5 we find a discussion of the 'given/new' distinction, and of Halliday's theory of information structure. Reference is central in chapter 6, including questions of anaphora. Finally, in chapter 7 there is a discussion of questions of textual coherence. This chapter teaches the student about 'frames', 'scripts', 'scenarios' and 'mental models'. These discussions are always clear and of a fundamental nature.

The book makes for absorbing reading. It is very well-written, inspiring and clear. It is indispensable literature for anyone working in the field of discourse analysis. The presentation of the book is up to the usual standards of Cambridge University Press.

John Dinsmore, *The Inheritance of Presupposition.* Pragmatics & Beyond, II:1. John Benjamins, Amsterdam, 1981. Pp. vi+97. Price: *f* 38,- ($ 14,00), paperback.

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The title of this booklet is to be understood as saying that it is about the well-known *projection problem of presupposition.* This is the problem posed by the fact that presuppositions associated with embedded clauses are sometimes preserved as entailed presuppositions of the whole complex sentence, sometimes weakened to the status of 'suggestion', and are sometimes 'filtered out' entirely. Thus, the clause:

(1)   : Harold's rabbit has won a prize.

is generally taken to presuppose (and entail): ﹅

(2)   Harold has a rabbit.

When (1) is embedded in (3), this entailed presupposition is preserved. In (4), however, it is weakened to a suggestion, and in (5) it is entirely lost:

(3)   Ben realizes that Harold's rabbit has won a prize.
(4)   Ben thinks that Harold's rabbit has won a prize.
(5)   If Harold has a rabbit, it has won a prize.

Dinsmore intends to solve this problem by proposing a system of 'worlds' whose relations depend on the linguistic material by which they are referred to (or introduced, - Dinsmore remains unclear on this point). Presuppositions are then said to hold in the worlds their carrier clauses refer to (or introduce), and may sometimes be inherited by other, related worlds. Dinsmore is convinced that his theory is "highly plausible" (p. 40; 90), indeed "the best account available" (p. 91).
Although one can sympathize with many of the intuitions that

are behind this work, it must be said that the theory proposed does little to solve the projection problem. Dinsmore classifies his work mainly under what he calls "procedural accounts" of presupposition, and in writing this little book be demonstrates the truth of what he says (p. 6) about such accounts: "The weakness of existing procedural accounts lies not in their conception, but in their resistance to explicit formalization, and in their reliance on undefined concepts."

First, the central concept of 'world' is left fatally obscure, and perhaps fatally incorrect. On p. 12-3 we read: "The concept of world in this sense should not be confused with that of *possible world* as used in model-theoretic semantics." Also: "A particular world of belief is one in which exactly those propositions are true which a particular person believes to be true." Furthermore, "worlds are objects which have a specifically cognitive function, and ... play a crucially important role in discourse." Intuitively, this notion in no doubt useful, perhaps even powerful. But then Dinsmore proceeds (p. 17 ff.) to speak of "truth in a world", as though his worlds are possible worlds after all. It is, generally, left unclear whether Dinsmore's 'worlds' are constructively built up as a result of proceeding discourse, or whether they are objects with respect to which truth-values can be established and references can be made, whereby the assignment of such truth-values and the making of such references are essential elements in the semantic calculus. Furthermore, Dinsmore stipulates (p. 18) that "the set of propositions true in a given world is closed under entailment", thereby ruling out the possibility of contradictory belief worlds. This is rather sad, given the massive literature on precisely this issue. Surprisingly, Dinsmore feels (p. 18) that he

> "should warn that this is already an oversimplification. The most typical worlds are individual belief worlds. Since people don't always know the consequences of their beliefs, (W1) [i.e., the preservation of logical entailments in 'worlds'] is not strictly true of a belief world. However, the positing of belief in cognition is functionally motivated by the fact that (W1) generally applies to belief worlds. In the following, I will assume that (W1) is valid for belief worlds, because this assumption allows for a simpler model."

It then turns out that the preservation of entailments in 'worlds' is meant to play a central and indispensable role in the (otherwise badly defective) formalism proposed further down. By Dinsmore's own admission, therefore, his whole theory is thus based on a fiction. Note that this fiction is highly damaging, since, apart from the ever-present belief worlds, there are also worlds of hope, worlds of memory, worlds of fancy. And these are most certainly not "functionally motivated by the fact the (W1) generally applies" to them. There is nothing strange, for example, in having irreconcilable hopes.

It would be pointless to dwell on every weakness in this book. It must be said, however, that Dinsmore has nothing of interest to say on the phenomenon of presupposition itself: he simply accepts

whatever has been written on presupposition as correct. Then, as Dinsmore acknowledges (p. 70) that his formal apparatus lacks the means for handling weakened presuppositions ('suggestions'), as well as other well-known problematic cases (such as cases of presuppositions embedded under modalities), he turns to a Gricean theory of conversational implicatures for a way out. On p. 90 it is quietly admitted that "not all of the predictions of this last section are rigorously demonstrable". If we add the numerous formal and logical mistakes or unclarities, the total lack of original good observations, and the boastful tone with which the product is presented, the reader will see why it is difficult not to be uncharitable about this book.

The book is produced in offset with a printed paper cover. It is disfigured by many typing errors (some of which are serious), and is generally poorly produced.