

1 Conventionalisation and Discrimination as Competing Pressures on Continuous
2 Speech-like Signals

3 Hannah Little^{1,2} (hannah.little@mpi.nl), Kerem Eryılmaz² (kerem@ai.vub.ac.be)

4 & Bart de Boer² (bart@arti.vub.ac.be)

5 ¹Max Plank Institute for Psycholinguistics,

6 P.O. Box 310, 6500 AH Nijmegen, the Netherlands

7 ²Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, Vrije Universiteit Brussel,

8 Pleinlaan 2, 1050 Brussel, Belgium

9

Abstract

10 Arbitrary communication systems can emerge from iconic beginnings through processes
11 of conventionalisation via interaction. Here, we explore whether this process of
12 conventionalisation occurs with continuous, auditory signals. We conducted an artificial
13 signalling experiment. Participants either created signals for themselves, or for a partner
14 in a communication game. We found no evidence that the speech-like signals in our
15 experiment became less iconic or simpler through interaction. We hypothesise that the
16 reason for our results is that when it is difficult to be iconic initially because of the
17 constraints of the modality, then iconicity needs to emerge to enable grounding before
18 conventionalisation can occur. Further, pressures for discrimination, caused by the
19 expanding meaning space in our study, may cause more complexity to emerge, again as a
20 result of the restrictive signalling modality. Our findings have possible implications for
21 the processes of conventionalisation possible in signed and spoken languages, as the
22 spoken modality is more restrictive than the manual modality.

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24 Speech-like Signals

25 **Introduction**

26 Speech, on the whole, is arbitrary. That is, in modern language there is very little
27 similarity between spoken words and the meanings they refer to. However, having
28 signals which are similar to their referents in some way (iconicity) is one way in which
29 language could have initially bootstrapped itself as a communication system (Imai &
30 Kita, 2014). If a signal is similar to its referent in some way, it will be easier for
31 language users to establish a signal-meaning mapping. However, there is very little
32 direct evidence available from real world languages about how language initially
33 bootstrapped itself, especially spoken languages. As a result, experimental studies have
34 been used by researchers in the field of language evolution to investigate the effects of
35 interaction and transmission on levels of iconicity and symbolism in signals.
36 Specifically, studies have concentrated on how we could have got from iconic beginnings
37 to an arbitrary system via processes of conventionalisation.

38 One of the main methods for investigating the process of conventionalisation has
39 been the field of experimental semiotics (see Galantucci & Garrod, 2011, for a review).
40 This started as far back as Brennan and Clark (1996), where participants communicated
41 different concepts using tangrams. Tangrams are arrangements made up from 7 flat
42 shapes. They found that after repeated interactions, the tangram arrangements became
43 more simplified as participants started to use elements of the original tangram
44 arrangements as "short-hand". This simplification of originally iconic forms, leading to a
45 loss in iconicity, is the hallmark of conventionalisation as we use it throughout the rest of

46 this paper.

47 Since Brennan and Clark (1996), Garrod, Fay, Lee, Oberlander, and MacLeod
48 (2007) have explored how iconic signals evolve into symbolic representations using a
49 pictorial-style task in different conditions. Garrod et al. (2007) had 3 conditions. In
50 one condition, one participant repeatedly drew items for an imaginary audience (no
51 feedback). In another, one participant drew items but were given feedback from a partner.
52 In the final condition, two participants took it in turns to draw items for each other with
53 ongoing feedback. The study measured complexity in the images throughout the task, as
54 well as the levels of iconicity in the drawings. They measured iconicity with the rate at
55 which naïve participants could match the drawings with their intended referents after the
56 experiment. Garrod et al. (2007) showed that knowledge of early interactions in the
57 communication condition of the experiment improved naïve participant's ability to
58 match drawings with their referents, indicating that the images were becoming less
59 iconic. Getting naïve participants to match signs with referents is now a common method
60 used in experimental semiotics to measure iconicity. If naïve participants can pair signals
61 with their intended meanings, then those signals can be said to be iconic. Garrod et al.
62 (2007) also found that complexity in the images dropped throughout the communication
63 condition, as it did in Brennan and Clark (1996). However, in the individual condition,
64 with no communication partner, the drawings increased in complexity.

65 Other studies which used graphical signs to investigate conventionalisation include
66 Theisen, Oberlander, and Kirby (2010), which also used a pictorial style paradigm in a
67 communication task. They showed that over the course of the communication game,
68 drawings became less iconic. One of the contributing factors to minimise production

69 effort in this experiment was an incentive for participants to have as many successful
70 communicative interactions as possible within a constrained time period. A slightly
71 different approach was demonstrated by Caldwell and Smith (2012), which had
72 "replacement microsocieties", where they had a constant turnover of naïve participants
73 who contributed to signs becoming simpler and more abstract. One of the driving forces
74 for signs becoming simpler in this experiment was that participants could interrupt the
75 production of a signal once they were sure what it was, meaning signals never had to be
76 more complex than they needed to be. Concurrent feedback, such as interruption, was
77 also found to drive conventionalisation in conditions in Healey, Swoboda, Umata, and
78 King (2007) and Garrod et al. (2007).

79 There have also been several studies which have used gestural experiments to
80 investigate whether conventionalisation happens through interaction to get from iconic
81 pantomime-like gestures to more arbitrary language-like symbolic gestures.
82 Namboodiripad, Lenzen, Lepic, and Verhoef (2016) used a communication game in the
83 lab to get participants to repeatedly communicate scenes to one another and were able to
84 measure hallmarks of conventionalisation over the course of the experiment. Duration of
85 gestures and the size of the space used for the gestures was reduced, as was the amount
86 of complexity within a gesture. Motamedi, Schouwstra, Smith, and Kirby (2016) also
87 investigated conventionalisation in silent gesture, but focused on the effect of
88 transmission rather than interaction, looking at how signs changed in an iterated
89 transmission chain, where participants' signs were learnt from those output of a previous
90 participant pair. This study found that gestures developed from pantomimes to less
91 complex, more arbitrary signs.

92 Real world data can also contribute to our knowledge of conventionalisation
93 processes. There is diachronic evidence of some signs in American Sign Language
94 (ASL) losing complexity and iconicity (Schlehofer, 2016). Evidence from younger,
95 emerging sign languages, such as Al-Sayyid Bedouin Sign Language (ABSL) indicates
96 that the emergence of the first combinatorial phonology-like elements in the language
97 may be the result of a loss of iconicity in some signals as a result of conventionalisation
98 (Sandler, Aronoff, Meir, & Padden, 2011).

99 Combinatorial structure (structure where meaningless building blocks combine to
100 make meaningful units), has been hypothesised to have emerged in sign languages as an
101 alternative strategy to iconicity (Goldin-Meadow & McNeill, 1999). Spoken language
102 has high levels of combinatorial structure because the spoken modality is less able to
103 iconically represent meanings than the sign modality. In emerging sign languages,
104 Goldin-Meadow and McNeill (1999) propose that once an element of a signal ceases to
105 be interpreted as iconic, as a result of conventionalisation, then it opens itself up to be
106 reanalysed as a meaningless building block which can then be reused as combinatorial
107 units. Several studies since have used continuous signal-space paradigms, such as that
108 used in Roberts and Galantucci (2012), to look at whether iconicity hinders the
109 emergence of combinatorial structure in signals. Roberts, Lewandowski, and Galantucci
110 (2015) used a communication task where it was either easy or difficult to create iconic
111 signals for meanings. They found that when it was more difficult to be iconic, then
112 combinatorial structure was more likely to appear. Verhoef, Kirby, and Boer (2015)
113 carried out an experiment which investigated signals produced using slide whistles. They
114 used an iterated learning paradigm where signals from participants were fed to other

115 participants in a transmission chain. Signals and meanings were either kept matched to
116 one another in one condition (facilitating iconic mappings), or in the other condition,
117 meanings and signals were paired randomly between each generation in the experiment.
118 This study found that the emergence of structure was slowed down when the
119 signal-meaning pairs were kept stable, indicating that the iconicity in this condition was
120 inhibiting the emergence of combinatorial structure. However, neither of these
121 experiments looked explicitly at the process of conventionalisation across time, instead
122 opting to have different conditions which either facilitated or inhibited the use of more
123 iconic signals.

124 Another hypothesis for the emergence of combinatorial structure is that of Hockett
125 (1960). He was the first to hypothesise that combinatorial structure emerged as a way to
126 deal with pressures for discrimination caused by larger meaning spaces. This hypothesis
127 was also tested by Roberts and Galantucci (2012) who investigated whether signal
128 repertoires for bigger meaning spaces had more combinatorial structure, though their
129 results were inconclusive.

130 **Our Study**

131 In the current study, we compare signals produced in an individual condition
132 (where individuals both produce and recognise their own signals), with a communication
133 condition between two individuals. We then have naïve listeners match signals from both
134 conditions with referents from both the beginning and end of the experiment in order to
135 see how signals changed over the course of the experiment.

136 The signals used in our experiment are more analogous to speech signals than the
137 drawings in Garrod et al. (2007), or signals made from pre-discretised units, as in studies

138 such as Kirby, Cornish, and Smith (2008). Our signals are continuous, auditory and
139 make iconicity more difficult than it is with graphical representations. However, the
140 signals still remain non-linguistic enough to inhibit interference from pre-existing
141 linguistic knowledge.

142 In both conditions in our experiment, we have a growing meaning space, allowing
143 for investigation into the effect of discrimination pressures as the meaning space
144 expands, both on iconicity and structure in signals.

145 **Hypotheses**

146 One of the main hypotheses investigated in Garrod et al. (2007), was whether
147 complex iconic representations become more abstract symbolic representations through
148 a process of repetition, or whether interaction was also a necessary driving force in this
149 process of conventionalisation. We are interested in whether this process of
150 conventionalisation also happens in more speech-like signals.

151 If processes of conventionalisation happen in our continuous auditory signals in
152 the same way as they do with pictorial representations, following from Garrod et al.
153 (2007), we expect to see two things:

154 1. In the communication condition, signals will lose complexity throughout the
155 experiment. In contrast, in the individual condition, signals will gain complexity.

156 2. In the communication condition, signals will lose iconicity and in the individual
157 condition iconicity will be retained.

158 We are also interested in how knowledge of another person in the experiment will
159 influence what the signals look like. We hypothesise that the knowledge that a signal is
160 meant for someone else may drive signals to be more iconic, in order to aid

161 bootstrapping, before conventionalisation can happen. This difference (if present) will be
162 evident in the difference in iconicity between conditions at the beginning of the
163 experiment.

164 We are also interested in whether combinatorial-like structure emerges and
165 whether this will correlate with a loss in iconicity due to conventionalisation, as
166 hypothesised by Goldin-Meadow and McNeill (1999).

167 Further, we are interested in the hypothesis of Hockett (1960), that signals may
168 adopt combinatorial-like structure to deal with pressures for discrimination caused by
169 our growing meaning space. We might expect the signals to grow in complexity to assist
170 with the task of discrimination. This effect could be negated by the process of
171 conventionalisation, or occur in spite of it, or possibly in tandem with it.

172 **Experiment**

173 **Signals**

174 Participants created signals using a "Leap Motion" hand-tracking device: an
175 infrared sensor designed to detect hand position and motion (Eryılmaz & Little, 2016).
176 Participant's hand position was translated to the pitch of audio signals. Moving their
177 hand to the left would make the signal lower, moving their hand right would make the
178 signal higher. It was not possible to make pauses in a signal. Signals had no time limit.
179 All participants were given a demonstration of how the sensor worked before they started
180 the experiment, as well as time to use it themselves, to get used to the mapping between
181 hand-position and auditory feedback. The mapping between hand position and auditory
182 feedback was not linear. The auditory tone generated was an exponential function of the

183 x-coordinate of the hand position in the space above the sensor. The function was
184 exponential because of the non-linear way humans perceive pitch. The x-coordinates
185 ranged from -250-250 (with 0 being the centre point of the signal space). These
186 coordinates were transformed to pitch using the following formula:

$$frequency = 110 \times 3^{\frac{(x+200)}{200}}$$

187 **Meanings**

188 The meaning space was constructed to have no internal structure. The meanings all
189 had three features: shape, colour and texture. No two meanings had any features in
190 common. For example, in figure 1, only the left shape had the features blue, circle and
191 stripey, and only the cross had the features grey, cross and wavy lines. There were 15
192 meanings in the experiment (see figure 2).

193 **Conditions**

194 Participants were assigned to one of two conditions; an individual condition or a
195 communication condition. In the individual condition, participants both produced and
196 recognised their own signals. In the communication condition, participants took it in turn
197 to produce and recognise the signals of a partner. It is important that we had signal
198 creation and recognition within both conditions, allowing for; i) comparable measures of
199 recognition accuracy from within the experiment, and ii) a pressure for expressivity in
200 both conditions allowing for isolation of effects caused by the communication of two
201 people, rather than the process of communication itself (as individuals are effectively
202 communicating with themselves in the individual condition).

203 **Individual Condition**

204 **Participants.** 24 participants (17 female, 7 male, average age 21 ± 1.3) took part
205 in the individual condition and were paid €5 for the 30 minutes it took to complete the
206 experiment. Participants were recruited at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel.

207 **Procedure.** Participants were given clear instructions about the structure of the
208 experiment. They were explicitly told how many phases there were, and how the phases
209 were structured. They were also told how to use the leap motion by simply moving their
210 hand either left or right to manipulate the pitch of the signal. They got to try this out
211 before the experiment began. Participants knew from the beginning that they would have
212 to recognise their own signals in each round.

213 **Phases.** Participants created signals in three phases (see figure 2). In the first
214 phase, they created signals for 5 meanings, chosen at random from the pool of 15. In
215 phase 2, they created signals for all of the meanings they had already seen, plus 5 more,
216 making 10 in total. In phase 3 they created signals for all 15 meanings.

217 **Signal Creation Task.** Before the signal creation task, participants were told
218 that they would see images which they need to create signals for. They were explicitly
219 told they should make sure they remember the signals as they would be asked to
220 recognise the signals during the experiment. This introduction screen also displayed the
221 whole meaning space for that phase, so participants knew which meanings were in a
222 phase before they began creating signals.

223 Meanings were presented one after another in a random order and participants
224 created a signal for each one by pressing a "record" button to start, and a "stop" button to
225 finish. Participants could play signals back and rerecord them if they were not happy.

226 **Signal Recognition Task.** Once participants had created signals for all meanings
227 within a phase, they were given a signal recognition task. They heard each of their
228 signals in a random order, one after the other, and were asked to identify the meaning it
229 referred to from an array of 4 choices. The array included the correct meaning, and 3
230 other meanings taken randomly from the subset of meanings used within the current
231 phase. Participants were given feedback on the correct answer immediately after each
232 response.

233 **Practice and Experimental Round.** Participants completed the signal creation
234 task and the signal recognition task twice for each phase. The first time was framed as a
235 “practice round”, and existed so that the participant could get used to the structure of the
236 experiment and how to use the apparatus. Only data from the experimental round was
237 used in the analysis of the experiment.

238 **Post-experimental questionnaire.** After the experiment, participants completed
239 a post-experimental questionnaire. It asked about the specific strategies participants used
240 to generate signals, and whether they felt their strategies changed at all throughout the
241 course of the experiment.

242 **Communication Condition**

243 **Participants.** 32 participants (27 female, 5 male, average age 20.9 ± 2.8) took
244 part in 16 pairs in the communication condition. In this condition participants were paid
245 €10 for 1 hour. Participants were recruited at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel.

246 **Procedure**

247 Again, participants were given clear instructions about the structure of the
248 experiment, but were not given a detailed explanation about the mathematics of when
249 and how the meaning space expanded (see below). A detailed explanation would not
250 have served their success in the experiment, but may have confused or distracted them
251 from the simple goal of communication. They were told they would be playing a
252 communication game. Again, they were told how to use the sensor and given an
253 opportunity to practice making signals before the experiment began. They were told how
254 a turn worked. They were told that they would be given feedback about their success
255 after each turn, and that they would take it in turns to produce signals. They were told
256 that if they had not finished the experiment after 50 minutes, then the experiment would
257 automatically end.

258 Participants also knew that the experiment would progress more quickly the more
259 successful they were (the specifics of this mechanism are explained below). Participants
260 were also given an incentive to try to finish the experiment quickly. They were told that
261 the pair of participants who do the experiment the fastest would win a €20 voucher.

262 2 participants took it in turns to produce and receive signals with the producer
263 creating a signal for a meaning and the receiver choosing from an array of up to four
264 meanings, as in the individual condition. Both participants were given feedback after
265 every interaction about whether their communication was successful, as well as feedback
266 about both the meaning the producer was communicating, and the meaning the receiver
267 chose.

268 As in the individual condition, the communication condition also had an

269 expanding meaning space by phase. However, the meaning space only expanded by 2
270 meanings at a time (rather than 5 in the individual condition) and the experiment only
271 continued to the next phase once the participants had agreed on signals for existing
272 meanings. Ideally, the meaning space should have expanded at the same rate as the
273 individual condition. However, participants found the communication game much more
274 difficult than we had anticipated when giving the participants the meanings in batches of
275 5. As a result, we designed a system where the meaning space expanded in line with
276 their success in the experiment, in order to not overwhelm the participants with too many
277 meanings at once. This setup ensured that meanings were seen potentially more (or less)
278 than in the individual condition depending on how many times a meaning got randomly
279 chosen. However, overall frequencies were comparable and meanings introduced earlier
280 were seen more times than later ones, as in the individual condition. Bigger differences
281 occurred if participants were particularly bad at the communication task, then they were
282 given the same meanings many more times than in the individual condition.

283 Participants started with 2 meanings, chosen at random. The array in the
284 recognition task was constrained to these 2 possible meanings at the beginning of the
285 experiment. Once meanings had been communicated correctly twice in a row, they were
286 considered “established” meanings. If an established meaning was communicated
287 incorrectly, it would lose its established status. Once all meanings in a phase were
288 established, then the meaning space expanded by 2 more meanings, starting a new phase.
289 Since there were 15 meanings, the meaning space expanded only 7 times (the last time
290 by only one meaning), making 8 phases in total.

291 At first, which meaning the pair were to communicate in each interaction was

292 presented at random. However, once the meaning space expanded once, meanings were
293 chosen for interactions with a probability determined by whether it was an established
294 meaning or not. Meanings were chosen with a 45% probability if they were established,
295 and the remaining 55% of the time the meanings were either newly introduced meanings,
296 or meanings which had recently been communicated unsuccessfully. This mechanism
297 was in place because if all meanings had the same probability of appearing throughout
298 the experiment, the experiment would take far too long. Unestablished meanings needed
299 to have a reasonable frequency in order to become established so that the experiment
300 could progress.

301 Once all meanings were established, the experiment finished automatically. If
302 participants did not achieve established signals for all 15 meanings before 50 minutes,
303 they were stopped and their interactions and signals were recorded up until that point.

304 The signal data used in the analysis of this experiment was taken from signals once
305 they had become established, in order to make them more comparable with the signals
306 created in the experimental rounds in the individual condition.

307 Participants completed a post-experimental questionnaire, as in the individual
308 condition.

309 **Analysis of Signals**

310 Signals for analysis from the individual experiment were either taken from the first
311 phase (the first 5 signals produced) or the third phase (the last instance of all 15 signals),
312 so we could measure how iconicity was affected by repetition of signals throughout the
313 experiment.

314 Signals from the communication experiment were either from the first phase (for

315 the first 2 meanings after they had been communicated correctly twice in a row) or they
316 were the last successful instance of signals produced in the last phase of the experiment
317 that a pair saw, which was dependent on how well they did in the experiment. Some
318 pairs got to later phases than others as they were more successful at producing
319 established meanings. This data is presented below.

320 **Signal Measures.** Garrod et al. (2007) measured **complexity** by calculating the
321 amount of ink which was used in an image. In our study, we've made some effort to
322 create a comparable complexity measure: the amount of "auditory ink" used in signals.
323 This has been calculated by the duration of signals and the amount of movement in
324 signals. This does mean that signals using similar movements but using more or the
325 meaning space will be judged as more "complex". However, the amount of the signal
326 space used has also been used to measure signs of conventionalisation in silent gesture
327 studies such as Namboodiripad et al. (2016). The amount of movement in a signal was
328 calculated by measuring how much of the signal space had been used in the signals of
329 one participant. We measured this using the standard deviation of the trajectory of x-axis
330 coordinates in each signal. The articulation space which could be utilised was 500
331 coordinates across. Each signal's data was made up of a list of coordinates which could
332 be used to regenerate that signal. Using this information we could calculate the mean
333 coordinate of a signal (mapping on to a signal's mean pitch) and also the amount the
334 signal deviated from the mean. If a participant uses more of the signal space, their
335 signals' coordinate standard deviations will be bigger. The duration of signals was
336 simply measured using the number of data frames in a signal, which we converted to
337 seconds for the purposes of presenting the results.

338 Further to the above, we also measured the predictability (or entropy) of signals
339 based on the rest of a signal repertoire. This measure is similar to compressibility
340 measures (e.g. Ehret & Szmrecsanyi, 2011) in that it is affected by repeated patterns in
341 signal repertoires or static states, as these will make signals more predictable.

342 We measured the **predictability** within signals using the conditional probabilities
343 of points within the signal trajectories. The points of a trajectory were quantised signal
344 coordinates derived using a k-means algorithm ($k = 150$). Such a high value for k
345 ensured that we represented our very fine-grained data effectively. The k-means
346 algorithm clustered points in the trajectories into a time series of integer values
347 representing a participant's entire repertoire of signals. With this, we estimated the
348 marginal probability distribution of the points on each quantised trajectory and used
349 these to calculate the conditional probabilities of individual points, and finally, the joint
350 probability of whole signal trajectories by taking the negative logarithm of the product of
351 first order conditional probabilities of the points on the trajectory.

352 This predictability measure allows us to measure structure at the level of a
353 repertoire. In real language, combinatorial structure is not measurable at the level of one
354 word. For example, if you only have the word "cat" you cannot know if any of its units
355 exist in any other context, so you do not know if they are combinatorial. Measures of
356 entropy or compression which measure each signal individually cannot tell us anything
357 about the combinatorial structure of a signal repertoire, though can be informative about
358 general complexity.

359 In order to measure **iconicity**, we did an online playback experiment with the
360 signal data produced in both conditions. We asked naïve listeners to match the signals

361 with the meaning they felt the signal most represented. 391 naïve listeners were recruited
362 on social media. Each participant was asked to listen to 15 mp3 signals each and asked to
363 choose from an array of 4 possible meanings for each signal. Some participants matched
364 fewer than 15 because of experimenter error. Their data was still used in the analysis.

365 **Results**

366 The results will be presented in two parts: those results pertaining to the signals,
367 followed by the results pertaining to the signal recognition tasks, both within the
368 experiment, and after the experiment by naïve listeners.

369 **Signals**

370 **Movement in signals.** To investigate what affected the amount of movement in
371 signals, we conducted a linear mixed effects analysis, with standard deviation as the
372 dependent variable and how early in the experiment a signal was produced (phase
373 number) and condition as fixed effects. We had participant number and meaning as
374 random effects, as well as by-participant and by-item random slopes for the effect of
375 both time produced and condition which were correlated with the intercepts. We then
376 conducted likelihood ratio tests of our model against a null model without the effect in
377 question (but with the same random slopes) in order to obtain p-values. We found that
378 condition affected the amount of movement in a signal ($\chi^2(1) = 6.9, p = 0.009$), with
379 signals from the individual condition having standard deviations which were lower (by
380 on average 21.7mm), indicating less movement in the signals (see figure 3). However,
381 how early in the experiment participants produced the signals did not significantly affect
382 movement in the signals ($\chi^2(1) = 0.13, p = 0.25$). We also tested to see if there was an

383 interaction between condition and time produced by comparing models with and without
384 the interaction ($\chi^2(1) = 1.769, p = 0.18$).

385 **Length of signals.** We conducted a similar linear mixed effects analysis as with
386 the standard deviation values above, to investigate the length of signals with the same
387 random and fixed effects and random slopes. Signals produced in the communication
388 condition were longer than in the individual condition, though this effect was not
389 significant ($\chi^2(1) = 0.4, p = 0.52$). However, the time produced (phase number) did
390 have a significant effect on the duration of signals ($\chi^2(1) = 4.4, p = 0.03$). As can be
391 seen in figure 4, the duration went up throughout the experiment in both conditions,
392 though this was more marked in the individual condition.

393 **Predictability of signals.** We conducted a similar linear mixed effects analysis
394 as above looking at predictability with the same random and fixed effects and random
395 slopes. Condition did not have an effect on the amount of predictability within signals
396 ($\chi^2(1) = 0.02, p = 0.88$). There was an overall significant trend of production time
397 ($\chi^2(1) = 5.53, p < 0.02$) though figure 5 indicates this may be primarily driven by the
398 individual condition. However, there was no interaction between condition and
399 production time ($\chi^2(1) = 1.44, p = 0.23$).

400 **Signal Recognition**

401 **Recognition of signals within the experiment**

402 We conducted a linear mixed effects analysis to look at participant success
403 throughout the experiments, with time produced and which experiment signals were
404 produced in as fixed effects. We had meaning and participant (or pair) number as a
405 random effect, as well as by-meaning random slopes for the effect of time produced. As

406 above, we then conducted likelihood ratio tests of our model against a null models to
407 obtain p-values. Which experiment signals were created in had a significant effect on
408 participant success within the experiment ($\chi^2(1) = 7.8, p = 0.005$), with participants
409 being better in the individual experiment (85.6% correct) than in the communication
410 experiment (74.4% correct). There was no significant effect of time produced on success
411 during the experiment ($\chi^2(1) = 0.35, p = 0.55$). However, there was a significant
412 interaction between experiment and time produced ($\chi^2(1) = 5, p = 0.02$). As can be
413 seen in figure 6, in the individual experiment, participants got slightly better throughout
414 the experiment. In the communication experiment, participants got worse.

415 Another measure of success within the communication condition was how far
416 participants got before their time ran out. As explained in the methods, whether
417 participants got to the next phase was dictated by whether they had managed to establish
418 signals for all of the meanings which were currently in the meaning space. As one would
419 expect, some pairs were much better at the task than others, with some pairs only
420 reaching the second phase of the experiment (4 meanings), and others doing much better
421 (success of all pairs can be seen in figure 7). No pair managed to establish signals for all
422 15 meanings, thus, nobody finished the experiment. As a result of this, the signals used
423 in the playback experiment were taken from signals at the end of the experiment no
424 matter where they got to in the communication condition, rather than using signals from
425 specific phases.

426 **Recognition of signals by naïve listeners**

427 We conducted a linear mixed effects analysis, with time produced (early or late)
428 and condition as fixed effects. We had meaning as a random effect, as well as

429 by-meaning random slopes for the effect of time of production and condition. Again, we
430 conducted likelihood ratio tests of our model against a null model. Condition did not
431 affect the amount of iconicity in the signals ($\chi^2(1) = 0.1, p = 0.74$), with overall levels
432 of matching nearly exactly the same (around 35% in both conditions). How early in the
433 experiment participants produced the signals also did not significantly affect iconicity
434 ($\chi^2(1) = 2.3, p = 0.13$). However, there was a significant interaction between condition
435 and time produced ($\chi^2(1) = 5.9, p = 0.015$). As can be seen in figure 8, naïve listeners
436 were much better at matching signals with their intended referents which were produced
437 later in the experiment in the communication condition. However, in the individual
438 condition, the signals went down in their iconicity, though this difference was much less
439 marked than in the communication condition.

440 We were also able to measure the iconicity of signals for specific meanings. Figure
441 9 shows the iconicity of each signal as measured using naïve listeners. Some meanings
442 lend themselves to iconicity better than others. The upwards pointing arrow is particular
443 strong in its iconicity, almost certainly because having a signal with rising pitch is an
444 easy way to represent this in the paradigm. Signals for pointy images were also easy to
445 recognise, though some participants in the communication condition did report having
446 trouble differentiating the signals of their partners' for these meanings.

447 **Post-experimental questionnaire.** The questionnaire revealed that nearly all
448 participants attempted to use iconic strategies throughout the experiment in both
449 conditions. They were more likely to try and use shape than any other feature to identify
450 signals.

451

Discussion and Further Work

452 In our experiment, we measured complexity in signals to give us some sense of
453 whether signals were becoming more simplified throughout the experiment, from more
454 complex iconic representations to a more abstract symbolic representation as we
455 hypothesised according to the results of Garrod et al. (2007).

456 We have used several measures to quantify complexity in our signals (movement,
457 duration and predictability). Using these measures, we found that signals were less
458 complex in the individual condition than in the communication condition. This is in
459 contrast to findings from Garrod et al. (2007), who found that pictures produced in their
460 individual condition stayed complex throughout the experiment, and pictures produced
461 in the communication condition reduced in complexity throughout, resulting in the
462 images in the communication condition overall to be much less complex, the opposite of
463 our finding. In our experiment, we found no effect of signals becoming less complex
464 over time in the communication condition, an effect that is likely to be due to the
465 differences between our signalling paradigm and that of Garrod et al. (2007).

466 Signals in our paradigm are much more constrained in the forms they can take,
467 which may mean they need to grow in complexity simply in order to differentiate
468 between different meanings in the experiment as the meaning space expands. Under the
469 hypothesis of Hockett (1960), that a growing meaning space will elicit combinatorial
470 structure because of crowding in the signal space, we might not expect the signals to
471 become simpler in either the individual or communication conditions as further
472 complexity is beneficial for the task of discrimination. The reason the drawings in the
473 communication condition in Garrod et al. (2007) dropped in their complexity was

474 possibly because their communication modality (drawing) was so much more flexible
475 than our paradigm, allowing for more complexity as a starting point. With the
476 signal-space being so much more restricted with the Leap Motion signals, participants
477 started simple, and ran out of ways to generate distinctions between signals quite
478 quickly. This may have implications for the processes of conventionalisation (or the
479 emergence of combinatorial structure) between languages in the real world, as the signed
480 modality is arguably much more flexible than the spoken modality. Indeed, in emerging
481 sign languages, such as ABSL, we can observe a delay in the emergence of
482 combinatorial structure (Sandler et al., 2011), which is possibly because the flexibility of
483 the modality does not immediately produce the pressure described by Hockett (1960).
484 This pressure for discrimination (or expressivity) is also often cited as important factor in
485 the emergence of structure in artificial language experiments which use pre-discretised
486 building blocks to form signals (e.g. in Carr, Smith, Cornish, & Kirby, 2016; Kirby et
487 al., 2008; Kirby, Tamariz, Cornish, & Smith, 2015)).

488 Further, in our experiment we found that signals became more complex later in the
489 experiment in the individual condition, which is in line with the findings from Garrod et
490 al. (2007). However, Garrod et al. (2007) hypothesise that their result is because, in the
491 absence of feedback, participants encode more features in their signals later in the
492 experiment as they think of more things they can include about the meanings they are
493 communicating. The opportunity for this to happen in the current experiment was
494 relatively limited, as the meaning space was not so complex. Further, in
495 post-experimental questionnaires participants usually only describe trying to encode one
496 feature of the meanings (mostly shape). As a result, the pressure for discrimination from

497 the expanding meaning space, as described above, is a much more likely candidate for
498 the growth in complexity seen in the individual condition.

499 Further to the complexity measures, we also measured the level of iconicity. In
500 previous literature iconicity is generally lost along with complexity as signals
501 conventionalise (Garrod et al., 2007). However, complexity (especially as we are
502 measuring it in this paper) can also arise as the result of combinatorial structure, which
503 has been in inverse relationship with iconicity in some experimental studies (Roberts &
504 Galantucci, 2012; Roberts et al., 2015; Verhoef et al., 2015). We test whether complexity
505 we see growing in our signals throughout the experiment is the result of a reduction in
506 iconicity, hinting at perhaps something like combinatorial structure emerging as a result
507 of the expanding meaning space. However, if iconicity increases it may be because of
508 communication driving signals to be more iconic which is aided by complexity in the
509 signals.

510 We measured iconicity in the same way as Roberts and Galantucci (2012) and
511 Garrod et al. (2007), by getting naïve listeners to match signals with their intended
512 meanings. We found that at the beginning of the experiment, signals in both conditions
513 started with the similar levels of iconicity, though the individual condition was slightly
514 higher. This goes against our hypothesis that the knowledge of another participant would
515 drive signals to be initially more iconic in the communication condition. However, what
516 we found was that signals became more iconic as the communication task progressed.
517 Importantly, this is the opposite of the result of Garrod et al. (2007), where naïve
518 listeners who only saw drawings from the end of the experiment were worse at matching
519 them to their correct referents than naïve listeners seeing the earlier drawings. Again, we

520 can account for this result because of the fundamental differences between our paradigm
521 and the drawings used by Garrod et al. (2007). It is much easier to be iconic with the
522 more flexible drawing paradigm, especially for visual stimuli, allowing for more
523 iconicity at the beginning, which can then be “lost”. However, this does not account for
524 the backwards trend we find in our communication condition. It is possible that this
525 result is because of participants becoming more accustomed to the communication game
526 and good strategies to use. Having another participant present with whom you are
527 communicating may be driving the signals to be more iconic. Perhaps, the
528 communication process causes signals to adapt to be more mutually intelligible. While
529 signals produced by an individual for themselves may have a certain level of iconicity (at
530 the levels found in the individual experiment), it is not necessarily true that this iconicity
531 is transparent for naïve listeners. What makes a signal fit for communication may be
532 iconicity that is less idiosyncratic. It may be that signals need to reach this level of
533 transparent iconicity before they can be emancipated from their meanings in order to
534 partake in the process of conventionalisation.

535 In Perlman, Dale, and Lupyan (2015), non-linguistic vocalisations also became
536 more iconic over the course of a communication game possibly for similar reasons. Both
537 vocalisations, and the signals produced using the leap motion, present a difficulty for
538 producing transparently iconic signals. This difficulty is not so present when using
539 gesture or drawing as modalities that negate the need for an initial stage of negotiation.
540 This explanation makes sense in the light of the signals not gaining iconicity in the
541 individual experiment (see figure 8) because signals can remain idiosyncratic to one
542 person in that condition. Iconicity generally requires more complexity which would

543 explain why signals become more complex.

544 We also found that participants were much more able to recognise signals within
545 the experiment in the individual condition than in the communication condition. In the
546 individual condition, no negotiation is needed to establish signals, which inevitably leads
547 to higher scores. We also found that in the individual condition, participants got slightly
548 better throughout the experiment, despite the meaning space growing. This could be
549 because participants are simply becoming more used to the apparatus and task
550 throughout the experiment. In the communication condition, participants got worse,
551 probably because the meaning space was growing, making the task more difficult,
552 though as it only expanded by 2 meanings at a time, the effect of having new meanings
553 to negotiate should not have affected the success rate throughout the experiment.
554 However, new meanings competing iconically with old meanings could have affected
555 success for both, and participants did self-report finding some meanings difficult to
556 differentiate (e.g. the spiky brown shape and the white star). Previous artificial language
557 experiments have demonstrated context effects on structure that comes out in these
558 experiments (Winters, Kirby, & Smith, 2015). That is, signals only encode information
559 that is relevant to successful communication which may be different features depending
560 on what other meanings are present. For example, if randomly selected meanings in the
561 recognition task all had shared features this may produce different behaviour and cause
562 specific features to be encoded in signals which wouldn't happen if all meanings had
563 different features. As the meaning space in the experiments presented here are designed
564 to be unstructured and not have any shared features, the effects of context are likely to be
565 much less severe than experiments with structured meaning spaces.

566 We did not have a condition in our experiment for concurrent feedback, where
567 participants could interrupt one another to initiate repairs, because feedback only came
568 after signals had been completed, transmitted and recognised. Previously, Healey et al.
569 (2007) found that concurrent feedback in a task can be the driving force which makes
570 representations more abstract and less iconic. Garrod et al. (2007) also ran a condition
571 with concurrent feedback, and found that the loss of complexity proceeds faster with
572 ongoing interaction throughout the production of drawings. Participants interrupting
573 each other was also one of the driving forces for conventionalisation in Caldwell and
574 Smith (2012). A paradigm using concurrent feedback may be a worthwhile experiment
575 to conduct using our paradigm. However, as signals are already so short (around 3
576 seconds), it may not provide much opportunity for interruption, and may in fact drive
577 signals to be longer and more complex so that hearers can be more sure of their guess
578 before interrupting.

579 **Conclusion**

580 We have shown that conventionalisation, as a process for arbitrary forms to
581 emerge, may not work in the same way or as quickly with different modalities. We found
582 no evidence that signals in our experiment became more conventionalised (simpler and
583 less iconic) through interaction or repetition. We hypothesise that when iconicity is
584 difficult in a modality, iconicity needs to emerge over a period of negotiation to gain
585 transparent, mutually intelligible signals. It is only when a signal is grounded for more
586 than one person that it can then be separated in form from its meaning and become more
587 arbitrary. Further, the pressure for discrimination with more restrictive signal spaces may
588 also act against the conventionalisation process causing signals to become more

589 complex. It is not possible with the current work to say which of the above best accounts
590 for our results, but we believe this work is a good first step to demonstrate how modality
591 might affect the process of conventionalisation.

592 In this article we have compared our results to those of Garrod et al. (2007).
593 However, the current study differed in more ways than only the modality. The expanding
594 meaning space was a confound in our experiment as well as only having visual meanings
595 that will be easier to communicate using a visual modality. An important next step, then,
596 should be to have an experiment with a direct comparison between two conditions where
597 modalities differ only in their flexibility and iconicity.

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


Figure 1. Two meanings with different shapes, colours and textures.




Figure 2. The shapes used as meanings in the experiment in the 3 phases in the individual condition, with the meaning space increasing by 5 with each phase.




Figure 3. The standard deviation of coordinates within signals, indicating the amount of movement in signals, produced in both conditions, at the beginning, middle and end of the experiment. Here, "last phase" means phase 3 in the individual condition, or the last phase which participants got to in the communication game.




Figure 4. The durations of signals produced in both conditions, at the beginning, middle and end of the experiment. Here, "last phase" means phase 3 in the individual condition, or the last phase which participants got to in the communication game.




Figure 5. The predictability of signals produced in both conditions, at the beginning, middle and end of the experiment. Here, "last phase" means phase 3 in the individual condition, or the last phase which participants got to in the communication game. Higher numbers here refer to lower predictability (or high complexity).




Figure 6. Scores of participants within the experiment, at the beginning, middle and end of the experiment. They are not cumulative, but a sample of responses from phases at the different periods. Again, here, "last phase" means phase 3 in the individual condition, or the last phase which participants got to in the communication game.




Figure 7. The success of participants throughout the experiment in the communication condition. The scores are not cumulative, but the percent of correct responses within each phase of the experiment, defined by the period before each meaning space expansion. Each pair is one line, and the length of the line illustrates how far that pair got within the 50 minute time limit.




Figure 8. The percentage of signals correctly matched with their meanings by naïve listeners. Both signals produced at the beginning and at the end of the experiment were tested. Here, "last phase" means phase 3 in the individual condition, or the last phase which participants got to in the communication game.




Figure 9. The percentage of correct responses from naïve listeners matching signals with their intended meanings. The graph shows data from the last phase of the individual condition with 90% error bars. The line represents what we would expect if matchers were behaving at chance level.