *monogamy* – the second marriage variable in Table 3 – the pattern of correlations (0.34 with *diverging devolution*, 0.26 with *male farming*, 0.20 with *advanced agriculture*, and 0.18 with *complex polity*) suggests that *diverging devolution* does play the mediating role envisaged in Goody’s model.

The third marriage variable – *prohibited premarital sex* – is only weakly connected to the other variables in Table 4. Its strongest correlations – between 0.19 and 0.23 – are with *male farming*, *diverging devolution*, and *complex polity*. But, although these are also the variables with which *in-marriage* is most strongly associated, there is virtually no association between *prohibited premarital sex* and *in-marriage* itself (a correlation coefficient of only 0.08).

This brings us to the final column in Table 3 and to the variable *sibling kin terms*, which Goody’s model treats as an after-effect of the marriage practice variables. This is a second way in which Goody’s model is clearly inconsistent with the data. The kin term variable has correlations of 0.23 or higher with all of the other variables except for *prohibited premarital sex*. In fact, the kin term variable’s strongest correlation (0.32) is with *advanced agriculture*, suggesting that changes in kinship cognition may have been involved from the very beginning in the social transformations that accompanied agricultural development.

These two departures from Goody’s model are confirmed by the results of a path analysis based on the same *Ethnographic Atlas* variables. The results of the analysis, which was carried out by J.C. Mitchell on Goody’s behalf, are set out in diagrammatic form on page 39 of *PAR*. They confirm that *in-marriage* has distinct connections with *male farming* and *complex polity*, not mediated through the connection with *divergent devolution*. The path coefficients for all three paths are very similar (0.20, 0.20, and 0.18 respectively) indicating that each of these connections is equally important in causal terms. The path analysis also shows that the variable *sibling kin terms* is causally connected with *in-marriage* and *monogamy* but confirms that its closest causal connection is with *advanced agriculture*.

However, the path analysis is reported at the very end of PAR’s discussion of *Ethnographic Atlas* data, and Goody’s main comment is “Once again this test was carried out by J.C. Mitchell, who comments ‘From this model you will see that a great deal of your paradigm survives quite well’.” [PAR page 37]

From this comment, and a further note at the back of the book (PAR page 137, third note on chapter 4), it appears that Goody was aware that his model did not completely fit the data – but also that he did not pick up on the particular issues that we have raised. We have the impression that he had taken the *Ethnographic Atlas* analysis as far as he felt able, and now wished to turn back to the detailed ethnographic and historical materials with which he was more familiar.

We too feel that it is time to turn to ethnography – and in the next part of this paper we will draw on our own field research to throw light on the workings of endogamy in contexts where *diverging devolution* is minimal or absent, and inheritance strategies are not the main concern.
How the Systems Work: equality and inequality in Hakkari and Carnia

As a first step, we present the data on endogamy itself. Tribal endogamy was 100% within Sisin. Among all 65 existing marriages in Sisin at the time of fieldwork, 22 of them were between no cognate/agnate to one another, but they were nevertheless members of the same tribe. All other marriages were between kin.11

The figures for Ovasta are presented in Table 6. Sixteen of the 44 existing marriages (36 percent) were locally endogamous. Nearly all the rest were patrilocal, with non-Ovastan women moving to Ovasta to join their husbands. However, the system had been changing. Of the nineteen marriages contracted before 1960, ten (53 percent) were locally endogamous. In the 1960s and 1970s, the endogamy rate had fallen to 29 percent (5 marriages out of 17). By the 1980s, local endogamy had come to an end, and the rule of patrilocality had also ceased to be observed. In the discussion that follows, we will focus on the system as it was when endogamy was frequent and patrilocality still prevailed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of marriage</th>
<th>Ovastan men married to Ovastan women</th>
<th>Ovastan men married to non-Ovastan women</th>
<th>Non-Ovastan men married to Ovastan women</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930s</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940s</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 on</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 6: Marriages of Ever-married Men Living in Ovasta in 1991*12

We would now like to describe how the two systems work – focussing particularly on their implications for equality and inequality. The discussion is structured primarily around the axes of a) seniority, b) gender, c) economy, and d) military. The first two axes involve linked principles of hierarchical classification which challenge equality, hence we shall look at these two axes together in order to investigate how these challenges were met. The other two axes involve institutional spheres in which individual men, and their families, compete for personal status, but in a way that accepts and reproduces an underlying principle of categorical equality.

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Seniority and Gender

We begin with seniority. In Hakkari, as in many Muslim and patrilineal societies, seniority meant higher status. Senior men were respected in the society, they were given better and first food, better places to sit, were addressed with respectful terms, and in general were treated differentially and had an advantage over younger men and certainly over women. There were, however, two aspects of this seniority: it was dependent on the life cycle, hence all men could expect to be respected with advancing age. The second aspect is that respect was also associated with the lineage and clan structure and historical significance, taking the form of lineage or clan honour, as has often been discussed in relation to clan ‘sharaf’ (Leach 1940; Barth 1953; Eickelman 1998; Meeker 1976; Peters 1967; King and Stone 2010). This kind of honour and respect was due to all men (and women) who belonged to a particular tribal category, hence it worked as a levelling mechanism among men (but not as much among men and women), among those who were of course members of this particular lineage/clan.

In the village of Sisin, in Hakkari, solidarity among men was framed within the conceptual model of patriliny. This model, other than entailing endogamy, was, following King and Stone’s (2010) argument, closely linked with the performance of masculinity (mêranî in Kurdish), see also Herzfeld (1985) on similar performances of mountain Cretan manhood, or Gilsenan (1996) on Lebanese rhetoric of manhood, and with strong notions of patrilineal continuity (xwîn in Kurdish, soy in Turkish). Patrilineal solidarity was expressed in terms like being all one man, especially when one wanted to highlight the need to prevent dissent within various levels of tribal segmentation. Such segmentation would be feared in cases of conflicts over marriage strategies, such as wife-kidnapping, which was a common strategy, of which the local interpretation would vary between elopement with consent or abduction without the consent of the woman. Especially in the latter case, if the wife-kidnappers were from segments of the tribe, which were structurally close to the lineage of the kidnapped woman, or if the kidnappers were from affinally related lineages and households or were neighbours (all cases where close group solidarity would be the essential basis for collective action), the mediators of the conflict would use the following formula most often: em mêrovê tekin, ‘we are all one man’.

Other than the levelling mechanism of clan honour, in principle reachable for all, the Kurdish kinship terminology as used within the tribal system had the function of levelling status differences between men, by referring to all patrilineal members of the lineage and clan as classificatory patrilineal cousins (pismam). This possibility of addressing even the personally unknown members of the tribal lineages created not only intimacy and closeness (Cuisenier 1975; Eickelman 1998) but also, we argue, structural equality, as has been well documented in segmentary societies (Evans-Pritchard 1970; Peters 1967; Tillion 1983 [1966]). Young men, nevertheless, had few possibilities of challenging the senior men who were in control of property and women. One had access to these ‘valuables’ as one went through the life cycle of growing up, going to the military, marrying, having children, and finally separating one’s own household either from the parental or the fraternal household. We shall return to the theme of military service and conscription and its significance for both societies below.

Before we discuss the case of seniority in Carnia, we also need to outline how the category of gender worked in both societies. Both societies were patriarchal, yet the way women were placed

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13 Leach (1940: 19–20) describing endogamy within the patrilineal clan (taifa) notes that “all [within the tribe] call one another ‘amoza’”, a term for FB’s children, the southern Kurdish equivalent of pismam.
in family, household, and larger units such as the village or the tribal unit showed differences. In Hakkari, women’s fertility, labour, marriage choices, and inheritance were far more strictly controlled by men than they were in Carnia. Women in Hakkari’s semi-nomadic tribal society were born into and grew up in large households, where female and male chores were strongly differentiated and although gender segregation as known in some Muslim societies was not very significant (cf. Tillion 1983 [1966]), patriarchal and discriminatory practices against women such as physical violence, honour killings, wife-kidnapping, and early/child marriage practices were not uncommon. Yet, women in these tribal contexts were also valued and significant as individuals and for making links between otherwise patrilineally and descent divided lineages. There were even cases where women became the name givers to lineages. More importantly, however, women could be kidnapped from other (senior) men and their households and hence younger men could challenge the seniors through this practice. Furthermore, they could also articulate their own decision and marriage choice against the opinions of the elders. Especially in cases where a woman was thought to be agreeing to the kidnapping man’s will (hence elopement, in anthropological jargon), the male relatives of the woman would acknowledge the challenge by taking up arms and chasing the kidnappers, but they would shoot in the air as in mock fighting between tribally close segments.

Women in Hakkari did not bring in into marriage any property as trousseaus, but as long as there was endogamy there was no bride-price paid either. More significantly, the lack of trousseau and bride-price was explained as maintaining equality within the tribal members (as expressed in the sentence, ‘we are all one’, en mērovê tekin) and as not giving daughters away to strangers. The principle of equality among tribesmen was amplified in the marriage practice of direct exchange of marriage partners, where two women moved between two different households as wives of two men in these households. We argue therefore that all these marriage practices combined with endogamy were central for linking men and lineages.

Much of this discussion carries over unchanged to Carnia. Here too, membership of the community was based on descent through males – with the same implication of strictly patrilocal marriage. Households were multi-generational and extended, with a clear gendered division of labour, and authority vested in the older generation – with the senior woman having authority over daughters and daughters-in-law, and the senior man having authority over his sons and the household as a whole.

In Carnia, as in Hakkari, there was a strong emphasis on the importance of local unity – and villagers all shared in the collective status brought by the visible prosperity and reputed solidarity of their village. As in Hakkari, the community was linked together by ties of both descent and marriage – and both kinds of tie have a role in the symbolism of village unity. However, a different emphasis is given to each kind of tie.

To start, let us look at descent. While in Hakkari the descent tie is treated as the primary source of unity, in Carnia it is not. Most people do not trace their descent back more than about four generations, and the inhabitants of any particular village do not see themselves, even ideally, as the patrilineal descendants of a single male ancestor. Instead, the village is seen as united by ritual kinship – ties of individual and collective godparenthood. This is still descent of a kind, but it does

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14 Altuntek (2006) argues, for example, that among the Kurds in Eastern Anatolia women were very important for linking patrilineages and the relations to MBs were institutionalised. For similar arguments on the role of affinal relations in patrilineal societies, see Khuri 1970.

15 Bride-price was a common practice in most of non-tribal, exogamous, and prestige marriages.
not embody the patrilineal principle that underlies collective identity in Hakkari (and family identity in both places).

If the emphasis on descent is weaker in Carnia, the stress on unity through marriage is stronger. Carnia shares with Hakkari the reluctance to give girls away to strangers, and also the sense that the exchange of brides can create ties of solidarity. But instead of a restricted exchange of brides taking place between two families, the Carnian system involves the generalised exchange of brides between all families of the village. This is linked to another difference: the choice of marriage partners was a matter for the young people of the village – not for their families. As we have seen, this possibility exists in the form of kidnapping/elopement in Hakkari: but while it is an alternative form in Hakkari, it was the norm in Carnia, where parentally arranged marriages were the rare exceptions.

To make this possible, both the practical and symbolic arrangements for socialising between young men and women were very different from those in Hakkari. Between their late teens and marriage, young people of both sexes formed a recognised social group within the village expected to spend time together free from the supervision of the older generation. Honour killings were unheard of, but young women did face public shaming for sexual immorality – in two contexts. The first was if a girl cheated on her regular boyfriend, in which case the shaming was done by the young men of the village. The second was if she became pregnant and could not persuade the child’s father to marry her. In such a case, which was actually quite unusual, the official who registered the birth might assign the child a family name – such as Fiori (“flowers”) – which associated the child with fields or plant life, underlining the point that its mother had not provided it with a proper status within a patrilineal family home.

The role of young men as controllers of courtship was expressed in an annual ritual in which young unmarried men entered every house in the village, and then – with the assistance of the young women – organised a dance for the village as a whole. After the house visit – but before the dance – the young men publically announced the names of courting couples, and the parents were obliged to allow their daughters to be escorted to the dance by the partner who had been announced by the young men.16

A final angle on the social meaning of marriage is provided by the accompanying payments. As in Hakkari, no bride-price was involved for marriages within the village community, but a bride-price was demanded for marriages to outsiders. However, the bride-price was paid, not to the girl’s family, but to the young men of the village (who spent it on a big party). Brides did not bring dowries in the form of housing or land into the marriage, but they did bring trousseaux – in the form of clothes, linen, work tools (e.g. a spinning wheel), and also the mattress for the marital bed (which had been jointly sewed by the bride and her women friends). The sense that this personal property would give her some status in her new home was conveyed by the way the trousseau was brought to the house of her future parents-in-law. It was carried by women friends (the bride herself was not there) who asked the future parents-in-law whether they accepted these goods –

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16 Wedding parties were much looked forward to in Sisin for exactly the same reason: young men and women would see one another in their best clothes, talk and dance together – mostly in a circular group dance known as halay in Turkish and da\textit{vete} in Kurdish. But exactly this social occasion of young men and women intermingling caused men (and women) of the parental generation anxiety over how to control the youth. Hence, at wedding parties the senior men were often nervous and apprehensive about challenges to their authority and honour, especially if the fire gun used for saluting the happy occasion might also be used to kidnap young girls as wives.
“and all that will follow after”! Implicitly, these goods would help to form the basis of a new conjugal family, which would not be entirely under the control of the senior generation.

**Economy**

It can be seen from the above illustrations that economy, our third axis, is closely linked with the marriage system in both cases. Both in Carnia and in Hakkari, the management of commons was corollary to solidarity as a village unit (Carnia) or as a tribal unit (Hakkari). In the latter case, tribal pastures were the central common property, for which ownership was customarily defined as tribal lands (and legally held by the state), but use rights were collectively managed and strongly protected. In fact, the collective protection of ‘traditional’ tribal pastures made the backbone of and the only reason for collective tribal action. In no other circumstances would the whole tribe come together.

Sisin had been a Nestorian village until about the beginning of the 20th century. After the Nestorians fled to Iraq during the wars at the end of the Ottoman Empire, the empty village was eventually settled by Kurds belonging to the tribe of Oramarî around late 1930s. The Oramarî live in numerous mountain villages along the border to Iraq, to the south of Yûksêkova in Hakkari. At the time of fieldwork in Sisin – between 1980 and 1982 – the economy was strongly relying on semi-nomadic sheep and goat herding, supplemented with intensive agriculture of terraced fields in the villages. The pastures and hay cutting areas were claimed and managed by the tribe. The usage rights were distributed along the sublineages and managed collectively by households belonging to these sublineages. The terraced fields and land for building houses, however, were bought from the government at the time of the settlement by Kurds and were individual property and inherited among male descendants. With population increase and limited availability of cultivable land, the need for cooperation between tribal villages was met partly by keeping the rule of endogamy within the tribe and exchanging wives between tribal villages.

Pasture ownership was based on tribal membership which followed patrilineal lines for rights of access and rights to inherit usage rights, according to the tribal customary law. Even if women were not equals and hence did not have use or inheritance rights to pastures in this patrilineal ideology, affinal ties through women often played a role in securing peace and/or access to pasture and camping grounds. Furthermore the availability of female labour was crucial for household economy, hence the number of women each household had, had to be carefully planned within the production system at all phases of the household’s developmental cycle. Keeping affinal ties lively and effective was an important strategy in cases of the encroachment of the state institutions into the pasture usage and allocation. It is not possible to say whether the affinal ties and their maintenance as a corrective mechanism to the patrilineal inheritance of pasture usage rights have emerged in response to the state encroachment of tribal autonomy. Tribes have commonly been in contact with the states possibly from the era of the emergence of states in Eurasia. They also incorporated at times settled and nomadic branches, or as nomadic tribes had economic relations with settled villagers.

The economy of mountain villages in Hakkari had limited use of money, which was acquired from the sale of butter and sheep wool, also of sheep when there were major expenses. Otherwise, subsistence economy dominated in the early 1980s. All agricultural produce was either used by the household and/or bartered with wheat and vegetables grown in plains villages. Goods and products which were not produced by households (consumption goods as well as household and construction
goods, gadgets, and simple machines) were bought by money, either from the local markets or smuggled across the Turkish Iraqi border. Despite all these economic relationships with townspeople and agriculturalist villagers, marrying into town or non-tribal agriculturalists or taking wives from them was very rare.17

Tribal Kurdish men in Sisin and in the tribal area of Oramarî strived to accumulate social and economic capital through strategical successful household management. This was done through managing the herd size, controlling male and female labour within the household, and controlling marriage strategies. Competition between men had to take place within the ideological framework of keeping solidarity within the tribe but increasing one’s fame and honour as an efficient and able manager of a pastoral household. The personal attributes like being a good story teller, physical qualities like being a strong and hardworking man, religious qualities like being pious, all added together in order to differentiate men from one another. But these were subtle differences of status. Like in Carnia, economic cooperation in cultivating and herding were more important reasons to stick together instead of distinguishing one’s self from others (cf. Leach 1940: 21).

At the time of fieldwork in Carnia – between 1989 and 1991 – the village commons, and the economic system of which it had been part, no longer had much practical significance. This was due to the effects of the boom years which followed the Second World War in Italy, as in other parts of Europe. These meant that the old economic strategy, centred on mountain agriculture, lost its attraction in comparison with the new opportunities that were available to villagers in other economic sectors, both locally and elsewhere in northern Italy. The tipping point in this process of economic change occurred in the early 1970s (Heady 1999: 5–10, 25–27). But the earlier system, and the role within it of common village property, had been living realities until that time – and so it was possible to reconstruct how the system had worked by speaking with middle-aged and older informants. The factual accuracy of these accounts could be checked with local official statistics and historical studies – and also with statistics on work and marriage patterns derived from systematic fieldwork interviews with people living in Ovasta. The emotional tone of these accounts, and also of local people’s evaluation of their current situations, revealed a good deal about the ways in which economic practicality interacted with social relationships of solidarity and competition.

The economic situation in Carnia before the 1970s was not unlike that in Hakkari, though several differences are worth noting. In Carnia, forestry was as much of an economic resource as cattle raising, and until the eighteenth century both the forests and the high pastures had been the collective property of individual villages. This changed in the wake of the Napoleonic wars, and the subsequent Austrian occupation, during which time much of the commons was taken over by the state or sold to large private landlords (Bianco 1985). Ovasta was one of a minority of local villages that had managed to regain control of their own collective woods and pastures – though other villages as well maintained some informal use rights in their former commons. Just as important as common lands was a tradition of collective enterprise. Almost every village had its own cooperative dairy for processing the milk into cheese and selling on some of the product to outside traders. Many also had commonly run stalls in which the village cattle were kept during the winter. Gathering firewood and maintaining paths to the high pastures were also managed as collective village tasks – as was keeping the roads free of snow during the winter.

17 This is a point also made in early research on Kurds, especially by Leach (1940) and Barth (1954).
Nevertheless, each family was also its own business unit, harvesting hay and vegetables from its own land, keeping its own animals, and also drawing a good deal of income from some family members’ participation in the monetary economy – whether as local forestry workers or sawmill operators, or as seasonal emigrants.

Each village family was trying to maintain a reasonable living standard (given the expectations of those days) but their economic efforts also had social meanings. The possession of rights in a home and of the land needed to support a family was crucial for male status – and for this reason houses were transmitted exclusively to sons (except in the case that the children were all daughters). This was felt to give the son the right to authority over his wife – complementing but outweighing the limited status she brought in with her trousseau. It was considered extremely humiliating for a man to move in with his wife’s family. To the extent that the law allowed, sons were also given preference in the inheritance of land. Indeed, until the end of the eighteenth century women had no right to inherit land at all. Economic achievement was also important for the family’s social position in the village as a whole. It was (and is) important to have a house that looked good, but also to keep one’s fields neat and tidy, and to keep up with the neighbours in starting and completing each season’s agricultural tasks.

But this competition, though intense, was not unlimited. People took turns working together on each other’s land – and it was also important to help out people in particular need without calculating an immediate return. Looking back, people saw this as a time of both competition and solidarity in which no-one – except for a few rich families (one or two in each village) – was much better than anyone else. This attitude affected the way that middle-aged and older people around 1990 viewed the behaviour of younger people who, because of the rapid decline of agriculture during the previous two decades, no longer helped out much in the fields. The older people thought their juniors considered themselves superior – “like rich people” – no longer willing to join in the egalitarian work relationships that had been central to their parents’ lives (cf. Bailey 1971 “competing to remain equal”).

Indeed, cooperation was central to the continuance of the village as a social and reproductive unit. Once the collective pressure to cooperate on commons diminished, people also stopped marrying within the same village – confirming that endogamy, cooperation, and the sense of equality were complementary aspects of a single social system.

Military

Our final axis concerns military life. In both Carnia and Hakkari, the practice of conscription had been incorporated into local folklore as both a masculine rite of passage and an affirmation of the on-going vigour of the community as a whole. In Carnia, many family homes displayed photos of their sons or fathers in the uniforms of the mountain infantry (Alpini) or mountain artillery: regiments whose traditions and uniforms celebrated their own mountain identity. Conscription was also incorporated into the symbolism of the annual ceremony in which the young men asserted their ritual control of courtship. They became eligible for membership of the young men’s group once they had reached the age of military service and attained the status of “coscrits” (conscripts). The crucial stage here was the “visita di leva” – the medical inspection at the local barracks prior to military service itself. It was a matter of pride that all the young men from the local community (in this context the multi-village ‘commune’) were passed fit. When this occurred, the young men
would daub local walls with the name of the year and the words “tutti abili” (all passed fit) in celebration of the event.

In Hakkari, military conscription meant serving in the Turkish army, which was seen as a rite de passage and was also a process of experiencing one’s own male and Kurdish identity outside the tribal area. Similar to Carnia, young conscripts (who were called to service as cohorts) left together after visiting all the village households and saying farewell and receiving money gifts, they also visited all the village households and were welcomed at arrival again with money gifts, resonating very much van Gennep’s description of separation and integration rites at rites of passage. Young men, therefore, were first separated from the village and tribal community of equals and were ritually re-integrated as adult men upon their arrival. Their military experience – like in Carnia – was later commemorated with their formal pictures in uniform hung on each household’s home.

It might seem, therefore, that the local community was dependent on the state in this crucial symbolic respect – and there is clearly some truth in this idea. However, there is another implication that is equally important: that the local community is itself a society of soldiers, capable, if necessary, of independent military action. This is plainly the case in Hakkari, whose rather lawless recent history has often involved local communities in military action (cf. Leach 1940: 55). In Hakkari, the prime military unit is the multi-village tribe which, unlike the village, is more strictly endogamous. Indeed, the need to maintain marriage links between different villages within the same tribal area may explain why individual villages are only partly endogamous.

Carnia has no social unit corresponding to the tribe – and the greater degree of state control than in south-east Anatolia has usually meant that there was less scope for purely local military action. Nevertheless, there is a sense of shared Carnian unity, and when – in the closing phase of the Second World War – the opportunity arose for local military action, the Carnians took it: declaring their independence from the German and Fascist authorities, and maintaining this independence for several months (Angeli and Candotti 1971).

Patrilocal Endogamy and the Bases of Eurasian Society

That concludes the ethnographic part of this paper. We do not claim any great originality for the data – which could with minor changes of detail have been collected from many upland communities in the Near East and on both shores of the Mediterranean. Of the two systems, Hakkari’s emphasis of patrilineal unity and the authority of senior males is more typical of the Near East and North Africa, while the emphasis on unity through marriage and the relative autonomy of youth is found in ethnographic descriptions of village communities in a chain of European mountain ranges extending from the Carpathians, through the Alps to the Pyrenees and Iberia (Albera and Isnart 2010; Heady 2003).

The point of this paper lies in the conclusions which we draw from these facts. As we signalled at the start, we think that they pose a fundamental challenge to Goody’s explanation of Eurasian endogamy: namely that it arose as a status-maintaining strategy in the stratified state societies of the bronze age.

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\[18\] As we noted earlier, tribal endogamy was 100 percent within Sisin. This is consistent with Leach’s and Barth’s findings on tribal endogamy among the Kurds in Iraq (Leach 1940, Barth 1953 and 1954). Todd (2011) cites numerous studies from the Near East and North Africa, which find similar levels of cousin marriage.
Patrilocal Endogamy and the Origins of Eurasian State Systems

Our first point is that the systems of patrilocal endogamy that we have described are not ‘bronze age’ in this sense – since their purpose is not the maintenance of class difference, but the construction of systems of local unity which bring together units – extended families and villages – of equal status.

We would like to go further than this, and suggest a stronger sense in which these social systems are ‘not bronze age’ – namely that, although the modern communities that embody them are inevitably entangled to some extent with state and class institutions, there is nothing in the principle of patrilocal endogamy which requires this. We, propose, then, that a) it could have existed earlier, b) it could have provided a socio-political framework for the development of advanced agriculture, and c) it could have existed in the plains. The combination – of endogamous marriage, joint ownership of common lands, economic cooperation, and a military system, which avoids serious violence within the endogamous field, while being fully prepared for military action at its periphery – would have been viable in its own terms, even without the presence of hierarchical state institutions.

Projecting this back before the rise of bronze-age states, we can hypothesise a western Eurasian system in which the common lands of each village were jointly owned and managed by an intermarrying set of patrilineal village families, who for the purposes of military action extended their sense of solidarity, and their marriage links, to neighbouring villages. This can be contrasted with a sub-Saharan system in which, according to Fortes (2006 [1969]), the social unit that owned the local commons was typically a single exogamous lineage – more or less permanently at war with the neighbouring lineages from which it took its wives. The endemic violence of this sub-Saharan system, which Goody also recognised (Hart 2011), does not provide a situation in which men can turn their main energies to intensive agriculture – and the need to keep some distance from hostile neighbours may also help to explain what Goody saw as the under-population of much of sub-Saharan Africa.

Though the hypothesised Eurasian system of commons management would certainly not guarantee peace, it would reduce the expectation of attack from immediate neighbours – permitting denser settlement and greater concentration on productive activities, resulting in the accumulation of surplus produce from which bronze-age states would eventually grow. If this argument is correct, the association between intensive agriculture and systems of local kinship endogamy was not a by-product of the rise of bronze-age states, but a precondition for their initial establishment and hence for the Eurasian miracle.

The Durability of Upland Social Forms

But what evidence do we have that things occurred in this order? We have no direct evidence, but two supporting arguments – which can be called the “argument of peripherality” and the “argument of resistance”.

In his recent work on the origin of Eurasian family systems, Todd (2011) bases much of his argument on the principle that social innovations tend to take place in core districts while older systems are often preserved on geographical peripheries. He treats mountain areas as peripheral in this sense – which would be consistent with our contention that contemporary conditions in Kurdistan and Carnia may provide a window onto earlier forms of social life. On the other hand, one might question the concept’s applicability to the particular mountains that we have in mind.
After all, if peripherality is taken to mean isolation, this can scarcely be applied to the Alps at the heart of Europe or to the mountains of Kurdistan at the crossroads between the leading Islamic centres of Turkey, Persia, and Mesopotamia.

This is where the argument of resistance comes in. Braudel (2012) made an important point about the circum-Mediterranean highlands. He called them lands of freedom: meaning that they were areas in which local communities could organise themselves with only limited interference from lowland state authorities. Horden and Purcell (2005: 80–83) similarly draw attention to the mountain regions of the circum-Mediterranean as zones of ‘wide internal coherence and close contact’, adding that this internal coherence does not mean isolation or lack of contact with the plains and other zones. This can be compared with the similar accounts by Leach (1979 [1954]) and Scott (2009) of the ways in which upland communities in south-east Asia have maintained contact with, but autonomy from, the state communities of the valley floors.

So our contention is this: We are not arguing that Carnia and Kurdistan have existed as geographic isolates – able to preserve earlier social forms because they were somehow living ‘out of time’. They have clearly interacted with, and been partially dominated by, imperial and state structures over a period of at least two millennia – and, as we have described, have even incorporated these relationships with outside powers into their rituals of manhood. What we are arguing is that outside domination has never been complete – and that their mountain environment has enabled them to conserve those elements of autonomous organisation that they themselves have found to be valuable. If these highland communities have chosen to preserve elements of neolithic social organisation, it is because they have found these forms of organisation to be highly effective – and it is because they have been able to defend them, that they can still give us a glimpse of how western Eurasian societies may generally have operated before their lowland neighbours succumbed to the domination of bronze-age states and their successors.

Patrilocal Endogamy and the Status of Women

Our analysis may also enable us to say something about the status of women in the three regions concerned: north Mediterranean, south and east Mediterranean, and sub-Saharan Africa. Common to all of them is the fact that women are valued not just as individual persons but as links between groups of men. However, the consequences for women themselves are very different in the three systems.

The difference turns on the ease with which young men and women can make contact with each other. In the kind of sub-Saharan system described by Fortes, contact would be difficult, since the rule of exogamy means that potential sexual partners live in distinct local communities – whose hostility keeps them apart, and can only be overcome by inter-community transfers of women and bridewealth organised by senior men. Senior men can thus use their control of women to transact their relationships to each other and to place younger wife-receivers in their own lineages in their debt. None of this requires violence directed at the women themselves, and indeed is compatible with a good deal of sexual freedom, provided that young women are willing to accept the official marriage partnerships which are made on their behalf.

The situation is very different in the Carnian and Hakkari-type systems. In these, marriageable young men and women belong to the same community and take active part in local economy – and
so it is much harder to keep them apart.\textsuperscript{19} As the data on wife-kidnapping in Hakkari shows, there is not much scope for using violence to scare off the young men, since that would breach the taboo on military conflict within the endogamous community. This leaves open two possibilities. One is to direct the violence at the young women themselves, as is done effectively in Hakkari and much of the southern and eastern Mediterranean. This maintains the control of marriage alliances by senior males, enabling them to use women as tokens to establish social ties – but at the cost not just of the oppression of women but of a good deal of tension between rival groups of men. The second possibility is the Carnian system, in which senior men surrender the control of courtship to young men – which, while still placing men in a superior position to women, avoids violence and generally favours consensual partner choice. It also maintains social unity, so long as the young people have a continuing interest in the economic resources of the local environment. However, when more attractive economic opportunities appear outside the agricultural sphere, the young people have little reason to maintain the system of local marriage ties, and the local social structure can rapidly dissolve – as it did in Carnia in the 1970s and 1980s.

\textbf{The Transformation and Decline of ‘Neolithic’ Eurasia}

If the differences between the ‘Hakkari’ and ‘Carnian’ systems arose from alternative responses to a common structural dilemma, one might expect to find evidence that both had developed from an original ‘neolithic’ system in which the principles of patriarchal authority and unity-through-marriage were more evenly balanced. So it is not surprising that Todd (2011) provides historical evidence that patrilineal family systems round the Mediterranean were once fairly similar, but then underwent contrasting changes which reinforced patrilineal ties in the Near East and North Africa, but placed greater emphasis on bilateral connections in southern Europe.

What is surprising, however, (at least from our ‘neolithic’ viewpoint) is when these changes appear to have occurred: namely in the last two or three millennia – distinctly post-bronze-age! Though we are sticking to our thesis that the common features of our two systems pre-date the rise of the state, the systems themselves are part of a story that must have involved extensive interactions with state and market systems. It is a story that seems likely to end with the weakening or even disappearance of the ‘neolithic’ principle of patrilocal endogamy.

Two distinct processes have led to the decline of this western Eurasian system of broadly egalitarian local solidarity. The first, going back millennia is the rise of the bronze-age state – and the gradual reinforcement of state power ever since. In the lowland regions, this would soon have led to the replacement of communities of independent farmer-herders sharing common lands by various forms of subordination to landlords and the state. In recent centuries, even the highlands have been increasingly incorporated into state structures, though local communities (such as those in Hakkari and to a lesser extent those in Carnia) were often successful in maintaining their owner-occupier status and control of their common lands.

The second process has undermined local solidarity from within. In recent decades, economic and educational changes have meant that Carnians can earn far more in modern sectors of the economy than from continuing their traditions of herding and mountain agriculture. In the case of Sisin, not economy or education have caused the end of herding and mountain agriculture but the

\textsuperscript{19} Tillion (1983 [1966]) argues that this is the purpose of veiling. Through imposing veiling on women, senior men are able to control the access of young men to marriageable women.
military and national armed conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurdish nationalist military organisation. The result has been an almost total abandonment of these traditional occupations, mirrored at the social level by the abandonment of village endogamy and a weakening of the tradition of patrilocality. These processes have not gone so far in Hakkari – but there too economic modernity (even if induced through war and displacement) is associated with a move away from traditional social patterns. These changes, though sad from some points of view, confirm our argument that locally endogamy was closely bound up with the self-organisation of cooperative agricultural and herding communities.

20 Ironically, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which is the most effective military organisation of the Kurds (including now several young men and women from Sisin) idealises and mystifies the solidarity and egalitarianism of mountain communities and continues to maintain a strict control of (female and male) sexuality.
Appendix: the derivation of Goody’s “In-Marriage” variable

As noted earlier in this paper, “In-Marriage” – the main variable used in PAR to measure endogamy – is constructed in a complex way. In a footnote to Table 13, page 127 of PAR, Goody lists the Ethnographic Atlas variables and codes which were used to construct it. The definitions of the codes are given in Murdock (1967).

The table in this appendix lists the variables (aka “columns”) and codes concerned, along with the definitions provided by Murdock.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of in-marriage</th>
<th>Ethnographic Atlas reference</th>
<th>Ethnographic Atlas definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Column 19, code D</td>
<td>“communities revealing a marked tendency toward local endogamy but not segmented into clan-barrios”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinship</td>
<td>Column 25, codes Q,D,F; Column 26, code A</td>
<td>Preference for marriage with father’s brother’s daughter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caste stratification</td>
<td>Column 69, Codes C, E</td>
<td>“C Complex caste stratification in which occupational differentiation emphasizes hereditary ascription and endogamy to the near exclusion of achievable class statuses”. “E Ethnic stratification, in which a superordinate caste withholds privileges from and refuses to intermarry with a subordinate caste (or castes) which it stigmatizes as ethnically alien”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Composition of Goody’s “In-Marriage” Variable
References


